The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Scientific Rationality, Formal or Informal?

Author(s): Jiang Tianji
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 409-
423
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Brit.
J.
Phil. Sci.
36 (1985), 409-423
Printed in Great Britain
409
Scientific
Rationality,
Formal
or Informal?*
by JIANG TIANJI
x Introduction
2
Standard
Conception of Scientific Rationality
3
Vindication
of
Kuhn's
Conception of Informal Rationality
4
Other Models
of Informal Rationality
5
Conclusion
I INTRODUCTION
About scientific
rationality,
which is the central
problem,
if not be identified
with the whole
field,
of the
philosophy
of
science,
there are now two extreme
positions,
with
quite
a few intermediate ones in between. The standard
conception
of scientific
rationality,
as
represented by logical positivism,
critical rationalism and related
views,
claims that scientific
rationality
does
not
change
over
time,
and it is
implicit
in all
genuine
science
through
different
periods
of its
development.
It is thus the aim of inductive
logicians
and normative
methodologists
to make
explicit
as
fully
as
possible
that
permanent rationality
of science. On the other
hand,
the revolutionaries of
the
sixties,
as
represented by Polanyi, Kuhn, Feyerabend
et
al.,
claim that
standards of
rationality change
with the
change
of scientific
beliefs,
and
there is no
superstandard
or
supermethod
that stands above scientific
change
and is immune to
revision,
that ensures
continuity
within science
and demarcates
genuine
science from non-science and
pseudo-science.
Their heretical
conceptions
have been
stigmatised
as irrationalistic
by
the
most orthodox of the other
camp.
In one
respect
the formal
rationality
of the
standard
conception
is in
striking
contrast to the informal
rationality
of
the heretical
conception;
in another
respect
the
methodological
monism of
the former contrasts
sharply
with the
methodological pluralism
of the latter.
In this
paper
I shall focus
my
discussion on the first
topic,
while
lightly
touching upon
the second one. Section 2 will be devoted to a characteris-
Received
2
December
1983
*
This
paper
was first delivered as a lecture for the Course
Philosophy
of Science at the Inter-
University
Centre of
Postgraduate Studies, Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia,
and
again
read at the
Institute of
Philosophy,
the
University
of
Beograd, April 1983. I
would like to thank all those
who made
helpful
comments on both occasions. I am
especially
indebted to Bill Newton-
Smith for
help
and
encouragement.
I am also
grateful
to a referce for
helpful
comments and
suggestions.
410
Jiang
Tianji
ation of the standard
conception
of scientific
rationality.
Kuhn's heretical
conception
will be vindicated
against charges
of irrationalism in section
3,
and other models of informal
rationality
will be
briefly
discussed in
section
4.
2 STANDARD CONCEPTION OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
Logical positivists
and
Popperians
have believed that science
proceeds by
following
a distinctive
method,
the scientific
method,
and
rationality
is
nothing
other than
acting
in
conformity
with the norms of this method.
They
have
aspired
after an
explicit
formalisation of
rationality.
In their
opinion, rationality
is identified with commitment to this formalisable
method.
From Mill to
Carnap
and
Hempel,
influential
philosophers
of science
have continued to believe that some
thing
like a formal method
('inductive
logic')
underlies
empirical
science and that continued work
might
result in
an
explicit
statement of this
method,
a formalisation of inductive
logic
comparable
to the formalisation of deductive
logic
which was achieved
by
Frege
and others. If such a method were
discovered,
then scientific
rationality
would be identified with the
possession
and
employment
of this
method. This influential view was voiced
by
I.
Scheffler as follows:
Underlying
historical
changes
of
theory,
there is ... a
constancy
of
logic
and
method,
which unifies each scientific
age
with that which
preceded
it and with that which is
yet
to follow. Such
constancy comprises
not
merely
the canons of formal
deduction,
but also those criteria
by
which
hypotheses
are confronted with the test of
experience
and
subjected
to
comparative
evaluation
(Scheffler [19671, PP. 9-1o).
Proponents
of this view admit that 'we do not . .. have
explicit
and
general
formulations of such criteria at the
present time',
but
they
insist that criteria
'are embodied
clearly enough
in scientific
practice
to enable communication
and
agreement
in a wide
variety
of
specific
cases
(and such)
communication
and consensus indicate that there is a codifiable
methodology underlying
the
scientific
enterprise' (ibid.).
It was assumed that there are universal
principles
of
theory-acceptance
implicit
in scientific
practice
at least since the time modern science
began;
in
other
words,
there is a
rationality implicit
in the work of natural scientists
since about the time of
Newton,
this
explains why
this work is so successful.
It is
possible
that these criteria of
rationality
are not well-understood at a
given
time and
incorrectly applied
on occasion. But it was further assumed
that
by i800
or
1850,
this
rationality
was
fully operative
in the work of
major
natural
scientists,
so that we could
speak
of 'the' scientific method.
Thus for
logical positivists,
it was assumed that scientific
rationality
takes
the form of a
logic.
It
is, therefore,
formal. It is
given
once and for
all;
it
never
develops
or
changes.
This was not to
say
that all scientists
employ
it
Scientific Rationality,
Formal or
Informal? 41I
equally
well. But the
assumption
was that there is a norm of rational
procedure
which all scientists should endeavour to
comply
with and all
philosophers
should endeavour to disclose.
Logical positivists
have at-
tempted
at an
explicit general
formulation of the
principles
of rational
acceptance.
Take
Hempel's logic
of
confirmation,
for instance. In his
'Studies in the
Logic
of
Confirmation', Hempel
is
engaged
in a search for
'general objective
criteria
determining
whether . .. a
hypothesis
H
may
be
said to be corroborated
by
a
given body
of evidence E'
(Hempel [19651, p. 6).
His aim in the
essay
is to
provide
definitions of the
concepts
of confirmation
and disconfirmation which characterise those relations in a
purely
formal
way:
the criteria of confirmation 'should contain no reference to the
specific
subject
matter of the
hypothesis' (ibid. p. Io).
For
Hempel,
one
ought
to be
able to tell
simply by looking
at the
logical
forms of a
hypothesis-sentence
and an evidence-sentence whether the confirmation relation holds between
them, just
as one can tell
simply by inspecting
the
logical
forms of
premise-
sentences and the conclusion-sentence whether the
implication
relation
holds between them. The
search, then,
is for formal
syntactic
criteria of
confirmation
analogous
to the formal criteria for the
validity
of deductive
arguments.
What would count as evidence for an
hypothesis
is determined
by
the form of
hypothesis-sentences
and
evidence-sentences,
not
by
their
content.
The situation seems from an
epistemological point
of view ideal: the
justification
of
hypotheses
becomes a
very straightforward
matter.
But, alas,
reality
has a
way
of
eluding
the
ideal,
for actual evidential relations in science
are not
captured by
such
analysis
of confirmation. The
analysis Hempel
provides
is of a
formal, syntactic
relation between sentences. This relation
holds
only
between sentences
containing
the same
predicates.
But most
interesting
scientific theories are not
evidentially supported by
statements
containing
the same terms as occur in the
theory,
but
by
statements
containing quite
different kinds of terms. Therefore the
Hempelian
approach
is
applicable only
to a restricted set of evidential
relations,
the
relation between observation statements and theories which are
merely
generalisations
of observation
reports.
Generally speaking,
the
logical positivist
account of
theory-acceptance
is
oversimplified.
In his inductive
logic Carnap
treats all
logical consequences
as
having
the same evidential
relationships
to the
hypothesis they support:
no distinction is drawn between those known in advance and the 'novel'
ones. It would be
very
difficult for him to
incorporate
such a distinction into
his
scheme,
because there is no
way
to know
by
a
simple inspection
of an
observation statement whether it would count as 'novel' or not.
Only
the
history
of the
theory
in
question
can tell one that. But the
positivists
have
adopted
a
very
abstract model of
rationality
in which
only
the formal
structure of a
theory
and the
empirical
evidences drawn from it are relevant
to
theory
evaluation.
They paid
no attention to the
prior
historical
development
of a
theory
and the different
degrees
of
support
conferred
by
412 Jiang Tianji
different sorts of evidence
upon
it.
According
to their intuitive
principles
based on an a
priori
notion of
evidence,
all
accepted consequences
lend the
same
degree
of
support
to the
theory
or the same
degree
of disconfirmation if
they
are refuted. What
they emphasised
is the mere fact that
theory
and
evidences are
deductively
related.
They
can
easily
set
up
a
postulational
system
of
plausible principles
of
evidence,
the trouble is that this does not
apply
to what
actually goes
on in science. It is now
generally agreed that,
in
actual scientific
practice,
what counts most of all in favour of a
theory
is not
just
its success in
prediction
but its
'dynamical
character' or its
'fertility',
its
ability
to meet
anomaly
in a creative and fruitful
way.
This is
something
which manifests itself
only gradually
over the course of
time;
one cannot
attest to it until the
theory
has survived
many
tests and been extended in
illuminatingly
new
ways.
Time
plays
an essential role here. Whether such
actual evidential relations can be formalised or
not,
we have
yet
to see.
Popper
and
Popperians
have
attempted
to formulate a more
complex
model of
rationality
than that of
logical positivists.
But with them
they
shared the
assumption
that there are norms of the scientific
method,
an
unchanging
set of intuitive
principles underlying
validation in science.
According
to
Popper,
a scientist
ought
to act in accordance with the dictates
of the method of falsificationism:
propose
testable
theories;
not
investigate
ad hoc
theories; accept
that
theory
for further theoretical and
practical
purposes,
which is best
corroborated;
select a
simpler hypothesis
because it
is more testable than a less
simple one;
and so on.
Popper
has claimed that his
method will
give
us a better chance to achieve the
goal
of
epistemic progress.
In this model of
rationality,
three criteria are offered for rational
theory-
choice:
first,
the criterion of
prior appraisal; second,
the criterion of
posterior appraisal,
and
third,
the criterion of
appraisal
for theories which
are known to be false.
The notions of
empirical
content and
explanatory power, etc.,
are defined
in
purely logical
terms
by Popper.
In his
explication
of
empirical
content
(or
falsifiability),
one
important problem
concerns the measurement or com-
parison
of contents. There are
objections
that content
comparison
is
impossible
because contents of theories are not subsets of each other. But
Watkins still
attempts
to show that at least the idea of
comparing empirical
content-a
pre-testing concept-can
be rescued.
As to
theory testing, Popper
thinks that
only
a novel fact can
really
support
a
theory.
Thus he introduces the ideas of
background knowledge
and
severity
of a test to account for the distinction between 'evidence' known
in advance and verified
prediction
of a novel
fact,
a distinction which cannot
be made in
Carnap's theory
of confirmation. The
logical
relation of
deducibility
cannot of itself
convey
this
difference;
a
temporal analysis
of
some kind is needed. But success in novel
prediction
is not
fertility. Fertility
is not a matter of
prediction
at all. He concedes the
importance
of time order
in
theory appraisal
but never
quite
comes to
viewing fertility
as a criterion of
appraisal.
Scientific Rationality,
Formal or
Informal? 413
Finally, Popper's
formal
concept
of verisimilitude will allow two false
theories to be
compared
with
respect
to their
truthlikeness,
the
theory
with
more truth-content or less
falsity-content
is to be
preferred.
However this
concept
of verisimilitude has come under criticism from D. Miller and
P.
Tichy,
and it seems that a
precise
definition of verisimilitude couched in a
formalised
language
will never be
possible,
because truth-contents and
false-contents are not
comparable. Therefore,
both the
problem
of
pre-
testing
measurement of content and the
problem
of
post-testing compara-
tive verisimilitude have met with severe technical
difficulties,
and the
concept
of
degree
of corroboration will not be
very
useful if all theories have
been refuted or are bound to be refuted. The model of
Popper's
thus has its
own unsolvable
difficulties,
not to
speak
of its
inapplicability
to
theory-
choice in actual scientific
practice.
Now we come to Lakatos's
improvement
of the
Popperian methodology.
Lakatos took one
step
further in
insisting
that the unit for
appraisal
is not the
theory
taken at a moment of time but the
theory
considered in terms of its
entire historical
career,
what he called a 'research
programme'.
He had two
main criteria for the
appraisal
of scientific research
programmes.
One is
increase in
empirical content,
at least some of which has been
experimentally
confirmed. The other is the idea that a research
programme
is better than a
competitor
if it has more heuristic
power, potential
for
creating
'evidential
support', i.e.,
if it makes
possible
the construction of a
sequence
of theories
with
increasing
'evidential
support'. Roughly,
a research
programme
is
fruitful if it can lead to a series of theories which
produce
novel
knowledge.
It
appears
that heuristic
power
is
scarcely
more than the
capacity
to
generate
increase in successful
prediction.
Urbach has
attempted
to show that the
heuristic
power
of a research
programme
can be
objectively
determined. For
Lakatos,
a research
programme
is better than its rival if it has more
'evidential
support'
and more heuristic
power, i.e., power
to create theories
with 'evidential
support'.
Thus
everything hinges, again, upon
the idea of
'evidential
support'.
But
prediction
failures are not relevant to the
appraisal
of research
programmes.
A
major problem
for Lakatosians is how to rule out ad hoc evidential
support.
Worrall
suggests
that those facts which have been used in the
construction of the
theory
in
question
cannot
'support'
the
theory.
Worrall
maintains that it can be
objectively
determined whether a fact was used in
constructing
a
theory.
If a fact has been used once in a
theory,
then the same
fact can
only
be
explained
ad hoc
by
that
theory-a
fact cannot be used twice.
Lakatos comes near to the criterion of
fertility
with his
emphasis
on the
historical
development
of a
programme,
but not
quite;
it seems what is
sought
in a
'good' development
is mere increase in successful
prediction.
Of
course Lakatos
put emphasis
on the
importance
of heuristics for the
development
of science. But this heuristic is said to set a
'pre-conceived'
plan
for the research
programme.
And heuristic
power
is reduced to
power
to
generate
increase in successful
prediction.
Thus the
principal
criterion
414 Jiang Tianji
for rational
theory-choice
is excess evidential
support,
not different from
what is dictated
by
falsificationism: chose the best corroborated
theory. Just
like
falsificationism,
its formal
approach
to
rationality
cuts itself off from the
particularity
and
peculiarity
of the historical situations where scientific
theory-choices
take
place. Necessarily,
what
appears
to be
development
of a
theory (a scientific
research
programme)
is
really
a
sequence
of classes of
propositions (theories) logically
related to one another as
specified by
method. The
fertility
of a
theory,
on the other
hand,
refers to the
theory's
proven ability
to take
up
new forms which are not deducible from the
previous versions,
but which are
suggested by them, according
to Ernan
McMullin's account
(see
his
[1976], pp. 398-402).
The
important
relation-
ship
then becomes that of
suggestion, holding
between a
previous
and a later
version of the same
theory.
It is a
very significant
fact
that,
as McMullin
points out,
this
suggestion
relation is not a
purely logical one,
but
necessarily
dependent
on the historical record. The
fertility
of a
theory
would then be
conceived in terms of the
developmental
transformations it has
undergone
to solve new
problems,
where later formulations are not inferable from
previous ones,
but
suggestible by
them in the
light
of the
historically
available evidence. We cannot
hope
to state
precise
rules for the relation of
suggestion.
But Lakatos did believe that the
methodology
of scientific
research
programme
can be characterised
by general
rules that would be
binding
and
consciously
or
instinctively
observed
by
scientists.
Lakatos and Lakatosians claimed with the
help
of case studies that the
evaluative criteria which scientists
actually
use are those described
by
the
methodology
of scientific research
programmes.
It was claimed that when
scientists fail to conform to Lakatos'
methodology
it is because of external
pressures.
That is to
say,
when
they
are
acting rationally, they
act in
accordance with the dictates of this
methodology;
when
they
are
acting
irrationally,
then
they
deviate from them. Therefore this
methodology
is an
explicit
formulation of the universal rational method
underlying empirical
science. Lakatosians
expressed
views about the
constancy
of scientific
method
just
like those of
logical positivists
as voiced
by
I.
Scheffler. Elie
Zahar,
for
instance,
has this to
say:
MSRP entails that the
presystematic methodology instinctively
used
by
scientists in
judging
individual achievements did not
change very
much over the
centuries, say
from the time of ancient Greece until the
present day.
MSRP does not of course
presuppose
absolute
stability,
but it nonetheless
implies
that deviations from its
norms have been in the nature of local fluctuations
very
different in
magnitude
from
large
scale scientific revolutions. This
stability thesis, namely
that there have been no
methodological upheavals
on a
par
with scientific
revolutions, may prove
too
strong.
Still the
stability
thesis is to
my
mind a
very interesting working hypothesis
which
ought
to be
investigated.
. . .
Many people
have a
strong feeling
that intuitive
methodology,
like intuitive
logic,
has been
largely
stable
(Zahar [1982]).
He seemed to
imply
that Lakatos'
methodology
is this instinctive meth-
Scientific Rationality,
Formal or
Informal? 415
odology
made
explicit,
that is
why
scientists would
tacitly
subscribe to it if
they
are not under external
pressures.
From what is described
above,
it follows that
Popper
no less than
Carnap,
and Lakatos no less than earlier
Hempel,
would
equate rationality
with
formal
rationality.
Formal
rationality
was
regarded
as actual
rationality
in
science, i.e.,
as
explicit
statement of the
rationality implicit
in scientific
practice.
Their models of
rationality
are based on the
following
assumptions:
I.
There is a unified scientific method or
methodology
which has been
instinctively
used
by
almost all scientists in all
ages
or at least from the
time when real science
began.
This is the doctrine of
unity, universality
and
stability
of method.
2. The instictive
methodology
or
implicit rationality
can be formulated and
formalised,
even if we do not
yet
have such a formulation at the
present
time. This is the theses of
formalisability
of method.
3.
The formal method or formalisable method can be used to achieve our
objectives
in
science,
be it the
discovery
of
truth, epistemic progress,
explanation
and
understanding, prediction
and
technological control,
problem-solving,
and what not. This is the thesis of
rationality
of
method.
4.
The formal or formalisable method also serves as a demarcation criterion
between science and other human
pursuits,
between science and non-
science or
pseudo-science.
It is the
defining
characteristic of science. This
is the thesis of
essentiality
of method. From this it is concluded that the
formal method can serve as the
very
definition of
rationality.
3
VINDICATION OF KUHN'S CONCEPTION OF INFORMAL
RATIONALITY
This standard
conception
of
rationality
is
rejected by
Thomas
Kuhn,
the
leading proponent
of a more
complex
view of scientific
rationality.
Kuhn has
challenged
all the above
assumptions
of the standard
conception. According
to the standard
conception,
the crux of
rationality
is the
acceptance
or
rejection
of beliefs on the basis of evidence. Whether the inductive
support
of
logical positivists,
the corroboration of
Popper
or the evidential
support
of
Lakatos,
all these are more or less formalised accounts of evidential
relations
holding
between the
theory being
tested and observations.
Rationality
of the decisions of scientists consists in the formal
relationships
they
bear to
logic,
on the one
side,
and to
empirical
facts on the other.
Experience
and
logic
can determine
uniquely
the
acceptance
or
rejection
of a
theory.
For
Kuhn,
this is
possible only
in normal science for
determining
the
validity
of an articulation or an
application
of an
existing theory.
Whole
theories or
paradigms
cannot be
judged by
the same sort of criteria that are
employed
when
judging
a
theory's
individual research
applications,
he said:
EE
41
6
Jiang
Tianji
Observation and
experiment
can and must
drastically
restrict the
range
of admissible
scientific
beliefs,
else there would be no science. But
they
cannot alone determine a
particular body
of scientific belief. An
apparently arbitrary element, compounded
of
personal
and historical
accident,
is
always
a formative
ingredient
of the beliefs
espoused by
a
given
scientific
community
in a
given
time
(Kuhn [1972], p. 4).
Because of this
arbitrary element,
the outcome of
theory
choice cannot be
dictated
by logic
and
experiment
alone. Therefore
any
formal account of
evidential relations would not
apply
to actual scientific
practice. Objecting
to the
positivist
and
Popperian
models of
rationality
Kuhn
said,
both of
them assume that 'the
problem
of
theory-choice
can be resolved
by
techniques
which are
semantically
neutral. The observational
consequences
of both theories are first stated in a shared basic
vocabulary (not necessarily
complete
or
permanent).
Some
comparative
measure of their
truth/falsity
count then
provides
the basis for a choice between them. For Sir Karl
Popper
and his
school,
no less than for
Carnap
and
Reichenbach,
canons of
rationality
thus derive
exclusively
from those of
logical
and
linguistic
syntax' (Kuhn [1970], p. 243).
Their
assumption
of the
rationality
and
essentiality
of a formal method for
theory
evaluation is
radically rejected by
Kuhn.
Now come to Kuhn's
positive
views on
theory
choice.
First,
he affirms
that
theory
choice is
definitely rational,
there
being good
reasons of the sort
usually
described for
choosing
between
competitive
theories.
Second,
these
reasons constitute values to be used in
making
choices rather than rules of
choice. There cannot be
any
shared
algorithm by
the use of which all
members of a scientific
group
will reach the same decision. On the
contrary,
accuracy, simplicity, scope, fruitfulness,
and so
on,
constitute a shared
ideology
for the
group.
Scientists who share the same
ideology may
nevertheless make different choices in the same concrete situation.
Group
behaviour will be affected
decisively by
the shared
commitments,
but
individual choice will be a function also of
personality, education,
and
prior
pattern
of
professional
research. Therefore individual scientists will not all
apply
the same values in the same
way.
Even if
they agree
about the
importance
of the various
values,
there would remain the
problem
of
combining
them all into one
precise
overall criterion which would de-
termine which of two
competing
theories to
accept.
But there is no
unanimity
at all as to the relative
weights
that are to be
assigned
to different
values in the overall
comparison
of theories.
Third,
the choice between
competing
theories lies in the hands of the
group
of
specialists.
These
specialists
share the same commitments. Even
though they
don't share
precise
criteria for
theory choice,
and even
though
their
preference
is
determined in
part
also
by idiosyncratic factors,
there does in
fact,
in the
process
of a
controversy
over the relative merits of two
competing theories,
eventually emerge
a consensus
leading
to the
acceptance
of one of the rivals.
Though
there are no
explicit
rules of
acceptance
for
Kuhn,
he neverthe-
less offers what amounts to a
justification
for the
group
behaviour in
theory
Scientific Rationality,
Formal or
Informal? 417
choice. Here Kuhn
argues
that scientists' modes of behaviour as
exemplified
in
theory
choice have certain essential functions: 'In the absence of alternate
mode that would serve similar
functions,
scientists should behave essen-
tially
as
they
do if their concern is to
improve
scientific
knowledge' (Kuhn
[1970], p. 237).
Kuhn
regards
all behaviour essential to scientific
develop-
ment as
rational;
since scientific behaviour in
theory
choice conduces to the
improvement
of scientific
knowledge,
this is also an
argument
in favour of
the claim that scientific
activity
is rational.
Now the crucial
question
is: is
theory
choice as characterised
by
Kuhn
really
rational? There are at least several
objections.
First, many philosophers
insist that an action ordecision in science cannot
be considered rational unless it is based on
logical
or
methodological
rules
which are
objective
in the sense that different scientists
following
the same
rules and
provided
with the same information will arrive at the same
decision. The basic
assumption
is that all
rationality
should be
equated
with
formal
rationality.
Since Kuhn would not have
anything
to do with such
rules,
decision as to which of the
competing theory
is to be chosen cannot be
based on
logic
or
methodology,
but rather based on a value
system
or
ideology,
the
application
of which in a concrete situation will not lead to
unanimous decisions
by
different scientists. Personal factors have to be
taken into
account,
and what
actually
determines a decision is individual
judgement
rather than
general
rules. But
according
to the
objection,
such
personal
factors
dependent
on historical
contingencies
are irrelevant to
rational
theory
choice. Since for
Kuhn,
scientists
actually rely
on sub-
jectivistic
and
psychologistic
criteria for
choosing
between
competing
theories,
such choice is not
rational,
it is irrational. Kuhn is accused of
irrationalism.
This
objection
is untenable. On Kuhn's
view,
both the shared values and
personal
factors are relevant to individual decisions. Because
perception
and
judgement
are involved in
applying
values in a concrete
situation,
each value
can be
judged quite differently,
individual
variability
in decisions is
naturally
to be
expected.
But individual decisions are not
final, they
generally
take risks and
might
be
wrong.
Still
they
are not
irrational,
because
they
are not made
arbitrarily
without reasons. And
they
do not violate
any
accepted
rules because there are no such
binding
rules in scientific
practice.
What is
important
is the unanimous decision
belatedly
reached in a
group.
Neither individual choice nor
group
choice is based on what is called sub-
jectivistic
and
psychologistic criteria, though psychology
is not irrelevant
because
theory
choice is a human
activity,
and occurs not in the 'world
3'
of
Popper,
but in this real world of our scientists.
Second,
from the
standpoint
of the
objectors,
consensus
eventually
emerging
within the
group
of
scientists, leading
to the
acceptance
of a
paradigm,
is not a rational decision
either,
for
according
to their
conception
of formal
rationality,
the consensus criterion is not
objective,
but sub-
jectivistic. Only
the
logical positivists' degree
of confirmation or inductive
418 Jiang Tianji
support
and the
Popperian comparative degree
of corroboration are
objective
criteria for
theory
choice.
They
seem to think that for Kuhn a
group
of scientists
may
choose
any theory they
like so
long
as
they agree
in
their choice and therefore enforce it.
This,
of
course,
would be sub-
jectivistic.
But
nothing
of the sort is
implied
in Kuhn's
concept
of
consensus. On Kuhn's
view,
when a
group
of
specialists
reach a unanimous
decision,
it is never
arbitrary,
but must be based on
good
reasons. It
may
be a
conclusion reached at the end of a
process
of deliberation or
argumentation,
or it
may
be more or less
easily
arrived at as a result of the relative
unanimity
of the
professional judgements
of these
specialists.
Therefore the consensus
among
scientists is
objectively
arrived
at,
and is at least
partly
a
product
of
objective
social conditions and institutions. As Kuhn well said:
Recognition
of the existence of a
uniquely competent professional group
and
acceptance
of its role as the exclusive arbitor of
professional
achievement has further
implications.
The
group's members,
as individuals and
by
virtue of their shared
training
and
experience,
must be seen as the sole
possessors
of the rules of the
game
or of some
equivalent
basis for
unequivocal judgements (Kuhn [1972], p. 168).
Why
should scientific communities be able to reach a firm consensus
unattainable in other fields like art and
philosophy? According
to
Kuhn,
science is the
only
field that shows
progress
in
increasing
the number and
precision
of the solved
problems.
The nature of scientific communities
'provides
a virtual
guarantee
that both the list of
problems
solved
by
science
and the
precision
of individual
problem-solutions
will
grow
and
grow'.
At
least,
the nature of the
community provides
such a
guarantee
if there is
any
way
at all in which it can be
provided.
What better criterion than the decision
of the scientific
group
could there be?
(Kuhn [1972], p. 170).
If for
Popper,
'there is
nothing
more "rational" than . . . the method of science'
(Popper
[1972], p. 27), then,
Kuhn should have
said,
'there is
nothing
more
"rational" than the decision of a scientific
group'.
But unlike
logical
positivists
and
Popperians
for whom inductive
support
or evidential
support
would be the sole or at least the
principal
criterion for
theory
acceptance,
the
ability
to solve
empirical problems
is for Kuhn neither the
unique
nor an
unequivocal
basis for
paradigm
choice
by
a scientific
group.
There can be no criterion of that
sort,
and no criterion is needed. The
group's
decision is based on
examples
of what a scientific
theory
achieves
and on
judgements
of value. That is
why
there is no formal
rationality,
informal
rationality
is all we have.
Third,
there are still some other
philosophers
who would neither
denounce Kuhn's model of
theory
choice as
irrational,
nor concede that it is
rational.
According
to
them, 'any
kind of
action, including
scientific
choice,
can be called rational
only
if it can be
causally
linked to deliberation or
reasoning
aimed at
achieving specific
ends. Scientific
theory
choice as
characterized
by
Kuhn would not be rational in this sense but would rather
be akin to...
latently
functional behaviour
patterns,
which serve a function
Scientific Rationality,
Formal or
Informal? 419
they
were never chosen to fulfill'
(Hempel [I981]).
I think what
Hempel
emphasises
here is
correct,
the
question
whether an action is rational or non-
rational
hinges
on this
point:
whether or not it involves a
process
of
deliberation. A
spontaneous,
unconscious action is non-rational. But a
deliberate and considered
judgement,
even when it is not the conclusion of a
cogent reasoning,
can be rational. We should not
suppose
that the
judgements
of a scientific
group
on the
comparative
merits of
competing
theories cannot be
causally
linked to
any
deliberation at all. The
drux
of the
matter is: how extensive and detailed a
process
of deliberation is
required
before it can confer
rationality upon
the action that will ensue from it. If it
were demanded that a scientist knows what his alternatives
are,
and he
knows what the
possible
outcomes of these alternatives
are,
and he also
knows what his
preferences
are
among
the
possible
outcomes
(that is,
if it
were demanded that he must know what alternatives will maximise his
expected utility,
before his choice can be
rational),
then choices of an
individual scientist are seldom rational.
By
the same
token, group
choices
are
very
seldom
rational,
because we cannot
expect any
scientist to know all
this. But
why
should we demand of a scientist or a
group
of scientists this
knowledge
of all alternatives and
especially
of all the
possible
outcomes of
them? Actions of
scientists, including theory choice,
can be rational if a less
extensive and less careful deliberation is
required.
The
theory
choice as
characterised
by
Kuhn is not rational in the
utility-maximisation
sense of
rationality.
What is at issue is the
problem
of formal versus informal
rationality.
The
standard
conception
of scientific
rationality
identifies
rationality
with
formal
rationality,
commitment to a formal method of science.
Logical
positivists
and
Popperians
have
attempted
to
'explicate'
scientific
pro-
cedures as
governed by explicit
and
precise
rules. The
acceptance
or
rejection
of a
theory
is rational if it can be
justified by
some of these
rules,
otherwise it would be irrational or non-rational. This
overly
narrow and
abstract
conception
of
rationality
would
relegate
most scientific decisions
and beliefs to
irrationality.
The contributions of Thomas Kuhn consist in
the liberalisation of
rationality.
Formal
rationality
becomes
only
a
part,
and
may
be an
unimportant part,
of
rationality,
because scientific method in an
especially comprehensive
and momentous
context, namely
in
regard
to
scientific revolutions and
theory change,
cannot be characterised
by explicit
general
rules to be observed
by practising
scientists. It is obvious that where
formalisation of scientific
procedures
is
impracticable
or
unsuccessful,
there
people
have to
rely
on informal
rationality.
But is it true that where a formal
method
exists,
no recourse to informal
rationality
is needed? Kuhn seemed
to
imply
this in what he said:
That
part
of his
(Karl Popper's) writing
which seek an
algorithm
for
verisimilitude,
if
successful, would eliminate all need for recourse to
group values, to
judgements
made
by
minds
prepared
in a
particular way (Kuhn [1970], p.
238).
420 Jiang Tianji
I think that this is incorrect. It is
highly unlikely
that a
complete
formalisation of all scientific
procedures
would be
forthcoming,
and even if
we
got
such a formal
method,
in
applying
it we cannot
dispense
with human
intelligence
and
judgement.
4
OTHER MODELS OF INFORMAL RATIONALITY
While Thomas Kuhn has
established,
in a more or less
descriptive way,
that
theory
choice is under the
sway
of informal
rationality, Hilary
Putnam
provides
a
powerful argument against
the
formalisability
of scientific
rationality.
His central idea is that the need for an informal element is
indispensable
for
any
formal method. The formalised scientific method
depends
on
inputs
which are not formalisable. Take the
Bayesian Approach
for instance. In
computing
the
degree
of
support
of various
hypotheses
using
the
Bayesian theorem,
as
'inputs'
we need not
only
the
computable
likehoods,
but also the
prior probabilities
of the various
hypotheses, i.e.,
the
'subjective degrees
of belief'
assigned by
scientists to those alternative
hypotheses prior
to
examining
the observational evidence. It turns out that
difference in the
prior probability
function can lead to violent difference in
the actual
degrees
of
support assigned
to theories. Putnam draws the
conclusion that formal
rationality
does not
guarantee
real and actual
rationality.
If one starts out with a 'reasonable'
prior probability function,
then one will
only assign degrees
of
support
to 'reasonable'
hypotheses,
but
if one's
prior probability
function is
'unreasonable',
then one's
assignment
of
degrees
of
support
to various
hypotheses
will be 'irrational'. This
prior
probability
metric
represents
the scientists' antecedent beliefs about the
world. It seems that one of the
inputs
to the method itself is a set of
substantive factual beliefs
(or degrees
of of
belief).
The need for an informal
element is similar in other
approaches.
Therefore it is not
possible
to draw a
sharp
line between the content of science and the method of science. Both
Putnam and
Shapere lay
stress on the
dependence
of scientific method
upon
scientific
beliefs,
and maintain that scientific method
changes constantly
as
the content of science
changes.
If the method of science
changes constantly,
then the traditional belief in a universal stable method is untenable and the
attempts
to formalise it would be doomed to failure. Putnam has this to
say,
The
hope
for a formalisable
method, capable
of
being
isolated from actual human
judgements
about the contents of science
(about
the
world),
and
capable
of
actually
being
stated seems to have
evaporated (Putnam [1981]).
If from the
constancy
of scientific method the ideal of formalisation is
derived,
and as a result the
praises
of formal
rationality
are
sung,
and formal
rationality
is identified
with
the
very rationality itself,
then
from
the
changeability
of scientific method we should be convinced that
complete
formalisation is
hopeless
and informal
rationality
must be restored to its
Scientific Rationality,
Formal or
Informal? 421
legitimate
status.
During
the
period
from fifteenth to seventeenth
century,
when new science was
originated
and
developed, general methodological
maxims instead of
precise
formal rules were
put
forward
by
scientists and
philosophers
for the
guidance
of scientific
inquiry.
In the
application
of
general
maxims to
particular
cases
intelligence
and
judgement
are
required,
thus it was informal rather than formal
rationality
that
prevailed
in scientific
practice
of that
period.
After a
long
tradition of
attempts
at formalisation
from Mill to
Carnap
and
Popper,
it was
Polany
and
Kuhn,
in the
years
around
i960,
who first threw off the
tyrannical yoke
of formal
rationality
imposed by logical positivists
and
Popperians. Polanyi
is
sceptical
of the
degree
to which the skill of
theory-assessment
which
develops historically
in
the scientific
community
can be made
explicit
either
by
scientists
or, post
factum, by philosophers.
In his
view,
scientific
rationality
can never be made
fully explicit
or even rendered
unambiguous
in outcome. Kuhn claimed that
decision in
theory-choice
is based on
ideology
rather than on
logic.
There
cannot be
any algorithm
for
theory-choice
which will dictate the same
decision for all members of the
group.
The
upshot
of all this is to
replace
formal
rationality by
informal
rationality.
Other models of informal
rationality
include both the inferential and the
noninferential ones.
Shapere's
discussion of
principles
of
reasoning
as
having
a central role in
many
scientific decisions between
competing
theories or lines of research is a
clarification of the
functioning
of informal
reasoning
in scientific
practice.
These
principles
of reasonable scientific research are not formal
rules,
the
reasons
they provide
for
seeking
a certain
type
of
theory
are of course not
conclusive.
Shapere said,
'that the reasons were not
logically
conclusive did
not make them
any
the less reasons-and
good ones,
relative to the state of
science at that time-nor did it make action in accordance with them
any
the
less rational'
(Shapere [19741,
p.
409).
Therefore in
accounting
for the
rationality
of scientific
discovery
as well as of
justification
our one recourse is
to informal
rationality.
The non-inferential models of informal
rationality
are
emphasised,
besides Kuhn and
Putnam, by Polanyi, Grene,
Toulmin and
Wartofsky.
It
is a form of rational
judgement
modelled on
judgement
in the
law,
in medical
diagnosis
and in aesthetic
appraisal;
this form of
informed,
skilled
judge-
ment involves the
application
of
general
maxims or directive to
particular
cases,
but it is not
rigorously
rule-determined. It is rational in the sense that
judgements may
be defended
by citing particular cases, previous appli-
cations of the maxims and the like.
Wartofsky
wants to resurrect a historical
alternative
conception long
overshadowed
by
the standard
conception
of
rationality.
This is the 'heuristic tradition'
involving
'craftsmanlike skill in
judgement'
and
'tinkering'.
The scientific theorists tinker with ideas
(see
his
[1980]).
This
kind
of down-to-earth
tinkering
found
in
crafts allows for
creative innovation in science. Thus this model of informal
rationality
would make scientific behaviour both creative and rational.
422
Jiang Tianji
5
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the standard
conception
of scientific
rationality,
the
model of formal and abstract
rationality,
is divorced from scientific
practice.
This normative
conception
is in conflict with the historical fact that
standards of
rationality change
over time. It is the
assumption
of fact-value
dichotomy
that renders the standard
conception seemingly
invulnerable.
But
starting
from Kuhn and
others, philosophers
are
increasingly coming
to
agree
that scientific
rationality
includes an informal
part
whose
importance
is estimated
differently by
different
philosophers.
Both extreme
positions-
the identification of
rationality
with a formal method or the
complete neglect
of formal
rationality-seem
to be incorrect. Thomas Kuhn
gives
formal
rationality
its due in normal science.
Hilary
Putnam would think that each
functioning
of scientific
rationality
includes a formal
part
and an informal
part.
This 'liberation' of
rationality
from formal
logic
or normative
methodology
is a
good thing.
Let us
quote
Kuhn
again:
The man who embraces a new
paradigm
at an
early stage
must often do so in defiance
of the evidence
provided by problem-solving.
... There must also be a
basis, though
it need be neither rational nor
ultimately correct,
for faith in the
particular
candidate
chosen.
Something
must make at least a few scientists feel that the new
proposal
is on
the
right
track
... (Kuhn [1972], p. 158).
For
Kuhn,
belief or faith in a
theory's promise
is a most
important
factor
relevant to
theory-choice,
but the faith need not be based on a rational
inference
(and
thus would be
rejected by
the standard
conception
of
rationality
as
irrational),
but based on a rational
judgement
or an
insight:
the
scientists feel that the new
proposal
is on the
right
track.
Only specialists
can
make such a
judgement.
Even if the
judgement
is sometimes inarticulate or
turns out to be
wrong, might
we
say
that it is irrational? I think not. The
liberalisation of
rationality
must be extended to the
point
of
including
such a
judgement among
the rational ones.
Wuhan
University
People's Republic of
China
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