The appellant ( veera Ibrahim )

Accused of an offence : only a person against whom a for mal accusation relating
to the com mission of an offence has been level led which in the normal course
may result in his prosecution, would fall within its ambit .
Case referred : ( R.C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal
1
)

In RC mehtas case the issue was : a statement was recorded by an officer of
Customs in an enquiry under Section 171-A of the Sea Customs Act. One of the
contentions raised was, that a 'person against whom such an enquiry is made is a
person accused of an offence' and on that account, he cannot be compelled to be a
witness against himself and the statement obtained or evidence collected under
the aforesaid provision by the Officer of Customs is inadmissible. This contention
was repelled by Shah J.
Normally a person stands in the character of an accused when a First I nformation
Report is lodged against him in respect of an offence before an Officer competent
to investigate it, or when a complaint is made relating to the commission of an
offence before a Magistrate competent to try or send to another Magistrate for trial
of the offence.

SECTION 123 (CUSTOMS ACT ,1962). Burden of proof in certain cases.
(1) Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in

1
AIR 1970
the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that
they are not smuggled goods shall be

(a) in a case where such seizure is made from the possession of any person,
-
(i) on the person from whose possession the goods were seized; and
(ii) if any person, other than the person from whose possession the goods
were seized, claims to be the owner thereof, also on such other person;
(b) in any other case, on the person, if any, who claims to be the owner of
the goods so seized.

(2) This section shall apply to gold, and manufactures thereof, watches, and any
other class of goods which the Central Government may by notification in the
Official Gazette specify.

In the absence of the requisite notification, the statutory presumption under
Section123 ( customs act 1962 ) could not be invoked by the prosecution







Evidence by the respondent :
A perusal of the statement Ex. I made by the appellant before the Inspector of
Customs would show that it contained exculpatory matter. Therein, the
deponent claimed that he was not aware that the packages which were loaded in
the truck were contraband goods, and alleged that the goods were not loaded
under his instructions.


Statement made by the person accompanying Veera Ibrahim :
"I did not ask Mullaji (driver) what goods were
being loaded in his lorry.... Mullaji was only my friend and I was not aware of
any of his mala fide activities."

PAKALA NARAYAN SWAMI V. EMPEROR
2
, LORD ATKIN observed :
a confession must either admit in terms the offence , or at any rate substantially all
the facts which constitutes the offence. An admission of a gravely incriminating fact ,
even a conclusively incriminating fact , is not in itself a confession , for example , an
admission that the accused is the owner of and was and was in the recent possession of
the knife or revolver which caused death with no explanation of any other mans

2
AIR 1939 P.C. 47
possession. The definition is not containes in the evidence act , 1872 ; and in that act it
would not be consistent with the natural use of the language to construe confession as a
statement by an accused suggesting the inference that he committed the crime.
A statement which may not amount to a confession may still be relevant as an
admission. Only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession but
when a confession falls short of actual admission of guilt it may nevertheless be used
as an evidence against the person who made it as an admission under S.21.
3

Cases referred by the respondent against the application of S-24 indian
evidence act , 1872 are :

Pakala Narayana v. Emperor
Confessions carrying inculpatory and exculpatory statements
The definition attempted by the Privy Council has found favour with the Supreme Court.
In its decision in Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court approved the
Privy Council decision in Pakala Narayan Swami v. Emperor, over two scores. Firstly,
the definition of confession is that it must either admit the guilt in terms or admit
substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and secondly, that a mixed up
statement which, even though contains some confessional statements, will still lead to
acquittal, is no confession.

3
Dr. AVATAR SINGH , PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE ,CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS (NINETEENTH
EDITION)
Palvinder was on trial for the murder of her husband along with another who all
the time remained absconding. The husbands body was recovered from a well
after it had already suffered about two months decomposition. The post mortem
could not even reveal whether death was due to poisoning or what. In her
statement to the court the accused said that her husband, a hobbyist photographer,
used to keep handy photo developing material which is quick poison; that on the
occasion he was ill and she brought him some medicine; that the phial of medicine
happened to be kept nearby the liquid developer and the husband while going for
the medicine by mistake swallowed the developer and died; that she got afraid and
with the help of the absconding accused packed the body in a trunk and disposed it
off into the well.

The statement thus consisted of partly guilty and partly innocent remarks. It was partly
inculpatory in the sense that it confessed to something wrong and partly exculpatory in
the sense that if accepted it would totally absolve her of any guilt. The lower courts sorted
out the exculpatory part and acting on the inculpatory part announced her to be guilty of
the murder of her husband by poisoning him. But the Supreme Court did not countenance
this approach.

The court thus accepted the inculpatory part of the statement and rejected the
exculpatory part. In doing so it contravened the well accepted rule regarding the
use of confession and admission that they must either be accepted as a whole or
rejected as a whole and that the court is not competent to accept only inculpatory
part, while rejecting exculpatory part as inherently incredible.

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA :

The circumstances established unmistakably and irresistibly pointed to the
conclusion that the appellant was knowingly concerned in a fraudulent, attempt
at evasion, if not, fraudulent evasion, of duty chargeable on those contraband
goods.