Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PSC 171‐10
Shambaugh
In 1944, while the eyes of the Western Allied Powers were fixated on the
battlefields of Europe—quickly closing in on the Axis Powers of Germany and Italy;
island hopping toward Japan in the Pacific; and planning the reconstruction of over
three decades of war and depression, US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
quietly assembled a diplomatic mission, destined to enter Northern China.
American military personnel and Foreign Service Officers had been scattered
throughout China during the two decades preceding this mission, but the objective
of this effort would depart from an unofficial and previously untested alliance that
had spanned over a decade. By 1944, US intelligence indicated the political tides
were turning within China, and growing frustration with the leader of the ruling
party, the Kuomintang’s Chiang Kai‐shek, further indicated that the United States
needed to expand its diplomatic efforts in the region to extend its strategic upper
hand against their common enemy, the Imperial Japanese Empire.
The formation of the US Army Observation Group, better known as the Dixie
Mission, began in early 1944, and its mission was to establish the first official US
diplomatic contact with the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Zedong, the chief
military adversary of Chiang Kai‐shek. A combination of military and foreign service
officers arrived in China that year, but by 1945, diplomatic gridlock became
indicative of the mission’s failed nature. Over the mission’s three years, various
attempts were made to expand military intelligence, to instigate a political divide
between Mao and Soviet Russia, and to unite the war‐torn Chinese factions.
However, dissenting opinions between the military leaders and US Foreign Service
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Officers’ over the trustworthiness of Mao quickly isolated and factionalized the
mission. The Dixie Mission was intended to expand the tired arm of US diplomacy
during World War II alongside the multiple theaters of US involvement around the
world, the ideological disconnect between the warring Chinese factions, and the
poorly‐instigated military decisions of Chiang Kia‐shek; however, with a lofty range
of goals, the United States stepped into a diplomatic nightmare with deep political
wounds that could not be easily overcome.
To understand the goals, shortcomings and accomplishments of the Dixie
Mission, one must first examine the rise of the modern Chinese state in the
preceding 100 years. Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, insurrections
and rebellions broke out throughout the ailing Chinese Empire as European
imperial powers gobbled up land along China’s coast and began expanding inward.
The ruling Manchu Dynasty was able to maintain power as long as it was successful
in quenching the rising number of internal insurrections that challenged
colonization, but China was losing its sovereignty to the growing “spheres of
influence” carved by Western states. European powers increased their amount of
foreign autonomy over the once closed Chinese empire, and China’s increasingly
limited military was unable to stop this expansion.
Half a world away, United States President Theodore Roosevelt was
presiding over his country’s rise into the influential group of Western imperial
powers, as the United States became the richest country on the globe around the
turn of the century. Roosevelt foresaw an era of United States hegemony, and his
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presidency, more so than any before his era, took commanding roles in international
affairs outside the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere. With the United States
several decades behind European powers’ inroads into China—yet many years
ahead in relations with the Japanese—Roosevelt decided to take action to limit the
European powers’ expansion further into the heart of China, while (debatably)
preserving Chinese sovereignty by resurrecting a previously established “Open Door
Policy.”
Roosevelt’s use of the “Open Door Policy” attempted to ferment itself through
treaties ratified by the United States and other Western powers; yet these policies
were often ignored by their member nations’ expansionist actions (and subsequent
new treaties), as colonial imperialism continued to crush native sovereignty of once
autonomous regions around the globe. In the case of China, Russia, its northern
neighbor, had entered its bordering province of Manchuria in the early 1900’s—
followed by internal Chinese rebellion; by 1908, Russia and Japan had waged a war
for control that region; while the 1920’s witnessed a Nine‐Power Treaty, signed by
Japan, Russia, the United States, and other western powers, to “preserve Chinese
independence” (Department of State, 1949, p. 23). Preserving independence, which
had previously been agreed upon by these powers, faltered as Russia was given
chunks of the Manchurian province and Japan again invaded the land, unopposed by
any Treaty government (Department of State, pp. 13‐18). Lacking a modern army to
deal with the barrage of invaders trampling on China’s independence, rebellions
against the ruling Manchu Dynasty erupted, and the many stresses of the European
invasion gave way to a recall of the ruling Manchu government. This became the
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final blow to the Chinese Empire’s ability to govern, with Chinese sovereignty
chipping away at a steadily increasing rate, setting the stage for a new form of
government leadership to strengthen the embattled nation.
Throughout the time frame of invasion and internal rebellion—the before
mentioned examples are just a fraction of the actual scope of events that occurred
within China—the United States remained steadfast in its policies to preserve a
unified China, independent of foreign control. Facilitating these policies, a series of
statements, pacts, and treaties were issued—such as the Root‐Takahira Agreement,
the Knox “Neutralization” Proposals, and various statements issued by Secretary of
State Frank Kellogg—but through these agreements, the United States also upheld
its policy of military abstinence, diluting the very policies the US wished to maintain
in the region (Department of State, pp. 8‐11). Again, simultaneous events in Europe
closely resembled those concurring in China, as Adolph Hitler took leadership in
Germany and began absorbing neighboring countries of Austria, Poland and
Czechoslovakia. In both Asia and Europe, opposition Western powers issued
policies of appeasement, leading to the deterioration of sovereignty in each region.
With no Chinese rebellion group organized enough to immediately fill the
power vacuum that followed the Manchu Dynasty’s death, China became a divided
civilization, fracturing into various warlord factions. This “Warlording era” lasted
about a decade, but a young military commander, Chiang Kai‐shek, began uniting the
warlording provinces under his Kuomintang government. After seizing widespread
power by the mid 1920’s, his government established its legitimate rule by
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providing the first signs of stability the country had seen in over a decade (Zarrow,
p. 230). Eventually Chiang’s government was recognized by Western powers, and
foreign aid began to flow into his expanding base of power. However, the Japanese
army, too, found opportunity in the power vacuum, and in 1931, Japan seized full
control of Manchuria, establishing a puppet government under its own guise (The
Department of State, 1967, pp. 152‐154). Furthermore, while Chiang’s efforts
proved key in uniting a vast majority of China, not all of its land came under the
umbrella of the Kuomintang government. The remaining warlording factions, the
invasion of Manchuria by Japanese forces, and the political influence of the Soviet
Union, lead to a new internal power struggle within China, and a third major
faction—which had once been a united force within the Kuomintang—split from the
KMT to form a Communist resistance party under the influence of an emerging
leader, Mao Zedong (Zarrow, pp. 263‐264).
This extremely condensed, and admittedly patchy, history of China’s internal
political struggle during the first half of the 20th century, displays the Chinese
civilization’s first taste of the western‐driven, technologically‐superior method of
globalization that occurred concurrently on nearly every continent of the world
during this time period. Essentially, this is the part of China’s history where China
loses the remnants of its centuries‐long regional supremacy and is catapulted out of
relative isolation; meanwhile, the once unsubstantiated political will of United
States’ foreign policy regarding China, receives heavy military and monetary
fortification. This increased interest in China was a direct result of several
paralleling events around the world, including a devastated Europe facing several
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power vacuums following World War I, the fear and political mystery of the newly
established Communist Russia, and the events within China described in the earlier
paragraphs of this essay. Meanwhile, the internal politics of the United States
limited its global influence as domestic affairs focused on a rising economic
depression that would divide global powers and draw the world into a second
international conflict.
Following World War I, and the concurring overthrow of the Russian Czar,
the United States was forced to confront the spreading ideologies of domestic
communist parties. The increased status of the United States as a global
superpower came in direct conflict with the shroud of mystery cloaking the new
Soviet Empire’s own aspirations. After a decade of domestic policies surrounding
the elimination of communist factions within the US, the US and Russia eventually
became allies during World War II, as they fought a common enemy, Nazi Germany.
Further drawing upon global paradigms of the era, both the US and Russia spent the
final years of World War II shoring up their respective (and growing) diplomatic
networks as they selectively began their battle for dominance in the world, and the
battlefields of China were not isolated from the looming ideological confrontation.
Here, Mao Zedong’s communist faction was steadily increasing its diplomatic and
military relations with the Soviet Union as he gained greater command in the region
while the US watched its ally squander resources. With visitors from Moscow
ascending upon Mao’s command in China’s northern province of Yenan Province,
the United States decided to retaliate by expanding its support for the ruling
Kuomintang government. Foreseeing China as a potential ideological battlefield
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against Communist Russia, the previous decade of diplomatic and advisory aid
expanded into providing he Kuomintang with further monetary aid and lend‐lease
assistance as the Second Sino‐Japanese war erupted in 1938 (Department of State,
1949, p. 346). By the end of the 1930’s, the Kuomintang had established a military,
political, and monetary stronghold over China, but Mao’s resistance efforts
combined with the impending Japanese invasion from Manchuria to challenge
Chiang’s leadership.
As previously stated, the Kuomintang had been receiving insignificant
amounts of aid from the United States prior to 1938, but after the Sino‐Japanese war
began to escalated, military supplies and strategic goals were filtered to the
Nationalist Party directly from US commanders in the region. While the United
States had previously established diplomatic ties with Generalissimo Chiang, US
intelligence detailing his war efforts before this time period were generally limited.
The reality was that Chiang had suffered from several costly battles, losing
thousands of troops while clashing with the Japanese military, and in 1937, the
Nationalists began a retreat to Sichuan, where Chiang would hold his command for
the remainder of the war (Zarrow, p. 295). The following year, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt decided to increase the involvement of his Administration and the
military might of the US war machine by deploying a military commander, General
Joseph Stilwell, to the region. Stilwell’s mission was to serve as an aid and to further
assist General Chiang Kai‐shek with using an abundance of supplies sent to achieve
US military objectives in China (Esherick, p. 1), as the United States had yet to
officially enter the war effort in either Europe or Asia. Additional support came
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from Soviet Russia and even Great Britain, as Chiang received Soviet advisors and
aid—Moscow, through policy and open statements, did not recognize the Chinese
Communist Party as holding concurring ideologies (Zarrow, p. 314). While aid, in
the form of loans and military armaments, slowly increased, support for the
intended goals the aid was designed to accomplish, Chiang Kai‐shek decided to
reinforce his domestic political position and rebuild his crippled army by
withholding KMT forces from battle with the Japanese. While the move was
designed to improve the KMT’s strength, the strategy steadily ruptured General
Stilwell’s temper as Chiang’s incessantly opposed US directives.
Chiang’s strategic reassessment not only increased tensions with the United
States, but the decision escalated into a dangerous political mistake as he undercut
his government’s loose military alliance with Mao. Chiang theorized that he could
hold his under‐supplied foes responsible for defending the country from the well‐
trained Japanese military, thus wearing down—if not eliminating all together—his
political enemies once and for all. Furthermore, Chiang relied on his political
alliance with the United States to bring US troops to battle the Japanese within China
(The Department of State, 1967). By cutting back his military, Chiang hoped to
maintain his political stronghold and increase his weapons arsenal, while leaving
the Maoist People’s Liberation Army at the mercy of invading Japanese forces.
Unfortunately for General Chiang, this strategy weakened his army’s discipline as a
steady stream of PLA guerilla attacks on Japanese forces led to small victories
against the Japanese, which expanded Mao’s influence to an ever‐growing network
of small, rural pockets of Communist‐led communities in Northern China (Zarrow,
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2005). Furthermore, while Chiang decreased his attacks on the Japanese, he
continued to authorize attacks on Communist forces while increasing the
authoritarian nature of the regime while also exposing the scope of its corruption
(Zarrow, p. 295).
Perhaps the greatest tool Mao used to accelerate his political movement
within China came from the collapse of the KMT‐PLA alliance known as the “Second
United Front,” and by 1941, leaving any semblance of the United Front had become
a pitted, hollowed shell of its once idealistic inception. As previously mentioned in
relation to Chiang’s shift in military strategy, the United Front was an alliance
designed to suspend the civil warfare waging on throughout China and unite the
warring armies to preserve China’s autonomy against the Japanese invasion;
however, while a ceasefire was initially successful, each side continued political
maneuvers to increase their internal base of power in the regions known as “Free
China.” Chiang’s KMT relied heavily on international recognition and strong support
from the United States, and Mao increased his forces’ domestic popularity by
appealing to the masses of disenfranchised rural Chinese in the north, where he held
his (Zarrow, p. 339).
With both factions unilaterally jockeying for greater power, the political war
erupted into violent attacks between the “united” parties by the end of 1940, and in
an event known as The New Fourth Army Incident, Chiang successfully quenched
over nine thousand Communist troops in a highly disputed military outbreak
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(Department of State, pp. 52‐55)1. Regardless of the instigator, the event bolstered
the battle cry for both Mao and Chiang, and the United Front began to deteriorate at
a faster pace. Moreover, the incident marked a turning point in the civil war, as Mao
was better able to capitalize from the political fallout of the event with his
propaganda, and Chiang’s ruthlessness and corruption took center stage across the
country (Kubek, pp. 48‐49).
Again, while the United States continued to pressure Chiang to engage
Japanese forces, the Chinese leader expected heavy military reinforcement from the
US to quickly drive the Japanese invaders out of China from the moment the US
officially declared war on Japan at the end of 1941. If successful, the Communist
forces—which waged several successful guerilla campaigns against the Japanese
army—vulnerable, weak and easy targets for an attack by KMT forces. In September
of 1944, Stilwell noted in his final reports that Chiang still “believes he can go on
milking the United States for money and munitions by using the old gag about
quitting if he is not supported,” further noting that Chiang believes the war in the
Pacific is nearly over…[and that] he can throw the whole burden on [the United
States]” (Department of State, pp. 68‐69). Contrary to Chiang’s expectations,
however, the United States’ focus once it entered the War immediately became the
European Theater, followed by a highly successful island hopping campaign in the
Pacific Ocean. The US had relied on Chiang to support its fight against Japan within
China, but as US forces successfully gained ground in the Pacific, Japanese forces
1 Deterioration of Kuomintang‐Communist Relations, 1938‐1941
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continued their move into China in spite of US pressure on Chiang, which Stilwell
continued to point out in this report.
By the mid 1940’s, the Kuomintang remained the United States’ sole ally in
central China, and President Roosevelt and his military command were still unable
to pressure Chiang to engage and carry out the policies of US military advisors.
Reading reports form General Stilwell regarding the hording of US military supplies,
Roosevelt understood the predicament his command faced in China. In response to
these reports, Roosevelt opened lines of direct communication with Chiang Kai‐shek
several times, as detailed in a letter sent in the early 1940’s. Here, President
Roosevelt cited financial aid reaching over $500 million dollars in support of war
efforts against Japanese forces in the “great battle for freedom” (Department of
State, p. 510). Additionally, Treasure Secretary Morgenthaw submitted a separate
follow‐up letter that reiterated an article within the United Nations’ charter—
previously signed by both the US and Chiang’s government—that mandated all
signers to “employ full resources, military or economic, against those members of
the Tripartite Pact,” for which this (and other) aid was granted (Department of
State, p. 511).
These letters of correspondence were not enough to jolt Generalissimo
Chiang, and the Chinese leader responded by consistently stating that the “Chinese
Communist problem [was] a purely political problem,” insisting that it “should be
solved by political means” (Department of State, p. 530). Additionally, subsequent
reports were sent to Washington, explaining the status of KMT‐PLA diplomacy,
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insisting that several proposals were being drafted to end the political stalemate.
Moreover, the tone of the letters and reports generated for Washington blamed the
core of the political deadlock on the Communist’s inability to accept the Nationalists’
“establishment of constitutional government [and recognize] the legal status of
various political parties” (Department of State, 1949, pp. 530‐544). These
conversations documented political the discontent Chiang’s government had with
its opposition, and General Stilwell’s continued to clash with Chiang over the
directives attached to US aid. As 1943 came to a close, the rivaling Communist
forces had established their own networks in the northern region of Yenan, China,
and Chiang’s lack of progress finally took its toll on the observing eyes of the United
States regional command.
After nearly a decade of resistance from Chiang Kai‐shek, General Stilwell
gradually lost all influence with the Generalissimo; furthermore, Stilwell
increasingly (and openly) criticized his conceived counterpart—action that would
ultimately result in his removal from command the region (Department of State, pp.
510‐511). However, John Paton Davies, a US Foreign Service Officer in the region,
sent President Roosevelt a memo regarding the inherent need to open diplomatic
relations with Mao’s Communist Party of China (CPC) in Yenan (Davies, 1944). The
once classified document carefully outlined the status of Chinese affairs in the early
months of 1944. Davies drew specific attention to the strategic military positions
Communist forces held near Japan’s largest and second largest Chinese‐based
military and industrial centers, respectively. Furthermore, the Communists held
“the most abundant supply of intelligence on Japanese enemy available to [the US]
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anywhere;” were “the most cohesive, disciplined” force combating Japan; and would
be Soviet‐friendly as the force emerged throughout China. Additionally, Davies
noted that further prolonging diplomatic relations with the Yanan forces might
encourage expanded collaboration with Soviet forces, which had previously sent
officials from Moscow to assist Mao in his war efforts.
While US frustration with Chiang’s military inaction was evident, fears of
Soviet influence within China coincided with greater fears of expanded Soviet
hegemony in Europe following the defeat of the Axis Powers. Davies’ specific
mention of Mao’s growing Chinese faction falling under the influence of Russia thus
became a driving factor in supporting the mission to Yanan. Unlike Stilwell’s many
complaints to the President, Roosevelt almost immediately shifted resources to
extend Chinese diplomatic relations to Mao Zedong’s Communist Party, and within
six months, the first team of military and Foreign Service officers were to arrive in
Yenan to meet with Mao.
In early 1944, an Asian tour by then Vice President Henry A Wallace, in
which he visited Soviet Central Asia and Generalissimo Chiang Kai‐shek in China, set
the stage for the arrival of US forces in Yenan. Wallace reported a stark contrast
between Chiang’s China and that of the Soviet Union, but to the dismay of the US
government, the Soviets seemed to have achieved agricultural success while the
Chinese Nationalists were observed as a state of chaos (The Department of State,
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1967, pp. 55‐57)2. With Stilwell’s accounts more than substantiated by the visiting
Vice President, China, General Patrick Harley—a well‐versed and respected private‐
sector negotiator in the US—arrived in Yenan in August of 1944 with a team of
military and State Department officers in what would be known as the first round of
the Dixie Mission.
Upon arrival to Yenan, Hurley immediately reported that he was “convinced
that the Russian Government does not recognize the [CPC] as Communist … [and
that] Russia is not supporting the [CPC]” (Department of State, 1949, p. 73). This
conclusion was shared with several other members of the mission, including John
Service, one of the few Foreign Service Officers in the initial delegation, and the team
began drafting proposals with Mao Zedong to merge the two Chinese factions. After
several months, the US and CPC submitted a “five‐point plan” that was immediately
rejected by the Nationalist government over its proposal to unite the two armies
without either faction holding command over the other; the Nationalists then
responded with a three‐point plan, insisting the Communist government “give their
full support to the National Government in the prosecution of the war
resistance…and give over all their troops to the National Government through the
National Military Council” (The Department of State, 1967, p. 76). This statement
rebuffed the Communist proposal that would have united the armies through
separate military leadership, similar to the United Front. Furthermore, the
remaining four points were reworded to further subjugate the role of the CPC under
2 A Review of Kuomintang‐Communist Relations
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a united government. While Mao’s five‐point plan had relinquished a great deal of
political autonomy in favor of uniting the Chinese military front, Chiang’s self‐
righteous belief that his government was superior in every capacity, prohibited the
Nationalists from proceeding with further negotiations.
Within months, General Hurley was officially anointed Ambassador Hurley at
President Roosevelt’s insistence; but with greater political influence came greater
political consequence, as the mission quickly evolved from a covert fact‐finding
mission with a lofty set of goals, into a mission to unite the two governments
claiming China as their own. Possibly motivated by his elevated diplomatic status,
Hurley’s initially positive review of the Chinese Communists transformed into
skepticism and hostility, as his later reports signaled a lurid distrust of Mao. More
so, Ambassador Hurley’s fundamental understanding of the political situation in
China limited his ability to comprehend and assess the situation. While his
background was in US negotiations with the private sector, Hurley lacked the
background and understanding on the history of the region. For instance, Hurley
viewed the battle between Communist and Nationalist forces as a simple political
dispute—equating differences to disputes between Republicans and Democrats in
the United States (The Department of State, 1967, p. 203).
After encountering the resistance of Chiang’s government to Mao’s proposals,
Hurley carried this believe that China would be able to unite peacefully under
Chiang Kai‐shek’s established Nationalist government to Russia, where he met with
Russian officials Marshal Joseph Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov. During their
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April 15, 1945, meeting, the two parties agreed that neither Chinese faction fit the
definition of a “communist” government—though both sides had previous ties to
Soviet Russia—and that support for uniting the warring parties was necessary in
order to defeat Japan (The Department of State, 1967, pp. 94‐95)3. Additionally,
Hurley and his Russian counterparts also decided to support Chiang Kai‐shek’s
government, allowing Mao’s Communist Party to represent their faction in the
international accords scheduled to follow the concluding war. However, to Mao, the
policies adopted by the US and Russia placed a permanent ban on the disbursement
of arms and funding for any government not ordained by Chiang, causing suspicion
of the United States’ objective nature in negotiating peace.
After nearly a year in China, Harley failed to make significant diplomatic
headway in negotiating a peace between the two factions due to Chiang Kai‐shek’s
stonewalling efforts. General Chiang continued to view Mao’s party as subservient
to his Nationalists, and Chiang’s stubbornness further extrapolated the reports
General Stilwell had issued during his tenure by Chiang’s side. With disagreement
on a key provision of Hurley’s five point plan and Hurley’s inability to comprehend
the deep wounds between the two factions, stalemate ensued, and the Hurley
mission was recalled.
While General Hurley was unable to reinvigorate the damaged United Front,
his team made great inroads in establishing diplomatic ties with the Chinese
Communists. As mentioned before, Hurley’s mission did not view the Mao’s
3 Ambassador Hurley’s Interview with Marshal Stalin, April 15, 1945
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Communist party as a hostile extension of Soviet Russia, and the CPC accommodated
their American visitors and treated their diplomatic efforts with the utmost regard.
Clearly Mao had seen the support the United States had given to Chiang, felt the
drawback of Soviet support as the war slid in the favor of the Allied Powers, and
sought the opportunity to capitalize from the discontent the United States had with
his rival KMT forces. This first mission established a successful line of
communication between Washington and Yenan, and while the United States was
unable to resolve China’s internal conflict, a foundation for military and intelligence
cooperation was established between the US and the CPC, dramatically expanding
the level of US influence throughout Communist China.
The first mission to Yenan concluded as World War II came to an end, and
with its failure to unify China, a second mission—still a part of the same Observation
Group—was dispatched to China after the in late 1945 to pick up where Hurley’s
mission had not succeeded. This second mission focused less on extending
diplomatic ties with the Communists, the focus of the Dixie Mission shifted
completely to negotiating a permanent peace between the two warring factions.
However, the once high aspirations of US diplomacy to reinvigorate the Chinese war
effort began to fade as the Axis Powers were defeated in Europe, and by August, one
year after the Dixie Mission first arrived in Yenan, Japan surrendered to the United
States after atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Iwo Jima and
Okinawa. US leadership had also changed by the second incarnation of the Mission,
as Harry S Truman became President after Franklin Roosevelt died in office. These
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events concurred within four months of each other, and the timeliness placed the
fate of China on the backburner of US foreign policy.
Economic rejuvenation and political unification efforts began to take center
stage in United States foreign policy, drawing considerable attention away from the
ailing China situation, and General George Marshall was sent to follow up where
Hurley had left off. However, by the time Marshall replaced Hurley in China, Mao’s
political momentum and his domestic policies began to gain new traction as a
political vacuum formed with the abrupt vacancy of the Japanese army. While Mao
did not, and could not, accept surrender from the Japanese militants—Soviet troops
were ushered in to do so—Mao had the only Chinese forces in these regions, and his
guerilla warfare strategy was beginning to see the first fruits of the decade‐long
resistance effort (Zarrow, pp. 274‐276). With the Japanese threat eliminated and
with US resources focusing on dozens of post‐war power struggles around the
world, General Chiang entered the final phase of the Chinese Civil War grasping for
General Marshall’s diplomatic help in unifying his country.
Because the war came to a close so quickly, US never provided the
Kuomintang with the ground support Chiang once expected, and because the
Generalissimo refused to take the Japanese head‐on in Manchuria, Mao quickly
capitalized on the prompt surrender of the Japanese military. Chiang’s plans began
to fall apart, and General Marshall began directing Chiang’s military strategy. While
Chiang was finally listening, his actions came too little, too late.
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General Marshall, together with Albert Wedemeyer, increased aid to the
Chiang Regime, while insisting that the Communists fold their operations into the
KMT government. Between 1945 and 1946, the US again attempted to bridge a path
to peace by convincing Chiang to demilitarizing troops and returning to negotiations
with the Communists, but by this time, Mao had amassed a loyal army totaling over
1 million troops, was seizing the stockpiles of arms left by the Japanese in
Manchuria, established an effective administration over about 90 million people,
began gathering intelligence from within the decaying Nationalist Army through
CCP operatives (Zarrow, p. 297). Inversely, the Nationalists were battling inflation,
a stagnant economy, and a decreasingly effective military (Zarrow, pp. 322‐323).
With Chinese Communists bolstered by resources and positioning gained by the
Japanese’s mass departure in 1945, full‐fledged warfare resumed following the Dixie
Mission’s final diplomatic impasse, and battling continued in 1947 until the
Nationalists fled to the island of Formosa to establish their government miles away
from the arms of Communist China.
With the expulsion of the Chinese Nationalist Party to Taiwan, the Chinese
Communists ascended upon Beijing to take command of a reunified Chinese
mainland. As the KMT government slowly lost ground to the People’s Liberation
Army, Chiang Kai‐shek and his supporters vacated successfully to Taiwan to re‐
establish their government where Mao could not attack. With the fall of the KMT on
China’s mainland, the efforts at Yenan to unify the Chinese political factions officially
ended in failure. The factors leading to the change in perception of Chiang’s
government—ignorance of US military commands, the squandering of allied forces’
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funds, mass corruption, decadence displayed by KMT leadership, and the stubborn
political will of Chiang Kai‐shek himself—eventually doomed his political movement
as Mao capitalized on his faults.
Furthermore, Mao’s inclusion of as many political factions under his
Communist doctrine’s umbrella allowed him to unite several opposing views,
including those of the warlording factions. Clearly Mao’s approach succeeded
where Chiang’s had failed, and the US delegation to Yemen had noted and
encouraged Chiang to draw upon the success of this approach. Unfortunately,
Chiang further relied upon allied forces drive out the Japanese invasion, and Mao
was better positioned to fill the power vacuum when upon the surrender of the
Japanese to the US in 1945. Ultimately, the Communist approach gained greater
acceptance, and the Dixie Mission’s attempts to unify China failed.
While Chinese political unification became the main goal of the Dixie mission,
the diplomatic goals of the mission were extremely successful. Here, US forces
forged relationships with the CPC, finding common ground in their efforts to thwart
the Japanese and while the US gained a greater understanding of the Chinese
Communist mission and of their culture. Once the KMT vacated Mainland China—
supposedly to plan an invasion of the mainland to depose the ruling Communist
Party—the United States relations with the KMT continued as a “One China” was
established, causing most countries to choose between forging relations with one
government over the other. This divide left the government of Mainland China—
now called the People’s Republic of China—to undergo several failed domestic
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economic programs before the 1970’s when the United States reestablished ties
with the PRC.
Because of the Dixie Mission, President Nixon was able to relate a common
event and share the previous positive relations between the US and Communist
China. Again, the diplomatic mission of the US trip to Yenan was a general success,
and generated further diplomatic success several decades later. The positive
aspects of the Dixie Mission seem to outweigh its failures, yet the premise and
eventual failings of the mission remain rooted in China’s internal struggle. If not for
the magnitude of the Chinese Civil War, the US would not have invested as much
energy in the region by sending diplomats during and after the Japanese invasion to
negotiate the internal peace.
Because of the extensive size of the United States’ war efforts in the 1940’s,
US leadership was forced to support goals and strategies that indicated certain
success, and the Soviet Union’s positioning after World War II—in which the Soviets
held military personnel in Eastern Europe, Manchuria, and North Korea—further
diverted attention from diplomatic relations like China. While a unified China had
become a top priority of the Dixie Mission, the larger goal was to defeat the
Japanese, and by mid 1945, that goal was accomplished, and with the consequences
of China’s internal politics holding significantly less weight against rebuilding
Europe and counter‐balancing the Soviets, the post‐war portion of the Dixie Mission
concluded quickly with diplomatic stalemate. If not for the rapid, concurrent
conclusion of events around the world, the Chiang Kai‐shek may have received the
Thulin 22
military support he had relied on, and the Dixie Mission may have witnessed the
unification of China under Chiang Kai‐shek’s regime rather than its overthrow and
outcast by the Chinese Communists.
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Bibliography
Davies, J. (1944, January 15). Observers' Mission to North China. Retrieved April 2,
2008, from Wikipedia:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9d/JPDmemo.jpg
Department of State. (1949). United States Relations with China. Washington, DC,
USA: Office of Public Affairs, Division of Publications.
Esherick, J. W. (1986). Reform and Revolution in China. Berkeley, California, USA:
University of California Press.
Kubek, A. (1973). Red China Papers. New Rochelle, NY, USA: Arlington House
Publishers.
The Department of State. (1967). The China White Paper (Vol. 1). Stanford,
California, USA: Stanford University Press.
Zarrow, P. (2005). China in War and Revolution: 18951949. New York, New York,
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