October 2011 Supreme Court Decisions on

Political Law
Posted on November 14, 2011 by Vicente D. Gerochi IV Posted in Constitutional Law, Philippines - Cases
Here are selected October 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on political law:
Constitutional Law
Constitutionality of RA 10153. Republic Act 10153 reset the ARMM elections from August 8,
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three years thereafter, to coincide with
the countrys regular national and local elections. The law also granted the President the
power to appoint officers in charge for the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor, the
Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who will
hold said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified
and assumed office. In addressing the constitutionality of this law, the Court discussed the
following issues:
Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections? Yes. While the Constitution
does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the
clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission,
by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain
synchronization of elections. The objective behind setting a common termination date for
all elective officials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve
winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future
elections whether national or local to once every three years. This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations. These
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions
of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for
all the following elections. Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
Does the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution? No.
That section provides that before a bill passed by either the House or the Senate can
become law, it must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when
the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate enactment. In this case, the
records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. FollowingTolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the
Presidents certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply
with the three separate readings requirement.
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA 9054
violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution and the corollary doctrine
on irrepealable laws? Yes. Even assuming that RA 9333 and RA 10153 did in fact amend
RA 9054 (the Court ruled in this case that those two laws did not amend RA 9054), the
supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054
has to be struck down for giving that law the character of an irrepealable law by requiring
more than what the Constitution demands. RA 9054 is the Second Organic Act of the
ARMM, which provided that the first ARMM elections would be held on the second Monday of
September 2001. RA 9333 is one of several laws prior to RA 10153 that reset the date of
the ARMM regional elections. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. As long as majority of
the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have
the quorum needed to conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of
majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve acts. In contrast, Section 1, Article
XVII of RA 9054 requires a vote of no less than 2/3 of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to amend that law. Clearly,
this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the passage of
bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the
laws it had passed. While a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is
constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators room for
action and flexibility.
Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only to the creation of autonomous regions under
paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the Constitution? Yes. RA 9054 enlarged the
plebiscite requirement in the Constitution with respect to the ARMM. This enlargement
violates Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. Section 18 states that a plebiscite is
required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. This means that
only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the
creation ofautonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the
basic structure of the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system, i.e.,
the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant
and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. The date of the ARMM elections does not fall
under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for
in the Organic Act. Therefore, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as a
substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with the
plebiscite requirement.
Does RA 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM? No. Petitioners argued that
while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to
impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner,
one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional
mandates synchronization and regional autonomy such that it is necessary to choose
one over the other. The Court found this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic
principle in constitutional construction that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole, and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the
primacy of one over the other is clear. Synchronization is an interest that is as
constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that the Court should
reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA 10153, which provides the
measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the
interests that must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead
of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its governing
features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by the attendant
circumstances. Further, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a
regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still
subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for those specific
areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. The autonomy
granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the
synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the
region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
Given the constitutional objective of synchronization, did Congress gravely abuse its
discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA 10153 the concomitant
problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it? No. TheCourt here
identified the following options open to Congress in order to resolve the problems: (1) allow
the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those
elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM,
with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections
assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint officers in charge, pursuant to
Section 3 of RA 10153, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office. The
Court held that in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint OICs, Congress
chose the correct option and passed RA 10153 as a valid law.
Holdover option is unconstitutional. This option violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states that theterm of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three yearsand no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Since elective ARMM officials are local
officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution; Congress cannot extend their term through a law allowing officials to serve in
a holdover capacity. If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint
the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is
constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e.,
to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Congress cannot
also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
COMELEC has no authority to order special elections. Another option proposed by the
petitioner is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections
pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881. The power to fix the date of elections is
essentially legislative in nature. Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing
the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date May 13, 2011 for regional
elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so
doing, Congress itself has madea policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom
that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor
the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. The Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
legislative decision and effectively legislating. Further, the constitutional power of
COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for and to set the date of elections,
is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election. COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special elections unless
pursuant to a specific statutory grant.
The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials. Even assuming
that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections,
no legal basis exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until
the ARMM officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office. The
Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution,
the power to fix the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be
denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators
obtaining the least votes in the 1992 congressional elections, and extended the terms of the
President and the Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not
granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be
changed by mere statute. More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not the Court,
has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM forless, or more,
than the constitutionally mandated three years, as this tinkering would directly contravene
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. In the same way that the term of elective ARMM
officials cannot be extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting
an expiration date earlier than the three years that the Constitution itself commands. This
is what will happen a term of less than two years if a call for special elections shall
prevail.
Does the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs violate the
Constitution? No. The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the
limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed;
these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The
appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
pertinently states that the President shall appoint all other officers of the government whose
whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Since the Presidents authority to
appoint OICs emanates from RA 10153, it falls under this group of officials that the
President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM
executive and legislative officials be elective and representative of the constituent political
units. This requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. But the Court said
this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if
RA 10153 were to bemistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA 10153 in
fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from
appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to
office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
Given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of
constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM
officials, is the choice of the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as
an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution an
unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make? Admittedly, the grant of the
power to the Presidentunder other situations or where the power of appointment would
extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government
that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to
govern them may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the elective and
representative governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. But
this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA
10153 where the period is fixed and, more important, the terms of governance both under
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA 9054 will not systemically be touched nor
affected at all. RA 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in
accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys choice of leaders, but
this will take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner
that interim measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government
units and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. These measures,
too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections
(considered vis--vis the regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in
other words, is no different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of
the State, where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure
taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be
affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the
appointment process; only the elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of
OICs. In this regard, RA 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the
appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in
the Appointment of OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualifications. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, etc., et
al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et
al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis Barok Biraogo vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al./Jacinto V. Paras vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R.
No. 196271/G.R. No. 196305/G.R. No. 197221/G.R. No. 197280/G.R. No. 197282/G.R. No.
197392/G.R. No. 197454. October 18, 2011.
Ombudsman; power to grant immunity. In this case, petitioner argues that by excluding
the respondents in the information, the Ombudsman is engaged in selective prosecution
which is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. He claims that before the Ombudsman
may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they must be included first in the
information filed with the court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their
discharge so that they can be used as state witnesses under the conditions laid down in
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court held petitioners claim to be
erroneous. The Ombudsman has the power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to
the filing of information in court. RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative
by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity, subject to such terms and conditions
as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this authority is the
need to take into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., Section 17,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The rule under RA No. 6770 clarifies that in cases already
filed with the courts, the prosecution merely makes a proposal and initiates the process of
granting immunity to an accused-witness in order to use him as a witness against his co-
accused. If there is any distinction at all between the public prosecutor and the
Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the specificity of and the higher priority given by law
to the Ombudsmans purpose and objective. This accounts for the Ombudsmans unique
power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court, a
power that the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy. Thus, there was no
grave abuse of discretion in this case. Erdito Quarto vs. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, et al., G.R. No. 169042.
October 5, 2011.
Police power; zoning. Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city
council, police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised
Charter of Quezon City. With regard to the power of local government units to issue zoning
ordinances, jurisprudence has recognized that the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare.

However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Based
on the foregoing, the power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential
uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of
the residents of a locality. In this case, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city
council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of
arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their
prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the
convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for
commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so
because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a
business zone along EDSA. Consequently, the enactment of the ordinance in this case is
within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City and any resulting burden on those
affected cannot be said to be unjust. Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development
Authority/Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933. October 11, 2011.
Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure. This case involves a search of office
computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and
eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer
were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Petitioner questions the
legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent. He said this search violated his constitutional right to
privacy. The right to privacy is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right involves a
two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective). Once the right is established, the next inquiry is whether the search
alleged to have violated such right was reasonable. This proceeds from the principle that
the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches
and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance the
invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of privacy against the governments need
for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. A public employers
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct,should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard,both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable. Ordinarily, a search of an employees office by a supervisor
will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that
the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose. The search will be
permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives
of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following
issues: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and
computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service
Commission Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioners computer,
reasonable in its inception and scope? Here, the relevant surrounding circumstances to
consider include: (1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item
was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the
employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item.
The Court answered the first issue in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed
office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open
to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted
any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary,
he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have
visitors in his office. Even assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of
privacy in his computer as he claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy
regulating the use of office computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store,
send or receive on the office computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use of
the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-
spot inspections may be done to ensure that computer resources were used only for
legitimate business purposes.
On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of petitioners
computer files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related
misconduct. Under the facts obtaining, the Court held that the search conducted on
petitioners computer was justified at its inception and in scope. Briccio Ricky A. Pollo vs.
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; due process. Procedural due process is the constitutional standard
demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is
rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course,
he would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be
heard. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. In this case, while the
petitioner did not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt
on August 14, 2006 of a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order) conducted by the GSIS,
GSIS President and General Manager Winston Garcias decision of February 21, 2007 duly
considered and discussed the defenses raised in the pleadings filed by petitioners
counsel. Furthermore, what negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners
subsequent motion for reconsideration which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer
might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners case. Again, Garcia duly
considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for reconsideration when he
rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his
pleadings. Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
Administrative agencies; findings of facts. In this case, petitioner was found to have
committed the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight
GSIS Naga Field Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution requirements
under PPG No. 153-99. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the findings of the
GSIS, the CSC and the CA that the petitioners acts constituted grave misconduct. While
great respect is accorded to the factual findings of administrative agencies, the Supreme
Court did not characterize the offense committed as grave. No substantial evidence was
adduced to support the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule that must be present to characterize the misconduct
as grave. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not see the type of
open defiance and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC observed. In fact, the CSCs
findings on the petitioners actions prior to the approval of the loans negate the presence of
any intent on the petitioners part to deliberately defy the policy of the GSIS. First, GSIS
branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan applications
beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient
practice in the approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the
existing GSIS policy; and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate
supervisor before acting on the loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the
characteristic flagrant disregard of the rules that grave misconduct requires. Thus, the his
liability under the given facts was found to constitute as simple misconduct only. Monico K.
Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; due process. Due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a
hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting evidence,
must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision
must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal
must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be
rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various
issues involved. In the present case, the fifth requirement was not complied with. Reyes
was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made
the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. The fact that
Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner via a Motion for
Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the
violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the said motion precisely to
raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. As it were, petitioner rendered its
Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to
Reyes. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and
intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512. October 5, 2011.
Government contract; lack of appropriation. Petitioner DPWH argues that the contracts with
respondents were void for not complying with Sections 85 and 86 of Presidential Decree
1445, or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order
No. 292. These sections require an appropriation for the contracts and a certification by the
chief accountant of the agency or by the head of its accounting unit as to the availability of
funds. In this case, there was an appropriation amounting to Php400 million, which was
increased to Php700 million. The funding was for the rehabilitation of the areas devastated
and affected by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which included the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua
River for which some of the channeling, desilting and diking works were rendered by
respondents construction companies. It was, however, undisputed that there was no
certification from the chief accountant of DPWH regarding the availability of funds for the
disputed expenditure. In spite of the lack of certification, however, the Supreme Court held
that jurisprudence has consistently recognized the rule that payment for services done on
account of the government, but based on a void contract, cannot be avoided. The contract
in this case was not illegal per se. Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Ronald E.
Quiwa, doing under the name R.E.Q. Construction, et al., G.R. No. 183444. October 12, 2011.
Government construction contracts; price escalation. The issue here is whether Presidential
Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of construction
materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation is granted
in a construction contract. Petitioner argues that Section 8 of PD 1594 requires the
following conditions before an adjustment of the contract price may be made: (i) there was
an increase or a decrease in the cost of labor, equipment, materials and supplies for
construction; and (ii) the increase or decrease is due to the direct acts of the
government. Petitioner stresses that respondent failed to show the existence of these
conditions. The Court disagreed. The contractor does not need to prove that the increase in
construction cost was due to the direct acts of the government. PD 454, which was enacted
prior to PD 1594, provides (in relation to adjustment of contract price for public works
projects) that increase of prices of gasoline and other fuel oils and of cement shall be
considered direct acts of the Government. Consequently, when PD 1594 reproduced the
phrase direct acts of the government without supplying a contrary or different definition,
the definition and coverage provided by the earlier enacted PD 454 were deemed adopted
by the later decree. Thus, proof of increase in fuel or cement price during the contract
period is enough to justify a claim for price escalation based on such increase. Philippine
Economic zone Authority vs. Green Asia Construction & Development Corporation, etc., G.R.
No. 188866. October 19, 2011.
MMDA; power to demolish. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28,
Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancaycos property. It further alleges
that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No.
2904, as amended. However, the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the
provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and
Highways, not in MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated
by the DPWH to implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out
the demolition. Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not
include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it
merely prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of
the court. The ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine
whether there was a violation of the ordinance. Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of
Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro Manila Development Authority
vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933. October 11, 2011.
Election Law
Election protest; failure to file preliminary conference brief. In exercising its powers and
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC
must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes. Here,
notwithstanding the fact that petitioners motion for reconsideration was not verified, the
COMELEC should have considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioners
meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for the preliminary
conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit any evidence in support of ones claim or defense. It is the denial of
this opportunity that constitutes violation of due process of law. Procedural due process
demands prior notice and hearing. The fact that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or
information of the date set for the preliminary conference by means other than the official
notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his protest, because it cannot be
denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to adequately prepare for and
submit his brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only able to file his
Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself. Hence, by denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, without taking into consideration the violation of his
right to procedural due process, the COMELEC also guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. Salvador D. Violago, Sr. vs. Commission on Elections and Joan V. Alarilla, G.R. No. 194143. October 4, 2011.
Public Officers
Public officers; dishonesty. Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind
denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to
put the holder upon inquiry. In other words, good faith is actually a question of
intention. Although this is something internal, one can ascertain a persons intention not
from his own protestation of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his
conduct and outward acts. In this case, the facts and circumstances surrounding
petitioners acquisition of the Certificate of Eligibility cast serious doubts on his good
faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC official and accepted the Certificate of Eligibility
from the latters representative. These circumstances reveal petitioners knowledge that the
CSC official could have pulled strings in order to obtain his Certificate of Eligibility and have
it delivered to his residence. Besides, whether some CSC personnel should be held
administratively liable for falsifying petitioners Certificate of Eligibility is beside the
point. The fact that someone else falsified the certificate will not excuse him for knowingly
using the same for his career advancement. Thus, the Supreme Court held that that the CA
did not err in affirming the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties imposed by
the CSC. Cesar S. Dumduma vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606. October 4, 2011.