Professional Documents
Culture Documents
extraordinary nature, and of great concern, gravity, and importance to the public;
OPINIONS BELOW
A); The Opinion/Ruling of The Court of Appeals dated October 30, 2009 appears
petition.
STATEMENT
This Petition shows that the Probate Court, Superior Court, and The Court of
Appeals of Georgia entered decisions in conflict with this Court and The United
States Supreme Court on the same important matters. The actions in Probate and
Superior Courts addressed very important State and Constitutional issues beyond
1
Notice that the case referenced on the bottom of the page of the Court of Appeals
Order is 05CV13901 which is a family violence case in Superior Court in which
Petitioner was not a party, and not the case Petitioner Appealed from. Attached to
the Court of Appeals Order is the Docket Report from the Court of Appeals which
also reflects case 05CV13901. Petitioner Appealed from 05CV13909 see “App-
B”.
1
the facts and parties involved.
This Petition further shows that through numerous acts of fraud, fraud upon
the Court and actions by Court(s) lacking jurisdiction, the Orders rendered by the
Courts are not merely voidable, but in fact void and should have been set aside.
innocent citizens in this State will suffer the same manifest injustices.
and with actual knowledge that Petitioner held an Irrevocable Durable Power of
Probate Courts in Georgia also lack jurisdiction over criminal matters; see
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1872) which for the past 130 plus years has
held:
2
Petitioner is a disabled adult male receiving Supplemental Security Income, has
been denied Legal-Aid, Pro Bono assistance, unable to locate an attorney willing to
work full contingency and without assets to obtain legal counsel, is forced to
proceed as Pro Se. * Georgia’s Legal Services Programs are Federally Funded,
Petitioner is eligible and qualifies, yet he has been denied aid. *Adult Protective
Services (APS) Georgia Dep’t of Health and Human Services under O.C.G.A.
§§30-5-1 – 30-5-10 which is run through DeKalb County Solicitor’s Office’ of
“Disabled and Adult Protective Services” and also receives Federal Funding, has
also denied Petitioner assistance.
3
Petitioner has never been arrested, charged, indicted, or convicted or any crime.
2
“if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills…
estates…, should proceed to try parties for [criminal] offenses,
jurisdiction over the subject of offenses being entirely wanting in
the court,…his commission would offer no protection to him in the
exercise of usurped authority.” “…whereas a probate court judge
would not be immune from liability if he tried a criminal case
because he clearly lacked all subject matter jurisdiction. Id. (citing
Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352).
Further, Probate Clerks are not permitted to act when judicial in nature, and are
O.C.G.A. §15-9-36.
“(a) The judges of the probate courts are, …clerks of their own
courts; but they may appoint one or more clerks,… shall also have
the authority to appoint one of their clerks as chief clerk…
(b) The appointed clerks, … chief clerk … may do all acts the
judges of the probate courts could do which are not judicial in their
nature and … in which they are authorized to act for the judge …
(c)(1) In addition to other powers … the chief clerk …may exercise
all the jurisdiction of the judge of the probate court concerning
uncontested matters …”
Probate Court clearly lacked jurisdiction over the claims “that prior to
power of attorney”; see Morrison, et., al., v. Morrison, et., al., 663 S.E.2d 714,
3
“Furthermore, … the non-fraud claims could not have been decided
by the probate court, because it did not have jurisdiction …The
probate court has jurisdiction over the probate of wills and "[a]ll
other matters and things as appertain or relate to estates of deceased
persons ...." OCGA § 15-9-30 (a) (10). Thus, "the probate court
does have jurisdiction over a claim that an estate's executors have
breached their fiduciary duty. [Cit.]" (Emphasis omitted.) Heath v.
Sims, 242 Ga. App. 691, 692 (1) (531 SE2d 115) (2000). However,
"a probate court clearly does not have jurisdiction over a general
breach of duty claim ...." Heath v. Sims, supra. Therefore, the
probate court here did not have jurisdiction over the claims that,
prior to the testator's death and the appointment of the executor,
Appellee intentionally interfered with an expected gift or breached
the fiduciary duties which he held by virtue of a power of attorney.
TGP seized Petitioner’s assets,4 personal property, and real property. When
TGP realized Petitioner had been alerted to the theft and conversion of the
Wachovia accounts (consisting of stocks, Mutual Funds, no cash) which had been
re-titled into TGP’s sole name and Social Security Number, stocks re-issued, and
Mutual Funds sold to get cash, the TGP immediately filed a vexatious litigation in
Superior Court against Petitioner to prevent Petitioner from regaining control over
the accounts.
Seven months after TGP filed the Superior Court action, Petitioner’s aunt
became a victim of untimely demise from sequel to blunt head trauma.5 Superior
4
Brokerage accounts in the name of Janet McDonald AND James Stegeman Joint
Tenants With Rights of Survivorship (JTWRS), which could have never been
considered as part of his aunt, Geneva Caffrey’s Estate.
5
The elderly aunt was removed from her home (kidnapped), hidden from all family
(falsely imprisoned), a new Will was immediately made (under duress by an
incompetent person) put into the least expensive home they could find and that was
not set up for the amount of care she needed, allowing injury sustaining accidents:
4
Court Ordered that Plaintiff be substituted by a Personal Representative within 30
days or the case would be dismissed6 (App-D). With two Wills7 and a caveat
filed, a Personal Rep. could not be, and was not appointed. Superior Court should
have sua sponte dismissed, instead the Court ignored it’s own Order. The
Superior Court action was allowed to carry on without a Plaintiff thereby lacking
4 in less than 9 months, the last one killed her (negligent homicide). She had been
continually lied to, told that no family had looked for or cared about her,; she was
cremated and buried before family knew she had passed away. The Death
Certificate was provided by Respondent, everything on it was knowingly falsified
6
It ended up being no less than thirteen (13) months before a Personal
Representative could have been appointed, yet the Court ignored it’s own Order to
substitute within thirty (30) days.
7
The Original Will naming Petitioner sole heir and benefactor and which had been
on file at the Courthouse since 1992, and a new Will that had never been filed,
naming a lay-Minister as Administrator that barely knew Ms. Caffrey, and the
assets left after he played with the assets for two years, was to go to Charity.
5
nullity.” Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 217 (1821)
“No judgment of a court is due process of law, if rendered without
jurisdiction in the court, or without notice to the party.” Old
Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1970).
“A court should be cautious in exerting its inherent power and
‘must comply with the mandates of due process” First Bank of
Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 21117, -25; 2002 FED App. 0356P (6th Cir.
2002); In Re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir.
2002)
April 22, 2003, through fraud upon the Court, Respondent and his attorney
Estate. Respondent and his attorney Mr. Turner knowingly, willingly, wantonly,
perjury, and fraud upon the court when they caused to be filed Petition to Probate
the new Will, claiming: “no other Wills”8, and “the nephew and his brother are
estranged from the deceased” and “the DeKalb County DA’s office are currently
investigating Felony theft by taking charges and Elder abuse charges against James
Stegeman”. (App-C-2)
There is not now, and has never been a record of an investigation being
conducted. Attorney Pattie Williams said she had spoken to the DA and there were
no plans to ever investigate Mr. Stegeman, she therefore filed Motion in Limine in
8
Ms. Caffrey’s Original Will , she had drawn up on her own using attorneys, and it
had been on file at DeKalb County Courthouse since 1992, which Respondent in a
deposition, admitted he had actual knowledge of.
6
the Superior Court action to prevent the fraudulent, malicious claims from being
stated in the Jury trial. Respondent and attorney Turner knowingly, willingly,
wantonly and maliciously committed perjury and fraud upon the Court to obtain
(App-C-2, 20,21).
2,14). There is no other logical explanation with two Wills, the legitimate one yet
7
without a hearing. 9 (App-C-15)
March 24, 2004, eleven months later, a few days before Jury trial, Petitioner
was pressured into a settlement agreement by his attorney who, through fraud and
for malicious, fraudulent intentions, had clearly conspired with the opposing
agreement, March 24, 2004 but neither would file it, showing the agreement within
the conspiracy was to get the case removed from the jury trial docket. Petitioner’s
only obligation was to withdraw the caveat, which was immediately done; which
9
Petitioner attempted to file Motion to Revoke letters testamentary in Probate
Court, they refused to file the Motion, as well as several other motions, and
affidavits Petitioner submitted for filing before the Summary Judgment hearing.
The documents that Petitioner was allowed to submit to the Court, were held
without filing until the Ruling was made.
10
The attorney at that point had been paid over $40,000.00
8
allowed Respondent to immediately get Letters of Testamentary. Respondent then
After Petitioner’s attorney deserted him, he found that the agreement had
Court, asking that the agreement be filed with the Court so he could regain access
to the Wachovia accounts which he had been refused all information about and
access to for two and a half (2 ½ ) years. The Court did nothing.
actual knowledge that Petitioner was unrepresented, set the case for Jury trial to
begin October 18, 2004. September 2004, Petitioner had to retain new counsel,13
Although Respondent’s Summary Judgment filings show that he obviously forgot
11
what his full obligations were, one of which Respondent was supposed to help
Petitioner regain the Wachovia accounts. In reality, Respondent and attorney
Turner, continued meddling with the bank, advising them not to release the
accounts.
Among the modifications was adding “with prejudice” to the agreements, which
12
Williams fees on the promise that Petitioner would prevail; Ms. McDonald paid
9
Stephen Apolinsky, to file Motion to Enforce and have the case removed from the
docket, but the Court refused to sign the Order.14 Petitioner was extorted into
accepting a less favorable agreement six months after he had entered into a
settlement agreement which all parties had consented to. The new “Consent
Order” is the first court document that gave the impression that Plaintiff had been
showed TGP as Plaintiff. That was the only way Petitioner and Ms. McDonald
could regain access to their account, which by that time was only a single account
with nothing in it. Wachovia continued to refuse them access to the account.
Wachovia accounts, actions of Probate and Superior Courts, and TGP. When the
and to try “an attorney in Macon, maybe” and that he has “to work in DeKalb
County”.
April 2005, Administrator of Ms. Caffrey’s Estate filed for discharge falsely
swearing all debts of the estate had been satisfied (App-C-3). Petitioner, acting Pro
10
Se,15 filed as a creditor,16 Objection to the Discharge (App-C-Tr17-1,2).
The only money that was paid to anyone was paid to TGP, attorney Turner,
and Respondent. There were no debts paid, and no evidence was ever presented
(except attorney’s bills and Extra compensation Orders) of what happened to the
Petitioner, as the only known family member of Ms. Caffrey in Georgia, has
been taken to court several times and repeatedly contacted by Ms. Caffrey’s
creditors due to Administrator’s failure to notify them of the death and satisfy the
debts. At least one credit card company had been sending credit card bills to
15
Although Petitioner attempted to obtain legal counsel, Legal-Aid and Pro Bono
attorneys denied him and unable to locate an attorney who worked full
contingency.
16
Petitioner had co-signed for a loan for Caffrey with her house as back-up to
Petitioner; Caffrey’s guardian, with permission of the Probate Clerk, sold the
house, but never paid any of the loan. Ms. McDonald had been paying the loan
since 2002 attempting to protect Petitioner’s credit. Demand for payment had been
made several times during the three years, a subpoena had been complied with
September 2002 showing the loan to belong to the Aunt; neither the guardian, nor
administrator paid anything on the loan although they had actual knowledge and
sufficient assets to do so.
17
“Tr” denotes the Affidavit of Petitioner which is serving as a transcript in
Appellant’s Brief filed with The Court of Appeals of Georgia, the Brief is attached
as App-C.
11
Respondent’s home before Ms. Caffrey’s untimely demise, that debt was not even
dollars ($25,000.00) due to lack of notice of the death, and lack of payment.18
Fowler (the conversation was taped) told Petitioner he could file nothing. After a
lengthy debate about “Rights”, Mr. Fowler agreed to allow filing of Response, but
said that it still wouldn’t matter, Fowler was right because all of Petitioner’s filings
were held unfiled til after Final Ruling November 2005.19 (App-C-3thru5, C-Tr-2)
12
willingly, wantonly, and maliciously riddled with libel and slander, defamation,
Court, Robert Turner participated and advised in the acts for the purpose of
obtaining a ruling in their favor which constitutes fraud upon the Court.
Law Clerk Mr. Fowler kept his word, and nothing filed by Petitioner was
allowed into the file or Court before the hearing, thereby Petitioner had presented
no evidence to support his Objection; no evidence was in the record showing the
fact that none of the debts of the estate had been paid; none of the documentation
attorney would file it in Superior Court; that the Wachovia account they claimed
had been returned to Petitioner in fact had no assets backing it up, only a loan in
the amount of $145,000.00 against anything that would have been left in the
account; and that the claim that TGP had spent $88,000 for care of the aunt and the
accounting by same was fraudulent. All of the assets of the estate had been
squandered away on attorney’s fees for a case which had no legal party Plaintiff.
TGP was not released from Guardianship until November 2004, one and a half
years after the aunt’s death, of which Probate Court had actual knowledge.
Respondent and attorney Turner made claims which have not only never been
13
stated anywhere else, but for which no evidence was provided. Among the
App-F-121 (shows death on April 18, 2003, death occurred April 17, 2003)
1st ¶: “The deceased had escaped from the her house where she was kept in the
basement22 to a hospital with the assistance of DeKalb EMT and the DeKalb
Sheriff’s office23 …with the standing order that she did not want her location
App-F-1 “Statements of Facts”: wrong date of death; “guardian was guardian until
death” (TGP was not discharged until November 2004) “$27,261.59 from the
beneficiary although there was no beneficiary listed in the new Will; and that
20
It must be noted that attorney Robert Turner, during the time period of 2002-
2005 was a member of the TGP’s law firm, was also representing: TGP, the aunt,
Respondent, the estate, and his own best interests. There was a definite conflict of
interest, and the aunt’s best interest could not have been served by an attorney that
was representing so many closely related subjects that were conflicting with one
another.
21
App-F-1 denotes: Appendix F, page 1.
22
Ms. Caffrey did not escape from the basement of her home, she lived alone
23
the caregiver called EMT for assistance lifting Ms. Caffrey off the floor where
she had laid herself (and neither DeKalb Sheriff’s Office, nor DeKalb PD came to
the scene)
14
App-F-2 “No claims, including specifically those creditor’s claims mentioned by
the Caveator, have been made by any creditor…” (Petitioner filed as a creditor,
and there is no evidence that any of the other creditors were notified by
$120,000.00 held of the Deceased cash and other investments…” (The Wachovia
accounts belonged to Petitioner and Ms. McDonald not the deceased, and there
was $145,000 loan against the account when Petitioner regained it)
Throughout the whole document attorney and Respondent carry on about having
paid all the debts until there were no assets of the Estate left. They have never
shown that one debt was paid; only that the attorneys, guardian, and Respondent
got paid. In fact Petitioner has been named as Defendant in no less than five
lawsuits by creditors that were not noticed of the death, and that did not get paid.
One debt was an RV bank loan for which TGP, and Respondent had actual
knowledge. Other creditors wrote off enormous debts of the Estate that TGP and
Respondent had actual knowledge of and the evidence suggests that one or both of
$33,000.00 (App-F-7) and attorney Turner got $27,702.26 out of Ms. Caffrey’s
15
estate and none of her debts got paid; while Petitioner was returned his and Ms.
$145,000.00 loan against the account; and Petitioner got stuck trying to pay a
fifteen year loan of Ms. Caffrey’s attempting to protect his own credit.
which Respondent committed perjury claiming he had satisfied all the debts of the
Estate.24 The same ruling Probate Court stated that Petitioner was “a beneficiary”
beneficiary was given $33,000.00 (App-F-7). Petitioner was not named in the new
Ruling.
Petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal, Ms. McDonald paid the Appeal fee.
Probate Court held the Notice and check until time to file Notice of Appeal had
expired, mailed it back saying that Petitioner would not be allowed to appeal.
24
Respondent refused to conduct discovery and Probate Court refused to allow
Petitioner to file Motion to Compel Discovery; no evidence was produced by
Respondent showing that any of the creditors had been notified, or that an ad had
run in the newspaper, or that any debts had been satisfied. To the contrary,
Petitioner provided evidence of debts TGP an Respondent both had actual
knowledge of and refused to pay, one of the debts had been being mailed to
Respondent’s home address.
16
for Void Judgment of Probate Court Orders was filed in Superior Court and given
2. Statement of Proceedings
On December 22, 2005 Petitioner filed Appeal and Void Judgment in Superior
Court to set aside Probate Court Rulings, due to being fraud and fraud upon the
Court and Rulings for which Probate Court lacked “either personal or subject
aside that probate court order, either in the probate court or in an original action in
17
superior court under OCGA 9-11-60 (d) (1), or to obtain its reversal by way of
appeal” Mobley, et., al., v. Sewell, et., al., 226 Ga. App. 866 (487 SE2d 398)
(1997) Further, Probate Court’s Rulings were made without jurisdiction, and/or
“[a] judgment void on its face may be attacked in any court by any
person.” The phrase “judgment void on its face” means a judgment
which “lacks either personal or subject matter jurisdiction.”
Murphy v. Murphy, 263 Ga. 280, 282 (430 SE2d 749) (1993)
In Wasden v. Rusco Indus., 233 Ga. 439, 445 (211 SE2d 733) (1975), the
Supreme Court held that " [s]tatutes of limitation have no application to [void]
judgments, and there can be no bar, estoppel or limitation as to the time when a
void judgment may be attacked.” The language used in Wasden to specify when a
judgment is void on its face is virtually identical to OCGA 9-11-60 (d) to specify
apparent on the face of the record. The court held that "a judgment is void on its
face when there is a non-amendable defect appearing on the face of the record or
pleadings " Id. at 444. See also Ricks v. Liberty Loan Corp., 146 Ga. App. 594 (1
& 2) (247 SE2d 133) (1978) (cert. den.). See, e.g., Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co.,
246 Ga. 147 (1) (269 SE2d 426) (1980) (holding that an order denying a motion
for new trial was properly set aside based on the court's failure to notify the
appellant of the decision); Beach's Constr. Co. v. Moss, 168 Ga. App. 462 (309
SE2d 382) (1983) (holding that the failure of counsel or a party acting pro se to
18
receive notice of trial was such a defect would authorize setting aside of judgment
against that party); Brown v. Wilson Chevrolet-Olds, 150 Ga. App. 525 (258 SE2d
subject to set aside); Redding v. Commonwealth of America, 143 Ga. App. 215,
216 (1) (237 SE2d 689) (1977), disapproved on other grounds in Wise, Simpson
&c. Assoc. v. Rosser White &c., Inc., 146 Ga. App. 789, 795-796 (247 SE2d 479)
(1978) (failure to conduct a jury trial was a nonamendable defect where no waiver
of jury trial appeared of record). See also Coker v. Coker, 251 Ga. 542 (307 SE2d
921) (1983); Scott v. W. S. Badcock Corp., 161 Ga. App. 826 (289 SE2d 769)
It has long been held that the Court must provide the losing party with the
Ruling so that they can Appeal. This Court has repeatedly sent the message that
motions.” See Intertrust Corp. v. Fischer Imaging Corp., 198 Ga. App. 812 (1)
(403 SE2d 94) (1991); Atlantic-Canadian Corp. v. Hammer &c. Assoc., 167 Ga.
App. 257 (1) (306 SE2d 22) (1983); Jefferson-Pilot Fire &c. Co. v. Combs, 166
19
Ga. App. 274 (304 SE2d 448) (1983).”
This applies to final judgments as well, see: Morgan v. Starks, 214 Ga. App.
265 (447 SE2d 651) (1994): “…the logic of mandating notice to allow the losing
party to take appropriate action applies with even stronger force to final judgments,
including dismissals…”
See Murphy v. Murphy, S93A0512. (263 Ga. 280) (430 SE2d 749) (1993):
fn2: “This court has held that failure to receive notice of a final
hearing constitutes a nonamendable defect on the face of the record,
subject to attack. Coker v. Coker, 251 Ga. 542 (307 SE2d 921)
(1983); Brown v. C & S Nat. Bank, 245 Ga. 515, 518 (265 SE2d
791) (1980). However, we have not held that such a judgment may
be attacked outside the three-year time limitation of subsection (f)
where there is no allegation that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction.”
fn3: “OCGA 9-12-16 (former Code Ann. 110-709) provides
that[t]he judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the person or
the subject matter or which is void for any other cause is a mere
nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to
20
the interest of the parties to consider it.(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA
9-12-16, which embodies a principle that has been the law of this
State since 1863, Ga. L. 1863, p. 659, 3513, was not repealed by
the enactment of the Civil Practice Act. See Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609,
687; see also Canal Ins. Co., supra at 711”
March 24, 2006 Petitioner filed Motion For Order on the pending Appeal and
Motion For Order on the pending Void Judgment (App-C-Tr-4).25 “While the
mandating notice to allow the losing party to take appropriate actions applies with
even stronger force to final judgments” See Intertrust Corp. v. Fischer Imaging
Corp., 198 Ga. App.812 (1) (403 SE2d 97)(1991); Atlantic-Canadian Corp. v.
Hammer &c. Assoc., 167 Ga. App. 257 (1) (306 SE2d 22)(1983); Jefferson-Pilot
Fire & c. Co. v. Combs, 166 Ga. App. 274 (304 SE2d 448)(1983); Morgan v.
Further, Morgan shows the exact reason why the peremptory hearings were
held more than three years after the Dismissal, see 165 Ga. App. at 162 “Motions
to set aside for the reasons set forth in O.C.G.A. §9-11-60 may be granted as long
as the motion is brought ‘within three years from entry of the judgment complained
of.’”
Superior Court obviously decided to ignore the Void Judgment, it has never been
25
addressed.
21
It has long been held that when the trial Court “fails to notify of dismissal”,
and/or “where the losing party is not informed of the entry of an appealable order
until after the time for appeal has run”, the order should he reissued to allow a
timely appeal”.26
Superior Court, just as Probate Court did, tampered with, hindered and outright
Denied Petitioner his statutory and Constitutional Right to Appeal Final Rulings.
It has been long standing in Georgia that a Court’s failure to notify the losing party
of it’s Ruling is grounds to set aside the judgment under O.C.G.A. §15-6-21(c):
receiving Notice, and through periodically watching the Docket Report for the next
three and a half (3 ½) years, Petitioner discovered that Superior Court had begun
Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147 (1) (269 SE2d 426) (1980), 246 Ga. At
26
147-149(1).
27
Superior Court claims to have Dismissed the Appeal on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction March 8, 2006 (App-D-2,3), but Petitioner repeatedly attempted to get
a Ruling, and was told by the Clerk that there wasn’t one. Petitioner filed Motion
for Order on Appeal, and a Motion for Order on Void Judgment, and still could not
obtain a Ruling; he then filed Notice of Intent to Appeal Ruling on Appeal, and
Notice of Intent to Appeal Ruling on Void Judgment.
22
scheduling the Appeal/Void Judgment on peremptory calendars in an attempt to
quietly “dispose of by Rule 14”28 the matter (App-C-7,27; C-Tr-5). In all, there
Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.2 allows thirty (30) days for responding to
Motions. Judges are to “decide promptly on motions of any nature”, the “Judge
then has a duty to file with the clerk”, and “to notify” the parties of the Ruling.
Refusals and failures to abide by U.S.C.R. 6.2 is “grounds for impeachment” and
(b) “In all counties … it shall be the duty of the judge of the
superior, …within 90 days…motions of any nature.”
(c) “When …so decided, …the duty of the judge… to notify…”
(d) “If any judge fails or refuses, …or if any judge repeatedly or
28
See Andrus v Andrus, 659 S.E.2d 793, 290 Ga. App. 394 (2008) “…the trial
court held a peremptory hearing calendar call ‘to dispose by Rule 14 of the
Georgia Uniform Superior Court Rules those cases in which no action had been
taken for some period of time’”; “…the parties did not receive notice of the
peremptory calendar call.”
23
persistently fails or refuses to decide the various motions,
demurrers, and injunctions coming before him …such conduct shall
be grounds for impeachment and the penalty therefor shall be his
removal from office.”
November 20, 2008 Petitioner learned about the second peremptory hearing in
time to attend. At the hearing, when only one party appeared, the Court addressed
them, and they were allowed to “be heard”. If the appearing party was Plaintiff the
Court granted them whatever relief they requested in their pleading; if the party
Petitioner’s name was called twice, both times he was told they would “get
back” to him. After all parties present had been addressed, Petitioner was called
again, told there is no file, advised to wait and they would “get back” to him, then
the Judge, Clerks and Court Reporter left the Courtroom. After waiting in the
Courtroom 30 minutes or so, the bailiff told Petitioner that he and Ms. McDonald
needed to leave the Courtroom, they waited outside the Courtroom 20-30 minutes
until the Clerk appeared, and said that she would mail everything in the file to
Petitioner, which she never did (App-C-8; C-Tr-6). Petitioner was disparately
treated, he was not afforded what all others in the same situation were afforded.
24
As the only party to appear for the hearing, Petitioner had a right to have his
case addressed by the Court, the Right “to be heard”, the Right to be treated the
same as everyone else at the hearing (to be treated equally), and the Right for his
In RE: Law Suits of Anthony J. Carter (two cases) 235 Ga. App.
551, 510 S.E.2d 91, (1998).
at [31]: "Both the Georgia and United States Constitutions prohibit
the state from depriving `any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.' United States Const., amend. XIV, sec.
1; see also Ga. Const., [Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I]. The fundamental idea
of due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard." *fn14 As
stated in Citizens &c. Bank v. Maddox, *fn14 "[t]he benefit of
notice and a hearing before judgment is not a matter of grace, but is
one of right." "A party's cause of action is a property interest that
cannot be denied without due process. (Cit.)" *fn14
at [54]: “Howard v. Sharpe, supra at 772 (1), citing three
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Although Howard
applied federal constitutional law, so fundamental a concept would
likewise be inherent in the state constitution's guarantee of due
process.”
any and every Ruling/Order not specifically listed herein violated due process of
25
‘must comply with the mandates of due process” First Bank of
Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 21117, -25; 2002 FED App. 0356P (6th Cir.
2002); In Re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 136, 143 (1st Cir.
2002).
upon the Courts and it’s Judges to honor their Oath of Office; abide by, uphold,
and honor The State of Georgia Constitution and The Constitution of the United
States; to protect his Civil and Constitutional Rights; to ensure that he is treated
fairly; and to guarantee that his case will go before a fair and impartial tribunal.
Petitioner then found that a Jury Trial showed on the Docket Report for
January 26, 2009 Civil Jury Trial Calendar for an Appeal and a Void Judgment,
neither of which are Jury issues. Obviously, the Court decided since it didn’t get to
Dismiss for failure to attend the peremptory hearing, that the Court would get to
Dismiss for failure to attend a Civil Jury Trial Calendar call (App-C-28).
At the January 2009 hearing, the Judge became very abusive toward Petitioner,
who was in a wheelchair. The Judge ranted and raved, threatened to have
Petitioner “taken out back” (whatever that means); threatened to have him arrested
26
for contempt; then had him physically removed from the Courtroom (App-C-Tr-7)
for inquiring into what “the technical difficulty” in the file was.
Clearly, his Civil and Constitutional Rights have been grossly violated by the trial
courts (App-C-24,25,26,27).
See also:
U.S. v. Georgia 04-1203 (2006), Goodman v. Georgia 04-1236
(2006) Justice Stevens with Justice Ginsberg concurring: “…
interference with access to the judicial process, and procedural due
process violations…
27
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
accord Constantine, 411 F.3d at 486-487.”
“Title II enforces the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of …
based on hostility, or ‘mere negative attitudes’”, University of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001); “to private biases”, Palmore
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
Superior Court threatens all disabled, and/or pro se litigants. Appellant has been
situated”; differently than pro se litigants at the hearings; and although there were
the Court threatens other disabled pro se litigants with harm or incarceration.
State’s alleged conduct violates Title II; (2) to what extent such alleged
misconduct also violates the Constitution; and (3) whether such alleged
misconduct violates Title II but does not violate the Constitution Georgia 546 U.S.
126 S.Ct. at 882.” Miller v. King, 449 F.2d 1149, 17 A.D. cases 1758 (11th Cir.
The United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S. Ct. 652, 656-57 (1950) held: “There can be no
doubt that, at a minimum, the Due Process Clause requires notice and the
28
opportunity to be heard incident to the deprivation of life, liberty or property at the
hands of the government…the government must provide the requisite notice and
On June 26, 2009 Judge Shoenthal, at the last scheduled peremptory hearing, in
Forma Pauperis with Exhibit and the required Affidavit of Poverty, which Superior
This Court Docketed the Appeal, then transferred it to The Court of Appeals of
Georgia, where it was scheduled to be reviewed January 2010. Two days after
receiving Petitioner’s timely filed Brief, and without Respondents filing anything
at all, The Court of Appeals Dismissed the Appeal (App-B-1,2). Petitioner timely
filed Notice of Intent in The Court of Appeals. So, The Court of Appeals of
Georgia, going against their own past Rulings, Rulings of this Court and Rulings of
the US Supreme Court has too, ignored the many wrongs and manifest injustices
Petitioner has been subjected to, and denied Petitioner his Right to Appeal.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner has shown that all of the necessary elements required for this
and of great concern, gravity, and importance to the public. Petitioner is not asking
29
for a review of the sufficiency of evidence.
Petitioner has shown that there was an elaborate scheme and conspiracy
involved, that Courts made Rulings without jurisdiction, Clerks made Rulings
without authority, and the life of an elderly, incompetent lady was lost due to greed
and negligence.
By: _____________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(404) 300-9782
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
No. _____________________
__________________________________________
Versus
________________________________________________________________
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
_______________________________________________________________
30
I hereby Certify that I have this 4TH day of December, 2009 served a true and
be deposited with the United States Postal Service, Certified First Class Mail with
Robert E. Turner
111 North McDonough St.
Decatur, GA 30030
_____________________________
JAMES B. STEGEMAN, Pro Se
821 Sheppard Rd.
Stone Mountain, GA 30083
(770) 879-8737
31