In The Case of Cariño V

In the case of Cario v.
Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it

was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office
had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of
the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden
of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid,
and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed
to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that
no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity
of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.

Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
when it says, The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51

Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable
such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an
affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths
that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the
barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages
and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of
the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by
a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also
during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
SYED AZHAR ABBAS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
GLORIA GOO ABBAS,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 183896
Present:
VELASCO, JR., 1., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
LEONEN,JJ.
Promulgated:
January 30, 2013 f!. \ t~
x-------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------e--=~~r--
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the
Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and theCA Resolution
dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria GooAbbas
(Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contrace of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
2 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.
'Rollo, p. 13. I
Decision 2 G.R. No. 183896
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to
the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met
Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on
August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock
in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men.
He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony,
one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of
the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C.
Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said
certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy
cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8
4 Id. at 47.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 12.
7 Id. at 10.
8 Id. at 48.
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a
letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite,
and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which
was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses
and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the
certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying
that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued
any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other
person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann
Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of
the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride
on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the
requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage
contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and
Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas
Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage
license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know
where the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding
ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
9 Id. at 49, January 19, 1993 in some parts of the records.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 49-50.
12 Id. at 50.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 51.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 52.
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony
held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help
of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license,
and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to
their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the
same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the
contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage
license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case
had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending
before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo
and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos
and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and
her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license,
and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their
house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after
several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to
sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on
June 15, 1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who
had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of
21 Id.
22 Id. at 53.
23 Id. at 54.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 55.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 56.
the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9,
1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had
been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that
neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a
formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was
void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to
cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage
contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent
Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
30 Id. at 57.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 58.
33 Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is
required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.
34 Rollo, pp. 58-59.
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005,
but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS
NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE
LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE
WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN
TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE
PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law.37 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition
after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
35 Id. at 122.
36 Id. at 128.
37 Id. at 129.
38 Id. at 130.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED.
The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between
Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840
but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
39 Id. at 131.
40 Id. at 135-146.
41 Id. at 173-174.
42 Id. at 31.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity
of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by
the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the
marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license
under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for
the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued.
The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that
he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by
an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain
no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court
held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to
certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
43 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that
the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage
License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite,
and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words despite diligent
search in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been
conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which
merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor
is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact
that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed
44 Id. at 262.
45 Supra note 43.
46 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.
Decision 1 0 G.R. No. 183896
does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent
search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license,
as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the
sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of
her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply
been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it
was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office
had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of
the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden
of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid,
and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed
to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that
no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity
of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and
Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
47 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).
48 Supra note 43.
49 Supra note 47, at 870.
Decision 1 1 G.R. No. 183896
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was
even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties
herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature
above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer,
the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held
after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit 5-C which
shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
x x x x
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15
June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01
August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit 1) dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
when it says, The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). Article
35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51
50 Rollo, pp. 129-130.
51 Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable
such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without
necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an
affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths
that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the
barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages
and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a legible copy of
the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the
municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by
a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also
during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether
members of the armed forces or civilians.
Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of
the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petitiOn is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution
dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January
9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
J. VELASCO, JR.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be
performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc solemnized in accordance
with thcir customs, rites or practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Thc
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Decision
WE CONCUR:
~
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
13 G.R. No. 183896
JOSE CA~1DOZA
Asso~lb~~:~~~~
,
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the op ion of the
Court's Division.
PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.
As ociate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ISECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent
Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered
private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of
a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared
null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies
officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a
church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that
at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at
the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not
been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered
only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4,
1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his
claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh.
11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence.
Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to
Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage
to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence
during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the
facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void
is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a
church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.
i[1]

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage
to herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate
court affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It does not say, however, that
a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage
is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the
matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself
for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even
before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results
would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-
repealed provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.
x x x
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this
wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo
M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null
and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the
amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes
from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.
ii[2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition
asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY
OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED
BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL
EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first
marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly?
To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed
light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss
jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner
to private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the
marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected
petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza
iii[3]
and People v. Aragon
iv[4]
are applicable in
this case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no
judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these
cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by
E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into
the provisions of law previously obtaining.
v[5]

In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this
case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the
now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
x x x
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. . . .
vi[6]

At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis
vii[7]

and Mercado v. Tan,
viii[8]
both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,
ix[9]
under which
a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse
present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be
valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the
Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter,
however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,
x[10]
and People v. Aragon,
xi[11]
this Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases
involved the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a
third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated
a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second
marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage.
There is no need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the
second marriage is void, and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are
no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes
dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge
whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,
xii[12]
and Consuegra v. Consuegra,
xiii[13]
however, we recognized
the right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their
acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for
judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the
husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to
share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.
xiv[14]

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),
xv[15]
the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground
that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was
already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The
Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void
marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.
xvi[16]

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),
xvii[17]
the Court held that there is a need for
a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in
1972. In 1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the
Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground
of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded
that:
xviii[18]

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra)
of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz
Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,
xix[19]
however, the Court found the second marriage void
without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon
rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family
Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in
Article 40 of the Family Code.
xx[20]
Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)
xxi[21]
the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel,
categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary.
Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the
subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was void
since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have
known that the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals
(1993),
xxii[22]
the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42,
44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).
xxiii[23]

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances
of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)
xxiv[24]
the first wife charged a municipal trial judge
of immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first
marriage was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got
pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and
Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the children
thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family
Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in
Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for
lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity
before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that
private respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,
xxv[25]
the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case,
that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we
are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private
respondents deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could
benefit from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church
ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license
used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this
matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation
that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a
marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of
their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to
recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality,
i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She
argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense
due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in protecting the
inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In
our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and
formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the
first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the celebration of the
civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding
of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to
ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for brushing
aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have
tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court.
But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of
letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees.
Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted
duplicitously and craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages
because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.
xxvi[26]

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded
in the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless
complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we
grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages
from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation.
xxvii[27]
There are other remedies.
xxviii[28]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed
partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the
amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two
children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor
age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

i[1]

See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353, 365 (1996); Son
vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.
ii[2]

Rollo, pp. 48-52.
iii[3]

45 Phil 739 (1954).
iv[4]

100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
v[5]

Rollo, p. 47.
vi[6]

Rollo, p. 49.
vii[7]

G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.
viii[8]

G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Vitug opined that
the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be
held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No
such judicial declaration of nullity, in his view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for
instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent
to the marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to
refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
ix[9]

E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
x[10]

45 Phil 739 (1954).
xi[11]

100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
xii[12]

33 SCRA 614 (1970).

xiii[13]

37 SCRA 315 (1971).
xiv[14]

See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil 88 (1943).
xv[15]

77 SCRA 338 (1977).
xvi[16]

22 SCRA 525 (1983).
xvii[17]

143 SCRA 499 (1986).
xviii[18]

Id. at 501.
xix[19]

145 SCRA 229 (1986).
xx[20]

The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
xxi[21]

211 SCRA 7 (1992).
xxii[22]

226 SCRA 572 (1993).
xxiii[23]

Id. at 579.
xxiv[24]

268 SCRA 47 (1997)
xxv[25]

286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).
xxvi[26]

Rollo, p. 51.
xxvii[27]

Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.1,
Manila: 1990, p. 223.
xxviii[28]

Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by
the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the
controversy between the two Susans whom he married. 1wphi1.nt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision
1
of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was
on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with
whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he
had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,
3
while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of
sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number;
5
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar
of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO
CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence,
we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the
records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.
6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of
the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED,
AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE.
8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
9

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
10
In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the
two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled
to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,
12
and the
absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
13
renders the marriage void ab initio.
14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of

such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
15
the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as
in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid
and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy.
Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to
respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased
and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of
the spouses according to the applicable property regime.
16
Considering that the two marriages
are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,
17
-
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to
him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in
the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
x x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
19

Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner
to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of
the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits
under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,
20
where the Court awarded one-half of the

retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished
her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate
upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still
subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the
property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial
declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case,
the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
22
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code,
clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to
contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first
marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of
money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of
nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court,
if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
23
the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner
to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi 1. nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 43-47
2. Rollo, pp. 49-55
3. Exhibit F, Records, p. 38
4. Ibid
5. Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36
6. Exhibit E, Records, p. 37
7. Rollo, p. 55
8. Rollo, p. 18
9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]
10. Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra
12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of
this Title, but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides
14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character;
x x x x x x x x x
15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29

16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43
and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition,
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the
preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
x x x x x x x x x
(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law
17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127263 April 12, 2000
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J .:
For review is the decision
1
dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44144,
which affirmed the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the
petition
3
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15,
1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.
4
Both were then 22 years old. Their
union was blessed with two children, Frederick and Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975
and February 14, 1978, respectively.
5

The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit, Pampanga, and
later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber and hardware business in Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga.
6

On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived
separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother. However, their son Frederick
transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila on May 15, 1988, and from then
on, lived with his father.
7

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil Case No. 7900
before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the
action was later amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her
husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living separately for more than
one year; and that they voluntarily entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29,
1983, containing the rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership.
8
Judgment
was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of
properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses.
9
The trial court also
granted custody of the children to Filipina.
10

In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that in the
afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her
husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga.
While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family

computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started spanking him. At that
instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched her in the different parts of her
body. Filipina also claimed that her husband started choking her when she fell on the floor, and
released her only when he thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions
on different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a
Medical Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time
Fernando maltreated her.
11

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision
12
dated April 26, 1990, convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 8273, on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3)
attempt by respondent against her life; and (4) abandonment of her by her husband without
justifiable cause for more than one year. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in
its decision
13
dated December 4, 1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical
violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of their
daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition
14
for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out that the final judgment rendered
by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal
separation, and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her
husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as
manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead;
and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself.
Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed from the time of
the celebration of their marriage and became manifest thereafter.
15

The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision
16
dated December 9, 1993,
denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It
stated that the alleged acts of the respondent, as cited by petitioner, do not constitute
psychological incapacity which may warrant the declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court. In the
decision
17
of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the testimony of petitioner
concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity falls short of the quantum of
evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all the formal and essential requisites of law.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent had existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It
reiterated the finding of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or
almost ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their separation in
1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the lower court which it found to be in accordance with law and the evidence on record.
18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
19
which the Court of Appeals denied in its resolution
dated November 21, 1996.
20

Hence, this appeal by certiorari
21
wherein petitioner now raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY
APPELLANT [herein petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein
respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW
THAT THE ALLEGED UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS CELEBRATED IN 1973;
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT BY
RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES
THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY
WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS (240 SCRA 20)
IS APPLICABLE HERETO.
22

In sum, two issues are to be resolved:
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid
marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her, the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate
and marriage license are different and incongruous.
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal, as
this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice,
23
in a number of instances, we have
relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that technicalities are not ends in themselves but
exist to protect and promote substantive rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be
applied with severity and rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be
defeated.
24
Hence, when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the
operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.
25
In our view, the case at bar requires
that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Filipina and Fernando which
petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license, in order to arrive at a

just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict between the parties. Note, however, that here
the pertinent facts are not disputed; and what is required now is a declaration of their effects
according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for annulment of marriage
before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of
the marriage itself would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the
beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted
before the court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September 17,
1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in her petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibit "A"
in the course of the trial.
26
The date of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta.
Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as
stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
before the trial court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.
27
This fact was also affirmed by
petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination,
28
as follows:
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married on November 15, 1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their son's and
daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes "B" and "C" in the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B"
and "C" in the course of the trial.
29
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show
that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a
formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet,
neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
30

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed petitioner did
not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was incongruity between the date of
the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From
the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost
one year after the ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is
that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find
private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code
31
is clearly applicable
in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between
petitioner and private respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79
32
of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage
between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning.
We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So are the birth
certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll. Nevertheless, these documents were
marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial below, which shows that these have been examined
and admitted by the trial court, with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due
execution. Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on November 15, 1973. We are
of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely
object thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.
33

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain us.
It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio
for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, dated December 9, 1993 as well as the Decision promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated November 21, 1996 in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside.
The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private
respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the
time of celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
CA Records, at 51-59.
2
Records, at 136-143.
3
Id. at 1-5.
4
Exh. A; Id. at 6.
5
Exhs. B & C; Id. at 7-8.
6
Id. at 136.
7
Ibid.
8
Id. at 10-11.
9
Exh. E, Id. at 10-18.
10
Id. at 18.
11
Id. at 23-24.
12
Exh. G; Id. at 23-26.
13
Exh, H; Id. at 27-46.
14
Id. at 1-5.
15
Id. at 3.
16
Id. at 136-143.

17
Supra, note 1.
18
Id. at 59.
19
Id. at 60-64.
20
Id. at 76.
21
Rollo, pp. 10-55.
22
Id. at 31.
23
Sumbad v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106060, June 21, 1999, p. 23; Modina vs. CA, G.R.
No. 109355, October 29, 1999, p. 13; citing Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of
Appeals, 269 SCRA 145 (1997).
24
Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187, 198 (1997);
Mauna vs. Civil Service Commission, 232 SCRA 388, 398 (1994).
25
GSIS vs. CA, at 198, citing Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 371 (1995).
26
Exhibit A, Records, p. 6; Rollo, p. 72.
27
Records, at 1 and 53.
28
TSN, 22 January 1993, p. 4.
29
Records pp. 7 & 8; Exh. A, Rollo, p. 72.
30
Rollo, at 20.
31
Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character:
x x x x x x x x x
32
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or
commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the
aggrieved party; may apply to the court for relief.
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and
moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not.

(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit
accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the
separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
Art. 74. The property relations between husband and wife shall be governed in the following
order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local customs.
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of
absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the regime agreed upon is
void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be
made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
135 and 136.
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by
the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice
third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract
is recorded as well as in the proper registries of property.
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage
settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give
consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title
IX of this Code.1wphi1.nt
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlements executed by a person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it
shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party
thereto.
33
See also Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556 (1995); Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997);
Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ISIDRO ABLAZA,
Petitioner,

-versus -

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 158298

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
*
and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 11, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J .:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the
old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the
petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on
the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring
the action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
xxviii[1]
The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117
entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab
initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that
his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself
included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.
xxviii[2]

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000,
xxviii[3]
the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby
resolved to DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out
of time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage

(contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26,
1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone
error that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that
the petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003,
xxviii[4]
however, the CA affirmed the
dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action
must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the
parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro
Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage
contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of
petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment
of marriage will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law
file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party
to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be
prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on
appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
xxviii[5]

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT
CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party
in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and
wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity
of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted.
xxviii[6]
As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.
xxviii[7]
To
illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void under
the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code; yet, the
intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the
Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the
validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.
xxviii[8]

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed
herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which
took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line
to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those

solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
xxviii[9]
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took
effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.
xxviii[10]

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,
xxviii[11]
the following actions for declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the
Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the
law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the
exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action
for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition
to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v.
Bayadog,
xxviii[12]
the children were allowed to file after the death of their father a
petition for the declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage

license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable
one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is
necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. A void marriage does
not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of
mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.
Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court
between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either
or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts. It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime
of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For
the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the
death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such
need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
xxviii[13]

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new
Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v.
Sandoval,
xxviii[14]
the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural
law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest.
xxviii[15]
Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a proper
interest can file the action.
xxviii[16]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a
mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the
real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
xxviii[17]

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then
he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit
not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to
the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001
and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner
from succeeding to the deceaseds estate.
xxviii[18]
Necessarily, therefore, the right of
the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether
Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving
heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry
thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue
presented in this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of
the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as
the late Cresencianos surviving wife,
xxviii[19]
stood to be benefited or prejudiced by
the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not
all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;
xxviii[20]
hence, her participation in this action is
made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had
been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have

been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was
truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is not
before the court [that] the action should be dismissed. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
xxviii[21]

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza
and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to
determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property involved
therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009,
and the petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a
defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge
that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable
party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The
petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the
present action, however, considering that Section 11,
xxviii[22]
Rule 3, Rules of Court,
states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an

indispensable party may be made on motion of any party or on (the trial courts)
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by
the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage
Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza,
petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are returned to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions to first
require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila
Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to
determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants,
or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as well as whether
the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza
entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed
accordingly.

No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A.
TAMANO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:

A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence, in the case of subsequent marriage
laws, no vested rights shall be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate union of a
married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision
1
dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
2
dated September 13, 2005,
which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring
petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llaves (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen.
Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the Islamic
laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City
3
and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993.
4
In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamanos civil status was indicated as divorced.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son
Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos
legitimate children with Zorayda,
5
filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint
6
alleged,
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred
that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant Zorayda, having been
celebrated under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by deceased
Mamintal with Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he contracted the same
while his prior marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his status
being declared as "divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because the deceased
never divorced Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have validly
done so because divorce is not allowed under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not have divorced Complainant
Zorayda by invoking the provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that the marriage of the deceased with
Complainant Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to have been one
contracted under Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be thus
covered by this law;
7

Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994. She then asked from the court for
an extension of 30 days to file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995,
8
and again, another
15 days
9
or until February 18, 1995, both of which the court granted.
10

Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss
11
on February 20,
1995 where she declared that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under

the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the latters disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano.
12

Estrellita argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case because under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of sharia courts.
The trial court denied Estrellitas motion and asserted its jurisdiction over the case for declaration of
nullity.
13
Thus, Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this Court questioning the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA
14
which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC continued to try the case since there can
be no default in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the respondent failed to file an
answer. Estrellita was allowed to participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented their
evidence. When it was Estrellitas turn to adduce evidence, the hearings set for such purpose
15
were
postponed mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended the
proceedings
16
in view of the CAs temporary restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining
it from hearing the case.
17

Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision dated
September 30, 1996.
18
Estrellita then elevated the appellate courts judgment to this Court by way of
a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603.
19

Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present her
evidence on June 26, 1997.
20
As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset to July
9, 1997.
21
The day before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again asked for a postponement.
22

Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case
for decision,
23
reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case. Estrellita opposed, on the
ground that she has not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.
24

On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of Quezon City,
25
stating as one of the
reasons that as sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in cases of
marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general
jurisdiction, is not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our Resolution dated
August 24, 1998,
26
we denied Estrellitas motion for reconsideration
27
with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the RTC rendered the aforementioned
judgment declaring Estrellitas marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.
28

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared
Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article
35 of the Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
29

The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately shows that the second marriage of the
late Senator with [Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first marriage with
[Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage void from the very beginning. The fact that the late

Senator declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect the void character of the
second marriage because, in this jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous marriage, especially, where the
subsequent marriage was solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.
30

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,
31
Estrellita argued that she was denied her right to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to file her answer
after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry
her as his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed by the Muslim Code. Lastly,
she highlighted Zoraydas lack of legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the
deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17, 2004,
32
the CA held that Estrellita can no
longer be allowed to file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be heard but simply
ignored it by asking for numerous postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse of
around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita
cannot rely on her pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that Estrellitas marriage to Sen. Tamano is
void ab initio for being bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano is
governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first
nuptial celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim celebration was only
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is
Sen. Tamanos wife and, hence, the injured party in the senators subsequent bigamous marriage
with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution,
33
the CA denied Estrellitas Motion for
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the public prosecutors report on the existence
of collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court
34
and Article 48 of the
Family Code
35
will not invalidate the trial courts judgment as the proceedings between the parties
had been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion. Assuming that the issues have not been
joined before the RTC, the same is attributable to Estrellitas refusal to file an answer. Lastly, the CA
disregarded Estrellitas allegation that the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to
our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the
issue on the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of Estrellitas
marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the opportunity to
file an answer and to present her evidence to dispute the allegations against the validity of her
marriage. She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias
36
laid down the rule that the filing of a motion to
dismiss instead of an answer suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the trial court
is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction

has not yet been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely participated in the RTC
hearings because of the trial courts assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition questioning the RTCs jurisdiction and yet,
the RTC violated this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on August 18, 1998, months
before the records of G.R. No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.
37
She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a finding of whether there was collusion,
this being a prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a party has failed to file an
answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with the late senator is valid as the latter
was already divorced under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts that such law
automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their
consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under
Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested
to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.
38

Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to file suit because only the
husband or the wife can file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Supreme
Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
39

Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen) defends the CAs reasoning and stresses
that Estrellita was never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an original action for
certiorari does not stay the proceedings of the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol Gen says
that this is no longer essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in the suit that
obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports private respondents legal standing
to challenge the validity of Estrellitas purported marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that any
proper interested party may attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda and Adib
have such right to file the action as they are the ones prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial courts judgment, even though the latter
was rendered prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered without waiting
for the Supreme Courts final resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No.
126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus was denied due process; and c)
the public prosecutor did not even conduct an investigation whether there was
collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous;
and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellitas marriage
declared void ab initio.

Our Ruling
Estrellitas refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss of her right to answer; and her pending
petition for certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss before the
higher courts does not at all suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the RTC of
Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of her right to due process. She was never
declared in default, and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias
40
to justify the suspension of the period to file an answer
and of the proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
denial of her Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellitas basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a Motion to Dismiss, instead of filing an Answer to the
complaint. The filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her Answer to the complaint.
Until said motion is resolved by the Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent
Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001,
issued its Order denying the Motion to Dismiss of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance of the period provided
for in Rule 11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days computed from service on her
of the aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the complaint: x x
x
41
(Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced therein is that the trial court is
mandated to suspend trial until it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it. Nothing
in the above excerpt states that the trial court should suspend its proceedings should the issue of the
propriety or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the appellate courts. In Macias, the
trial court failed to observe due process in the course of the proceeding of the case because after it
denied the wifes motion to dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste even when, under the rules of procedure,
the wife still had time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the trial
court after she filed motions for extension of time to file an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for
the resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before this Court.
However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari
does not suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application for certiorari is an
independent action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of
the judgment complained of."
42
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that "[t]he petition
shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case."
43
In fact, the trial court respected the CAs temporary restraining order and only after the CA
rendered judgment did the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any order
precluding the trial court from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous requests for
postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence
when it was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait first for our decision in G.R. No.

126603. Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were attributable only
to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of
the other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story. Neither
should the lower court wait for the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory, nor
should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the
propriety of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC)
44
also requries the participation of the public prosecutor in cases involving void
marriages. It specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his investigation report to determine
whether there is collusion between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court
order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to
the court stating whether the parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and
their respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof
in his report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of
collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the
report for hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the
case for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State
at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the public prosecutor to submit the required
report,
45
which we find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo
T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated March 30, 1995,
46
wherein he attested that there could be no
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is not the spouse of
any of the private respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of
report of collusion or a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we held in Tuason v.
Court of Appeals,
47
the lack of participation of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure

lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.
48

The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites.
49
The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.
50
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is
not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394
51
which was not availed of during
its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way
of divorce under PD 1083,
52
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot
benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where
the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."
53

Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively
override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless
otherwise provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein except as otherwise
specifically provided, shall affect their validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired or
liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate prospectively, unless
the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied;
accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article
186 aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law, specifically,
the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place before the Muslim Codes enactment.
54

An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-
Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register
their mutual desire to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered as one
contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil
and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal status

since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior
marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly
adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the declaration of nullity
of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition
for nullity is prospective in application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the
ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines,
55
Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a)
56
thereof, only the husband
or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore
only she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the petition to the
exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the
following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of voidable marriages and
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a
legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses
upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and
not to seek its dissolution.
57

Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
"aggrieved or injured spouse." If Estrellitas interpretation is employed, the prior spouse is unjustly
precluded from filing an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder

of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J .:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of
money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to
1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot
28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda
por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela
51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda
52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.
These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a
partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining
land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,
4
2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad
with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of

title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo
II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled
Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad
narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.
5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of
P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing
of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel
TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval
and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval
and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.
6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
7

The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo
contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a

claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented
and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution
of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call
for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case.
Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas,
then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered
view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the

motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case
on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage -
is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of
the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the
basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an
indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support
what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative
filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his
life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.
8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible
error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law,
or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,

petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
the laws and misapprehension of the facts.
9
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through
a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are
other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19
10
of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x
11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary

judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003
12
is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.
13
In that case, We
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.
14
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney
to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that
there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
17
(Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
20
is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,
21
viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
22
(Underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon
when the marriage took place.
23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
24
But the Civil Code is
silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
25
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.
26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
28
where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.
x x x x
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the
amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
29
(Underscoring
supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,
successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.
32
Conversely,
if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.
33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-
party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with
respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the
entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate
son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner
has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence,
does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void
from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,
34
or even an adopted child
35
excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is
a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper
and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the
matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's
bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to
support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to
support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation
of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that
is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An

assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born
or conceived within a valid marriage.
37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED
AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice


I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca
De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, concurring.
2
Civil Case No. 95-135.
3
Rollo, pp. 49-51.
4
Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.
5
Rollo, p. 55.
6
CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
7
Id. at 63.
8
Id. at 60-63.
9
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
10
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of

marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.
11
CA rollo, p. 61.
12
Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
13
G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts.
48 & 60, and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
14
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143.
15
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177,
citing Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289,
and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.
16
Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470
SCRA 508, 529, and Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424
SCRA 725, 740.
17
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534
SCRA 418, 429, citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders.
18
Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185
SCRA 766, 772. (Note in the citation omitted.)
19
Id. at 429-430.
20
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7,
2003.
21
Supra note 17.
22
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.
23
Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
24
See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No.
179474, March 28, 2008; Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007,
531 SCRA 446.
25
Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735,
746.

26
Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
27
Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117; and Bank of America NT & SA v.
Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil.
215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v.
Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres,
G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in turn University of
the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993,
227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA
334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
28
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing Rules of Court, Rule 3,
Sec. 2, Rule 2, Sec. 1; Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328
SCRA 122.
29
Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.
30
Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 522.
31
Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different
classes of illegitimate children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them
fall in the category of illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family
Code:
Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless otherwise provided in this Code.
32
See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA
322; see also Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 520;
Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620; Heirs
of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300
SCRA 345.
33
Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.
34
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
35
Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
36
Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97, February 9, 2006,
482 SCRA 87, citing Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 105, 114, citing in turn Saura Import &
Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co., Inc., 118 Phil. 150, 156 (1963); and
Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).

37
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA
438

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from impugning the subsequent
marriage.1wphi 1 But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for
nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code,
such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003.
58

Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage in November 1994.
While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which
no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.
59
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real
party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit.
60

Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be interpreted in a way
that would preserve their respective rights which include striking down bigamous marriages. We thus
find the CA Decision correctly rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13,
2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO CARLOS II,
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J .:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during the
effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity and
annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or
confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed and set aside the summary judgment
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of
money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically
reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.
Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a
non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to
1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the
subd. plan, containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot
28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda
51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda
52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el
plano, el cual se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was
made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.
These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City;
and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No. 160401
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son,
Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of
respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by
TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the approval of a
partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective
shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the
remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining
land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,
4
2,331 square meters of the second parcel of
land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental compromise
agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and
damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent Felicidad
with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the certificates of
title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of
title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo
II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary judgment.
Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized the marriage.
Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate,
the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar of
Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384, entitled
Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent Felicidad
narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.
5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its report
and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage
license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural,
illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of
P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing
of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061
of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to
cancel said title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel

TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole
name of plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval
and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval
and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of
Manila to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.
6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that the
trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the
marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo,
Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
7

The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a quo
contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a
claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented
and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a
misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the
petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly
proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution

of marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively
dissolved the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for
thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the
latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call
for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case.
Rather that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the
case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for
annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily
conceded that a valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in
relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the
marriage license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as
appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is
corroborated by the following statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas,
then Justice of the Peace who officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at
Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said
marriage license was inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the
reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage
Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the same."
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered
view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the
motivations underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case
on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage -
is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-
presentation of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not
procured. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be
emphasized, rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the
legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of
the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the
basis of the inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it
had effectively disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of
appellant Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son
of appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the
said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his
entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's
bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an
indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support
what could well be a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative
filiation. Inconsistent though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more
credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his
life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his
household. The least that the trial court could have done in the premises was to
conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues
pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos II.
8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of the ponente,
Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision,
Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the
Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage,
petitioner respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible
error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the
circumstances of this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law,
or has otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules
of Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing
Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of

speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of
the laws and misapprehension of the facts.
9
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab initio through
a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a trial. But there are
other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in bringing the action for
nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19
10
of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary
the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x
11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of summary
judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been
stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on March
15, 2003
12
is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case.
No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters
involving property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be
proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.
13
In that case, We
excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or
declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all
kinds of actions.
14
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty
to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of the
public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney
to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that
there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of evidence, the
public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court
is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. - (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to
intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or
fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -
(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot
be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.
Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of
the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
17
(Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy, loving,
peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the foundations of
marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are simultaneously the
directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide
when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of
the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against
the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of
their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate
heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as
stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March
15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003
20
is prospective in its application. Thus, the
Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,
21
viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.
22
(Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon
when the marriage took place.
23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law
is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
24
But the Civil Code is

silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person
can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a
license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
25
Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.
26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question
involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
28
where the Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who
can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.
x x x x
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage
cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign
law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of
additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was
granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows
or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the
amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must
dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.
29
(Underscoring
supplied)
III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only surviving
compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession,

successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory
heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad and
Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to
succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral relatives.
32
Conversely,
if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.
33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a
brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue and
without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted
son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first half being
allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-
party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother with

respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the
entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate
son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then petitioner
has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent
Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence,
does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be found to be void
from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant,
illegitimate,
34
or even an adopted child
35
excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the
decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is
a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper
and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave the
matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.
36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, petitioner's
bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is insufficient to
support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We are not inclined to
support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation
of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of
respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act that
is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable. An
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born
or conceived within a valid marriage.
37

Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as said
disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null and void ab
initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of
marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted
son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the
action for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED
AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give this
case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case

Associate Justice
Chairperson

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca
De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P.
Abesamis, concurring.
2
Civil Case No. 95-135.
3
Rollo, pp. 49-51.
4
Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.
5
Rollo, p. 55.
6
CA rollo, pp. 48-49.
7
Id. at 63.
8
Id. at 60-63.
9
Rollo, pp. 24-25.
10
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. However, in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint
shall always be proved.
11
CA rollo, p. 61.

12
Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
13
G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts.
48 & 60, and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
14
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143.
15
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177,
citing Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289,
and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.
16
Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470
SCRA 508, 529, and Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424
SCRA 725, 740.
17
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534
SCRA 418, 429, citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders.
18
Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185
SCRA 766, 772. (Note in the citation omitted.)
19
Id. at 429-430.
20
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC - Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following
its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7,
2003.
21
Supra note 17.
22
Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.
23
Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
24
See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No.
179474, March 28, 2008; Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007,
531 SCRA 446.
25
Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735,
746.
26
Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
27
Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574,
November 17, 2004, 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117; and Bank of America NT & SA v.
Court of Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil.
215, 224 (2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v.
Ralla, G.R. No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres,
G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in turn University of
the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993,
227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA
334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
28
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing Rules of Court, Rule 3,
Sec. 2, Rule 2, Sec. 1; Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328
SCRA 122.
29
Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.
30
Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 522.
31
Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different
classes of illegitimate children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them
fall in the category of illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family
Code:
Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless otherwise provided in this Code.
32
See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA
322; see also Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 520;
Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620; Heirs
of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300
SCRA 345.
33
Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.
34
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
35
Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
36
Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97, February 9, 2006,
482 SCRA 87, citing Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 105, 114, citing in turn Saura Import &
Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co., Inc., 118 Phil. 150, 156 (1963); and
Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).
37
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA
438

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