Civil Liberties Union vs.

The Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991

FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon Aquino is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other
than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. The Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices
or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional
Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. Evidently,
from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the
intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official
family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by
any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.












Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
GR 122156, 1997

Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel
Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad. MPHs bid was at
P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically
considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid
and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but
GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB.

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:
1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a
statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit
buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the
Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs
and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to
corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means
that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a
qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.
**Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the
national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty
per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe,
certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.
G.R. No. L-21064 June 30, 1970

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL and THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondents-
appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

From our decision of February 18, 1970, reversing the judgment of the lower court holding that Republic Act
No. 2616 as amended is unconstitutional, printed motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner-appellee
on March 31, 1970 reiterating its arguments as to its alleged invalidity for being violative of the due process
and equal protection guarantees. On May 27, 1970, a detailed opposition to such a motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Solicitor General, the Honorable Felix Q. Antonio, on behalf of respondents-
appellants. Then came a rejoinder of petitioner, on June 15, 1970, to the pleading of the Solicitor General.
The motion for reconsideration is thus ripe for determination. With due recognition of the vigor and
earnestness with which petitioner argued its motion, based on what it considered to be our applicable
decisions, the Court cannot grant the same. Our decision stands.

1. It was a unanimous Court that could not locate a constitutional infirmity vitiating Republic Act No.
2616 directing the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City. There are points of differences in the
three written opinions, but there is none as to the challenged legislative act being invulnerable on the
grounds therein asserted to justify its sought for nullification. While, to repeat, petitioner apparently remains
unconvinced, standing fast on the contentions to which it would seek to impart greater plausibility, still the
intent of the framers of the Constitutional Convention, as shown not only by the specific provisions allowing
the expropriation of landed estates, but also by the social justice provision as reflected in our decisions, save
possibly Republic vs. Baylosis, 1 preclude a favorable action on the impassioned plea of petitioner for a
reconsideration of our decision. At any rate, petitioner-appellee can take comfort in the separate opinion of
Justice Teehankee, with which four other members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, are in
agreement, to enable it to raise questions, the answers to which, if its view would be sustained, would
certainly afford sufficient protection to what it believes to be an unconstitutional infringement on its
property rights.

2. It may not be amiss to make more explicit and categorical what was held in our opinion that Section
4 of Republic Act No. 2616 prohibiting a suit for ejectment proceedings or the continuance of one already
commenced even in the absence of expropriation proceedings, is unconstitutional, as held in Cuatico v. Court
of Appeals. 2 Greater emphasis likewise should be laid on our holding that while an inaccuracy apparent on
the face of the challenged statute as to the ownership of the Tatalon Estate does not suffice to call for its
invalidity, still to erase even a fanciful doubt on the matter, the statement therein found in Section 1 of the
Act that in addition to petitioner-appellee, Gregorio Araneta & Co., Inc. and Florencio Deudor, et al. are
included, cannot be understood as conferring on any juridical or natural persons, clearly not entitled thereto,
dominical rights over such property in question.

3. In the aforesaid decision of Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, reference was made to the amendatory Act,
Republic Act No. 3453 to Section 4 as it originally was worded in Republic Act No. 2616, the amendment
consisting of the following: "Upon approval of this amendatory Act, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupants of any lot in said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment
proceedings already commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion thereof shall not be sold by
the owners of said estate to any person other than the present occupant without the consent of the latter
given in a public instrument." 3 The question before the, Court, according, to the opinion penned by Justice
Bautista Angelo, was: "Are the provisions embodied in the amendatory Act which prescribe that upon
approval of said Act no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against any occupant of any
lot in the Tatalon Estate, or that no ejectment proceedings already commenced shall be continued,
constitutional and valid such that it may be said that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in denying the
petitions for suspension filed by petitioners.?" 4

Then came this portion of the opinion: "This is not the first time that this Court has been called upon to pass
upon the validity of a provision which places a landowner in the situation of losing his dominical rights over
the property without due process or compensation. We refer to the provisions of Republic Act 2616 before
they were amended by Republic Act No. 3453. Note that, as originally provided, Republic Act No. 2616
prohibited the institution of an ejectment proceeding against any occupant of any lot in the Tatalon Estate or
the continuance of one that has already been commenced after the expropriation proceedings shall have
been initiated and during the pendency of the same. On the surface this provision would appear to be valid if
the same is carried out in the light of the provisions of our Constitution relative to cases of eminent domain,
for in that case the rights of the owner of the property to be expropriated are protected. But then an attempt
came to circumvent that provision in an effort to safeguard or protect the interest of some occupants of the
land, which reached this Court for adjudication, as when some occupants attempted to block their ejectment
upon the plea that the government would soon start expropriation proceedings even if no sufficient funds
were appropriated to provide compensation to the owner and even if it was not in a position to take
possession of the estate, and so the owner contested the attempt invoking its rights under the Constitution.
And this Court upheld the contention of the owner by declaring the attempt unconstitutional." 5

The conclusion that inevitably was called for is worded thus: "It is, therefore, imperative that we declare, as
we now do, that Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453 which prohibits the filing of an ejectment proceeding, or
the continuance of one that has already been commenced, even in the absence of expropriation proceedings
offends our Constitution and, hence, is unenforceable." 6

What we said then, we reaffirm now, as was indeed evident in our decision sought to be reconsidered but
perhaps not given the importance which, in the opinion of petitioner-appellee, it was entitled to. Nothing in
our decision can be taken to detract in any wise from the binding force and effect of the Cuatico ruling which
declared unconstitutional Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3453.

4. We likewise ruled that the mistake imputed to Congress in apparently recognizing the rights of
ownership in entities or individuals not possessed of the same could not invalidate the challenged statute. In
the same way, it cannot be made the basis for non-existent rights of ownership to the property in question. It
is in that sense that, as noted in our decision, no fear need be entertained that thereby the petitioner-
appellee would be adversely affected. The government certainly would not pay to a party other than the
owner the claim for just compensation which, under the Constitution, it is required to meet. Neither, then
can any party who is not in that situation have any standing whatsoever. This much is beyond dispute. To
repeat, the apprehension entertained by petitioner-appellee, perhaps indicative of it, excess of caution, is
without legal foundation.

WHEREFORE, the motion for the reconsideration of our decision of February 18, 1970, filed by petitioner-
appellee, is denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.




In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta
AM No. 98-5-01-SC | November 9, 1998
FACTS:
On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta
as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated, as it
seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety."
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on the Commissions
records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration together with the Councils
nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day immediately
before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies that the Presidents Office did not
agree with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the list of final
nominees for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present
vacancy occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after
the May elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by
the JBC shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the Justice
Secretary and the other members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted
CJ to call for a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6
letter where the President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments,
the whole article being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have
special and specific provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof."
Article 8 Sec 9
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the
President from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for
every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacanang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the
appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so
without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the appointments
for both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latters office and had
not been transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacanang copy
of his appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential election, Art8 shall apply where vacancies in SC
shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art7 must be considered where the President shall not
make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands
of the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
ISSUE:
WON the President can fill vacancies in the judiciary pursuant to Article 8 Sec 4 and 9, during the
appointment ban period stated in Article 7 Sec 15.
HELD:
Article 8 Sec 4 and 9 simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time
frames provided therein unless prohibited by Article7 Sec15. Thus, the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so. Likewise, the prohibition on appointments comes
into effect only once every six years. The Court also pointed out that Article8 Sec4 and 9 should prevail over
Article7 Sec15 as they may be considered later expressions of the people when they adopted the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, declared the appointments signed by the President on March 30,
1998 of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta VOID. They are ordered to cease and desist from discharging the
office of Judge of the Courts to which they were respectively appointed on the said date. They come within
the operation of the prohibition on appointments. While the filling of judiciary vacancies is in the public
interest, there is no compelling reason to justify such appointment within the 2 months appointment ban.
In view of Valenzuelas oath taking, the authenticity of the letter of which was not verified from the Office of
the Court Administrator, SC reiterated the standing practice and procedures in appointments to the Judiciary
that originals of all appointments are to be sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief
Justice. The Clerk of Court of the SC, in the Chief Justices behalf, will advice the appointee of their
appointments as well as the date of commencement of the pre-requisite orientation seminar to be
conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new judges.


ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.

These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under
Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits
the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination
through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It
argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to
Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to
Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains
why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial
Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the
Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political
vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there
being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy
has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process
until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly
requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the
Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement.

HELD:

Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division
of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made
explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term
does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of
the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This
conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section
15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to
be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4
(1) thereof.










BERNARDINO MARCELINO, vs. THE HON. FERNANDO CRUZ, JR., et. Al.
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983

Bernardino Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. On August 4, 1975, the prosecution finished
presenting evidence against Marcelino and rested its case. On the same date, the attorneys of both parties in
the criminal case moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda. The presiding judge,
Fernando Cruz, Jr., gave them 30 days or until September 4, 1975. Only Marcelino submitted a memoranda.

On November 28, 1975, Judge Cruz filed with the Clerk of Court a copy of his decision, his decision bears the
same date of November 28, 1975. The promulgation of the decisions was scheduled in January 1976.
Marcelino is now contending that the court can no longer promulgate judgment because by January 1976,
the 3-month period (90 day period) within which lower courts must decide on cases had already lapsed, thus,
the lower court lost its jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Cruz had resolved the case within the allotted period.

HELD: Yes. The case is deemed submitted for decision on September 4, 1975 (date of last day of filing of the
memoranda by the respective parties). From that day, the 3-month period begins to run so Judge Cruz had
until December 4, 1975 to rule on the case. Judge Cruz made a rendition of his decision on November 28,
1975. The date of rendition is the date of filing of the decision with the clerk of court. Hence, Judge Cruz was
able to rule on the case within the 3-month period because November 28, 1975 was merely the 85th day
from September 4, 1975.

The date of promulgation of a decision, in this case it was set in January 1976, could not serve as the
reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date.

Is the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory?

Section 11 (1), Art 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides that upon the effectivity of this constitution, the
maximum period within which case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission
shall be; 18 months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for the inferior courts and 3 months for lower courts.
In practice, the Supreme Court is liberal when it comes to this provision. The provision is mandatory, its
merely directive. Extensions can be granted in meritorious cases. To interpret such provision as mandatory
will only be detrimental to the justice system. Nevertheless, the SC warned lower court judges to resolve
cases within the prescribed period and not take this liberal construction as an excuse to dispose of cases at
later periods.












City of Manila v. Genaro Teotico
GR L-23052, 1968

In January 1958, at about 8pm, Genaro Teotico was about to board a jeepney in P. Burgos, Manila when he
fell into an uncovered manhole. This caused injuries upon him. Thereafter he sued for damages under Article
2189 of the Civil Code the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city health officer, the city
treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of
Manila should pay damages to Teotico. The City of Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that
the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city
officers in enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil Code which is
a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable in the case at bar.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law; that the charter of
Manila is a special law and that the Civil Code is a general law. However, looking at the particular provisions
of each law concerned, the provision of the Manila Charter exempting it from liability caused by the
negligence of its officers is a general law in the sense that it exempts the city from negligence of its officers in
general. There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of
the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and
municipalities liable for the damages caused to a certain person by reason of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for the first time in the Citys
motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even
though it is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national,
provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the Citys control and supervision, it shall be responsible
for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the City admitted they have
control and supervision over the road where Teotico fell when the City alleged that it has been doing
constant and regular inspection of the citys roads, P. Burgos included.




















Bagatsing vs. Ramirez
GR L-41631, 17 December 1976

Facts:
In 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 7522, regulating the operation of public markets
and prescribing fees for the rentals of stalls and providing penalties for violation thereof.

The Federation of Manila Market Vendors Inc. assailed the validity of the ordinance, alleging among others
the non-compliance to the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. The
respondent alleged that only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code

Issue:

Whether the publication requirement was complied with.

The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance
enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires
publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231),
which only demands publication after approval.

Held:
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas
the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Section 17 of the
Charter speaks of ordinance in general. Whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances
levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. While the Charter requires publication, before
the enactment of the ordinance and after approval thereof, in two daily newspapers of the general
circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication widely circulated within the
jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in
two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Being a general law
with a special provision applicable in the case, the Local Tax Code prevails.

Decision:
The decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila,
dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No costs.