REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.
ROBERT P. NARCEDA

FACTS:
Robert Narceda was married to Marina on July 22, 1987. Sometime
in 1994, Marina went to Singapore and never returned since then. Robert
tried to look for her but could not find her since there was never
communication between them. A town mate of them went home from
Singapore told Robert that the former saw his wife living with a Singaporean
husband.
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry, he filed a petition to
the RTC for a judicial declaration of presumptive death and/or absence of
Marina.
RTC Ruling:
It granted the petition and declared the PRESUMPTIVE DEATH OF
MARINA.
Petitioner Appealed to CA
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed
the decision of the RTC to the CA via Rule 42 alleging that the respondent
failed to conduct a search of his missing wife with the diligence required by
law and enough to give rise to a well- founded belief that she was dead.
CA Ruling:
The CA dismissed the appeal. It ruled that the declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding. Thus, it is governed by the
Family Code which provides that the judgment of the trial court in a summary
proceeding shall immediately be final and executory.
Petitioner went to the SC
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied. Thus, appealed
to the SC via Rule 45 alleging that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismi
i
ssing the petition on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction
2. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee
spouse is dead.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction on summary proceedings and if it
has, WON its decision is final and executory
SC Ruling:
The SC agrees with the CA. It further provides that,
by express provision of the law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Art. 41 of the FC. It goes without saying that, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in
the CA in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure,
even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the CA in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision
of the CA, the losing party may file a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the ROC with the SC. This is because the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction is merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed
itself of a wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing a
petition for certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that
period, the decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned.
Consequently, petitioners contention that respondent has failed to
established a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse is dead may no
longer be entertained by the Court.
Petition Denied. The Decision of the CA dismissing the appeal of the
petitioner and its resolution was affirmed. The decision of the RTC declaring
the presumptive death of Marina Narceda is hereby declared FINAL and
EXECUTORY.


SPOUSES AUGUSTO DACUDAO AND OFEJA DACUDAO
VS.
SEC. OF JUSTICE, RAUL M. GONZALES
(digested case of Tidong)
FACTS:
The Spouses Dacudao, petitioner herein, were among the investors
whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of
Companies allegedly defrauded through the legacy Groupss buy back
agreement that earned them checked payments that were dishonoured.
After the written demands for the return of their investments went
unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against
Delos Angeles, Jr. et. al. in the office of the City prosecutor of Davao.
On March 18, 2009, the Sec of Justice issued DOJ Order no. 182,
directing all Regional State prosecutors, and City prosecutors to forward all
cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr. et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Pursuant thereto, the
complaints of the petitioners were forwarded to the secretariat of the DOJ
Special Panel.
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioner directly come to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
ascribing respondent Sec of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Dept Order. They claim that the said order violated their right to due process,
right to equal protection clause and right to speedy disposition of cases. They
insist that the Dept Orded was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the
rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect. Thus the court held-

ISSUE: WON, the petitioners properly brought their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus directly to the SC.



HELD:
No. The petitioners violated the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts.
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy of hierarchy of
courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court
from having to deal with causes that are also within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to
it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious
and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
The Supreme court is the court of last resort, and must remain if it is
to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental
character and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened
with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so- called extraordinary writs should be exercised
only where absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons
exists therefore.
Hence, the jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
action or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or
other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reasons or other not
controllable by the CA.
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the CA or the RTC, it is either of these courts that the specific
action for the writs procurement must be presented. This and should
continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must
strictly observe.
Petitioners have unduly disregarded the Doctrine of hierarchy of
Courts by coming directly to the SC with their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special, important or
compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
DISMISSED.
MARK ANTHONY ESTEBAN (in substitution of the late Gabriel Esteban)
VS.
SPOUSES RODRIGO MARCELO AND CARMEN MARCELO

FACTS:
The late Gabriel Esteban had been in possession of a piece of land
since 1950s. In 1960s, the late Estebans sister constructed a foundry shop
at the property. However, the shops operations had proven unproductive, it
was leased thus leased to the respondents herein (spouses) for a monthly
rental of P50.00. Since March 2001 however, the respondent failed to pay
their rents. On October 2005, Gabriel Esteban, through a lawyer, sent the
respondents a demand letter to settle their arrears and to vacate the
premises within 5 days from receipt thereof. Due to failure to comply with the
demand, Gabriel Esteban filed before the MeTC an unlawful detainer case
against the respondents.

MeTC and RTC Rulings:
The MeTc ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment. The
respondents failure to pay upon demand and failed to vacate constitute
unlawful possession of the property. The RTC likewise ruled the same.
Respondent appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling:
The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
It ruled that the case is an accion publiciana and not an accion interdictal
since the time of dispossession in 2001 until the time of filing of the case on
2005 is more than one year. Thus the MeTC has no jurisdiction and thus
rendered its decision null and void.


Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari to SC to assail the
rulings of the CA.
The petitioner argues that this case is an accion interdictal
cognizable by the MeTC and was filed on Dec. 6, 2005, within one year
prescriptive period, which is counted from the last demand to vacate and to
pay which is on October 31, 2005
ISSUE: WON this case is under the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
SC Ruling:
Yes. The one-year prescriptive period is counted from the last
demand to pay and vacate.
( The case of accion interdictal is cognizable by the lower court (MeTC) in its
exclusive original jurisdiction)
In cases where there are more than one demand to pay and vacate,
the reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last
demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the
defaulting lessee remains in the premises.
The petition for review on certiorari was granted. CAs ruling is
reversed and set aside. The RTCs decision is reinstated.










SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA JR. AND MA. ROSARIO M.
SABITSANA
VS.
JUANITO MUERTEGUI, represented by his Atty.-in-fact Domingo A.
Muertegui, Jr.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1981, Albert Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of
Sale in favour of Juanito Muertegui over a parcel of unregistered land.
Juanitos Father Domingo Sr. and brother Domingo, Jr. took actual
possession of the land and planted some trees thereon and also paid the real
property taxes from the year 1980 up to 1998.
On October 1991, Garcia sold the same parcel of land to petitioner
herein, known to be the Muerteguis Family Lawyer, through a notarized
Deed of Sale. The subject land was registered in the name of petitioner and
the TCT was transferred in the latter.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration of
the subject lot however petitioner herein filed an opposition to the DENR
PENRO office claiming that they are the true owner of the same.
Thus, Juanito through his lawyer in fact filed a civil case for Quieting of title
and preliminary injunction against petitioners claiming that the latter was in
bad faith and their possession constitutes cloud on their title.
To counter this argument, the petitioner asserted that the sale to Juanito was
null and void since it lacked the marital consent of Garcias wife. They
likewise insisted that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case since it
involves title to or possession of the land the assessed value of which is only
P1230,00 cognizable by the MTC.
RTC Ruling:
The Court finds in favour of the plaintiff (respondent herein) and against the
defendant (petitioner). It ruled that the petitioners were buyer in bad faith.


CA Ruling:
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the appeal of the
petitioner.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: WON, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for Quieting of Title.
It is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be
instituted in the RTC, regardless of the assessed value of the property
in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the ROC, an action to quiet title to real
property or remove clouds there from may be brought in the
appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted
by the petitioners August 4, 1998 letter-opposition to respondents
application for registration. Thus in order to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon his application for a title, respondent filed a civil case to obtain a
declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief,
which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of
the ROC.







EDITH PADLAN
VS.
ELENITA DINGLASAN AND FELICISIMO DINGLASAN
FACT:
Elenita Dinglasan was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by a TCT. Without her knowledge and consent her property was
subdivided into several lots by one Maura Passion who acquired the TCT of
Elenita Dinglasan from the latters mother. Later, Maura succeed in selling the
lots to several buyers through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged
signature of the herein respondents. She sold the lot No. 625-K to Lorna
who subsequently sold the same lot to the herein petitioner Edith Padlan for
a sum of P4,000.00.
After learning of what happened, the respondents demanded
petitioner to surrender possession of the lot but the latter refused to do so.
Thus, the respondents filed before the RTC for the cancellation of the TCT.
Summon was served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.
Respondents move to declare the petitioner in default and they be
allowed to present evidence ex parte. However the petitioner filed an
opposition to declare defendant in default with Motion to Dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction on the person of Defendant. Since the summon was not validly
served upon her person but only through substituted service through her
mother. Thus, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her. This was further
testified by his brother, that she was in japan when the service of summon
was issued.
RTC Ruling:
The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. But later rendered a decision
finding petitioner to be a buyer in good faith and dismiss the complaint.

Respondent sought recourse to the CA


CA Ruling:
The CA rendered decision in favour of the respondents and reversed
and set aside the decision of the RTC.
The CA find the petitioner buyer in bad faith .

Aggrieved Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration but it was
likewise denied.
The petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case, considering that from the complaint it can be
inferred that the value of the property was P4,000.00 which was the amount
alleged by respondents which was sold to Lorna.
The respondent on the other hand argue d that CA is correct in ruling in their
favor.
Hence this petition,

ISSUE: WON, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

SC Ruling:
BP blg. 129 as amended provides that actions involving title to or possession
of real property which assessed value does not exceeds P20,000 and does
not exceeds P50,000 in Metro Manila is cognizable by the lower or first level
courts. If it exceeds the above amount it is cognizable by the RTC.
The SC ruled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law and determined by the allegation in the complaint which comprise of a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of
action.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must
allege the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
In the case at bar, the only basis of the valuation of the subject property is
the value alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold by Lorna to petitioner
in the amount of P4,000.00. In view of the alleged value and pursuant to the
Rule of BP 129 regarding the action on title to or possession of the lot in
question, the jurisdiction over the subject matters falls on to the lower or
inferior court. Thus, The RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.








































G.R. No. 193000 | October 16, 2013
SPOUSES FELIPE AND EVELYN SARMIENTO AND SPOUSES GREG
AND FELIZA AMARILLO, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES RODOLFO AND
CARMELITA MAGSINO, Respondents
(digested case of Pio)

FACTS:
Spouses Rodolfo and Carmelita Magsino, respondents herein, initially filed a
Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against spouses Leopoldo
and Elvira Calderon before the RTC Branch 93 of San Pedro Laguna,
praying for the delivery of the owners duplicate of title and the execution of a
Deed of Absolute Sale over two parcels of land. In the alternative, the
Magsinos prayed that the Calderons be ordered to reimburse the amount of
P383, 013.70 plus 12% interest per annum and the costs of suit should
reliefs primarily prayed for become legally impossible.
Since the Calderons have already sold the subject properties to third
persons, the petitioners herein, the court granted on December 17, 2002 the
alternative relief prayed for. The Magsinos then moved for the execution of
the courts order. The subject properties, which were still registered in the
names of the spouses Calderon even if they were already sold to and in
possession of the Sarmientos and the Amarillos, were then levied after the
issuance of the writ of execution. On August 27, 2004, the properties were
sold to the Magsinos at a public auction.
A Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued to the Magsinos on October
24, 2005, subsequently confirmed by the order of RTC Branch 93 dated April
23, 2007. On June 5, 2007, RTC Branch 93 declared null and void the
owners duplicate copy held by the petitioners.
On July 3, 2008, the Magsinos petition for writ of possession was granted.
Upon the issuance of the corresponding writ on July 28, a Notice to Vacate
was served upon the petitioners. The Sarmientos and the Amarillos, who
were evicted afterward, moved for the nullification of the notice.
Before RTC Branch 93s resolution of their motion, the petitioners filed a
separate Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership of the
Subject Properties (with application for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction) before RTC Branch 31. The respondents moved to
dismiss but RTC Branch 31, granting and issuing instead the writ of
preliminary injunction applied for by the petitioners, denied them on
September 22, 2008.
In justifying its decision, it said that while there is the general rule that no
court has the authority to interfere with the judgment or decrees of another
court of equal or concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, it is not so when a third
party claimant is involved. RTC Branch 31 was convinced that there is a
prima facie evidence of the existence of a right in [petitioners] favor and that
said right had been violated.
Moreover, the court said that the restoration, of possession over the
properties to the petitioners, is not equivalent to the disposition of the main
case but a mere provisional remedy.
After RTC Branch 31 denied their motion for reconsideration on Dec 8, 2008,
the respondents brought the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.
On March 17, 2010, the CA ruled in favor of the Magsinos and set aside the
orders issued by RTC Branch 31, emphasizing on the rule against the
interference of courts by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by
injunction.
Through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioners
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court after the CA denied their motion
for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

The foregoing boil down to the issue of whether or not RTC Branch 31
interfered with the judgment and order of RTC Branch 93, a co-equal court,
when it issued its Orders dated 22 September 2008 and 8 December 2008
granting and issuing a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent
spouses from occupying the subject properties and ordering them to vacate
the same, which in effect enjoined the enforcement of the writs of execution
and possession issued by RTC Branch 93.


HELD:
The petition has become moot and academic. Thus, the (Supreme) Court
will refrain from expressing its opinion in a case where no practical relief may
he granted in view of a supervening event.
Pending resolution on the petition, RTC Branch 31 decided in favor of the
petitioners complaint, making permanent the injunction against respondent
spouses. The decision, dated January 3, 2013, ordered respondent spouses
to pay petitioners P50, 000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit.
As the main case has already been decided by the merits and in favor of the
petitioners, the resolution of the issue would be of no practical use or value.





































NIPPON EXPRESS CORPORATION
VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FACTS:
Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and registered with the
SEC and a VAT-registered entity. For the year 2001, it regularly filed its
amended quarterly VAT returns.
On April 24, 2003, it filed an administrative claim for refund of P20,
345, 824.29 representing excess input tax attributable to its effectively zero-
rated sales in 2001.
Pending review of the BIR, petitioner filed a petition for review with
the CTA, requesting for the issuance of a TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in the
amount of P20, 345, 824.29.
CTA FIRST DIVISION RULING:
It denied the petition for insufficiency of evidence.
March 24, 2009:
However, upon motion for reconsideration of the petitioner, it reversed its
decision and ordered the respondent to issue a tax credit certificate in favour
of the petitioner in the amount of P10, 928, 607.31.
With regard to the timeliness of the filing of petitioners administrative
and judicial claim for refund was made within the two-year prescriptive
period, petitioners immediate resort to the court was a premature invocation
of the courts jurisdiction due to non-observance of the procedure in Sec 112
(D) of the NIRC which provides that:
an appeal may be made with the CTA within 30 days from receipt of
the decision of the CIR denying the claim or after the expiration of the 120
day period without action on the part of the CIR.
The CTA First Division however noted that the CIR did not make any
objection regarding such matter when he filed his answer thus he is deemed
to have waived his objection thereto.
The CIR sought reconsideration but likewise denied.
The CIR elevated the case to the CTA en banc
CTA EN BANC RULING:
First Ruling
It reversed and set aside the amended decision of the CTA First
Division of March 24, 2009 and its resolution. Petitioners claim for refund
was denied.
Second Ruling
Petitioners Motion for reconsideration made CTA en banc later
changed its position setting aside its own decision in the First Ruling and
affirmed the March 24, 2009 amended decision of the CTA First Division.
The CIR filed a Motion for reconsideration
It pointed out that the CTA had no jurisdiction over the petition for
review because it was filed before the lapse of 120-day period accorder to
CIR to decide its administrative claim for input VAT refund.
CTA EN BANC:
Again, it set aside the march 24, 2009 amended decision of the CTA
First Division and dismissed the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.
It ruled that 120-day period under Section 112(D) of the NIRC which
granted the CIR the opportunity to act on claim for refund, was jurisdictional
in nature such that petitioners failure to observe before resorting to judicial
action warranted the dismissal of its petition for review for having been
prematurely filed.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CTA has jurisdiction to entertain the instant case

HELD:
No. CTA has no jurisdiction to this case.
Petitioner argues that the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a
jurisdictional defect as to prevent the tax court from taking cognizance of the
case. It merely renders the filing of the case premature and makes it
susceptible to dismissal for lack of cause of action if invoked.
PETITIONER is mistaken.
The provision of National Internal Revenue Code specifically Section 112(D)
reveals that the tax payer may appeal the denial or the inaction of the CIR
only within 30 days from receipt of the decision denying the claim or the
expiration of the 120-day period given to CIR to decide the claim.
Moreover, the 120 + 30 day period is indeed mandatory and jurisdictional as
recently ruled in CIR vs. San Roque power Corp. Thus, failure to observe the
said period before fling a judicial claim to the CTA would not only make such
petition premature, but would also result in the non-acquisition by the CTA of
jurisdiction to hear the said case.
Petition is denied.


































SIXTO N. CHU
VS.
MACH ASIA TRADING CORPORATION

FACTS:
Respondent herein is a corporation engaged in the business of
importing dump trucks and heavy equipments. Petitioner CHU purchased
from respondents a hitachi excavator worth P900,000.00 with initial payment
of P180,000 and the balance will be paid on 12 month instalment. Thereafter,
CHU again purchased another Two heavy equipments on instalment in the
sum of P1M. Petitioner made a downpayment of P200,000 through the Land
Bank posdated checks.
However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonoured. Thus,
respondent informed petitioner and invited the latter to replace the checks.
Without response from the petitioner, respondent sent a formal demand letter
urging the latter to settle his account within 5 days from receipt of the letter.
Petitioner replied that his business was badly hit by economic crisis and that
he shall pay by giving partial payment. If failed to pay, petitioner shall
voluntarily return the subject units.
Respondent filed to the RTC
Respondent filed to the RTC for sum of money, writ of replevin, atty.s fees
and damages.
RTC issued an order allowing the issuance of the writ of replevin. The Sheriff
went to petitioners address to serve the summon and together with the writ
and bond. However, the Sheriff failed to serve the summon personally to the
petitioner since the latter was not there. Instead, the Sheriff resorted to
substituted service by having the summon and complaint received by
Rolando Bonayon, a security guard of the Petitioner.
Petitioner failed to file an answer which made the RTC declared him in
default by motion of the respondent and order the latter to present evidence
ex parte. After such, RTC rendered decision against petitioner.

Petitioner sought recourse to CA arguing that:
1. RTC erred in concluding that the service of summon was valid
2. there was error on the part of the RTC when it declared him in default, in
proceeding with the case, and rendered judgment against him
CA:
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA ruled that the
requirement of due process was duly complied with when the service of
summon was received by the security guard. The CA further said that the
process servers neglect or inadvertence in the service of the summons
should not unduly prejudice the respondents right to speedy justice.
Petitioner move for Reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition:
ISSUE: WON RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner
by substituted service of summon through the security guard.

HELD:
No. The Rule provides that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is acquired either through the service of summon or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.
As a rule, service of summon should be personally served to the defendant.
It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable
period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. Section 7, Rule 14
of the ROC provides that:
Section 7. Substituted service.- If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
maybe effected by (a) leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

After service of summon, a report should indicate that the person who
received the summon in defendants behalf was one with whom the
defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually
receive the summon. It must be shown also that efforts have been made to
find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed.
In the case at bar, clearly it was not shown that the security guard who
received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the
summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service
on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with
the requirements of substituted service.
The service of summon is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due
process. As a rule, if defendant have not been validly summoned, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment
rendered against them is null and void.
Since the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitionerthe
judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon him for
being null and void.
PETITION GRANTED. The decision and resolution of CA is reversed and set
aside. The decision of RTC is declared NULL and VOID and ordered to
validly serve summon upon the petitioner and thereafter, proceed with the
trial of the main action with dispatch.
































DARMA MASLAG
VS.
ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND REGISTRY OF DEEDS
OF BENGUET

FACTS:
In 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property
with declaration of nullity of OCT against the respondents. The Complaint
was filed before the MTC. After trial, MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of
fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property. It ordered her to
reconvey the property and pay damages and costs of suit.
Respondent appealed to the RTC. The RTC declared that the MTC
has no jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. It further held that it will
take cognizance of the case pursuant to sec 8 of Rule 40 of the ROC which
provides:
Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the
case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in
accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of
amended pleadings and additional evidence before the new Judge, Edgardo
Diaz De Rivera, Jr..
On May 24, 2004, Judge Rivera issued a resolution reversing the
MTCs decision. The fallo reads as follows:
Wherefore, the Judgment appealed from the MTC is set aside. The
Petitioner is ordered to turn over the possession of the property to Monzon.
This remedies afforded by law to a builder in good faith for the improvements
she constructed thereon. No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
So Ordered.
Petitioner filed a NOTICE OF APPEAL from the RTCs May 24,2004
Resolution praying that the MTC decision be adopted.
Respondent moved to Dismiss petitioners ordinary appeal for being the
improper remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 42 because the RTC rendered the
decision in its appellate jurisdiction.
CA Ruling:
CA dismissed petitioners appeal. It agrees with the respondent that
petition for review on certiorari is the proper remedy.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON,the CA is correct in dismissing the appeal for being an
improper remedy.
HELD:
Yes. CA is correct.
In the case at bar, the subject matter involves action to title to a parcel of
land which has an assessed value of P12,400 thus cognizable by the MTC.
The RTC erred in saying that the MTC has no jurisdiction since BP 129
provides otherwise. Since the MTC acquired jurisdiction, the RTC decided
the case on its appellate jurisdiction when the MTCs decision was appealed
therefrom. Moreover it was further proved by the judgment of Judge Rivera
saying that judgment appealed from the MTCs decision.
Since the RTC exercised in its appellate jurisdiction, the proper
mode of appeal is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 42 and not
Rule 41 which is an ordinary appeal.
Petition for review was denied for lack of merit.