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PHILAMLIFE v. BREVA
G.R. No. 147937 Nov 11, 2004 Callejo, Sr. J.
petitioners
Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (P)
respondents
Hon Augusto Breva (presiding Judge of RTC Davao, Branch 10) and Milagros P. Morales
summary
Respondent Morales filed a complaint for damages and reimbursement against P. P filed a
MtoD since the summons was improperly served on the regional office and not on its main
office. After Morales amended the complaint, the RTC dismissed the MtoD and issued an alias
summons on P’s office. Ct. held that a case should not be dismissed just because the original
summons was wrongfully served. RTC should have issued an original summons on the
amended complaint since the original summons on the 1
st
complaint never reached P. But
since the objective of notifying P that a case has been filed against it, the Ct held that the label
of the summons was of no importance.

facts of the case
- Sept. 2 1999, priv respondent Morales, filed a complaint for damages and reimbursment of insurance premiums
against P. Complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes
through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.
- Summons, together with the complaint was served upon the reg’l office of P.
- December 8, 1999- P filed motion to dismiss, arguing that the summons was improperly served upon its employee
and said EE is not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 of RoC.
- December 9, 1999- Morales filed an amended complaint alleging that summons and other court processes could be
served at P’s principal office in UN Ave, Manila, through its President or any person authorized to receive summons
- RTC denied motion to dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be served at P’s main office. Ruled
that the improper service of summons is not a ground for dismissal of the compliant since the case was still in its
initial stage. According to the RTC, the remedy was to issue an alias summons to be served at the principal office.
- December 14, 1999 P received an Alias Summons together with copy of the complaint
- CA affirmed the RTC. The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the
authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person.

issue
Whether weather yes or no question. YES OR NO PARA KITA AGAD.

ratio
- The Ct. cited Lingner and Fisher GMBH v IAC: A case should not be dismissed simply because an original summons
was wrongfully served.
- In this case, the complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss.
- Rule 10 Section 8 of the RoC states that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends.
- Does the summons issued on the original complaint become invalid? NO. Summons on the original complaint which
has already been served continues to have its legal effect. [ Application? Where the defendant has already been served
summons on the amended complaint may be served upon him w/o need of another summons. When no summons
have been issued on the original complaint, new summons for the original complaint must be served on him.]
- Application to case: since at the time complaint was amended, no summons had been properly served on P and it had
not yet appeared in Ct. ! Correct thing: New summons should’ve been issued on the amended complaint. The RTC
should not have sent alias summons, because alias summons are just continuations of the 1
st
complaint (which was
already amended).
- Since there’s a new complaint, original summons may be made
- BUT, the rationale behind the service of summons- to make certain that P would promptly and properly receive
notice of the filing of an action against it- has been served.
- It is not pertinent whether summons is designated as original or as long as it has served its purpose. What is essential
is that the summons complies with the requirements under the RoC and it has been duly served on the defendant.
- (Requirements under the RoC: contains all the info required under the rules; it was served on the proper officer
authorized to receive it)

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Atiko Trans Inc., and Chen Lie Navigation Co. v. Prudential Guarantee
G.R. No. 167545 August 17, 2011 J. Del Castillo
petitioners
Atiko Trans Inc.
and Chen Lie
Navigation Co.



respondents
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc.
summary
Prudential Guarantee insured tinplates on board a ship owned by Cheng Lie Navigation Co.
that were found damaged upon arrival and is seeking repayment. Atiko is Cheng Lie’s
shipagent. Atiko filed a Notice of Appeal arguing that MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
it because summons was served through its cashier. Cheng Lie filed its own Memorandum of
Appeal maintaining that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person because when
the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the
Philippines, service of summons may be made, among others, upon its resident agent—but
there is no proof that Atiko is the local agent of Cheng Lie. Jurisdiction was acquired over
Atiko but not over Cheng Lie. Atiko voluntarily appeared. In Cheng Lie’s case, where service
of summons upon the defendant principal is coursed thru its co-defendant agent, and the
latter happens to be a domestic corporation, the rules on service of summons upon a domestic
private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of both defendants. And insofar as the principal is
concerned, such jurisdictional flaw cannot be cured by the agent’s subsequent voluntary
appearance.

facts of the case
40 coils of electrolytic tinplates were loaded on board M/S Katjana in Kaohsiung, Taiwan for shipment to
Manila. The shipment was covered by a Bill of Lading issued by petitioner Cheng Lie Navigation Co., Ltd. (Cheng Lie)
with Oriental Tin Can & Metal Sheet Manufacturing Co., Inc. (Oriental) as the notify party. The cargoes were insured
against all risks by respondent Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. (Prudential). Upon discharge of the cargoes, it
was found that one of the tinplates was damaged. The sea van in which it was kept during the voyage was also damaged,
presumably while still on board the vessel and during the course of the voyage. Oriental then filed its claim against the
policy. Satisfied that Oriental’s claim was compensable, Prudential paid Oriental P205,220.97.
Prudential filed with the MeTC of Makati City a Complaint for sum of money against Cheng Lie and Atiko Trans, Inc.
(Atiko), its duly authorized shipagent. Later, Prudential filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, alleging among
others that a copy of the summons was served upon petitioners thru cashier Cristina Figueroa and that despite receipt
thereof petitioners failed to file any responsive pleading. MeTC granted ! judgment in default ! Atiko filed a Notice of
Appeal arguing that MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it because summons was served through its cashier and that
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the defendant is a domestic corporation like Atiko, summons may
be served only upon its president, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Cheng Lie filed its
own Memorandum of Appeal maintaining that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over its person because when the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service of summons may
be made, among others, upon its resident agent—but there is no proof that Atiko is the local agent of Cheng Lie. RTC
affirmed MeTC ! CA affirmed.

issue
Whether or not MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Atiko. YES
Whether or not MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Cheng Lie. NO

ratio

MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the person of Atiko. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be
acquired not only by proper service of summons but also by defendant’s voluntary appearance without expressly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction, as embodied in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 20. Voluntary
appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be
deemed a voluntary appearance.

When Atiko filed its Notice of Appeal, Memorandum of Appeal, Motion for Reconsiderationof the April 8, 2003
Decision of the RTC, and Petition for Review, it never questioned the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person. The filing
of these pleadings seeking affirmative relief amounted to voluntary appearance and, hence, rendered the alleged lack of
jurisdiction moot. In Palma v. Galvez: “…the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.” It was only in their Memorandum
filed with the SC where they claimed, for the first time, that Atiko was not properly served with summons. In La Naval
Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the issue of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant must be
seasonably raised.

MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Cheng Lie. Before it was amended by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC, Section
12 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated
by law to that effect, or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.


When the defendant is a foreign juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon: 1.Its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose; 2. The government official designated by law to receive summons if
the corporation does not have a resident agent; or 3. Any of the corporation’s officers or agents within the Philippines.
No summons was served upon Cheng Lie in any manner prescribed above. It should be recalled that Atiko was
not properly served with summons as the person who received it on behalf of Atiko, cashier Cristina Figueroa, is not one
of the corporate officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over
the person of Atiko not thru valid service of summons but by the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus, there being no
proper service of summons upon Atiko to speak of, it follows that the MeTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person
of Cheng Lie. To rule otherwise would create an absurd situation where service of summons is valid upon the purported
principal but not on the latter’s co-defendant cum putative agent despite the fact that service was coursed thru said
agent. Indeed, in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant foreign private juridical entity
under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there must be prior valid service of summons upon the agent of such
defendant.
Also, the records of the case is bereft of any showing that cashier Cristina Figueroa is a government official
designated by law to receive summons on behalf of Cheng Lie or that she is an officer or agent of Cheng Lie within the
Philippines. Hence, her receipt of summons bears no significance insofar as Cheng Lie is concerned.
With regard to Cheng Lie’s filing of numerous pleadings, the same cannot be considered as voluntary
appearance. Unlike Atiko, Cheng Lie never sought affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. From the very beginning, it has consistently questioned the validity of the
service of summons and the jurisdiction of the MeTC over its person.



SAMARTINO v. RAON
G.R. No. 131482 July 3, 2002 Ynares-Santiago, J.
petitioner
Regalado P. Samartino
respondent
Leonor B. Raon, Agustin G. Crisostomo, et al.
summary
Private respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. Summons was served to
petitioner’s brother since petitioner was in drug rehab at that time.
The court declared him in default for failure to answer the complaint and allowed the
respondents to present evidence ex parte. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the respondents.
RTC affirmed MTC judgment. CA dismissed Petition for Certiorari and MR.
Petitioner comes to court in a Petition for Review.
SC found there was improper service of summons because the requirements for a valid
substituted service were not fulfilled. The sheriff’s return contain no information regarding the
circumstances warranting a substituted service. Hence, jurisdiction was not acquired over the
petitioner and the judgment rendered by the lower court is null and void.

facts of the case
Private respondents filed in MTC a complaint for ejectment against petitioner. Summons was served to petitioner’s
brother since petitioner was in drug rehab at that time.
During trial, an NBI officer appeared before the court to certify that petitioner was in rehab and he is not able to
comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period. But the court still declared him in
default and allowed the respondents to present evidence ex parte. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the respondents and
ordered the petitioner to vacate the lot.
RTC affirmed MTC judgment. MTC issued writ of execution. Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment,
submitting an affidavit of merit alleging that the lot in question was already sold to him as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. RTC again dismissed the petition for relief.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed the petition and denied the MR.
Hence, this Petition for Review with the SC.

issue
Whether or not there was improper service of summons? YES, improper service of summons.

ratio
The Court found that the requirements for a valid substituted service were not fulfilled.
The sheriff’s return failed to show the reason why personal service could not be made.
“It failed to state that prompt and personal service on the defendant was rendered impossible.
“It was not shown that efforts were made to find the defendant personally and that said efforts failed; hence the resort
to substituted service.
“These requirements are indispensable because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
“It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of
such action is served not upon him but upon another whom law could only presume would notify him of the pending
proceedings.
“Nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom
substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s
residence.
“For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders
said service ineffective.”

“There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner.”
“The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to due
process.
“Perforce, the judgment rendered against petitioner is nugatory and without effect.”

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ASIAVEST LIMITED v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128803 25 September 1998 Davide, Jr., J.
petitioner
Asiavest Limited
respondents
Court of Appeals and Antonio Heras
summary
Asiavest Ltd, a Hong Kong company, filed a complaint against Heras (who left HK
for good and is now based in Quezon City) ordering him to pay to Asiavest the
amounts awarded by the HK Court. Heras claimed that the HK Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over him, especially since summons were not properly and validly served
on him (Asiavest had to apply for leave and commissioned the Sycip Salazar
Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the summons here in the Philippines). The
Court ruled that since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against
him was in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong
Kong. The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not
confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. The Hong Kong court
judgment cannot be given force and effect in the Philippines for having been rendered
without jurisdiction.

facts of the case
Asiavest Ltd, a Hong Kong company, filed a complaint against Antonio Heras, based on his personal
guarantee of the obligations of Compania Hermanos de Navegacion S.A who had defaulted its payments.
Based on the stipulation of facts, Heras had left Hong Kong for good and is now residing in New Manila,
Quezon City. Asiavest prayed that Heras pay to Asiavest the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court.
Heras claimed that the Hong Kong Court did not acquire jurisdiction over him. No summons was ever
served upon him in the Philippines and in Hong Kong, and neither did a copy of the judgment of the court
was served on him. Asiavest, however, contends that he was given a service of summons when a messenger
from the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served said summons by leaving a copy to his son-in-law. Furthermore, the
mere fact that the Hong Kong Court rendered judgment means that it can be presumed that there was service
of summons.

issue
WON the judgment of the HK Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to lack of notice
to the party. YES.

ratio
First, the court determined whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. An action in personam is an
action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.

In this case, the action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal
guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in
court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following
modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8;

(2) personal service outside
the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.
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However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
In the stipulated facts, Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines", which refers to his
residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. With this,
Asiavest cannot now claim that he was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.
Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, indisputably,
one in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial
service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction
over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the
Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Even assuming that Heras was formerly a Hong Kong resident, he was no longer so in November 1984 when
the extraterritorial service of summons was attempted to be made on him. Heras left HK in October 1984 "for
good."

His absence in HK must have been the reason why summons was not served on him therein; thus,
Asiavest was constrained to apply for leave to effect service in the Philippines, and upon obtaining a favorable
action on the matter, it commissioned the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan law firm to serve the
summons here in the Philippines.


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Manotoc v. CA
G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006 Velasco Jr., J.
petitioners
Ma. Imelda Manotoc a.k.a Imee Marcos
respondents
Court of Appeals, Agapita Trajano on behalf of the estate of Archimedes Trajano
summary
Trajano sought to enforce a foreign judgment before the RTC against Imee Marcos in a civil
case against the latter for the wrongful death of her husband Archimedes Trajano during
martial law. The sheriff sought to serve the summons to Imee in her residential address in
Alexandra Homes, Pasig City. However, following several failed attempts of personally
serving summons to Imee, the sheriff effected a substituted service of summons upon a certain
Dela Cruz who was allegedly Imee’s condo caretaker. The RTC and CA both held that the
court has validly acquired jurisdiction over Imee. However, the SC held that the service of
summons upon Imee was invalid and the court therefore did not acquire jurisdiction over her.
According to the court, for a sevice to be valid, it must comply with the requisites laid down in
the Rules of Court. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. Otherwise, the defendant’s right to
due process will be violated.

facts of the case
Imee Marcos is the respondent in a civil case filed before the US District Court by Agapita Trajano for the wrongful
death of her husband Archimedes Trajano by military intelligence under the command of the former during martial law.
Upon obtaining a favorable decision, Trajano sought to enforce the foreign judgment through the RTC. The RTC then
issued summons addressed to Imee’s residence as indicated in the complaint as Alexandra Homes , E2 Room 104, at No.
29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City. Upon failing to personally serve the complaint and summons upon Imee, the sheriff
resorted to substituted service by serving the summons upon one Macky Dela Cruz, who was allegedly the petitioner’s
caretaker. When Imee failed to file an answer, the RTC declared her in default. Imee, by way of special appearance,
eventually filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction alleging that the service was invalid because (1) she was not a
residence of Alexandra Homes but of Singapore; and (2) Dela Cruz was not her representative, employee or a resident of
said condo unit. The RTC rejected her claim so Imee filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA to annul
the RTC’s decision. The CA however, upheld the RTC’s ruling. Imee then elevated the case to the SC.

issue
WON the substituted service upon Imee Marcos was valid. NO, IT WAS NOT. COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF IMEE MARCOS.

ratio
The SC explained that Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or
when there is no valid service of summons, "any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void." In an action strictly in personam (like the case at bar), personal service on the defendant is the
preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for
excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the
usual method of service." This is why one must strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances
authorized by the ROC.

For a substituted service to be valid, the requisites laid down by Section 8 Rule 14 of the Old Rules of Court are as follows:
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service
! The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there
is impossibility of prompt service.
! While Section 8 of Rule 14 does not define "reasonable time," the court explained that it means as "so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract
or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party."
! According to the court, the following periods could be used to determine the sheriff to effect a personal service in
order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service:
• To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a
complaint is what a plaintiff wants.
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• One month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with regard to personal
service on the defendant. (based on practice in submitting sheriff’s returns which is 15-30 days and practice
in submitting clerk of court’s monthly reports to the Office of the Court Administrator which is first 10 days
of the month).
! The court further explained that since defendants are expected to be evasive, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period before substituted service becomes available.
! "Several attempts" means at least 3 tries, preferably on at least two different dates and the sheriff must cite why such
efforts were unsuccessful.
2. Specific details in the return
! The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service: efforts made to find defendant and reasons for failure, dates/times of attempts, names of occupants of
defendant’s residence, all acts done by the Sheriff, even if futile.
! SC Administrative Circular No. 5 (1989) requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating
the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof
of service.
3. Person of suitable age and discretion
! If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of "suitable
age and discretion then residing therein."
! A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons.
! "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". -> to be of sufficient discretion, such person
must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the
need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take
appropriate action.
! The court said that the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would
receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. -> this must be ensured by the sheriff and described in
the return.
! 2 requisites: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or
residence of defendant.
4. Competent person in charge
! According to the court, if the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of the place (ex. person managing the office or business of
defendant) and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

The court said that after a careful scrutiny of the sheriff’s return, it will be revealed that there has been an invalid
substituted service in this case citing the following reasons:
! There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why efforts of the Sherriff proved inadequate, to reach the
conclusion that personal service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of
"on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally," "at reasonable hours
during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or
residence or premises." -> no showing of extraordinary efforts to locate Imee.
! Requisites of ‘person of suitable age and discretion’ have not been complied with.
o Sheriff’s return does not show age, residence, and discretion of Dela Cruz nor does it indicate that the
latter is a resident in the defendant’s alleged condo unit.

Thus, considering the findings of the court, it declared that the service of summons against Imee Marcos was void and
illegal therefore the court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person.






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Pascual v. Pascual
G.R. No. 171916 4 December 2009 J. Peralta
petitioners
Constantino A. Pascual, substituted by his heirs, represented by Zenaida Pascual
respondents
Dr. Lourdes S. Pascual
summary
The process server failed to personally serve summons upon respondent, who was allegedly
not home at all the times the server came; instead, her maid received the summons. When
respondent was declared in default and an adverse judgment was rendered against her, she
assailed the validity of the service of summons. The CA agreed with her, declaring the service
of summons upon the maid as not sufficient to have vested jurisdiction with the RTC. The SC
upheld the CA’s decision, listing the requisites of a valid substituted service (see below) and
ruling that there had been no compliance with the requisites in this case. Thus, the RTC
judgment against respondent, issued without having acquired jurisdiction over the
respondent, is void.

facts of the case
Petitioner Constantino filed against respondent Dr. Lourdes a Complaint for Specific Performance with Prayer for
Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Damages. In the first Return of Service, the process server reported
that he was unable to serve summons at Dr. Lourdes’ residence, because she was not home, and only a maid who refused
to receive the summons was there. The following day, the process server returned to Dr. Lourdes’ home, but she was still
not present. The Return of Service thus reported that the original summons and copy of the complaint was not served.
The RTC where the case had been filed then issued an alias summons, and the server proceeded to Dr. Lourdes’
residence, accompanied by barangay officials. He was again unable to serve the alias summons, because the respondent
was apparently still not home.
Dr. Lourdes was then declared in default, and after trial, the RTC ruled in Constantino’s favor. When the RTC denied
her motions to set aside the order and to reconsider, she filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted Dr. Lourdes’ petition, ruling that there had been no valid service of
summons. Petitioner thus bring this petition for review.

issue
Whether there was proper and valid substituted service of summons on the respondent’s maid, through which the court
acquired jurisdiction over the respondent. NO.

ratio
This is an action in personam, and the defendant is in the Philippines. Thus, Secs. 6 and 7, Rule 14, govern. These
provide for service of summons on the defendant, in person; or, failing this, substituted service. Thus, personal service of
summons is the first option, and only when that cannot be done within a reasonable time may the process server resort to
substituted service.
The following are the requisites of a valid substituted service:
1. Impossibility of prompt personal service—It must be shown that the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time, i.e. one month, or there is impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts (three tries, on at
least two different dates) must have been made over the one-month period, and the sheriff must cite why such
efforts were unsuccessful.
2. Facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service—The date and time of the attempts, the
inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants or the alleged residence of defendant, and all
other acts done, though futile, must be specified in the Return.
3. Person of suitable age and discretion must receive the summons—This is a person who has attained the age of
full legal capacity (i.e. 18 years old), and is considered to have discernment to understand the importance of a
summons. Hence, such person must know how to read and understand English and fully realize the need to
deliver the summons to the defendant at the earliest possible time, so the defendant may take action. Therefore,
the person receiving the summons must have some “relation of confidence” to the defendant to ensure that the
summons would be received.
4. A competent person must be in charge—If substituted service will be done at the defendant’s office/regular place
of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge, such as the president or manager. This
person must have sufficient knowledge to understand the defendant’s obligation, the importance of the
summons, and the effect of inaction.
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In this case, the Returns of Service simply state that the defendant was not home, and the maid refused to receive the
summons. They show no actual exertion or positive steps taken by the officer/process server to personally serve the
summons on Dr. Lourdes.
The petitioners contend that the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions must operate in the
process server’s favor. But here, where there was no compliance whatsoever with the procedure for substituted
compliance, such presumption does not apply.
Thus, jurisdiction over Dr. Lourdes was never vested with the RTC. The decision never attained finality. The remedy
of Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 sought with the CA was thus proper.
11

REPUBLIC v. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 175299 Sept. 14, 2011 J. Leonardo – De Castro
petitioners
Republic of the Phils, represented by the DPWH, through the Hon. Sec., Hermogenes Ebdane
respondents
Alberto A. Domingo
summary
Domingo filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against DPWH Region III
for non-payment of equipment rentals. Summons was served to the address of DPWH Region
III, and was received by a clerk. DPWH was declared in default for failure to file its answer.
The OSG then filed a petition for annulment of judgment due to lack of jurisdiction, since the
summons should have been served with the OSG. Held: The DPWH Region III being attached
to the DPWH, is only an agent of the Republic. Sec. 13, Rule 14 RoC
1
specifically states that
when the Republic is the defendant, service may be effected on the SolGen. The decision is
void for failure to include indispensable parties.

facts of the case
Domingo filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against the DPWH Region III. He averred that
from April-Sept. 1992, they entered into 7 contracts for the lease of Domingo’s construction equipment in order to
implement the emergency projects of the agency, which aimed to control the flow of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo in the
adjacent towns in the provinces of Tarlac & Pampanga. DPWH failed to pay the rentals.

Summons was issued by the RTC. The proof of service of the Sheriff stated that he personally served the copy of the
summons together with the complaint upon DPWH Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga through a clerk in the
office. For failure to file a responsive pleading, the RTC declared the agency in default, and decided in favor of Domingo.

The OSG filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. They argued that the 7 contracts were entered into by the Regional Director, Asst. Regional
Director and/or Project Mngr. of the DPWH Region III for and in behalf of the Republic—the real party to the contract.
Moreover, under the law, the statutory representatives of the gov’t. for purposes of litigation are either the SolGen or the
Legal Service Branch of the Executive Dept. concerned. Hence, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the Republic.

CA: Dismissed. The regional office is an extension of the dept. itself and service of summons upon the former is
service upon the latter. Nothing in the functions of the OSG remotely suggests that service of summons upon the Republic
should be made exclusively on the OSG.


issue
WoN the summons were properly served with the regional office. NO

ratio
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired
through coercive process, generally by the service of summons issued by the court, or through the defendant's voluntary
appearance or submission to the court.

Jurisprudence instructs that when a suit is directed against an unincorporated gov’t agency, which, because it is
unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit against the agency’s principal, i.e., the State. The
DPWH and its regional office are merely the agents of the Republic, which is the real party in interest in the civil case.
Thus as mandated by Sec. 13, Rule 14 RoC, the summons in this case should have been served on the OSG.

The Court holds that the Republic was not validly served with summons in the civil case—the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the Republic. The decision is void.

1
SEC. 13. Service upon public corporations. – When the defendant is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the
Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service may be effected on its executive
head, or on such other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct.
12

JEHAN SHIPPING CORP. v. NFA
G.R. No. 159750 Dec.14,2005 J.Panganiban
petitioners
Jehan Shipping Corporation
respondents
National Food Authority (NFA)
summary
Jehan won in a suit against NFA in RTC. NFA filed an MR and Supplemental MR without
notice of hearing. Jehan claims that it is a violation of Sec.4 and 5 of Rule 15. SC disagreed:
GR: a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the
reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.
E2R: as provided in this case when the purpose of a notice of hearing was served. The test is
the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based.

facts of the case

Jehan sued NFA for a sum of money and injunction. The complaint was due to NFA’s fault and negligence in the
sinking of one of the vessels of Jehan which NFA hired in transporting imported rice. Jehan won in the RTC.

NFA filed an MR and Supplemental MR without a notice of hearing directed to the parties as required by Sec.
4 and 5 of Rule 15. The MR was dismissed based on such lack of notice of hearing. NFA filed a notice of appeal but was
denied because the MR did not toll the period of appeal and the decision became final.

issue WON the lack of notice of hearing in the MR is fatal, such that the filing of the Motion did not toll the
period to appeal and the RTC decision became final and executory? NO, there was substantial
compliance in this case.

ratio

Admittedly, NFA committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing in its MR, filed on the
very last day of its appeal period. Again, it committed the same lapse in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary
period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading. However, the purpose of the notice requirement—
procedural due process—was satisfied in this case. As an integral component of procedural due process, the three-day
notice required by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of
avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the
arguments in the motion before a resolution by the court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party
should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and
meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present
case, we believe that the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that the
compliance justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing.

AS APPLIED: The RTC gave Jehan 10 days within which to comment on NFAs MR. Jehan filed its Opposition to
the Motion. In its 14-page opposition, it not only pointed out that the Motion was defective for not containing a notice of
hearing and should then be dismissed; it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion and of
the Supplemental MR. In this case, the RTC set the MR and the Supplemental MR for hearing on during which Jehan’s
counsel appeared. In other cases, the Court has held that lack of notice is cured when, after learning that a motion has that
defect, the trial court promptly resets a hearing with due notice to all the parties.


13

Dumaguete v PPA
G.R. No. 168973 Aug. 24, 2011 J. Leonardo – De Castro
petitioners
CITY OF DUMAGUETE, herein Represented by City Mayor, Agustin R. Perdices
respondents
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY
summary
F: The City of Dumaguete filed for an Application for Original Registration of Title over a
parcel of land. Initially, the RTC dismissed such application based on the MTD of the
Respondent alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction as the land being sought to be registered
is part of the public domain. But the RTC subsequently reversed itself based on the MR and
Supplemental MR filed by Petitioner. Respondent now avers that MR and Supplement MR
were mere scraps of paper (thus no legal effect) for being procedurally flawed (Rule 13 and
15).
H: Ordinarily, non-compliance of procedural rules would render motions as mere scraps of
paper and unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, this case has
exceptional circumstances to warrant the liberal application of the rules.
For Section 11 of Rule 13, the considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels
(QC and Dumaguete) made the personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the
other clearly impracticable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done
would only be superfluous.
For Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15, there was substantial compliance with such rules when
Respondent received copies of the MR and the Supplemental MR, even if they did not receive
any Notice of Hearing. Respondent cannot claim that it was deprived of the opportunity to be
heard on its opposition to said Motions.
facts of the case
The City of Dumaguete, through its Mayor, filed for an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of
land with improvements before the RTC. It alleges that the land has been continuously possessed and occupied by the
City Mayor for more than 30 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and the OGCC filed Oppositions, saying that
they were not able to possess the land for more than 30 years and that it was part of the public domain.
During the pendency of the case, several postponements delayed the proceedings. After the testimony of the first
witness of the petitioner, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by the RTC,
stating that the subject property is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by
petitioner’s own witness, Engr. Dorado.
RTC: Granted the Motion to Dismiss. Because of this, Petitioner filed an MR and Supplemental MR, asserting that the
dismissal is premature.
Respondent: MR and Supplement MR had procedural and substantive defects. It violated Sections 4 (Hearing of
motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also failed to
comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the Motion for Reconsideration a written
explanation why it did not resort to personal service of the said Motion. They should then be treated as mere scraps of
paper with no legal effect. Since it did not interrupt the reglementary period to appeal, the Order had already attained
finality.
RTC: Initially, it agreed that the MR by the Petitioner violated the abovementioned Rules but it subsequently agreed
with the Supplemental MR, in the interest of justice, and decided to proceed with the case by having a full-blown
proceeding to determine factual issues in the case.
Respondent: Filed a Rule 65 before the CA because it avers that the RTC acted with GAD when it modified a judgement
that has attained finality.
CA: Granted the Petition for Certiorari.

issues
WON Secs. 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 may be relaxed in this case. YES.
WON Sec. 11 of Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case. YES.




ratio
14
The Court held that it was an error for the CA to act on the Petition for Certiorari by the Respondent, as the RTC’s
decision to reverse itself was well within its powers. Procedural rules may be relaxed in order to serve the demands of
substantial justice, especially if it cites meritorious grounds to justify the liberal application of the procedural rules.

Substantial Grounds to Justify Liberal Application
Generally, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. As a
necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
In this case, jurisdiction was vested in the RTC as Petitioner properly followed the prescribed form and content of
Applications for Original Registration of Lands. Respondent then sought the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence presented by
petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienable
and disposable. When the RTC initially dismissed the Application, it indeed acted prematurely as factual issues such as
the nature of the land must be resolved in the normal course of trial.

Procedural Issues
Admittedly, said motions filed by Petitioner did not comply with certain rules of procedure. Ordinarily, such non-
compliance would have rendered said motions as mere scraps of paper, considered as not having been filed at all, and
unable to toll the reglementary period for an appeal. However, we find that the exceptional circumstances extant in the
present case warrant the liberal application of the rules.
For Section 11 of Rule 13, the considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels (QC and Dumaguete)
made the personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other clearly impracticable and a written
explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be superfluous.
For Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15, there was substantial compliance with such rules when Respondent received copies
of the MR and the Supplemental MR, even if they did not receive any Notice of Hearing. Respondent cannot claim that it
was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on its opposition to said Motions.


15

De los Reyes v Ramnani
G.R. No. 169135 June 18, 2010 DEL CASTILLO, J.
petitioners
JOSE DELOS REYES
respondents
JOSEPHINE ANNE B. RAMNANI
summary
Motion for issuance of final certificate of sale is non-litigious. Ramnani won a civil case and
bought the property on public auction. It was not redeemed. Now the petitioner cannot contest
the right of Ramnani asking for a final cert. of sale. Being a non-litigious motion, it does not
need a notice of hearing.

facts of the case
Ramnani won in a civil case. A writ of execution was issued. Ramnani was the highest bidder in the auction sale.
Consequently, a certificate of sale was executed in her favor. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court. After 12
years a certificate of sale was annotated at the back of the TCT. Taxes on the sale was paid a year after.
2004- Ramnani filed a motion (subject motion) for the issuance of an order directing the sheriff to execute the final
certificate of sale in her favor. Petitioner opposed on the twin grounds that the subject motion was not accompanied by a
notice of hearing and that the trial court’s October 11, 1977 Decision can no longer be executed as it is barred by
prescription.
The trial court ruled that the prescription for the issuance of a writ of execution is not applicable in this case. Less
than a year from the October 11, 1977 Decision, respondent exercised her right to enforce the same through the levy and
sale of the subject property on June 6, 1978. Although the annotation was on 1990, petitioner still did not exercise right to
redeem.
CA:affirmed. Respondent is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right because
petitioner failed to redeem the subject property.


issue
WON notice of hearing is needed. NO
WON respondent is barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. NO

ratio
While, as a general rule, all written motions should be set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15, excepted from this rule
are nonlitigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. Ramnani is entitled to the issuance of the final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to
oppose the same.

Petitioner argues that there is prescription because of respondent’s failure to secure the final certificate of sale within
10 years from the entry of said judgment. However, the decision was already enforced when the property was levied and
sold about 8 months after promulgation of decision.
"#


Koppel Inc v Makati Rotary Club
Foundation
G.R. No. 198075 Sept 4 2013 J. Perez
petitioners
Koppel Inc (FKI)
respondents
Makati Rotary Club Foundation (MRCF)
summary
Due to a dispute regarding a lease contract which contained an arbitration
clause, MCRF sued to eject FKI. MeTC went through with the case, and
ruled in favor of FKI (~eject). When it reached SC, it ruled that, because of
the arbitration clause, the proper thing for MeTC to have done is to have
stayed the action and referred the parties to arbitration.

facts of the case
! 1975. Koppel (FKI) donated a parcel of land to Makati Rotary Club Foundation (MRCF) with the condition that
the land will be leased to KFI for 25 years
! The Contract of Lease had an Arbitration Clause that was enforceable if the parties had any disagreement as
regards the ¨interpretation, application and execution¨ of the lease.
! The lease was renewed twice, on 2000 and on 2005, and the rent was fixed at P4.2m/yr. Moreover, FKI had to
make a yearly donation to MRCF.
! 2009. FKI refused to pay any more rent, arguing that it was exorbitant and in violation of their original agreement
which, according to FKI, actually extended up to 2025.
! MCRF sent two demand letters. KFI refused to pay and sued to rescind the donation at the RTC. MCRF instituted
this ejectment case in the MeTC.
! Despite the arbitration clause, MeTC refused to dismiss the case. Still, it rendered judgment in favor of KFI (MeTC ruling:
insufficient demand because the 2
nd
demand letter was not introduced in evidence.)
! RTC reversed and ordered KFI to vacate. It ruled that, among other things, KFI cannot invoke the arbitration clause and
impugn the validity of the lease contract at the same time.
! CA affirmed.

issues
Whether the instant case is arbitrable. YES.

What are the legal effects of applying the Arbitration Clause?
(1) The Court must stay the action until arbitration has been had. (RA 876 Sec 7)
(2) The Ct must refer the parties to arbitration. (RA 9285 Sec 24)


ratio
MRCF argued that, pursuant to Gonzales v Climax Mining, the validity of a contract cannot be subject to arbitration
proceedings because this requires the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which are within judicial
function.
SC clarified that Gonzales was decided on the fact that the law being applied necessitated that the case be a mining
dispute, which Gonzales was not. It is therefore not applicable here. Moreover, it was previously held in Cargill
Philippines v San Fernando Regal Trading that even the rescission of a contract is arbitrable.
As to the argument that FKI failed to file a formal request for arbitration, the SC said that it is sufficient to request
such not later than pretrial conference (RA 9285 Sec 24).
MeTC was in error when it went through with the proceedings. It should have instead stayed the action and referred
the parties to arbitration, in accordance with their contract.
The SC explained that, in the past, courts regarded arbitration with disdain, hostility and jealousy. Much has
changed, however, with the courts recognizing that alternative means of dispute resolution are effective partners in the
administration of justice, such that bona fide arbitration agreements are now recognized as valid.
The SC, therefore, set aside all proceedings and remanded the case back to MeTC, ordered the same to be suspended
at the point when FKI filed its counterclaim (this is the time when FKI requested for arbitration) and referred the parties
to arbitration.
17

Strongworld v. Perello
G.R. No. 148026 July 27, 2006 J. Chico-Nazario
petitioners
Strongworld Construction Corp., Leo Cleto Gamolo & Reynold Molo
respondents
Hon. N. C. Perello, First People’s Bank (formerly Rural Bank of San Teodoro), Bank of
Commerce, Orlando Francisco, and Editha Lizarda.
summary
Strongworld & board directors filed a complaint for sum of money and damages vs banks &
its EEs for depositing checks to personal accounts. RTC dismissed complaint for no cause of
action, petitioners not proper property in interest. CA dismissed appeal since wrong course of
certiorari (Rule 41 v Rule 65). SC ruled that CA erred. Dismissal of the complaint being
without prejudice, the remedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.

facts of the case
• Rizal Cement Co delivered to Strongworld four 4 checks amounting to P5,085,615.22 as payment for the construction
of housing units.
• However, the subject checks were not deposited to Strongworld’s Bank of Commerce account, but were instead
diverted to the personal accounts of bank employees Francisco and Lizarda in First People’s Bank, without the
knowledge and consent of Gamolo and Molo, Strongworld’s authorized signatories, and without authority from
Strongworld’s Board of Directors. No action was made by respondent despite repeated demands, resulting in the
damage and prejudice of petitioners.
• Petitioners filed a complaint for sum of money and damages w/ RTC Muntinlupa City.
• RTC (Jan.9, 1998): Dismissed complaint. Not prosecuted by the proper property in interest, no cause of action. Gamolo
& Molo, though officers of Strongworld, did not show any evidence proving authority to sue or defend in behalf of the
company.
• Petitioners’ MR (Mar.30): Granted. Case reinstated. Though board resolution authorizing Gamolo to prosecute the case
in behalf of Strongworld was defective (not authenticated by the proper officer), intention to authorize was clear.
• RTC (May 7): Recalled Mar.30 order. Case should remain dismissed. MR was not served on respondents. Also lacked a
notice of hearing, which rendered MR a mere scrap of paper.
• Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration and for Declaration of Default. Dismissed by RTC.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari w/CA.
• CA: Dismissed for utilizing the wrong recourse of certiorari. Remedy of a party aggrieved of a final order or judgment
is appeal under Sec.1, Rule 41, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (RRCP), and not a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65.
• Petitioners’ MR denied. Hence, present petition for review on certiorari w/ SC.

issue
WoN CA was in error when it dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari on the ground that appeal was the appropriate
remedy under Rule 41, 1997 RRCP, and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 – YES
(To fit discussion: WoN RTC’s May 7 order, reviving the Jan.9 order, which dismissed the complaint, an order dismissing
an action without prejudice – YES. Not appealable thus Rule 65 proper remedy)

ratio
Dismissal with prejudice - disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; subject to the right of appeal
Dismissal without prejudice – allows refilling of complaint; not appealable
Dismissals that are based on the following grounds, based on Sec.1, Rule 16, 1997 RRCP: (1) that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations (letter f); (2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished (letter h); and (3) that the claim on which the
action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds (letter i), bar the refiling of the same action
or claim, as provided by Sec.5 of the same rule. Logically, the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the preceding
grounds is “with prejudice” because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo, dismissals
based on the rest of the other grounds enumerated in Sec.1 are without prejudice because they do not preclude the
refiling of the same action.
In this case, the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint was not based on any of the grounds specified in Sec.5, Rule 16
(letters h, i, j of Sec.1), rather, it was grounded on what was encapsulated in Sec.1(g), that the complaint states no cause of
action for not being prosecuted by the proper party in interest. For this reason, the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint
cannot be said to be a dismissal with prejudice which bars the refiling of the same action.
18
Sec.1(h), Rule 41, 1997 RRCP mandates that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without
prejudice. The same section provides that in such an instant where the final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. In this case, CA erred when it ruled that petitioners’ petition
for certiorari filed before it was not the proper remedy. The dismissal of the complaint being without prejudice, the
remedy available to the aggrieved party is Rule 65.



Sec.1, Rule 41, 1997 RRCP

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable:
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending,
unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.

Sec.1, Rule 16, 1997 RRCP

SECTION 1. Grounds. – Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of
frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.


Sec.5, Rule 16, 1997 RRCP

SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. – Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based
on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim.




19

PINGA v HEIRS OF GERMAN SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006 J. Tinga
petitioners
Eduardo Pinga
respondents
Heirs of German Santiago represented by Fernando Santiago
summary
A counterclaim can stand on its own. Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the original complaint due to the fault of plaintiff
does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim. Dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the
counterclaim.

facts of the case
Pinga was one of the two defendants in a complaint for injunction filed by the Heirs of Santiago, alleging
that he and co-defendant Saavedra had been entering Santiago’s coco land, cutting wood and bamboos and
harvesting fruits therein. Pinga filed a counterclaim, alleging that the lands were owned by his father.
The Heirs failed to attend the hearings, and the case was dismissed. Pinga elevated the matter to the SC via
certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the dismissal of his counterclaim.

issue
WON the dismissal of the original complaint shall cause the dismissal of the counterclaim? NO

ratio (just see summary, no need to read all these)
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of
plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact,
the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim.

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion
of defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The express qualification in the provision that the dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff’s fault, as
in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or separate action. This stands in marked contrast to the provisions under Rule 17 of
the 1964 Rules of Court which were superseded by the 1997 amendments. In the 1964 Rules, dismissals due to
failure to prosecute were governed by Section 3, Rule 17, to wit:

SEC. 3. Failure to prosecute. — If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect
of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.

Evidently, the old rule was silent on the effect of such dismissal due to failure to prosecute on the pending
counterclaims. As a result, there arose what one authority on remedial law characterized as "the nagging
question of whether or not the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim."22
Jurisprudence construing the previous Rules was hardly silent on the matter.

The doctrine that the complaint may not be dismissed if the counterclaim cannot be independently adjudicated
is not available to, and was not intended for the benefit of, a plaintiff who prevents or delays the prosecution
of his own complaint. Otherwise, the trial of counterclaims would be made to depend upon the maneuvers of
20
the plaintiff, and the rule would offer a premium to vexing or delaying tactics to the prejudice of the
counterclaimants. It is in the same spirit that we have ruled that a complaint may not be withdrawn over the
opposition of the defendant where the counterclaim is one that arises from, or is necessarily connected with,
the plaintiff’s action and cannot remain pending for independent adjudication.

While the distinction is necessary as a means to facilitate order and clarity in the rules of procedure, it should
be remembered that the primordial purpose of procedural rules is to provide the means for the vindication of
rights. A party with a valid cause of action against another party cannot be denied the right to relief simply
because the opposing side had the good fortune of filing the case first.

Thus, the present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the
counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not
on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers
jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing
it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on
those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect
such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.


21

VIRRA MALL TENANTS v. VIRRA MALL
G.R. No. 182902 October 5, 2011 J. Sereno
Petitioner
Virra Mall Tenants Association, Inc.
Respondents
Virra Mall Greenhills Association, Inc., Lolita Regalado, Annie Trias, Wilson Go, Pablo Ochoa,
Jr., Bill Obag and George Winternitz
Summary
Intervenor association, which is seeking to be reimbursed by the plaintiff in a civil case, has a
right to intervene therein because (1) it has a cause of action against the defendant of that case,
which defendant allegedly refused to reimburse it for expenses it incurred for the
rehabilitation of a property; (2) it has a legal interest in that case in that it stands to be
benefitted or injured by its result; and (3) its intervention will avoid the multiplicity of suits.

facts of the case
Ortigas & Company (Ortigas), owner of the Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC), and Virra Realty entered into a 25-
year lease contract over a portion of the GSC. Pursuant thereto, Virra Realty constructed Virra Mall, and organized
respondent Virra Mall Greenhills Association (VMGA), an association of all the tenants and leasehold right holders
managing and operating Virra Mall. VMGA assumed and was subrogated to all the rights, obligations and liabilities of
Virra Realty in the lease with Ortigas.
VMGA requested for Ortigas to renew the lease since it had already expired. Meanwhile, it also acquired new sets
of insurance policies effective from January 10-December 31, 2001. On May 5, 2001, Virra Mall was gutted by fire,
requiring substantial repair and restoration. Thus, VMGA claimed the insurance proceeds.
On September 3, 2001, Ortigas entered into a new lease with VMGA, through its President, Uy. Then, Uy assigned
and transferred all his rights and interests over the property to herein petitioner Virra Mall Tenants Association
(VMTA).
Ortigas sued several defendants including herein respondents for Specific Performance with Damages and Prayer
for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. It accused them of fraud, misappropriation and conversion of
substantial portions of the insurance proceeds for their own personal use unrelated to the repair and restoration of Virra
Mall. To secure the subject insurance proceeds, Ortigas also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against herein respondents.
VMTA filed a Complaint-in-Intervention in the above case, claiming that as the assignee or transferee of the
rights and obligations of Uy in the Second Contract of Lease, and upon the order of Ortigas, it had engaged the
services of various contractors in the amount of P18,902,497.75. Thus, it sought the reimbursement of the expenses it
had incurred in relation thereto.
The RTC admitted VMTA’s Complaint-in-Intervention and denied respondents’ subsequent motion for dismissal
thereto. However, upon respondent’s Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the CA, the RTC’s ruling was reversed upon
the grounds that: (a) VMTA failed to state a cause of action; (b) VMTA has no legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (c) the
Complaint-in-Intervention would cause a delay in the trial of the action, make the issues more complicated, prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the parties, stretch the issues, and increase the breadth of the remedies and relief. The CA stressed that if VMTA had
any cause of action, it would be against Ortigas and not VMGA, because it was the former that ordered it to undertake the
rehabilitation. Also, it lacked legal interest in the case between Ortigas and VMGA since it was not privy to the first
contract of lease between the two.

issue
WON VMTA’s Complaint-in-Intervention was proper – YES.

ratio
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: “A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.” Such interest must be of a
direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment.
Applying the foregoing points to the case at bar, VMTA may be allowed to intervene because of the following
reasons.
22
First, VMTA has a cause of action, which is “the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.” The elements
of a cause of action consist of: (1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff, (2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect
the plaintiff’s right, and (3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.
In the case at bar, VMTA, in its Complaint-in-Intervention, explicitly laid down its cause of action, which is VMGA’s
failure to deliver the insurance proceeds to the real beneficiary, VMTA, and its alleged misappropriation thereof, inspite
of due notice and demand. VMTA’s purported right as the real beneficiary of the insurance proceeds is rooted on the
ground that it had facilitated and spent for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall upon Ortigas’orders. Corollarily,
respondents have a duty to reimburse it for its expenses since the insurance proceeds had already been issued in favor of
respondent VMGA, even if the latter was not rightfully entitled thereto. Finally, the imputed act or omission on the part
of respondents that supposedly violated the right of VMTA was respondent VMGA’s refusal, despite demand, to release
the insurance proceeds it received to reimburse the former for the expenses it had incurred in relation to the restoration
and repair of Virra Mall.
Second, VMTA has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. It is seeking reimbursement from Ortigas for the
substantial amount it had advanced for the repair and restoration of Virra Mall. Precisely because VMTA seeks
reimbursement from Ortigas that the intervention is proper, since the main issue in the case between Ortigas and VGMA
is whether the former has a contractual right to the insurance proceeds received by the latter. Thus, the recoupment by
VMTA of the expenses it incurred in the repair of Virra Mall depends on the success of either party in the main case.
VMTA therefore has an undeniable stake in the said civil case that would warrant its intervention therein.
Further, the issuance to Ortigas of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against VMGA puts VMTA in a situation in
which it will be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the court,
pursuant to the said writ. The prospect of any distribution or disposition of the attached property will likewise affect
VMTA’s claim for reimbursement.
Finally, VMTA’s intervention will avoid a multiplicity of suits. Although the CA was correct in stating that VMTA
could always file a separate case against Ortigas, allowing VMTA to intervene will facilitate the orderly administration of
justice and avoid a multiplicity of suits.

23

Pinlac v. CA
G.R. No. 91486 September 10, 2003 Ynares-Santiago, J.
petitioners
Alberto Pinlac, et al
respondents
CA
summary
This is a case for quieting of title. The Republic filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-
in-intervention concerning Lot No. 3 when the petitioners’ MR was already pending before the
SC. SC granted Republic’s petition to protect public interest as well as government properties
located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of
procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice.

facts of the case
The case stemmed from a Petition for quieting of title filed by petitioners over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot
1, 2 & 3. TC rendered a partial decision in favour of petitioners declaring them to be the absolute owners of the 3 lots and
that the area of Lot 3 was in excess of its true and actual area. The private respondents filed a petition to annul TC partial
decision with CA. CA granted and this was affirmed by SC.
On MR before SC, petitioners contend that TC decision w/ respect to Lot 3 should not have been annulled by CA
because the petition for annulment filed by private respondents concerned only Lot 2. SC issued a resolution reinstating
TC decision concerning Lot 3. Republic of the Philippines, represented by Land Registration Authority thru OSG filed
a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring OCT of Lot 3 be
declared valid and not in excess of its true and actual area.
note: government buildings found in Lot 3 are HOR, CSC, DSWD, Sandiganbayan, COA, DPWH, PUP, TESDA, several public
elementary and high schools, health centers and barangay halls

issue
WON Republic’s petition-in-intervention should be granted despite being filed pending resolution of MR by the
petitioners - YES

ratio
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully
and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention
notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the TC. In one case, intervention was allowed even when the petition for
review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.
The intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government properties
located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a
protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its
properties.
The TC decision regarding Lot 3 was flawed as it neither specify which portions are in excess of the area of Lot 3
nor state the metes and bounds that would serve as basis for implementing the dispositive portion of the decision.
24

Agustin v CA
G.R. No. 162571 June 15, 2005 Corona, J.
petitioners
Arnel Agustin
respondents
Hon. Court of Appeals
summary
The trial court ordered Agustin to submit to a DNA test to determine his alleged
paternity of Martin Angela, in a case for support filed by Martin’s mother Fe. CA
affirmed. Agustin filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65, claiming compelled DNA
testing violates his right against self-incrimination. The SC upheld the TC’s order,
ruling that DNA testing technology has merit as a dependable and authoritative
form of evidence gathering. Agustin was unable to prove that the CA acted with
grave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial court’s order to compel DNA
testing. CA decision AFFIRMED.

facts of the case
Fe Angela and her son Martin sued Martin’s alleged biological father, Agustin, for support and support pedente lite
before the QC RTC, claiming that Agustin impregnated Fe in Nov. 1999, resulting in her giving birth to Martin out of
wedlock in Aug. 2000. In support of these claims, she presented a baby’s birth certificate purportedly signed by Agustin,
who had shouldered pre-natal and hospital expenses but refused further requests for support.

Jan 2001: incident wherein Agustin had sped off in a van, and hit Fe’s leg while she carried baby Martin. (incident was
reported to the police) July 2001: Fe was diagnosed with leukemia, has been undergoing chemotherapy ever since. March
2002: Fe and Martin sue Agustin for support.

Agustin denied having sired Martin and claimed that he had ended his relationship with Fe in 1998, before Martin’s
conception (he terminated the affair to return to his wife and children); that he and his family migrated to the U.S. then
returned in June 2000 to find Fe spreading rumors about him impregnating her; that the community tax certificate
attributed to him in acknowledgement of Martin’s birth ceritifcate was falsified, and erroneously reflected his marital
status to be single when he was actually married.

July 23 2002: Martin and Fe move for issuance of the order that all parties submit to DNA paternity testing pursuant to
rule 28 of the ROC. Agustin opposed on grounds that DNA would violate his right against self-incrimination, and that Fe
lacked cause of action considering his signature on the birth certificate was forgery, and that the law does not entitle an
illegitimate child to support if not recognized by the putative father.

TC: denied Agustin’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and ordered submission to DNA paternity testings. The CA
affirmed.

issue
WON the CA committed grave abuse in discretion in upholding the Trial Court’s resolution ordering the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing. NO. Compelling Agustin to submit to DNA paternity
testing does NOT violate his constitutional right to privacy and self-incrimination. DNA testing technology
has merit as a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. Agustin was unable to prove that
the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding the trial court’s order to compel DNA testing. CA
decision AFFIRMED.

ratio

1. First, the trial court properly denied Agustin’s motion to dismiss because Fe had a cause of action.
Elements of cause of action
2
have been complied with, and in this case, the sexual relationship between Fe

2
ELEMENTS of CAUSE OF ACTION: 1. Plaintiff’s primary right and defendant’s corresponding primary duty, 2. Delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated.
25
and Agustin was undisputed. Whether this relationship produced Martin determines right for support;
therefore there is a cause of action.

2. Agustin’s refusal to recognize Martin and the authenticity of the birth certificate and his claim that Martin,
as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support without first establishing his filiation under Art.
283 and Art. 265 of the Civil Code are WITHOUT MERIT. The assailed resolution allowed Fe and Martin
to prove their cause of action against Agustin’s allegations of non-authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledge. Accord. to relevant jurisprudence
3
, whether or not Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation, which may be accomplished by the
proceedings ordered by the trial court, i.e. submission to DNA paternity testing.

3. [MAIN] Agustin’s contention that DNA is not recognized as a conclusive means of proving paternity and
that such an order violates his right against self-incrimination has NO MERIT.

a. Relevant Philippine jurisprudence
4
show that DNA testing is recognized as relevant evidence for
determining filiation. EVIDENCE IS RELEVANT when it relates directly to the fact in issue as to
induce believe in its existence or non-existence. DNA evidence is relevant and reliable, being
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

b. Compulsory DNA testing and admissibility thereof is constitutional. The right against self-
incrimination applies only against testimonial compulsion, not all compulsion. Where the evidence
sought to be excluded is part of objective evidence, such as DNA samples, and not extracted
from the lips of the accused as an admission of guilt, such is admissible. (other examples of
objective evidence include: photographs, hairs, other bodily substances, pregnancy tests for women
accused of adultery, etc.) If in a criminal case, an accused whose life is at stake can be compelled
to submit to DNA testing, so much more for a civil case where the consequences are not as dire.

c. In U.S. jurisprudence
5
, DNA testing has become so commonly accepted that ordering its
procedure has become a ministerial act, such as in Wilson v Lamb, where the SC of St. Lawrence
County, New York, allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently
challenge his prior knowledge, ordering the Family Court examiner to order DNA tests: “Upon
receiving a party’s challenge to an acknowledgement, the court shall order genetic marker tests or
DNA tests for the determination of the child’s paternity, if appropriate.”



3
Tayag v CA: in this case, the Court allowed integration of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one’s inheritance
Biz v Biz: there is absolute necessity requiring the action to compel acknowledgement/filiation be instituted and prosecuted successfully
prior to the action in which the same plaintiff seeks…partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs.
4
Tijing v CA, 2001: recognized that the University of the Philippines National Science Research INsititue DNA analysis Laboratory now has the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat analysis; People v Vallejo reasoned that DNA is admissible and authorityive
evidence in a rape case where murder victim’s DNA sameples from bloodstained clothes were admitted in evidence; People v Yaar
affirmed conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, principle evidence including DNA test results, in which the decision discussed
DNA, the process of DNA testing, and its admissibility in the context of rules of evidence (i.e. consider how the samples are collected,
handled, possibility of contamination, procedure followd in analyinzg samples, whether proper standards an dprocedures were followed in
conducting th ettests, and the qualification of the analysis)

5
i. DNA testing also appears in New York Family Court Act: that if the record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test
indicates at least 95% probability of apternaity, the admission of such record/report shall create a rebuttable presumption of paternity and
establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child…
ii. Rafferty v Perkins: SC of Missispi ruled that DNA tests rusults howing paternity were sufficient to overthrow presumption of legitimacy of
child born during the course of marriage
iii.Kohn v Amundson: SC of South Dakota demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity can be vacated after the adjudicated
father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity

26

Herrera v. Alba
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005 J. Carpio
petitioners
Rosendo Herrera (father)
respondents
Rosendo Alba (son), Armi Alba (mother), Hon. Nimfa Cuesta-Vilches, Presiding Judge, RTC
Manila Branch 48
summary
Rosendo Alba through his mother files a petition for compulsory recognition as biological son
of Rosendo Herrera. Herrera asserts that DNA testing is not accepted as a valid probative tool
to determine paternity, and that DNA is als inconclusive, coercive and violative of the right of
persons against self-incrimination. Court reiterates previous rulings and confirms DNA
analysis as a valid probative tool in determining filiation in this jurisdiction, subject to the
Vallejo standards for DNA testing. DNA analysis was also held to be constitutional, as the
right against self-incrimination is applicable only to testimonial evidence.
facts of the case

Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi, filed before the TC a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against Rosendo Herrera. R. Herrera filed a counterclaim denying that he is the biological father of R. Alba and
denying physical contact with Armi. As a result R. Alba and Armi filed a motion to direct the taking of a DNA paternity
test to abbreviate the proceedings. This was supported by the testimony of Dr. Saturnina Halos, a Cell Biology professor,
stating that the test had an accuracy rating of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. This was opposed by R. Herrera, arguing
that DNA testing has not yet gained acceptability and that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-
incrimination.

RTC granted motion to conduct DNA paternity testing for R. Herrera, R. Alba and Armi. R. Herrera files a MFR, arguing
that the DNA test would be “inconclusive, irrelevant and coercive… as well as being unconstitutional”. This was denied,
hence the appeal to the CA, which in turn affirmed the RTC decision, stating that the proposed DNA paternity testing
does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. The CA also
pointed out that Herrera can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.

issue
1. Whether or not DNA testing is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. YES.
2. Whether or not DNA testing is violative of Herrera’s right against self-incrimination. NO.

ratio
1. The Court, in discussing filiation proceedings, first gave an overview of paternity and filiation suits,
stating that the burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity
action which parties have to face:
a. A prima facie case – exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father, in which case corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to
the putative father;
b. Affirmative defenses – wherein the father may show incapability of sexual relations with the
mother because of either:
i. Physical absence, or
ii. Impotency
c. Presumption of legitimacy – applies to a child born to a husband and wife during a valid
marriage, in which case the child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under strict standards of
the law
d. Physical resemblance between the putative father and child – may be offered as part of the
evidence of paternity, however this kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier or
facts.

Rules enunciated by the Court to establish filiation include provision from the Family Code (Art. 172,
175) and the Rules of Court (Rule 130, Secs. 39-40), as well as other “incriminating acts” that may be
27
used to establish filiation, such as those enunciated in Pe Lim vs. CA (incriminating verbal and written
acts of the father), Co Tao vs. CA and Jao vs. CA (blood grouping test results).

In the case of DNA testing, the Court affirmed its rulings regarding the Court’s attitude towards the
probative value and admissibility of DNA Analysis as evidence, as iterated in Tijing vs. CA, People vs.
Vallejo and People vs. Yatar. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the Rules of Court did not pose
any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence, however the Court maintained that
trial courts are to be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence.

It is not enough to state that a child’s DNA profile matches that of its putative father. A complete
match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not
necessarily establish paternity. The highest standard adopted in an American jurisdiction require at
least 99.9% as minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) – a numerical estimate for the
likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to two random unrelated individuals. DNA
analysis that excludes the putative father should therefore be conclusive proof of non-paternity.

If the value is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence against paternity. If the value is 99.9% or higher, then there is a refutable presumption of
paternity that should be subjected to the standards of the Vallejo
6
case.

2. The Court then states that Art. III, Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right against
self-incrimination, is applicable only to testimonial evidence, stating the TC’s order:
“Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a
paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right
against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is “communicative” in
essence taken under duress (People vs. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 1987). The Supreme Court has
ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material… a defendant can be
required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body… the substance emitting from the
body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness… morphine forced out
of the mouth was received as proof… an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of
pants for size was allowed… and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit
for pregnancy test… since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on “testimonial
compulsion.”

6
People vs. Vallejo (431 Phil. 798 [2002]) states that “In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.”
28

Spouses Yu v. Basilio G. Magno Construction
G.R. No. 138701-02 17 October 2006 J. Garcia
petitioners
Spouses Roque Yu, Sr., Asuncion Yu and Leyte Lumber Yard & Hardware Co., Inc.
respondents
Basilio G. Magno Construction and Development and the Estate of Basilio G. Magno
summary
Petitioners filed two separate yet essentially similar complaints for sums of money against
respondents. The RTC rendered two separate decisions, but it was written by only one judge.
Without questioning this fact, the two parties appealed to the CA, which rendered a
consolidated decision. The petitioners now question the validity of the RTC decisions (having
penned by only one judge) and the propriety of consolidation. The SC ruled that it is too late
for the parties to question the judge’s decisions now, especially since it appears that a previous
consolidation had been agreed upon. Further, consolidation, given the circumstances of the
case (see enumeration below), should have been imperative.

facts of the case
Petitioners filed two separate complaints, both for sums of money with damages and preliminary attachment, against
the respondents:
1. Civil Case No. 5822—Raffled to Branch 8, Tacloban RTC; instituted by Leyte Lumber (where Roque Yu, Sr.
was president) against BG Magno and the estate of Basilio G. Magno, to collect on the amount of construction
materials allegedly obtained by BG Magno on credit; and
2. Civil Case No. 5823—Raffled to Branch 6, Tacloban RTC; instituted by the Spouses Yu against BG Magno and
Magno’s estate, to collect upon loans and advances allegedly made by the spouses to Magno.
On the same date, both branches rendered judgment in Magno’s favor. The two separate decisions were penned by
one judge: Judge Getulio Francisco of Branch 6. The parties in the cases did not call Judge Francisco’s attention to the
absence of a consolidation order of the two cases: instead, they directly appealed to the CA.
The CA then rendered a consolidated decision, where BG Magno was absolved from paying Leyte Lumber, but was
ordered to pay the spouses Yu. Petitioners thus brought this Rule 45 petition for review to the Supreme Court.

issue
Whether Judge Francisco had validly issued a decision for the case filed and heard in Branch 8. YES. There appears to
have been a prior agreement to consolidate the two cases before Branch 6, though no actual date of consolidation can
be found. Further, consolidation was the proper procedural step in this case, due to the identity of the cases.

ratio
Motions filed by petitioners’ counsel reflect the docket numbers of both cases, so as early as 6 months prior to Judge
Francisco’s decisions in the 2 cases, it is apparent that there was a transfer/consolidation of cases known to the parties,
though no actual date of transfer/consolidation appears on record. Further, there was no opposition from either of the
parties to the separate decisions by Judge Francisco. It is thus too late for the petitioners to question his competence in
rendering the two separate decisions.
In this case, consolidation of actions (expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31, Rules of Court) is appropriate for the
following reasons:
1. The cases were filed just a few months apart;
2. They involve simple cases of collection of sums of money between identical parties;
3. The respondents claim the same defense, i.e. overpayment;
4. The cases cover the same period of transactions, i.e. 4 years;
5. They entailed the presentation of practically identical evidence and witnesess.
The purpose of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent
delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the trial court’s work, and attain justice while causing the party-litigants the
least expense and vexation. In fact, where the above circumstances appear, consolidation becomes imperative.
Petitioners’ act of filing two separate petitions in this case is tantamount to forum-shopping,, which defeats the
purpose of consolidation.
The SC admonished the RTCs, however, because of the lack of an order of consolidation. Further, Judge Francisco’s
penning of two separate decisions—though not apparently made with ill intent or deliberate irregularity—still calls into
question his conduct. As a judge, he must be above reproach.
Aside from some modifications as to the monetary awards, the CA’s decision is affirmed.
29

Estrada v. Consolacion
G.R. No. L-40948 June 29, 1976 J. Antonio
petitioners
GREGORIO ESTRADA
respondents
HONORABLE FRANCISCO CONSOLACION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Br. II, CORAZON RAMIREZ UY, and LUCIO GALAURA
summary
Husband filed for damages due to the death of his wife, a passenger of respondent’s jeep. She
then filed a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff on the ground that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact in the case except as to the amount of damages defendant
was seeking from the plaintiff by way of counterclaim. TC granted the summary judgment.
Petitioner appealed to SC via certiorari, where the SC held that the petition was premature.

facts of the case
Estrada filed a complaint for damages against respondents Uy and Galaura, owner and driver, respectively, of a jeep
for breach of obligation as a common carrier, causing the death of his wife while she was a passenger of the jeepney.
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment against plaintiff on the ground that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact in the case except as to the amount of damages defendants are seeking from plaintiff by way of
counterclaim. In support of their claim, they presented: a sketch of the accident by a traffic investigator; said
investigator’s affidavit stating that the pick-up collided with another pick-up and that upon impact, the latter collided
with the jeep that was driven by Galaura; sworn statements of the drivers of the pick-ups that they exercised due care and
attributed negligence to the other; sworn statement of Galaura that he did what he could to minimize damages to his
passengers. Plaintiff opposed the motion but failed to present any counter-affidavit.
TC: there is no genuine issue as to material fact and no controversial question of fact to be submitted to the trial court,
and has concluded that defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of law except as to the amount of damages
recoverable. It is therefore ordered and decreed that defendants have judgment summarily against the plaintiff for such
amount as may be found due them for damages, to be ascertained by trial upon that issue alone.

issue
WON the petition for certiorari is premature? YES.

ratio
Respondent judge did not act arbitrarily in declaring in his order that "there is no genuine issue to any material
fact and no controversial question of fact to be submitted to the trial court." This was a mere interlocutory order directing
that a hearing be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the amount or the assessment of damages, which may be
adjudged in favor of the prevailing party. It is a determination of the court of a preliminary point or directing some steps
in the proceedings, but not a disposition of the merits. "Upon the rendering of the assessment, the Court shall direct the
entry forthwith of the appropriate summary judgment."
A Summary Judgment or Accelerated Judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. The very object is "to separate
what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial, so that only the latter may
subject a suitor to the burden of a trial. In conducting the hearing, the purpose of the judge is not to try the issue, but
merely to determine whether there is a meritorious issue to be tried. Where a motion is made for summary judgment,
such motion is not directed to the pleadings and deals only with the question of whether there are triable issues of facts
and where such issues exist summary judgment must be denied. Summary judgment should not be granted where it
fairly appears that there is a triable issue to be tried.
The test, therefore, of a motion for summary judgment is whether the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support
of the motions are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and to justify a finding as a matter of law that there is no
defense to the action or the claim is clearly meritorious.
In proceedings for summary judgment, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of action and
to show that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After plaintiff's burden has been discharged,
defendant has the burden to show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.
Under the contract of carriage, private respondents assumed the express obligation to transport the wife of
petitioner to her destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and
that any injury suffered by her in the course thereof, is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. To
overcome such presumption, it must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary diligence, which
30
means that the carrier must show the "utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and foresight can
provide", or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
Respondents submitted affidavits to prove that the accident which resulted in the death of petitioner's wife, was
due to the fault or negligence of the drivers of the two pickup trucks over whom the carrier had no supervision or control.
Having, therefore, shown prima facie that the accident was due to a caso fortuito and that Galauro was free of concurrent
or contributory fault or negligence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to rebut such proof. Having failed to do so, the
defense of the carrier that the proximate cause of the accident was a caso fourtuito remains unrebuted.
There being no judgment, the present petition is premature.


31

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 Corona, J.
petitioner
Republic of the Philippines
respondents
Honorable Sandiganbayan (Special First Division), Ferdinand E. Marcos (represented by his
estate/heirs: Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and
Irene Marcos-Araneta and Imelda Romualdez Marcos
summary
Pursuant to RA 1379, the PCGG sought to reclaim the Marcos ill-gotten wealth. The OSG
established Marcos, through faked ITRs, undeclared income, creating dummy accounts and
spurious transfers of money. The Marcoses stated in their reply a general denial of the
allegations but not substantiating the same. Since no genuine issue was raised in the reply, the
case was ripe for summary judgment.

facts of the case
The Republic, through the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379. The
Republic sought to recover the amount of 356 million USD (as of the writing of the decision, worth 658 million USD
including interest) deposited in escrow in PNB as ill-gotten wealth. Before the case was set to pre-trial, the Marcos
Children and PCGG Chairman Gunigundo executed a General Agreement and Supplemental Agreements. One of the
“whereas” clauses in the agreements was that the Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal that the
356 million USD belongs to the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met. The bank accounts containing the
sum of money were then frozen.

The Republic filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. The Sandiganbayan denied
the motion on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement took precedence over the motion for
summary judgment. Meanwhile, the Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich an additional request for the
immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. This request was granted. The Marcos children appealed
the said decision but their appeal was denied. They subsequently filed a motion to place the funds in custodia legis because
the deposit was allegedly in danger of dissipation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion.

Trial was reset several times and the Republic filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the sum of
money on the ground that based on the facts stipulated in the pre-trial conference, a summary judgment is warranted in
favor of the Republic. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and was subsequently reversed upon the filing of a motion
for reconsideration.

issue
WON Rule 65 is proper. NO. Decisions by the Sandiganbayan are brought to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. Nonetheless
the SC took exception because of the immense public interest and settled the petition, regardless.

[main] WON the Marcoses raised any genuine issue of fact that would justify a summary judgment. NO. Summary
judgment is proper.

ratio
1. Summary judgment defined: described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties
have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other
documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits,
depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and
finds that there is no genuine issue between them. According to Rule 35, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:

SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The theory
of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is
demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the
Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic.
32

The OSG proved its case [in the Sandiganbayan] through a detailed description of ITRs and income declarations and
showed the immense amount of discrepancy between the amount of wealth the Marcos family has and the income
that they have declared. The OSG was able to establish how the Marcoses acquired its wealth and stashed it in Swiss
banks using dummy accounts. They created several foundations in order to transfer money when needed. The
Marcoses filed their response, which was a general denial of all the allegations the OSG claimed.

Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that the Marcoses indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in
their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in
substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of
privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds
were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. The Marcoses' defenses were a sham and
evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues. In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each
and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were
stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall because it happened a long time ago,"
and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.

Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever
practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant
desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the
remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the
allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Philippine
jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both
parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true terms.

Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of
witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs.
Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of
her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally
unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary
judgment.

The Marcoses attempted to raise the defense that by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion
for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing
issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment. However, based on Rule 35,
the alleged acts and admissions did not preclude the Republic from filing a motion for summary judgment. Rule 35 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 35 - Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

The phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil
Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no
triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for
summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment
which is to "weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial."

33

BPI v. Yu
G.R. No. 184122 Jan 20, 2010 Abad, J.
petitioners Bank of the Philippine Islands Inc.
respondents Sps. Norman and Angelina Yu and Tuanson Builders Corp. represented by
Pres. Norman Yu
summary Sps. Yu doing business as Tuanson Corp. borrowed money P75M from Far
East Bank and Trust Co. In 1999, they were unable to pay their loans and
requested a loan restructuring, which the bank, now merged with BPI,
granted. Despite the restructuring given to the Sps. they still had difficulties
paying their loan which resulted in the foreclosure of some of their properties.
Sps. filed a complaint against the BPI for recovery of alleged excessive penalty
charges etc. Sps. moved for a summary judgment.
SC A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are
uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine issue of fact. although BPI
failed to state the penalty charges in the disclosure statement, the promissory
note that the Yus signed, on the same date as the disclosure statement,
contained a penalty clause that said: "I/We jointly and severally, promise to
further pay a late payment charge on any overdue amount herein at the rate of
3% per month." It is a valid contract absent proof of acts which might have
vitiated consent.

facts of the case
- Norman and Angelina Yu (the Yus), doing business as Tuanson Trading, and Tuanson Builders Corporation (Tuanson
Builders) borrowed various sums totaling P75 million from Far East Bank and Trust Company.
- For collateral, they executed real estate mortgages over several of their properties.
- In 1999, unable to pay their loans, the Yus and Tuanson Builders requested a loan restructuring, which the bank, now
merged with Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), granted. By this time, the Yus’ loan balance stood at P33,400,000.00. The
restructured loan used the same collaterals, with the exception of Transfer Certificate of Title 40247 that secured a loan
of P1,600,000.
- Despite the restructuring, however, the Yus still had difficulties paying their loan.
- On October 24, 2003 the Yus filed their new complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 1, in
Civil Case 10286 against BPI for recovery of alleged excessive penalty charges, attorney’s fees, and foreclosure expenses that
the bank caused to be incorporated in the price of the auctioned properties.
- The Yus claimed that BPI was in estoppel to claim more than the amount stated in its published notices. Consequently, it
must turn over the excess bid of P6,035,311.46.
- After pre-trial, the Yus moved for summary judgment, pointing out that based on the answer, the common exhibits of the
parties, and the answer to the written interrogatories to the sheriff, no genuine issues of fact exist in the case. The Yus waived
their claim for moral damages so the RTC can dispose of the case through a summary judgment.

- The Yus moved for partial reconsideration. They argued that, since BPI did not mark in evidence any document in support
of the foreclosure expenses it claimed, it may be assumed that the bank had no evidence to prove such expenses. As regards
their right to the pro-rating of their debt among the mortgaged properties, the Yus pointed out that BPI did not dispute the
fact that the proceeds of the sale of the properties in Legazpi City fully satisfied the debt. Thus, the court could already resolve
without trial the issue of whether or not the foreclosure of the Pili property was valid.
- BPI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. But the CA rendered judgment on January 23, 2008, affirming the RTC
decision in all respects. And when BPI asked for reconsideration, the CA denied it on July 14, 2008,

hence, the bank’s recourse
to this Court.

issue
WON the case presented no genuine issues of fact such as to warrant a summary judgment by the RTC.
Where summary judgment is proper, WON the RTC and the CA a) correctly deleted the penalty charges because of BPI’s
alleged failure to comply with the Truth in Lending Act; b) correctly reduced the attorney’s fees to 1% of the judgment
34
debt; and c) properly dismissed BPI’s counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation
expenses.

ratio
1. A summary judgment is apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine
issue of fact.

Here, to resolve the issue of the excessive charges allegedly incorporated into the auction bid price, the RTC
simply had to look at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate
mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure and bidding documents; and d) the admissions and other disclosures
between the parties during pre-trial. Since the parties admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution
of these documents but also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the reception of the evidence
of the parties.

- BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper given the following issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or
not the loan agreements between them were valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action
against BPI; 3) whether or not the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped from
questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with Magnacraft; 5) whether or not
the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated
the Truth in Lending Act.

- But these are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings and the admissions of
the parties.

Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or item of fact that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial
of the case. A trial would have been such a great waste of time and resources.

2. Both the RTC and CA decisions cited BPI’s alleged violation of the Truth in Lending Act and the ruling of the Court in
New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. v. Philippine National Bank to justify their deletion of the penalty charges.
Section 4 of the Truth in Lending Act states that:

SEC. 4. Any creditor shall furnish to each person to whom credit is extended, prior to the consummation of the transaction, a
clear statement in writing setting forth, to the extent applicable and in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the
Board, the following information:
(1) the cash price or delivered price of the property or service to be acquired;
(2) the amounts, if any, to be credited as down payment and/or trade-in;
(3) the difference between the amounts set forth under clauses (1) and (2);
(4) the charges, individually itemized, which are paid or to be paid by such person in connection with the transaction but
which are not incident to the extension of credit;
(5) the total amount to be financed;
(6) the finance charge expressed in terms of pesos and centavos; and
(7) the percentage that the finance bears to the total amount to be financed expressed as a simple annual rate on the
outstanding unpaid balance of the obligation.

- Penalty charge, which is liquidated damages resulting from a breach,

falls under item (6) or finance charge. A finance
charge "represents the amount to be paid by the debtor incident to the extension of credit."

The lender may provide for a
penalty clause so long as the amount or rate of the charge and the conditions under which it is to be paid are disclosed to
the borrower before he enters into the credit agreement.

- In this case, although BPI failed to state the penalty charges in the disclosure statement, the promissory note that the
Yus signed, on the same date as the disclosure statement, contained a penalty clause that said: "I/We jointly and
severally, promise to further pay a late payment charge on any overdue amount herein at the rate of 3% per month." The
promissory note is an acknowledgment of a debt and commitment to repay it on the date and under the conditions that
the parties agreed on. It is a valid contract absent proof of acts which might have vitiated consent.

- WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV 86577 dated
January 23, 2008 subject to the RESTORATION of the penalty charge of 12% per annum or 1% per month of the amount
due computed from date of nonpayment or November 25, 2001.

35

ESTATE OF LIM CHING v. BACALA
G.R. No. 149603 March 14, 2007 J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
petitioner
Estate of Lim Ching, represented by Atty. Jose Lim
respondents
Florencia Bacala, Dolores Mendoza, Juanita Alvarez, and Apolinario Laurena
summary
Land dispute. The TC approved petitioner’s motion for summary judgment based on
the commission’s report (this committee was formed based on the agreement of both
parties) belying respondents’ main defense that the land they are occupying and
claiming is different from that awarded by the court in a previous case to the
petitioner. The CA reversed this decision (remanded the case for further proceedings).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari – the SC ruled that the summary
judgment was correctly rendered by the TC since there was no more genuine factual
issue to be resolved. The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

facts of the case
! Dec 10, 1934: Ireneo Laurena executed a pacto de retro sale in favor of Lim Ching of 2 parcels of land in
Southern Leyte. After more than 2 months, Ireneo executed a deed of renunciation thus waiving his right
to repurchase the said lots.
! Sometime in 1936, Ireneo filed with Leyte CFI a complaint for recovery of the 2 parcels of land against Lim
Ching. It ruled for Ireneo – ordering Lim Ching to return the land.
o On appeal, the Tribunal de Apelacion (now CA) reversed the CFI’s judgment and declared Lim Ching
the owner of the property. This decision became final and executory since Ireneo did not take further
action.
! Lim Ching then continued exercising his right of ownership. Upon his death, his heirs, including Atty.
Jose Lim, representing the estate of Lim Ching, inherited the land.
! After 57 years (Feb 1996) Ireneo’s heirs, herein respondents, took possession of the property without the
consent of Lim Ching’s heirs, claiming that they inherited it from Ireneo.
! Several times, petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the land but they refused. Hence, petitioner
filed with Leyte RTC a complaint for quieting of title with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against respondents. Petitioner alleged that it is the absolute owner of the land in question as held by the
Tribunal de Apelacion.
! In their answer, respondents countered that petitioner has no cause of action as the land it is claiming is
different from the lot they have been occupying.
! Upon agreement of both parties, the RTC issued an Order creating a committee to undertake an ocular
inspection of the property – they found out that the land being claimed by petitioner is also the same
property being claimed by respondents.
! Petitioner then filed with the RTC a motion for summary judgment based on the aforementioned Report
and the Decision of the Tribunal de Apelacion declaring Lim Ching the owner of the property. RTC
granted this motion and submitted the case for resolution. Respondents filed their MR but it was denied.
! RTC ruled in favor of petitioner – holding that its claim deserves more credence and that the
respondents failed to substantiate their defense that the area they are claiming is different from the land
in controversy.
! The CA reversed the RTC Decision – it remanded the case to the TC for further proceedings. It found that
there are questions of fact in issue, such as respondents’ contentions that they have been in possession of the
land in dispute since time immemorial and that petitioner’s action has been barred by prescription.

issue
WON a summary judgment may be rendered by the trial court. YES. There was no more genuine factual issue
to be resolved.


36
ratio
The theory of summary judgment
7
is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues
requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment. It was devised to aid parties in avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
In this case, the parties agreed that a committee be formed to conduct an ocular inspection to determine
whether they are claiming the same property. The TC approved the finding of the committee that both parties
are claiming the same property. Considering that the parties agreed to the formation of a committee, they
are bound by its finding.
When a referee (the commissioners in this case) is appointed, he becomes for the time being an accredited agent and
an officer of the court. What he does while acting within the scope of his official duty is, therefore, in the contemplation
of law, done by the court itself. Hence, his conclusions must be assumed to be correct until error is properly shown,
which is not so in the present case.
Moreover, the respondents’ main defense that they are occupying a property different from that being
claimed by petitioner is belied by the Commissioner’s Report. Petitioner has also shown that the Tribunal de
Apelacion declared Lim Ching as the owner of the disputed property.
Clearly, a summary judgment was correctly rendered by the TC since there was no more genuine factual
issue to be resolved.
It is settled that a court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either
party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of
fact are involved, except the amount of damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.


7
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time, after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
37

Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas v. Limbaco
G.R. No. 175291 July 27, 2011 J. Carpio
petitioners
Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas
respondents
Melba Limbaco et al.
summary
Petitioners wanted to annul the titles of various parcels of land due to a double sale. RTC ruled
against them. They file a notice of appeal. CA ruled that they should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC since they only questioned the resolution. SC
affirms. An appeal that raises only questions of law under Rule 50 Section 2 should be
dismissed outright by the CA because it cannot review it.

facts of the case
Feb 4, 2003: Petitioners filed a complaint for the annulment of titles of various parcels of land with the RTC. They
allege that the late Nicolas Cabigas purchased 2 lots from Cobarde on Jan 15, 1980. Cobarde in turn purchased these lots
from Ouano. Ouano was able to sell the same lots to the National Airports Corporation (NCA) on Nov 25, 1952. The legal
heirs of Ouano successfully reclaimed title to the two lots. Then they sold them to New Ventures Realty Corp and others
who successfully registered the lots in their names. These titles were what the petitioners wanted to annul.
RTC: NCA buyer in good faith hence property belongs to them. They filed a notice of appeal to question the RTC
resolution. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss appeal alleging they can only raise questions of law in an appeal; that
petitioners should have file an appeal by certiorari with the SC and not an ordinary appeal to the CA.
CA: Petitioners should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 with the SC since they only
questioned the resolution.

issue
WON the proper petition is for review on certiorari under Rule 45. YES.

ratio
The SC affirms the decision of the CA. Petitioners availed of the wrong mode of appeal. Section 2, Rule 41 provides 3
modes of appeal: ordinary appeal, petition for review and appeal by certiorari.
The first mode, ORDINARY APPEAL under RULE 41 is brought to the CA from the RTC, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
The second mode of appeal, the PETITION FOR REVIEW under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA
from the RTC, acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law.
The third mode of appeal, the APPEAL BY CERTIORARI under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the
Supreme Court and resolves only questions of law.
Where a litigant files an appeal that raises only questions of law with the CA, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court
expressly mandates that the CA should dismiss the appeal outright as the appeal is not reviewable by that court.
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged fact


38
(Basbas v. Sayson – Ramos)
39

Fernando v. Santamaria
G.R. No. 160730 December 10, 2004 Ynares Santiago, J.
petitioners Sister Ma. Angelina M. Fernando R.V.M.
respondents Hon. Cesar D. Santamaria (RTC NCR judge), Chua Ping Hian, Willibaldo Uy,
Laureana P. Borres, Register of Deeds (Makati)
summary Petitioner borrowed money (3 loans) from Chua and mortgaged her property
as security. She executed a DoAS in order to obtain the 3
rd
loan. She sued
Chua, Borres (Chu’as agent), and Uy (buyer of her lot from Chua) to annul the
sale, and to recover money (P200k real property taxes + P120k unlawful
deduction from 3
rd
loan) from Borres. TC dismissed the complaint against
Chua and Uy but reinstated the complaint against Borres. On petitioner’s
appeal to CA, she argues that TC can’t render several judgments and separate
Borres’ liability with that of Chua and Uy, AND that there’s no need to file a
record on appeal to perfect her appeal (cos she failed to file it). Was she able to
perfect her appeal? No. The Court said that this case involves an action where
a several judgment is proper. Her cause of action against Borres is different
from that of Chua and Uy. Since a several judgment is proper, an appeal
requires a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the judgment. The
Court also didn't relax the application of procedural rules cos petitioner
adamantly refused to file the req’d record on appeal.

facts of the case
Petitioner borrowed money from Chua (total: P5.5M) and mortgaged her lot as security for the same. Before the 3
rd

loan was released, she signed a DoAS conveying the lot in favor of Chua in consideration of P3M upon Borres’ (Chua’s
agent) assurance that the deed was a mere formality. She found out later that the title was cancelled and a new one was
issued in Chua’s name. Chua offered to sell back the lot to her and she accepted (P10M). But on Dec. 7, 1995, she found
out that Chua had sold the lot to Uy (P7M). She filed a complaint for (1) annulment of DoAS in favor of Chua and Uy
and cancellation of UY’s TCT (2) recovery from Borres P200k which she gave as payment for real property taxes +
P120k Borres unlawfully deducted from her 3
rd
load (3) recovery of dmgs against all respondents.

TC: Chua filed a MTD (ground: prescription). TC dismissed the complaint against all the respondents (prescription,
ratification and abandonment of cause of action). It held that petitioner ratified Chua’s sale to Uy when she acknowledged
Chua’s ownership and offered to repurchase the same. TC modified its order by reinstating the complaint against
Borres. Petitioner’s appeal dismissed on Chua’s instance for failure to file a record on appeal within the required
period.

CA: Petitioner’s argument (TC cannot render several judgments and separate the liability of Borres with that of her co-
respondents. An appeal from the TC’s decision can be perfected by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
questioned order w/o need of submitting a record on appeal) was dismissed by the Court.

issue
WoN petitioner was able to perfect an appeal within the required period. NO.

ratio
The pertinent provision is Sec. 4 Rule 36 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which states:
Sec. 4 Several judgments – In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is
proper, render judgment against 1 or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against others.
! a several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties,
such that the claims against each of them could’ve been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of
them won’t necessarily affect the other.
40
!Application: TC correctly applied the provision. The 3
rd
cause of action
8
for payment of the amounts of P200k and
P120k is directed only against Borres to the exclusion of Uy and Chua. The cause of action for collection of sum of money
against Borres can thus proceed independently of the dismissal of the action to hold her solidarily liable with Chu and Uy
for the alleged fraudulent conveyance of the lot.
! Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v CA isn’t applicable in this case because in the mentioned case, the issues arise
from the same cause of action (hence not severable).

Under the ff. provisions of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.—
(a) Ordinary appeal.—The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal, appeal in habeas corpus —
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal.—
Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court
may motu propio or on motion to dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time, or for non-
payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.

! Rationale: to enable the appellate court to decide the appeal w/o the original record which should remain with the
court a quo pending disposal of the case with respect to the other defendants.
! Application: Petitioner’s required to file a record on appeal w/in 30 days from Nov. 15 2001 (date of receipt of Oct. 25,
2001 order). Since there was no record on appeal filed, CA was correct in dismissing her appeal for failure to perfect the
same w/in the reglementary period.

Wrt technical rules:
! GR: every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice
! E: liberal application in special cases

8
As Third Cause of Action

17. Defendant BORRES did not comply with her undertaking to pay the real property taxes on the aforementioned property for
the year 1995 – the same having been actually paid by MONTE DE PIEDAD & SAVINGS BANK (later renamed KEPPEL MONTE BANK),
the administrator of the said property for plaintiff – for which she received the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P120,000.00).
18. Furthermore, said defendant BORRES unlawfully deducted the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) from
the third loan obtained by plaintiff from defendant CHUA.
19. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the aforesaid sums from defendant BORRES with interest.

Prayer

c. that thereafter, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants:
on the first cause of action, declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex “B”) null and void and of no effect whatsoever, and as a
result thereof, directing defendant RD [Register of Deeds] to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 203326 (Annex “C”) which was
issued in the name of defendant CHUA pursuant thereto;
on the second cause of action, directing defendant RD similarly to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 203771 (Annex “E”) issued
in the name of defendant Uy;
on the third cause of action, ordering defendant BORRES to return to plaintiff the sums of P120,000.00 and P200,000.00 wrongfully
obtained by her from the latter, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the instant case until fully paid; and
on the fourth cause of action, ordering defendants, except defendant RD, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff:
moral damages in the amount of not less than P1,000,000.00
the sum of P500,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.
the sum of P100,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages;
and ordering defendants, except defendant RD, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit. (Emphasis, supplied)
[15]


41
- Exception doesn't apply in this case because petitioner adamantly refused to file the required record on
appeal.Assuming SC brushes aside the procedural flaws, appeal is still dismissible
" Petitioner’s conduct is inconsistent with her claim of fraud (offered to buy lot back from Uy)
" Criminal complaint for estafa was filed almost 3 years after she learned of the alleged fraudulent
transfers of her property
" Her claim that Borres refused to release the 3
rd
loan unless she signed a DoAS is untenable because the
loan was released on June 29, 1995 and the DoAS was executed on Oct. 24, 1995
42

Biraogo v. Nograles
G.R. No. 179120 July 30, 2009 PERALTA, J.:
petitioners
LOUIS C. BIRAOGO
respondents
HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG
summary
Just look at the facts and the last issue and ratio for the summary.

facts of the case
# The Court dismissed all the petitions, including Biraogo’s petition, and reversed the Joint Resolution of the
Commission on Election’s (COMELEC) Second Division that disqualified Limkaichong from running as a
congressional candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
# She was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
issue
Is Limkaichong qualified to run or be elected as Representative of Negros Oriental for the lack of the citizen
requirement? Did not answer. The court held that there must be a proper procedure to assail citizenship.
Does the Comelec still have jurisdiction? NO. HRET has jurisdiction
(MAIN ISSUE) WON a signed, but unpromulgated decision is considered as a valid one? NO

ratio
# Petitioner: She is not a natural-born citizen because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her
birth. The proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects.
# SC: In assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in accordance with Section
18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
9

# In Queto v. Catolico: x x x It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for
naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this
case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked
in accordance with the procedure laid down by law.
o In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation
in each particular case.
o It is the State, through its representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally or
invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is
plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizen’s descendant.
• The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins

9
Sec. 18. Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. - Upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his
representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its registration
in the Civil Register: 1. If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally; 2. If the person naturalized shall,
within five years next following the issuance of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and
establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized remaining more than one year in his native
country or the country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his
intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same: 3. If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention; 4. If it is shown
that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from a public or private high school recognized by the Office of Private
Education [now Bureau of Private Schools] of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another school or schools. A
certified copy of the decree canceling the naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the Clerk of Court of the Department of Interior
[now Office of the President] and the Bureau of Justice [now Office of the Solicitor General]; 5. If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has
allowed himself to be used as a dummy in violation of the constitutional or legal provisions requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for
the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
43
• The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have been tainted
with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction
$ Belac v. Commision on Elections held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who took
part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision
$ Before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the
deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the
Justices themselves.
$ We add that at any time before promulgation, the ponencia may be changed by the ponente
$ An unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least, they are part of the confidential internal
deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public.
$ A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated.15 Until such operative act occurs, there is
really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already affixed their signatures
thereto.
44

Antonino v. Register of Deeds of Makati
G.R. No. 185663 June 20, 2012 J. Reyes
petitioners
Remedios Antonino
respondents
The Register of Deeds of Makati City and Tan Tian Su
summary
Topic: Post-judgment remedies Remedy sought: annulment of judgment
Antonino was leasing property owned by Su with a right of first refusal. They executed an
Undertaking Agreement where Su agreed to sell the property to Antonino. However, they
disagreed with as to who should pay the taxes so this never pushed through.
This prompted Antonino to file a case with RTC Makati for specific performance + damages
against Su >> denied because it was a personal action and should’ve been filed at residence of
parties >> MR also denied >> 2
nd
MR also denied.
Antonino filed a petition for annulment of judgment of the above RTC rulings before the CA.
>> CA stated remedy sought was wrong but still ruled on merits >> denied pa rin
SC: the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under exceptional circumstances
because it is adverse to the principle of immutability of final judgments. This petition cannot
substitute the lost remedy of appeal through the fault of a party.

facts of the case

~ Since 1978, Antonino was leasing a residential property located at Makati City owned by respondent Su. Under their
lease contract, Antonino had a right of first refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the property.
~ On 2004, both parties executed an agreement where Su agreed to sell the property to Antonino. However, this did not
push through because they disagreed as to who between them would pay the capital gains tax of the property.
~ July 9, 2004: Antonino filed complaint with RTC Makati for the reimbursement of the cost of repairs of property +
damages, and for specific performance compelling Su to enforce their Agreement to sell.
~ December 8, 2004: RTC dismissed case on the grounds of improper venue and non-payment of docket fees. Ruled
that the complaint was for specific performance, damages, and sum of money, which are personal actions meaning it
should have been filed at the residence of any of the parties (Muntinlupa or Manila). Also, it ruled that he did not pay
the correct docket fees and therefore it never acquired jurisdiction (cited Manchester case).
~ January 3, 2005: Antonino filed a MR, claiming that her complaint was a real action. >>> Denied by RTC in an Order
dated January 6, 2005 for non-compliance of Secs. 4-5 of Rule 15 RoC.
~ Antonino filed another MR on January 21, 2005 reiterating her claims while Su also filed an Omnibus Motion praying
for the notice of lis pendens over property to be cancelled >>> both dismissed by a Joint Resolution of RTC on February
24, 2005.
~ April 1, 2005: Antonino filed with CA a petition for annulment of judgment, praying for the nullification of (1)
RTC’s Dec. 8, 2004 Order dismissing her complaint, (2) Jan. 6, 2005 Order denying her MR, and (3) Feb. 24, 2005 Joint
Resolution on the ground of GAD.
~ CA: recognized that the remedy sought was wrong but still ruled on merits >>> still denied Antonino and ruled it was
a personal action. Also ruled that there was not enough proof of GAD to annul a judgment.

issue
WON the remedy of annulment of judgment was appropriate in this case. NO.

Ratio

1) The remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under exceptional circumstances because it is adverse to
the concept of immutability of final judgment.
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is
no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for
annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for
annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to the notion
that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. (Ramos v. Judge Combong)
Only void judgments, by reason of “extrinsic fraud” or the court’s lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being
annulled. The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that
45
has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment
that is an absolute nullity to begin with. (Barco v. CA)
Furthermore, apart from the requirement that the existence of “extrinsic fraud” or “lack of jurisdiction” should be
amply demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and other appropriate
remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided under
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

2) A petition for annulment of judgment cannot substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal.
In this case, Antonino cannot resort to this remedy simply because she neglected to utilize the ordinary remedies
available (appeal). She never offered any explanation as to why she could not avail of appeal, which is the prescribed
remedy in her situation. Her failure to appeal, despite being given the chance to do so, meant that the RTC Orders had
become final. By no means can her petition for annulment of judgment prosper as that would, in effect, sanction her
blatant negligence or sheer obliviousness to proper procedure.
Before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and
resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a
petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him.
If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment
provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.

3) Grave abuse of discretion is not a ground to annul a final and executory judgment.
As mentioned earlier, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction are the 2 grounds to annul a final judgment. In this
case, by anchoring her petition on the alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her complaint and
the denial of her 2 MRs, Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of “lack of jurisdiction”.
“Lack of jurisdiction” as a ground for the annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. >>> not the same as GAD.
Remember “jurisdiction” vs. “exercise of jurisdiction” == Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of
jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

4) On merits = there is no GAD because RTC correct in ruling that complaint was a personal action.
Antonino’s cause of action is premised on her claim that there has already been a perfected contract of sale by
virtue of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with his obligations as seller. That
there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged sale does not confer to Antonino title to the subject
property. Ownership is transferred when there is actual or constructive delivery, which is not present in this case.

5) Even assuming that RTC’s ruling was wrong, this ruling cannot be disturbed because it is already final and
executory.
Litigation should end and terminate sometime and somewhere. It is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of
the verdict.
46

Mejillano v. Lucillo
G.R. No. 154717 June 19, 2009 J. Quisumbing
petitioners
Bonifacio Mejillano
respondents
Enrique Lucillo, Hon. Gregorio Consulta, RTC of Legazpi Branch 4
summary
Dispute over land. Respondent filed action for recovery of possession against petitioner. RTC
ruled in the former’s favor. Petitioner appealed to the RTC but failed to file an appeal
memorandum, hence his appeal was dismissed. SC held that TC acted accordingly when it
dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner cannot just ask Court to relax the rules. Rule 40, Sec
7(b) is clear when it said that it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum.
Inclusion of the word shall makes the said rule mandatory.

facts of the case (italicized not so impt)
% Faustino Loterina died, leaving behind two parcels of land (lot 9007 and 9014). Surviving children of his first marriage sold both
lots to Jesus Lorente.
% Children from the second marriage contest the sale of 9014 claiming that it is their inheritance. The conflicting claim caused
Lorente to file an action for recovery of possession, which was dismissed.
% Heirs of the children from the second marriage then sold lot 9014 to respondent Lucillo. However, when respondent
was about to enter the property, he discovered the petitioner Mejillano occupying the same. Petitioner claimed that
Lorente’s heirs sold him lot 9014.
% Respondent filed an action for recovery of possession against petitioner. Court ruled in respondent Lucillo’s favor,
ordering petitioner Mejillano to vacate.
% Petitioner Mejillano appealed to the RTC but failed to file an appeal memorandum. For failure to file said memo
pursuant to Rule 40, Sec 7(b) of the Rules of CivPro, his appeal was dismissed. CA affirmed, denied his MR.

issue
WON appeal memorandum is mandatory. YES. CA affirmed, petition denied.

ratio
% TC acted accordingly when it dismissed petitioner’s appeal pursuant to clear mandate of Rule 40, Sec 7(b) of the
ROC.
The rule is clear; OBLIGATORY on the part of petitioner to file his memorandum on appeal w/in 15 days from receipt of
notice of the same. Otherwise, appeal will be dismissed.

The use of the word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Under the express mandate
of said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of
discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his
appeal.

In rules of procedure, an act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection
or benefit of the party affected is mandatory.

% Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of litigants.
Procedural rules were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. Court
cannot just relax the rules as petitioner wishes. While the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

Section 7 (b), Rule 40 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors
imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant’s
memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.
47

De Grano v. Lacaba
G.R. No. 158877 June 16, 2009 J. Nachura
petitioners
Joven de Grano
respondents
Gregorio Lacaba
summary
In a forcible entry case, the RTC affirmed the MTC which ruled in favor of De Grano, spurring
Lacaba to file an MR. The RTC rendered a judgment on March, but on October the petitioner
asked for an amendment due to a clerical error. The CA took cognizance of an appeal,
counting the reglamentary period with October as the point of reckoning. The SC ruled that
the reglamentary period must be counted from March, not October, as the amendment made
on the decision was not material enough to give rise to a new judgment.

facts of the case
Lacaba filed a complaint for forcible entry against De Grano with a prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction. he
claimed that he was the owner of certain parcels of land in Batangas and that De Grano had destroyed perimeter fences,
cleared bushes and trees, and even destroyed a house of one of the spouses that respondent allowed to settle in the
property.

The MTC ruled on the case in favor of the petitioner for lack of cause of action, stating that the respondent's
allegations were belied by his own witnesses. The RTC affirmed the MTC decision. Respondent filed an MR. On march
28, 2001 a decision on the MR was issued denying it. On October 23, the petitioner pointed out that it was not he who
filed the MR. The RTC accordingly edited its decision and respondent received it on November 12.

Alleging that the October 23, 2001 RTC Resolution was the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration,
respondent filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review with the CA on November 27, 2001. The CA
granted the motion subject to its timeliness. Finally on December 12, 2001, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the
CA.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and to cite the respondent and his counsel for contempt because they
deliberately concealed the fact that the petition was filed out of time by not attaching the March 28 decision on the MR.

The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA dismissed the issue of the timeliness of the filing of respondent’s
motion for reconsideration before the RTC on the ground that such issue was raised for the first time before the appellate
court. It, likewise, ignored the issue of the belated filing of the petition for review with the CA, ratiocinating that
petitioner was barred by estoppel from questioning the timeliness of the petition, and that dismissing the case would not
serve the ends of justice.

The CA also reversed on the merits as the respondent was able to prove his peaceful, adverse and continuous
possession for more than 40 year as evidenced by his tax declarations.

issue
Whether or not the CA can take cognizance of the appeal, the timeliness of which is questioned. NO

ratio
The CA erred in taking cognizance of a petition for review that was filed way beyond the reglamentary period. Rules may
be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice but the one asking for it must prove that his reasons are meritorious. In this
case the respondent has not proffered any explanation for his delay in filing the petition for review.

The reglamentary period must be counted from March 28, not from October 23. The respondent was confused as to the
rule that when a judgment is amended, the date of the amendment must be considered the date of the decision in
computing the period of perfecting an appeal. This rule presupposes that the amendment consists of a material alteration
of such substance and proportion that would in effect give rise to a new judgment. In this case there was no material
alteration of the judgment. the amendment merely consisted of changing the word "defendant" with "plaintiff." When the
amendment consists of the correction of a clerical error, no judgment arises.

48
(Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo – Marin)
49

Sps. Mendiola v. CA
G.R. No. 159746 18 July 2012 Bersamin, J.
petitioners
Ramon Mendiola and Araceli Mendiola
respondents
Shell Petroleum Corporation and Tabangao Realty Inc.
summary
Shell foreclosed Pacific’s mortgage upon its default. During the auction, Pacific was unable to
participate. The proceeds of the sale did not fully cover Pacific’s obligations; thus, Shell
commenced a suit before the Manila RTC to recover the deficiency. Thereafter, Mendiola filed
a case before the Makati RTC to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. Makati RTC ruled on the
case despite Manila RTC’s decision being final and executory. SC ruled that Makati case
should have been dismissed on grounds of res judicata.

facts of the case
1. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) entered into an agreement with Pacific Management &
Development (Pacific) for the distribution of Shell petroleum products.
2. Pacific is a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola (Ramon).
3. To secure Pacific’s performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of Shell covering their real estate and its improvements.
4. Pacific defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.
5. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure, scheduled to be held at the main entrance of the
Parañaque Municipal Hall on May 14, 1987, petitioners proceeded to the announced venue on the scheduled date
and time but did not witness any auction being conducted. Moreover, they did not meet the sheriff supposed to
conduct the auction despite their being at the lobby from 9:00 am until 11:30 am of May 14, 1987.
6. Later, they learned that the auction had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc.
(Tabangao)
7. [MANILA CASE] After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency of
P170,228.00 remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover
the deficiency.
8. In his answer with counterclaim, Ramon asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been
devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action were made in bad faith,
with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
9. [MAKATI CASE] Later, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure. As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal stating among
others that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners’ failure to raise its cause of action as a compulsory
counterclaim in the Manila case.
10. The Manila RTC ruled in favor of Shell. This decision has become final and executory.
11. Despite this, Makati RTC still ruled on the Makati case, ruling in favor of Ramon Mendiola as it issued a denial of
the motion to dismiss.

issue
WON the Makati case is barred by res judicata (YES)

ratio
Makati case is barred and should be dismissed on ground of res judicata and waiver.
• The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of litis pendentia, or, once the
decision in the Manila case became final, should have been dismissed on the ground of being barred by res
judicata.
• In the Manila case, Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action had
been made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights. His pleading
thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in the Makati case - that of annulment of the foreclosure
sale - was identical to the compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila case.
• A compulsory counterclaim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained therein.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the ROC, a compulsory counterclaim not set up shall be barred.
• [See Rule 6, Sec, 7] A counterclaim is compulsory if:
50
o It arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the opposing party’s claim;
o It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction; and
o The court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an
original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the
amount.
& The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following:
o (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
o (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule?
o (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s
counterclaim? and
o (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by
the parties and the court?
& Of the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the claim
alleged in the complaint and that in the counterclaim.
& Such relationship exists:
' When conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail
substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court;
' When the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or
' Wwhen the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy between the parties.
' If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim is compulsory.
• The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The Makati case had the logical
relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted to secure the payment of petitioners’ credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell.
Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not
validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed
the logical relation between the two actions.
• Therefore, that the Makati case was already barred by res judicata
10
. Hence, its immediate dismissal is warranted.



10
Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the
judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (d) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
51

General Milling Corporation v. Ramos
G.R. No. 193723 20 July 2011 Velasco, Jr., J.
petitioners
General Milling Corporation
respondents
Spouses Librado and Remedios Ramos
summary
General Milling Corporation entered into a Growers Contract with Spouses Ramos,
accompanied by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. The spouses were unable to settle their
account, prompting GMC to foreclose the mortgage. The RTC ruled that the action GMC was
premature since the obligation of the spouses is not yet due and payable until an action is
commenced by the mortgagee against the mortgagor for the purpose of having the court fix
the date of maturity. The CA sustained the decision but anchored its ruling on a different
ground, that is, that the spouses were not in default since GMC made no extrajudicial
demand. The SC explained that the appellate court has a broad discretionary power in waiving
the lack of assignment of errors particularly in matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or
to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. There would be a just and
complete resolution of the appeal if there is a ruling on whether the spouses were actually in
default of their obligation to GMC.

facts of the case
In 1989, General Milling Corporation (GMC) entered into a Growers Contract with Spouses Ramos, where the latter
were to raise broiler chickens on their land which GMC would supply. Said contract was accompanied by a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage which extended to the spouses a maximum credit line of PhP 215,000 payable within an indefinite period
with an interest of 12%/year. A surety bond at the rate of PhP20,000 per 1,000 chicks delivered was also put up.

The spouses eventually were unable to settle their account with GMC, alleging that they suffered business losses
because of GMC’s negligence and breach of contract. Hence, in March 1997, the counsel for GMC allegedly notified the
spouses that GMC would institute foreclosure proceedings. In May 1997, GMC filed a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Mortgage, which subsequently resulted to the property being sold by public auction to GMC.

In March 2000, the spouses filed a complaint to annul the Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, contending that it was null
and void since there was no compliance with the requirements of posting and publication of notices under Act No. 3135,
as amended, or An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate
Mortgages. In its Answer, GMC argued that it repeatedly reminded spouses of their liabilities, was compelled to foreclose
because of their failure to pay and had observed all the requirements of posting and publication of notices.

The RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. It held that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was valid even if its term was
not fixed since the duration of the term was made to depend exclusively upon the will of the debtors-spouses.
Furthermore, the obligation is not due and payable until an action is commenced by the mortgagee against the mortgagor
for the purpose of having the court fix the date on and after which the instrument is payable and the date of maturity is
fixed. Hence, the action GMC was premature.

The CA sustained the decision of the RTC but anchored its ruling on a different ground. It ruled that GMC’s action was
premature as the spouses were not in default when said action was filed in May 1997. GMC made no demand to spouses
Ramos for the full payment of their obligation. A perusal of the letters presented and offered as evidence by GMC did not
“demand” but only request the spouses Ramos to go to the office of GMC to “discuss” the settlement of their account.

GMC now asserts that the CA erred in ruling on a different ground since the issue on the existence of the demand
letter was not raised in the RTC.

issue
Whether or not the CA can consider matters not alleged? YES.




52
ratio

In Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, an appellate court has a broad discretionary power in waiving
the lack of assignment of errors in the following instances:

(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;

(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;

(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision
and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;

(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;

(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is
dependent.

Paragraph (c) above applies to the instant case, for there would be a just and complete resolution of the appeal if
there is a ruling on whether the spouses were actually in default of their obligation to GMC.

On the sufficiency of the demand, the Court affirmed the CA decision in that GMC should have first made an
extrajudicial demand on the spouses before proceeding to foreclose the real estate mortgage (Article 1169 of the Civil
Code). The issue of whether demand was made before the foreclosure was effected is essential. If demand was made and
duly received and respondents still did not pay, then they were already in default and foreclosure was proper.