Proliferation

Iran will reach critical capacity by the middle of this year Now is key to stop
proliferation

Albright Et Al 2013, David Albright President, Institute for Science and International Security Mark
Dubowitz Executive Director, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Orde Kittrie Professor of Law,
Sandra Day OConnor College of Law, Arizona State University Leonard Spector Deputy Director, James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies Michael Yaffe
Professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, U.S.
Nonproliferation Strategy for the changing Middle East, The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation
Strategy January 2013, Washington, D.C. isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/FinalReport.pdf

Based on the current trajectory of Irans nuclear program, we estimate that Iran
could reach this critical capability in mid-2014 . Depending on the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of various
potential developments, Iran could in fact reach this critical capability either before or after mid-2014.
Developments that could expedite the date include Irans increasing its enrichment
from 20 percent to a level of 60 percent, a significant increase in the number or efficiency of Irans
centrifuges, the existence of a secret Iranian enrichment facility, or various potential developments relating to Irans plutonium
production capacity (e.g., reprocessing capabilities). Developments that could delay the date include another Stuxnet-type computer
attack on Irans nuclear program or other unexpected Iranian difficulties with its centrifuge program. In light of these factors,
caution dictates that the United S tates assume, and plan on the basis , that Iran is
likely to reach critical capability in mid-2014. Given these uncertainties and recognizing Prime Minister
Netanyahus more accelerated timeline, we believe that the intensification of sanctions we recommend needs to begin as rapidly as
possible.

Iranian proliferation ensures a rapid destabilization of the Middle East and
Saudi proliferation
Edelman et al 2011
Edelman, Eric S., Krepinevich, Andrew F., Montgomery, Evan Braden, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jan/Feb2011, Vol.
90, Issue 1 The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran Ebsco
The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear -
armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East , even if Israel does
not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab
Emirates -- all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) -- have recently announced
or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing
nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves
have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The NPT does not bar states from
developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium
and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to
accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium -- the very loophole that Iran has
apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow,
expensive, and difficult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to
constrain aspiring nuclear states' access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these
aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade. There is, however, at least one state that
could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate
throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological
rivals . Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed
Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi
Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a
nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons
development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting
its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing
proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The
Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-
2S, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad
have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop
in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to
Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce
nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided
such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for
plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from
spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to
maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an
extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems,
and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with
its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis
to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear
weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United
States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of
popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would
gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its
chief rival, India.

Their deterrence evidence doesnt assume the Middle East Saudi proliferation
would escalate to full-scale nuclear war
Edelman Krepinevich and Montgomery 2011
Eric, Andrew, and Evan, Foreign Affairs, The Dangers of NATO a Nuclear Iran Subtitle: The Limits of Containment,
Lexis
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-
armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would
unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the
Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers
would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United
States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are
generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance
of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East
might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-
armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike
capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a
devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable
capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the
close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in
the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to " launch on warning " of an attack or even,
during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch
authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early
warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an
unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a
nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted
state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was
responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it
would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps
to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety
measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee
that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their
governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items.
Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case,
however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.
Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the
Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear
Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence -- for good or ill -- the military
competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors,
enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such
transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But
they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain
influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and
thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear
powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the
Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

Iranian proliferation causes conflict with Israel
Edelman et al 2011
Edelman, Eric S., Krepinevich, Andrew F., Montgomery, Evan Braden, Foreign Affairs,
00157120, Jan/Feb2011, Vol. 90, Issue 1 The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran Ebsco
Given Israel's status as an assumed but undeclared nuclear weapons state, the most immediate
consequence of Iran's crossing the nuclear threshold would be the emergence of an
unstable bipolar nuclear competition in the Middle East. Given Israel's enormous quantitative and qualitative
advantage in nuclear weapons -- its arsenal is estimated to consist of anywhere from 100 to more than 200 warheads, possibly
including thermonuclear weapons -- Tehran might fear a disarming preventive or preemptive strike. During a crisis, then, the
Iranian leadership might face a "use them or lose them" dilemma with respect to its nuclear
weapons and resolve it by attacking first. For their part, Israeli leaders might also be willing to strike
first, despite the enormous risks. Israel's small size means that even a few nuclear detonations on its soil
would be devastating; Iran's former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was exaggerating only slightly when he claimed
that "even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything." Iran's nuclear arsenal is likely to be small at first
and perhaps vulnerable to a preventive attack. Moreover, even if current and future Israeli missile
defenses could not stop a full-scale premeditated attack by ballistic missiles, they might be
effective against any retaliation Iran might launch if it were hit first. And the willingness to
execute a preventive or preemptive strike when confronting a serious threat is a deeply
ingrained element of Israel's strategic culture , as Israel demonstrated in its attacks against
Egypt in 1956 and 1967, against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, and against a suspected Syrian
nuclear site in 2007. On the one occasion that Israel absorbed the first blow, in 1973, it came perilously close to defeat. In
short, the early stages of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition would be unstable.

That escalates to full scale war
Adamsky 2011
Dima Adamsky is an Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and the author of The Culture of Military Innovation. The scenarios discussed here
are speculative and do not represent the views of any official in the Israeli government, Foreign affairs, march
april 2011, lexis
The insecurity generated by a nuclear Iran might dwarf previous peaks of existential fear in
Israel . A nuclear Iran would likely undermine the foundations of Israeli self-confidence by
crossing two "redlines" in the Israeli strategic psyche. First, the arsenal of a single country
would pose an existential threat, conjuring memories of Nazi Germany. Focusing on Iran's ultimate
destructive capability rather than its intentions, Israeli strategists might therefore view a
nuclear Iran apocalyptically. Second, many Israelis might come to believe that the end of Israel's
nuclear monopoly has terminated the country's ultimate insurance policy, fundamentally
undermining Israel's general deterrence posture. These concerns, as Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan
Montgomery assert, might lead Israeli strategists to reexamine nuclear policies and adjust their current deterrence models

Extinction
Moore 2009
Carole, author, activist, leader of Libertarians for Peace, Israeli Nuclear Threats and Blackmail,
http://www.carolmoore.net/nuclearwar/israelithreats.html
The phrase the Samson Option is used to describe Israels strategy of massive nuclear
retaliation against enemy nations should its existence as a Jewish state be jeopardized
through military attack. Israeli leaders created the term in the mid-1960s, inspired by the Biblical figure Samson, who destroyed a
Philistine temple, killing himself and thousands of Philistine enemies.[1][2] Israel refuses to admit officially that it has nuclear
weapons - a policy known as nuclear ambiguity or "nuclear opacity."*3+ This despite government officials inferring repeatedly - and
occasionally admitting - the fact. And despite Israeli nuclear whistle blower Mordechai Vanunu making public smuggled photographs
of nuclear weapons and production equipment in the 1980s.[4] Israel now may have as many as 400 atomic and
hydrogen nuclear weapons,[5][6] as well as the ability to launch them via long range missiles,
submarines and aircraft.[7] It can use them in a second strike even if its military is devastated.
Originally a strategy of last resort retaliation - even if it means Israels annihilation - it has developed into being a
nuclear bullying strategy to further Israels territorial goals through threats and blackmail.
Israel has bullied not only Arab and Muslim nations, but the United States and Russia with its Samson
Option threats. Mordechai Vanunu has alleged that Israel uses for purposes of blackmail its ability to "bombard any city all
over the world, and not only those in Europe but also those in the United States."[8] Official policy and threats During the 1960s
Israel concentrated on conventional military superiority to defend lands confiscated in the 1948 and 1967 wars - and to convince
Palestinians in Israel and the occupied territories that they could not break free of it. However, in 1973's Yom Kippur War Israel was
almost overwhelmed by Arab forces. Prime Minister Golda Meir authorized a nuclear alert, ordering 13 atomic bombs be prepared
for missiles and aircraft. Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Simha Dinitz threatened very serious conclusions" if there was not an
immediate airlift of supplies.[9] This forced U.S. President Richard Nixon to make emergency airlifts of state of the art military
supplies to Israel.[10][11] Fearing intervention by the Soviet Union, U.S. forces went on Defense Condition (DEFCON) III alert
status[12], something which could have led to full scale nuclear war in case of misinterpretation of signals or hardware or software
failures. Additionally, as Seymour Hersh documents in detail in his book The Samson Option, from 1973 these weapons have been
used to discourage the Soviet Union - now Russia - from intervening militarily on behalf of Arab nations.[13] Obviously an Israeli
nuclear attack on Russia by the United States great ally Israel would result in Russia sending thousands of nuclear weapons towards
the U.S. and the U.S. responding in kind. Not surprisingly, no nation state has attempted to attack Israel since 1973. A former Israeli
official justified Israels threats. You Americans screwed us in not supporting Israel in its 1956 war with Egypt. We can still
remember the smell of Auschwitz and Treblinka. Next time well take all of you with us.*14+ General Moshe Dayan, a leading
promoter of Israels nuclear program*15+, has been quoted as saying Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.*16+
Amos Rubin, an economic adviser to former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, said "If left to its own Israel will have no choice but to fall
back on a riskier defense which will endanger itself and the world at large... To enable Israel to abstain from dependence on nuclear
arms calls for $2 to 3 billion per year in U.S. aid."[17] In 1977, after a right-wing coalition under Menachen Begin took power, the
Israelis began to use the Samson Option not just to deter attack but to allow Israel to redraw the political map of the Middle East
by expanding hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers into the West Bank and Gaza.[18] Then-Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon said
things like "We are much more important than (Americans) think. We can take the middle east with us whenever we go"[19] and
"Arabs may have the oil, but we have the matches."[20] He proclaimed his - and many Likud Party members' - goals of transforming
Jordan into a Palestinian state and transferring all Palestinian refugees there.[21][22] A practice known worldwide as "ethnic
cleansing." To dissuade the Soviet Union from interfering with its plans, Prime Minister Begin immediately gave orders to target
more Soviet cities for potential nuclear attack. Its American spy Jonathan Pollard was caught stealing such nuclear targeting
information from the U.S. military in 1985.[23] During the next 25 years Israel became more militarily adventurous, bombing Iraqs
under-construction Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, invading Lebanon to destroy Palestinian refugee camps in 1982 and to fight
Hezbollah in 2006, massively bombing civilian targets in the West Bank Jenin refugee camp in 2002 and thoughout Gaza in 2008-
2009. There are conflicting reports about whether Israel went on nuclear alert and armed missiles with nuclear weapons during the
1991 Gulf War after Iraq shot conventionally armed scud missiles into it.[24][25] In 2002, while the United States was building for
the 2003 invasion of Iraq, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon threatened that if Israel was attacked Israel will react. Is it clear?*26+
Israeli defense analyst Zeev Schiff explained: Israel could respond with a nuclear retaliation that would eradicate Iraq as a country.
It is believed President Bush gave Sharon the green-light to attack Baghdad in retaliation, including with nuclear weapons, but only if
attacks came before the American military invasion.[27] Former Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres has admitted that nuclear
weapons are used by Israel for compellent purposes - i.e., forcing others to accept Israeli political demands.[28] In 1998 Peres was
quoted as saying, "We have built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo," referring to imposing a
settlement on the Palestinians.*29+ In her book Israels Sacred Terrorism Livia Rokach documented how Israelis have used religion to
justify paramilitary and state terrorism to create and maintain a Jewish State.[30] Two other Israeli retaliation strategies are the
popularized phrase Wrath of God, the alleged Israeli assassination of those it held responsible for the 1972 killings of Israeli
athletes during the Munich Olympics*31+, and the Dahiya doctrine of destruction of civilian areas to punish Palestinians for
supporting their leaders.[32] Israeli Israel Shahak wrote in 1997: "Israel clearly prepares itself to seek overtly a hegemony over the
entire Middle East...without hesitating to use for the purpose all means available, including nuclear ones."[33] Zeev Schiff opined in
1998 that "Off-the-cuff Israeli nuclear threats have become a problem."*34+ In 2003 David Hirst noted that The threatening of wild,
irrational violence, in response to political pressure, has been an Israeli impulse from the very earliest days and called Israel a
candidate for the role of 'nuclear-crazy' state.*35+ Noam Chomsky said of the Samson Option the craziness of the state is not
because the people are insane. Once you pick a policy of choosing expansion over security, that's what you end up getting stuck
with.*36+ Efraim Karsh calls the Samson Option the rationality of pretended irrationality, but warns that seeming too irrational
could encourage other nations to attack Israel in their own defense.[37] Samson Option Supporters Two Israel supporters are
frequently quoted for their explicit support of the Samson Option. Martin Van Creveld, a professor of military history at the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, has been quoted as saying: "Most European capitals are targets for our air force....We have the capability to
take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel goes under."[38] In 2002 the Los Angeles
Times, published an opinion piece by Louisiana State University professor David Perlmutter in which he wrote: "What would
serve the Jew-hating world better in repayment for thousands of years of massacres but a
Nuclear Winter . Or invite all those tut-tutting European statesmen and peace activists to join us in the ovens? For the
first time in history, a people facing extermination while the world either cackles or looks
away--unlike the Armenians, Tibetans, World War II European Jews or Rwandans--have the power to destroy the
world . The ultimate justice?"[39]
SOP

Statutory restriction on executive war-making toward Iran solves separation of
powers. The constitution gives congress war-making authority
Bandow, 2012
Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is
the author and editor of several books, including The Politics of Plunder: Misgovernment in Washington, Attack
Iran? Ask Congress to Declare War, The American Spector, It is time to end the era of executive war-making,
spectator.org/archives/2012/01/04/attack-iran-ask-congress-to-de
Declarations of war have gone out of fashion. The last one was 70 years ago, in response to the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, less formal authorizations of force are common.
While not quite the same, Congress still voted on war with Iraq. And President George W. Bush
did not deny that he was fighting a war. In contrast, President Obama channeled George Orwell
in claiming the absence of hostilities in Libya as U.S. drones, missiles, and planes destroyed military materiel and
killed military personnel. It was an exquisite rhetorical performance. But also illegal and unconstitutional. This election the American
people should insist that whoever is elected actually follow the Constitution. The Founders were prepared to fight for their
independence, but they feared the costs of war. They particularly worried about the consequences of investing the executive with
the limitless power to engage in war, like the British king. Wrote James Madison, sometimes called the father of the Constitution:
Of all the enemies of true liberty, war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every
other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instrument
for bringing the many under the domination of the few. These sentiments animated the debates at the Constitutional Convention.
Enthusiasts for expansive, unaccountable executive power were few. That reluctance included giving the president authority to take
the new nation into war. The Constitution created barriers to executive war-making. Contrary to
conventional wisdom in todays White House, the Founders gave Congress several important
war-making powers, including raising an army, approving military expenditures, ratifying
treaties, setting rules of war, and issuing letters of marquee. Moreover, the legislative branch was to decide
whether there would be a war for the president to fight. According to Article 1, Sec. 8 (11), Congress shall have the power to
declare war. James Madison explained: the fundamental doctrine of the Constitution that the power to declare war is fully and
exclusively vested in the legislature. The convention delegates were not fools. Especially at a time when communication and
transportation were slow, they recognized that the chief executive might have to respond to foreign attack. For that reason the
Framers changed make to declare. However, that did not mean that Congress could only declare as in take note of the fact
that the president had, say, invaded another nation. The Founders objective was simple. They did not trust the
executive to make this important decision alone. For instance, John Jay contended that dubious motives often led
kings to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. George Mason declared: the president is
not safely to be entrusted with the power to start wars. Thus, Mason favored clogging rather than facilitating war. Similar was
James Wilson, who said the Constitution will not hurry us into war. Rather, he explained, the
provision is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single
body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is in the
legislature at large. Pierce Butler, an advocate of executive power at the convention, made a similar point when
campaigning for the Constitutions ratification in South Carolina. Butler assured his skeptical brethren that the document did not
give the president authority to start wars as throwing into his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving
his country in a war whenever he wished to promote her destruction. Similar was the understanding of influential leaders not
directly involved in drafting the document. Thomas Jefferson was ambassador to France at the time, but he wrote approvingly of the
proposed Constitutions effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose. Abraham Lincoln, no
opponent of expansive executive power, lauded the Founders for recognizing war to be the most oppressive of all Kingly
oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of
bringing this oppression upon us. Of course, the Constitution named the president commander-in-
chief of the military (but not the country). With that position comes important authority,
primarily to conduct wars authorized by Congress. Alexander Hamilton was an advocate of quasi-monarchy, but
he only referred to the commander-in-chief as the first general and admiral of the armed services. He emphasized that the
presidents authority was in substance much inferior to that of the British monarch, and would amount to nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the land and naval forces while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war. Over
the years presidents often engaged in military action without congressional authority. Military
maneuvers, attempts at intimidation, limited retaliation, and even isolated acts of war have
been common, but remain qualitatively different than initiating full-scale hostilities. Not until
President Harry Truman took America into the Korean War did a president claim the authority to unilaterally undertake large-scale
combat, especially against a nation which had not assaulted or even threatened America. And he did not have the excuse of
necessity, such as preempting a threatened Soviet nuclear attack. Truman could have called Congress together and made his pitch
for war, while readying U.S. forces to use if he received legislative sanction. Vietnam created a new precedent congressional
authorization short of a war declaration, in this case the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Congress took a similar approach to the Persian
Gulf War, attack on Afghanistan, and invasion of Iraq. My Cato Institute colleague John Samples categorizes these as conflicts which
involved (and were expected to involve) troops in combat and thus, casualties. More common, however, are wars many frankly
aggressive against nations which had done nothing against the U.S. or even an American ally which presidents conducted without
even a nod in Congress direction. Samples points to military action or threatened action in the Balkans, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and
Libya. In frustration over the fact that two presidents fought the Vietnam War for years with limited congressional authorization,
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in an attempt to add statutory constraints to
executive power. But unsurprisingly, most presidents have as little respect for the law as for the Constitution. Particularly
shocking was President Obamas claim that the war in Libya was not a war. He claimed unilateral
authority to intervene in a civil war in North Africa while citing the War Powers Resolution. Even
here he was on thin ground. The WPR authorizes introduction of troops pursuant a national
emergency created by attack on the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed
forces. Muammar Gaddafi had done none of these. (The bombing of PanAm flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, might have
qualified 23 years before.) However, the WPR is unambiguous about requiring either withdrawal or
congressional authorization after 60 days. When that deadline hit the president ignored the advice from his chief legal
officials and simply announced that the U.S. was not involved in hostilities. Sounding a lot like the former president who quibbled
over the definition of is, President Obama explained Americas role was non-kinetic, more
limited, and in support. One anonymous administration official declared that the kinetic pieces of that are
intermittent. Even Defense Secretary Robert Gates appeared to be bemused by this argument, observing that Gaddafi probably
thought differently. Thankfully most of these wars turned out to impose only modest direct costs on the U.S., though sometimes the
unintended geopolitical consequences were serious. Of greater concern, however, was the legal breach. Observed Columbia law
professor John Bassett Moore: There can hardly be room for doubt that the Framers of the
Constitution when they vested in Congress the power to declare war, never imagined that
they were leaving it to the executive to use the military and naval forces of the United States
all over the world for the purpose of actually coercing other nations, occupying their territory,
and killing their soldiers and citizens, all according to his own notions of the fitness of things, as
long as he refrained from calling his action war or persisted in calling it peace. Now the issue of
Iran looms. There are many good reasons to fear a nuclear Iran, but also many good reasons
to fear the consequences of launching a preventive military strike against Iran. If the
president, whoever it is, wants to do the latter, he or she should indeed, under the
Constitution, must go to Congress. The question came up in the 2008 campaign, and then candidate Obama
answered: The president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a
military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the
nation. Vice President Joseph Biden, when serving in the Senate, advocated impeachment of President W. Bush if the latter
bombed Iran without legislative authority. Biden explained that the Constitution denied the president unfettered power to start
wars and granted Congress the power to initiate all hostilities, even limited wars. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, when running
for president in 2008, announced: I do not believe that the president can take military action including any kind of strategic
bombing against Iran without congressional authorization. Of course, that was then, this is now. The Republican contenders have
said nothing about the issue. Almost all are claiming that they would be tough and vigorous commanders-in-chief. But none have
said if they would follow the clear legal and constitutional restraints on the commander-in-chief. The question should be asked of
every candidate for president. The fact that prior chief executives may have violated the law by deploying the military is no answer.
Most of those instances offer little precedent for anything, usually having been limited actions, often carried out for arguably
defensive purposes or under colorable legal authority, and sometimes even initiated without Washingtons authorization. None
justify attacking another sovereign nation half the world away which has not attacked or even threatened to attack the U.S.
Following the law does not make a president a pushover. For instance, President (and former General) Dwight Eisenhower
announced that I am not going to order any troops into anything that can be interpreted as war, until Congress directs it. He
explained: When it comes to the matter of war, there is only one place that I would go, and that is to the Congress of the United
States. Eisenhowers respect for the Constitution reflected that of another general turned president, George Washington: The
Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken
until after they shall have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure. Americans have suffered for
years under lawless government, with Congresses and presidents routinely acting without
constitutional authorization whenever they desired. That should come to an end. After all, when
he first ran for president, Barack Obama declared: No more ignoring the law when its
inconvenient. Republicans, who talk the most about restoring the Constitution, have an equal responsibility to reestablish the
rule of law. Hopefully there will be no cause for war with Iran. But if the president believes war is necessary, he or
she has a constitutional obligation to go to Congress. It is time to end the era of executive war-
making.

Congress checking Obamas war-making authority in Iran is essential to check a
presidential monopoly of power
Kalb and OHanlon 2013
Marvin Kalb, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Marvin Kalb focuses on the impact of media on public
policy and politics. He is also an expert in national security, with a focus on U.S. relations with Russia, Europe and
the Middle East. His most recent book is The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed,
available May 10, 2013 from Brookings Institution Press, Director of Research, Foreign Policy, Senior Fellow,
Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Michael OHanlon specializes in national security
and defense policy and is senior author of the Iraq and Afghanistan Index, projects. Before joining Brookings,
O'Hanlon worked as a national security analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. His current research agenda
includes military strategy and technology, Northeast Asia, U.S. Central Command, and defense budgets, among
other defense/security issues, an opportunity for Congress on the Road to War with Iran, States News Service,
WASHINGTON, DC, and Brookings Institution
[Editor's Note: Our Brookings colleagues Marvin Kalb and Michael O'Hanlon published an oped on the role of Congress in
U.S. policy toward Tehran in Politico early last week arguing that "if by fall there is no forward movement on the
negotiating front with Tehran, Congress should take up the Iran issue. The vote would consider the question of
whether, in the event that Iran moved irrevocably toward development of a nuclear weapon, all means should be considered by the
president to prevent that outcome." The piece sparked a number of counter-arguments, including one from Matthew Duss and
Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress published in Politico on Friday, June 28, "The U.S. Should Tread Lightly On Iran,"
contending that missteps by Washington would undercut possibilities for compromise on the nuclear issue. Iran @ Saban asked
O'Hanlon and Kalb to continue the conversation on our blog, which they kindly obliged below. Watch this space for more debate on
this issue, and please weigh in with your own comments and analysis at IranAtSaban@brookings.edu - we look forward to
continuing the discussion!] The United States is on the road to war with Iran. Proof is a string of
presidential commitments to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. "All options are on
the table," President Obama has stressed, leaving little doubt that if Iran continues to enrich its uranium reserve,
moving from the peaceful uses of nuclear power to its military uses, then a U.S. strike against Iran, with or without Israel, becomes a
distinct possibility. If there were any evidence that Iran is listening to these presidential warnings, and adjusting its nuclear program
accordingly, the option of an American military attack on Iran would almost certainly be shelved. Probably no US official would be
more relieved than Obama, who wants desperately to sheave his Mideast sword and return to nation-building in America. But there
is no such evidence, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Ah, but maybe there is, wonder such public policy analysts
as Matthew Duss and Lawrence Korb of the Center for American Progress. With the recent surprise election of Hassan
Rouhani, regarded as a moderate among the Iranian leadership, there may now be "renewed
possibility of a diplomatic solution" to the nuclear impasse, and the US should be as careful as possible to do
no harm. And what would do such harm? A "congressional debate over the use of force against Iran," write
Duss and Korb in a Politico op-ed. They claim there is "a lot the US can do" to help those in Iran seeking a
compromise with the United States. "A lot?" Really? Are they suggesting that Obama has ignored
obvious ways of avoiding war with Iran, that Obama prefers the military option? Unfortunately,
none of us has special access to the supreme leader of Irans secret files, or to sources close to him. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may be
the cleverest diplomat in an Iranian bazaar ever to engage in a nuclear negotiation, ready to conclude an acceptable agreement, if
only Obama would advance a face-saving compromise. Maybe, but there is no evidence after years of trying and negotiating of the
Ayatollahs yearning for a deal. If Obama had never made his original commitment to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons,
we would not be facing this growing crisis. But he did, and we do, and what now? Perhaps there is lesson in our recent history. In the
winter of 1966, as the US was slipping deeper into a colonial war in Southeast Asia, Senator J. William Fulbright, Chair of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, took an important step. He opened a series of public (and private) hearings on Vietnam. He invited
government officials, scholars and journalists. "Under our system," Fulbright explained, "Congress, and especially the
Senate, share responsibility with the president for making our national foreign policy." The Arkansas
Democrat was concerned that President Johnson, another Democrat, was leading the country into a poorly understood calamity,
and it was Congresss "responsibility" to do somethingin this case, to hold televised hearings that would educate the people to the
deadly realities of a guerrilla war in Southeast Asia. Then, he had to rely basically on the three major networks to carry his hearings,
if not 'live' then on their evening newscasts; and they did, more or less. The impact was tremendous. In one month, popular support
for the war fell from 63% to 49%. The war, of course, did continue, unfortunately. National life was severely disrupted, and more
than 58,000 Americans died. This lesson from history mirrors two current realities: more than ever,
Congress has effectively abdicated its responsibility to help manage the nations foreign policy,
vesting extraordinary powers in the presidency to start, run and stop wars; and the danger of a
war with Iran looms on the not too distant horizon. Those are the facts facing any analyst.
Minimally, we believe, Congress ought to get back into the business of representing the public on
matters of war and peace, and launch a serious conversation with the nation about US relations
with Iran, starting with the post World War II history of the two countries and then running up to todays nuclear crisis between
them. At this time, Congress can rely on more than the three TV networks to carry important hearings; it can also rely on a hugely
expanded technological universe, including the wondrous magic of the Internet, cable television and satellite radio. The result would
be a vastly more educated public and more. If, after these hearings, which could last several months, the Obama
administration faced the unmistakable prospect of conflict with Iran, Congress would then be in
a much better position to debate a resolution authorizing the president to take appropriate
action, including military action, to meet the challenge and to debate it far more intelligently than if there had been no
Congressionally-sponsored national seminar on U.S.-Iranian relations. According to this political and diplomatic
scenario, there would be no need for a declaration of war, which Congress has not authorized in
any case since December 1941, even though there have been many wars involving US troops. As Fulbright said, Congress must
share in the responsibility for running American foreign policy. It was never intended to be a
presidential monopoly.

Separation of Powers is essential to Hegemony Democratic institutions
produce credibility better
Ikenberry 2001
John G. Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in
the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also Co-
Director of Princetons Center for International Security Studies. Ikenberry is also a Global Eminence Scholar at
Kyung Hee University in Seoul, Korea. In 2013-2014 Ikenberry will be the 72nd Eastman Visiting Professor at Balliol
College, Oxford. The National Interest, Getting Hegemon Right, www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/readings-
sm/Ikenberry_Hegemony.pdf
First, America's mature political institutions organized around the rule of law have made it a
relatively predictable and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized way in which
U.S. foreign and security policy is made reduces surprises and allows other states to build
longterm, mutually beneficial relations. The governmental separation of powers creates a
shared decision-making system that opens up the process and reduces the ability of any one
leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward other states. An active press and competitive party
system also provide a service to outside states by generating information about U.S. policy and determining its seriousness of
purpose. The messiness of a democracy can, indeed, frustrate American diplomats and confuse foreign observers. But over the
long term, democratic institutions produce more consistent and credible policies policies that
do not reflect the capricious and idiosyncratic whims of an autocrat. Think of the United States as a giant
corporation that seeks foreign investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it operates according to
accepted accounting and fiduciary principles. The rule of law and the institutions of policymaking in a
democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability. Sharp
shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an array
of investigatory and decision-making bodies. Because it is a constitutional, rule based democracy, outside states are
more willing to work with the United States or, to return to the corporate metaphor, to invest in ongoing partnerships. This open
and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about
American power. It creates what might be called "voice opportunities"-that is, opportunities for political
access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington's
power is exercised. In 1990 the political analyst Pat Choate wrote a bestseller entitled Agents of Influence, detailing the
supposedly scandalous ways in which Japanese ministries and corporations were manipulating the American political process. High-
priced lobbyists were advancing Tokyo's commercial interests within the hallowed halls of the American capital and undermining the
pursuit of the U.S. national interest. Today Washington is even more inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving door lobbyists
working to ensure that the interests of America's partners are not overlooked. Looked at from the perspective of the stable
functioning of America's hegemonic order, Choate was actually describing one of the brilliant aspects of
the United States as a global power. By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, they
are drawn into active, ongoing partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the
United States.

American hegemony is necessary to prevent a multitude of conflicts in every
region of the world a multipolar world would not solve global problems, but
would only increase the likelihood of war.
Kagan, 2007
(Robert, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the
German Marshall Fund, End of Dreams, Return of History, 6-19,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html)
The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a
second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever
went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American
predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global
predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently
the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have
done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars
of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of
these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could
simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the
United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance,
the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete
with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the
guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such
as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the
waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for
naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans
as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt
trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples
but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes
its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to
reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the
guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any
dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be
possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality
among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical
fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power.
They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international
order that they like would remain in place. But that 's not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and
institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the
world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar
world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce
its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in
shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is
doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of
course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world 's great powers. Even under
the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and
draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European
allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains
possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers,
including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are
more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional
dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American
power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China 's neighbors. But even
China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that
an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In
Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene -- even if it remained the world's most powerful
nation -- could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful
approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the
disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the
need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without
Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe -- if it adopted what some call a strategy of
"offshore balancing" -- this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and
its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is
also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and
the assumption of a more passive, "offshore" role would lead to greater stability there. The
vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe
and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best
while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more "even-handed" policy toward Israel,
which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come
to Israel 's aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American
commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American
military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power
from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East,
competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two
centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn 't change this. It only adds a new and
more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American
predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states
within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a
diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China
and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of
the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would
voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn
't changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to "normal" or to a new kind of stability in the region.
It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American
regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of
burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among
nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should
imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global
involvement will provide an easier path.
Solvency

Plan: The United States federal government should increase statutory
restrictions on the war powers authority of the President in the area of
introducing Armed Forces into hostilities with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The plan nullifies the authority to attack Iran, established broadly by statutes in
2001 and 2002.
Ritter 2007
Scott Ritter, a former Marine intelligence officer, served as a chief weapons inspector for the United Nations in Iraq
from 1991 to 1998, 27 December 2007. Stop The Iran War Before It Starts, http://www.countercurrents.org/iran-
ritter270107.htm
If hearings show no case for war with Iran, then Congress must act to insure that the United
S tates cannot move toward conflict with that nation on the strength of executive dictate
alone. As things currently stand, the Bush Administration, emboldened with a vision of the unitary executive unprecedented in our nation's history, believes it has all of the
legal authority it requires when it comes to engaging Iran militarily. The silence of Congress following the President's decision to dispatch a second carrier battle group to the
Persian Gulf has been deafening. The fact that a third carrier battle group (the USS Ronald Reagan) will probably join these two in the near future has also gone unnoticed by
most, if not all, in Congress. The President and his advisers believe that they are acting in accordance with
the authorities given to the executive by the US Constitution, and by legislative authority as
well, as provided for in both the A uthorization for Use of Military F orce resolution of
September 14, 2001 (after the attacks of September 11, where Congress not only authorized
the President to use military force against the perpetrators of the terror attacks but also
against those nations deemed to be harboring people or organizations involved in the
attacks), and the A uthorization of Military F orce A gainst Iraq resolution of October 2002
(where Congress concurred that any presidential action would be "consistent with the United
States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international
terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations or persons who
planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001"). The National Security Strategy of the United States, most recently promulgated in March 2006, lists Iran as
the number-one threat to the United States, not only in terms of its yet-to-be-proven nuclear
weapons program but also from its status, as declared by the Bush White House, as the world's leading state
sponsor of terror. The Bush Administration has repeatedly linked Iran with the perpetrators of the 9/11
terror attacks and has accused Iran of harboring people and organizations involved in that
attack. If left unchallenged by Congress, the Bush Administration firmly believes it has all of
the authority required to initiate military action against Iran without Congressional approval.
This is not an idle statement on my part. One needs only to read the words of President Bush during his recent State of the Union address: Osama bin Laden declared: "Death is
better than living on this earth with the unbelievers among us." These men are not given to idle words, and they are just one camp in the Islamist radical movement. In recent
times, it has also become clear that we face an escalating danger from Shia extremists who are just as hostile to America, and are also determined to dominate the Middle East.
Many are known to take direction from the regime in Iran, which is funding and arming terrorists like Hezbollah, a group second only to Al Qaeda in the American lives it has
taken. The Shia and Sunni extremists are different faces of the same totalitarian threat. But whatever slogans they chant, when they slaughter the innocent, they have the same
wicked purposes: They want to kill Americans, kill democracy in the Middle East and gain the weapons to kill on an even more horrific scale. In the sixth year since our nation
was attacked, I wish I could report to you that the dangers have ended. They have not. And so it remains the policy of this government to use every lawful and proper tool of
intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement and military action to do our duty, to find these enemies and to protect the American people. [Author's emphasis] What is unrealized
in this passage is the loud applause given by members of Congress to the President's words. Democrats in Congress have the opportunity
to nip this looming disaster in the bud. The fact that most of the Democratic members of Congress who enjoy tenure voted in
favor of the resolutions giving the President such sweeping authority is moot. Democrats are all capable of pleading
that they were acting under the influence of a Republican-controlled body and unable to adequately ascertain through effective oversight the genuine state of affairs. This is no
longer the case. The Democrats in Congress are in firm control of their own destiny, and with it the destiny of America. A war with Iran will pale in comparison with the current
conflict in Iraq. And if there is a war with Iran, this Congress will be held fully accountable. Democrats should seek immediate legislative
injunctions to nullify the War Powers' authority granted to the President in September 2001
and October 2002 when it comes to Iran. Congress should pass a joint resolution requiring the
President to fully consult with Congress about any national security threat that may be posed
to the United States from Iran and demand that no military action be initiated by the United
States against Iran without a full, constitutionally mandated declaration of war. Those who embrace the
notion of a unitary executive will scoff at the concept of a Congressional declaration of war. They hold that the power to make war is not an enumerated power per se. While
statutory authorization (i.e., a formal declaration of war) is enumerated in the Constitution, the reality (as reflected by the current War Powers Act) is that the powers of
bringing America to a state of war are not so much separated as they are linked and sequenced, with Congress exercising its control over budgetary appropriations and the
President through command.

Removing the presidents threat of force strengthens the diplomatic track
toward Iran The threat of force only damages diplomacy.
Luers et al, 2013
Director of the Iran Project; Iris Beiri, the Iran Project Coordinator and Priscilla Lewis, editor for the Iran Project,
Thomas R. Pickering, Jim Walsh of MIR and Stephen Hentz of Rockefeller Brother Fund, The Iran Project is a Non-
Government Organization that seeks to Improve Official Contracts between the United States Iranian
Governments, Founding in 2002 b the United Nations Association of the USA, The Iran Project, strategic Options for
Iran: balancing Pressure with Diplomacy, pg 41-42,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/136389836/Strategic-Options-for-Iran-Balancing-Pressure-with-Diplomacy#fullscreen
IV. Strengthening The Diplomatic Track : Practical Considerations and Strategic Options Virtually
every American administration since 1979 has tries to find a way to work with Iran, only to be faced with the same core questions.
Whether, when, and how to start talks with Irans inaccessibleand often resistantleaders? Once talks have begun what, if
anything, to offer Iran in order to get what the United States wants, including on nuclear issues? How to bridge the growing cultural
and psychological divide and the deep-seated distrust that makes even indirect negotiations so unconformable, it not disagreeable,
for both parties? As summarized in Part VI of this paper (the Primer on Prior Initiatives to Improve U.S.-Iran Relations), the long
frustrating history of presidential efforts to reverse the downward spiral of relations with Iran
demonstrates the profound mutual distrust and misunderstanding that shape the words and
actions of both governments. Iranians with whom we have spoken tell us that similar questions
arise when Iran contemplate working with the United States. Of course, the tensions between the United
States and Iran are not just the results of bad attitudes and difficult processes. The enmity between the United States
and Iran reflects real differences, threats, conflicts, and offenses, which we have discusses in earlier sections
of this paper and in our two previous reports. These problems, if not resolved or managed more effectively,
could lead to armed conflict with Iran or even a war in the Middle East and beyond. We focus here on
strategies for working directly with Iran because our analysis suggests that the effective management of the problems between the
two countriesas well as some problems in the regionwill require such an approach. The goal would be to build a
practical relationship that could over time help the United States achieve its principal
objective without resort to force . Reaching this foal would necessarily be a gradual process,
with one step back for every two steps forward. As we have noted, strengthening the diplomatic
track of U.S. policy towards Iran does not mean abandoning the pressure track, including maintaining the option of using
military force should the Iranians move quickly to build a bomb. Nor does It mean reducing the use if surveillance and intelligence
gathering to detect any changed in the status if Irans nuclear program. But if the President decides to try to work with Iran, he will
have to take into account the political and strategic difficulty of managing those policy tracks
and their respective goals benefits, and costs. The challenge would include: Retaining the
credibility of threatened military action. Whether Iranian leadership has taken seriously President Obamas
stated willingness to take military action to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, it has
been called into question by critics. Their doubts would increase if the President decided to
negotiate directly with Iran and put serious offer on the table. Yet the more the president
threatens the use of force , the more difficult it will be for Irans defiant leadership to
consider any offer, and more the President will be under pressure to use military force.

The plan spurs future diplomacy This ensures no more proliferation
Al-Ahram 2013
Al-Ahram Weekly, Negotiating with Iran, August 22,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2171/19/Negotiating-with-Iran.aspx
The sanctions have shaken the Iranian economy, and Iran is looking for a solution out of the
deadlock that it can justify to domestic public opinion. After years of the government
exaggerating the nuclear project, cloaking it in nationalist rhetoric, public expectations have
risen to a level where Irans rulers can no longer simply shift their policy in response to foreign
pressures. Iran has also come to the conclusion that negotiations with the western powers
are useless without the United Statess approval , and it should not come as a surprise if Iran makes an effort to meet with its
American counterparts soon after the countrys elections in June. Khamenei admitted on 21 March that he was not optimistic about talks with the US, but he added
that he was not against them either. It appears that he is willing to take a chance and sit with the Americans
face to face. But he also sees himself as being too senior to personally lead the negotiations, so it is likely that Irans next president, to be elected in June, will take
the lead. Clearly, Iran does not wish to be perceived as an irrational state like North Korea, and returning to the
international community is a goal of the leadership. But more than just a lifting of the sanctions, Iran also needs to
feel welcome in the international community and to feel convinced that the latter is not
aiming for regime change. In the light of this, it may appear strange that Iran cast a negative vote on the UN treaty to control arms sales earlier this
month, with the global effort to regulate the sale of conventional weapons being opposed by Iran, Syria and North Korea. Irans opposition stunned many nations, particularly
those from the 120-member Non-Aligned Movement of which Iran is currently serving as president. The part of the treaty that likely did not suit Iran, Syria and North Korea was
that concerning arms sales to countries that face sanctions, with the UN treaty aiming not only to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons but also to increase
transparency. The Syrian government recently lost its seat in the Arab League to the rebels who have now been fighting the regime in Damascus since 2011, and the UN treaty, if
agreed, would likely have curbed weapons sales to the government. North Korea has already declared a state of emergency and has threatened to use nuclear warheads in a
stand-off with the US. Iran is in neither situation at the moment, but with tense relations with its neighbours and struggling to
solve its problems with the international community over its controversial nuclear
programme, it sees the UN treaty as limiting its scope for manoeuvre were the country to face
a confrontation. The treaty could be used to push for further sanctions on countries like Iran if a new round of resolutions passes at the UN, and it could also be
used to target Irans nuclear programme. Such matters are sure to have been in the back of the minds of Irans
rulers when they decided to vote against the UN treaty, and they help observers to
understand their resistance to uncritical cooperation with the I nternational A tomic E nergy A gency or with the
P5+1 group. Iran needs a security guarantee , and this cannot be gained unless

Failure to engage Iran in diplomacy motivates Irans nuclear policy and makes
war inevitable Current US policy is the driving force behind Iran proliferation
efforts
Parsi 2006
Trita the co-founder and current president of the National Iranian American Council, a non-profit educational
organization) May 8 2006 The United States Double vision in Iran, Open Democracy,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-iran_war/double-vision_3518.jsp
For the last five years, the George W Bush administration has often been accused of lacking an Iran policy. While all eyes were on
Iraq, Washington did little to seriously address the challenge posed by Iran. More recently, however, Washington has
overcompensated for these years of negligence by adopting not one, but two foreign policies on Iran: non-
proliferation of nuclear materials, and regime change. The problem is that these policies tend
to undermine each other in the short term and risk embroiling the United States in yet another
war in the middle east. As desirable as the goals of non-proliferation and regime change may be per se, they are
contradictory in nature and will likely leave Washington achieving neither. The regime-change policy brings with it
two elements that undermine the non-proliferation goal and tend to increase the risk of a
military conflict with Tehran rather than bringing closer Iran's peaceful democratisation. First, it compels
Washington to refuse direct negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear programme. This is against the
advice of United Nations secretary-general Kofi Annan, International Atomic Energy Agency secretary-general
Mohamed ElBaradei and European Union officials, who have all stated that a peaceful resolution is unlikely to be
achieved unless the two principal actors in this equation Iran and the US negotiate directly.
Second, financial aid to exiled Iranian dissident groups (which may or may not include the terrorist-listed Mujahedin-e Khalq)
as proposed in Condoleezza Rice's request to Congress for $85 million for democracy-promotion in Iran erodes the little trust that
is left between Iran and Washington and further undermines prospects for a peaceful conclusion to their nuclear dispute.
Washington's calculation may have been to increase the pressure on Iran from all directions, but it fails to appreciate the driving
force behind Iran's nuclear ambition. Indeed, the current impasse over Iran's nuclear programme has been intertwined with the
inequality of power between the two states. For many years, Iran has had to consider the real possibility of an American attack, and
those fears rather than Persian nationalism or Iranian pride have been a key motivating factor behind Iran's quest for a nuclear
option. According to former CIA officials who participated in the preparation of national-intelligence estimates on Iran in the 1990s
and since 2000, US intelligence experts have consistently concluded that Iran's fears of a US attack are a major contributing factor to
its pursuit of the nuclear option. The Bush administration has unfortunately not taken those intelligence estimates into
consideration. America's no-diplomacy policy has already toughened Tehran's stance . The Bush
administration's unwillingness to negotiate with the Mohammad Khatami government (1997-2005) after Iran's cooperation
with America in Afghanistan has strengthened the hand of those in Tehran who argue that no Iranian policy change will be sufficient
to satisfy Washington, and that Iran consequently has no choice but to prepare for what the Iranians see
as a likely American military assault. As Washington intensifies the pressure on Iran, and refuses to
actively participate in the nuclear negotiations and starts channelling funds to dissidents, the Iranian
perception of the threat from Washington will undoubtedly increase and prompt Tehran to cling
onto whatever deterrences against the US it possesses or can develop. This, in turn, will be seen as a casus
belli by hardliners in Washington. Clearly, this does not bode well for America's non-proliferation objective, but neither does it
advance the goal of democratisation as it increases the risk for a military showdown with Iran that undoubtedly will have profoundly
negative effects on Iran's prospects for democracy. To resolve this dilemma, granted that war is not the ultimate objective, the
duality of Washington's Iran policy must be made more refined. As ideologically unattractive as multilateral talks with Iran may
appear to the Bush White House, it must be recognised that the no-diplomacy policy has only aggravated the
situation and made the chance of attaining Washington's policy objectives less likely. During this
period, Iran has aggressively pursued nuclear technology and decreased Washington's manoeuvreability. Indeed, if Washington had
joined European Union states (Britain, France and Germany, the "EU3") in its negotiations with Iran from October 2003, Iran would
likely not be enriching uranium today. If the no-diplomacy policy is further pursued, Tehran will be
gifted more time to present Washington with a nuclear fait accompli , which will leave the US
in a much weaker position to change the dynamics of the nuclear stand-off and to promote democracy
in Iran. Opponents of multilateral talks have failed to present a compelling case for their position instead, they tend to present the
very problem sought to be resolved as an argument for not pursuing the most obvious solution. Invoking Iran's aggressive rhetoric,
its nuclear programme, theocratic nature or influence in Iraq as arguments not to join multilateral talks is self-defeating, as
America's experience with Iran over the last few years has shown. Since other policy options have proven
unsuccessful and since the stated preference is not to start a war, multilateral talks should be
pursued precisely because that is the most likely way to resolve Washington's problems with
Iran's rhetoric, its nuclear programme, its influence in Iraq and its lack of democracy. Joining multilateral talks with Iran
should neither be seen as a reward nor a concession. It is simply an appropriate policy modification put in place in order to
successfully obtain the objectives of non-proliferation and democratisation in Iran. If talks are not pursued,
Washington risks trapping itself in a situation in which military action will be its only remaining
option. That does not mean that war is inevitable, however. Diplomacy can still be given a chance.
But forsaking diplomacy is increasingly tantamount to choosing war.

Obama has outlined that it is his executive authority that decides the policy
taken in the area of Iran
Fitzpatrick 2013
Mark, Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme, Iran Will Determine Obamas Legacy,
Survival, Vol 54, No 6, December/January
Obamas nuclear policy agenda (indeed, the brunt of his foreign-policy agenda and his legacy) will hinge on how
the Iran nuclear challenge is handled. Through application of executive authority and freed
from reelection concerns, he should be able to make judicious reductions in Americas nuclear
force structure. A Department of Defense study soon to be released may provide justification to reduce offensively deployed
strategic nuclear weapons to 1,000 warheads, or even fewer. Delaying the Presidential Nuclear Guidance document decision until
after the election gives Obama more latitude in this regard. Pending Pentagon budget cuts will enhance the logic of such nuclear
reductions. Given the choice, military leaders prefer to save money for conventional equipment they need rather than nuclear forces
that are unusable in any but the very direst of circumstances. In the most optimistic scenario, a reduction in strategic arms by one-
third below the 1,550-warhead limit imposed by New START just might give Russia the rationale to cut back unilaterally on its own
nuclear forces. Budget pressures affect the Russian military too. Reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons would in turn give
NATO an excuse to bid farewell to the 200 or so US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Of the five nations that host these
weapons, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (and probably Italy as well), are keen to see them leave, not least to avoid the bill
for replacing the soon-to-be obsolete aircraft designated to carry the bombs. Only Turkey, living in a more dangerous
neighbourhood, wants to keep American nukes on its soil. Cutting deployed strategic weapons by a third, removing most US tactical
nuclear weapons from Europe and probably also cutting back the large number of nuclear weapons in non-deployed back-up
status, would be a powerful set of arguments for countries such as Brazil that today doubt Americas disarmament sincerity. Brazil
and Argentina would have little reason to continue to reject the Additional Protocol. More nations might even feel comfortable
enough to ratify the CTBT regardless of the deadlock it continues to face in the US Congress. Obamas Prague vision will have netted
some significant successes. The Middle East, however, will continue to present a nuclear conundrum.
Neither Iranian nor Israeli nuclear strategies will be affected by any American arms reductions.
Unless Iran accepts significant limits, at some point in Obamas next four years its enriched-
uranium stockpile and enrichment capability will grow too large for Israeli and American
comfort. Even if Iran does not purposely cross Obamas red line of weapons acquisition, the
size of a growing enriched-uranium stockpile and the ability to further enrich it to weapons
grade at short notice will at some point render invisible the line between capability and
production. The military option that Obama has kept in reserve will then come into play . Iran
will determine his foreign policy legacy.

Dialogue allows for cooperation on a wide range of issues and denuclearization
Brzezinski 2008
Mark an international lawyer in Washington, served on the National Security Council staff in the Clinton
administration, and Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, January 11 2008 Forging ties
with Iran The Boston Globe, http://www.cfr.org/iran/forging-ties-iran/p15247?breadcrumb=/region/404/iran
The recent tension in the Persian Gulf between Iranian vessels and the US Navy, coming on the heels of the
disclosures of the National Intelligence Estimate, highlights the failure of the Bush administration to craft a coherent Iran policy. While the
intelligence estimate contradicted persistent White House claims of imminent Iranian nuclear danger and undermined the case for war, the aggressive behavior of the
Revolutionary Guard underscores the continued challenge of Iran. Both developments reinforce caution and firmness as the right way to proceed. The intelligence estimate
undercuts the Bush administrations attempt to craft (let alone broaden) an international coalition to impose sanctions against Tehran. There is widespread feeling overseas that
the consequences of the judgment that Tehran has suspended its nuclear weapons program should be positive, not punitive. To be sure, the Islamic
Republic still has nuclear ambitions, and its expanded uranium enrichment capacity is certainly worrisome. Nonetheless, dialogue
and diplomacy are still the best means of mitigating the Iranian challenge. And despite President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejads odious rhetoric and the reckless behavior of Iranian speedboats, there is reason to believe that
Tehran may be open to such an approach. While some have depicted Iran as a rash, militant state imbued with messianic fervor, the clerical
state today is an unexceptional opportunistic power seeking to exert preponderance in its immediate neighborhood. Gone are the heady revolutionary days when Iran viewed
projection of influence as necessitating the subversion of the incumbent Arab regimes. In the past year, Irans representatives, particularly the peripatetic Ali Larijani, have made
overtures to both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, calling for collective mediation of the regions conflicts. From Iraqs raging sectarian strife to Lebanons internal convulsions, Iran may
well recognize that the best means of stabilizing the Middle East and safeguarding its own interests is through better relations with its longstanding rivals. The question then
becomes can Irans pragmatic streak be harnessed to accommodate a new relationship with the United States. Any diplomatic approach to Iran will find a confident theocracy
seemingly determined to achieve advanced nuclear capability. Russias recent delivery of uranium shows Irans ability to interact with outside powers to achieve this objective.
To compound the difficulty, Irans foremost leader, Ali Khamenei, has his own long-held suspicions of the United States, continuously decrying America as a source of cultural
contamination and imperial encroachment. Yet, Khamenei has conceded the importance of national interests and recently stated: We never said that these relations will be
suspended indefinitely. . . . Certainly I would be the first to approve of resuming ties with the US the day it is to the benefit of the nation. The challenge for US
diplomacy therefore is to alter Irans calculus, diminishing its inordinate sense of paranoia while
building on its desire for regional stability. The starting point of any cautious and firm approach
(as opposed to precipitous reaction) is an appreciation that after the intelligence estimate , there is little domestic or
international consensus for the use of force. Moreover, given the dramatic changes that the Middle East has undergone in the last few
years, and the removal of the traditional Iraqi barrier to projection of Irans influence, it is hard to see how Tehran can be isolated. At a time when Iranian officials are welcomed
in Arab capitals, and as trade between Iran and its neighbors soars, a regional accord on isolating Iran simply does not exist. Bushs statements after the intelligence estimates
release emphasized that nothing has changed, that Iran remains a threat. He intends to use his first extended tour of the Middle East to rally support for international pressure
against Iran. But the new intelligence estimate requires a revision of tactics toward Iran. That Iran ceased work on its
nuclear program several years ago is positive, as it provides an opportunity to start negotiations with Tehran without any
preconditions. Moreover, it allows both parties to come to the negotiating table with a constructive tone. If
either or both parties come to the table making veiled threats or hurling insults, or even
dismissing each others security concerns, the negotiations naturally will be derailed from the
outset. Now that a nuclear threat is not imminent, the US long-range goal for negotiations with Iran ought to be to create a context in which Iran sees it as in its own self-
interest to become more closely associated with the West and the international order. The US approach should reflect the mixed nature of shared as well as conflicting interests
with Iran. The stabilization of Iraq, Persian Gulf security, nuclear counterproliferation, among others, should be cast as shared interests. The possibility of growing interaction
economically should also be welcomed. At the same time, the United States should be clear that support of terrorism in the region directly threatens the security interests of
Iran. There should not be exaggerated expectations placed on such an approachit will not
produce an immediate panacea. But at a minimum, the pursuit of a calm, strategic policy toward
Iran may ensure that a future, more sober, post-Ahmadinejad leadership recognizes that an Iran linked more closely to the West and the international
community will be more prosperous and secure.

The plan would work best prevents proliferation and encourages peaceful
integration into the multilateral system

Dobbins 2012, James, former Assistant Secretary of State and now directs the International
Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Corporation, Coping with a Nuclearising Iran,
Survival, Vol 53, No 6

By contrast, a policy of pure containment would employ defensive alliances, sanctions and
non-communication to isolate and penalise Iran. Such an approach can achieve the
objective of restraining Irans external behaviour, but it works against the goal of
reforming its domestic politics and increases popular as well as regime support for the
acquisition of nuclear weapons . Pre-emption goes beyond mere containment to include an
offensive threat or the use of military force to forestall some unwanted development, in
Irans case the acquisition of a nuclear-weapons capability. Such an approach could slow
Irans nuclear programme, but it would strengthen both external sympathy and internal
support for the regime, as well as probably accelerating its efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons. Containing Irans regional influence would therefore become more difficult in the aftermath of a military strike.
Deterrence, by contrast, would employ the threat of retaliation to dissuade Iran from
employing nuclear weapons to influence, coerce or damage others. Such a policy is a necessary
companion to containment should Iran cross the nuclear threshold. If deterrence is not accompanied by a
greater level of engagement, however, the risk of uncontrolled escalation is high.
it sits down with the US, however painful that may be.