You are here: Home / Case Digest: Labrador v.

CA (184 SCRA 170)

CASE DIGEST: LABRADOR V. CA (184 SCRA 170)
Published by paul on July 1, 2013 |
Labrador v. C 184 SCRA 170

FACTS:
Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However, during probate proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition on the
ground that the will has been extinguished by implication of law alleging that before Melecios death, the land was sold to them evidenced by
TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold it to Navat. Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null and void. However, the CA
on appeal denied probate on the ground that it was undated.

ISSUE:
W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of CC.

HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The onlyrequirements are that the date be in the
will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. It states that
this being in the month of March 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and orinstruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the
one who made this writing is no other than Melecio Labrador, their father. This clearly shows that this is a unilateral act of Melecio who plainly
knew that he was executing a will.

CASE DIGEST: RODELAS V. ARANZA (119 SCRA 16)
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Rodelas v. Aranza 119 SCRA 16

FACTS:
Rodelas filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor.

Aranza, et al. filed a MTD on the grounds of:
1.Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as
required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
2.the copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect after death,
and therefore it was not a will, it was merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the
decedent;
3.the hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect because lost or destroyed
holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
4.the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
MTD was denied. Aranza et al. filed an MR, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will stating that in the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the
Supreme Court held that in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof
of authenticity of said wills.
And that the alleged holographic will was executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. The lapse of more than
14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent and the fact that the original of the will could not be located
shows to that the decedent had discarded the allegedholographic will before his death.
Rodelas filed an MR which was denied. Rodelas appealed to the CA. Aranza et al. moved to forward the case to the SC as it involves
a question of law not of fact.

ISSUE:
W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.

HELD:
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of
the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made by the probate court with the
standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce
no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that Perhaps it may
be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court,



You are here: Home / Case Digest: Kalaw v. Relova (132 SCRA 237)
CASE DIGEST: KALAW V. RELOVA (132 SCRA 237)
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Kalaw v. Relova 132 SCRA 237

FACTS:
On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the probate of her
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that the
holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as
required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading: Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will the
testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
ROSAs position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir
thereunder.
Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will. Reconsideration denied.

ISSUE:
W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full
signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.

HELD:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not been noted under his
signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original
heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that
the entire Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To state that the
Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be
given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic Will, which affect
only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and
alterations made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.


You are here: Home / Case Digest: Ajero v. CA (236 SCRA 488)
CASE DIGEST: AJERO V. CA (236 SCRA 488)
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Ajero v. CA 236 SCRA 488

FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testaments body nor the signature therein was in decedents handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was also contested by Dr.
Ajero with respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its
entirety, as she was not its sole owner. However, the trial court still admitted the decedents holographic will to probate. The trial court held that
since it must decide only the question of the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason
for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain
dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations
made had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not complies with.
HELD:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its
probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance
with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will
or on testators signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.

It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article
813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC and not those found in
Articles 813 and 814 are essential to the probate of a holographic will. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil
Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:

1.whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
2.whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3.whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and
4.whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject
should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator
himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by
the testator.


You are here: Home / Case Digest: Codoy v. Calugay (312 SCRA 333)
CASE DIGEST: CODOY V. CALUGAY (312 SCRA 333)
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Codoy v. Calugay 312 SCRA 333

FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due executi on of the will on 30
August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They
raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured. Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the
deceased.

The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to as the same was already
destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also
testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.

The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will
was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared i n the latters
application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she
had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which granted
the probate.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine
signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceaseds holographic will.

HELD:
1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of di scretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or
write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about the will
from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is
contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.


You are here: Home / Case Digest: Azaola v. Singson (109 P 102)
CASE DIGEST: AZAOLA V. SINGSON (109 P 102)
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Azaola v. Singson 109 P 102

FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria
Azaola was made the soleheir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on
the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him
and his wife; and that it was in the testatrixs handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power
of attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence certificates showing the testatrixs signature
were also exhibited for comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was
actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare
that the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probatebeing contested; and because the lone witness presented did not
prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.
Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness because the wills authenticity was not questioned;
and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a
holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

ISSUE:
W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.

HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce
more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no
witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious
that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a
question of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses who know the handwriting and signature of the testator and
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator.
There may be no available witness of the testators hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no
qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the
will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the wills authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the
other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in fact i t should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines ofinquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent
that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.


You are here: Home / Case Digest: Gan v. Yap (104 P 509)
CASE DIGEST: GAN V. YAP (104 P 509)
Published by paul on July 1, 2013 | Leave a response
Gan v. Yap 104 P 509

FACTS:
Felicidad Yap died of a heart failure, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in Manila.
Fausto E. Gan, her nephew, initiated the proceedings in the Manila CFI with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by
the deceased. The will was not presented because Felicidads husband, Ildefonso, supposedly took it. What was presented were witness
accounts of relatives who knew of her intention to make a will and allegedly saw it as well. According to the witnesses, Felicidad did not want her
husband to know about it, but she had made known to her other relatives that she made a will.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during
her lifetime. After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Judge refused to probate the alleged will on account of the
discrepancies arising from the facts. For one thing, it is strange that Felicidad made her will known to so many of her relatives when she wanted
to keep it a secret and she would not have carried it in her purse in the hospital, knowing that her husband may have access to it. There was
also no evidence presented that her niece was her confidant. In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositors
evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.

ISSUE:
1. May a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting
of the testator?

2. W/N Felicidad could have executed the holographic will.

HELD:

1. No. The will must be presented.
The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines,
and need not be witnessed.

This is a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190, which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills
to be subscribed by the testator and three credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used
and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the testator and of each other. Authenticity and
due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony
of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available.
From the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity
of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.

With regard to holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as stated, they need no witnesses; provided
however, that they are entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself.
In the probate of a holographic will says the New Civil Code, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and
signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least
three such witnesses shall be required. In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedents handwriting) and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

The witnesses need not have seen the execution of the holographic will, but they must be familiar with the decedents handwri ting. Obviously,
when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of
authenticity the testators handwriting has disappeared.

The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary evidence the testimony of
witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made
here. Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills? (NO)

Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen an implied admission
that such loss or theft renders it useless.

As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either
its execution or its contents, the above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they know of the
will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it. Obviously, this they cant do unless the will itself is presented
to the Court and to them.

This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the Spanish Civil Code provisions on the
matter.(According to the Fuero, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his holographic will, unless they are
shown his handwriting and signature.

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will
may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by
testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the
handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic
will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary) deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be
checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy
with the testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end themselves to any fraudulent scheme
to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive anything on account of the will.
Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible only one man could engineer the fraud this way: after making a
clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see
and read the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all good faith affirm its genuineness and
authenticity. The will having been lost the forger may have purposely destroyed it in an accident the oppositors have no way to expose
the trick and the error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may consist of two or three pages,
and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.
If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the
several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and
teachers of Civil Law.

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely
the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the
handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the
handwriting itself is not at hand.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein
petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6.

2. No. Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein
petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct proof required by Rule 77,
sec. 6.


You are here: Home / Case Digest: Dela Cerna v. Potot (12 SCRA 576)
CASE DIGEST: DELA CERNA V. POTOT (12 SCRA 576)
Published by paul on July 2, 2013 | Leave a response
Dela Cerna v. Potot 12 SCRA 576

FACTS:
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will ad testament where they willed that their 2 parcels of land be
given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.
Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court admitted for probate the said will but only for the
part of Bernabe.
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted by Manuela, but because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the
petition was dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. On
appeal, the order was reversed.

ISSUE:
W/N the will may be probated.

HELD:
Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was probated by a court of competent jurisdicti on it has
conclusive effect and a final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world. However, this is only with
respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.
The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated de novo.
The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to the disposition
of the wife, the will cannot be given effect.
A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of the will subject to such probate.


You are here: Home / Case Digest: Roxas v. De Jesus (134 SCRA 245)
CASE DIGEST: ROXAS V. DE JESUS (134 SCRA 245)
Published by paul on July 1, 2013 | Leave a response
Roxas v. De Jesus 134 SCRA 245

FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the deceased and also delivered the holographic
will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a letter-will entirely written and signed
in deceaseds handwriting. The will is dated FEB./61 and states: This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature.
Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic
will must signify the year, month, and day.

ISSUE:
W/N the date FEB./61 appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of
the Civil Code.
HELD:
Valid date.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution
of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed
in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will
should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or
purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil.
476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a
testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there
any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely
written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will
is fatally defective because the date FEB./61 appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code.
This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the date in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar,
there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date FEB./61 appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.


Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER

FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the
deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the
will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even
illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will
was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case bearing the signature
of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voters affidavit, but failed to as the same was
already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceaseds niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceaseds signature and handwriting as she used
to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece
also testified that the deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the
signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latters application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth
where she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonals demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals
which granted the probate.

ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine
signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceaseds holographic will.

HELD:
1. YES. The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the voters affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceaseds niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact
about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by
the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as
to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain
and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.
The word shall connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute, is mandatory.