1. RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.

SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the confirmation of the nomination of
Atty. Christian Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC to be null and void. The petitioner, Renato
Cayetano questioned the aforementioned appointment of Atty. Monsod on the ground that the latter
fail to fulfill the qualifications of being a COMELEC Chairman specifically the qualification on the ten year
practice of law.
Section 1 (1), Article IX- C of the 1987 Constitution provided that there shall be a Commission on
Election composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be a natural born citizens of the
Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least thirty fives years old, holders of a college
degree and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However the majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in practice of law for at least ten years.
The petitioner contends that practice of law refers primarily to litigation. Respondent Monsod was not
engage in litigation for at least ten years but rather he is a lawyer- economist, a lawyer- manager, a
lawyer entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer- negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer- legislator of both the
rich and the poor. Therefore he is not qualified to be a Chairman.
The issue is whether or not Atty Monsod had reached the 10 year practice of law as one of the
qualifications to be a Chairman in the Commission on Election.
The court ruled against the petitioner. The court ruled that the profession practiced by Atty
Monsod is more than enough proof that he had complied to the qualifications provided by law and
satisfied the ten years practice of law. In line with this, the court used a liberal statutory construction in
the provision stated in Sec1 (1), Art IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. The provision must not be taken
literally but must look at the spirit of the law or the reason why such provision exist.
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Moreover, the court proceeded that they could not reject a nomination confirmed by the Commission
on Appointment when the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on
Monsods appointment implicitly determined that Monsod possessed the necessary qualifications as
required by law unless the Commission on Appointment acted in grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, the petition was dismissed.



2. PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, petitioner VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, Director of
the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

A case was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio
Agrava in his capacity as Director of the Philippine Patent Office. The respondent issued a
circular announcing the schedule of examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys in the Philippine Patent Office. The petitioner then
contended that a person who passed the bar examinations and is l icensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law and who is in good standing is duly qualified to work in the Patent Office
without the need to take the required examination. They further contended that the
respondent acted in excess of his jurisdiction and in violation of the law in requiring the
members of the Philippine Bar with good standing to take and pass the said examination.
As a reply to the petitioners contention, the respondent argued that the exam is
necessary because the work in the Patent Office does not only involve in practice of law but
also includes scientific and technical knowledge. His conduction of the examination is in scope
of his jurisdiction under Sec. 28 of the Patent Law (RA 165). He further contended that since
our law is patterned to the United States and the US also conducted such examination to
admit person in the Patent Office thus he is not violating the law. He also emphasized that he
had conducted an exam for a long time and this is the first time that his act of conducting the
examination has been questioned.
The issue is whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent applications,etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.
The Supreme Court ruled that practice of law does not only involve litigation but also
embrace all matters that will be helpful in the determination of legal effects of facts and
conditions. In addition the court also stressed that any party can appeal in the Supreme Court
the decision or action of the director. Unlike in the United States that there Patent Law
expressly provides that the Patent Office must conduct and examination, the Philippine
Patent Law does not have and express or clear provision regarding the conduction of
examination thus there would be no reason to require lawyers, engineers, scientists etc., to
take such examination.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court hold that under the present law, members of the bar
are authorized and in good standing may practice their professi on before the Patent Office
since much of its work is on interpretation and determination of the scope of application of
Patent Law and other laws applicable.
The Supreme Court hereby prohibited the Director of the Patent Office to require
members of the Philippine Bar to take and pass the examination before appearing in the
Patent Office. No costs.

3. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-
appellant.

This is an appeal by the defendant- appellant to the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna
ruling that City Attorney Fiscal Fule, herein plaintiff- appellee represented by the People of the
Philippines, can act as private prosecutor under Sec 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court . The said Rules of
Court provides that in the court of a Justice of the Peace a party may conduct his litigation in person
with the aid of an agent or a friend appointed by him by that purpose or with the aid of an attorney. The
CFI of Laguna ruled that Fiscal Fule appeared as an agent of the offended party.
City Attorney Fule appeared as a private prosecutor to the complainant in crime of Malicious
Misdemeanor filed against the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, Simplicio Villanueva, herein
appellant. City Attorney Fule having entered as private prosecutor after securing the permission of City
of Justice with the condition that every time he would appear in trial he would be considered to be in
leave of absence in his public office and will not receive payment for his services. His appearance then as
private prosecutor was questioned by the accused Villanueva, herein respondent in this present case.
They filed a Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor invoking Sec 32, Rule 27
now Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which bars but the decision was ruled against the
party of Villanueva. Hence they appeal.
The issue is whether or not City Attorney Fule could engage in private practice of law.
The Supreme Court held that the appeal is dismissed for patently being without merits. The
Supreme Court argued that the defense of the appellant is a fallacy because of their confused
interpretation of Sec 32, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, now Sec 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The aforementioned Rules of Court provides that no judge or other court official or other
employee of the superior courts or of the office of Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in private practice of law since a lawyer who is engage in
private practice must be active and is continually practicing the legal profession and that his services are
available to the public for compensation as his/her source of livelihood. The appearance of City Attorney
Fule was an isolated appearance and do not constitute private practice of his legal profession.





4. JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff- appellee vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant- appellant and ROMULO CUI, intervenor-
appeallant.
The instant case is an appeal by the defendant- appellant and intervenor appellant to the
decision of the Court a quo ruling that the plaintiff- appellee has the right to be the administrator since
he holds the titulo de abogado. The office contended is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San
Jose de Barili. The plaintiff- appellee and defendant- appellant were brothers while the intervenor-
appellant was their cousin.
The Hospicio was a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa
Benigna Cui which are already deceased. The spouses executed a deed of donation that in case of
incapacity or death that the institution will be manage by persons as they may nominate or designate in
the order prescribed to them (Sec 2 of the deed of donation).
Don Pedro Cui died and the administration was left to his wife. When Doa Benigna Cui died the
administration of the Hospicio was left to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr.
Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. A year after Dr. Cui became the
administrator; a series of controversies and court litigations arises concerning the office of the
Administrator to which the present case is part of.
The issue between the brothers Antonio and Jesus Cui rested upon their respective qualification
to the position of administrator. Jesus Cui was older than Antonio thus he must be preferred based on
Sec 2 of the deed of donation however Sec 2 has additional provisions which stated that the
administrator "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion." The specific point in dispute is the
titulode abogado Jesus Ma.Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo
Tomas (Class1926) but is not a member of the Bar. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of
the Bar and although he is disbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10
February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de
Barili.
The issue is whether or not the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office
of administrator.
The court ruled that Antonio Cui is the rightful Administrator of the Hospicio de Barili since he
had the titulo de abogado which means he passed the bar exam and became a member of the
Philippine Bar unlike his older brother Jose Cui who only graduated in the course of Bachelor of Law and
did not pass the bar exam. Although Antonio Cui is disbarred by this Court, he was reinstated by
resolution promulgated on 10 February1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of
administrator of the Hospicio de Barili. Moreover, the Supreme Court also held that the filing of the
plaintiff- appellee claim to the office of the Administrator had already expired. The one- year limitation
must be the time when such right to office arose and not from the date the incumbent began to
discharge his office.
On the claim of Romulo Cui, he is not entitled to be the administrator since the order in the
deed of donation must be followed. The last administrator came from the line of Mauricio Cui thus the
next administrator will come from the line of Mauricio Cui and not from Vicente Cui unless the
descendants of Mauricio Cui fail to qualify as Administrator of the Hospicio. The costs will be equally
divided against the plaintiff- appellee and the intervenor-appellant.


5. IN THE MATTER OF PREOCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN

Before the Court was the "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed by Atty.
Almacen protest against what he therein asserts as "a great injustice committed against his client by this
Supreme Court." Atty. Almacen was lost in a case where he was the counsel. He filed a series of motion
for reconsideration which the court denied. With that incident, Atty Almacen indicted and ridiculed the
court using abrasive language. He called the court as a hypocrite and tolerates injustice against his
client.
The issue is whether or not Atty. Almacen must surrender his Lawyers Certificate of Title.
The Supreme Court ruled that they have the jurisdiction to suspend or disbar members of the
bar. In the present case, the court ruled the suspension of Atty. Almacen in the practice of law until
further orders. The suspension was based on the misconduct done by Atty. Almacen towards the court
that could have had influence the people to see the court as an arena where injustice is tolerated.
Moreover, the lost of Atty. Alamcen was his own negligence and he instead of blaming himself; he
blames the court for his actions.















6. IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN

This is a case against Atty. De Guzman for his unworthy act committed against the respondent
of an ejectment case in which he is the counsel of the petitioner. The respondent of the ejectment case
Lagrimas Lapatha filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders and other Proceedings in the Inferior
Court with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on the ground that Atty. de Guzman deceived him in signing
a Confess Judgment which she thought to be an agreement to postpone the trial. The court ruled in
favor of Lagrimas and the said court required the answer of Atty. de Guzman to the alleged deceit he did
to the respondent. The case then was referred to the Solicitor General for investigate report and
recommendation.
The issue is whether or not Atty; de Guzman deceived Lagrimas in signing the Confess
Judgment.
The court agreed to the findings of the Solicitor General that Atty. de Guzman did not deceive
Lapatha in signing the Confess Judgment based on the fact that the affixed signature was done in front
of the Clerk of Court. Moreover, her initial payment of P350.00 was not for the purpose of securing a
postponement but a payment to the rentals he failed to rent. Lapathat filed her Petition for Relief to
gain more stay in the premises where she committed to vacate.
Thus, the case is dismissed and Atty. de Guzman is exonerated from the charge against him.













7. In the Matter of the Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo A. Diao, respondent vs. Severino
G. Martinez, petitioner

The case is a petition filed by Severino Martinez, petitioner against Telesforo Diaom
respondent, praying for the disbarment of the latter. The petitioner argued that Diao did not complete
his high school training and that Daio never attended Quisumbing College and he did not obtained his
A.A diploma therefrom. As an answer to the complaint Diao admits that he had not complte his high
school but hje claims that he entered the service of the US Army, passed the General Qualification Test
and such service is equivalent to a high school diploma. On the second charge, Diao argued that he was
erroneously certified as a graduate of Quisumbing College.
The issue is whether Telesforo A Diao should be disbarred.
The Supreme Court ruled against Diao. On the first charge where he did not complete his high
school degree, Diao failed to exhibit any certification that his service in the US Army is equivalent to a
high school diploma. On the second charge, the court did not accept the explanatio0n of Diao because
such error or confusion is his own making since if he discloses that he obtained his A.A in Arellano
University and not in Quisumbing University, he would also disclose that the time he took his A.A it is six
mo0nths before he obtained his Assocaite of Arts degree. With that, Diao would not be permitted to
take the bar exam because the Rules of Court provides that the applicant for the Bar examination should
affirm under oath that previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily the required
pre- legal education as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.
Since Diao was not qualified to be a lawyer, the clerk of court was ordered to strike from the roll
of attorneys the name Telesforo Dao and the latter must return his lawyers diploma.










8. Atty. Ismael G. Khan Jr., Assistant Court Administrator, complainant vs. Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, respondent.

The complaint arose from the fact that Atty. Simbillo advertise in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
that he is an Annulment Marriage Specialist. Atty. Khan as an Assistant Court Administrator argued
that the advertisement of Atty. Simbillo violated the Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Sec 27 of the Rules of Court. As an answer, Atty Simbillo admitted the
advertisement but he contended that advertising and solicitation are not prohibited acts and added that
the time has come to change the prohibition on advertising and solicitation so that as lawyers they could
serve the public absolutely.
The issue is whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.
The Court ruled that Atty. Rizalino Simbillo was found to have violated Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibilty, and Rule 138, section 27 of the Rules of Court, and therefore,
suspended from the practice of Law for one year. repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely. Respondent advertised himself as an Annulment Specialist, and by this he
undermined the stability and sanctity of marriage. He encourages people who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so. Solicitation of
legal business is not altogether proscribed, however, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible
with the dignity of the legal profession. Moreover, legal profession is different from business since the
former is a public service- lawyers do not engage in practice of law primarily to earn money.











9. ELMER CANOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ, respondent

This is a case filed by the complainant, Elmer Canoy against the respondent Atty. Ortiz for
violating the rules under Canon 17, 18, 22 and Rule 18.03, 18.04 and 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility governs the conduct of lawyers towards their client. Canoy contended that Atty. Ortiz, as
his lawyer to the case against the Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, did not communicate to him about the
status of his case. The lawyer did not tell him that the case was dismissed because the former failed to
submit a position paper. On the other hand, Atty. Ortiz argued that he was able to make the position
paper but before he could submit it, the Labor arbiter ordered the dismissal of the case. He admits that
he files the position paper late because he was busy after his election as Councilor of Bacolod City. He
further contends that the complainant could have just visited his office and asked the status of his case.
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines where the complainant withdrew in the
case but the former continue in hearing the case in view of the rule that the investigation of the case
shall not be interrupted or terminated by mere withdrawal of the complainant.
The issue is whether or not Atty Ortiz is guilty of misconduct and malpractice under Canon 17,
18, 22 and Rule 18.03, 18.04 and 22.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Supreme Court ordered the 1 month suspension of Atty. Ortiz with a warning that repetition
of the same offense will be dealt more severely. The failure of Atty. Ortiz to file the position paper and
failure to notify the client that the case was dismissed violated Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which the latter states that as a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and such negligence shall render him liable and the former states that he owes fidelity
to his client. Moreover, it is the duty of Atty Ortiz to let his client knew the status of the case and his
being busy as Councilor does not excuse him from his negligent acts because the rule allows lawyer who
was elected from office to withdraw from his private practice.
Assuming that Atty. Ortiz was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do
so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. Indeed, Rule 22.02 requires that a lawyer who
withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to
which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter.
Atty. Ortiz claims that the reason why he took no further action on the case was that he was informed
that Canoy had acquired the services of another counsel. Assuming that were true, there was no
apparent coordination between Atty. Ortiz and this new counsel.
To quote the court, there are no good reasons that would justify a lawyer virtually abandoning
the cause of the client in the midst of litigation without even informing the client of the fact or cause of
desertion. That the lawyer forsook his legal practice on account of what might be perceived as a higher
calling, election to public office, does not mitigate the dereliction of professional duty. Suspension from
the practice is the usual penalty, and there is no reason to deviate from the norm in this case.

10. Borja, Sr.,petitioner vs. Sulyap, Inc., respondent.

This is a petition for review assailing the decision of Court of Appeals denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Basilio Borja, Sr. as lessor, and Sulyap, Inc., as lessee, entered into a contract of lease involving a
one-storey office building owned by Borja located at New Manila,Quezon City. Upon the expiration of
their lease contract, Sulyap demanded the return of the said advance rentals, dues and deposit but
Borja refused to do so. Thus, Sulyap filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for sum of money against
Borja. Subsequently, the parties entered into and submitted to the trial court a Compromise
Agreement stating that Borja is bound to pay the amounts P30,575 and P50,000 and in case any
amount due is not paid within the period stated in this agreement shall earn 2% interest per month
until fully paid plus 25% attorneys fees of the amount collectible and that writ of execution shall be
issued as a matter of right.
Petitioner, failed to pay the amounts stated in the judicial compromise. Sulyap filed a writ of
execution against Borja. The Trial Court granted the writ. Borja motioned to quash the writ by stating
that his failure to pay the amounts within the agreed period was due to Sulyaps fault; therefore, the
penalty clause should not be imposed. Borja filed another motion praying to quash the writ of execution
and modification of the decision contending that there was fraud in the execution of the compromise
agreement. He alleged that his former counsel, Atty. Leonardo Cruz, who assisted him in entering
into the said agreement, removed the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his
signature and fraudulently attached the same to the compromise agreement submitted to the court in
order to make it appear that he agreed to the penalty clause embodied therein.
The trial court ruled in favour of Sulyap because it gave credence to the testimony of Atty. Cruz
who testified that the petitioner agreed to the 2% penalty and he was the one who chose the 25%
attorneys fees. And it was noted that it was more than one year from receipt of the judgment on the
compromise agreement on that he questioned the inclusion of the penalty clause in the approved
compromise agreement despite several opportunities to raise said objection.
The issue is whether or not Borja is bound by the penalty clause in the compromise agreement.
The court ruled in affirmative. The petitioner is bound to pay the penalty imposed in the
compromise agreement since he failed to establish that there is fraud in obtaining the compromise
agreement. No evidence was presented by petitioner other than his bare allegation that his former
counsel fraudulently attached the page of the genuine compromise agreement where he affixed his
signature to the compromise agreement submitted to the court. The petitioner could not feign
ignorance to the existence of the penalty in the compromise agreement since he did not raise the issue
of fraudulent inclusion of the penalty in the agreement first time on appeal. Even assuming that Atty.
Leonardo Cruz exceeded his authority in inserting the penalty clause, the status of the said clause is not
void but merely voidable, i.e., capable of being ratified. His failure to question the monthly interest and
attorneys fees despite many opportunities to do so, estopped him from assailing its validity.
11. NOPA v. Campos (G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008)
FACTS:
Private Respondent Aniceto Campos and Petitioner NOPA (Negros Oriental
Planters Association, Inc.) entered into a contract denominated as Molasses
Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid in full, but was only able to receive a
partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of
the products being delivered. He then filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract
with Damages against Petitioner. After filing its Answer, NOPA filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the
exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the
unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket
fees. RTC dismissed the Motion. The Petition for Certiorari was likewise dismissed
on the ground, among others, that herein Petitioner failed to state in its
Verification that the allegations in the petition are "based on authentic records",
in violation of Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000).
ISSUE:
IS THERE A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
EVEN WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE
ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC RECORDS?
RULING:
There was no substantial compliance with the requirement of Verification. The A.M. No.
00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000) which amended Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure made the verification requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now
merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He
cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are
true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be
either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records. A pleading,
therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys knowledge and
belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the
deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of
this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the Verification to be remedied.
Assailed decisions are AFFIRMED.
12. Pp v. Laurente (G.R. No. L-129594, March 7, 2001)
FACTS:
Private Complainant Anna Liza Villamor was the househelp of spouses Carabio.
Accused Junnifer Laurente, who is the elder brother of Mrs. Carabio, allegedly raped
Villamor inside his sisters house at around 2 oclock in the morning. Thereafter,
accused-appellant left the room without uttering a single word. That same morning, she
performed her usual household chores. In the afternoon, complainant went to her
mother's house and narrated to her mother what accused did to her. On the other
hand, the accused claimed that he had been sleeping with the complainant in the
same room and that they had sexual intercourse with the latters consent. Giving
credence to the testimonies presented by the prosecution, the trial court, rendered
judgment convicting the accused.
ISSUE:
IS THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THE COMPLAINANT HERSELF CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO
WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED?
RULING:
No. In rape cases, an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the
complaining witness provided her testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that a
woman's conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value in gauging
the truth of her accusations. It must coincide with logic and experience.

True, she
should not be expected to act in a particular manner, for after all, people react
differently to a given situation; still, this Court finds it hard to believe that she would act
normally so soon after a harrowing incident.
In this case, there is a clear showing that the trial court overlooked the absence of the
element of force, the inconsistent and conflicting declarations of complainant both in
her oral testimony and in her sworn statement, her actuations after the supposed rape,
her actuation towards her alleged rapist, the observation of the inquest prosecutor, and
the lack of physical evidence to support her claims of force and resistance. The
combination of all the above is more than sufficient to cast doubt on the guilt of
accused-appellant.
The decision of RTC is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, thus ACQUITTING the accused of the
crime of rape.

13. Pp v. Perucho (G.R. No. 128869, April 14, 1999)
FACTS:
A Task Force was created to track down suspects who may have perpetrated the
kidnapping of Grace Chua and her grandfather in Cavite. A witness to the kidnapping
pointed to the picture of the accused Perucho who was then located by the members
of the Task Force, allegedly with a gun tucked in his waist. Immediately, the police
officers approached the accused, inquired if he had any authority to carry the gun, but
he allegedly resisted and boxed one of the police officers. Accused Perucho was
separately charged with illegal possession of firearms and disobedience to a person in
authority. Upon arraignment, accused, with the assistance of Counsel de Officio
pleaded not guilty to both charges and denied the allegations. He alleged that the he
had been arrested and searched without a warrant and tortured during the
investigation. The two cases were tried jointly wherein the accused was then convicted
by the RTC.
ISSUE:
ARE THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION CREDIBLE ENOUGH TO
WARRANT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED?
RULING:
No. Evidence must not only proceed from a credible witness, but also be credible in
itself. Thus, this Court has held: We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except
its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. It is unlikely that the
leader of a gang included in the PNP Order of Battle would be supervising a
construction work at night, unescorted, with a gun tucked in his waist in plain view.
Such casualness is unusual of former military men, who lead undercover lives due to
illegal activities.
The wanton disregard by the policemen of their own safety and that of the victims is
incompatible with common experience. Otherwise stated, their story is too improbable
to be accorded credence. That a person who was arrested and about to be detained
would worry about his personal belongings, such as stereo and television, is hardly
believable. But to maintain that he, a supposedly notorious gangster, would voluntarily
retrieve from his hut a second gun and surrender it meekly and perfunctorily to the
police, after he had already been apprehended, is ridiculous.
Because the improbabilities pertain to matters of weight and substance, the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses cannot be given full faith and credence. Clearly, the
requirement of moral certainty has not been fulfilled.
The Decision of the RTC is REVERSED and VACATED. Accused Mark Perucho is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

14. Pp v. Kamad (G.R. No. 174198, January 19, 2010)
FACTS:
Accused Zaida

Kamad, along with her boyfriend Leo Ramirez, was charged for illegal
possession of shabu after they have been caught in a buy-bust operation. The accused
denied the charge and claimed that she and Ramirez were framed-up. The RTC
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused appealed the in CA, attacking the RTCs reliance on the presumption of
regularity that the RTC found to have attended the conduct of the buy-bust operation
by the police. She argued that no presumption of regularity could arise considering that
the police violated NAPOLCOM rules. The CA rejected the defense arguments and
affirmed in toto the RTC findings.
ISSUE:
IS THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR?
RULING:
No. Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized
shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of
regularity in the performance of duties cannot be made in this case. A presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of
law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure
in the performance thereof. The presumption applies when nothing in the record
suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty
required by law; where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot
arise.
The Decision is REVERSE and SET ASIDE and accused Kamad is declared ACQUITTED.
15. Singer Sewing Machine vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 91307 January 24, 1991
FACTS:
Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio (SIMACUBA), the respondent union, filed a petition for
direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the Singer Sewing
Machine Company, Baguio City branch (hereinafter referred to as "the Company").
The Company opposed the petition mainly on the ground that the union members are actually
not employees but are independent contractors as evidenced by the collection agency agreement which
they signed. The respondent Med-Arbiter, finding that there exists an employer-employee relationship
between the union members and the Company, granted the petition for certification election. On
appeal, Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon affirmed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employee-employer relationship between the parties.
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of petitioner. Private respondents are independent contractors, not
employees. As such, they cannot enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the petitioner.
The present case mainly calls for the application of the control test, which if not satisfied, would
lead us to conclude that no employer-employee relationship exists. Hence, if the union members are not
employees, no right to organize for purposes of bargaining, nor to be certified as such bargaining agent
can ever be recognized. The following elements are generally considered in the determination of the
employer-employee relationship; "(1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment
of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee's conduct although
the latter is the most important element".
The nature of the relationship between a company and its collecting agents depends on the
circumstances of each particular relationship. Not all collecting agents are employees and neither are all
collecting agents independent contractors. The collectors could fall under either category depending on
the facts of each case.
A thorough examination of the facts of the case leads us to the conclusion that the existence of
an employer-employee relationship between the Company and the collection agents cannot be
sustained. The plain language of the agreement reveals that the designation as collection agent does not
create an employment relationship and that the applicant is to be considered at all times as an
independent contractor.
The Court finds that since private respondents are not employees of the Company, they are not
entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining. Accordingly, there is no constitutional and legal basis for their "union" to be granted their
petition for direct certification.

16. Manila Golf Club vs. IAC
G.R. No. 64948 September 27, 1994
FACTS:
This is originally filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) via petition of 17 persons who
styled themselves as Caddies of Manila Golf and Country Club-PTCCEA for the coverage and availment
of benefits of the Social Security Act as amended, PTCCEA (Philippine Technical, Clerical, Commercial
Employees Association) a labor organization where which they claim for membership.
The same time two other proceedings were filed and pending. These are certification election
case filed by PTCCEA on behalf of the same caddies of Manila Golf and Country club which was in favor
of the caddies and compulsory arbitration case involving PTCCEA and Manila Golf and Country Club
which was dismissed and ruled that there was no employer-employee relationship between the caddies
and the club.
ISSUE:
Whether or not persons rendering caddying services for members of golf clubs and their guests
in said clubs' courses or premises are the employees of such clubs and therefore within the compulsory
coverage of the Social Security System (SSS).
RULING:
SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Llamar is not an employee of the Manila Golf and Country
Club, Inc. The club is under no obligation to report him for compulsory coverage to the SSS.
In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their conduct while
enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever club
they do work in. They work for the club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but, on the other
hand, also without having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away
for as long they like.
These considerations clash frontally with the concept of employment. It can happen that a
caddy who has rendered services to a player on one day may still find sufficient time to work elsewhere.
Under such circumstances, the caddy may leave the premises and to go to such other place of work that
he wishes. These are things beyond the control of the petitioner.

17. Encyclopedia Britanica vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 87098 November 4, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent Benjamin Limjoco was a Sales Division Manager of petitioner Encyclopaedia
Britannica and was in charge of selling petitioner's products through some sales representatives. As
compensation, private respondent received commissions from the products sold by his agents. He was
also allowed to use petitioner's name, goodwill and logo. It was, however, agreed upon that office
expenses would be deducted from private respondent's commissions. Petitioner would also be informed
about appointments, promotions, and transfers of employees in private respondent's district.
Limjoco resigned from office to pursue his private business. Then on October 30, 1975, he filed a
complaint against petitioner Encyclopaedia Britannica with the Department of Labor and Employment,
claiming for non-payment of separation pay and other benefits, and also illegal deduction from his sales
commissions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
RULING:
SC ruled that Limjoco was not an employee of the petitioner company. He was merely an agent
or an independent dealer of the petitioner.
The records of the case at bar showed that there was no such relationship. He was free to
conduct his work and he was free to engage in other means of livelihood. At the time he was connected
with the petitioner company, private respondent was also a director and later the president of the
Farmers' Rural Bank. Had he been an employee of the company, he could not be employed elsewhere
and he would be required to devote full time for petitioner. If private respondent was indeed an
employee, it was rather unusual for him to wait for more than a year from his separation from work
before he decided to file his claims.

18. Carungcong vs. Sunlife
G.R. No. 118086 December 15, 1997
FACTS:
Susan Carungcong began her career in the insurance industry in 1974 as an agent of Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada. She signed an Agent Agreement with Sun Life. In virtue of which she was
designated the latters agent to solicit applications for its insurance and annuity policies.
This contract was superseded some five years later when she signed two (2) new agreements.
The first, denominated Career Agents or Unit Managers Agreement, dealt with such matters as the
agents commissions, his obligations, limitations on his authority, and termination of the agreement by
death, or by written notice with or without cause. The second was titled, Managers Supplementary
Agreement. It explicitly described as a further agreement. Carungcong and Sun Life executed another
Agreement named New Business Manager with the function generally to manage a New Business Office
established. This latest Agreement stressed that the New Business Manager in performance of his duties
defined herein, shall be considered an independent contractor and not an employee of Sun Life, and
that under no circumstance shall the New Business Manager and/or his employees be considered
employees of Sun Life.
Ms. Eleizer Sibayan, Manager of Sun Lifes Internal Audit Department, commenced an inquiry
into the special fund availments of Carungcong and other New Business Managers. Respondent Lance
Kemp, had been receiving reports of anomalies in relation thereto from unit managers and agents.
Thereafter, on January 1990, Carungcong was confronted with and asked to explain the discrepancies
set out in Sibayans report. She was given a letter signed by Metron V. Deveza, CLU, Director, Marketing,
which advised of the termination of her relationship with Sun Life.
Carungcong promptly instituted proceedings for vindication in the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commissions on January 16, 1990. There she succeeded in obtaining a
favorable judgment. Labor Arbiter found that there existed an employer-employee relationship between
her and Sun Life. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Arbiters judgment.
It affirmed that no employment relationship existed between Carungcong and Sun Life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.
RULING:
SC held that Carungcong is not an employee of Sun Life Co. She was an independent contractor.
Noteworthy is that this last agreement which emphasized, like the Career Agents or Unit
Managers Agreement first signed by her, that in performance of her duties defined herein.
Carungcong would be considered an independent contractor and not an employee of Sun Life, and that
under no circumstance shall the New Business Manager and/or his employees be considered employees
of Sun Life.
Carungcong is an independent contractor. It was indicated in the very face of the contract. The
rules and regulations of the company is not sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship. It
does not necessarily create any employer-employee relationship where the employers controls have to
interfere in the methods and means by which employee would like employ to arrive at the desired
results.
Carungcong admitted that she was free to work as she pleases, at the place and time she felt
convenient for her to do so. She was not paid to a fixed salary and was mainly paid by commissions
depending on the volume of her performance.

19. Ramos vs. CA
G.R. No. 124354; April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after seeking professional medical help, was advised to undergo
an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was referred to
Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the operation on her. The operation was scheduled
for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private respondent De Los Santos Medical Center
(DLSMC). Since neither petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio, knew of any
anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez. On the following
day, she was ready for operation as early as 7:30 am. Around 9:30, Dr. Hosaka has not yet arrived.
By 10 am, Rogelio wanted to pull out his wife from the operating room. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at
12:10 pm more than 3 hours of the scheduled operation.
Dr. Guiterres tried to intubate Erlinda. The nail beds of Erlinda were bluish discoloration in
her left hand. At 3 pm, Erlinda was being wheeled to the Intensive care Unit and stayed there for a
month. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died.
The family of Ramos sued them for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the medical center
and Drs. Hosaka and Guiterrez.
RULING:
SC ruled that there was no employee-employer relationship between de Los Santos Medical
Center and Drs. Hosaka and Gutierrez.
After a careful consideration of the arguments raised by DLSMC, the Court finds that respondent
hospitals position on this issue is meritorious. There is no employer-employee relationship between
DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered
by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
As explained by respondent hospital, that the admission of a physician to membership in
DLSMCs medical staff as active or visiting consultant is first decided upon by the Credentials Committee.
Neither is there any showing that it is DLSMC which pays any of its consultants for medical services
rendered by the latter to their respective patients. Moreover, the contract between the consultant in
respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent
hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant
to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its
staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient.
The hospital does not hire consultants but it accredits and grants him the privilege of
maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients. It is the patient who pays the consultants. The hospital
cannot dismiss the consultant but he may lose his privileges granted by the hospital. The hospitals
obligation is limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation and other things
that will ensure that the doctors orders are carried out.

20. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN
G.R. No. 138051; June 10, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation ("ABS-CBN") signed an Agreement
("Agreement") with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation ("MJMDC"). ABS-CBN
was represented by its corporate officers while MJMDC was represented by SONZA, as President and
General Manager, and Carmela Tiangco ("TIANGCO"), as EVP and Treasurer. Referred to in the
Agreement as "AGENT," MJMDC agreed to provide SONZAs services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for
radio and television.
ABS-CBN agreed to pay for SONZAs services a monthly talent fee of P310,000 for the first year
and P317,000 for the second and third year of the Agreement. ABS-CBN would pay the talent fees on
the 10th and 25th days of the month. SONZA filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the Department
of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region in Quezon City. SONZA complained that ABS-CBN did
not pay his salaries, separation pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel
allowance and amounts due under the Employees Stock Option Plan ("ESOP").
ISSUE:
Whether Jay Sonza is an employee of ABS-CBN or an independent contractor.
RULING:
SC ruled that Sonza is an independent contractor.
Selection and Engagement of Employees. Independent contractors often present themselves to
possess unique skills, expertise or talent to distinguish them from ordinary employees. The specific
selection and hiring of SONZA, because of his unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by
ordinary employees, is a circumstance indicative, but not conclusive, of an independent contractual
relationship. If SONZA did not possess such unique skills, talent and celebrity status, ABS-CBN would not
have entered into the Agreement with SONZA but would have hired him through its personnel
department just like any other employee.
Payment of Wages. All the talent fees and benefits paid to SONZA were the result of
negotiations that led to the Agreement. If SONZA were ABS-CBNs employee, there would be no need
for the parties to stipulate on benefits such as "SSS, Medicare, x x x and 13th month pay"20 which the
law automatically incorporates into every employer-employee contract. Whatever benefits SONZA
enjoyed arose from contract and not because of an employer-employee relationship. SONZAs talent
fees, amounting to P317,000 monthly in the second and third year, are so huge and out of the ordinary
that they indicate more an independent contractual relationship rather than an employer-employee
relationship.
Power of Dismissal. During the life of the Agreement, ABS-CBN agreed to pay SONZAs talent
fees as long as "AGENT and Jay Sonza shall faithfully and completely perform each condition of this
Agreement."24 Even if it suffered severe business losses, ABS-CBN could not retrench SONZA because
ABS-CBN remained obligated to pay SONZAs talent fees during the life of the Agreement. This
circumstance indicates an independent contractual relationship between SONZA and ABS-CBN.
Power of Control. Applying the control test to the present case, we find that SONZA is not an
employee but an independent contractor. The control test is the most important test our courts apply in
distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor.29 This test is based on the extent of
control the hirer exercises over a worker. The greater the supervision and control the hirer exercises,
the more likely the worker is deemed an employee. The converse holds true as well the less control
the hirer exercises, the more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor.30

21. Lazaro vs. Social Security Commission
G.R. No. 138254; July 30, 2004
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosalina M. Laudato ("Laudato") filed a petition before the SSC for social
security coverage and remittance of unpaid monthly social security contributions against her three (3)
employers. Among the respondents was herein petitioner Angelito L. Lazaro ("Lazaro"), proprietor of
Royal Star Marketing ("Royal Star"), which is engaged in the business of selling home appliances.
Laudato alleged that despite her employment as sales supervisor of the sales agents for Royal Star from
April of 1979 to March of 1986, Lazaro had failed during the said period, to report her to the SSC for
compulsory coverage or remit Laudato's social security contributions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employee-employer relationship between Laudato and Royal
Star Marketing.
RULING:
SC ruled that there exists such relationship between the parties.
It is an accepted doctrine that for the purposes of coverage under the Social Security Act, the
determination of employer-employee relationship warrants the application of the "control test," that is,
whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee, not only as to the
result of the work done, but also as to the means and methods by which the same is accomplished.
Suffice it to say, the fact that Laudato was paid by way of commission does not preclude the
establishment of an employer-employee relationship. The relevant factor remains, as stated earlier,
whether the "employer" controls or has reserved the right to control the "employee" not only as to the
result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be
accomplished.

22. Phil. Global Comm. vs. De Vera
G.R. No. 157214; June 7, 2005
FACTS:
Philippine Global Communications inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of
communication services and allied activities while Ricardo de Vera is a physician by profession whom
petitioner enlisted to attend to the medical needs of its employees. The controversy rose when
petitioner terminated his engagement.
In 1981, Dr. de Vera offered his services to petitioner. The parties agreed and formalized the
respondents proposal in a document denominated as retainership contract which will be for a period of
one year, subject to renewal and clearly stated that respondent will cover the retainership the company
previously with Dr. Eulau. The agreement went until 1994, in the years 1995-1996, it was renewed
verbally. The turning point of the parties relationship was when petitioner, thru a letter bearing the
subject TERMINATION RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT, informed Dr. de Vera of its decision to discontinue
the latters retainer contract because the management has decided that it would be more practical to
provide medical services to its employees through accredited hospitals near the company premises.
On January 1997, de Vera fileda complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, alleging that he
had been actually employed by the company as its company physician since 1991. The commission
rendered decision in favor of Philcom and dismissed the complaint saying that de Vera was an
independent contractor. On appeal to NLRC, it reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter stating that de
Vera is a regular employee and directed the company to reinstate him. Philcom appealed to the CA
where it rendered decision deleting the award but reinstating de Vera. Philcom filed this petition
involving the difference of a job contracting agreements from employee-employer relationship.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there exists an employee-employer relationship between the parties.
RULING:
SC ruled that there was no such relationship existing between Dr. de Vera and Phil. Com.
The elements of an employer-employee relationship are wanting in this case. The record are
replete with evidence showing that respondent had to bill petitioner for his monthly professional fees. It
simply runs against the grain of common experience to imagine that an ordinary employee has yet to bill
his employer to receive his salary.
The power to terminate the parties relationship was mutually vested on both. Either may
terminate the arrangement at will, with or without cause.
Remarkably absent is the element of control whereby the employer has reserved the right to
control the employee not only as to the result of the work done but also as to the means and methods
by which the same is to be accomplished.
Petitioner had no control over the means and methods by which respondent went about
performing his work at the company premises. In fine, the parties themselves practically agreed on
every terms and conditions of the engagement, which thereby negates the element of control in their
relationship.
23. ABS-CBN vs. Nazareno
G.R. No. 164156; September 26, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (ABS-CBN) is engaged in the broadcasting business
and owns a network of television and radio stations, whose operations revolve around the broadcast,
transmission, and relay of telecommunication signals. It sells and deals in or otherwise utilizes the
airtime it generates from its radio and television operations. It has a franchise as a broadcasting
company, and was likewise issued a license and authority to operate by the National
Telecommunications Commission.
Petitioner employed respondents Nazareno, Gerzon, Deiparine, and Lerasan as production
assistants (PAs) on different dates. They were assigned at the news and public affairs, for various radio
programs in the Cebu Broadcasting Station. On December 19, 1996, petitioner and the ABS-CBN Rank-
and-File Employees executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to be effective during the period
from December 11, 1996 to December 11, 1999. However, since petitioner refused to recognize PAs as
part of the bargaining unit, respondents were not included to the CBA.
In October 2000, respondents filed a Complaint for Recognition of Regular Employment Status,
Underpayment of Overtime Pay, Holiday Pay, Premium Pay, Service Incentive Pay, Sick Leave Pay, and
13th Month Pay with Damages against the petitioner before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment in favor of the respondents, and declared that they were regular employees of petitioner as
such, they were awarded monetary benefits. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but CA dismissed it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents were considered regular employees of ABS-CBN.
RULING:
SC ruled that Production Assistants (Pas) are regular workers. Thus, they are entitled to the
benefits in the CBA between ABS-CBN and its rank-and-file employees.
It was held that where a person has rendered at least one year of service, regardless of the
nature of the activity performed, or where the work is continuous or intermittent, the employment is
considered regular as long as the activity exists, the reason being that a customary appointment is not
indispensable before one may be formally declared as having attained regular status.
The Court states that the primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the
usual trade or business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the
nature of work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its
entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is
not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such
activity exists.
Additionally, respondents cannot be considered as project or program employees because no
evidence was presented to show that the duration and scope of the project were determined or
specified at the time of their engagement. In the case at bar, however, the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and respondents has been proven. In the selection and engagement of
respondents, no peculiar or unique skill, talent or celebrity status was required from them because they
were merely hired through petitioners personnel department just like any ordinary employee.
Respondents did not have the power to bargain for huge talent fees, a circumstance negating
independent contractual relationship. Respondents are highly dependent on the petitioner for
continued work. The degree of control and supervision exercised by petitioner over respondents
through its supervisors negates the allegation that respondents are independent contractors.
The presumption is that when the work done is an integral part of the regular business of the
employer and when the worker, relative to the employer, does not furnish an independent business or
professional service, such work is a regular employment of such employee and not an independent
contractor. As regular employees, respondents are entitled to the benefits granted to all other regular
employees of petitioner under the CBA . Besides, only talent-artists were excluded from the CBA and not
production assistants who are regular employees of the respondents. Moreover, under Article 1702 of
the New Civil Code: In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in
favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer.
24. Ollendorf vs. Abrahanson
G.R. No. 13228; September 13, 1918
FACTS:
The record discloses that Ollendorf is and for a long time past has been engaged in the city of
Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines in the business of manufacturing ladies' embroidered
underwear for export. Ollendorf imports the material from which this underwear is made and adopts
decorative designs which are embroidered upon it by Filipino needle workers from patterns selected
and supplied by him. Most of the embroidery work is done in the homes of the workers. The
embroiderers employed by plaintiff are under contract to work for plaintiff exclusively.
On September 1915, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract. Under the terms of this,
agreement defendant entered the employ of plaintiff and worked for him until April 1916, when
defendant, on account of ill health, left plaintiff's employ and went to the United States. While in
plaintiff's employ defendant had access to all parts of plaintiff's establishment, and had full opportunity
to acquaint himself with plaintiff's business methods and business connections. The duties performed by
him were such as to make it necessary that he should have this knowledge of plaintiff s business.
Defendant had a general knowledge of the Philippine embroidery business before his employment by
plaintiff, having been engaged in similar work for several years.
Some months after his departure, defendant returned to Manila as the manager of the
Philippine Underwear Company, a corporation. This corporation does not maintain a factory in the
Philippine Islands, but sends material and embroidery designs from New York to its local representative
here who employs Filipino needle workers to embroider the designs and make up the garments in their
homes. The only difference between plaintiff's business and that of the firm by which the defendant is
employed, is the method of doing the finishing work the manufacture of the embroidered material
into finished garments.
Shortly after defendant's return to Manila and the commencement by him of the discharge of
the duties of his position as local manager of the Philippine Embroidery Company, plaintiff commenced
this action, the principal purpose of which is to prevent, by injunction, any further breach of that part of
defendant's contract of employment by plaintiff, by which he agreed that he would not "enter into or
engage himself directly or indirectly . . . in a similar or competitive business to that of (plaintiff)
anywhere within the Philippine Islands for a period of five years . . ." from the date of the agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is valid.
RULING:
SC ruled that the contract is valid.
The only limitation upon the freedom of contractual agreement is that the pacts established
shall not be contrary to "law, morals or public order." (Civil Code, art. 1255.)
Public welfare is first considered, and if it be not involved, and the restraint upon one party is
not greater than protection to the other party requires, the contract may be sustained. The question is
whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular contract
involved in it the contract is, or is not, unreasonable.
The Courts adopt the modern rule that the validity of restraints upon trade or employment is to
be determined by the intrinsic reasonableness of the restriction in each case, rather than by any fixed
rule, and that such restrictions may be upheld when not contrary to the public welfare and not greater
than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it is imposed.
A business enterprise may and often does depend for its success upon the owner's relations
with other dealers, his skill in establishing favorable connections, his methods of buying and selling a
multitude of details, none vital if considered alone, but which in the aggregate constitute the sum total
of the advantages which are the result of the experience or individual aptitude and ability of the man or
men by whom the business has been built up. Failure or success may depend upon the possession of
these intangible but all-important assets, and it is natural that their possessor should seek to keep them
from falling into the hands of his competitors.
It is with this object in view that such restrictions as that now under consideration are written
into contracts of employment. Their purpose is the protection of the employer, and if they do not go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to effectuate this purpose they should be upheld. We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that in the light of the established facts the restraint imposed upon defendant by
his contract is not unreasonable.

25. Del Castillo vs. Richmond
G.R. No. L-21127; February 9, 1924

FACTS:
The case was instituted to declare the contract of services entered into by Alfonso del Castillo as
null and void. Del Castillo alleges that the provisions and conditions contained in the third paragraph of
said contract constitute an illegal and unreasonable restriction upon his liberty to contract, are contrary
to public policy, and are unnecessary in order to constitute a just and reasonable protection to the
defendant; and asked that the same be declared null and void and of no effect.
The said contract constituted an illegal and unreasonable restriction upon the right of the
plaintiff to contract and was contrary to public policy. It will be noted that the restrictions placed upon
the plaintiff are strictly limited (a) to a limited district or districts, and (b) during the time while the
defendant or his heirs may own or have open a drugstore, or have an interest in any other one within
said limited district.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said restraint is reasonable.
RULING:
SC ruled that the restriction is reasonable and not contrary to public policy.
The law concerning contracts which tend to restrain business or trade has gone through a long
series of changes from time to time with the changing conditions of trade and commerce. With trifling
exceptions, said changes have been a continuous development of a general rule.
The early cases show plainly a disposition to avoid and annul all contract which prohibited or
restrained any one from using lawful trade " at any time or at any place," as being against the benefit of
the state. Later, however, the rule became well established that if the restraint was limited to "a certain
time" and within "a certain place", such contracts were valid and not "against the benefit of the state."
Later cases, and we think the rule is now well established, have held that contract in restraint of trade is
valid providing there is a limitation upon either time or place. A contract, however, which restrains a
man entering into a business or trade without either a limitation as to time or place, will be held in valid.
As stated in the case of Ollendorf vs. Abrahamson, The public welfare of course must always be
considered, and if it be not involved and the restraint upon one party is not greater than protection to
the other requires, contracts like the one we are discussing will be sustained. The general tendency, we
believe, of modern authority, is to make the test whether the restraint is reasonably necessary for the
protection of the contracting parties. If the contract is reasonably necessary to protect the interest of
the parties, it will be upheld.
In that case we held that a contract by which an employee agrees refrain a given length of time,
after the expiration of the term of his employment, from engaging in business, competitive with that of
his employer, is not void as being in restraint of trade if the restraint imposed is not greater than that
which is necessary to afford a reasonable protection.

26. PT & T vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 118978; May 23, 1997
FACTS:
Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever for a fixed period from November
21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever
Agreement which she signed with Petitioner Company, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and
from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondents services as reliever were again engaged by
petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.
After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
It now appears that private respondent had made the s representation, that she was single
eventhough she contracted marriage months before, in the two successive reliever agreements which
she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same
later, its branch supervisor sent to private respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain the
discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about the companys policy of not accepting
married women for employment.
Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992, which she
readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter handed down a decision
declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was
illegally dismissed by petitioner. On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said
public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and it ruled that private respondent had indeed been the
subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T.

ISSUE:
Whether or not discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee is
expressly prohibited by Article 136.

RULING:
SC ruled that the stipulation is violative of Art. 136 of the Labor Code.
An employer is free to regulate, according to his discretion and best business judgment, all
aspects of employment, from hiring to firing, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which
may be provided by law. Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination,
afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
Respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she
wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by
that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work.
The government, to repeat, abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by
petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.
Under American jurisprudence, job requirements which establish employer preference or
conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categorized as a sex-plus discrimination
where it is imposed on one sex and not on the other. Further, the same should be evenly applied and
must not inflict adverse effects on a racial or sexual group which is protected by federal job
discrimination laws.
Petitioners policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on
the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her
employment, but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a
woman of the freedom to choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as
an intangible and inalienable right.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and
subvert the sacrament of marriage.

27. Duncan Asso. Of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo
G.R. No. 162994; September 17, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.) as
medical representative on October 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation. Tecson
signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find
that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to
inform management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest
or a potential conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company,
the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a transfer to another department in a
non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines
Norte sales area. Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of
Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astras Branch Coordinator in Albay.
Despite of warnings, Tecson married Bettsy. The superiors of Tecson reminded him of the company
policy and suggested that either him or Bettsy shall resign from their respective companies. Tecson
requested more time to resolve the issue. In November of 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to Mindanao
area involving the provinces of Butuan, Surigao and Agusan del Sur. Tecson did not agree to the
reassignment and referred this matter to the grievance committee. It was resolved and was submitted
to voluntary arbitration.
The NCMB rendered decision that Glaxos policy was a valid one. Aggrieved, Tecson filed a
petition to the CA where CA held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from having personal
relationships with employees of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from
marrying employees of any competitor company is valid.
RULING:
SC ruled that the prohibition is valid. It is an exercise of the companys management
prerogative.
There is no error to the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Glaxos policy prohibiting an
employee from having a relationship with an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of
management prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so
that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxos employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that
nature might compromise the interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy,
Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor company will gain access
to its secrets and procedures. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a
policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion and growth.

Indeed,
while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play.

28. City of Manila v. Laguio
G.R. No. 118127; April 12, 2005
FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged
in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism
as a hotel.
On June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30
March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES
AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of
prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were
not establishments for amusement or entertainment and they were not services or facilities for
entertainment, nor did they use women as tools for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the aforementioned Ordinance is valid and constitutional.
RULING:
SC ruled that the ordinance is null and void. Said ordinance is ultra vires, thus, unconstitutional.
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void. The Ordinance is so replete with
constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The
prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the
Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them
worthless.
A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws.
The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality
and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate
existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of
their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems with houses of ill-repute and
establishments of the like which the City Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and insupportable
to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs,
super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. This is not warranted under the
accepted definitions of these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not
per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further the
illegal prostitution is of no moment. We lay stress on the acrid truth that sexual immorality, being a
human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places that it may even take place in the
substitute establishments enumerated under Section 3 of the Ordinance.
The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be
said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but the
deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for
immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of
ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If that were so and if that
were allowed, then the Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would
be extinguished of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and
cranny would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as
the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out
of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men. The City
Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the
detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case
of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of
the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City of Manila so
desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably
accomplish the desired end.

29. Star Paper Corp. v. Simbol
G.R. No. 164774; April 12, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation is a corporation engaged in trading, principally of paper
products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while
Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director.
Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and Lorna E. Estrella
(Estrella) were all regular employees of the company. Simbol was employed by the company on October
1993 and met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June 1998. Prior to
the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should
resign pursuant to a company policy. Simbol resigned on June 20, 1998 pursuant to the company policy.
Comia was hired by the company on February 1997. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee,
whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them that pursuant to company policy,
one must resign should they decide to get married. Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.
Estrella was hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuiga (Zuiga), also a co-worker. Petitioners
stated that Zuiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated
her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.
The respondents signed a Release and Confirmation Agreement and stated therein that they
have no money and property accountabilities in the company. Respondents offer a different version of
their dismissal. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal,
separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and
contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and states that the company policy was decreed pursuant
to what the respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative. On appeal to the NLRC, the
Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the
Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said policy is a valid exercise of the companys management prerogative.
RULING:
SC ruled that it not a valid exercise of its management prerogative. There is no reasonable
business necessity of the policy.
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting employment policies
specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the same company. We note that two types of
employment policies involve spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company
(no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including spouses,
from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).
It utilizes two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate
impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to
either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate
impact, the complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a
particular class.
The courts that have broadly construed the term marital status rule that it encompassed the
identity, occupation and employment of one's spouse. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide
occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the current
employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove
that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is
no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse.
This is known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
We note that since the finding of a bona fide occupational qualification justifies an employers
no-spouse rule, the exception is interpreted strictly and narrowly by these state courts. There must be a
compelling business necessity for which no alternative exists other than the discriminatory practice. To
justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2)
that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
The court does not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. The protection given
to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the
legislatures silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a
policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of
a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management
prerogative.

30 . ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA V NLRC
198 SCRA 586 [1991]

Facts
The petitioner-union is said to represent the 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corp. It presented to the
company a demand for correction of the significant distortion in the workers wages. The Union
claims that demand was ignored. Thus, it made a position that the workers' refusal to work beyond
eight (8) hours everyday starting October 16, 1989 is a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct
the distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the Republic Act No. 6727,
otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act, to newly-hired employees.
That decision to observe the eight hours work shift was implemented on October 16, 1989 by
some 800 daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant's production line of San Miguel Corporation, joined by
others at statistical quality control and warehouse, all members of IBM.
There ensued thereby a change in the work schedule, which had been observed by daily-paid
workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years. This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of
work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC.
On October 18, 1989, SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a complaint against the
Union and its members to declare the strike or slowdown illegal and to terminate the employment of
the union officers and shop stewards.
Another complaint was filed by SMC against the Union and members thereof, this time directly
with the NLRC to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with prayer for the issuance of a
cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order.
On February 14, 1990, the Union filed the petition which commenced the special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition at bar.
It is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time
theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, which causes financial losses to the employer
in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of wage distortions, is an illegal and
unprotected activity. It is, contrary to the law and to the collective bargaining agreement between it and
the Union.

Issue: Is the workers abandonment of the regular work schedule and their deliberate and willful
reduction of the Polo Plants production efficiency, a slowdown, which is an illegal and unprotected
concerted activity?

Ruling: Yes. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code particularly in Article 263 is
that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. A similar right to
engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in
respect of employers.
However, these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract.
In the particular instance of distortions of the wage structure within an establishment resulting from the
application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof,
thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of
the issue.
Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, also prescribes
a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving
disputes or controversies. Generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes,
disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure
and ultimately by arbitration. The Union was thus prohibited to declare and hold a strike or otherwise
engage in non-peaceful concerted activities for the settlement of its controversy with SMC in respect of
wage distortions, or for that matter; any other issue involving or relating to wages, hours of work,
conditions of employment and/or employer-employee relations. The partial strike or concerted refusal
by the Union members to follow the five-year-old work schedule which they had therefore been
observing, resorted to as a means of coercing correction of wage distortions, was therefore forbidden
by law and contract and, on this account, illegal.
31. VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN

Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann,
the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of
October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were
shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers.
Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street,
in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to
dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction
and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses
were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to
the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before
the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present.


Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to
Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as
Mayor.


Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the
sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of
court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond
the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his
official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no
restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and
thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.
Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the
custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ
should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to
Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to
restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to
avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not
thus be easily evaded.


32. CAUNCA VS SALAZAR
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in
behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far
Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An
advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency,
for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to
another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she
was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted
that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expensefrom
the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.


Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain
a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?


Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a
prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the
house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom
to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral
compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of
an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any
other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the
unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is
to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection
of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.

33. MANOTOK VS CA

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before
each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the
country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative
to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and
Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for
the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner
and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for
departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither
the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange
Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from
exercising his constitutional right to travel.


Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.


Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving
the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction
on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication
that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his
behalf.


34. SILVERIO VS CA

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised
securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to
issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel
petitioners passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been
arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country
with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.


Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.


Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of
arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments.
There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused
must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person
facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country
or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987
Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines
without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20
[2nd
par. ]).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that
while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis
of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by
law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international
travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing
Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an
interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622,
25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing
his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his
right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended
party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best
interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes
35. LORENZO VS DIRECTOR OF HEALTH

The statute empowering the Director of Health and his authorized agents to
cause to be apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous persons
in the Philippine Islands was enacted by the Legislative body in the legitimate
exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of public health.

The petitioner and appellant, Angel Lorenzo is a leprous person and is confined in
the San Lazaro Hospital in the City of Manila. He made an appeal to induce the
court to set aside the judgment of the Court of the First Instance of Manila
sustaining the law authorizing the segregation of lepers. Lorenzo alleged that his
confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital was in violation of Constitutional rights
and alleged that leprosy is not an infectious disease.

Relation to Article 3:
Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.

I pity Angel Lorenzo for having leprosy. However, the law enacted was for the
public safety and not just to make lepers an outcast of society. Petitioner claims
that his constitutional rights were violated and I believe that he was referring to
the deprivation of liberty. It is true that he is deprived of liberty but he is deprived
with due process of law. His confinement and treatments is a compensation for
his freedom. It should be taken as an advantage for him. He is helping the country
so as the citizens wont be infected of leprosy and helping his self to get proper
treatment and attention to his illness.

As discussed in class, there are two types of due processes, the substantive and
procedural. In this case, his confinement is part of the procedural due process. He
is isolated, but in exchange, he is treated. So, there is no violation of the
petitioners constitutional rights. The judgment was affirmed.



36. SANTAIGO VS VASQUEZ

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan
for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was
issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for
acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the
amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the
cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on
recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made
that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the
instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is
impaired.


Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.


Held: The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public
statement, that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue
higher studies abroad. The court upholds the course of action of the
Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioners pal to go abroad
and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold departure order is but an exercise
of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain effectiveness
of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
(Manotoc v. C.A.)

37. VALMONTE VS BELMONTE
Facts: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986,
requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of
(the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each
on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal
implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the
letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied
that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and
all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the
GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June
1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo
Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar,
Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro,
and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed:
(a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean
loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.

Issue: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire
upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos
to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political
parties.

Held: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of
the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly,
Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the
reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was
the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds
administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently,
as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean
loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that
accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to
see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and
that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the
loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers
make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. Still,
Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and
its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any
law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can
only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system
of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State
power.

38. LEGASPI VS CSC

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspis request
for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose
said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the
suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual
interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.


Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit


Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a
public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that
when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in
the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of
a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact
that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which
possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

39. ELCANO V. HILL, 77 SCRA 98
FACTS:
Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was charged criminally for the killing of Agapito Elcano, son of plaintiffs
Elcano spouses. At the time of the killing, Reginald was a minor, married and was living with his father Marvin and
receiving subsistence from him. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of
intent to kill coupled with mistake. Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil action for damages against Reginald
and his father arising from the killing of their son. The case was dismissed by the lower court and plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court. One of the questions raised was whether the father of the minor who was already married but
living with, and receiving subsistence from said father was liable in damages for the crime committed by the minor.
ISSUE:
W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.
RULING:
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi -delict, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the Article 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the RPC. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal
in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of
Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married was living with his father and getting subsistence from him
at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with
their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child, while still a minor, does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2170 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to that of his son.
40. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA, GR NO. 97336, FEB. 19, 1993
FACTS:
On October 27, 1987, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old,
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; petitioner, on
the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition
that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her
started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked
her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations
against him. After trial, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.
ISSUE:
W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a mans promise to marry in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
41. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA, GR NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993
FACTS:
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner.

She alleges in her complaint
that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks
and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. Some parents of the students
complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances or particles. She brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the DOH for examination;
subsequently, the DOH informed her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated. Due to this, her sales of soft
drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses; not
long after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless and destitute.
ISSUE:
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of
implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one
for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the
same Code.
HELD:
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to
Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more
particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated
food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon
may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a
general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict, i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands, this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. The liabilities of a manufacturer or
seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.
42. BARREDO V. GARCIA AND ALMARIO, GR NO. 48006, JULY 8, 1942
FACTS:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was overturned and
one of its passengers, a son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of
the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was
instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently,
Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo thus making him primarily and
directly responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
HELD:
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil
Code are:
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes. However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such
as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code,
and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities
above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and
directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
43. JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, GR NO. L-41423, FEB. 23, 1989
FACTS:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration
from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its
way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way
fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards
Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the
same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by
respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the
tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result,
petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on
a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva
filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61
by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and
Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement. The trial court decided in favor of respondents
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action.
HELD:
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the
compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach
of contract of carriage, is untenable. If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action
arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested
in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases
of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents
were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars
recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for
the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
44. SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL., GR NO. 151452, JUL. 29, 2005
FACTS:
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple
Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and
a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three of its passengers, including a two-
month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five of the van's passengers. Sibayan was convicted and sentenced
due to the said crime. There was a reservation to file a separate civil action.
In the filing of the separate civil action, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause
of action had already prescribed. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the same for
error in the choice or mode of appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court is correct in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription based on quasi delict and not on ex
delicto.
HELD:
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double
recovery.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not
operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been
expressly reserved.
45. MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO. 150157, JAN. 25, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila,
he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan. Because of the collision, petitioner was
criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently,
respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI. According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the
speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook
the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner,
explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep
swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Petitioner was then acquitted of the
criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay
damages to respondent.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case?
HELD:
Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclics acquittal does not affect the case. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI
ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi -delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an
action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the
accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or
ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex
delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict
complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal,
whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained
of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist).
The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
46. White Gold Marine Service Inc. vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Co. 464 SCRA 448
Facts:
Petitioner White Gold bought a protection and indemnity coverage for its ships from Steamship Mutual through
Respondent Pioneer. Certificates and receipts thus were given. However, Petitioner failed to fulfill its payments
thus Steamship refused to renew its coverage. Steamship then filed for collection against Petitioner for recovery of
unpaid balance. Thereafter, Petitioner also filed a complaint against Steamship and Respondent before the
Insurance Commission for violations (186,187 for Steamship and 299,300,301 in relation to 302 and 303 for
Respondent) of the Insurance Code-license requirements as an Insurance company for the former and as insurance
agent for the latter. Said commission dismissed the complaint which decision was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not Steamship Mutual is a Protection and Indemnity Club engaged in the insurance business in the
Philippines
Held:
Steamship Mutual as a P & I Club is a mutual insurance company engaged in the marine insurance business.
An insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. This means that one party undertakes for a consideration to
indemnify another party against loss, damage, or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. While to
determine if a contract is an insurance contract we can look at the nature of the promise, the act to be performed,
exact nature of the agreement in view of the entire occurrence, contingency or circumstance where the
performance is mandated. The label is not controlling. While under Section 2(2) of the Insurance Code the phrase
doing an insurance business constitutes the following: 1) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance
contract; 2) making or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely
incidental to any other legitimate business or activity of the surety; 3) doing any kind of business, including a
reinsurance business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the meaning
of this code; 4) doing or proposing to do any business in substance to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provision of this code.
Taking all of these in to consideration, Steamship Mutual engaged in marine insurance business undertook to
indemnify Petitioner White Gold against marine losses as enumerated under sec. 99 of the Insurance Code. It is
immaterial whether profit is derived from making insurance contract and that no separate or direct consideration
is received since these does not preclude the existence of an insurance business.
47. Republic vs. Sunlife Assurance Company of Canada GR No. 158085; October 14, 2005
Facts:
On December 29, 1997, the [Court of Tax Appeals] (CTA) rendered its decision in Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
[CIR], which held that mutual life insurance companies are purely cooperative companies and are exempt from the
payment of premium tax and DST. This pronouncement was later affirmed by this court in [CIR] v. Insular Life
Assurance Company, Ltd. Sun Life surmised that[,] being a mutual life insurance company, it was likewise exempt
from the payment of premium tax and DST. Hence, on August 20, 1999, Sun Life filed with the CIR an
administrative claim for tax credit of its alleged erroneously paid premium tax and DST for the aforestated tax
periods.
For failure of the CIR to act upon the administrative claim for tax credit and with the 2-year period to file a claim
for tax credit or refund dwindling away and about to expire, Sun Life filed with the CTA a petition for review. The
CTA found in favor of Sun Life.
Seeking reconsideration of the decision of the CTA, the CIR argued that Sun Life ought to have registered,
foremost, with the Cooperative Development Authority before it could enjoy the exemptions from premium tax
and DST extended to purely cooperative companies or associations under [S]ections 121 and 199 of the Tax Code.
For its failure to register, it could not avail of the exemptions prayed for. The CTA denied the CIRs motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is exempted from payment of tax on life insurance premiums and documentary stamp
tax
Held:
YES. The Tax Code defines a cooperative as an association conducted by the members thereof with the money
collected from among themselves and solely for their own protection and not for profit. Without a doubt,
respondent is a cooperative engaged in a mutual life insurance business.
First, it is managed by its members. Both the CA and the CTA found that the management and affairs of
respondent were conducted by its member-policyholders. SUNLIFE has been mutualized or converted from a stock
life insurance company to a nonstock mutual life insurance corporation pursuant to Section 266 of the Insurance
Code of 1978. On the basis of its bylaws, its ownership has been vested in its member-policyholders who are each
entitled to one vote; and who, in turn, elect from among themselves the members of its board of trustees.
Second, it is operated with money collected from its members. Since respondent is composed entirely of members
who are also its policyholders, all premiums collected obviously come only from them. The member-policyholders
constitute both insurer and insured who contribute, by a system of premiums or assessments, to the creation of
a fund from which all losses and liabilities are paid.
Third, it is licensed for the mutual protection of its members, not for the profit of anyone. A mutual life insurance
company is conducted for the benefit of its member-policyholders, who pay into its capital by way of premiums.
Under the Tax Code although respondent is a cooperative, registration with the Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) is not necessary in order for it to be exempt from the payment of both percentage taxes on
insurance premiums, under Section 121; and documentary stamp taxes on policies of insurance or annuities it
grants, under Section 199.
48. Philamcare Health Systems Inc. vs Court of Appeals 379 SCRA 356 (2002)
FACTS:
In 1988, ErnaniTrinos applied for a health care insurance under the Philamcare Health Systems. He was asked if he
was ever treated for high blood, heart trouble, diabetes, cancer, liver disease, asthma, or peptic ulcer; he
answered no. His application was approved and it was effective for one year. His coverage was subsequently
renewed twice for one year each. While the coverage was still in force in 1990, Ernani suffered a heart attack for
which he was hospitalized. The cost of the hospitalization amounted to P76,000.00. JulitaTrinos, wife of Ernani,
filed a claim before Philamcare for them to pay the hospitalization cost. Philamcare refused to pay as it alleged
that Ernani failed to disclose the fact that he was diabetic, hypertensive, and asthmatic. Julita ended up paying the
hospital expenses. Ernani eventually died. In July 1990, Julita sued Philamcare for damages. Philamcare alleged
that the health coverage is not an insurance contract; that the concealment made by Ernani voided the agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philamcare can avoid the health coverage agreement.
HELD:
No. The health coverage agreement entered upon by Ernani with Philamcare is a non-life insurance contract and is
covered by the Insurance Law. It is primarily a contract of indemnity. Once the member incurs hospital, medical or
any other expense arising from sickness, injury or other stipulated contingent, the health care provider must pay
for the same to the extent agreed upon under the contract. There is no concealment on the part of Ernani. He
answered the question with good faith. He was not a medical doctor hence his statement in answering the
question asked of him when he was applying is an opinion rather than a fact. Answers made in good faith will not
void the policy.
Further, Philamcare, in believing there was concealment, should have taken the necessary steps to void the health
coverage agreement prior to the filing of the suit by Julita. Philamcare never gave notice to Julita of the fact that
they are voiding the agreement. Therefore, Philamcare should pay the expenses paid by Julita.
49. Commissioner Of Internal Revenue V. Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Co., Inc (2002)
FACTS:
Lincoln Philippine Life Insurance Co., Inc., (now Jardine-CMA Life Insurance Company, Inc.) issued a special kind of
life insurance policy known as the "Junior Estate Builder Policy" with a distinguishing feature. It had a "automatic
increase clause" upon attainment of a certain age by the insured.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued deficiency documentary stamps tax assessment for the year 1984
pertaining to the amount in the automatic increase clause.
Lincoln questioned the deficiency assessments.
Court of Tax Appeals: found no valid basis and cancelled it
CA: affirmed CTA.
CIR claims that "automatic increase clause" in the subject insurance policy is separate .
ISSUE:
W/N the "automatic increase clause" should not be taxed with the main policy.
HELD:
NO. CA set aside
Section 49, Title VI of the Insurance Code defines an insurance policy as the written instrument in which a contract
of insurance is set forth
Section 50 of the same Code provides that the policy, which is required to be in printed form, may contain any
word, phrase, clause, mark, sign, symbol, signature, number, or word necessary to complete the contract of
insurance.
Any rider, clause, warranty or endorsement pasted or attached to the policy is considered part of such policy or
contract of insurance.
Section 173 that the payment of documentary stamp taxes is done at the time the act is done or transaction had
and the tax base for the computation of documentary stamp taxes on life insurance policies under Section 183 is
the amount fixed in policy, unless the interest of a person insured is susceptible of exact pecuniary measurement.
The amount fixed in the policy is the figure written on its face and whatever increases will take effect in the future
by reason of the "automatic increase clause" embodied in the policy without the need of another contract.
The amount insured by the policy at the time of its issuance necessarily included the additional sum covered by the
automatic increase clause because it was already determinable at the time the transaction was entered into and
formed part of the policy.
To claim that the increase in the amount insured (by virtue of the automatic increase clause incorporated into the
policy at the time of issuance) should not be included in the computation of the documentary stamp taxes due on
the policy would be a clear evasion of the law requiring that the tax be computed on the basis of the amount
insured by the policy.

50. ENRIQUEZ v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada

Facts:
On 24 September 1917, Joaquin Herrer made application to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada through its
office in Manila for a life annuity. Two days later he paid the sum of P6,000 to the manager of the company's
Manila office and was given a receipt. The application was immediately forwarded to the head office of the
company at Montreal, Canada.
On 26 November 1917, the head office gave notice of acceptance by cable to Manila. (Whether on the same day
the cable was received notice was sent by the Manila office to Herrer that the application had been accepted, is a
disputed point.)
On 4 December 1917, the policy was issued at Montreal. On 18 December 1917, attorney Aurelio A. Torres wrote
to the Manila office of the company stating that Herrer desired to withdraw his application. The following day the
local office replied to Mr. Torres, stating that the policy had been issued, and called attention to the notification of
26 November 1917. This letter was received by Mr. Torres on the morning of 21 December 1917. Mr. Herrer died
on 20 December 1917.
An action was brought by Rafaek Enriquez as administrator of the estate of the late Joaquin Ma. Herrer to recover
from Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada the sum of P6,000 paid by the deceased for a life annuity. The trial
court gave judgment for Sun Life. Enriquez appealed.
Issue: Whether Herrer received notice of acceptance of his application, to hold that the contract for a life
annuity was perfected.
Held:
NO. The letter of 26 November 1917, notifying Mr. Ferrer that his application had been accepted, was prepared
and signed in the local office of the insurance company, was placed in the ordinary channels for transmission, but
was never actually mailed and thus was never received by the applicant. The Civil Code rule, that an acceptance
made by letter shall bind the person making the offer only from the date it came to his knowledge, may not be the
best expression of modern commercial usage. Still it must be admitted that its enforcement avoids uncertainty and
tends to security. Not only this, but in order that the principle may not be taken too lightly, it is identical with the
principles announced by a considerable number of respectable, courts in the United States. The courts who take
this view have expressly held that an acceptance of an offer of insurance not actually or constructively
communicated to the proposer does not make a contract. Only the mailing of acceptance, it has been said,
completes the contract of insurance, as the locus poienitentise is ended when the acceptance has passed beyond
the control of the party. In resume, therefore, the law applicable to the case is found to be the second paragraph
of article 1262 of the Civil Code providing that an acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the
offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The pertinent fact is, that according to the provisional
receipt, three things had to be accomplished by the insurance company before there was a contract: (1) There had
to be a medical examination of the applicant; (2) there had to be approval of the application by the head office of
the company; and (3) this approval had in some way to be communicated by the company to the applicant. The
further admitted facts are that the head office in Montreal did accept the application, did cable the Manila office
to that effect, did actually issue the policy and did, through its agent in Manila, actually write the letter of
notification and place it in the usual channels for transmission to the addressee. The fact as to the letter of
notification thus fails to concur with the essential elements of the general rule pertaining to the mailing and
delivery of mail matter as announced by the American courts, namely, when a letter or other mail matter is
addressed and mailed with postage prepaid there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that it was received by the
addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mails. But if any one of
these elemental facts fails to appear, it is fatal to the presumption. For instance, a letter will not be presumed to
have been received by the addressee unless it is shown that it was deposited in the post-office, properly addressed
and stamped. The contract for a life annuity in the case at bar was not perfected because it has not been proved
satisfactorily that the acceptance of the application ever came to the knowledge of the applicant.