1

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 105746. December 2, 1996]
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, through its MAYOR
ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, VICE MAYOR ROBINSON B.
LOMO, COUNCILORS TEOFILO GALORIO, CASIANO
ADORABLE, MARIO APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE
SULLANO, MARIETO TAN, SR., HERMINIO SERINO,
BENJAMIN DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, and
ELEUTERIO A. QUIMBO, ROBINSON B. LOMO,
TEOFILI GALORIO, CASIANO ADORABLE, MARIO
APAO, ANTONIO BIENES, VEDE SULLANO,
MARIETO TAN SR., HERMINI SERINO, BENJAMIN
DANO, and CRISPULO MUNAR, in their private
capacities as taxpayer in the Province of Misamis
Occidental and the Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, and BENJAMIN C. GALINDO and
BENHUR B. BAUTISTA, in their private capacities as
taxpayers in the Province of Misamis Occidental and
the Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis
Occidental, petitioners, vs., HON. VICENTE T. BAZ,
JR., Presiding Judge REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 14, 10
th
JUDICIAL REGION, OROQUIETA
CITY, and MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN through its
MAYOR EUFRACIO D. LOOD, VICE MAYOR BASILIO
M. BANAAG, COUNCILORS CONCEPCION E. LAGA-
AC, MIGUEL F. ABCEDE, JUANITO B. TIU, CLAUDIO
T. REGIL, ANCIETO S. MEJARES NAZIANCINO B.
MARIQUIT, and FEDERICO QUINIMON, and THE
PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL through the
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL and
its members, VICE-GOVERNOR FLORENCIO L.
GARCIA, BOARD MEMBERS MARIVIC S. CHIONG,
PACITA M. YAP, ALEGRIA V. CARINO, JULIO L. TIU,
LEONARDO R. REGALADO II, CONSTACIO C.
BALAIS and ERNESTO P. IRA, and THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, through its Chairman, HON.
EUFEMIO DOMINGO, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT through its Secretary, HON.
LUIS SANTOS (now HON. CESAR SARINO), and THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
through its Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE
(now HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ), and The Hon.
CATALINO MACARAOG (now HON. FRAKLIN
DRILON), EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 4,
1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Oroquieta
City,
[1]
affirming the legal existence of the Municipality of
Sinacaban in Misamis Occidental and ordering the relocation of
its boundary for the purpose of determining whether certain
areas claimed by it belong to it.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive
Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to 68
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The full text of the
Order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 258
2

CREATING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN,
IN THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior, and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, there is hereby created, in the Province of Misamis Occidental, a
municipality to be known as the municipality of Sinacaban, which
shall consist of the southern portion of the municipality of Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental, more particularly described and bounded as
follows:
On the north by a line starting from point 1, the center of the
lighthouse on the Tabo-o point S. 84
0
30W., 7,250 meters to point 2
which is on the bank of Palilan River branch; thence following Palilan
River branch 2,400 meters southwesterly 'to point 3, thence a straight
line S 87
0
00 W, 22,550 meters to point 4, where this intersects the
Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; on the west, by the present
Misamis Occidental-Zamboanga boundary; and on the south by the
present Jimenez-Tudela boundary; and on the east, by the limits of the
municipal waters which the municipality of Sinacaban shall have
pursuant to section 2321 of the Revised Administrative Code,
(Description based on data shown in Enlarged Map of Poblacion of
Jimenez, Scale 1:8:000).
The municipality of Sinacabn contains the barrios of Sinacaban, which
shall be the seat of the municipal government, Sinonoc, Libertad, the
southern portion of the barrio of Macabayao, and the sitios of Tipan,
Katipunan, Estrella, Flores, Senior, Adorable, San Isidro, Cagayanon,
Kamanse, Kulupan and Libertad Alto.
The municipality of Jimenez shall have its present territory, minus the
portion thereof included in the municipality of Sinacaban.
The municipality of Sinacaban shall begin to exist upon the
appointment and qualification of the mayor, vice-mayor, and a
majority of the councilors thereof. The new municipality shall,
however, assume payment of a proportionate share of the loan of the
municipality of Jimenez with the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
as may be outstanding on the date of its organization, the proportion of
such payment to be determined by the Department of Finance.
Done in the City of Manila, this 30
th
day of August, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-nine, and of the Independence of
the Philippines, the fourth.
(SGD.) ELPIDIO QUIRINO
President of the Philippines
By the President:
(SGD.) TEODORO EVANGELISTA
Executive Secretary
By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171,
[2]
dated
November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio
Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and
Sinara Alto,
[3]
based on the technical description in E.O. No.
258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis
Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.
In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding
that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban,
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement
it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was
approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its
Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950, which fixed the
common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez as follows:
[4]

From a point at Cagayanon Beach follow Macabayao Road until it
intersects Tabangag Creek at the back of the Macabayao Elementary
3

school. Follow the Tabangag Creek until it intersect the Macabayao
River at upper Adorable. Follow the Macabayao River such that the
barrio of Macabayao, Sitio Adorable and site will be a part of the
Jimenez down and the sitios of San Vicente, Donan, Estrella, Mapula
will be a part of Sinacaban. (Emphasis added)
In its decision dated October 11, 1989,
[5]
the Provincial
Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It
held that the previous resolution approving the agreement
between the municipalities was void because the Board had no
power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No.
258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg.
337), 134.
[6]
The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No.
13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking
reconsideration.
[7]

On March 20, 1990, Jimenez filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, Branch 14. The suit was filed against
Sinacaban, the Province of Misamis Occidental and its
Provincial Board, the Commission on Audit, the Departments of
Local Government, Budget and Management, and the Executive
Secretary. Jimenez alleged that, in accordance with the
decision in Pelaez v. Auditor General,
[8]
the power to create
municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently
Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no
legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis--
vis Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed that
Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision
over the disputed barrios; that the Provincial Board be enjoined
from assuming jurisdiction over the claim of Sinacaban; that
E.O. No. 258 be declared null and void; that the decision dated
October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial
Board be set aside for having been rendered without
jurisdiction; that the Commission on Audit be enjoined from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds by Sinacaban;
that the Department of Budget and Management be enjoined
from allotting public funds to Sinacaban; and that the Executive
Secretary be enjoined from exercising control and supervision
over said municipality.
During pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit the issues to the
following:
A. Whether the Municipality of Sinacaban is a legal
juridical entity, duly created in accordance with law;
B. If not, whether it is a de facto juridical entity;
C. Whether the validity of the existence of the
Municipality can be properly questioned in this action
on certiorari;
D. Whether the Municipality of Jimenez which had
recognized the existence of the municipality for more
than 40 years is estopped to question its existence;
E. Whether the existence of the municipality has been
recognized by the laws of the land; and
F. Whether the decision of the Provincial Board had
acquired finality.
On February 10, 1992, the RTC rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the finding of this Court that
the petition must be denied and judgment is hereby rendered declaring
a STATUS QUO, that is, the municipality of Sinacaban shall continue
to exist and operate as a regular municipality; declaring the decision
dated October 11, 1989 rendered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
fixing the boundaries between Sinacaban and Jimenez, Missamis Occi.
4

as null and void, the same not being in accordance with the boundaries
provided for in Executive order No. 258 creating
the municipality of Sinacaban; dismissing the petition for lack of
merit, without pronouncement as to cost and damages. With respect to
the counterclaim, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
The Commissioners are hereby ordered to conduct the relocation
survey of the boundary of Sinacaban within 60 days from the time the
decision shall have become final and executory and another 60 days
within which to submit their report from the completion of the said
relocation survey.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC, inter alia, held that Sinacaban is a de
facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even
prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for
forty years before the existence was questioned; that Jimenez
did not have the legal standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban, the same being reserved to he State as represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General in a quo
warranto proceeding; that Jimenez was estopped from
questioning the legal existence of Sinacaban by entering into an
agreement with it concerning their common boundary; and that
any question as to the legal existence of Sinacaban had been
rendered moot by 442 (d) of the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
On March 17, 1990, petitioner moved for a reconsideration
of the decision but its motion was denied by the RTC. Hence
this petition raising the following issues: (1) whether Sinacaban
has legal personality to file a claim, and (2) if it has, whether it is
the boundary provided for in E.O. No. 258 or in resolution No.
77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which should
be used as the basis for adjudicating Sinacabans territorial
claim.
First. The preliminary issue concerns the legal existence of
Sinacaban. If Sinacaban legally exist, then it has standing to
bring a claim in the Provincial Board. Otherwise, it cannot.
The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not
validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling in Pelaez
v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is
essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was
without power to create by executive order the Municipality of
Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a
number of cases
[9]
later decided. However, we have since held
that where a municipality created as such by executive order is
later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal
validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,
[10]
this
Court considered the following factors as having validated the
creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipallity
of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President
before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor general: (1) the fact that for
nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality
had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling
in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity
of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the
fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class
municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and
considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above
5

all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de
jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been
put to rest by the local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. no.
7160), 442 (d) of which provides that municipal districts
organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on
Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation
in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in
existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was
decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258
creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was
only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only
because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired
for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under
Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against
a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced
within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was
done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the
municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacabans
corporate existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated
June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is
constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized
Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it
regarding their common boundary. The agreement was
embodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of
Misamis Occidental.
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning
legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis
Occidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of san
Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any
defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this
Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing
municipal district organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective set of elective
municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.
Second. Jimenez claims, however, that R.A. No. 7160,
442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional
and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the
creation of new municipalities.
[11]

This contention will not bear analysis. Since, as previously
explained, Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time
the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not
subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies
only to new municipalities created for the first time under the
Constitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was
originally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the previous Constitution
which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be
applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the
municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.
Third. Finally Jimenez argues that the RTC erred in
ordering a relocation survey of the boundary of Sinacaban
because the barangays which Sinacaban are claiming are not
enumerated in E.O. No. 258 and that in any event in 1950 the
6

parties entered into an agreement whereby the barangays in
question were considered part of the territory of Jimenez.
E.O. no. 258 does not say that Sinacaban comprises only
the barrios (now called Barangays) therein mentioned. What it
say is that Sinacaban contains those barrios, without saying
they are the only ones comprising it. The reason for this is that
the technical description, containing the metes and bounds of its
territory, is controlling. The trial court correctly ordered a
relocation and consequently the question to which the
municipality the barangays in question belong.
Now, as already stated, in 1950 the two municipalities
agreed that certain barrios bellonged to Jimenez, while certain
other ones belonged to Sinacaban. This agreement was
subsequently approved by the Provincial board of Misamis
Occidental. Whether this agreement conforms to E.O. no. 258
will be determined by the result of the survey. Jimenez
contends however, that regardless of its conformity to E.O. No,
258, the agreement as embodied in resolution No, 77 of the
Provincial Board, is binding on Sinacaban. This raises the
question whether the provincial board had authority to approve
the agreement or, to put it in another way, whether it had the
power to declare certain barrios part of the one or the other
municipality. We hold it did not if effect would be to amend the
area as described in E.O no. 258 creating the Municipality of
Sinacaban.
At the time the Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 77
on February 18, 1950, the applicable law was 2167 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 which provided:
SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes. How settled. Disputes
as to jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall
be decided by the provincial boards of the provinces in which such
municipalities are situated, after an investigation at which the
municipalities concerned shall be duly heard. From the decision of the
provincial board appeal may be taken by the municipality aggrieved to
the Secretary of the Interior [now the Office of the Executive
Secretary], whose decision shall be final. Where the places or barrios
in dispute are claimed by municipalities situated in different provinces,
the provincial boards of the provinces concerned shall come to an
agreement if possible, but, in the event of their failing to agree, an
appeal shall be had to the Secretary of Interior [Executive Secretary],
whose decision shall be final.
As held in Pelaez v. Auditor General,
[12]
the power of
provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an
administrative nature involving as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities. It is a power to fix common boundary, in order
to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities. It is thus limited to implementing the law
creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of
boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a
municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its
amendment.
[13]
If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical
description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by
Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban.
Jimenez properly brought to the RTC for review the decision
of October 11, 1989 and Resolution No. 13-90 of the Provincial
Board. Its action is in accordance with the local Government
Code of 1983, 79 of which provides that I case no settlement
of boundary disputes is made the dispute should be elevated to
the RTC of the province. In 1989, when the action was brought
by Jimenez, this Code was the governing law. The governing
law is now the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), 118-119.
7

Jimenezs contention that the RTC failed to decide the case
within one year form the start of proceeding as required by 79
of the Local Government Code of 1983 and the 90-day period
provided for in the Article VIII, 15 of the Constitution does not
affect the validity of the decision rendered. For even granting
that the court failed to decide within the period prescribed by
law, its failure did not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the
case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible
administrative sanction.
[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 14 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
Narvasa C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima
Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.



[1]
Per Judge Vicente T. Baz, Jr.
[2]
Petition, Annex Z; Rollo, pp. 183-184.
SECOND DIVISION


NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
Petitioner,


- versus -


G.R. No. 142601

Present:

PUNO, J.,
Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-
COMMISSION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS, MUNICIPALITYOF SAN
JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN,
SPS. ANGEL and ROSARIO CRUZ,
RUFINO LAAN, RUFINO
LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES
NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO and
HERMINIA HAGOS, LEON
GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR and
HAYDEE BADILLO,
Respondents.

GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.





Promulgated:

October 23, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----x

D E C I S I O N


SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
[1]
assailing the
Decision
[2]
of the Court of Appeals dated November 16, 1999 and
Resolution dated March 13, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495, entitled
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, versus, THE
HON. RUFINO V. MIJARES, in his capacity as
Commissioner, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS (COSLAP), MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE DEL
MONTE, BULACAN, represented by Hon. Eduardo V. Roquero, in
his capacity as Municipal Mayor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
JOSEPH ELMER S. GUEVARRA, Sheriff IV of the Ex-Officio
8

Sheriff, Malolos, Bulacan, SPS. ANGEL A. CRUZ and ROSARIO C.
CRUZ, RUFINO LAAN, RUFINA LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES
NEPOMUCENO, SPS. ALBERTO HAGOS and HERMINIA
HAGOS, LEON GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR R. BADILLO and
HAYDEE M. BADILLO, and LEONCIO LAAN, respondents.

The undisputed facts are:

Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute
between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (one of
herein respondents) and the City of Caloocan. In order to resolve the
long-challenged conflict, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del
Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-94
[3]
on February
10, 1994. This resolution recognizes the official boundary of
respondent municipality and the City of Caloocan, described as
follows:

ON JOINT MOTION of all members present;

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved to recognize the
official boundary of the Municipality of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan and the City of Caloocan, Metro
Manila as the true and correct line marking between the
two Local Government Units as shown by the attached
certified true copy of the geographic position and plain
grid coordinates of Caloocan, Rizal per CAD-267
specifically from MBM (Municipal Boundary
Monument) 22 to MBM 33;
x x x


On August 8, 1995, another Resolution
[4]
was passed by
the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte recognizing the
geographic position and plane coordinates of Tala Estate, Caloocan
City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the lot lines delineating the
boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and
Caloocan City. This prompted the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Region III to conduct a relocation survey.

On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a
Comprehensive Report,
[5]
some excerpts of which provide:

ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS
1. The geographic positions of MBM Nos. 22 to
33, Cad 267, Caloocan Cadastre was the basis
for the establishment of the true and correct
boundary between the municipality
and Caloocan City. However, during the
dialogue with concerned government agencies
on May 12, 1995, the municipality of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, emphasized that the
boundary between the two local government
units is the imaginary straight line between two
boundary monuments, starting from MBM Nos.
22 to 33.

2. The FNSP-G surveying team plotted/drafted
in a topographic map all pertinent records
affecting boundary disputes of the two locality,
such as the geographic positions and coordinates
9

of MBM Nos. 22 to 33 Cad 267 Caloocan
Cadastre, BM Nos. 11 to 23 of Tala Estate lot
lines. Tala Estate lot lines were plotted
approximately by scale, because there were no
records on its geographic coordinates and
incomplete cadastral maps. The findings are the
following:

a) The plotted positions of MBM
Nos. 23 to 30, 32 and 33 Cad 267
Caloocan Cadastre are almost
identical or equivalent to BM
Nos. 12 to 16, 18 to 20, 22 and 23
of Tala Estate.

b) The lot lines of Tala Estate
traverses thru Marilao River.

c) The northern portion of the lot
lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3 SWO-
41615 Tala Estate indicated that it
traverses thru Marilao River.

3. In Municipal Resolution No. 06-08-
95 dated August 8, 1995, it is requested that the
geographic positions of BM Nos. 11 to 24, Tala
Estate shall be recognized as the official lots
lines which delineates the boundaries of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan
and Caloocan City. Moreover, the resolution is
opposed to the delineation of Marilao River as
the boundary of two localities, as embodied in
SWO-41615.

4. If the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-
41615 will be the basis for the boundaries of the
two LGUs, Marilao River will be the natural
boundary between the two LGUs; if BM 11 to
24, Tala Estate shall be the basis for the
boundaries, some northern portions of Parcels 1,
2 and 3, SWO-41615, portions of Bankers
Village and Pangarap Village belongs to the
Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.


The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del
Monte Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions contradict the delineation
embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare property
allotted by the government mainly for housing and resettlement site
under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA),
pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.
Uns
atisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a
complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP),
[6]
against petitioner NHA. Several residents of San Jose
del Monte, namely: spouses Angel and Rosario Cruz, Rufino Laan,
Rufina Laan Santos, Andres Nepomuceno, spouses Alberto and
Herminia Hagos, Leon Guilalas, spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo,
and Leoncio Laan (herein private respondents) joined the municipality
as complainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are
within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte; that Presidential
Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and that the
10

NHAs Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their
landholdings. They prayed that the NHA be ordered to award them
damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a
party in their complaint.

On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling
that the correct boundary between respondents San Jose del Monte
and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of
the Sangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The COSLAP likewise
held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are mere
incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land
covered by the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San
Jose del Monte, encroaches upon respondents properties.

On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the
Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of
Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held
on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of respondent
municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to
provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundary
between the two local government units. During the meeting,
petitioner NHA posed strong opposition to the COSLAP Resolution,
contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary
dispute. Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 30 days.

Instead of submitting a position paper, respondent municipality
filed with the COSLAP a motion for execution of its Resolution
dated June 22, 1998. On May 17, 1999, the COSLAP granted the
motion and issued a writ of execution.

Petitioner NHA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari alleging that in issuing the June 22, 1998 Resolution and
the writ of execution, COSLAP acted without jurisdiction.
On November 16, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the
petition for having been filed out of time and for petitioners failure to
avail of the remedy of appeal.


Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied.


Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a
quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become
final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question.
[7]


The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has
jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between respondent
municipality and Caloocan City.
11


COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued
on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The
Commission is an administrative body established as a means of
providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land
problems to avoid social unrest. Its objective is to settle land conflicts
among small settlers, landowners and members of cultural minorities.

The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in
Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561, thus:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
x x x

2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the
agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land
problem or dispute referred to the Commission:
Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or
disputes which are critical and explosive in nature
considering, for instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension
or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:

(a) Between
occupants/squatters and pasture
lease agreement holders or
timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters
and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between
occupants/squatters and public
land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification,
release and/or subdivisions of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems
of grave urgency and magnitude.
x x x


Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are
specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes.
[8]
In acting on a
land dispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if the matter
falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency
having appropriate jurisdiction.

There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that
COSLAP has jurisdiction over boundary dispute between two local
government units. Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code, the respective legislative councils of the
contending local government units have jurisdiction over their
boundary disputes. Sections 118 and 119 provide:

Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for
Settlement of Boundary Dispute.
x x x
12


(d) Boundary disputes involving a
component city or municipality on
the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other, or
two (2) or more highly urbanized
cities, shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the respective
sanggunians of the parties.

(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to
effect an amicable settlement within
sixty (60) days from the date the
dispute was referred thereto, it shall
issue a certification to that
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall
be formally tried by the Sanggunian
concerned which shall decide the
issue within sixty (60) days from
the date of the certification referred
to above.

Section 119. Appeal. Within the time and
manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the
proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the
area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide
the appeal within one (1) year from the filing
thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area
prior to the dispute shall be maintained and continued
for all legal purposes.


Rule III implementing the above provisions states:
Rule III

SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

Art. 15. Definition and Policy. There is
boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the
territorial area of an LGU is claimed by two or more
LGUs. Boundary disputes between or among LGUs
shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.

Art. 16. Jurisdictional Responsibility.
Boundary disputes shall be referred for
settlement to the following:

(a) Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan for disputes
involving two (2) or more
barangays in the same city or
municipality, as the case may be;
(b) Sangguniang panlalawigan
for those involving two (2) or
more municipalities within the
same province;
(c) Jointly, to the sanggunians
of provinces concerned, for those
involving component cities or
municipalities of different
provinces; or
(d) Jointly, to the respective
sanggunians, for those
involving a component city or
municipality and a highly
urbanized city or two (2) or
more highly-urbanized cities. x x
x
13


Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case, the
COSLAP should have referred respondents complaint to
the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Caloocan City and the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Jose del Monte. Their decision may be appealed to the
proper Regional Trial Court.

Consequently, we rule that the COSLAP does not have
jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between San Jose del Monte
and Caloocan City. We have consistently ruled that a judgment for
want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of
any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant
to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it
can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
void.
[9]
Such nullity is correctable only by certiorari.
[10]
And
certiorari cannot be dismissed for timeliness inasmuch as a void
judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity
does not prescribe.
[11]
Having no legal effect, the situation is the same
as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties
in the position they were in before the trial.
[12]


Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in disposing NHAs
petition for certiorari. It should have dismissed the petition, not on the
grounds that it was filed late and that certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal, but solely on the ground that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the subject boundary dispute.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
54495 are SET ASIDE.


SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION


STA. LUCIA REALTY &
DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
Petitioner,


- versus -


CITY OF PASIG,
Respondent,

G.R. No. 166838

Present:

VELASCO, JR .,
*

Acting Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
**

DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

14

MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL,
Intervenor.
Promulgated:

June 15, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision
[1]
and the January 27,
2005 Resolution
[2]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603,
which affirmed with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision
[3]
and
October 9, 1998 Order
[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 157, in Civil Case No. 65420.

Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is
the registered owner of several parcels of land with Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which
indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,
Municipality of Pasig
[5]
(Pasig).

The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated
with that covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio
Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal
(Cainta). The two combined lots were subsequently partitioned into
three, for which TCT Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, now all
bearing the Cainta address, were issued.

TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT
Nos. 92869 and 92870.

15

The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a
commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center,
Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.
[6]


Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos.
532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9,
1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with
respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,
Pasig City.
[7]


On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition
[8]
for the
settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC,
Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-3006, is still pending up to this date.

On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint,
[9]
docketed as
Civil Case No. 65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate
taxes, including penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT
Nos. 532250, 598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the
improvements thereon (the subject properties).

Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously
paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-
in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and
the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject
properties were within its territorial jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further
argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes for the lots covered by
the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta.
[10]


Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention
when it moved to intervene on the ground that its interest would be
greatly affected by the outcome of the case. It averred that it had
been collecting the real property taxes on the subject properties even
before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta further asseverated that the
establishment of the boundary monuments would show that the
subject properties are within its metes and bounds.
[11]


Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of
the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the
Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta
and Pasig, presented a prejudicial question to the resolution of the
case.
[12]


16

The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for
lack of merit. Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its
ownership and location,
[13]
the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a
Decision in favor of Pasig:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of [Pasig], ordering Sta.
Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:

1) P273,349.14 representing unpaid real
estate taxes and penalties as of 1996, plus
interest of 2% per month until fully paid;

2) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys
fees; and

3) The costs of suit.

Judgment is likewise rendered against the
intervenor Municipality of Cainta, Rizal, ordering it to
refund to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the
realty tax payments improperly collected and received
by the former from the latter in the aggregate amount
of P358, 403.68.
[14]



After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig,
on September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
RTCs August 10, 1998 Decision.

The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasigs motion in an
Order
[15]
and modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes
due on the improvements on the subject lots:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is hereby
granted. Accordingly, the Decision, dated August 10,
1998 is hereby modified in that the defendant is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the amount
of P5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and
penalties on the improvements on the subject parcels
of land whereon real estate taxes are adjudged as due
for the year 1996.
[16]



Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to
include the RTCs October 9, 1998 Order in its protest.

17

On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal, to which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several
oppositions, on the assertion that there were no good reasons to
warrant the execution pending appeal.
[17]


On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Execution against Sta. Lucia.

On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals to assail the RTCs order granting the execution. Docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was raffled to the First Division
of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22, 2000, ruled in favor
of Sta. Lucia, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE and GRANTED by this Court. The assailed
Order dated April 15, 1999 in Civil Case No. 65420
granting the motion for execution pending appeal and
ordering the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared NULL and VOID.
[18]


The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case
presented a prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x
Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties.
[19]


Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition
for Certiorari filed before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this
was denied on June 25, 2001 for being filed out of time.
[20]


Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was
raffled to the (former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals and
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered its Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTCs
judgment:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of P50,000.00 attorneys fees is DELETED.
[21]


In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there
was no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings.
[22]
Elucidating
on the legal meaning of a prejudicial question, it held that there
18

can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both
civil.
[23]
The Court of Appeals further held that the elements of litis
pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta to be present,
were not met.

Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated January 27, 2005.

Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions
for Certiorari with this Court. Caintas petition, docketed as G.R. No.
166856 was denied on April 13, 2005 for Caintas failure to show any
reversible error. Sta. Lucias own petition is the one subject of this
decision.
[24]


In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of
the Court of Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING [WITH MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
SUSPENDING THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY OF
THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE WHICH WILL FINALLY
DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA WAS VALID
PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES

IV.

19

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE
BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO CITY
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY RESOLVED,
THE PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE PAYING THE
REALTY TAXES ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH
THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO PRESERVE THE STATUS
QUO.
[25]



Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts
correctly decided the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their
faces that the subject properties are situated in its territorial
jurisdiction. Pasig contends that the principles of litis pendentia,
forum shopping, and res judicata are all inapplicable, due to the
absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains that the
boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the
complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed before the
Pasig RTC. It avers that the doctrine of prejudicial question, which
has a definite meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two cases
involved are both civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal
ground to preclude the simultaneous hearing of both cases, the
suspension of the proceedings in the Pasig RTC is baseless.

Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal
authority over the subject properties, which fall within its territorial
jurisdiction. Cainta claims that while it has been collecting the realty
taxes over the subject properties since way back 1913, Pasig only
covered the same for real property tax purposes in 1990, 1992, and
1993. Cainta also insists that there is a discrepancy between the
locational entries and the technical descriptions in the TCTs, which
further supports the need to await the settlement of the boundary
dispute case it initiated.

The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down
into two basic issues:

1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in
deciding Pasigs Complaint without waiting for the
resolution of the boundary dispute case between
Pasig and Cainta; and

2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real
property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged to have
always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in
Sta. Lucias TCTs.

20

We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute
between Pasig and Cainta would determine which local government
unit is entitled to collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia.
[26]


The Local Government Unit entitled
To Collect Real Property Taxes

The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that
the resolution of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not
necessitate the assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and
bounds of their respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v.
Court of Appeals
[27]
wherein we said that a certificate of title is
conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location.
[28]
The Court
of Appeals even referred to specific provisions of the 1991 Local
Government Code and Act. No. 496 to support its ruling that Pasig
had the right to collect the realty taxes on the subject properties as
the titles of the subject properties show on their faces that they are
situated in Pasig.
[29]


Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the Real Property Tax
Code, the authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the
locality where the property is situated:
Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. All real
property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
appraised at the current and fair market value
prevailing in the locality where the property is
situated.
x x x x
Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the
responsibility of treasurers. The collection of the
real property tax and all penalties accruing thereto,
and the enforcement of the remedies provided for in
this Code or any applicable laws, shall be the
responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or
municipality where the property is
situated. (Emphases ours.)


This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also
known as the 1991 the Local Government Code, to wit:

Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. All
real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be
appraised at the current and fair market value
prevailing in the locality where the property is
situated. The Department of Finance shall promulgate
21

the necessary rules and regulations for the
classification, appraisal, and assessment of real
property pursuant to the provisions of this Code.


Section 233. Rates of Levy. A province or
city or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila
Area shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax
applicable to their respective localities as follows: x x
x. (Emphases ours.)


The only import of these provisions is that, while a local
government unit is authorized under several laws to collect real
estate tax on properties falling under its territorial jurisdiction, it is
imperative to first show that these properties are unquestionably
within its geographical boundaries.

Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial
boundaries, this Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections
[30]
said:

The importance of drawing with precise strokes
the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra
vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the
boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is
the evil sought to be avoided by the Local Government
Code in requiring that the land area of a local
government unit must be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions.
[31]
(Emphasis ours.)


The significance of accurately defining a local government
units boundaries was stressed in City of Pasig v. Commission on
Elections,
[32]
which involved the consolidated petitions filed by the
parties herein, Pasig and Cainta, against two decisions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with respect to the plebiscites
scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its creation of two
new Barangays. Ruling on the contradictory reliefs sought by Pasig
and Cainta, this Court affirmed the COMELEC decision to hold in
abeyance the plebiscite to ratify the creation of Barangay
Karangalan; but set aside the COMELECs other decision, and
nullified the plebiscite that ratified the creation ofBarangay Napico in
Pasig, until the boundary dispute before the Antipolo RTC had been
resolved. The aforementioned case held as follows:

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No.
125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while

22

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R.
No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order
in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET
ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997
to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City
of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the
same is ordered held in abeyance until after the
courts settle with finality the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.
[33]



Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect
real property taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the
subject properties are situated within its territorial jurisdiction;
otherwise, it would be acting beyond the powers vested to it by law.

Certificates of Title as
Conclusive Evidence of Location


While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as
to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an
action for the very purpose of attacking the statements
therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
[34]
we
proclaimed that:

We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a
certificate of title shall be conclusive as to all matters
contained therein and conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it
bears stressing that while certificates of title are
indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do
not create or vest title. They merely confirm or record
title already existing and vested. They cannot be used
to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they
be used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither
do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of
other.
[35]



In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente
Coronado,
[36]
we set aside the lower courts ruling that the property
subject of the case was not situated in the location stated and
described in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in
line with the doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of
ownership and location. However, we refused to simply uphold the
veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded the case back
to the trial court for the determination of the exact location of the
23

property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before
it.
[37]


In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero,
[38]
this Court
reprimanded the City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property that
was outside its territorial jurisdiction, viz:

In this case, it is basic that before the City of
Tagaytay may levy a certain property for sale due to
tax delinquency, the subject property should be under
its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected
to know such basic principle of law. The failure of the
city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the property is
within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the
same constitutes gross negligence.
[39]
(Emphasis ours.)


Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the TCTs
of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the
metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in
the TCTs, reveal that they are within Caintas boundaries.
[40]
This only
means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated
and the location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance
therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be
conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if both the
stated and described locations point to the same area.

The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case
between Pasig and Cainta is pending, would be able to best
determine once and for all the precise metes and bounds of both
Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial jurisdictions. The resolution
of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the extent and reach of
each local governments authority, a prerequisite in the proper
exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation. This
was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v.
Commission on Elections,
[41]
and by the First Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we
cannot adhere to the same logic and reasoning in this case.

The Prejudicial Question Debate

It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real
property taxes it already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its
boundary dispute with Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently
argued that the boundary dispute case is not a prejudicial
question that would entail the suspension of its collection case
24

against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of Pasig v.
Commission on Elections,
[42]
when it sought to nullify the COMELECs
ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the boundary
dispute case), the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay
Karangalan. We agreed with the COMELEC therein that the boundary
dispute case presented a prejudicial questionand explained our
statement in this wise:

To begin with, we agree with the position of the
COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta
and the City of Pasig presents aprejudicial
question which must first be decided before plebiscites
for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no
prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil
and criminal action and does not come into play where
both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this
may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad
v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,

that, in the
interest of good order, we can very well suspend
action on one case pending the final outcome of
another case closely interrelated or linked to the
first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig
vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within
its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same
area are included in the boundary dispute case pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely,
whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the
creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of
a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be
properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or
less permanent natural boundaries.

Precisely because
territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending
civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with
finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the
proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for
potentially ultra viresacts of such barangays. x x
x.
[43]
(Emphases ours.)


It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term prejudicial
question, as appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had
been used loosely. Its usage had been more in reference to its
ordinary meaning, than to its strict legal meaning under the Rules of
Court.
[44]
Nevertheless, even without the impact of the connotation
derived from the term, our own Rules of Court state that a trial court
may control its own proceedings according to its sound discretion:

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND
JUDICIAL OFFICERS
Rule 135

25

SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts.
Every court shall have power:

x x x x

(g) To amend and control its process
and orders so as to make them
comformable to law and justice.


Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent
power in our own decisions, to wit:

The court in which an action is pending may, in
the exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in
another court, especially where the parties and the
issues are the same, for there is power inherent in
every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights of
parties to the second action cannot be properly
determined until the questions raised in the first action
are settled the second action should be stayed.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to
the power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its
time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants. But if
proceedings must be stayed, it must be done in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent vexatious
litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between
litigants and courts. It bears stressing that whether or
not the RTC would suspend the proceedings in the
SECOND CASE is submitted to its sound discretion.
[45]



In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should
have held in abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in
view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary dispute case
before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasigs and
Caintas rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax
collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta. Lucia refused to
pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another local
government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the
contending local government units herein been delineated with
accuracy, then there would be no controversy at all.

In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is
directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes due on the
subject properties, in an escrow account with the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
26


WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30,
2004 Decision and the January 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and
the Municipality of Cainta are both directed to await the judgment in
their boundary dispute case (Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before
Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court in Antipolo City, to determine
which local government unit is entitled to exercise its powers,
including the collection of real property taxes, on the properties
subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property
taxes due on the lots and improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, 599131, 92869, 92870 and 384

G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991
LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D.
MENZON, petitioner,
vs.
LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR, LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA in his
capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte and
Head of SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and Leyte
Provincial Treasurer FLORENCIO LUNA,respondents.
Zozimo G. Alegre for petitioner.
The Provincial Attorney for respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:p
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court
dated August 28, 1990 which initially denied the petition
for certiorari and mandamus filed by then Acting Vice-Governor
of Leyte, Aurelio D. Menzon. In the August 28 resolution, the
Court stated that Mr. Menzon cannot successfully assert the
right to be recognized as Acting Vice-Governor and, therefore,
his designation was invalid. In this motion, the primary issue is
the right to emoluments while actually discharging the duties of
the office.
The facts of the case are as follows: On February 16, 1988, by
virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the
province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government Luis
Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as
Acting Governor of Leyte.
On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated
by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the
province of Leyte.
The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator Alberto
Romulo on March 29, 1988.
On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U.
Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of
the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of
Leyte.
27

In his reply letter dated June 22, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto
T. Rubillar, Jr. stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision
relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case
of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as the
temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-
Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the
Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both
offices.
As a result of the foregoing communications between Tente U.
Quintero and Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued
Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the
petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The pertinent
portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREAS, the circumstances obtaining at
present in the Office of the Vice-Governor is that
there is no permanent (sic) nor a vacancy in said
office. The Honorable Leopoldo E. Petilla
assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor after he
took his oath of office to said position.
WHEREAS, it is the duty of the members of the
Board not only to take cognizance of the aforesaid
official communication of the Undersecretary,
Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., but also to uphold the law.
WHEREAS, on motion of the Honorable Macario
R. Esmas, Jr., duly seconded by the Honorable
Rogelio L. Granados and the Honorable Renato
M. Rances.
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved not to
recognize Honorable Aurelio D. Menzon as Acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte. (Rollo, p. 27)
The petitioner, on July 10, 1989, through the acting LDP
Regional Counsel, Atty. Zosimo Alegre, sought clarification from
Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr. regarding the June 22,
1989 opinion.
On July 12, 1989, Undersecretary Jacinto T. Rubillar replied and
explained his opinion. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
This has reference to your letter dated July 10,
1989, requesting for clarification of our letter to
Provincial Administrator Tente U. Quintero dated
June 22, 1989, which states in substance, that
"there is no succession provided for in case of
temporary vacancy in the office of the vice-
governor and that the designation of a temporary
vice-governor is not necessary.
We hold the view that the designation extended by
the Secretary of Local Government in favor of one
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members of
Leyte to temporarily discharge the powers and
duties of the vice-governor during the pendency of
the electoral controversy in the Office of the
Governor, does not contradict the stand we have
on the matter. The fact that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member was temporarily designated
to perform the functions of the vice-governor could
not be considered that the Sangguniang member
succeeds to the office of the latter, for it is basic
that designation is merely an imposition of
additional duties to be performed by the designee
28

in addition to the official functions attached to his
office. Furthermore, the necessity of designating
an official to temporarily perform the functions of a
particular public office, would depend on the
discretion of the appointing authority and the
prevailing circumstances in a given area and by
taking into consideration the best interest of public
service.
On the basis of the foregoing and considering that
the law is silent in case of temporary vacancy, in
the Office of the Vice-Governor, it is our view that
the peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte,
where the electoral controversy in the Office of the
Governor has not yet been settled, calls for the
designation of the Sangguniang Member to act as
vice-governor temporarily. (Rollo, p. 31)
In view, of the clarificatory letter of Undersecretary Rubillar, the
Regional Director of the Department of Local Government,
Region 8, Resurreccion Salvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a
letter addressed to the Acting-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo E.
Petilla, requesting the latter that Resolution No. 505 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be modified accordingly. The letter
states:
In view thereof, please correct previous actions
made by your office and those of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan which may have tended to discredit
the validity of Atty. Aurelio Menzon's designation
as acting vice-governor, including the payment of
his salary as Acting Vice-Governor, if he was
deprived of such. (Rollo, p. 32)
On August 3, 1989, the Regional Director wrote another letter to
Acting-Governor Petilla, reiterating his earlier request.
Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor
and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct
Resolution No. 505 and correspondingly to pay the petitioner
the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
Thus, on November 12, 1989, the petitioner filed before this
Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petition
sought the nullification of Resolution No. 505 and for the
payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-
Governor of Leyte.
In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of
Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the
Governor of the province of Leyte.
During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May
16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna
allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the
actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-
Governor.
On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by
Aurelio D. Menzon.
On September 6, 1990, respondent Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue
of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct
the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte all the
emoluments and compensation which he received while acting
as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.
29

On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of our resolution. The motion prayed that this
Court uphold the petitioner's right to receive the salary and
emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Governor while he
was acting as such.
The petitioner interposes the following reason for the allowance
of the motion for reconsideration:
THAT THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE
EMOLUMENTS FOR HIS SERVICES
RENDERED AS DESIGNATED ACTING VICE-
GOVERNOR UNDER THE PRINCIPLES OF
GOOD FAITH. SIMPLE JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
The controversy basically revolves around two issues: 1)
Whether or not there was a vacancy?; and 2) Whether or not
the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make
temporary appointments?
The respondents argue that there exists no vacancy in the
Office of the Vice-Governor which requires the appointment of
the petitioner. They further allege that if indeed there was a
need to appoint an acting Vice-Governor, the power to appoint
is net vested in the Secretary of Local Government. Absent any
provision in the Local Government Code on the mode of
succession in case of a temporary vacancy in the Office of the
Vice-Governor, they claim that this constitutes an internal
problem of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and was thus for it
solely to resolve.
The arguments are of doubtful validity.
The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no
vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified
incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is
no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office. (see Stocking v. State, 7 Ind.
326, cited in Mechem. A Treatise on the Law on Public Offices
and Officers, at p. 61)
Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily
seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when
the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed
Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he
was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to
exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Petilla,
notwithstanding his succession to the Office of the Governor,
continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-
Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor call
for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More so when the
vacancy is for an extended period. Precisely, it was Petilla's
automatic assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted
in the vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that
the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the
petitioner shows the need to fill up the position during the period
it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to
ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote
all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful if the
Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment
made by a higher authority.
Disposing the issue of vacancy, we come to the second issue of
whether or not the Secretary of Local Government had the
authority to designate the petitioner.
We hold in the affirmative.
30

The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of
succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in the Office of
the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be
understood to convey that a remedy in law is wanting.
The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a
necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor. For
about two years after the governatorial elections, there had
been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of Leyte,
Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been
proclaimed due to a pending election case before the
Commission on Elections.
The two-year interregnum which would result from the
respondents' view of the law is disfavored as it would cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people and in the proper management of the affairs of the local
government of Leyte. Definitely, it is incomprehensible that to
leave the situation without affording any remedy was ever
intended by the Local Government Code.
Under the circumstances of this case and considering the
silence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules that, in
order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum
created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter
ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the
situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment extended
to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of
public service demanded nothing less than the immediate
appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that
Undersecretary Jacinto Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his
previous position and acknowledged the need for an acting
Vice-Governor.
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws
deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions.
However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local
Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we
see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the
two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The
respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct
appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the
President who has supervision over local governments as
provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to
the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the
President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of their
right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through
their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,
etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent,
may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent
delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if
the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.
Whether or not the absence of a Vice-Governor would main or
prejudice the province of Leyte, is for higher officials to decide
or, in proper cases, for the judiciary to adjudicate. As shown in
this case where for about two years there was only an acting
Governor steering the leadership of the province of Leyte, the
urgency of filling the vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor
to free the hands of the acting Governor to handle provincial
31

problems and to serve as the buffer in case something might
happen to the acting Governor becomes unquestionable. We do
not have to dwell ourselves into the fact that nothing happened
to acting Governor Petilla during the two-year period. The
contingency of having simultaneous vacancies in both offices
cannot just be set aside. It was best for Leyte to have a full-time
Governor and an acting Vice-Governor. Service to the public is
the primary concern of those in the government. It is a
continuous duty unbridled by any political considerations.
The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord
with the intent behind the Local Government Code. There is no
question that Section 49 in connection with Section 52 of the
Local Government Code shows clearly the intent to provide for
continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor.
The Local Government Code provides for the mode of
succession in case of a permanent vacancy, viz:
Section 49:
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-
Governor assumes the Office of the Governor, . . .
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntary resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office the sangguniang
panlalawigan . . . member who obtained the
highest number of votes in the election
immediately preceding, . . . shall assume the office
for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the
mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies may
likewise be observed in case of a temporary vacancy in the
same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy.
The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The
Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the
temporary appointment.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's right to be paid the
salary attached to the Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable.
The compensation, however, to be remunerated to the
petitioner, following the example in Commonwealth Act No. 588
and the Revised Administrative Code, and pursuant to the
proscription against double compensation must only be such
additional compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not
exceed the salary authorized by law for the Office of the Vice-
Governor.
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the
Secretary of Local Government, possesses no power to appoint
the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer
entitled to compensation.
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the
Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed
by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the
alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government,
after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto
Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government
Regional Director Res Salvatierra.
Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The
respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the
petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only
when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the
same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor
32

that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made
an issue and the recognition withdrawn.
The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties
attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed
as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public
policy on which the de facto doctrine is based and basic
considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now
deny him the salary due him for the services he actually
rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
(See Cantillo v. Arrieta, 61 SCRA 55 [1974])
WHEREFORE, the COURT hereby GRANTS the motion for
reconsideration. The additional compensation which the
petitioner has received, in the amount exceeding the salary
authorized by law for the position of Senior Board Member, shall
be considered as payment for the actual services rendered as
acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134213. July 20, 1999]
Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr., petitioner, vs. Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and
Juan Y. Araneta, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
The query herein is purely legal. May an incumbent Vice-
Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside
over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?
The facts are not in dispute.
In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J.
Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y.
Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and
SP members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor
designated petitioner as Acting Governor for the duration of the
formers official trip abroad until his return. When the SP held its
regular session on September 6, 1995, respondents questioned the
authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as
Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. The latter,
however, refused to do so. In another session, seven (7) members of
the SP voted to allow petitioner to continue presiding while four (4)
others voted against with one (1) abstention. On September 22, 1995,
respondents filed before the lower court a petition for declaratory relief
and prohibition. In the meantime, on October 2, 1995, the Governor
re-assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and
declared petitioner as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside
over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting
Governor.
[1]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review raising
the issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is dismissible for
having become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998
of the terms of office of the local officials involved herein, the Court
nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy but novel
issue under the existing laws on local government.
Sections 49(a) and 466(a)(1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provide that
the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP.
[2]
In
addition to such function, he become(s)
[3]
the Governor and
assume(s)
[4]
the higher office for the unexpired term of his
predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein. When the
33

vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the Vice-Governor shall
automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and
perform the duties and functions
[5]
of the Governor. It may be noted
that the Code provides only for modes of succession in case of
permanent vacancy in the office of the Governor and the Vice-
Governor (whether single or simultaneously) as well as in case of a
temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor. But, no such
contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the office of
the Vice-Governor, just like the 1983 Local Government Code.
[6]

It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the powers
and duties of the Office of the Governor, he does not assume the
latter office. He only acts as the Governor but does not become
the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of
the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or
vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily, he does
not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by
merely becoming an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely
exercising the powers and duties of the higher office. But the problem
is, while in such capacity, does he temporarily relinquish the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including
the power to preside over the sessions of the SP?
Sad to say the new Local Government Code is silent on this
matter, yet this query should be answered in the positive. A Vice-
Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-
Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for
the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor
and Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain
members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of a
legislative character. This is because the authority vested by law in the
provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative
powers of Congress.
[7]
Unlike under the old Code, where the Governor
is not only the provincial Chief Executive,
[8]
but also the presiding
officer of the local legislative body,
[9]
the new Code delineated the
union of the executive-legislative powers in the provincial, city and
municipal levels except in the Barangay. Under R.A. 7160, the
Governor was deprived of the power to preside over the SP and is no
longer considered a member thereof.
[10]
This is clear from the law,
when it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the
SP,
[11]
which is the legislative body of the province, and
enumerates therein its membership consisting of the:
1.) Vice-Governor, as presiding officer,
2.) regular elective SP members,
3.) three elective sectoral representatives, and
4.) those ex-officio members, namely:
a.) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay,
b.) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan,
c.) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian members of
municipalities and component cities.
[12]

Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed
excluded applying the rule in legal hermeneutics that when the law
enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. On the contrary, local
executive power in the province is vested alone in the
Governor.
[13]
Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers
in the office of the local chief executive under the former Code has
been disbanded, so that either department now comprises different and
non-intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system of
check and balance between the two.
It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the country is
considered effectively absent, the Vice-Mayor should discharge the
34

duties of the mayor during the latters absence.
[14]
This doctrine should
equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly situated as the
Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a definite rule as to
what constitutes absence, yet this term should be reasonably construed
to mean effective absence,
[15]
that is, one that renders the officer
concerned powerless, for the time being, to discharge the powers and
prerogatives of his office.
[16]
There is no vacancy whenever the office
is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there
is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume
and exercise at present the duties of the office.
[17]
By virtue of the
foregoing definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or
assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor
during such contingency. Considering the silence of the law on the
matter, the mode of succession provided for permanent vacancies,
under the new Code, in the office of the Vice-Governor may likewise
be observed in the event of temporary vacancy occurring in the same
office.
[18]
This is so because in the eyes of the law, the office to which
he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise
the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature
of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to
discharge them.
[19]
Such is not only consistent with but also appears to
be the clear rationale of the new Code wherein the policy of
performing dual functions in both offices has already been
abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the
office of the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in
the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor
by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an
inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor)
to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of
the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Code
concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The
continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as
presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such
capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the
regular presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the
members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.
[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994
JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JESUS JAMES
CALISIN, respondents.
Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
35


QUIASON, J .:
This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to section 2, Article IX of the
Constitution, to set aside (a) the Resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) dated January 22, 1993, which
certified respondent James Calisin as the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Albay and (b) its Resolution dated February 22, 1993, which
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.
The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay for
purposes of succession.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the
first, second and third districts of the Province of Albay were
elected and proclaimed as members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, to wit:

FIRST DISTRICT
Name No. of Votes Garnered
1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes
2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes
SECOND DISTRICT
1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes
2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes
THIRD DISTRICT
1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315
votes
2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes
3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes
4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes

(Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the
Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically
assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving
vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the law, Azana's
position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest
ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by
petitioner and private respondent.
In answer to private respondent's petition for his declaration as
senior Sanggunian member for the Province of Albay, the
COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993,
certifying him as first in the order of ranking with petitioner
herein as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its
certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian
members in relation to the number of registered voters in the
district.
Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of
the Department of Interior and Local Government designated
private respondent as acting Vice-Governor of the province.
36

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
resolution which was denied on February 22, 1993.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members
should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in
relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the
number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. He
further argues that a district may have a large number of
registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case
the winning candidate would register a low percentage of the
number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a
smaller number of registered voters but may have a big voters'
turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher
percentage of the votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would
come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.
Petitioner gives the following illustration:
1. for private respondent.
107,216 (actually voted)
x 28,335 (votes
obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)
2. for petitioner
121,423 (actually voted)
x 32,918 (votes
obtained) = 25.84%
154,665 (registered voters)
(Rollo, p. 9).
We are not persuaded.
The Local Government provides:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office
of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become governor or
mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice-mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or
vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other Sanggunian members
according to their ranking as defined herein.
xxx xxx xxx
For purposes of succession as provided in this
Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election. (Emphasis
ours)
37

The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top
three Sanggunian members:

NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
Candidates

ALBAY
CALISIN,
JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st
VICTORIA,
JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd
MARCELLANA
JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd

(Rollo, p. 14)
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained
by each winning candidate of the total number of registered
voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no
recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from
the words (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).
In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 710 (1992),
we held that:
. . . Under the principles of statutory construction,
if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given it literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This plain-
meaning rule or
verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests
on the valid presumption that the words employed
by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent or will and preclude the court from
construing it differently. The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisely, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. . .
Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the
clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other
interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the
legislative branch and not to this Court which has no power to
change the law.
Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated
January 22, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.
38


The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 116763. April 19, 1996]
GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS and AL
NACINO, petitioners, vs. MAYOR ANGELO M. ARBA,
VICE MAYOR MANUEL S. HERNANDO, and
EDWARD PALAFOX, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE;
APPOINTING AUTHORITY; VESTED IN THE GOVERNOR
IN CASE OF PERMANENT VACANCY CAUSED BY A
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER WHO DOES NOT
BELONG TO ANY POLITICAL PARTY, UPON
RECOMMENDATION OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
CONCERNED. - Since the vacancy in this case was created
by a Sanggunian member who did not belong to any
political party, the specific provision involved is par. (c) of
Sec. 45 of the Local Government Code. But who is the
local chief executive referred? And which is the
Sanggunian concerned? With respect to the first (local
chief executive), petitioners look to Sec. 45(a) for the
answer and say that it is the governor, with respect to
vacancies in the Sangguniang Panlungsod of component
cities and Sangguniang Bayan, or the mayor with respect to
vacancies in the sangguniang Barangay. Reference to
Secs. 50 and 63 provisions is appropriate not for the reason
advanced by petitioners, i.e., that the power to appoint
implies the power to remove, but because implicit in these
provisions is a policy to vest in the President, the governor
and the mayor in descending order the exercise of an
executive power whether to appoint in order to fill vacancies
in local councils or to suspend local officials. These
provisions are inpari materia with Sec. 45. To be sure the
President of the Philippines can not be referred to as local
chief executive in Sec. 45(c) but it is apparent that the
phrase is a misnomer and that the choice of this phrase was
simply dictated by the need to avoid, for stylistic reasons,
interminably repeating the officials on whom the power to
appoint is conferred. Perhaps authorities concerned would
have been a more accurate generic phrase to use. For that
matter, to follow private respondents interpretation would
be to run into a similar, if not greater, difficulty. For Sec.
45(a)(3) vests the power to fill vacancies in the
Sangguniang Barangay in the mayor but the local chief
executive of a barangay is not the mayor. It is the punong
barangay. Yet local chief executive cannot be applied to
the punong barangay without rendering Sec. 45(a)(3)
meaningless. For then there would never be any occasion
when the mayor, under this provision, can appoint a
replacement for a member of the Sangguniang Bayan who
for one reason or another ceases from office for reason
other than the expiration of his term. And why should a
vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be filled by a
different authority (the governor, according to this view)
simply because the vacancy was created by a member who
does not belong to a political party when, according to Sec.
45(a)( 1), a vacancy created by a member who belongs to a
political party must be filled by appointment by the President
of the Philippines? With reference to the phrase
sanggunian concerned in Sec. 45(c), petitioners say it
means, with respect to a vacancy in the Sangguniang
39

Bayan, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Their reason is that
under Sec. 61 of the Code, the power to investigate
complaints against elective municipal officials is vested in
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This interpretation is
inconsistent with the fact that in filling vacancies in the
Sangguniang Barangay it is the Sangguniang Barangay
which under Sec. 45(a)(3)recommends the appointee, not
the Sangguniarang Panlungsod or the Sangguniang Bayan,
which would be the case if petitioners view were to prevail.
We think that the phrase sanggunian concerned in Sec.
45(c) should more properly be understood as referring to
the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in
keeping with the policy implicit in Sec. 45(a)(3). In other
words, with the exception of the Sangguniang Barangay
pars. (a) and (b) must be read as providing for the filling of
vacancies in the various Sanggunians when these
vacancies are created as a result of the cessation from
office (other than expiration of term) of members who
belong to political parties. On the other hand, Sec. 45(c)
must be understood as providing for the filling of vacancies
created by members who do not belong to any political
party. There is only one rule governing appointments to the
Sangguniang Barangay. Any vacancy therein caused by the
cessation from office of a member must be made by the
mayor upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The
reason is that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are
not allowed to have party affiliations.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT BOUND TO APPOINT ANYONE
RECOMMENDED TO HIM BY THE SANGGUNIAN
CONCERNED. - Having determined that appointments in
case of vacancies caused by Sanggunian members who do
not belong to any political party must be made in
accordance with the recommendation of the Sanggunians
concerned where the vacancies occur, the next question is:
Is the appointing authority limited to the appointment of
those recommended to him? We think an affirmative
answer must be given to the question. The appointing
authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended to
him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power of
appointment is a discretionary power. On the other hand,
neither is the appointing power vested with so large a
discretion that he can disregard the recommendation of the
Sanggunian concerned. Since the recommendation takes
the place of nomination by political party, the
recommendation must likewise be considered a
condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment, by
analogy to the provision of Sec. 45(b).
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Pineda Pineda Mastura Valencia and Associates for
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
The question in this case is: In case of a permanent
vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation
from office of a member who does not belong to any political
party, who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with
what procedure?
This case arose from the following facts:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he
resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, the mayor,
respondent Angelo M. Barba, recommended to the Governor of
40

the province, petitioner Rodolfo C. Farias, the appointment of
respondent Edward Palafox.
A similar recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas
but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The
resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in
compliance with 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No.
7160).
1

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this
provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the
resolution for the reason that the authority and power to
appointSangguniang Bay an members are lodged in the
Governor, and therefore, the Resolution should be addressed to
the Provincial Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of
petitioner Al Nacino, vice Carlito Domingo, as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On June 8, 1994, petitioner
Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office
that same day.
On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed
respondent Edward Palafox to the same position on June 8,
1994. The next day, June 9, 1994, respondent Palafox took his
oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition,
entitled Governor Rodolfo C. Farias and Al Nacino v. Mayor
Angelo M. Barba, Vice Mayor Manuel S. Hernando, Jr. and
Edward D. Palafox.
On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision,
upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent
Mayor Barba. It held:
Under the facts and circumstances as shown clearly in the case, there
is no doubt the law that is applicable is sub-section C of Section 45
of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991 which provides:
In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member
who does not belong to any political party, the Local Chief Executive
shall upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint
a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
. . . Inasmuch as the permanent vacancy is in the Sanggunian Bayan of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, it is the Sanggunian concerned referred to
in the law which recommends the appointment to fill the vacancy. . . .
This being so, the Local Chief Executive referred to in sub-section C
of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 7160 is the Municipal Mayor of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
It cannot be denied that the Governor has the authority to
appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in the Sanggunian
Bayan caused by resignation of a member thereof as that is
vested in him or her by the Provision of No. 2, Sec. 45 of
Republic Act No. 7160. To the mind of the court that authority is
not vested in him or her where the permanent vacancy is
caused by a Sanggunian Member who does not belong to any
political party as that authority is specifically vested upon the
Local Chief Executive upon recommendation of the Sanggunian
concerned as per sub-section C of Section 45 of the same
Republic Act No. 7160. Under No. 2 of Sec. 45 aforementioned
the law does not require a recommendation for the appointment
of Sanggunian Bayan Member to fill a permanent vacancy either
from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or from the Sanggunian
Bayan. . . . As such there can be no other person referred to as
the Local Chief Executive having the authority to appoint other
than the Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of the Sanggunian
Bayan where there is permanent vacancy. This can be clearly
41

inferred from the two (2) provisions of the law (No. 2 and sub-
section C of Sec. 45 of Rep. Act No. 7160). While No. 2 of Sec.
45 specifically vests the power to appoint in the Governor, sub-
section. C of Sec. 45, specifically vests the power to appoint in
the Local Chief Executive. The Local Chief Executive
specifically mentioned in said sub-section C of Sec. 45 is not the
Governor, for there would have been no need for the law
making body to have specifically stated in the law if it had
intended that the Governor is that one and the same Local Chief
Executive vested with power to appoint.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the trial court on August 18, 1994. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the power to fill a vacancy in the
Sangguniang Bayan, which is created as a result of the
cessation from office of a member who does not belong to a
political party, is vested in the provincial governor upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The statutory provision in question is 45 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which reads:
45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. (a) Permanent
vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided
above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following
manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive
Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent component
cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang
bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of
the sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of
the sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the
political party under which the sanggunian member concerned had
been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank
created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the
manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the
vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the
appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of
membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political
party concerned are conditions sine qua non,and any appointment
without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab
initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the
official responsible therefor.
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member
who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive
shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a
qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the
barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically
by the official next in rank of the organization concerned.
[1] Since the vacancy in this case was created by a
Sanggunian member who did not belong to any political party,
the specific provision involved is par. (c), to wit:
42

(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member
who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive
shall, upon recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a
qualified person to fill the vacancy.
But who is the local chief executive referred? And which is
the sanggunian concerned? With respect to the first (local
chief executive), petitioners look to 45(a) for the answer and
say that it is the governor, with respect to vacancies in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang
Bayan, or the mayor with respect to vacancies in the
sangguniang Barangay.
In support of this view, they cite, first of all, the following
provision of the former Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337):
50. Permanent Vacancies in the Local Sanggunians. -In case of
permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or sangguniang barangay, the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister of
Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy
in the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod;
the governor, in the case ofsangguniang bayan members; or the city or
municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay members.
Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from
the political party of the sanggunianmember who caused the vacancy,
and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
and, second, the following provision of the present Code:
63. Preventive Suspension - (a) Preventive suspension may be
imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a
component city or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the
barangay. . .
Reference to these provisions is appropriate not for the
reason advanced by petitioners, i.e., that the power to appoint
implies the power to remove, but because implicit in
these provisions is a policy to vest in the President, the
governor and the mayor in descending order the exercise of an
executive power whether to appoint in order to fill vacancies in
local councils or to suspend local officials. These provisions are
in pan materia with 45.
To be sure the President of the Philippines can not be
referred to as local chief executive in 45(c) but it is apparent
that the phrase is a misnomer and that the choice of this phrase
was simply dictated by the need to avoid, for stylistic reasons,
interminably repeating the officials on whom the power to
appoint is conferred. Perhaps authorities concerned would
have been a more accurate generic phrase to use.
For that matter, to follow private respondents interpretation
would be to run into a similar, if not greater, difficulty. For
45(a)(3) vests the power to fill vacancies in the Sangguniang
Barangay in the mayor but the local chief executive of a
barangay is not the mayor. It is the punong barangay. Yet local
chief executive cannot be applied to the punong barangay
without rendering 45(a)(3) meaningless. For then there would
never be any occasion when the mayor, under this provision,
can appoint a replacement for a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan who for one reason or another ceases from office for
reason other than the expiration of his term. And why should a
vacancy in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be filled by a
different authority (the governor, according to this view) simply
43

because the vacancy was created by a member who does not
belong to a political party when, according to 45(a)(1), a
vacancy created by a member who belongs to a political party
must be filled by appointment by the President of the
Philippines?
With reference to the phrase sangguniang concerned in
45(c), petitioners say it means, with respect to a vacancy in the
Sangguniang Bayan, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Their
reason is that under Sec. 61 of the Code, the power to
investigate complaints against elective municipal officials is
vested in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan:
61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints -A verified
complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as
follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized city, an independent component city or a component city
shall be filed before the office of the President;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be
filed before the sanggunian panlalawigan whose decision may be
appealed to the Office of the President;
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned
whose decision shall be final and executory.
This interpretation is inconsistent with the fact that in filling
vacancies in the Sangguniang Barangay it is the Sangguniang
Barangay which under 45(a)(3) recommends the appointee,
not the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the Sangguniang Bayan,
which would be the case if petitioners view were to prevail.
We think that the phrase sanggunian concerned in 45(c)
should more properly he understood as referring to the
Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in keeping
with the policy implicit in 45(a)(3).
In other words, with the exception of the Sangguniang
Barangay pars. (a) and (b) must be read as providing for the
filling of vacancies in the various Sanggunians when these
vacancies are created as a result of the cessation from office
(other than expiration of term) of members who belong to
political parties. On the other hand, 45(c) must be understood
as providing for the filling of vacancies created by members who
do not belong to any political party. Consequently, 45 must be
construed to mean that -
I. Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by a
Sanggunian Member belonging to a Political Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang
Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities - The President,
through the Executive Secretary, upon the
nomination and certification of the political party to
which the member who caused the vacancy
belonged, as provided in 45(b).
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities
and Sangguniang Bayan - The Governor upon the
nomination and certification of the political party to
which the member who caused the vacancy
belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).
II. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian
Member Not Belonging to a Political Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang
Panlungsod of highly urbanized and independent
44

component cities - The President, through the
Executive Secretary, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod as the case may be.
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities
and Sangguniang Bayan - The Governor upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan as the case may be.
III. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the
Sangguniang Barangay - City or Municipal Mayor
upon recommendation of the Sangguniang
Barangay.
There is only one rule governing appointments to the
Sangguniang Barangay. Any vacancy therein caused by the
cessation from office of a member must be made by the mayor
upon the recommendation of that Sanggunian. The reason is
that members of the Sangguniang Barangay are not allowed to
have party affiliations.
Indeed there is no reason for supposing that those who
drafted 45 intended to make the manner of filling vacancies in
the Sanggunians, created by members who do not belong to
any political party, different from the manner of filling such
vacancies when created by members who belong to political
party or parties. The provision for the first must approximate the
provision for the second situation. Any difference in procedure
must be limited to the fact that in the case of vacancies caused
by those who have political affiliations there is a party which can
nominate a replacement while there is none in the case of those
who have no political affiliation. Accordingly, where there is no
political party to make a nomination, the Sanggunian, where the
vacancy occurs, must be considered the appropriate authority
for making the recommendation, by analogy to vacancies
created in the Sangguniang Barangay whose members are by
law prohibited from having any party affiliation.
[2] Having determined that appointments in case of
vacancies caused by Sanggunian members who do not belong
to any political party must be made in accordance with the
recommendation of the Sanggunians concerned where the
vacancies occur, the next question is: Is the appointing authority
limited to the appointment of those recommended to him? We
think an affirmative answer must be given to the question. The
appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone
recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned. The power
of appointment is a discretionary power. On the other hand,
neither is the appointing power vested with so large a discretion
that he can disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian
concerned. Since the recommendation takes the place of
nomination by political party, the recommendation must likewise
be considered a condition sine qua non for the validity of the
appointment, by analogy to the provision of 45(b).
[3] The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither
petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was
appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding
discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by
member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was
appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended
by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand,
respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial
governor who appointed him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Ilocos Norte, insofar as it dismisses petitioners action for quo
warranto and prohibition, is AFFIRMED, but for different
reasons from those given by the trial court in its decision.
45

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 141307 March 28, 2001
PURTO J. NAVARRO and DANNY B. TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ADOLFO AQUINO, ROLANDO
LALAS, ABRAHAM MORALES, BLANDO QUINTO, ROMEO
VISPERAS, ANTONIO PENULIAR, EDUARDO ABULENCIA,
EMILIO PENULIAR, JR., ERNESTO SERAPION, VICTORIO
LALANGAN, ANTONIO BURGUILLOS, MIGUEL JIMENEZ,
and ELPIDIO VILLANUEVA,respondents.
KAPUNAN, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing as erroneous the
decision of the Court of Appeals, Fourth Division,
1
dated
October 7, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 5475 which granted the
petition for certiorari filed by herein respondents and declared
as null and void the appointment of herein petitioner Purto J.
Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of Mapandan, Pangasinan.
The facts are undisputed.
In the May 11, 1997 local elections, the following officials were
elected to office in the Municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan:
Cesar M.
Calimlim
Mayor Lakas NUCD-
KAMPI
Baltazar Aquino Vice-Mayor Lakas NUCD-
KAMPI
Elected as members of the Sangguniang Bayan ranked
according to the highest number of votes obtained were the
following councilors:
Political Party
1. Danny B. Tamayo REFORMA-LM
2. Rolando S. Soriano REFORMA-LM
3. Leopoldo C. Biagtan REFORMA-LM
4. Florentino Z. Lalas REFORMA-LM
5. Mamerto Eden, Jr. REFORMA-LM
6. Victorio C. Lalangan LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI
7. Judy A. Pascual REFORMA-LM
8. Rolando Lalas LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI
On March 25, 1999, Mayor Cesar Calimlim died. A vacancy was
thus created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of law,
Section 44 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, then Vice-Mayor Baltazar Aquino
succeeded him. Accordingly, the highest-ranking member of the
Sangguniang Bayan,i.e. the one who garnered the highest
number of votes, was elevated to the position of the Vice-Mayor,
46

pursuant to the same law. This was petitioner Danny B. Tamayo
who belonged to the REFORMA-LM political party.
Since a vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the
elevation of petitioner Tamayo to the office of the Vice-Mayor,
Governor Victor Agbayani of Pangasinan appointed herein
petitioner Purto J. Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan. Navarro belonged to the same political party as that of
petitioner Tamayo.
Private respondents filed Civil Case No. 99-12958-D to nullify
the appointment of petitioner Navarro before the Regional Trial
Court of Dagupan City, Branch 44 presided by Judge Crispin
Laron. Their motions for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and for the inhibition of Judge Laron having been denied,
private respondents filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
this Court.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 1999, this Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals due to the hierarchy of courts.
Private respondents argued before the Court of Appeals that it
was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the
mayor, who created the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian
Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the
Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former
vice-mayors political party, in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-
Kampi.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the
elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest-ranking
member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-
Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the
Sanggunian Bayan. Pursuant to Section 45 (b) of RA 7160, the
person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should
come from the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner
Tamayo. Hence, the appointment extended by Governor
Agbayani to petitioner Navarro, who was a member of and
recommended by the REFORMA-LM, is valid.
The Court of Appeals in a decision dated October 7, 1999
resolved the petition in favor of private respondents but for the
reason different from that posited by private respondents.
According to the appellate court, the vacancy which resulted
from the death of the mayor created a series of vacancies and
successions by operation of law. By this interpretation, petitioner
Tamayos former position as the highest-ranking member of the
Sanggunian Bayan was filled up by second highest-ranking
member and that vacated by the second highest-ranking
member was succeeded by the third highest-ranking member,
and so forth. And the last vacancy created was the position of
the lowest ranking-member of the Sanggunian, that is, the
eighth position occupied by Rolando Lalas. The Court of
Appeals then concluded that it was the appointment of the
eighth councilor, who was Rolando Lalas to the number seven
position which created the "last vacancy;" therefore, the person
to be appointed to the vacant position should come form the
same political party to which Rolando Lalas belonged, which
was the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi.1wphi1.nt
Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners
brought the instant petition.
We give due course to the petition.
Sections 44 and 45 of RA 7160 governing vacancies and
succession are quoted hereunder:
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent
47

vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy in the offices
of the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, the
highest sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest-ranking sanggunian
member, shall become the governor, vice-governor,
mayor or vice-mayor as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by
the other sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined herein:
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
punong barangay, the highest-ranking sanggunian
barangay members or, in case of his permanent inability,
the second highest-ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the punong barangay.
(c) A Lie between or among the highest ranking
sanggunian members shall be resolved by the drawing of
lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the
unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter,
ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning
candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding local election.
Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian.
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where
automatic successions provided above do not apply shall
be filled by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive
Secretary, in the case of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod
of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang
panglunsod of component cities and the
sanguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of
sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of
the sangguniang barangay concerned;
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the
nominee of the political party under which the
sanggunian member concerned had been elected and
whose elevation to the position next higher in rank
created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The
appointee shall come from the same political party as
that on the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy
and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In
the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a
certificate of membership of the appointee from the
highest official of the political party concerned are
48

conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without
such nomination and certification shall be null and void
ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action
against the official responsible therefor.
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a
sanggunian member who does not belong to any political
party, the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a
qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth
and the barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall
be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the
organization concerned.
Under Section 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an
elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume
office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office.
What is crucial is the interpretation of Section 45(b) providing
that "xxx only the nominee of the political party under which the
Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose
elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last
vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner
hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused
the vacancy xxx."
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate
a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by
the people in the election.
2

With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to
REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy
occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with
someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner
Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LMs representation in the
Sanggunian would be diminished. To argue that the vacancy
created was that formerly held by Rolando Lalas, a LAKAS-
NUCD-Kampi member, would result in the increase of that
partys representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of the
REFORMA-LM. This interpretation is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the law and thus violative of a fundamental rule in
statutory construction which is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent and purpose of the law.
3
As earlier pointed out, the
reason behind par. (b), section 44 of the Local Government
Code is the maintenance party representation in the
Sanggunian in accordance with the will of the
electorate.1wphi1.nt
The "last vacancy" in the Sanggunian refers to that created by
the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next higher
in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the
causes already enumerated. The term "last vacancy" is thus
used in Sec. 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy
previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy
in the No. 8 position which occurred with the election of Rolando
Lalas to the seventh position in the Sanggunian. Such
construction will result in absurdity.
Petitioners also allege that the Court of Appeals erred in giving
due course to the petition because the verification is defective. It
is argued that the affidavit merely stated that the allegations
therein are "true and correct to the best of my own knowledge
and information" whereas Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court specifically requires that the allegations be "true and
correct of his knowledge and belief."
49

The contention is without merit. Verification based on the
affiants own knowledge and information is sufficient under the
circumstances. Verification is merely a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite which does not affect the validity or
efficacy of the pleading, or the jurisdiction of the
court.
4
Therefore, a defective verification, as in the present
case, does not render the pleading or the petition invalid and the
Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54675 dated October
7, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appointment of
petitioner Purto J. Navarro to the Sanggunian Bayan of
Mapandan, Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED as valid and
legal.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 173165 February 17, 2010
ATTY. LUCKY M. DAMASEN, Petitioner,
vs.
OSCAR G. TUMAMAO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
1
under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the June
14, 2006 Decision
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90882.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 2, 2004, Nelia Tumamao, the Vice-Mayor of San
Isidro, Isabela, died.
3
As a result, a permanent vacancy was
created in the Office of the Vice-Mayor.
Pursuant to Sec. 44 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7160,
4
Ligaya C.
Alonzo (Alonzo) was elevated to the position of Vice-Mayor, she
being the highest-ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan,
that is, the one who garnered the highest number of votes for
that office.
5
As a result, a permanent vacancy was created in the
Sangguniang Bayan.
To fill up the ensuing vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, San
Isidro Mayor Abraham T. Lim (Mayor Lim) recommended to
Governor Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca (Governor Padaca),
the appointment of respondent Oscar G. Tumamao (Tumamao),
a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the
same political party to which Alonzo belonged.
6

On April 15, 2005, Tumamao took his oath as a member of the
Sangguninang Bayan before Mayor Lim.
7

On April 26, 2005 and May 3, 2006, Tumamao attended the
regular sessions of the Sangguniang Bayan.
8

50

On May 5, 2005, petitioner Atty. Lucky Damasen (Damasen)
became a member of the LDP after taking his oath of affiliation
before the LDP Provincial Chairman, Ms. Ana Benita Balauag
(Provincial Chairman Balauag).
9
On even date, Damasen was
able to secure from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag a letter of
nomination addressed to Governor Padaca for his appointment
to the Sangguniang Bayan.
10

On May 12, 2005, Damasen was appointed as Sangguniang
Bayan member by Governor Padaca.
11

On May 16, 2005, Damasen took his oath as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan before Governor Padaca.
12

On May 17, 2005, Damasen attended the Sangguniang Bayan
session, but with Tumamao present thereat, the former was not
duly recognized.
13
Hence, in the afternoon of the same day,
Damasen filed with the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City
(RTC) a Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for the Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
14
seeking to be declared the
rightful member of the Sangguniang Bayan, claiming that he
had been nominated by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag and
had been appointed thereto by Governor Padaca.
15
The case
was docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. 0234.
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72
hours. Thereafter, the RTC issued an order extending the
Temporary Restraining order to 17 days.
Later, in the hearing to determine the propriety of issuing a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction, Damasen testified that he is a member
of the LDP and was nominated to the position in question by
LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag; that pursuant thereto, he
was appointed by Governor Padaca as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, and that he later took his oath before her;
but that during session of the Sangguniang Bayan on May 12,
2005, he was not recognized by a majority of its members.
16

For his part, Tumamao called to the witness stand his counsel
Atty. Ernest Soberano (Soberano), who identified a letter dated
June 14, 2005, signed by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag,
which states that the latter was revoking her nomination of
Damasen, and that she was confirming Tumamaos nomination
made by Mayor Lim.
17
Later, Tumamao presented Provincial
Chairman Balauag who affirmed the contents of her letter
revoking the nomination of Damasen.
18

On August 4, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
19
ruling in
favor of Damasen, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after careful evaluation of the evidence
presented, the Court resolves the petition declaring petitioner,
Atty. Lucky M. Damasen as the rightful person to have the right
to occupy and exercise the functions of Sangguniang Bayan
member of San Isidro, Isabela, enjoining, excluding respondent
Oscar G. Tumamao from occupying and exercising the function
of Sangguniang Bayan member of San Isidro, Isabela, from
usurping and unlawfully holding or exercising said office. After
determining that herein petitioner is the rightful person to occupy
and exercise the functions of Sangguniang Bayan member of
San Isidro, Isabela, it follows that he is entitled to the salaries,
benefits and other emoluments appurtenant to the position. He
is also entitled to recover his costs.
SO ORDERED.
20

The RTC based its decision on Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160,
21
which
provides for the rule on succession in cases of permanent
vacancies in the Sangguninan. The RTC ruled that the evidence
submitted by Damasen proved that the requirements to be able
51

to qualify for the position was fully complied with.
22
Moreover,
the RTC held that the revocation of the political nomination
issued by LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag was done after
Governor Padaca had acted on it and had issued the
appointment of Damasen.
23
Hence, the RTC declared that it
could no longer undo what Governor Padaca had done, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion.
24

Tumamao appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. On June 14,
2006, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the appealed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the
judgment appealed from must be, as it hereby is, VACATED
and SET ASIDE. The Quo Warranto case is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without special pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
25

The CA held that Damasen was not entitled to assume the
vacant position in the Sangguniang Bayan, thus:
While Atty. Damasen might have been appointed by Governor
Padaca, this appointment must fly in the face of the categorical
and unbending sine qua non requirements of the statute.
Indeed, Atty. Damasen was nominated simply by Ms. Balauag,
the Provincial Chairman of the LDP, who obviously is not the
highest official of this political party. It cannot escape notice that
the quoted provision particularizes: "highest official of the
political party concerned" without any additional qualifying or
restrictive words.
According credence to the June 16, 2005 letter of the LDP
Deputy Secretary Counsel Demaree Raval, (and we have no
reason not to), it should be easy enough to see that Atty.
Damasen also was not a member of the LDP, as his application
for membership therein was not endorsed to the LDPs National
Council for approval.
More importantly, Atty. Damasens aforesaid nomination was
eventually withdrawn, cancelled or revoked by Ms. Balauag,
who declared that she was misled into accepting him as
member of the LDP (owing to the fact that Atty. Damasen was
affiliated with the Lakas CMD-Party and under the banner of this
party indeed ran for Mayor of San Isidro against the LDP
candidate for Mayor), and in nominating him. That much is clear
from Ms. Balauags letter of June 14, 2005 to Governor Padaca,
the contents whereof she affirmed in her testimony, as follows: x
x x
Oddly enough, Atty. Damasen helped accentuate Ms. Balauags
thesis by admitting that he was previously a member of the
Lakas-CMD, and that he did not resign therefrom when he
joined the LDP, and moreover, his joining the LDP was not
based on party ideals but because he just wanted to.
26

Damasen did not file a motion for reconsideration of the CA
Decision and instead sought direct relief from this Court via the
present petition for review. In his petition, Damasen raised the
following issues for this Courts resolution, to wit:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE QUO
WARRANTO ON THE BASIS THAT THE NOMINATION OF
THE PETITIONER DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 45 OF REPUBLIC ACT 7160.
52

B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEN
IT DID NOT RULE ON THE VALIDITY OF THE ASSUMPTION
TO OFFICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
APPEAL FAILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE
LATTER HAVING NO AUTHORITY TO QUESTION THE
VALIDITY OF THE APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER.
27

The petition is not meritorious.
At the outset, this Court shall address a procedural matter
raised by Damasen. Damasen argues that Tumamao was not
appointed as Sangguniang Bayan and, therefore, the latter has
no right to question his appointment by way of appeal.
28
More
specifically, Damasen argues in the wise:
By reason of the appeal, the situation of the parties had been
changed since it is now the private respondent who is assailing
petitioners exercise of a public office. Else wise stated, the
private respondent is now alleging that the petitioner is a person
who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holding the position of
Sangguniang Bayan. This being the case, the proper legal
remedy should be a separate case of Quo Warranto to be filed
against petitioner.
29

Damasens contention that Tumamao should have filed a
separate case of quo warranto and not an appeal to the CA
does not hold water. The determination of who, between
Damasen and Tumamao, is entitled to the contested position is
the crux of the controversy in the case at bar. Hence, a separate
action would only be tantamount to a multiplicity of suits, which
is abhorred by law.
It is undisputed that the law applicable to herein petition is Sec.
45(b) of RA 7160, which provides for the rule on succession in
cases of permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian, to wit:
Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian.
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where
automatic succession provided above do not apply shall
be filled by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive
Secretary, in the case of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the Sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of
Sangguniang Barangay, upon recommendation of
the Sangguniang Barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the Sangguniang Barangay, only the
nominee of the political party under which the
sanggunian member concerned had been elected and
whose elevation to the position next higher in rank
created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be
appointed in the manner hereinabove provided. The
appointee shall come from the same political party as
53

that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy
and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In
the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a
certificate of membership of the appointee from the
highest official of the political party concerned are
conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without
such nomination and certification shall be null and void
ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative action
against the official responsible therefore.
30

As can be gleaned from the above provision, the law provides
for conditions for the rule of succession to apply: First, the
appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the
appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of
Membership from the highest official of the political party
concerned.
It is the contention of Damasen that he has complied with the
requirements of Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160. Specifically,
Damasens position is predicated on his submission of the
following documents:
1. Oath of Affiliation with the LDP
31
dated May 5, 2005;
2. Certificate of Membership with the LDP
32
dated May 5,
2005;
3. Letter of Nomination made by LDP Provincial
Chairman Ana Benita G. Balauag
33
dated May 5, 2005;
4. Letter of Appointment from Governor Padaca
34
dated
May 12, 2005;
5. Panunumpa sa Katungkulan as Sangguniang Bayan
member
35
dated May 16, 2005.
For his part, Tumamao argued that Damasen has not complied
with the requirements of the law. Tumamao argued in the main
that Damasen is not a bona-fide member of the LDP and that
Provincial Chairman Balauag is not the "highest official" of the
LDP as contemplated under Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160.
In order to resolve the brewing dispute on Damasens
membership in the LDP, this Court shall hereunder discuss and
scrutinize two documents which are vital for a just resolution of
the petition at bar, the first being the June 14, 2005 letter
36
of
LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag to Governor Padaca, and the
second being the June 16, 2005 letter
37
of Demaree J.B. Raval,
the Deputy Secretary Counsel of the LDP also to Governor
Padaca.
Revocation of the nomination given by the LDP Provincial
Chairman
On June 14 2005, LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag sent a
letter to Governor Padaca revoking the nomination she issued in
favor of Damasen, the text of which in hereunder reproduced in
its entirety, to wit:
This refers to the nomination which I issued in favor of Atty.
Lucky M. Damasen to fill in the vacancy in the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Isidro, Isabela dated May 5, 2005.
When Judge Jose O. Ramos (Ret.) together with Atty. Damasen
came to see me at my residence in Quezon City sometime in
the month of May, 2005, to request the nomination of Atty.
Damasen, he did not inform me that Atty. Damasen was a
candidate for Mayor in the May 2004 elections affiliated with the
54

Lakas Party and who ran against our Partys candidate for
Mayor in San Isidro. I was given the impression that Atty.
Damasen was not affiliated with any political party that is why I
signed the documents presented to me and endorsed his
nomination. However, I later learned that Atty. Damasen was
actually a candidate for Mayor and a member of Lakas so that
his joining our Party and his nomination as such to the vacant
position of Sanggunian member is not accordance with our
Partys principles pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. IV of our By-Laws.
In view of the foregoing, as the Provincial Chairman of LDP-
LABAN, I am constrained to withdraw, cancel, and/or revoke the
nomination issued to Atty. Lucky M. Damasen dated May 5,
2005 for all legal intents and purposes.
38

In his defense, Damasen maintains that he did not commit any
misrepresentation when he secured his Certificate of
Nomination and Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman
Balauag. Damasen thus argued in this wise:
According to ANA BENITA BALAUAG when she testified, she
claimed that she did not know that petitioner was a candidate for
Mayor during the last Local and National Election. This is
absurd because Echague, Isabela where ANA BENITA
BALAUAG also ran for Mayor is just an adjoining town of San
Isidro, Isabela. xxx
39

In addition, Damasen asservates that in the Philippines,
politicians change their political affiliation more often than
not.
40
More importantly, Damasen is of the belief that the
subsequent revocation of the nomination after he was already
appointed by the Governor has no legal effect, to wit:
Respondent is of the view that since the nomination of the
petitioner dated May 5, 2005 has been cancelled and/or
revoked by LDP Isabela Provincial Chairman ANA BENITA
BALAUAG on June 14, 2005, petitioner no longer has a right to
be a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. This is wrong. The
respondent should open its eyes and must come to realize that
the revocation and/or cancellation CAME AFTER the petitioner
has been APPOINTED. x x x x
41

It is not the province of this Court to decide if in fact LDP
Provincial Chairman Balauag knew or should have known that
Damasen was a member of the Lakas-CMD party. However, as
can be gleaned from the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated
July 12, 2005, LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag repeatedly
denied knowing that Damasen ran for Mayor in San Isidro,
Isabela.
42
The same notwithstanding, this Court must take into
consideration the fact that Damasen was previously a member
of the Lakas-CMD party. Likewise, while the revocation of
Damasens nomination came after the fact of his appointment
by Governor Padaca, the same should not serve to bar any
contest on said appointment as the primordial issue to be
determined is whether or not Damasen has complied with the
requirements of Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160.
Letter from the LDP that Damasen is not a bona fide member
What is damning to the cause of Damasen, is the letter of
Demaree J.B. Raval, the Deputy Secretary Counsel of the LDP,
addressed to Governor Padaca wherein it is categorically stated
that Damasen is not a bona fide member of the LDP, to wit:
x x x x
As regards the claim of Mr. Lucky Magala Damasen, please be
informed that pursuant to the LDP Constitution, Mr. Damasen
does not appear in our records as a bona fide member of the
LDP. While it is true that Mr. Damasen may have been issued a
55

Certificate of Membership dated May 5, 2005 by our Provincial
Chairman for Isabela, Mrs. Ana Benita G. Balauag, his
membership has not been endorsed (even to date) to the LDP
National Council for approval. Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy of Mr. Damasen for the May 10, 2004 elections
shows that he was nominated by the "Lakas-CMD Party".
43

Like the CA, this Court has no reason to doubt the veracity of
the letter coming from the LDP leadership. Quite clearly, from
the tenor of the letter, it appears that the membership of
Damasen still had to be approved by the LDP National Council.
Thus, notwithstanding Damasens procurement of a Certificate
of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, to this
Courts mind, the same merely started the process of his
membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic
membership thereto. While it may be argued that Damasen was
already a member upon receipt of a Certificate of Membership
from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, this Court cannot
impose such view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that
the membership of Damasen still had to be endorsed to the
National Council for approval, then this Court cannot question
such requirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It
is well settled that the discretion of accepting members to a
political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter,
which this Court cannot meddle in.
In resolving the petition at bar, this Court is guided by Navarro v.
Court of Appeals
44
(Navarro), where this Court explained the
reason behind the rule of succession under Sec. 45 (b) of RA
7160, to wit:
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate
a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the
Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by
the people in the election.
With the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who belonged to
REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy
occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with
someone belonging to the political party of petitioner Tamayo.
Otherwise, REFORMA-LMs representation in the Sanggunian
would be diminished. Xxx. As earlier pointed out, the reason
behind Par. (b), Sec. 45 of the Local Government Code is the
maintenance of party representation in the Sanggunian in
accordance with the will of the electorate.
45

Since the permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian occurred
because of the elevation of LDP member Alonzo to vice-mayor,
it follows that the person to succeed her should also belong to
the LDP so as to preserve party representation. Thus, this Court
cannot countenance Damasens insistence in clinging to an
appointment when he is in fact not a bona fide member of the
LDP. While the revocation of the nomination given to Damasen
came after the fact of his appointment, this Court cannot rule in
his favor, because the very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is
that the appointee must come from the political party as that of
the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. To stress,
Damasen is not a bona fide member of the LDP.
In addition, appointing Damasen would not serve the will of the
electorate. He himself admitts that he was previously a member
of the Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the position of Mayor
under the said party on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise, he
did not resign from the said party when he joined the LDP, and
even admitted that his joining the LDP was not because of party
ideals, but because he just wanted to.
46
How can the will of the
electorate be best served, given the foregoing admissions of
Damasen? If this Court were to grant herein petition, it would
effectively diminish the party representation of the LDP in the
Sanggunian, as Damasen would still be considered a member
of the Lakas-CMD, not having resigned therefrom, a scenario
56

that defeats the purpose of the law, and that ultimately runs
contrary the ratio of Navarro.1avvphi1
Lastly, the records of the case reveal that Tumamao has the
nomination
47
of Senator Edgardo J. Angara, the Party Chairman
and, therefore, the highest official of the LDP. In addition, he is a
member in good standing of the LDP.
48
Thus, given the
foregoing, it is this Courts view that Tumamao has complied
with the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The June 14, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 90882, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC


MANUEL B. JAPZON,
Petitioner,





- versus -
G. R. No. 180088

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,





COMMI SSI ON ON ELECTI ONS and
JAI ME S. TY,
Respondents.
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 19, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N

57


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 64
[1]
and
65
[2]
of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Resolution
[3]
dated 31 July 2007 of the First Division of public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the
Resolution
[4]
dated 28 September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA
No. 07-568, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private
respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the Office of Mayor
of the Municipality of General Macarthur,Eastern Samar, in the local
elections held on 14 May 2007.

On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by filing
before the COMELEC a Petition
[5]
to disqualify and/or cancel Tys
Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition that Ty was a
former natural-born Filipino, having been born on 9 October 1943 in
what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar (now the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang
Chim Ty (a Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty
eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA) and
became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the USA for the last
25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 28 March
2007, he falsely represented therein that he was a resident
of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one
year before 14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or
immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have applied for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided
in Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a
period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as
required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991. In fact, even after filing his
application for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued
to make trips to the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October
2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty already
took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines, he
continued to comport himself as an American citizen as proven by his
travel records. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship
as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or related
laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that the COMELEC
order the disqualification of Ty from running for public office and the
cancellation of the latters Certificate of Candidacy.
58


In his Answer
[6]
to Japzons Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty
admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to
work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. Ty
claimed, however, that prior to filing his Certificate of Candidacy for
the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, on 28 March 2007, he already performed the following acts:
(1) with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the Philippine
Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for
the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005,
Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied for a Philippine passport
indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was
at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Tys application was approved and he was issued on 26
October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March 2006, Ty
personally secured and signed his Community Tax Certificate (CTC)
from the Municipality of General Macarthur, in which he stated that
his address was at Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered as a voter in
Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar; (6) Ty secured another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating
therein his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on 19 March 2007 a duly
notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Given the
aforementioned facts, Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine
citizenship and renounced his American citizenship, and he had been
a resident of theMunicipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
for more than one year prior to the 14 May
2007 elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzons
Petition in SPA No. 07-568.

Pending the submission by the parties of their respective
Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007 elections were
already held. Ty acquired the highest number of votes and was
declared Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, by the Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007.
[7]


Following the submission of the Position Papers of both parties,
the COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolution
[8]
dated 31 July
2007 in favor of Ty.

The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with the
requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 and
reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:

59

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective public office, and
the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our
people and our country or a unit of territory
thereof. Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed
an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and
executed a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in compliance with R.A.
[No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is [Ty] a candidate for or
occupying public office nor is in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the
armed forces in the country of which he was
naturalized citizen.
[9]



The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not commit
material misrepresentation in stating in his Certificate of Candidacy
that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for at least one year before the elections
on 14 May 2007. It reasoned that:

Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the]
Philippines when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in
1969, the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and
subsequent acts thereof proved that he has been a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar for at least one (1) year before the
elections held on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his
certificate of candidacy[.]

As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:

The term residence is to be
understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or
legal residence, that is, the place where
a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and
remain (animus manendi). A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues
until the same is abandoned by
60

acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner
lost his domicile of origin in Oras by
becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting
in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on
and until November 10, 2000, when he
reacquired Philippine citizenship,
petitioner was an alien without any
right to reside in the Philippines save as
our immigration laws may have
allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a
resident alien.

Indeed, residence in the United
States is a requirement for
naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8,
1427(a) of the United States Code
provides:

Requirements of naturalization:
Residence

(a) No person, except as
otherwise provided in this subchapter,
shall be naturalized unless such
applicant, (1) year immediately
preceding the date of filing his
application for naturalization has
resided continuously, after being
lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, within the United States for
at least five years and during the five
years immediately preceding the date of
filing his petition has been physically
present therein for periods totaling at
least half of that time, and who has
resided within the State or within the
district of the Service in the United
States in which the applicant filed the
application for at least three months, (2)
has resided continuously within the
United States from the date of the
application up to the time of admission
to citizenship, and (3) during all period
referred to in this subsection has been
and still is a person of good moral
character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States,
and well disposed to the good order and
61

happiness of the United States.
(Emphasis added)

In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this
Court ruled that immigration to the
United States by virtue of a
greencard, which entitles one to
reside permanently in that country,
constitutes abandonment of domicile
in the Philippines. With more reason
then does naturalization in a foreign
country result in an abandonment of
domicile in thePhilippines.

Records showed that after taking an Oath of
Allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General on October 2, 2005, [Ty] applied
and was issued a Philippine passport on October 26,
2005; and secured a community tax certificate from
the Municipality of General Macarthur on March 8,
2006. Evidently, [Ty] was already a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar for more than one (1) year before the elections
on May 14, 2007.
[10]
(Emphasis ours.)


The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit.
[11]



Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On 28 September 2007,
the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution
[12]
denying Japzons
Motion for Reconsideration and affirming the assailed Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division, on the basis of the following
ratiocination:

We have held that a Natural born Filipino who
obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently spurns
the same, is by clear acts of repatriation a Filipino
Citizen and hence qualified to run as a candidate for
any local post.

x x x x
62


It must be noted that absent any showing of
irregularity that overturns the prevailing status of a
citizen, the presumption of regularity
remains. Citizenship is an important aspect of every
individuals constitutionally granted rights and
privileges. This is essential in determining whether one
has the right to exercise pre-determined political rights
such as the right to vote or the right to be elected to
office and as such rights spring from citizenship.

Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus
presumed that every person is a citizen of the country
in which he resides; that citizenship once granted is
presumably retained unless voluntarily relinquished;
and that the burden rests upon who alleges a change
in citizenship and allegiance to establish the fact.

Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration
shows that it does not raise any new or novel
issues. The arguments made therein have already
been dissected and expounded upon extensively by
the first Division of the Commission, and there appears
to be no reason to depart from the wisdom of the
earlier resolution. We thus affirm that [Ty] did not
commit any material misrepresentation when he
accomplished his Certificate of Candidacy. The only
ground for denial of a Certificate of Candidacy would
be when there was material misrepresentation meant
to mislead the electorate as to the qualifications of the
candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is
not enough reason to deny due course to the
Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty.
[13]


Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the COMELEC,
Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition for Certiorari, relying on
the following grounds:

A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY
DISREGARDED THE PARAMETERS SET BY LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A NEW
DOMICILE OF CHOICE AND RESIDENCE.
[14]



B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
63

LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY
REFUSED TO CANCEL *TYS+ CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY, AND CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE
[JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF GEN.
MACARTHUR, EASTERN SAMAR.
[15]



Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized American
citizen, he lost his domicile of origin. Ty did not establish his
residence in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, just because he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The
burden falls upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of
choice in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden which he failed
to discharge. Ty did not become a resident of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by merely executing the Oath of
Allegiance under Republic Act No. 9225.

Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one-year
residency requirement for running as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections. The one-year residency requirement for
those running for public office cannot be waived or liberally applied in
favor of dual citizens. Consequently, Japzon believes he was the only
remaining candidate for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is the only
placer in the 14 May 2007 local elections.

Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the
Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 of the
COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; to issue a new
resolution denying due course to or canceling Tys Certificate of
Candidacy; and to declare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present
Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found sufficient
evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of
theMunicipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior
to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court cannot evaluate again
the very same pieces of evidence without violating the well-
entrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on
the Court. Ty disputes Japzons assertion that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed
Resolutions, and avers that the said Resolutions were based on the
evidence presented by the parties and consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter. Even assuming that Ty, the winning
candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, is indeed disqualified from running in the
64

local elections, Japzon as the second placer in the same elections
cannot take his place.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is of the
position that Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement
set by law to qualify him to run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14
May 2007 local elections. The OSG opines that Ty was unable to
prove that he intended to remain in the Philippines for good and
ultimately make it his new domicile. Nonetheless, the OSG still prays
for the dismissal of the instant Petition considering that Japzon,
gathering only the second highest number of votes in the local
elections, cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is
found to be disqualified from running for the said position. And since
it took a position adverse to that of the COMELEC, the OSG prays
from this Court to allow the COMELEC to file its own Comment on
Japzons Petition. The Court, however, no longer acted on this
particular prayer of the COMELEC, and with the submission of the
Memoranda by Japzon, Ty, and the OSG, it already submitted the case
for decision.

The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.

There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He
was born and raised in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left to work in
the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2
October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of thePhilippines before
Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 9225.
[16]
At this point, Ty still held dual
citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March
2007 that Ty renounced his American citizenship before a notary
public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs
the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire or
retain
[17]
his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign
citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities under such
circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that
it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-
born Filipino taking advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No.
9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect
of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
65

current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly,
Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of
residence. This is only logical and consistent with the general
intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and
foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in
the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen.

Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when
the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for
public office.

Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

x x x x

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.


Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born
Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond
question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a Renunciation
of Foreign Citizenship before a notary public. By the time he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March
2007, he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship,
keeping solely his Philippine citizenship.

66

The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
pertains to the qualifications required by the Constitution and
existing laws.

Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress to
enact a local government code which shall provide, among other
things, for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal,
term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and
all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.

Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, Section 39 of
which lays down the following qualifications for local elective officials:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or,
in the case of a member of thesangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.

x x x x

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice
mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one
(21) years of age on election day.


The challenge against Tys qualification to run as a candidate for
the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, centers on his purported failure to meet the one-year
residency requirement in the said municipality.

The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to
domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain (animus manendi).
[18]

67


A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until
the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). In Coquilla,
[19]
the Court already acknowledged that for an
individual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish
residence in theUSA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a
naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily
abandoned the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as
his domicile of choice.

As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein,
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and
he did not necessarily regain his domicile in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his
residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.

How then could it be established that Ty indeed established a
new domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines?

In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
[20]
the Court
provided a summation of the different principles and concepts in
jurisprudence relating to the residency qualification for elective local
officials. Pertinent portions of the ratio in Papandayan are
reproduced below:

Our decisions have applied certain tests and
concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a
candidate has complied with the residency
requirement for elective positions. The principle
of animus revertendi has been used to determine
whether a candidate has an intention to return to
the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to
this is a determination whether there has been an
abandonment of his former residence which signifies
an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of
Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of
the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled
the election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents
immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
68

an abandonment of his domicile and residence in
the Philippines. Being a green card holder, which was
proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant
of the United States, and in the absence of any waiver
of his status as such before he ran for election on
January 18, 1988, respondent was held to be
disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of
the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd
District of Northern Samar. The House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his
election against claims that he was not a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this Court,
citing Faypon v. Quirino, applied the concept of animus
revertendi or intent to return, stating that his
absence from his residence in order to pursue studies
or practice his profession as a certified public
accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter
other than in the place where he was elected did not
constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent
made periodical journeys to his home province in
Laoag revealed that he always had animus revertendi.

In Abella v. Commission on Elections and
Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections, it was explained
that the determination of a persons legal residence or
domicile largely depends upon the intention that may
be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In
that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had
obtained the highest number of votes in the local
elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been
proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was
disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and
registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a
registered voter of Kananga,Leyte. The COMELEC
ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to
change her residence one year before the election by
registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for
the position of governor of the province of Leyte was
proof that she considered herself a resident
of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the
COMELEC and held that petitioner Larrazabal had
established her residence inOrmoc City, not
in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the time that she
ran for the position of Provincial Governor
of Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence
to show that she and her husband maintained separate
residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband
at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally
visited Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify
69

an intention to continue her residence after leaving
that place.

In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the
Court held that domicile and residence are
synonymous. The term residence, as used in the
election law, imports not only an intention to reside in
a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner
Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during
the early 1980s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It
was held that the sudden departure from the country
of petitioner, because of the EDSA Peoples Power
Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United
States until favorable conditions had been established,
was not voluntary so as to constitute an abandonment
of residence. The Court explained that in order to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2)
an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.


Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that it is
the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification
requirement.

As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with the
one-year residency requirement for running for public office is a
question of fact. Its determination requires the Court to review,
examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties before the COMELEC.

The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same pieces
of evidence presently before this Court, found that Ty was a resident
of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year
prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual
findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have
acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the
Court. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
70

patent and substantial denial of due process, considering that the
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within
its domain.
[21]


The Court even went further to say that the rule that factual
findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of
justice, except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings, should be applied with greater
force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELECcreated and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itselfon a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The factual finding of the
COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the Court.
[22]


The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have
acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their
jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only respect but even
finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only
substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
[23]


The assailed Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September
2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively, were
both supported by substantial evidence and are, thus, binding and
conclusive upon this Court.

Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine
citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport
indicating in his application that his residence in the Philippines was
at A. Mabini St., Barangay6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily submitted himself
to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the
said municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini
St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17
July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines,
since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably, just a little over a year
71

prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. Japzon maintains that Tys
trips abroad during said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14
to 18 July 2006), and to theUSA (from 31 October 2006 to 19 January
2007), indicate that Ty had no intention to permanently reside in
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. The COMELEC First Division and en banc, as well as this
Court, however, view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did
come back to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his animus
manendi and animus revertendi.

There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and
never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the14 May 2007 local
elections so that he could be considered a resident thereof. To the
contrary, the Court has previously ruled that absence from residence
to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss
of residence.
[24]
The Court also notes, that even with his trips to other
countries, Ty was actually present in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, for at least nine of the 12
months preceding the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of
actual stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact of
residence therein, it does strongly support and is only consistent with
Tys avowed intent in the instant case to establish residence/domicile
in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.

Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that Ty
arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 4
May 2006 only to comply with the one-year residency requirement,
so Ty could run as a mayoralty candidate in the 14 May
2007 elections. In Aquino v. COMELEC,
[25]
the Court did not find
anything wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run
for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with reasonable
certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. As this Court already found
in the present case, Ty has proven by substantial evidence that he had
established residence/domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little over a year prior to
the 14 May 2007 local elections, in which he ran as a candidate for
the Office of the Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of
votes.

Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence
qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would
not be thwarted by upholding the victors right to the office, the will
of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election
72

laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the
voters.
[26]
To successfully challenge Tys disqualification, Japzon must
clearly demonstrate that Tys ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions
and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to substantiate his
claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition
for Certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000]
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and
JACQUELINE M. SERIO, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y.
EMANO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in
order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the
needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all
matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers'
qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch
as Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his
family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in
Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during
his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the
provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered
as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could
not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he ran for and
was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be
liberally construed to give effect to the popular mandate.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the January 18, 1999
Resolution
[1]
of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc
in SPA No. 98-298, which upheld the July 14, 1998
Resolution
[2]
of the Comelec First Division. The assailed
Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano
possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to
vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.
73

The Facts
The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records,
are as follows.
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was
elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis
Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the
province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 12, 1995,
his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis
Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in
Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of
Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in which he claimed
20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that
his residence for the preceding two years and five months was
at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998,
along with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of herein
petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno
Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents
of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec,
docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground
that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence
requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the
Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city
mayor. Thus, on May 29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition
before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,
[3]
in which they
sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent;
and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had
garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly elected
mayor of the city.
In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First
Division denied the Petition for Disqualification. Upon
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Consolidation, the two cases were consolidated.
[4]

Ruling of the Comelec
As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings
and conclusions of the First Division, holding that "[t]he records
clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of
Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time necessary to
qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly
established by the respondent having a house in the city which
has been existing therein since 1973 and where his family has
been living since then."
Additionally, it ruled:
"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial
official from residing and/or registering as a voter in a highly
urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for
and be elected to a position in the province embracing such
highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the
requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
"Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the
petitioners showing that the respondent was a registered voter
as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay Poblacion,
Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the petitioner's argument
that the respondent is not a resident [or a] registered voter in
Cagayan de Oro City since registration in said Precinct No. 12
74

does not preclude the respondent from registering anew in
another place."
Hence, this recourse
[5]
before this Court.
Issues
In their Memorandum,
[6]
petitioners submit that the main
issue is whether the "Comelec gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned
Resolutions." Allegedly, the resolution of this issue would
depend on the following:
[7]

"1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's
(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City on
March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998 election;
(b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as
governor of said province until said date; and
(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of
Misamis Oriental,
precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for
at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City prior to the May 11,
1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for city
mayor of said City.
2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a
residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding offices as
governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in
Cagayan de Oro City and having a house therein where [he
had] stay[ed] during his tenure as governor, and registering as a
voter in said City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as
against the undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute a
change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental in
favor of a new domicile of choice in Cagayan de Oro City for at
least one (1) year for purposes of qualifying him to run for city
mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.
3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for mayor
of Cagayan de Oro City in the May 11, 1998 elections, who
received the second highest number of votes, can be declared
winner, considering that respondent Emano was disqualified to
run for and hold said office and considering that his
disqualification or ineligibility had been extensively brought to
the attention and consciousness of the voters prior to the May
11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety, notwithstanding which
they still voted for him."
Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two
questions: (1) whether private respondent had duly established
his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to
the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the
mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing,
the candidate who had received the second highest number of
votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners
75

Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the
petitioners was deliberated upon by the Court. We note that
petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty.
Erasmo B. Damasing as entitled to be proclaimed winner as
mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro
City."
[8]
And yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition
for Certioraripursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought before us.
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought
only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3)
a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
[9]
A reading
of the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under
any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to
bring this suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate
cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC 98-298 for
disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our
election laws and the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any
voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds
provided by law,
[10]
or to contest the election of a city officer on
the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic.
[11]
The
petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters" of Cagayan de
Oro City, therefore satisfy the requirement of said laws and
rules.
[12]

Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy
Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his
domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan de Oro
City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run
and won as governor of the province of Misamis Oriental for
three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998
elections; (2) in the pleadings he filed in connection with an
election protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he had
stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3)
he had fully exercised the powers and prerogatives of governor
until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25,
1998.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial
governor, private respondent remained a resident of the
province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification
that an elective official must possess throughout his term. Thus,
private respondent could not have changed his residence to
Cagayan de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis
Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were not
sufficient to constitute a change of domicile: having a house in
Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's
office as governor (the city being the seat of government of the
province), securing a residence certificate and registering as
voter therein.
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he
actually and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City while
serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms,
since the seat of the provincial government was located at the
heart of that city.
[13]
He also avers that one's choice of domicile
is a matter of intention, and it is the person concerned who
would be in the best position to make a choice. In this case,
Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of
residence after the May 1995 elections. In fact, in January
1997, he secured his Community Tax Certificate at the City
Treasurer's Office, stating therein that he was a resident of 1409
San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City. During the general registration of voters in June 1997,
he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
76

City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of
the city for the minimum period required by law. No one has
ever challenged this fact before any tribunal.
Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal
residence did not ipso facto divest him of his position as
provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an
elected official from transferring residence while in
office. Second, an elective official's transfer of residence does
not prevent the performance of that official's duties, especially in
private respondent's case in which the seat of government
became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled
in Frivaldo v. Comelec,
[14]
the loss of any of the required
qualifications for election merely renders the official's title or
right to office open to challenge. In Emano's case, no one
challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when
he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally,
he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his
candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people's will, as
expressed in the election result, must be respected. He is not,
after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During
his three terms as governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and
actuations have been closely interwoven with the pulse and
beat of Cagayan de Oro City.
Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially
on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec
[15]
in its
Memorandum
[16]
which supports the assailed Resolutions, and
which has been filed in view of the solicitor general's
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment.
[17]
Thus, the poll
body argues that "x x x the fact of residence x x x ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the Constitution's residency qualification requirement."
Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials

The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39
of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991,
[18]
which
provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as
follows:
"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be
a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period
of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the
Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter from
[seeking] an elective office to serve that community."
[19]
Such
provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage
of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain."
[20]
Establishing residence in a community merely
to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most
cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This
purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."
[21]

Facts Showing Change of Residence

77

In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v.
Comelec,
[22]
this Court ruled that private respondent therein,
now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of
Cagayan, had duly proven his change of residence from
Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao,
Cagayan (part of the Third District in which he sought election
as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1) in
July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in
Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2) in July 1995, he
leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3) the January 18, 1998 Certificate of
Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma
Dumaguit; (4) the Certificate of Live Birth of his second
daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his
family showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at
least one year immediately preceding the May 1998
elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much
importance that in his [Aguinaldo's] certificates of candidacy for
provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995,
private respondent stated that he was a resident of Gattaran."
[23]

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private
respondent and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house
he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms
(1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he
physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial
government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as
voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-
Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was
a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient
to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the
Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his
choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de
Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot
participate in the provincial elections. Such political
subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the
purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area
as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that
matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics,
commerce and other businesses from the entire province -- and
vice versa -- especially when the city is located at the very heart
of the province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part
of Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the
province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more
important, it is itself the seat of the provincial government. As a
consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their
functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less,
getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Vicente Y.
Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three
terms and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within
that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to
the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to
adopt it as his permanent place of residence.
Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that
"although private respondent declared in his certificates of
candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a
resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was actually a
resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the
May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since
July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident of
Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was
governor from 1988 to 1998 and, therefore, it would be
convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao,
which is the capital of the province of Cagayan."
78

Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually
and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while
discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He
owned a house in the city and resided there together with his
family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as
a voter therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution
and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and
eligible to run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have
continued to qualify as provincial governor if he was indeed a
resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue
before this Court is whether Emano's residence in the city
qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he
could have continued sitting as governor of the province. There
was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running the
province; hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement on
such issue. Considerations of due process prevent us from
adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On the basis,
however, of the facts proven before the Comelec, we hold that
he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for
the mayorship of the city.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the
desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not
only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but,
more important, with the constituents themselves -- their needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development,
and all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite
period would give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with
their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to
evaluate the former's qualifications and fitness for the offices
they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence
of herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is
substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of
mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for the
mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this
simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the residence
requirement.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate

There is no question that private respondent was the
overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City. He
won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.
[24]
Thus, we find it apt to
reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as
expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In
case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate.
[25]
Verily, in Frivaldo v.
Comelec,
[26]
the Court held:
"x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival
of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert
utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public
policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the
choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the
people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very
democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
79

In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec
[27]
that
"election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections."
Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of popular
sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms."
[28]

In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be
faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion in
upholding private respondent's election.
Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on
Second Placer
With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is
obvious that the second one posited by petitioners has become
academic and need not be ruled upon.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed
Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June
2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes,
assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14
May 2013 issued by public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a
registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an
Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the
ground that it contained material misrepresentations,
specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married
to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;
1
(2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan,
Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at
the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P.
Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the
Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
80

Representatives;
2
(3) that her date of birth is 3 July
1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is
either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
3
(4) that she is not a
permanent resident of another country when she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant
4
of the United
States of America;
5
and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen
when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
6


In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is
publicly known to be the wife of Congressman
Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas),
there is no valid and binding marriage between them.
According to petitioner, although her marriage with
Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a religious
rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements
prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab
initio.
7
Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is
not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas,
then his residence cannot be attributed to her.
8
As to
her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by
the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July
1964.
9
Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that
she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the
United States of America is not supported by
evidence.
10


During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February
2013, respondent filed a Manifestation with Motion to
Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of
Exhibits
11
consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of
an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013
entitled Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O.
Reyes with an Affidavit of Identification and
Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo
J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the
Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an
American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a
Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by
Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and
Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which
indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her
various travels abroad.

On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution
12
cancelling petitioners COC, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
herebyCANCELLED.

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the
declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not
a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to
comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003, namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First
Division ruled that she did not have the one-year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
13
Thus, she is ineligible to run for
the position of Representative for the lone district of
81

Marinduque.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
14
on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost
such status by simply obtaining and using an American
passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that the
COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her
marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she
is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred,
however, that such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the
twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner
attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24
September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year
residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution,
she averred that, as she never became a naturalized
citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is
Boac, Marinduque.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a
Resolution
15
denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Certificate of Finality
16
declaring the 14 May 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory,
considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have
elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order
issued by this Court restraining its execution.
17


On same day, petitioner took her oath of office
18
before
Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which
officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.

In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner
raises the following issues:
19

31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives
for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent
Tans alleged newly-discovered evidence without the
same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of
the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence, in
violation of Petitioners right to due process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
82

of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.

34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on
Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it
imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of
a Member of the House of Representatives as
enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction
of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be
a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not
confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before
this Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET which has
jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on
her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the
House of Representatives is best discussed in another
tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It appears then that
petitioners recourse to this Court was made only in an
attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its
final and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.

Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and
consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The
need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the
discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it
was emphasized that the term of office of the Members
of the House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.

According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
20
because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of
the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioners claim, however, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioners qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly
filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that
she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after
the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x
83


As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,
21
the HRET does not
have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member
of the House of Representatives, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioners qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections, suffice it to say that HRETs jurisdiction as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate
considered a Member of the House of Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,
22
citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC
23
and Guerrero v. COMELEC,
24
the Court ruled
that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case
of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,
25
wherein the Court,
referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis
the HRET, held that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,
26
to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
After proclamation, taking of
oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez,
jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well
as questions regarding the conduct of election and
contested returns were transferred to the HRET as the
constitutional body created to pass upon the same.
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be
considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the
pronouncement that once a proclamation has been
84

made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus,
its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in
these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in
the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only
taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed
office.

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v.
COMELEC,
27
the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the
candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office
before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the
duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or
after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed
his comment in which he brought to Our attention that
on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of
thestatus quo ante order of the Court, he had already
been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected
Member of the House of Representatives of the First
Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very
same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of
the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his
duties accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case
has already been transferred to the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis
supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the
questioned candidate had already assumed office, and
hence, was already considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, unlike in the present case.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of
the House of Representatives because, primarily, she
has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier
been said, the term of office of a Member of the House
of Representatives begins only at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
28
Thus, until
such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement,
petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Officetaken
before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013.
However, this is not the oath of office which confers
membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives
provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. Members
shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or
individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of
the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.
Here, although she made the oath before Speaker
Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during
85

plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied
with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in
this controversy that before the proclamation of
petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had
already finally disposed of the issue of petitioners lack
of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution
dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioners qualifications to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representative. We will
inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the
argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was
ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which
was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision.
The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner
cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a
decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a
decision of the COMELEC First Division.

Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and
the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which
was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and
executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due
course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare
nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to
postpone or suspend elections shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013
from becoming final and executory, petitioner should
have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37
29
of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64
30
of the Rules of
Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-
day period, but she failed to do so. She would file the
present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on
5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a
Certificate of Finality.

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her
Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in
Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC
committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her
ineligible for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of newly-discovered
evidence without the same having been testified on
and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay
and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau
of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a
violation of her right to due process of law because she
was not given the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence.

86

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound
to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in
the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally
construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the
Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings
in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate
of candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly
discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the
case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
2012 when Tans petition was filed up to 27 March 2013
when the First Division rendered its resolution,
petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due
process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case
of Sahali v. COMELEC:
31

The petitioners should be reminded that due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be
heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps many times more creditably and predictable
than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation
of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard
on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for
office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First
Division, discoursed as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino
citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following
acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before the Consul-General of the
Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make
a personal and sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in
the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioners
lack of proof regarding her American citizenship,
contending that it is petitioners burden to present a
case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized
citizen of the USA.
87


Due to petitioners submission of newly-discovered
evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a
holder of an American passport which she continues to
use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to
substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to
respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do,
leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent
falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of
RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American
citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship, she
remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any
elective public office in the
Philippines.
32
(Emphasis supplied.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In
moving for the cancellation of petitioners COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US
passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan.
At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same,
or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the
bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a
holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is
only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.
33

Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September
2012.
34
Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve
the people and to comply with rules, even as a
superfluity.
35
We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioners explanation. If petitioner executed said
Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an
admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner
cannot claim that she executed it to address the
observations by the COMELEC as the assailed
Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the
Affidavit was executed in September 2012.

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a
footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office
as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance
for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino
status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of
office is in order to make reference to what is already
part of the records and evidence in the present case
and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
88

matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by
Respondent COMELEC.
36
This statement raises a lot of
questions Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance
for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she
did, why did she not present it at the earliest
opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born
Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance
as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that,
since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with
her appointment as Provincial Administrator of
Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her
status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is
being presented for the first time before this Court, as it
was never raised before the COMELEC. For another,
said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance
with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements
have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004
issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioners
oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be
considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with
R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt
was clearly cast on petitioners citizenship. Petitioner,
however, failed to clear such doubt.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the
finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born status,
we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First
Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident
of Marinduque:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines
through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made
it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that
[petitioner] had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There
being no proof that [petitioner] had renounced her
American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that
she has met the one-year residency requirement of the
law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac,
Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to
July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient
to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner]
has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as
89

she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned
her domicile of choice in the USA.
37
(Emphasis
supplied.)

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and
cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the
COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and
admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective
of determining of whether or not the COC should be
cancelled. We held inMastura v. COMELEC:
38

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies
will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when
there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied
with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as
the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC created and explicitly made independent
by the Constitution itself on a level higher than
statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has
broad powers to ascertain the true results of the
election by means available to it. For the attainment of
that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence.

Time and again, We emphasize that the grave abuse of
discretion which warrants this Courts exercise
of certiorari jurisdiction has a well-defined meaning.
Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on
Elections
39
where the Court held:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a
specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise
of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility;
or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform
a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down
as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to
adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of
the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No.
9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members
of the House of Representatives other than those
enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We
find the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications
on candidates for the House of Representatives who
have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year
residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the
case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the
compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No.
90

9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the
constitutional provision and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELECEn Banc affirming the
27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
is upheld.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Abad, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Carpio, Villarama, and Leonen, JJ. joins the dissent of J.
Brion.
Velasco, Jr., and Mendoza, JJ., no part.
Brion, J., see dissent.
Peralta, J., on official leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., no part due to voluntary inhibition.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDO T.
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.

VITUG, J .:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties on the meaning of the term
"fugitive from justice as that phrase is so used under the
provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code
(Republic Act No. 7160). That law states:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad(.)
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective
position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the
11th May 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying
for the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quo
warranto against the winning candidate, herein private
respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive
from justice.
91

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his
certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten
(10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los
Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of
California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it
is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on
account of his alleged "flight" from that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation
(SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the
ground of the candidate's disqualification under Section 40(e) of
the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the
COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No.
105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was
dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of
a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against
private respondent. The Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992,
held:
Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a
pre-proclamation controversy. Since the private
respondent had already been proclaimed as the
duly elected Governor of the Province of Quezon,
the petition below for disqualification has ceased
to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63
and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. 84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989,
171 SCRA 468, this court held that a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this
point of time and should be dismissed. The proper
remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the
disqualification suit in a separate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS
the petition, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so
desired, within ten (10) days from notice.
1

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon
on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo
warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent
before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. The
COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a
reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such
as to be expected, focuses on whether private respondent who,
at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to
date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign
court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term
"fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being
a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an
elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he
asseverates, needs no further interpretation and construction.
Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he
submits, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399,
by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671;
92

King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs.
PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275
Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it may be so conceded as
expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the
conclusions of the Oversight Committee which, conformably
with Section 533
2
of R.A. 7160, was convened by the President
to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations
necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any
and all provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the
principles of Local Autonomy.
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is
resumed.
So, we are in agreement to retain
Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next,
Page 39.
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny
Marquez.
REP. CUENCO: What does he
want?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung
puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na
kung kuwestiyunin ang
constitutionality nito before the
Supreme Court later on.
REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay
diyan?
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong
disqualification to run for public
office.
Any person who is a fugitive from
justice in criminal or nonpolitical
cases here or abroad.
Mabigat yung abroad. One who is
facing criminal charges with the
warrant of arrest pending, unserved.
. .
HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think
that is even a good point, ano
what is a fugitive? It is not defined.
We have loose understanding. . .
CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit
na rin sa definition of terms iyong
fugitive.
Si Benny umalis na, with the
understanding na okay na sa atin ito.
THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have
this rule or not she can run. She is
not a fugitive from justice. Mrs.
Marcos can run at this point and I
have held that for a long time ago.
So can. . .
93

MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait.
Can we just agree on the wording,
this is very important. Manny, can
you come up?
MR. REYES. Let's use the word
conviction by final judgment.
THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means
somebody who is convicted by final
judgment. Okay,. Fugitive means
somebody who is convicted by final
judgment. Insert that on Line 43 after
the semi-colon. Is that approved? No
objection, approved (TSN, Oversight
Committee, 07 May 1991).
xxx xxx xxx
THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba
naman itong amendment on page 2?
Sino ba ang gumawa nito? Okay, on
page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive
from justice". What "fugitive"? Sino
ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well,
last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to
clarify the word "fugitive".
THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from
justice means a person" ba ito, ha?
MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...
THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
HON. REYES. A person who has
been convicted.
THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from
justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall
mean or means one who has been
convicted by final judgment. It means
one who has been convicted by final
judgment.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang
ibig sabihin niyan.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige,
tingnan natin.
HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob
ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan,
fugitive from justice. He has been
convicted by final judgment, meaning
that if he is simply in jail and
94

because he put up, post bail, but the
case is still being reviewed, that is
not yet conviction by final judgment.
3

The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious
apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section
40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification therein
meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely
were facing criminal charges. A similar concern was expressed
by Senator R. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameral
conference committee of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, made this reservation:
. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the
scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a.
4

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991. It provided:
Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons
shall be disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) . . .
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers
to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment.
5
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed
upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves
great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court
certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity
and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to
apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can
neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent
to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some
personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the
Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,
to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to
refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by
final judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding
on whether or not, in fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from
justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light
of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on
the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not
being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to
the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual
matter.
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission
on Elections are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is
hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is DIRECTED to
proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with
the foregoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and
Francisco, JJ., concur.
95

EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 154796-97. October 23, 2003]
RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ OCA, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
JOSEFINA P. JAREO, HON. MAYOR RAYMUND M.
APACIBLE, FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ, AGRIPINA
B. ANTIG, MARIA G. CANOVAS, and DIVINA
ALCOREZA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to nullify
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) en banc. Resolution No. 5404
[1]
dated 23 July
2002 ordered the deletion of Raymundo A. Bautistas
(Bautista) name from the official list of candidates for the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan,
Nasugbu, Batangas (Lumbangan) in the 15 July
2002 elections. Resolution No. 5584
[2]
dated 10 August
2002 provided for the policy of the COMELEC regarding
proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible for not being
registered voters in the place where they ran for office.
The Facts
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy
for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July
2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina
P. Jareo (Election Officer Jareo) refused to accept
Bautistas certificate of candidacy because he was not a
registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed
an action for mandamus against Election Officer Jareo with the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14 (trial
court).
[3]
On 1 July 2002, the trial court ordered Election
Officer Jareo to accept Bautistas certificate of candidacy and
to include his name in the certified list of candidates
for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801
[4]
mandates Election Officer
Jareo to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of
candidates until the COMELEC directs otherwise.
[5]
In
compliance with the trial courts order, Election Officer Jareo
included Bautista in the certified list of candidates for Punong
Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareo referred
the matter of Bautistas inclusion in the certified list of
candidates with the COMELEC Law Department on5 July
2002.
[6]
On 11 July 2002, the COMELEC Law Department
recommended the cancellation of Bautistas certificate of
candidacy since he was not registered as a voter in
Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the
COMELEC Law Departments recommendation before the
barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and
private respondent Divina Alcoreza (Alcoreza) were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in
Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes
(719) while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a
margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of
96

Canvassers (Board of Canvassers)
[7]
proclaimed Bautista as
the elected Punong Barangay
[8]
on 15 July 2002. On 8 August
2002, Bautista took his oath of office as Punong Barangay
before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhainof the First District
of Batangas. On 16 August 2002, Bautista again took his oath
of office during a mass oath-taking ceremony administered
by Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.
Meanwhile, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5404 on 23
July 2002 and Resolution No. 5584 on 10 August
2002 (COMELEC Resolutions). In Resolution No. 5404, the
COMELEC en banc resolved to cancel Bautistas certificate of
candidacy. The COMELEC en banc directed the Election Officer
to delete Bautistas name from the official list of
candidates. The dispositive portion of Resolution No. 5404
reads:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to ADOPT the recommendation, as follows:
1. To DENY due course to/or cancel the certificates of candidacy
of the following:
A. For Barangay Officials:
1. CONRADO S. PEDRAZA Navotas
2. PIO B. MALIGAYA Sampaga
3. PATERNO H. MENDOZA Sampaga
all of Balayan, Batangas.
B. a. RAY OCA A. BAUTISTA, candidate for Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, for not being
registered voters of barangays where they are running for an office;
2. To DIRECT the Election Officers of Balayan, Batangas and
Nasugbu, Batangas, to delete their names in the official list of
candidates in their respective Barangays without prejudice to the filing
of complaint against them for misrepresentation under Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code if the evidence so warrants.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution.
On the other hand, Resolution No. 5584 expressed
COMELECs policy regarding proclaimed candidates found to
be ineligible for not being registered voters in the place of their
election, thus:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE
FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was
denied due course to or cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the
Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement
the resolution of the Commission deleting the name of the candidate
whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted
to cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the
position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order
was issued by the Supreme Court; and
3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose
of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and correcting the
Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.
97

(b) For a proclaimed candidate who is subsequently declared
disqualified by the Commission in the disqualification case filed
against him prior to his proclamation.
1. To DIRECT the proclaimed disqualified candidate to cease
and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the
position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order
was issued by the Supreme Court; and
2. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose
of proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and correcting the
Certificate of Canvass of Proclamation.
(c) For a proclaimed candidate who is found to be ineligible only
after his proclamation (i.e., There is no Resolution denying due course
to or canceling his certificate of candidacy and there is no petition for
disqualification pending against him before his proclamation.)
1. To DISMISS any and all cases questioning the eligibility of
such candidate for LACK OF JURISDICTION, the proper remedy
being a quo warranto case before the metropolitan or municipal trial
court.
In a letter dated 19 August 2002,
[9]
COMELEC
Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer
Jareo to (1) delete the name of Bautista from the official list of
candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan; (2)
order the Board of Canvassers of Lumbangan to reconvene for
the purpose of proclaiming the elected Punong Barangay with
due notice to all candidates concerned; and (3) direct the
proclaimed disqualified candidate Bautista to cease and desist
from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position
which he won in the elections, citing COMELEC Resolution Nos.
5404 and 5584. Consequently, Election Officer Jareo issued
on 20 August 2002 an Order
[10]
deleting the name of Bautista
from the list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The Order
also prohibited Bautista from assuming the position and
discharging the functions of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan
pursuant to the COMELEC Resolutions. The Board of
Canvassers reconvened on 23 August 2002 and after making
the necessary corrections in the Certificate of Canvass of Votes,
proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong
Barangay.
[11]
Alcoreza thus assumed the post
of Punong Barangay of Lumbangan.
On 26 August 2002, Bautista wrote a letter to COMELEC
requesting the latter for reconsideration of the COMELEC
Resolutions.
On 9 September 2002, while his letter for reconsideration
was still pending with the COMELEC, Bautista filed this petition
for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
The Issues
The issues raised are:
1. Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and
5584;
2. Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due
process when the COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584; and
3. Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as
Punong Barangay in view of the alleged
disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.
98

The Courts Ruling
Before considering the merits of the case, we shall first
resolve the procedural questions raised by
respondents. Respondents contend that a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions is a
prerequisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Absent any extraordinary circumstances, a party
who has filed a motion for reconsideration should wait for the
resolution of the motion before filing the petition for certiorari.
Respondents allege that the instant petition is premature
because Bautista has a pending motion for reconsideration of
the COMELEC Resolutions. Respondents claim that Bautista
filed the instant petition barely two weeks after filing the motion
for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc without waiting
for the resolution of his motion.
[12]

The contention of respondents is wrong. The case
[13]
cited
by respondents refers to a motion for reconsideration pending
before the COMELEC en banc seeking the reconsideration of a
resolution rendered by a COMELEC division. Rule 19 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
division. However, Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibits a motion to reconsider
a resolution of the COMELEC en banc except in cases involving
election offenses. As held inAngelia v. Commission on
Elections:
[14]

We hold that petitioner acted correctly in filing the present petition
because the resolution of the COMELEC in question is not subject to
reconsideration and, therefore, any party who disagreed with it only
had one recourse, and that was to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 13, 1 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
What Pleadings are Not Allowed. The following pleadings are not
allowed:
.. . .
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or
decision except in election offense cases;
. . .
As the case before the COMELEC did not involve an election offense,
reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution was not possible and
petitioner had no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. For him to wait until the COMELEC
denied his motion would be to allow the reglementary period for filing
a petition for certiorari with this Court to run and expire.
The instant controversy involves resolutions issued by the
COMELEC en banc which do not pertain to election
offenses. Hence, a special civil action for certiorari is the proper
remedy
[15]
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of
the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari
under Rule 65 except as hereinafter provided. (Emphasis supplied)
Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584
99

Bautista argues that without any disqualification case
formally filed against him, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of his case. The COMELEC cannot motu
proprio act on the issue of his alleged lack of qualification. Even
assuming that there was a disqualification case filed against
him, it is the COMELEC sitting in division which has jurisdiction
and not the COMELEC en banc.
[16]

On the other hand, respondents allege that the Constitution
vests the COMELEC with the power to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. The
Constitution thus empowers the COMELEC to pass upon the
qualification of candidates for elective office. Furthermore,
respondents submit that the COMELECs jurisdiction to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of disqualified candidates is already
settled jurisprudence.
[17]

Respondents cited cases to support their claim that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction to cancel the certificates of
candidacy of disqualified candidates. However, the COMELEC
heard these cases first in division and not en banc in the first
instance.
In Garvida v. Sales, J r.,
[18]
the Court held that it is the
COMELEC sitting in division and not the COMELEC en
banc which has jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate
of candidacy. The Court held:
x x x The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs
the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy, viz:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
election.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law
Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has
made a false material representation in his certificate. The petition
may be heard and evidence received by any official designated by the
COMELEC after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC
itself.
Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to
cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in
Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of
votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in
the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
It is therefore the COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and
decide election cases. This is clear from Section 3 of the said Rules
thus:
Sec. 3. The Commission in Sitting in Divisions. The Commission
shall sit in two (2) Divisions to hear and decide protests or petitions in
ordinary actions, special actions, special cases, provisional remedies,
contempt and special proceedings except in accreditation of
citizens arms of the Commission.
100

I n the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to
any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. I t therefore acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2,
1996. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Election Officer Jareo reported to the
COMELEC Law Department Bautistas ineligibility for being a
non-registered voter. The COMELEC Law Department
recommended to the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or
to cancel Bautistas certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en
banc approved the recommendation in Resolution No. 5404
dated 23 July 2002.
A division of the COMELEC should have first heard this
case. The COMELEC en banc can only act on the case if there
is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COMELEC
division. Hence, the COMELEC en banc acted without
jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of Bautistas
certificate of candidacy without first referring the case to a
division for summary hearing.
The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy does not merely pertain to the administrative
functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve
the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions. The Court discussed
the difference between administrative and quasi-judicial
functions in Villarosa v. Commission on Elections:
[19]

In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva
Caceres vs. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148, he noted that
(t)he term administrative connotes, or pertains, to administration,
especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or
superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or
things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the
production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution
thereon.
While a quasi-judicial function is
A term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis supplied)
In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers,
the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear and decide
cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by
the COMELEC en banc.
[20]
In Baytan v. COMELEC,
[21]
the
Court expounded on the administrative and quasi-judicial
powers of the COMELEC. The Court explained:
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the
COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-judicial
powers. The COMELECs administrative powers are found in Section
2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987
Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise
its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The
Constitution merely vests the COMELECs administrative powers in
the Commission on Elections, while providing that the COMELEC
may sit en banc or in two divisions. Clearly, the COMELEC en
banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative
powers. Indeed, this has been the practice of the COMELEC both
under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
On the other hand, the COMELECs quasi-judicial powers are found
in Section 2 (2) of Article I X-C, to wit:
101

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.
The COMELECs exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to
Section 3 of Article I X-C which expressly requires that all election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by
the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall
be decided by the COMELEC en banc. I t follows, as held by the
Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases
first in division, and then upon motion for reconsideration en banc,
only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial
powers. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy must be heard summarily after due
notice. It is thus clear that cancellation proceedings involve the
exercise of the quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which
the COMELEC in division should first decide. More so in this
case where the cancellation proceedings originated not from a
petition but from a report of the election officer regarding the
lack of qualification of the candidate in the barangay election.
The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it
denies due process to the candidate.
Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due
process when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584
Bautista alleges that the COMELEC denied him due
process because there was no notice and hearing prior to the
issuance of Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584. He became aware
of the issuance of the COMELEC Resolutions only when he
received a copy of Election Officer Jareos Order dated 20
August 2002 ordering him to cease and desist from assuming
the position of Punong Barangay.
[22]

The Solicitor General submits that the COMELEC did not
deprive Bautista of due process. Bautista had the chance to be
heard and to present his side when he filed a letter to the
COMELEC en banc requesting reconsideration of the
Resolutions.
[23]

This Court has explained the nature of due process
in Stayfast Philippines Corporation v. NLRC:
[24]

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice
and hearing. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
102

The opportunity to be heard does not only refer to the right
to present verbal arguments in court during a formal
hearing.
[25]
There is due process when a party is able to present
evidence in the form of pleadings.
[26]
However, the COMELEC
did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain his side. The
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584
without prior notice and hearing.
We cannot ignore the importance of prior notice and
hearing. Severe consequences attach to the COMELEC
Resolutions which not only ordered the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy of Bautista but also the annulment of his
proclamation as Punong Barangay. What is involved here is not
just the right to be voted for public office but the right to hold
public office. As held in Sandoval v. Commission on
Elections:
[27]

x x x Although the COMELEC is clothed with jurisdiction over the
subject matter and issue of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we
find the exercise of its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold
that its order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for
having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural due
process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it
is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to
support its ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party
be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of
the case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case. The facts show that COMELEC set aside
the proclamation of petitioner without benefit of prior notice and
hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on private
respondents allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs. COMELEC:
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of
law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a vested
right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right. Due
process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-
judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among
others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases,
the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, we
had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes vs.
Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on Elections
that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice
and hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact that Bautista was able to file a letter with the
COMELEC en banc requesting for reconsideration of the
Resolutions is beside the point. To reiterate, the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibit a motion for
reconsideration of a COMELEC en banc resolution except in
cases involving election offenses.
Respondents likewise submit that there was no need for
presentation and evaluation of evidence since the issue of
whether Bautista was a registered voter is easily resolved by
looking at the COMELEC registration records.
[28]
This reasoning
fails to consider the instances where a voter may be excluded
through inadvertence or registered with an erroneous or
misspelled name.
[29]
Indeed, if it was just a simple matter of
looking at the record of registered voters, then the COMELEC
would not have included Section 7 (g)
[30]
in its Resolution No.
4801. This Section allows candidates who are not registered
voters to be included in the certified list of candidates until the
COMELEC directs otherwise.
Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides for the twin requirements of prior notice and hearing,
as follows:
103

Rule 23 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificates of
Candidacy
Section 1. Grounds for Denial of Certificate of Candidacy. A petition
to deny due course to or cancel, a certificate of candidacy for any
elective office may be filed with the Law Department of the
Commission by any citizen of voting age or a duly registered political
party, organization, or coalition of political parties on the exclusive
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
by law is false.
Sec. 2. Period to File Petition. The petition must be filed within five
(5) days following the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy.
Sec. 3. Summary Proceeding. The petition shall be heard
summarily after due notice.
Sec. 4. Delegation of Reception of Evidence. The Commission may
designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to
hear the case and receive evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC
could do away with the requirements of notice and hearing. The
COMELEC should have at least given notice to Bautista to give
him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in the
cancellation proceeding. The COMELEC en banc deprived
Bautista of procedural due process of law when it approved the
report and recommendation of the Law Department without
notice and hearing.
[31]

Whether Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay
Lumbangan when he filed his certificate of candidacy
The events
[32]
that transpired after the 15 July
2002 elections necessitate the early resolution of this case. The
Court deems it proper not to remand the case to the COMELEC
to avoid further delay. The Court will resolve this case based on
the pleadings submitted by the parties.
Under the Revised Administrative Code,
[33]
one of the
qualifications of an elective municipal officer is that he must be a
qualified voter in his municipality. Section 2174 of the Revised
Administrative Code reads:
Section 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer. An
elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a
qualified voter in his municipalityand must have been resident
therein for at least one year, and must not be less than twenty-three
years of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently
either English, Spanish, or the local dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under the Republic Act No.
2370,
[34]
otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, a candidate for
the barrio council
[35]
must be a qualified elector. Section 8 of
the Barrio Charter reads:
Section 8. Qualifications for election to the barrio council.
Candidates for election to the barrio council:
(a) Must be a qualified elector and must have been a resident of the
barrio for at least six months prior to the election; and
(b) Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude or of a crime which carries a penalty of at least one year
imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the 1958 case of Rocha v. Cordis,
[36]
the Court
held that a candidate for an elective municipal office did not
104

have to be a registered voter in the municipality to qualify to run
for an elective municipal office. Citing the earlier case of Yra v.
Abao,
[37]
the Court ruled that the words qualified elector
meant a person who had all the qualifications provided by law to
be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list. In the
same vein, the term qualified when applied to a voter does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter.
However, under the Local Government Code of
1991,
[38]
which took effect on 1 January 1992, an elective local
official, including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a
qualified elector or a qualified voter, he must also be a
registered voter.
[39]
Section 39 of the Local Government Code
provides:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filpino or any other local language or
dialect.
x x x
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or
member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least
eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
x x x
These qualifications were reiterated in Section 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 dated 23 May 2002 which
prescribed the guidelines on the filing of certificates of
candidacy in connection with the 15 July
2002 elections. Section 2 reads:
Sec. 2. Qualifications. (a) Candidates
for Punong Barangayand Sangguniang Barangay Kagawad must be:
(1) Filipino citizens;
(2) At least 18 years old on election day;
(3) Able to read and write
Pilipino or any local language or dialect; and
(4) Registered voters of the barangay where they intend to
run for officeand residents thereof for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 likewise
requires the Election Officer to verify whether the candidates are
registered voters and possess all the qualifications of a
candidate. Thus, Section 7 (f) and (g) read:
(f) Before the preparation of the certified lists of candidates it
shall be the duty of the Election Officer to: (1) verify whether all
candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are
registered voters of the barangay where they file their certificates of
candidacy; and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of candidacy
and determine on the basis of said entries whether the candidate
concerned possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.
(g) I f there are candidates who are not registered voters in the
barangay where they run for barangay or sangguniang kabataan
positions or do not possess all the other qualifications of a candidate,
he shall make the corresponding report by REGI STERED MAI L
and by RUSH TELEGRAM to the Law Department of the
Commission within three (3) days from the last day for filing the
certificates of candidacy, copy furnished the Provincial Election
105

Supervisor and the Regional Election Director. The names of said
candidates, however, shall still be included in the certified lists of
candidates until the Commission directs otherwise. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is thus clear that the law as it now stands requires a
candidate for Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the
barangay where he intends to run for office.
Bautista admitted in his affidavit
[40]
dated 24 August
2002 that he was not a registered voter of Barangay
Lumbangan, thus:
A F F I D A V I T
That I, RAYMUNDO A. @ OCA BAUTISTA, of legal age, married,
Mechanical Engineer by profession, Filipino citizen and have been
residing at Sitio Calamundingan, Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu,
Batangas, after being duly sworn according to law depose and say:
1. That I was born at Barangay Tumalim, Nasugbu, Batangas, on
March 15, 1954 and upon reaching the age of four (4) our family
transferred to Sitio Calamundingan, Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu,
Batangas and I have been permanently residing thereat since that time
up to the present, and this fact can be attested to by our immediate
neighbors.
2. That since the time I reached the age of majority, I have
participated both in the National and Local Elections up to the year
1995 and as matter of fact I ran for the Office of member of the
Municipal Council in the year 1992 Elections.
3. Sometime during the late part of the year 1995, I went to the
United States of America scounting (sic) for a good job but I was not
able to find one so I went home in the year 2000 but again believing
that I could land a job in the United States, I again went there but I
was not able to get a job therein and so I went back to
the Philippines in the year 2001 but I found out that my name was
no longer included in the list of registered voters at Barangay
Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas.
4. Sometime in the year 2002, I personally went to the Office of
the Local Election Registrar particularly talking to Miss Josefina P.
Jareo in order to register because as I know, to run for the Office of
Barangay Chairman, I have to be a registered voter in our
Barangay.
5. However, I was denied registration because according to her,
her Office is not open for registration at any time and I should wait for
the General Registration and for that reason I was not able to register.
xxx
11. That had I known that there is a provision in Section 52,
under paragraph (k) A, when Miss J osefina P. J areo denied my
request for registration as a voter, I would have filed a Petition for
Mandamus with the proper Court so that she can be ordered to
register me as a voter in Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu,
Batangas so that any and all technicality may be
avoided.(Emphasis supplied)
According to Bautistas affidavit, he was practically out of
the country from 1995 until 2001. When the certified list of
voters ceased to be effective and operative after the barangay
elections in 1997, qualified voters had to register again to vote
in any election. Apparently, Bautista failed to register during the
general registration of voters conducted by the COMELEC in
1997 since he was still out of the country during that
time. Republic Act No. 8189 (The Voters Registration Act of
1996) provides for a system of continuing registration of
106

voters. Thus, Bautista should have registered anew in the office
of the Election Officer when he came back to the Philippines in
2001 and learned that his name was no longer included in the
roster of registered voters. The pertinent provisions of RA No.
8189 read:
SEC. 7. General Registration of Voters. I mmediately after the
barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall
cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998
elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recall
subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general
registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on J une
14, 15, 21 and 22 and, subject to the discretion of the Commission, on
J une 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
SEC. 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The
personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be
conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular
office hours. No registration shall, however be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
xxx
SEC. 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be
registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or
municipality where he resides to be able to vote in any election. To
register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application
form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3)
copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours
after having acquired the qualifications of a voter. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxx
It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure
his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As early as
2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer
included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista chose
not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that he
needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run for the
office of PunongBarangay.
Bautista alleges that his non-registration as a voter of
Barangay Lumbangan was due to the refusal of Election Officer
Jareo to register him sometime in January 2002.
[41]
Aside from
his bare allegation that he tried to register in January 2002,
Bautista did not proffer any other proof like a duly accomplished
application form for registration to substantiate his claim that he
indeed attempted to register anew. On the other hand, Election
Officer Jareo denies Bautistas allegations in her comment filed
on 10 October 2002, thus:
COMMENT
COMES NOW Respondent JOSEPINA P. JAREO (sic) and to this
Honorable Supreme Court by way of comment to the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order, filed by herein Petitioner, most respectfully states
that:
1. Respondent JOSEPINA P. JAREO (sic) is the
Election Officer of Nasugbu, Batangas, while
petitioner, RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA was one of
the candidates for the Barangay Chairman of
Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, in the
recently concluded barangay elections;
2. Based on the records in our files, petitioner was
not and is not a registered voter of Barangay
107

Lumbangan or any other barangays in Nasugbu,
Batangas;
3. There was never an instance during the period
starting J une 1997 up to December 26, 2001
when registration of voters for the updating of
the Voters Registration Record had been
undertaken by the Commission on Elections on
an on again/off again system, did petitioner
RAYMUNDO BAUTISTA come to our office to
check or ensure that he is still in the active list
of voters of Barangay Lumbangan, i.e.,
assuming that he was registered as a voter
thereof, in the first place;
4. The last day of registration of voters (new or
transferee) had been last December 26,
2001 and registration shall resume again, this
coming September 16, 2002. In the meantime, no
general registration nor special registration had
been mandated by the Commission on Election
(COMELEC, for brevity) between the
period December 27, 2001 until September 15,
2002;
5. I only met petitioner RAYMUNDO BAUTISTA for
the first time when he came to our office to file
his Certificate of Candidacy last J une 10, 2002,
which was the last day set by the COMELEC for
the filing of Certificates of Candidacy;
x x x
Bautista was aware when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Punong Barangay that he lacked one
of the qualifications that of being a registered voter in the
barangay where he ran for office. He therefore made a
misrepresentation of a material fact when he made a false
statement in his certificate of candidacy that he was a registered
voter in Barangay Lumbangan.
[42]
An elective office is a public
trust. He who aspires for elective office should not make a
mockery of the electoral process by falsely representing
himself. The importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests
at the very core of the electoral process.
[43]
Under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material
fact in the certificate of candidacy is a ground for the denial or
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy. The material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 refers to
qualifications for elective office. A candidate guilty of
misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if
elected, from serving, or (3) prosecuted for violation of the
election laws.
[44]

Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argues that
the peoples choice expressed in the local elections deserves
respect. Bautistas invocation of the liberal interpretation of
election laws is unavailing. As held in Aquino v. Commission
on Elections:
[45]

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELECs
conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective
position as Representative of Makati Citys Second District on the
basis of respondent commissions finding that petitioner lacks the one
year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A
democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner
clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for
membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a
majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City
108

would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself.
Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the
qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of
the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility.
[46]
The fact that Bautista, a non-registered voter,
was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase
the fact that he lacks one of the qualifications for
Punong Barangay.
Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong
Barangay in view of ineligibility of the winning candidate
Bautista subscribes to the view of the Solicitor General that
under the law and jurisprudence, the COMELEC cannot
proclaim as winner the second placer in case of ineligibility of
the winning candidate.
The Solicitor General submits that the disqualification of the
winning candidate Bautista does not result in the proclamation
of Alcoreza who obtained the second highest number of votes
because Alcoreza was obviously not the choice of the
electorate. The Solicitor General emphasized that the
COMELEC declared Bautista ineligible for the post of Punong
Barangay only after his election and proclamation as the
winning candidate.
Respondent Alcoreza, however, alleges that her
proclamation as the elected Punong Barangay was legal and
valid. Alcoreza claims her case falls under the exception to the
rule that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not
entitle the candidate with the next higher number of votes to be
proclaimed winner. Alcoreza cites Grego v.
COMELEC
[47]
which held that the exception is predicated on the
concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who
obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the
electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates
disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm
of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of
the ineligible candidate.
This Court agrees with the view of the Solicitor General. It
is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as
winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or
disqualified.
[48]
The exception to this well-settled rule was
mentioned in Labo, J r. v. Commission on
Elections
[49]
and reiterated in Grego v.
COMELEC.
[50]
However, the facts warranting the exception to
the rule do not obtain in the present case.
Although the COMELEC Law Department recommended to
deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
Bautista on 11 July 2002, the COMELEC en banc failed to act
on it before the 15 July 2002 barangay elections. It was only
on 23 July 2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution
No. 5404, adopting the recommendation of the COMELEC Law
Department and directing the Election Officer to delete
Bautistas name from the official list of candidates.
Thus, when the electorate voted for Bautista as Punong
Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief that he was
qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to
the invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautistas
disqualification.
[51]
The Court cannot adhere to the theory of
respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in favor of Bautista are
stray votes.
[52]
A subsequent finding by the COMELEC en
banc that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of
109

elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
[53]
As held
in Domino v. COMELEC:
[54]

Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not
notoriously known by the public as an ineligible candidate. Although
the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered
before the election, however, the same is not yet final and
executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC in its
Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO
to be voted for the office and ordered that the votes cast for him be
counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet attained
finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been
cast in the sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, without any
intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can not be
treated as stray, void, or meaningless.
The Local Government Code provides for the rule regarding
permanent vacancy in the Office of the Punong Barangay, thus:
SEC. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor,
the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in the case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian
member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or
vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the
said office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined
herein.
(b) I f a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
punong barangay member, the highest ranking
sangguniang barangay member, or in the case of his
permanent disability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian
members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the
unexpired terms of their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises
when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed
from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the
sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
(Emphasis supplied)
Since Bautista failed to qualify for the position of Punong
Barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member,
or in the case of his permanent disability, the second highest
ranking sangguniang member, shall become the Punong
Barangay.
[55]

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. Petitioner
Raymundo A. Bautista is ineligible for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan for not being a registered
voter of Barangay Lumbangan. The proclamation of the second
placer Divina Alcoreza as winner in lieu of Bautista is
void. Instead, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member of Barangay Lumbangan shall assume the office of
Punong Barangay of Lumbangan for the unexpired portion of
the term.
SO ORDERED.
110

Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, on official leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 158830. August 10, 2004]
ELLAN MARIE P. CIPRIANO, a minor represented by her
father ROLANDO CIPRIANO, (AND OTHER YOUTH
OF THE LAND AFFECTED AND SIMILARLY
SITUATED), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Election Officer LOPE GAYO,
JR., 1
st
District, Pasay City, SANGGUNIANG
BARANGAY thru its Chairman JOHNNY SANTIAGO
of Barangay 38, Pasay City, GREG PAOLO ALCERA
in his capacity as SK Federation President of Pasay
City, EDNA TIBAR a minor assisted by parents,
KRISTAL GALE BONGGO a minor assisted by
parents, SK Chairman RUEL TAYAM DECENA of
Barangay 142, Pasay City, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PAMBANSANG KATIPUNAN NG MGA
SANGGUNIANG ABATAAN, and ALL SK OFFICERS
AND YOUTH OF THE LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED
and THEIR AGENTS AND
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
May the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own,
in the exercise of its power to enforce and administer election
laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his
certificate of candidacy on the ground that he lacks the
qualifications prescribed by law? This is the issue that needs to
be resolved in this petition for certiorari filed by Ellan Marie P.
Cipriano, the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay
City, whose certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the
COMELEC motu proprio on the ground that she was not a
registered voter in thebarangay where she intended to run.
On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002.
[1]

On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of
the Commissions Law Department to deny due course to or
cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the
SK elections, including petitioners. The ruling was based on the
findings of the Law Department that petitioner and all the other
candidates affected by said resolution were not registered
voters in the barangay where they intended to run.
[2]

Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15
SK elections and her name was not deleted from the official list
of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was
proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly
elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City.
[3]
She took
her oath of office on August 14, 2002.
[4]

On August 19, 2002, petitioner, after learning of Resolution
No. 5363, filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration
of said resolution. She argued that a certificate of candidacy
111

may only be denied due course or cancelled via an appropriate
petition filed by any registered candidate for the same position
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646. According to
petitioner, the report of the Election Officer of Pasay City cannot
be considered a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and the COMELEC cannot, by itself, deny due
course to or cancel ones certificate of candidacy. Petitioner
also claimed that she was denied due process when her
certificate of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission
without notice and hearing. Petitioner further argued that the
COMELEC en banc did not have jurisdiction to act on the
cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance
because it is the Division of the Commission that has authority
to decide election-related cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. Finally, she contended that she may only be
removed by a petition for quo warranto after her proclamation as
duly-elected SK Chairman.
[5]

On October 7, 2002, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
5781,
[6]
resolving petitioners motion for reconsideration. It cited
its previous resolution, Resolution No. 5584, in relation to
Resolution No. 4801. The Commission stated in Resolution No.
5584 its policy on proclaimed candidates found to be ineligible
for not being registered voters in the place where they were
elected. It explained:
A portion of Resolution No. 5584 explained the procedure adopted by
the Commission in denying due course the certificate of candidacy of a
candidate. It reads:
Under COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Election Officers were given
the duty to: (1) verify whether all candidates
for barangay and sangguniang kabataan positions are registered
voters of the barangay where they filed their certificates of candidacy;
and (2) examine the entries of the certificates of candidacy and
determine on the basis of said entries whether the candidate concerned
possesses all the qualifications of a candidate.
Further, Election Officers are mandated to report by registered mail
and by rush telegram to the Law Department of this Commission the
names of candidates who are not registered voters in the place where
they seek to run for public office within three (3) days from the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy. The names of these
candidates, however, shall still be included in the certified lists of
candidates until the Commission directs otherwise.
By virtue of the said report, the Law Department makes a
recommendation to the Commission En Banc, and the latter, by virtue
of an En Banc Resolution either gives due course to or denies/cancels
the certificates of candidacy of the said candidates.
Verily, the administrative inquiry of the Commission on the eligibility
of candidates starts from the time they filed their certificates of
candidacy. The candidates, by virtue of the publication of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 on May 25, 2002 in the Manila Standard and
Manila Bulletin are deemed to have constructive notice of the said
administrative inquiry. Thus, the Commission, by virtue of its
administrative powers, may motu propriodeny/cancel the certificates
of candidacy of candidates who are found to be not registered voters in
the place where they seek to run for public office.
Any registered candidate for the same office may also file a verified
petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
pursuant to Section 69 (nuisance candidate) or Sec. 78 (material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy) of the Omnibus
Election Code either personally or through a duly authorized
representative within five (5) days from the last day for filing of
certificate of candidacy directly with the Office of the Provincial
112

Election Supervisor or with the Office of the Election Officer
concerned.
Hence, as long as the Election Officer reported the alleged ineligibility
in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, or the petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy was filed within
the reglementary period, the fact that the Resolution of this
Commission, denying due course to or canceling the certificate of
candidacy of an ineligible candidate, was not promulgated or did not
arrive prior to or on the day of the elections is therefore of no
moment. The proclamation of an ineligible candidate is not a bar to
the exercise of this Commissions power to implement the said
Resolution of the Commission En Banc because it already acquired the
jurisdiction to determine the ineligibility of the candidates who filed
their certificates of candidacy even before elections by virtue of either
the report of the Election Officer or the petition to deny due course to
or cancel the certificate of candidacy filed against them.
On the matter of petitions for disqualification, the provisions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 are likewise clear: (1) A verified
petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground of ineligibility or
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code may be filed at
anytime before proclamation of the winning candidate by any
registered voter or any candidate for the same office, (2) All
disqualification cases filed on the ground of ineligibility shall survive,
although the candidate has already been proclaimed.
Clearly, by virtue of the above-quoted provisions, the proclamation of
a candidate who is found to be disqualified is also not a bar to the
Commissions power to order a proclaimed candidate to cease and
desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the position to
which he was elected.
By way of contrast, in case of proclaimed candidates who were found
to be ineligible only after they were elected and proclaimed, the
provisions of Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code are clear:
The remedy of losing candidates is to file a petition for quo
warranto before the metropolitan or municipal trial court. This is
logical The Commission did not acquire jurisdiction over these
proclaimed candidates prior to election (i.e., There was no report from
the Election Officer regarding their ineligibility and no petition to deny
due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy and/or petition for
disqualification was filed against them.) Thus, the Commission has no
jurisdiction to annul their proclamation on the ground of ineligibility,
except in cases wherein the proclamation is null and void for being
based on incomplete canvass.
Thus, the Commission ruled:
Premises considered, the Commission, RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to establish a policy as follows:
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE
FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED.
(a) For a proclaimed candidate whose certificate of candidacy was
denied due course to or cancelled by virtue of a Resolution of the
Commission En Banc albeit such Resolution did not arrive on time.
1. To DIRECT the Election Officers concerned to implement the
resolution of the Commission deleting the name of the candidate
whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course;
2. To DIRECT the candidate whose name was ordered deleted to
cease and desist from taking his oath of office or from assuming the
position to which he was elected, unless a temporary restraining order
was issued by the Supreme Court; and
113

3. To RECONVENE the Board of Canvassers for the purpose of
proclaiming the duly-elected candidates and correcting the Certificate
of Canvass of Proclamation.
[7]

The Commission further stated:
Considering that there are queries as to the status of the proclamation
of disqualified candidates as an offshoot of Resolution No. 5584, the
same was amended by virtue of Resolution No. 5666, the dispositive
portion of which now reads:
Considering the above-quoted provision, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE the
recommendation of Commissioner Sadain to amend Resolution No.
5584 promulgated on 10 August 2002 with modification.
Accordingly, Resolution No. 5584 shall now read as follows:
I
ON PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES FOUND TO BE INELIGIBLE
FOR BEING NOT REGISTERED VOTERS IN THE PLACE
WHERE THEY WERE ELECTED XXX XXX
(a) xxx
(b) xxx
(c) xxx
(d) For both (a) and (b), in the event
that the disqualified candidate is
proclaimed the winner despite his
disqualification or despite the
pending disqualification case filed
before his proclamation, but which
is subsequently resolved against
him, the proclamation of said
disqualified candidate is hereby
declared void from the beginning,
even if the dispositive portion of
the resolution disqualifying him or
canceling his certificate of
candidacy does not provide for
such an annulment.
[8]

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition seeking:
a) To declare illegal and unconstitutional the COMELEC
Resolution No. 5363 promulgated on 15 July 2002 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 5781 promulgated on October 7,
2002 and any other COMELEC actions and resolutions which
are intended to summarily oust and remove petitioner as SK
Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City without any notice,
inquiry, election protest, petition for quo warranto,
investigation and hearing, and therefore a clear violation of
due process of law.
b) To declare illegal the aforesaid COMELEC Resolutions
sitting en banc which does not have authority to decide
election related case, including pre-proclamation
controversies, in the first instance, in consonance to this
Honorable Courts ruling in the cases of Sarmiento vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 87308, August 29, 1989 and Garvida
vs. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997.
c) To declare unconstitutional Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 and
also to declare the age of membership and its officers of the
KK or SK organization from 15 to 21 years old in accordance
with Sec. 39 (f) and Sec. 423 (b) and other provisions of R.A.
7160 otherwise known as Local Government Code of 1991.
114

d) If Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 9164 are sustained as
constitutional to direct all SK Officers and Members who are
now more than 18 years old to cease and desist from
continuously functioning as such SK Officers and Members
and to vacate their respective SK Officers position, as they are
no longer members of the Sangguniang Kabataan
organization or Katipunan ng Kabataan organization for being
over age upon attaining the age of 18 years old.
e) To direct respondents to pay the salary, allowance and other
benefits of the petitioner as SK Chairperson of Barangay 38,
Pasay City.
[9]

Stripped of the non-essentials, the only issue in this case is
the validity of Resolution No. 5363 of the COMELEC.
Petitioner argues that she was deprived of due process
when the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 canceling her
certificate of candidacy. She claims that the resolution was
intended to oust her from her position as SK Chairman without
any appropriate action and proceedings.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, defends its resolution by
invoking its administrative power to enforce and administer
election laws. Thus, in the exercise of such power, it may motu
proprio deny or cancel the certificates of candidacy of
candidates who are found to be unqualified for the position they
are seeking. The Commission further contends that the
publication of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 governing the
conduct of the Barangay and SK elections in two newspapers of
general circulation is sufficient notice to the candidates
regarding the Commissions administrative inquiry into their
certificates of candidacy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The COMELEC is an institution created by the Constitution
to govern the conduct of elections and to ensure that the
electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful. It is
mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall.
[10]
As an independent Constitutional
Commission, it is clothed with the three powers of government -
executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial
powers. The administrative powers of the COMELEC, for
example, include the power to determine the number and
location of polling places, appoint election officials and
inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law
enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections;
register political parties, organization or coalitions, accredit
citizens arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses,
and recommend to the President the removal or imposition of
any other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has
deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or
decision. It also has direct control and supervision over all
personnel involved in the conduct of election.
[11]
Its legislative
authority is found in its power to promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce
and administer.
[12]
The Constitution has also vested it with
quasi-judicial powers when it was granted exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials;
and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
[13]

Aside from the powers vested by the Constitution, the
Commission also exercises other powers expressly provided in
115

the Omnibus Election Code, one of which is the authority to
deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The
exercise of such authority, however, must be in accordance with
the conditions set by law.
The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu
proprio deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
based on its broad administrative power to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections.
We disagree. The Commission may not, by itself, without
the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate
files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial
duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in
Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code, thus:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. -
The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or
officer designated by the Commission or the board of election
inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty
to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to
give or not to give due course to petitioners certificate of
candidacy.
[14]
The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to
certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in
character. While the Commission may look into patent defects
in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on
their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate
is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
[15]

Nonetheless, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allows any person to file before the COMELEC a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the
ground that any material representation therein is false. It
states:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Under Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
It is therefore clear that the law mandates that the candidate
must be notified of the petition against him and he should be
given the opportunity to present evidence in his behalf. This is
the essence of due process. Due process demands prior notice
and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that
the tribunal shows substantial evidence to support its ruling. In
other words, due process requires that a party be given an
opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side of the
case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case.
[16]
In a petition to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy, since the proceedings are
required to be summary, the parties may, after due notice, be
required to submit their position papers together with affidavits,
counter-affidavits, and other documentary evidence in lieu of
oral testimony. When there is a need for clarification of certain
matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or
Division, the parties may be allowed to cross-examine the
affiants.
[17]

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of
due course or cancellation of ones certificate of candidacy is
116

not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but
rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs.
[18]
We have earlier enumerated the scope
of the Commissions administrative functions. On the other
hand, where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is
of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise
of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than
a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.
[19]

The determination whether a material representation in the
certificate of candidacy is false or not, or the determination
whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking
involves a determination of fact where both parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.
Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation
of ones right to run for public office, or, as in this case, ones
right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the
candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him
and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations
against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the
COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
Commissions inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present
his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications
for the office he seeks.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we rule that Resolution
No. 5363 and Resolution No. 5781, canceling petitioners
certificate of candidacy without proper proceedings, are tainted
with grave abuse of discretion and therefore void.
We need not rule on the question raised by petitioner as
regards the constitutionality of Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act
No. 9164 lowering the age of membership in the SK as it is not
the lis mota of this case.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, COMELEC Resolution No. 5363
promulgated on July 15, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No.
5781 issued on October 7, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.