US VS GO CHICO

Facts: On or about the 4th day of August, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and
one of the show cases of his store in No. 89 Calle Rosario, Manila, a number of medallions, in the form
of a small button, upon which were printed the miniature faces of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag or
banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Phil. Islands to designate and identify those in
armed insurrection against the United States. On the day previous to the one set forth above, the
appellant had purchased the said medallion sold at a public sale under the authority of the sheriff of the
city of Manila. On the day in question, the appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of
displaying them to the public, and in doing so, he placed the medallions in his showcase and on one of
the windows of his store. The appellant was ignorant of any law against the display of such medallions
and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts stated above are admitted. The appellant has two
propositions for his acquittal: first is that before a conviction can be had, a criminal intent upon the part
of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Second is that the prohibition of law is
directed against the use of identical banners, devices or emblems actually used during the Philippine
insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.
Issue: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary in crimes punishable by special laws.
Held: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. The words
used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed
rebellion against the United States mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection,
but any flag which is of that type. The description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The
literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or evidently fail to give the real intent of the
legislature.
Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.
February 23, 1988
Per Curiam
Facts:
Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai, saying that
Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai of at least
the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No.
960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit or attempt to
take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an authorization by the
Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by them. Tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at
points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of
foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty
of the crime of blackmarketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal
(minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00.
At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to
the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he
and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to
and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his business
associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for
acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the
law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution
must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments found in
the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such foreign
exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the trial,
and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people.
In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo
Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is
nothing in the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the
said amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.

Estrada vs sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No.
7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia,
that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code;
and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, and are committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his
guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.

G.R. No. 172602 April 13, 2007
HENRY T. GO vs.THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
Vicente C. Rivera, then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Henry Go, Chairman and President of PIATCO,
were charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Go, in relation to the voided 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA) entered into by the government with Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc (PIATCO).
Petitioner Go contended that it was error to charge him with the violation given that he was not a public
officer, a necessary element of the offense under Sec 3(g) of RA 3019. He further assert that conspiracy
by a private party with a public officer is chargeable only with the offense under Sec3(e).
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Go, a private person, may be charged with violation of Sec 3(g) of RA 3019.
Ruling:
The application of the anti-graft law extends to both public officers and private persons.
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held
liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019. This is in consonance with the avowed
policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable to Gos case. In the former, Dans, the public officer and with
whom Marcos had allegedly conspired with in committing Section 3(g) of RA 3019, had already been
acquitted. Marcos could then not be convicted, on her own as a private person, of the said offense.

The finding of probable cause against petitioner by the Office of the Ombudsman is a function duly
belonging to the latter. The exercise of such function cannot be meddled with by the courts by virtue of
the doctrine of non-interference except for compelling reasons.

Teves vs. Comelec
FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros
Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a
petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was convicted of
violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the
Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent
alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office.
On May 11, 2007, the COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of
member of House of Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. It
appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections for the position
of member of the House of Representatives of the Third district of Negros Oriental thereby rendering
the instant Motion for Reconsideration moot and academic.
The petitioner filed a petition which the court found to have merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of
a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by
the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The accused is a public officer;
2) he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he
either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is
prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
Thus, there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The first mode is
when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. The second mode is when he is prohibited
from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law.
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. (a) It shall be unlawful for any local
government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
x x x x
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law,
which is possession of a prohibited interest.
However, conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral
turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute must be
considered. Besides, moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but
whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain such
pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his interest in the subject
cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred
before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
The crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral
turpitude.

People v. Saley (1998)
Facts:
Saley was convicted of 16 cases of illegal recruitment, one of which was on the large scale.She was also
convicted of 11 counts of estafa. Sheclaims that she was not engaged in recruitment but ismerely acting
as an agent. She also claimed that shewas merely aiding the processing of the complainantsvisas.
Held:
Saley is guilty of illegal recruitment andestafa. She has no valid license or authority to engage
inplacement of workers. There is no double jeopardy inthis case. Conviction under the Labor Code for
illegalrecruitment is malum prohibita while estafa under the RPC is malum in se.

People v. Simon (1994)
Facts:
The accused was arrested after a buy-bust operation conducted by the police wherein theaccused sold 2
tea-bags of marijuana to a poseur buyerfor P40.
Held:
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the sale
must be clearly established. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction .The court held that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under RA 6425 as amended by RA7659 is prison correccional to be taken from the
medium period thereof pursuant to Art. 64 of the RPC, there being no aggravating and mitigating
circumstance. Dissent: It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the RPC if both its definition and the
penalty therefore are found in the special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the RPC its
nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of apenalty found in the RPC can by
no means make an offense thereunder an offense punished or punishable by the RPC.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Ladonga
G.R. No. 141066 17February2005
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.
The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both are regular customers in
the pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of
April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of
P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of
P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the
three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga
spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against
them.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
In this case Evangeline Ladonga is trying to contest her conviction on the grounds that she was not a
party to the agreement and that she was not a signatory to the checks and that the decision of the Court
of Appeals with regard to her being a co-conspirator is w/o merit.

stimony that Evangeline Ladonga was
merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to
mean concurrence with the criminal design.
d conclusive evidence.
Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in
itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough
to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the
evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven
guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.
HELD:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is
ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs