Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill

Table of Contents
1 Overview
2 Deepwater Horizon
3 Explosion and fire
4 Casualties and rescue efforts
5 BP Investigation
6 Magnitude of the spill
6.1 Government assessment of the leak
6.2 Ongoing debate about the leak
7 Geographic extent of the spill
7.1 Extent of surface oil
7.2 Extent of oil in the water column
8 The "spillcam" phenomenon
9 The Spill in Context
9.1 Natural seeps
10 Attempts to stop the leak
11 The cleanup
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Encyclopedia of Earth
Articl e Tools:
Lead Author: Cutler J. Cleveland (other articles)
Article Topics: Pollution, Marine ecology, Fisheries and Oceans
This article has been reviewed and approved by the following Topic Editors: C Michael Hogan (other articles) and
Peter Saundry (other articles)
Last Updated: June 10, 2010
Revised 10 June 2010; 5:32 PM EDT
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also known as the Gulf of
Mexico Oil Spill or the BP Oil Spill) is a large ongoing oil spill
caused by an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon offshore
oil platform about 50 miles southeast of the Mississippi River
delta on April 20, 2010 (28.74N, 88.39W). Most of the 126
workers on the platform were safely evacuated, and a
search and rescue operation began for 11 missing workers.
The Deepwater Horizon sank in about 5,000 feet (1,500 m)
of water on April 22, 2010. On April 23 the U.S. Coast
Guard suspended the search for missing workers who are
all presumed dead.
BP was principal developer of the Macondo Prospect oil
field where the accident occurred. The Deepwater Horizon,
owned by Transocean Ltd., was under a contract with BP to
drill an exploratory well. BP was the lessee and principal
developer of the Macondo Prospect oil field in which the rig
was operating. At the time of the explosion, BP and
Transocean were in the process of closing the well in
anticipation of later production. Halliburton had
Deepwater Horizon oil spill - Encyclopedia of Earth http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill
1 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
11.1 Controlled burns
11.2 Chemical dispersants
11.3 Construction of sand berms
12 Paying for the clean up
13 Ecological concerns
13.1 Fish and Wildlife Collection Report
14 Antecedent events
14.1 Exclusion from environmental review
14.2 Questions about Blowout Preventers
14.3 Questions About Cementing
15 Government response
15.1 Timeline of key actions
15.2 Drilling moratorium
15.3 The Obama Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Legislative Package
15.4 Problems in the Minerals Management Service
15.5 Criticism of the Administration Response
15.6 The Response by Congress
16 Economic Impacts
17 BP environmental and safety record
17.1 Exxon Valdez oil spill
17.2 California oil refineries
17.3 Texas City refinery disaster
17.4 Prudhoe Bay oil spill
17.5 BP and low carbon energy
18 Endnotes
19 Sources
The Deepwater Horizon oil platform ablaze on April 21, 2010. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.
recently completed cementing of casings in the well. The
U.S. Government has named BP as the responsible party in
the incident and will hold the company accountable for all
cleanup costs resulting from the oil spill. BP has accepted
responsibility for the oil spill and the cleanup costs but
indicated that the accident was not their fault as the rig was
run by Transocean personnel.
The sinking of the platform caused crude oil to gush out of
the riser the 5,000-foot pipe that connects the well at the
ocean floor to the drilling platform on the surface. Attempts
to shut down the flow, first estimated at about 1,000 barrels
of oil a day, failed when a safety device called a blowout
preventer could not be activated. On April 28, government
officials said there were three leaks and the well was spilling
over 5,000 barrels of oil a day over 200,000 gallons
nearly a mile below sea level. The exact spill flow rate is
uncertain and is part of an ongoing debate. Some
independent estimates made in the initial days of the
accident put the spill rate as in the range of 20,000 to
100,000 barrels per day.
On May 27, 2010, a U.S. government team of experts
announced its determination that the overall best initial
estimate for the lower and upper boundaries of flow rates of
oil is in the range of 12,000 and 19,000 barrels per day. By
June 7, this amounted to between 564,000 barrels (23.7
million gallons) and 893,000 barrels (37.5 million gallons)
released since April 22, making the Deepwater Horizon by
far the worst accidental release of oil in U.S. history. On
June 3, BP installed a containment system on the leaking
well that was capturing 11,000 barrels per day by June 7.
Live video feeds from the well site a mile beneath the water's
surface show a sizable amount continues to escape from
the area of the containment cap.
Prior to the Deepwater Horizon, the largest oil spill in U.S.
waters was in 1968 when the tanker Mandoil II spilled about
300,000 barrels into the Pacific Ocean off Columbia River
near Warrenton, Oregon. The 1989 wreck of the Exxon
Valdez released about 261,905 barrels (11 million gallons)
of crude oil into Prince Williams Sound in Alaska. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused a spill of eight million gallons of crude and refined oil products
from many different point sources into the southern corridor of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico. In 1979-80, the Ixtoc 1 exploratory well
operated the PEMEX, the Mexican national oil corporation, experienced a blowout and ultimately released about 3.3 million barrels (140 million
gallons) of crude oil into the Bay of Campeche in Mexico.
The oil slick produced by the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill has covered as much 28,958
square miles (75,000 square kilometers), an
area about the size of South Carolina, with
the extent and location of the slick changing
from day to day depending on weather
conditions. By the first week in June, oil had
come ashore in Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida, with significant wildlife
fatalities in Louisiana. In the weeks following
the accident, scientists discovered enormous
oil plumes in the deep waters of the Gulf of
Mexico, raising concerns about ecological
harm far below the surface that would be
difficult to assess.
The surface slick threatens the ecosystems
and the economy of the entire Gulf Coast
region. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
reported that up to 32 National Wildlife
Refuges could potentially be affected by the
spill. Concerns haver also been raised about
the environmental impacts of chemicals
known as dispersants that have been used to
dissipate the oil slick. By June 2, 2010, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) had banned fishing in
about 37% of federal waters, or 88,522 sq mi (229,270 sq km) of the Gulf.
By June 9, BP stock had lost close to half its value, more than $82 billion, in the seven weeks since the spill started, and the company had spent
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The Deepwater Horizon before the
disaster. Credit: Transocean.
Firefighters combat the fire on the
Deepwater Horizon. Credit: U.S. Coast
Guard.
$1.43 billion, including the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling, grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs.
With oil still flowing from the leak seven weeks after the accident, it was clear that the oil industry's impressive ability to extract oil from ever deeper
offshore environments had not been accompanied by an equally effective capability to predict and respond to accidents. As drillers pushed the
boundaries, regulators didn't always mandate preparation for disaster recovery or perform independent monitoring. Documents and testimony from
Congressional hearings revealed a series of potential failures and warning signs at the well site in the hours leading up to the rig explosion, as well as
questions that had been raised years earlier about the reliability of deepwater technology and the ability of the industry to deal with "worse-case
scenarios" of accidents. The Minerals Management Service, the government agency with lead oversight of offshore oil and gas activity, came under
heavy criticism for lax environmental planning and for sacrificing sound stewardship of a public natural resource for the narrow economic gain to
private industry.
Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, column-stabilized,
semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU). The rig was 396 feet (121 m) long and 256
feet (78 m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m) deep, to a maximum drill
depth of 30,000 feet (9,100 m). Built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea and completed in
2001, the rig was owned by Transocean Ltd. and leased to BP until September 2013. At the time of
the explosion, the rig was on BP's Mississippi Canyon Block 252, referred to as the Macondo
Prospect, in the United States sector of the Gulf of Mexico, about 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisiana
coast. The rig commenced drilling in February 2010 at a water depth of approximately 5,000 feet
(1,500 m). The well was planned to be drilled to 18,000 feet (5,500 m), and was to be plugged and
abandoned for subsequent completion as a subsea producer.
The fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon reportedly started at 9:45 p.m. CST on April 20, 2010.
Survivors described the incident as a sudden explosion that gave them less than five minutes to
escape as the alarm went off. Video of the fire shows billowing flames, taller than a multistory building. After burning for more than a day, Deepwater
Horizon sank on April 22, 2010.
The precise cause of the explosion and fire that led to the oil spill are under investigation. The
current hypothesis about the chain of events is as follows. Transocean, Ltd., representatives said
workers had been performing their standard routines with "no indication of any problems" just
prior to the explosion. At the time of the explosion the rig was drilling but was not in production.
Production casing was being run and cemented at the time of the accident. Once the cementing
was complete, it was due to be tested for integrity and a cement plug set to temporarily abandon
the well for later completion as a subsea producer. Halliburton said that it had finished cementing
20 hours before the fire. Interviews with rig workers suggest that a bubble of methane gas
escaped from the well and shot up the drill column, expanding quickly as it burst through several
seals and barriers before exploding. Transocean chief executive Steven Newman stated: "there
was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both."
At the time of the explotion there were 126 people on the Deepwater Horizon platform; of these, 115 individuals were evacuated. Most of the workers
evacuated the rig and took diesel-powered fiberglass lifeboats to the M/V Damon B Bankston, a workboat that BP had hired to service the rig; some
were then evacuated from the workboat by helicopter to regional trauma centers. The United States Coast Guard launched a rescue operation
involving two cutters, four helicopters and a rescue plane. After a three-day search covering 5,300 miles, the Coast Guard called off the search for
the 11 missing persons, concluding that the "reasonable expectations of survival" had passed. Officials concluded that the missing workers may have
been near the blast and not been able to escape the sudden explosion.
On May 24, 2010, BP announced that its internal investigation of the Deepwater Horizon event suggested that the accident was brought about by the
failure of a number of processes, systems and equipment. BP's internal investigation is focused on the following seven mechanisms.
The cement that seals the reservoir from the well; 1.
The casing system, which seals the well bore; 2.
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A video of the oil leak taken by a
remotely operated underwater vehicle.
Credit: PBS.
Oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill pools against the Louisiana coast along Barataria Bay. Credit: Associated Press
The pressure tests to confirm the well is sealed; 3.
The execution of procedures to detect and control hydrocarbons in the well, including the use of the BOP; 4.
The BOP Emergency Disconnect System, which can be activated by pushing a button at multiple locations on the rig; 5.
The automatic closure of the BOP after its connection is lost with the rig; and 6.
Features in the BOP to allow Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) to close the BOP and thereby seal the well at the seabed after
a blow out.
7.
On Friday, April 23, two remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) began scanning the riser to determine if there were any leaks. The discovery
of two leaks was made Saturday morning. BP, and the Coast Guard initially reported that about 1,000 barrels of oil per day were coming from the
leaks on the riser. On April 28, NOAA estimated the leak was likely 5,000 barrels (210,000 US gallons) per day due in part to the discovery of a third
leak. The 5,000 barrel per day figure remained BP and government doctrine for a month after the accident.
On May 12, 2010, BP released a 30 second video clip of the leak that was taken by a camera
mounted to an ROV, which ignited a debate over the magnitude of the leak. At the request of
Senator Bill Nelson (Florida) and Barbara Boxer (California), BP released four videos of the leaks.
Multiple scientists reviewed those videos, remotely sensed data, and information on the
subsurface plume, and concluded that the leak rate was much higher than what BP and the
government had reported. In a U.S. Congressional testimony on May 19, 2010, Steve Wereley, a
professor of mechanical engineering at Purdue University, reviewed the independent leak rate
assessments and reported a range of 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day. These estimates are far
greater than the rate of 5,000 barrels per day cited by BP and the U.S. government. At the higher
leak rates, it would take a few days, at most a week, for the spill to exceed the Exxon Valdez oil
spill's record.
On May 21, 2010, the New York Times published the estimates made by a group of independent
scientists. The group included Steve Wereley from Purdue University, Ian R. MacDonald, an
oceanographer at Florida State University, John Amos, a geologist and remote sensing expert at
Skytruth.org, and Timothy Crone, a marine geophysicist at Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory,
Columbia University. Contrary to BP's claim that the spill rate was impossible to measure, this
group argued that there are at least two ways to measure the rate of the spill. The first method
uses computer image analysis of satellite photos and data to measure the spread and thickness of oil on the ocean surface. Remote sensing images
examined by Amos and MacDonald indicated that at least 26,500 barrels of oil have been reaching the surface each day.
The second method is to measure flow rates at the site of discharge using optical image analysis. Using video released by BP, Wereley and Crone
estimated 60,000 to 75,000 per day. The scientists acknowledge that because the video released was of poor quality, and information regarding the
image scene is sparse, the uncertainties in these measurements are large.
Note that these estimates pertain only to the oil coming from the broken riser pipe resting on the ocean floor. There is a second leak point on the top
of the blow-out preventer whose magnitude is unknown, but it will only increase the estimate of the total flow escaping.
These scientists conclude that the discharge is at least 40,000 barrels per day and could be as much as 100,000 barrels. Their assessments suggest
that BPs stated worst-case estimate of 60,000 barrels has been occurring all along.
Other
independent
analysts
suggest than
any estimate
higher than
about 25,000
barrels per
day is
inconsistent
with actual
production
rates from oil
wells in the
region. Bruce
Bullock,
Director of the Maguire Energy Institute at Southern Methodist University, observed that the record
daily production rate for an unimpeded well in the Gulf is 41,352 barrels per day in BP's Troika
project, and that the discovery well in that project produced only 27,000 barrels per day. Single well
4 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
maximum rates now approach 30,000 barrels per day. Production rates in other new deep water
range from 6,000 to 25,000 barrels per day.
For the first month after the spill, BP and the government repeatedly rejected estimates higher than 5,000 barrels per day, arguing that there is no
way to estimate the flow coming out of the pipe accurately. Instead, they relied on measurements of oil on the sea surface made by the Coast Guard
and NOAA. But on May 20, 2010, BP acknowledged that the spill rate was greater than 5,000 barrels per day because its own recovery effort was
capturing that amount and more was still leaking out. BP's admission bolstered criticism that the government had been lax in measuring the true extent
of the spill and its impacts. Confusion over the spill rate was heightened on May 21, 2010 when BP backed off of its statement that it had begun
siphoning up 5,000 barrels per day, saying instead that the recovery rate was about 2,000 barrels per day.
BP was subject to intense pressure and criticism that it was impeding independent scientific inquiry into the leak. Rep. Edward J. Markey
(Massachusetts) sent a direct request to BP Americas CEO Lamar McKay to release more video footage. Bowing to this pressure, BP announced on
May 19, 2010 that there will be a live feed of the oil spill made publicly available on the web--an oil gusher webcam. BP said they would release the
feed, which went live on May 20, 2010 at the web site of the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global
Warming. Heavy traffic caused the web site to crash.
On May 20, 2010, Jane Lubchenco, head of NOAA, said that a government task force is working "around the clock" to determine the actual flow rate.
On May 21, 2010, Admiral Thad Allen, the National Incident Commander for the Deepwater Horizon Response team, formally established the Flow
Rate Technical Group (FRTG), a multi-agency federal effort to determine oil flow rates from the BP spill. BP continued to maintain that third-party
estimates did not factor in the amount of natural gas escaping from the well, or the damage to the riser and drill pipes after the April 20 explosion,
factors that could depress the amount of oil escaping.
The FRTG announced on May 27 that the overall best initial estimate for the lower and upper boundaries of flow rates of oil is in the range of 12,000
and 19,000 barrels per day. The FRTG used three separate methodologies to calculate its initial estimate:
A mass balance approach analyzed how much oil is on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico using data that was collected from NASAs
Airborne Visible InfraRed Imaging Spectrometer (AVIRIS), an advanced imaging tool. Based on observations on May 17th, the FRTG
estimated that between 130,000 and 270,000 barrels of oil are on the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. The FRTG also estimated that a
similar volume of oil to the amount AVIRIS found on the surface has already been burned, skimmed or dispersed by responders or
has evaporated naturally as of May 17th. This corresponds to a release rate in the range of 12,000 to 19,000 barrels of oil per day.
The Plume Modeling Team used video observations of the oil/gas mixture escaping from the kinks in the riser and at the end of the
riser pipe alongside advanced image analysis to estimate fluid velocity and flow volume. This Team made an initial range estimate of
12,000 to 25,000 barrels of oil per day.
A lower limit was calculated based on the amount of oil collected by the Riser Insertion Tube Tool (RITT), plus the estimate of how
much oil is escaping the RITT, and how much oil is leaking from the kink in the riser. The RITTI Team calculated that the lower
bound estimate of the total oil flow is at least 11,000 barrels of oil per day, depending on whether the flow through the kink is
primarily gas or oil. The lower bound estimate calculated by the RITT Team is more than twice the amount of the earlier flux estimate
of 5,000 barrels of oil per day and is independent of any calculations or model assumptions made by either team above.
Seven weeks after the disaster, the magnitude of the leak remained the subject of intense debate. Some analysts suggested that the leak rate
increased sharply when BP sliced through the riser to install its new collection device on June 3, perhaps much more than the 20 percent increase
that government officials warned might occur when the riser was cut. BP said that the containment cap it placed on the BOP was recovering about
15,000 barrels of oil per day by June 9. That amounts to a significant fraction of the 12,000 to 19,000 barrels a day being released according to
government estimates. However, the video feed of the leak revealed significant quantities still being released, suggesting that the government estimate
was too low.
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Estimates of the size of the surface slick in the Gulf of Mexico formed by oil from
the Deepwater Horizon accident. Data from Skythruth.org.
NASA satellite image surface slick in the Gulf of Mexico
formed by oil from the Deepwater Horizon accident. Credit:
NASA.
Estimates of the extent of the surface oil slick were
derived from data on wind and ocean current
forecasts, as well as analysis of aerial photography
and satellite imagery from a variety of sources. Using
these data, New York Times produced a daily map of
(1) the observed extent where oil was visible on the
surface of the water during aerial surveys of the Gulf,
and (2) the probable extent of the oil slick as
estimated by NOAA of where oil is most likely to go.
The extents may vary widely from day to day because
of changes in wind patterns and ocean currents. One
month after the accident, the surface slick covered an
area of about 16,000 square miles (41,424 square
kilometers), an area about twice the size of the state
of New Jersey.
By May 12, 2010, the Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) had confirmed
shoreline impact at the South Pass and Whiskey
Island. On May 18, 2010, Louisiana officials
confirmed that surface oil had reached and
penetrated the marsh ecosystems at the Head of
Passes, the region where the main stem of the
Mississippi River branches off into three distinct
directions at its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico:
Southwest Pass (west), Pass A Loutre (east) and
South Pass (center). By May 20, 2010, the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality had
confirmed shoreline impact on the Chandeleur
Islands, Whiskey Island, Raccoon Island, South
Pass, East Fourchon/Elmers Island, Grand Isle,
Trinity Island, Brush Island, and the Pass a Loutre area. Marsh Island was added on May 23. On May 20, NOAA, set the total amount of Louisiana
shoreline with oil impact at 34.52 miles; by May 23 the affected coastline was more than 65 miles.
The arrival of the oil onshore was different than the iconic images from the Exxon Valdez spill where crude oil from a tanker spilled onto the surface of
an enclosed body of water close to a rocky, static shoreline. Instead, the BP spill is pouring millions of gallons from the floor of the Gulf 5,000 feet
below in an open sea, and 50 miles from the nearest land, which is composed of broken marshes, river deltas, open bays and barrier islands. The oil
arrived in thin lines on the Louisiana coasts, and some scientists predicted a series of "rolling skirmishes" that will last for months, if not years, even
after the well is finally capped.
On June 1, 2010, red-brown oil is first appeared on Dauphin Island off the coast of Alabama near the mouth of Mobile Bay, and Mississippi Gov.
Haley Barbour said a strand of oil about a meter wide and two miles long has been found on Petit Bois Island near the Mississippi-Alabama border.
On May 19, NOAA concluded that some portion of the oil had reached the
Loop Current in the form of "light to very light sheens". The Loop Current
is a warm ocean current in the Gulf of Mexico that flows northward
between Cuba and the Yucatn peninsula, moves north into the Gulf of
Mexico, loops west and south before exiting to the east through the Florida
Straits. Once in the Loop Current, oil could be carried into the Florida
Keys and the Atlantic Ocean. By May 27, 2010, a change in the current
had trapped a slick of oil in a huge circular eddy that scientists said
appears likely to push slowly west instead of pumping the oil south into the
Florida Keys.
On June 3, scientists at National Center for Atmospheric Research
released the results of a computer modeling study that indicates that oil
from the spill in the Gulf of Mexico might soon extend along thousands of
miles of the Atlantic coast and open ocean as early as the summer of
2010. The computer simulations indicate that, once the oil in the
uppermost ocean has become entrained in the Gulf of Mexicos
fast-moving Loop Current, it is likely to reach Florida's Atlantic coast within
weeks. It can then move north as far as about Cape Hatteras, North
Carolina, with the Gulf Stream, before turning east. Whether the oil will be
a thin film on the surface or mostly subsurface due to mixing in the
uppermost region of the ocean is not known.
On June 4, 2010, the first significant amount of oil arrived on the Florida
coast. State and local officials reported that gooey blobs of oil tar were
washing ashore in growing numbers on the white-sand beaches of the
Florida Panhandle.
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A frame from the high resolution
video of oil and gas being released
from the severed riser pipe on June
3, 2010. Credit: BP
On May 12, scientists at the National Institute for Undersea Science and Technology (NIUST) discovered why they described as large oil plumes in
the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, including one as large as 10 miles long, three miles wide and 300 feet thick in spots. The plumes were
recorded at depths of 1,0001,400 meters. Initial reports suggested that the plumes are depleting the oxygen dissolved in the water column, which
could pose a threat to marine life forms at varying trophic levels.
On May 27 2010, scientists from the University of South Florida and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Research Institute reported a new, wide area of
dissolved hydrocarbons that is about six miles wide, and extends from the surface down to a depth of about 3,200 feet. The plume stretches 22 miles
northeast of the blown wellhead toward Mobile Bay, Alabama. Yhey discovered the plume while they were taking watersamples in the DeSoto
Canyon off the Florida Panhandle. The plume is clear, with the oil entirely dissolved. Scientists need to do more tests to determine whether those
hydrocarbons are from the chemical dispersants used to break up the oil, or the emulsification of oil as it flowed away from the well.
A month after the accident, some scientists criticized the government of failing to conduct an adequate scientific analysis of the damage and of
allowing BP to obscure the spills true scope. They point to a 2003 study by the National Academy of Sciences, which suggested that the oil in a
deepwater blowout could break into fine droplets, forming plumes of oil mixed with water that would not quickly rise to the surface. Critics charge that
NOAA should have been better prepared to assess the fate and transport of oil below the surface.
On May 30, 2010, scientists from the University of Georgia reported the existence of the underwter plume based on two pieces of evidence. First,
data from their Conductivity, Temperature, Depth (CTD) Sensor indicate a plume that extends from about 1100m to 1300m in the water column.
Second, oil was clearly visible in water samples taken within the plume, but absent from samples taken above and below the plume.
On June 8, 2010, NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco announced that tests on the samples taken by the University of South Florida research team
confirmed "very low" concentrations of subsurface oil at sampling depths ranging from the surface to 3,300 feet at locations 40 and 42 nautical miles
northeast of the well sites, and another sampling station at 142 nautical miles southeast of the wellhead. Chemical "fingerprinting" confirmed that the
oil 42 nautical miles from the well site was from the BP oil spill source.
One of the most important forces driving the response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster was the "spillcam"--live video footage of the leak and
recovery operations that was taken by cameras mounted on the ROVs and streamed live on the Web. Video from the spillcam shaped scientific
debate about the extent of the oil release, fueled public outrage towards BP, and emboldened politicians to pressure BP for more data and a faster
response.
On May 12, 2010, BP released a 30 second video clip of the leak that
was taken by a camera mounted to an ROV, which ignited a debate
over the magnitude of the leak. At the request of Senator Bill Nelson
(Florida) and Barbara Boxer (California), BP released four videos of
the leaks. Rep. Edward J. Markey (Massachusetts) sent a direct
request to BP Americas CEO Lamar McKay to release more video
footage. Bowing to this pressure, BP announced on May 19, 2010
that there will be a live feed of the oil spill made publicly available on
the web--an oil gusher webcam. BP said they would release the feed,
which went live on May 20, 2010 at the web site of the U.S. House of
Representatives' Select Committee for Energy Independence and
Global Warming. Heavy traffic caused the web site to crash.
On May 21, 2010. PBS Newshour was among the first to convert the video feed to make it work on most Web browsers; subscribers to the
Newshour channel on YouTube doubled in 24 hours. Since then thousands of web sites have linked to the video supplied by BP. Within a few days,
BP oil spill live feed was close to the top of a list of searches on Google.
On June 8, 2010, BP released the first high-quality video if the leak after Sens. Barbara Boxer and Bill Nelson requested "full access to all video" to
help independent experts determine the exact rate of oil flowing from the well. The high-resolution video shows the ruptured well two days after robots
cut the well's riser pipe in preparation for the containment cap. Some scientists and politicians criticized BP for withholding all the high quality video
that would increase understanding of the extent of the leak.
Oil enters the marine environment from a variety of natural and human sources. The largest sources from human activity originate in the exploration,
production and transportation stages of the oil and gas industry. These include offshore oil platforms, tankers, pipelines, barges, railroads, trucks and
various oil storage facilties. The ten largest individual releases of oil from accidents in the U.S. are:
April 22, 2010, Deepwater Horizon, Gulf of Mexico, off Louisiana: 564,000 - 893,000 barrels (through June
7, 2010)
1.
February 29, 1968, Mandoil II, Pacific Ocean, off Columbia River, Warrenton, OR: 300,000 barrels 2.
March 24,1989, Exxon Valdez, Prince William Sound, Valdez, AK: 261,905 barrels 3.
7 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
Estimates on the quantity of oil
released from the Deepwater
Horizon accident, from natural oil
seeps in the entrie Gulf of Mexico,
and from some notable historic U.S
oil spills. Data sources: Deepwater
Horizon: this article; natural seeps:
Schmidt Etkin, 2009 and NRC,
2003; U.S. oil spills: Schmidt Etkin,
2009
November 1, 1979, Burmah Agate, Gulf of Mexico, off Galveston Bay, TX: 254,762 barrels 4.
February 8, 1968, Pegasus (Pegasos), Northwest Atlantic Ocean, off U.S. east coast: 228,500 barrels 5.
March 26, 1971, Texaco Oklahoma, Northwest Atlantic Ocean, off U.S. east coast: 225,000 barrels 6.
November 5, 1969 Keo, Northwest Atlantic Ocean, SE of Nantucket Island, MA: 209,524 barrels 7.
December 12, 1976, Argo Merchant, Nantucket Shoals, off Nantucket Island, MA: 183,333 barrels 8.
April 4, 1975, Spartan Lady, Northwest Atlantic Ocean, off U.S. east coast: 142,857 barrels 9.
October 24, 1966, Gulfstag, Gulf of Mexico: 133,000 barrels 10.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused a spill of about 190,000 barrels (8 million gallons) of crude and refined oil products from many different point
sources into the southern corridor of the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico.
Except for theDeepwater Horizon, all of the accdients in the list involve oil tankers. Prior to the Deepwater Horizon, the largest release of oil from a
platform accident was the Alpha Well 21 Platform A disaster in 1969--also known as the Santa Barbara oil spill--which released about 100,000
barrels of oil. The Deepwater Horizon passed that mark in the first six to nine days.
Natural seeps can be thought of as natural springs from which liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons (hydrogen-carbon compounds) leak out of the
ground. Oil seeps are fed by natural underground accumulations of oil and natural gas. Satellite images have identified hundreds of areas in the
where oil is likley to seep from the Earth's crust into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. These seeps occur over a wide range of the 615,000 mi (1.6
million km) Gulf. A 2003 study by the National Academy of Sciences and a 2009 report by oil spill expert Dagmar Schmidt Etkin indicate that
between 560,000 and 1,400,000 barrels per year (1,534 to 3,835 barrels per day) seep into the Gulf of Mexico from natural sources, and presumably
have been doing so for millennia. Dozens of natural seeps have been identified off the coasts of Louisiana and Texas, some in the region of the
Deepwater Horizon site.
These natural seeps are quasi-continuous or chronic inputs that represent a "background" rate of oil
input that have been in existence for hundreds or thousands of years. As the term "seep" implies, the
rate of release from these sources of oil is much smaller than human spills that often release large,
concentrated pulses of oil. One of the largest and most intensively studied seepage areas lies off Coal
Oil Point, in Santa Barbara County, California. Individual seeps in this area release an estimated 80 to
100 barrels (3,360 to 4,200 gallons) of oil per day; Deepwater Horizon is releasing 12,000 to 19,000
barrels per day.
The Deepwater Horizon site releases 3 to 12 times the oil per day compared to that released by
natural seeps across the entire Gulf of Mexico. By May 30, the Deepwater Horizon site had released
between 468,000 and 741,000 barrels of oil, compared to 60,000 to 150,000 barrels from natural
seeps across the entire Gulf of Mexico over the same 39 day period.
Natural seeps are not constantly active; the volume of oil released can vary considerably throughout
the day and from day to day. As a result, only a small area around the source is actually exposed to
"fresh" non-degraded oil, which is its most toxic state.
Marine and coastal organisms and ecosystems presumably have adapted to the natural rate of oil
input. Indeed, most organisms living in the regions near natural oil seeps have no special adaptations
to the oil. Researchers at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute and the University of California/Santa
Barbara studied natural seeps off the coast of California. They found that as the oil moved upwards in
the water column, a wide range of microbes consume the oil and produce intermediate products, and
that those intermediate products are then converted by another group of microbes to natural gas and
other compounds. Their research suggests that oil from natural seeps normally stays in the water for
between ten hours to five days.
Oil that does make it to the surface from natural seeps can spread out very widely. One gallon of oil
can spread out to cover more than a full square mile, forming an extremely thin film on the surface,
about one-hundredth of a millimeter thick. Under these conditions, the oil is not hazardous. Some of the oil in that thin sheen evaporates within
seconds or minutes after it reaches the surface.
A sudden, concentrated and massive pulse of oil from an event such as the Deepwater Horizon disaster presents a fundamentally more acute stress
to marine and coastal systems. The amount, rate and spatial concentration of crude oil released from such an event overwhelm the natural
mechanisms of oil dispersal and breakdown, producing the significant ecological effects that we observe.
BP's long run plan is to complete so-called relief wells that will intercept the existing wellbore at approximately 12,800 feet below the sea floor. Once
that is accomplished, heavy fluids and cement can be pumped down hole to kill the well. BP estimated this process will take at least 90 days. On May
2, 2010, BP began drilling the first deep-water intercept relief well, which is located one-half mile from the Macondo well, in a water depth of roughly
4,990 feet. A second relief well was begun on May 16.
BP's engineers sought to cut off the leak by using ROVs to activate the blowout preventer (BOP), a massive five story, 450 ton stack of shut-off
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A blowout preventer. Credit:
Cameron-Nautronix.
valves, rams, housings, tanks and hydraulic tubing that sits on top of the well. The BOP is designed to quickly shut off the flow of oil or natural gas by
squeezing, crushing or shearing pipe if there is a sudden, unexpected spike in pressure. This procedure failed. Early speculation suggested that gas
hydrates formed in the BOP, causing it to malfunction. A gas hydrate is a crystalline solid consisting of gas molecules, usually methane, each
surrounded by a cage of water molecules. It is similar to ice, except that the crystalline structure is stabilized by the guest gas molecule within the
cage of water molecules. Gas hydrates are common when gas and water mix, and are found on the ocean floor where there are low temperatures
and high pressure.
On May 7, 2010, BP maneuvered a 98-ton steel containment dome over the worst of the leaks, and
planned to funnel the oil through a pipe to the surface, where it would be collected by a drill ship. This
procedure failed when the domes opening was clogged with gas hydrates. The dome was moved off
to the side of the wellhead and is resting on the sea floor.
On May 12, 2010, BP abandoned plans for a second, smaller containment dome or top hat"
cofferdam, a 5-foot-tall, 4-foot-diameter structure that weighs less than 2 tons and would be injected
with alcohol to act as an antifreeze to keep its outlet clear of gas hydrates.
The first significant success at reducing the release of oil came on May 17, 2010 when robots
inserted a four-inch diameter Riser Insertion Tube Tool (RITT) into the Horizons riser (21-inch
diameter pipe) between the well and the broken end of the riser on the seafloor in 5,000 feet of water.
The RITT was expected to work like a straw, sucking the leaking oil into a tanker waiting on the surface
where the oil would be separated and then shipped ashore. BP initially stated that the RITT was
recovering 5,000 barrels per day, but on May 21, 2010, BP reduced that estimate, stating that the
device was recovering an average of about 2,200 barrels of oil a day. Additional oil continued to flow
from the leaks. BP subsequently reported that from the period from May 17th to May 23rd, the daily
oil rate collected by the RITT had ranged from 1,360 barrels of oil per day (b/d) to 3,000 b/d, and the
daily gas rate has ranged from 4 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) to 17 MMCFD. The oil is being
stored and gas is being flared on the drillship Discoverer Enterprise, on the surface 5,000 feet above.
The RITT was disabled on the evening of May 25, 2010 in preparation for the "top kill" procedure
initiated the following day.
On May 26, 2010, the U.S. government gave BP the approval to proceed with a "top kill" operation
today to stop the flow of oil from the damaged well. The procedure is intended to stem the flow of oil
and gas and ultimately kill the well by injecting heavy drilling fluids through the blowout preventer on the
seabed, down into the well.On May 29, 2010, BP engineers said that the top kill technique had failed. Despite successfully pumping of over 30,000
barrels of heavy mud, in three attempts at rates of up to 80 barrels a minute, and deploying a wide range of different bridging materials, the operation
did not overcome the flow from the well.
Simultaneously with the top kill, BP attempted what is known as a junk shot. This method involves debris such as shredded tires, golf balls and similar
objects being shot under extremely high pressure into the blowout preventer in an attempt to clog it and stop the leak. The process was carried out "a
number of times" with the U.S. Coast Guard before BP concluded that it had failed.
After consultation with government officials, BP then decided to move on to another option. The company said its next attempt will be a custom-built
cap known as the Lower Marine Riser Package (LMRP) Cap Containment System. This first involves cutting and then removing the damaged riser
from the top of the failed Blow-Out Preventer (BOP) to leave a cleanly-cut pipe at the top of the BOPs LMRP. The cap is designed to be connected to
a riser from the Discoverer Enterprise drillship and placed over the LMRP with the intention of capturing most of the oil and gas flowing from the well.
In the wake of BP's unsuccessful attempts, on June 1, 2010, Coast Guard Adm. Thad Allen said that efforts to plug the well were over for the
timebeing, and that effort will focus on containing and directing most of the oil to tankers on the surface. Allen acknowledged that this will may not
capture all the oil, but the hope is it will capture most of the spill until relief wells cap it permanently.
The next move was a "cut-and-cap" approach. On June 3, 2010, a cap was succesfully placed on top of the BOP after a 20 foot pair of shears had
severed the riser from the BOP. About 6,000 barrels were recovered on June 4 and pumped to a recovery ship on the surface. According to BP, by
June 7 rate of recovery had risen to about 11,000 barrels per day.
On June 8, the Coast Guard directed BP to develop contingency plans for the collection of oil brought to the surface in the event of an operational
failure or severe weather.
BP assumed responsibility for the initial clean up and mitigation efforts. According to BP Chief Executive, Tony Hayward, "we are taking full
responsibility for the spill and we will clean it up and where people can present legitimate claims for damages we will honor them." On April 28, the
U.S. military announced it was joining the cleanup operation.
The U.S. government established a "unified command" structure to coordinate the response to the spill. The stated purpose of the unified command is
to link the organizations responding to the incident and to provide a forum for those organizations to make "consensus decisions." The Deepwater
Horizon Unified Command include BP, Transocean, and the following federal agencies: Minerals Management Service, NOAA, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
As of June 9, the Unifed Command identified these resources employed to respond to the spill:
Total response vessels: 4,500
Total boom deployed: more than 4.77 million feet (regular plus sorbent boom)
Oily water recovered: more than 16 million gallons
Dispersant used: more than 1.14 million gallons (798,000 on surface, 346,000 below surface)
9 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
A controlled burn of surface oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil
platform. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.
Overall personnel responding: more than 24,000
17 staging areas are in place and ready to protect sensitive shorelines, including: Dauphin Island, Ala., Orange Beach, Ala.,
Theodore, Ala., Panama City, Fla., Pensacola, Fla., Port St. Joe, Fla., St. Marks, Fla., Amelia, La., Cocodrie, La., Grand Isle, La.,
Shell Beach, La., Slidell, La., St. Mary, La.; Venice, La., Biloxi, Miss., Pascagoula, Miss., and Pass Christian, Miss.
On April 28, BP performed the first controlled burn of surface oil, also
known as an in situ burn. Fire booms, U-shaped devices that are
towed behind two boats and used to pull oil away from the main spill
for safe burning, can be used when seas are below 3 feet and when
sufficient amounts of oil can be "corralled." Controlled burns
continued to be used at the Deepwater Horizon spill site through
mid-May, 2010 when conditions were right. This represents the first
on-water in-situ burning at a spill since the 1989 test burn during the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, which was the first time a fire-resistant boom
was used at a spill. The amount of oil burned at the Deepwater
Horizon spill site is unknown.
The EPA and Coast Guard approved the use of dispersants, a group
of chemicals designed to be sprayed onto oil slicks to accelerate the
process of natural dispersion. The dispersants used in the Deepwater
Horizon clean-up are Corexit 9500 and Corexit EC9527A, also known
as deodorized kerosene. The EPA has pre-approved both for
emergencies that are three nautical miles (roughly five kilometers ) off
the shoreline and in water depths greater than 30 feet (10 meters). In
the weeks following the spill, surface dispersants were applied by
aerial means by BP and various federal agencies. By May 30, 2010, 920,000 gallons of total dispersant have been deployed720,000 on the surface
and 200,000 subseaby far the largest ever use of dispersant in a U.S. oil spill.
Corexit 9500 is known in prior scientific studies to pose a high level of toxicity to primary producer biota in the water column; in addition, it has been
shown to accelerate the uptake of certain likely carcinogenic minority components present in petroleum such as napthalene. The dispersants used
are approximately 10,000 times more lethal to biota than crude oil itself. Corexit 9500 and Corexit EC9527A, manufactured by an Illinois company,
both contain 2-butoxyethanol, a chemical known to cause respiratory and skin irritation effects in humans. These dispersants have been banned for
use by the United Kingdom, due to known biological effects on people and natural systems.
Oil spill dispersants do not actually reduce the total amount of oil entering the environment.
1
Rather, they change the inherent chemical and physical
properties of oil, thereby changing the oils transport, fate and potential effects. Small amounts of spilled oil naturally disperse into the water column,
through the action of waves and other environmental processes. The objective of dispersant use is to enhance the amount of oil that physically mixes
into the water column, reducing the potential that a surface slick will contaminate shoreline habitats or come into contact with birds, marine mammals,
or other organisms that exist on the water surface or shoreline. Conversely, by promoting dispersion of oil into the water column, dispersants
increase the potential exposure of oil to fish and bottom dwelling biota such as clams or oysters. Dispersant application thus represents a conscious
decision to increase the risk to one component of the ecosystem (e.g.,the water column) while reducing the load on another (e.g., coastal wetland).
Decisions to use dispersants, therefore, involve trade-offs between decreasing the risk to water surface and shoreline habitats while increasing the
potential risk to organisms in the water column and on the seafloor.
10 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
Aerial application of chemical diserpsant to urface oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil platform. Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.
A 2005
study by
the National Research Council (NRC) on the ecological effects of dispersants concluded that there is insufficient scientific data to assess the net
effect of chemical dispersants on marine and coastal ecosystems. The NRC stated: "In many instances where a dispersed plume may come into
contact with sensitive water-columns or benthic organisms or populations, the current understanding of key processes and mechanisms is inadequate
to confidently support a decision to apply dispersants." EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson acknowledged this point in a testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committe on Environment and Public Works on May 18, 2010, when she stated "...the long term effects of dispersants on aquatic life are
unknown..."
During the first weeks of May, BP applied dispersant at the sea floor during EPA-sanctioned tests. On May 7, 2010, after having deployed
approximately 15,354 gallons of subsea dispersants, EPA halted subsea dispersant operations, awaiting additional test results in order to
resume. Initial studies by EPA indicated that the subsurface application of approximately 10,000-15,000 gallons of dispersants have the equivalent
effect on the oil as the surface application of approximately 50,000 gallons of dispersant. Thus, in principle, the subsurface application of dispersants
is more efficient than surface application and could result in less dispersant being released into the environment.
On May 15, 2010, the U.S. Coast Guard and the EPA authorized BP to use dispersants undersea. Government officials stated that preliminary testing
results indicate that subsea use of the dispersant is effective at reducing the amount of oil reaching the surface and can do so with the use of less
dispersant than is needed when the oil does reach the surface. Some scientists are concerned that this practice may contribute to the formation of
the underwater oil plume by shaping the oil into smaller droplets. On May 17, U.S. Rep. Edward J. Markey (Massachusetts) sent a letter to EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson asking EPA to respond to concerns about the potential ecological impacts of dispersants.
On May 19, 2010, the EPA informed BP that the company had to immediately identify and use less-toxic forms of chemical dispersants, suggesting
that federal officials were concerned that the unprecedented use of chemical dispersants could pose a significant threat to the Gulf of Mexico's
marine life. On May 20, 2010, the EPA began to post data from BP on the company's monitoring and sampling programs at the EPA web site. Some
of the monitoring parameters include: 1) identification of dispersed oil, 2) oil droplet size, 3) dissolved oxygen (DO) and other physical characteristics
such as conductivity, temperature and depth (CTD) and, 4) toxicity information.
On May 20, 2010, BP told the EPA that it cannot find a safe, effective and available dispersant to use instead of Corexit, and will continue to use that
chemical application to help break up the spill. BP told EPA that Sea-Brat 4, a proposed alternative dispersant, was rejected in part due to concern
that it may degrade to a nonylphenyl, a suspected endocrine disruptor.
Some environmental scientists have criticized BP for keeping secret some of the "alternative" chemical ingredients it is using in the oil spill
dispersants in its May 20 response to EPA. The EPA says BP and several of the dispersant manufacturers have claimed some sections of BP's
dispersant response contain confidential business information (CBI). EPA stated that "by law, CBI cannot be immediately made public except with the
company's permission," and that the "EPA is currently evaluating all legal options to ensure that the remaining redacted information is released to the
public."
On May 24, 2010, the EPA directed BP to "significantly scale back the overall use of dispersants," because their data demonstrated that sub sea
dispersant application was having an effect on the oil at the source of the leak, and thus far has had "no significant ecological impact." By ramping
down on the amount of dispersant used, particularly on the surface where the EPA expected less un-dispersed oil because of the sub sea application,
the amount of dispersant applied could be reduced by as much as half, and possibly more. By May 27, 2010, BP had reduced daily use of
dispersants to 12,000 gallons from 70,000. EPA and U.S. Coast Guard continued to view BPs scientific analysis of alternative dispersants as
insufficient, stating that BP seemed " more interested in defending their initial decisions than analyzing possible better options."
On May 27, scientists that participated in a two day conference on dispersants concluded that, to date, the effects of dispersing oil into the water
11 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
Shoreline modification in coastal Louisiana to reduce oil impact on wetlands. Credit:
U.S. Coast Guard.
column has generally been less environmentally harmful than allowing the oil to migrate on the surface into the sensitive wetlands and near shore
coastal habitats. The meeting was co-sponsored by the Coastal Response Research Center at the University of New Hampshire, NOAA, EPA and the
U.S. Coast Guard.
Louisiana state officials proposed the
construction of about 80 miles of sand berms
along barrier islands and wetlands to capture oil
from the spill. The proposed berms would run
along the Chandeleur Islands chain, along federal
and state wildlife refuges at the mouth of the
Mississippi River, and would block oil from
entering back bays and wetlands to the west of
the river, all the way to the Isles Dernieres near
the center of the state. The idea is that the oil
would collect behind these walls of sand so
cleanup crews could suck it up before it reaches
the marshes.
The plan requires a permit from the U.S. Corps of
Engineers and from the U.S. Coast Guard which
oversees the government response. But federal
officials and some scientists expressed concern
about the plan. Some experts question whether
dredging companies could build up the barrier
islands quickly enough to save the marshes.
There is also concern that the kind of sand berms
envisioned in the plan might wash away quickly
after a couple of storms, wasting scarce sand in
the region. In addition, the underwater borrow
pits proposed by the state could be too close to
the berms, and thus could cause greater erosion
to existing barrier islands or other environmental
problems. Some scientists are concerned that the berms could block inlets that carry water to the wetlands on shore and interfere with the movement
of organisms that depend on tidal flushing.
The feasibility and cost of the berm project is a point of contention between state and local officials. On May 23, 2010, Louisiana Attorney General
Buddy Caldwell sent a letter to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Sunday advising them that the State of Louisiana was within its rights to rebuild
barrier islands in order to combat the Gulf of Mexico oil spill if the Federal government did not do so first. Caldwell advised Lt. Gen. Robert L. Van
Antwerp, commanding general of the Corps, that under the U.S. constitution the federal government does not have the legal authority to deny a state
the right to conduct such emergency operations to protect its citizens and territory.
On May 27 the U.S government approved the state's proposal to build a 6-foot-high sand berm just south of Scofield Island, west of the Mississippi
River, as a temporary barrier to oil from the Deepwater Horizon spill reaching wetlands in Barataria Bay. The cost of construction will be borne by
either BP or the federal government. The island is one of six oil-protective sand berms proposed by the state that were granted an emergency permit
by the Army Corps of Engineers. The other five -- including two east of the Misssissippi River and three more to the west -- would have to be paid for
by the state, with no guarantee that BP or the federal government would pick up their cost. State officials criticized the delay in approval, and for the
decison not to fund the construction for all six berms.
On June 1, the U.S. government BP directed BP directed BP to pay for five additional barrier island projects in addition to the one approved on May
27. BP announced that it supports that decision, and that the company will fund the estimated $360 million it will cost to construct the six sections. The
six approved barriers -- four west of the Mississippi River and two to the east -- would rise 6 feet above sea level. They would be 300 feet wide at their
base and 25 feet wide at their crown.
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), established in the Treasury, is available to pay the expenses of federal response to oil pollution under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and to compensate claims for oil removal costs and certain damages caused by oil pollution as authorized by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). The law requires that disbursements under the OSLTF be recovered from responsible parties liable under OPA when
there is a discharge of oil to navigable waters. Aggressive collection efforts are consistent with the polluter pays public policy underlying the OPA.
BP and Transocean have been named as responsible parties, although all claims are being processed centrally through BP.
The OPA requires that responsible parties pay the entire pricetag for cleaning up after spills from offshore drilling, including lost profits, destroyed
property and lost tax revenue, but the statute caps their liability for economic damages at $75 million. In a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano and Interior Secretary Ken Salazar on May 16, 2010, BP Chief Tony Hayward said the company believes claims related to the spill will
exceed the limit. Howard stated that "we are prepared to pay above $75 million on these claims and we will not seek reimbursement from the U.S.
Government or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund."
Democratic legislators tried to speed a bill through Congress that would increase the liability cap for oil spills from $75 million to $10 billion. Bill
S.3305, the "Big Oil Bailout Prevention Liability Act" would have capped BP's liability at $10 billion, even if damages from the spill surpass that
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A sea turtle covered in oil from the
Deepwater Horizon site. Credit:
Louisiana Fish and Wildlife.
Pelicans in the Breton National
Wildlife Refuge, Louisiana. Credit:
Louisiana Fish and Wildlife.
amount. The bill was killed on May 13, 2010 by Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska), a key oil industry ally.
On June 9, BP said cost of the response to date is approximately $1.43 billion, including the cost of the spill response, containment, relief well drilling,
grants to the Gulf states, claims paid, and federal costs. BP said that 42,000 claims have been submitted and more than 20,000 payments already
have been made, totaling over $53 million.
Transocean, the world's largest offshore drilling contractor which owned the Deepwater Horizon, filed papers in a Houston court on May 20, 2010,
seeking to limit its legal liability to $27 million.
The negative effects of oil on organisms and ecosystems are well-documented. Oil causes harm to wildlife through physical contact, ingestion,
inhalation and absorption. Floating oil can contaminate plankton, which includes algae, fish eggs, and the larvae of various invertebrates. Long term
damage to lower trophic levels is difficult to assess, but could pose ecological risks in the Gulf of Mexico for years, based upon interference with
metabolic functions of thousands of species; benthic organisms in the inner and outer continental shelves could be affected from oil coating of
substantial portions of the ocean floor. Birds can be exposed to oil as they float on the water or dive for fish through oil-slicked water. Oiled birds can
lose the ability to fly and can ingest the oil while preening. Sea turtles such as loggerheads and leatherbacks can be impacted as they swim to shore
for nesting activities. Turtle nest eggs may be damaged if an oiled adult lies on the nest. Scavengers such as bald eagles, gulls, raccoons, and skunks
are also exposed to oil by feeding on carcasses of contaminated fish and wildlife.
Oil has the potential to persist in the environment long after a spill
and have long-term impacts on fish and wildlife, interacting with the
environment. Long-term effects on birds and marine mammals are
less understood, but oil ingestion has been shown to cause
suppression to the immune system, organ damage, behavioral
changes, skin irritation and ulceration.
The area affected by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has some of the world's most productive marine
and coastal ecosystems. Southern Louisiana has about 40% of the nation's coastal wetlands. These
wetlands provide a range of goods and services, including flood control, water purification, storm
buffer, wildlife habitat, nursery grounds for aquatic life, and recreational areas. Louisiana wetlands
have been heavily degraded by human activity. In particular, marsh has been lost--converted to open
water--for decades due to oil and gas development, dredging and levee construction for navigation
and flood control, and other human disturbance. Louisiana has lost 1,900 square miles of land since
the 1930's. Between 1990 and 2000, wetland loss was approximately 24 square miles per year- that is
the equivalent of approximately one football field lost every 38 minutes. Degradation by oil of the marsh grass, that is essential for holding sediment in
place, could accelerate wetland loss.
The location of the spill site is in the ocean zone known as the Bathypelagic, a depth which has pressure as great as 160 atmospheres and
temperatures of merely a few degrees Celsius. This depth is almost devoid of sunlight and hence offers virtually no primary production, but there are
a variety of bioluminescent and soft muscled creatures, many of which we know little about. Due to pelagic mixing, the crude oil will migrate vertically
and affect all depths of the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, including the shallower waters, where substantially more biodiversity and biological
productivity is present.
Scientists at Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi recently completed a comprehensive survey of the Gulf's biodiversity. They found that that the NNE
octant of the Gulf (that area containing the Deepwater Horizon site) contains 8,332 species of plants and animals. Including only the major taxa of
animals at all depths in the region of the spill, there are 1,461 mollusks, 604 polychaetes, 1503 crustaceans, 1,270 fishes, 4 sea turtles, 218 birds and
29 marine mammal species.
Scientist's familiar with the Gulf of Mexico cite a number of concerns about the timing of the spill:
Breeding Season: Invertebrates, sea turtles, and birds will be facing the brunt of the spill just as they are laying eggs or caring for
them in important wildlife areas.
Trans-Gulf Migration Season: Tens of millions of birds cross the Gulf of Mexico from the Yucatan Peninsula and South America to
the U. S. Gulf Coast (Texas to Florida). The spill occurred near the peak of the Trans-Gulf Migration Season.
Hurricane Season: A big storm could complicate recovery and cleanup efforts and spread oil throughout the Gulf. The first of June is
the official start of hurricane season. NOAA and others are predicting a particularly rough
year for Atlantic storms.
La Nia: Moderate El Nio conditions are expected to dissipate by June. That
phenomenon, which means warmer Pacific waters, creates so-called wind shear in the
Atlantic that helps break up hurricanes as they form. So without El Nio, June storms
might be more likely to form. In its place, say several climate models, is a La Nia period,
which means warmer temperatures in the southern areas of the United States and
generally more powerful storms.
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service identified 32 National Wildlife Refuges at risk from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill that line the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Of particular
concern are Refuges in the Southeast Louisiana (SELA) Refuges Complex, including Breton National
Wildlife Refuge, the second oldest refuge in the country. The coastal wetlands in this complex support
some of the nation's most abundant wildlife, including nesting wading birds and seabirds, passerine
13 of 24 6/13/2010 6:30 PM
An oiled pelican in coastal
Louisiana. Credit: Carolyn Cole,
Los Angeles Times.
birds (songbirds), raptors, as well as wintering shorebirds and waterfowl. For example, coastal wetlands are relied on by all 110 neo-tropical migratory
songbird species as many as 25 million can pass through the area each day during the breeding season.
The wetlands in the Refuges and other coastal regions also support a diversity of fish and shellfish species, including Speckled trout, redfish,
flounder, blue crabs and shrimp. These coastal wetlands are extremely important nursery areas for both fresh and saltwater fish species.
Endangered and threatened species at risk from the spill include West Indian manatees, whooping cranes, Mississippi sand hill cranes, wood storks
and four species of sea turtles.
Widespread impacts on wildlife were observed beginning the week of May 16. By May 24, 2010 two rookeries for brown pelicans in Barataria Bay
showed signs that oil had breached the protective booms. By the first week of June, reports of death and injury to birds, sea turtles and dophins were
rising sharply across the Louisiana coast.
The possible impacts of crude oil and chemical dispersants in the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico are largely unknown and extremely difficult to
assess. Another area of concern is the Pinnacles Region, an extensive deep (~100 m) reef tract on the Mississippi-Alabama outer continental shelf
(OCS). Most of these formations are fossil reefs that are no longer actively accreting, and do not support true reef-building algae or corals. They
nonetheless support a well-developed community of reef-dependent and reef-associated organisms and a relatively diverse population of fish and
fauna when compared to surrounding soft sediments.
On May 2, 2010, BP announced commitment of up to $500 million to an "open research program" studying the impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill,
and its associated response, on the marine and shoreline environment of the Gulf of Mexico. BP stated that it will appoint an independent advisory
panel to construct the long term research program.
In the weeks after the accident, coastal and marine scientists from Texas to the Everglades collected soil and water samples as well as tissue from
mollusks and coastal marine life that could be affected if the effects of the spill spread. This information will provide the baseline data needed to
assess any impacts that do occur.
On May 30, 2010, the Unified Area Command published its first
"Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Collection Report." These are the
consolidated numbers of collected fish and wildlife that have been
reported to the Unified Area Command from the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), incident area commands, rehabilitation
centers and other authorized sources operating within the Deepwater
Horizon/BP incident impact area. These data reflect only the initial,
field-level, evaluation and they do not reflect a final determination of
the cause of injury, or death. Not all of the injured or dead fish and
wildlife reflected in these numbers were necessarily caused by the
Deepwater Horizon/BP incident. On the June 8 the report included:
Birds: 1,002 birds collected, with 514 of these visibly oiled. 622 birds were dead; 380 were captured alive.
Sea Turtles: 315 collected; 265 were dead; 50 were alive.
Mammals, Including Dolphins: 38 collected in the spill zone; 36 of those were dead. Determination whether oil was the cause of death is pending for
dolphins.
Wildlife biologists believe that many more wildlife will ultimately be killed by the oil, but their toll is hidden because their bodies have sunk in the open
ocean, or been eaten by scavengers.
By way of comparison, the Exxon Valdez oil spill killed between 350,000 and 600,000 birds, along with thousands of sea otters and other marine
creatures.
Several events leading up to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill may be germane in understanding the context of this incident. These matters include
trends in deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico; permit processing; and preparedness steps.
The Wall Street Journal reports that in the year 2009, deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico increased over 2008 (and the average for the previous
ten years) by fifty percent, or a jump of 150 million barrels per annum of crude oil. The New York Times on May 13 reported that over 300 offshore
drilling permits had been issued by the U.S. government without proper approval by NOAA in the prior year to the incident. The New York Times
elaborated: "Federal records indicate that these consultations ended with NOAA instructing the minerals agency that continued drilling in the gulf was
harming endangered marine mammals and that the agency needed to get permits to be in compliance with federal law."
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During the Bush Administration in 2004, the MMS granted a categorical exclusion from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to certain oil
and gas activities in the Gulf of Mexico, including individual exploration plans. The MMS essentially said that it will not thoroughly review the
environmental impacts of certain activities, including such activities as the exploration phase for the Deepwater Horizon site. Some legal analysts
argue that this was wrong because the 2004 MMS Departmental Manual explicitly stated that a categorical exclusion should not be issued if the lease
or exploration is: (1) In areas of high seismic risk or seismicity, relatively untested deepwater, or remote areas; or (2) Within the boundary of a
proposed or established marine sanctuary, and/or within or near the boundary of a proposed or established wildlife refuge or areas of high biological
sensitivity; or (3) In areas of hazardous natural bottom conditions; or (4) Utilizing new or unusual technology. The Deepwater Horizon project was
deep and it used new technology.
Mark Chernaik at the Environmental Law Alliance Worldwide notes that the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for a cluster of 11 oil and
gas lease sales that included Oil and Gas Lease Sale 206, the site of the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and oil spill was seriously flawed. Prepared
by the Minerals Management Service, the DEIS never assessed the impact of a catastrophic spill, limiting its focus to spills no larger than 4,600
barrels. The DEIS also failed to propose the use of one safeguard an acoustic control system for blowout prevention that might have promptly
contained the spill when the manual blowout preventers failed. Such systems are required in some countries, but they were not even proposed in the
DEIS. BP's 52 page exploration and environmental impact plan for the Deepwater Horizon well stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surface
or subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities" and that "due to the distance to shore (48 miles) and the response capabilities that
would be implemented, no significant adverse impacts are expected."
Early in 2009, BP sought approval of the exploration plan for this well, whose flaws might have been detected by a full blown review under NEPA. That
did not occur due to the categorical exclusion, so when the MMS approved the exploration plan for this well on April 6, 2009, it did so in compliance
with the 2004 policy decision to limit environmental review of oil and gas activities in the Gulf.
The MMS' own environmental assessements downplayed the potential for environmental damage. In a 2007 environmental impact statement for the
Western and Central Planning Area Sales, which covered oil drilling leases from 2007-2012 for the region that included the Macondo Prospect where
the Deepwater Horizon operated, the MMS assessed the potential impact of oil spills and blowouts on wetlands, marine mammals, commercial fishing,
economic impacts, and water quality. MMS stated:
"Offshore oil spills resulting from a proposed action are not expected to damage significantly any wetlands along the Gulf Coast...
Overall, impacts to wetland habitats from an oil spill associated with activities related to a proposed action would be expected to be
low and temporary."
"At the expected level of impact, the resultant influence on commercial fishing activities from a proposed action would be negligible
and indistinguishable from variations due to natural causes."
"Since LWC [loss of well control] events and blowouts are rare events and of short duration, potential impacts to marine water quality
are not expected to be significant."
On May 17, 2010, the Defenders of Wildlife and the Southern Environmental Law Center filed suit against the Minerals Management Services (MMS)
for "lax oversight of oil drilling operations, including its failure to require a thorough examination of spill risks from exploratory drilling operations like
the Deepwater Horizon." The suit seeks to prohibit the MMS from continuing to exempt from environmental review new exploratory drilling operations
in the Gulf of Mexico. The suit argues that the MMS continued exemption of over 20 new structures and exploratory wellsincluding four at almost
twice the depth (over 9,000 feet) of the Deepwater Horizon (almost 5,000 feet)from environmental review of the risks after the current oil spill is a
violation of the National Environmental Policy Act.
The Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer (BOP) was not equipped with a remote control shut-off failsafe switch required in two other major
oil-producing nations as last-resort protection against underwater spills. Both Norway and Brazil require such a device, which costs about $500,000.
U.S. Federal regulators had specifically exempted the Deepwater Horizon from having such a remote shut-off switch partially on the grounds of the
costliness of the device (less than one percent of the Deepwater Horizon capital cost).
The failure of the BOP was foreshadowed by a 2003 paper by Deepwater Horizon owner Transocean that highlighted problems with hydraulic
components of BOP control systems across the industry and suggested equipment was being rushed into the field with limited testing. Other studies
had noted that a part of the BOP called a shear ram the last line of defense that is intended to cut and close a drill pipe when all else fails can't
always slice through the thick pipe used in deepwater drilling. A 2004 study commissioned by federal regulators found that only three of 14 newly built
rigs had shears powerful enough to cut through pipe at the equipment's maximum water depth.
In 2001, the U.S. Minerals Management Service proposed rules that would have required emergency backup control systems on BOP systems. The
proposed rules were not yet law at the time of the Deepwater Horizon accident.
An Associated Press report published on May 24, 2010 suggested that lax federal regulation oil well cementing--a suspected cause of the accident--
contributed to the disaster. Federal regulators don't regulate what type of cement is used, leaving it up to oil and gas companies, who are "urged" to
simply follow guidelines of the American Petroleum Institute, an industry trade group. Far more stringent federal and state standards and controls exist
on cement work for roads, bridges and buildings. Reports by the MMS named cementing as a factor in 18 of 39 well blowouts at Gulf rigs from 1992
to 2006, and five of nine out-of-control wells in the year 2000 were related to cementing problems.
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A boom on the Louisiana coast
collecting oil from the Deepwater
Horizon accident. Credit: Louisiana
Fish and Wildlife.
The Coast Guard responded to the explosion and fire on April 20, 2010, treating the event as a Search and Rescue (SAR) operation. The next day,
on April 21, 2010, the Coast Guard continued its search for the missing eleven people.
Concurrent with the SAR, efforts began to assess the containment of the oil release. The federal
government's response to such an event so governed by the National Contingency Plan (NCP) a
blueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases. Pursuant to the NCP, the
Administration named Rear Admiral Mary Landry the Federal On-Scene Coordinator. A Regional
Response Team was established, including representatives of the Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Commerce (DOC)/NOAA, Department of the Interior (DOI)
and the EPA, as well as state and local representatives.
In the weeks following the spill, a number of government probes were announced into the Deepwater
Horizon explosion and oil spill. These included probes by the Marine Board of Investigation (Coast
Guard and Minerals Management Service), Interior Department Outer Continental Shelf Safety Board,
National Academy of Engineering, House Energy and Commerce Committee, House Oversight and
Government Reform Committee, and House Natural Resources Committee.
On April 22, 2010, a National Response Team (NRT), an organization of 16 federal departments and
agencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous
substance pollution events, convened its first daily meeting with leadership from across the federal
government. Participants in the meeting included the White House, U.S. Coast Guard, the Department
of Defense, DHS, DOC, DOI and EPA, among others.
On April 23, 2010, the Unified Area Command was formally stood up in Robert, La., after three days
of informal operations and planning. The U.S. Coast Guard announced that the Deepwater Horizon rig
had been found upside down approximately 1,500 feet northwest of the blowout preventer at the
wellhead. At 5 p.m., the Coast Guard suspended the search for the 11 missing workers.
On April 29, 2010, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano declared the event a
Spill of National Significance (SONS), indicating that the government would designate more forces to
contain the spill. This designation also led to the naming of U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral
Thad Allen as the National Incident Commander on May 1, 2010, which provided additional authority and oversight in leveraging government assets to
combat the spill.
The Council on Environmental Quality and the Department of the Interior announced a review of the National Environmental Policy Act procedures for
the Minerals Management Service (MMS), the bureau in DOI that manages the nations natural gas, oil and other mineral resources on the outer
continental shelf (OCS). The review will examine the MMS NEPA procedures for OCS oil and gas exploration and development.
On May 17, 2010, the Small Business Administration deployed staff to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida to meet individually with business
owners, answer questions about the Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, issue loan applications, and provide help in completing the loan forms
via business outreach centers.
On May 21, 2010, President Barack Obama issued an Executive Order that created the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling. The Commission will be chaired by former two-term Florida Governor and former Senator Bob Graham and former
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency William K. Reilly. The seven member commission was intended to be bipartisan with "broad and
diverse representation of individuals with relevant expertise." No currently serving government employees or elected officials will sit on the
commission.
On June 1, 2010, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. announced that the Justice Department had begun civil and criminal investigations. Holder said
they were reviewing violations of the Clean Water Act, which carries criminal and civil penalties and fines; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which can be
used to hold parties responsible for cleanup costs; the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered Species Act, which provide penalties for injury
and death of wildlife.
On June 8, 2010, the Department of the Interior issued a directive to oil and gas lessees and operators on the Outer Continental Shelf implementing
seven stronger stronger safety requirements. The new requirements focused on greater independent review and verification of safe operating
procedures for offshore drilling.
On June 8, 2010, the Department of Energy started online access to schematics, pressure tests, diagnostic results and other data about the
malfunctioning blowout preventer. There is also a timeline of key events and detailed summaries of the Deepwater well configuration, the blowout
preventer stack tubes, and the containment system
On May 27, President Barack Obama rescinded his March 31, 2010 proposal for expanded offshore drilling, and instituted a temporary halt to drilling
and new safety requirements. Key details of the moratorium and licensing changes include:
No new drilling will be allowed in water depths greater than 500 feet for six months, including sidetracks and bypasses of currently-
drilling wells.
Drilling on 33 wells will be suspended at the first safe stopping point.
Workover activities, well completions, abandonment activities, interventions, and waterflood, gas injection, and disposal wells will not
be affected.
Drilling offshore Alaska will be postponed until at least 2011.
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The Nansen production platform
operates in about 3,500 feet of
water off the Texas coast. Credit:
Devon Energy.
Oil-soaked hands of a worker from
the Deepwater Horizon clean-up.
Credit: U.S. Coast Guard.
Western GoM Lease Sale 215 and the proposed Virginia Lease Sale 220 have been cancelled.
The three other remaining GoM lease sales in the 2007 2012 OCS Leasing Program are subject to review.
New standards for equipment and procedures will be implemented, with a focus on blowout preventers (BOPs), well control systems
(fluid displacement procedures), casing and cementing.
On May 28, 2010, Interior Secretary Salazar issued a memorandum
to the Director of the MMS that directed the MMS to not process any
new applications for permits to drill consistent with that directive.
Confusion arose in the following week regarding whether the
moratorium covered all wells, or just "deep" wells. A regional office of
the MMS issued two drilling permits for shallow wells off the coasts
Louisiana and Mississipi on June 2, but the permits were rescinded
on June 3. An Interior spokeswoman said that the MMS rescinded
the permits "out of caution" and "to ensure that new drilling activities
are consistent with" new federal safety requirements.
The oil industry was highly critical of the drilling moratorium. The American Petroleum Institute, an
industry trade group, stated that an extended moratorium "would create a moratorium on economic
growth and job creation--especially in the Gulf States whose people and economies have already been
most affected by the oil spill--by undercutting our nation's access to affordable, reliable, domestic
sources of oil and natural gas." The Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association estimated that
the idle drilling rigs would reduce commerce by $16.5 million per day, and that wages lost lost by those who work on the idled drilling platforms could
reach as high as $330 million per month.
The moratorium was also criticized by members of a panel of experts identified by the National Academy of Engineering who had been asked to
review a draft of Secretary Salzar's report on measures to improve offshore safety. The final version delivered to President Obama on May 27
included the drilling moratorium, but angry panel members and some others who contributed to the Salazar report said they had reviewed only an
earlier version of the secretary's report that suggested a six-month moratorium only on new drilling, and then only in waters deeper than 1,000 feet.
"We broadly agree with the detailed recommendations in the report and compliment the Department of Interior for its efforts," a joint letter from the
panelists to various politicians says. "However, we do not agree with the six month blanket moratorium on floating drilling. A moratorium was added
after the final review and was never agreed to by the contributors."
New rules issued on June 8, 2010 by the Interior Department tightened standards for barriers at underwater wells and blowout preventers. The new
rules also shifted the cost and accountability of verification, certification and inspection from the government directly to the leaseholder by requiring
safety inspections by professional engineers and other independent analysts rather than having Interior Department investigators sign off on well
plans and equipment. The new rules required that CEOs must certify, under penalty of criminal prosecution, that their operations comply with all
regulations, equipment has been tested and all personnel are trained. Drilling operations were allowed to resume in less than 500 feet below the
surface of the sea once the new standards were met; the drilling ban remained in effect for sites in deeper water.
President Barack Obama sent a legislative package to Congress on May 12 whose purpose was to
"continue expeditiously, speed assistance to people affected by this spill, and strengthen and update
the oil spill liability system to better address catastrophic events." The package proposed funding for
small business loans, oil spill unemployment assistance, nutrition assistance, disaster relief for
fishermen and communities, and grants to state and local communities. The President's plan would
fund the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to monitor and respond to the environmental impact of the
oil on seafood fished from the gulf and surrounding areas. It also increased funding to the Secretary
of the Interior for additional inspections, enforcement, studies and other activities that are outside of
those recoverable from the responsible parties or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. The bill would
extend the time allowed by statute for the Minerals Management Service to review and approve oil and
gas lessee exploration plans to allow additional time for the required review. The legislation would also
provide funding to the EPA and NOAA for various environmental studies that improve the federal
response to the spill.
The Obama bill would raise the statutory expenditure limitation for the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund from
$1 billion to $1.5 billion and the cap on natural resource damage assessments and claims from $500
million to $750 million. The proposal would also raise the caps on liability for responsible parties, and
increase the tax that oil companies pay to finance the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund from 8 cents per barrel (per 42 gallons) to 9 cents per barrel
starting this year.
In the wake of theDeepwater Horizon accident, the Minerals Management Service came under heavy criticism for alleged conflicts of interest among
its competing missions. The agency was tasked with collecting royalties from oil and gas produced on federal lands and issuing energy leases; at the
same time it also is responsible for policing offshore drilling and setting regulations for the industry. Indeed, in the wake of the spill President Barack
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Oil industry executives testifying
before Congress about the
Deepwater Horizon accident
Obama noted a "cozy relationship" between federal regulators at the MMS and the industry they police. Investigations revealed, for example, that
some employees at the minerals service accepted lavish gifts from oil companies and allowed companies to fill out their own inspection reports. Other
MMS employees lobbied for jobs at the companies they were supposed to regulate. Minerals Management Service officials can receive cash bonuses
in the thousands of dollars based in large part on meeting federal deadlines for leasing offshore oil and gas exploration
MMS regulators repeatedly ignored warnings from government scientists about environmental risks in its push to approve energy exploration activities
quickly. In a 2009 response to MMS' proposed five-year plan for oil and gas leasing, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
said that MMS understated the scale of oil spills. NOAA concluded that MMS some statements "seem to directly conflict with studies of major spills,"
and that the MMS did not fully evaluate oil spill modeling.
According to a report by theWashington Post, a review panel with NOAA issued a scathing critique of Shell Exploration and Production's plan to
conduct an open-water marine survey in Alaska's Chukchi Sea, finding "... no clearly stated 'scientific objectives.' " The Post report described "a war
between the biologists and the engineers" in which MMS regulators frequently changed documents and bypassed legal requirements aimed at
protecting the marine environment.
Several government watchdog groups have criticized the "revolving door" through which drilling regulators move from government to industry and back
again, sometimes on multiple occasions. The Associated Press reported that one MMS employee who was critical of industry drilling regulations in
2005, later became an employee of BP and argued against more stringent environmental regulation of the industry.
On May 19, 2010, Interior Secretary Ken Salazar announced a plan for breaking the MMS into three separate bureaus:
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, which would be responsible for development of conventional and renewable energy
resources on the outer continental shelf.
The Office of Natural Resources Revenue, which would be responsible for collecting and distributing royalties from oil and gas
produced on federal lands and waters.
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, which would be tasked with broadly overseeing energy production and
imposing safety and environmental regulations on all offshore energy activities.
On May 27, 2010, Elizabeth Birnbaum, the director of the U.S. Minerals Management Service, resigned. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar praised
Birnbaum as "a strong and effective person and leader" and said she "resigned today on her own terms and on her own volition," but White House
officials made clear that Birnbaum had been forced out. On May 28, 2010, Bureau of Land Management Director Bob Abbey was named as acting
director of the MMS.
A month after the accident, the Obama administration came under increasingly sharp criticism for underestimating the size of the discharge, for the
lack of transparency in its response efforts, and for being too easy on BP and the oil industry. Scientists have been especially critical of the
Administration for not forcing BP to fund and make publicly available more data from subsurface analysis of the leak, aerial surveillance of the ocean
surface, the extent and impact of the subsurface oil plume, and the fate and impact of chemical dispersants. Scientists criticized the EPA for not
releasing its finds from offshore water sampling, and they questioned why NOAA was so slow to investigate the magnitude of the spill and the damage
it is causing.
Government critics point out that BP also has ties to the Department of Energy. Steven Chu was the head of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
at the University of California, Berkeley, when the Lab received the bulk of a $500 million grant from the British oil giant BP to develop alternative
energy sources through a new Energy Biosciences Institute. Dr. Chu received the grant from BPs chief scientist at the time, Steven E. Koonin. Dr.
Chu is now the Secretary of the Department of Energy, and Dr. Koonin, who followed Dr. Chu to the Energy Department, now serves as under
secretary of energy for science. No one has accused Dr. Chu or Dr. Koonin of direct conflict of interest or questioned their scientific credentials,
and the Department of Energy has no direct responsibility for the cleanup. Dr. Koonin is recused from all matters relating to the disaster because of
his past ties to BP.
Main article: Congressional hearings on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
The U.S. Congress reacted swiftly to the accident, holding nine hearings and three briefings on
the oil spill in the first few weeks, with many more planned. A month after the accident, 10
different House and Senate committees were probing the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The
hearings were part political theater, but they also produced important breakthroughs in the
investigation. For example, Reps. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., and Bart Stupak, D-Mich., used their
leadership roles on the House Energy and Commerce Committee to persuade BP and
Transocean to turn over timelines and test data from the damaged well. Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass.,
used his committee chairmanship to successfully pressure BP to release live video of the leak.
Hearings in the House also helped pressure EPA to force BP to investigate alternatives to its
choice of dispersants to break up the oil
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Shrimp harvest in Louisiana. Credit: Louisiana Fish and
Wildlife.
Cleanup in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, after the Exxon Valdez
accident in 1989.
The economic impacts from the spill originate in the communities affected by
the spill, but then ripple throughout the entire nation. Commercial fishermen
in the Gulf harvested more than 1 billion pounds of fish and shellfish in 2008.
In addition, there are approximately 5.7 million recreational fishermen in the
Gulf of Mexico region who took 25 million fishing trips in 2008. Fisherman in
areas closed to fishing, or whose catch are harmed by the spill, feel the
immediate effects, as do hotels, restaurants and other businesses that are
tied to tourism, conventions and recreation in the Gulf Coast. The reduction
in the harvest of oysters, shrimp and other seafood caused prices to rise
sharply in the weeks following the spill, which in turn caused food prices to
rise in restaurants as far away as New York City. The mere threat of oil
caused thousands of hotel cancellations in the run-up to the usually hectic
Memorial Day weekend.
Florida's Department of Tourism tried to alleviate public concern about its
beaches by posting information about Floridas destinations on its Web site
in real time with beach Webcams, Twitter feeds and photos. Gov. Charlie
Crist said he had secured $25 million from BP to finance the tourism
advertising campaign after an initial $25 million went to disaster preparation
and response.
On May 24, 2010, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke declared a
"fishery disaster" in the Gulf of Mexico due to the economic impact on
commercial and recreational fisheries from the Deepwater Horizon accident.
The affected area includes the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama.
The declaration makes it easier to mobilize federal relief efforts.
The oil spill clean-up also generates economic benefits. Cleanup crews and reporters covering the spill have replaced oil field workers and fishermen
in some hotels and restaurants, and some fishermen could use their boats in spill clean up. Companies that specialize in booms, chemical dispersant,
hazardous materials training and other spill-related services experienced a significant boom in business.
In a preliminary assessment of the economic dmamage released on May 17, 2010, Moody's Investors Service suggested that while Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama may experience short-term economic booms related to clean-up efforts, that will give way to longer term deteriorating
revenue for coastal communities. Cities and counties in those Gulf states are likely to experience a decline in property tax values, which will mean a
reduction in services or a necessary increase in revenue to maintain current credit rating levels. The long-term economic and financial impact on
those states may be manageable, however, especially since there is a short-term economic boom and BP has pledged to pay cleanup costs and
damage claims, Moody's said. But it's likely there will be a more severe impact on communities in Florida, which is highly dependent on tourism and
sales tax.
The Department of Energy announced that its national laboratories were working with the Department of Homeland Security's National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), which is modeling the economic costs and societal impact of the oil spill on energy and other industries in
the Gulf and along the coast to support the response efforts of the National Incident Commander and the Unified Area Command. NISAC is a
modeling, simulation, and analysis center within DHS that leverages national expertise to address infrastructure protection.
The Deepwater Horizon disaster is widely expected to send insurance costs higher for deepwater drilling.
On June 1, 2010, led by a drop in energy stocks, the Dow Jones industrial average fell 120 points shortly after the Obama Administration announced
its criminal investigation into the disaster. BP lost 15 percent of its market value during the days trading
On June 8, 2010, Sean Snaith, an economist at the University of Central Florida, said that a worst case scenario--i.e., Florida beaches suffer a
massive, direct hit from the Gulf oil spill--could cost $10 billion and put about 195,000 people out of work.
BP was heavily criticized for its role in the response to the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989, one of the largest in the nation's
history. BP owned a controlling interest in Alyeska, the Alaska oil
industry consortium that was responsible for designing, constructing,
operating, and maintaining the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).
The pipeline stretches from the Arctic Ocean to the Valdez terminal
on the Pacific. Alyeska was required to write the Oil Spill Response
Plan (OSRP), and to respond to the spill. The Alaska Oil Spill
Commission's report dedicated an entire chapter to failures by
Alyeska, who essentially ran the first days of containment efforts in
Prince William Sound, an inlet on the south coast of Alaska. The
Commission found that Aleyska failed to make good on its own plan in numerous ways: slow
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The BP Texas City refinery after
the explosion and fire in 2005.
Credit: AP.
Workers clean up an oil spill from
a BP oil pipeline near Prudhoe Bay,
Alaska in 2006. Credit: Blooomberg
response, and an overall lack of skimmers, barges to store captured oil, helicopters, and crews on
standby.
A ProPublica study reported that in 2002, California officials discovered that BP had falsified inspections of fuel tanks at a Los Angeles-area refinery
and that more than 80 percent of the facilities didn't meet requirements to maintain storage tanks without leaks or damage. Inspectors were forced to
get a warrant before BP allowed them to check the tanks. The company eventually settled a civil lawsuit brought by the South Coast Air Quality
Management District for more than $100 million.
The BP Texas City Refinery suffered one of the worst industrial
disasters in recent U.S. history. Explosions and fires killed 15
people and injured another 180, and resulted in financial losses
exceeding $1.5 billion. According to the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board, the Texas City disaster was caused by organizational and
safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation. Warning
signs of a possible disaster were present for several years, but
company officials did not intervene effectively to prevent it.
After the disaster, BP agreed to pay out $1.6 billion in private settlements and then plead guilty to
lesser criminal violations. BP Products North America agreed in 2007 to plead guilty to a felony
for failing to have adequate written procedures and for failing to inform contractors of the hazards
related to their occupancy of temporary trailers located near the refinerys isomerization unit. BP
Products agreed to a $50 million fine and three years probation. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration on Friday imposed an
$87 million fine against BP for failing to correct safety hazards after the 2005 disaster. The fine - at the time the largest in OSHA's history - came
after a 6-month inspection revealed hundreds of violations of the settlement agreement to repair hazards at the refinery.
On October 25, 2007, the British Petroleum Exploration (Alaska ),
Inc., (BPXA) agreed to plead guilty to a criminal violation of the Clean
Water Act to resolve its criminal liability relating to pipeline leaks of
crude oil onto the tundra and a frozen lake in Alaska. The first
pipeline leak, discovered on March 2, 2006, resulted in more than
200,000 gallons of crude oil spreading over the tundra and a nearby
frozen lake. This was the largest spill ever to occur on the North
Slope. The second leak occurred in August of 2006, but was quickly
discovered and contained after leaking approximately 1,000 gallons
of oil onto the tundra. As part of the guilty plea BPXA agreed to a
total of $20 Million of which $12 million is criminal fine, $4 million is
community service payments to the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) for the purpose of
conducting research and activities in support of the arctic environment in the State of Alaska on the
North Slope, and $4 million is criminal restitution to the State of Alaska. BP also served a three-year
term of probation.
BP was among the first major oil corporations to publicly acknowledge that global warming was "real."
In 1997, John Browne, Group Chief Executive, British Petroleum (BP America) stated: "To be
absolutely clear - we must now focus on what can and what should be done, not because we can be
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The BP corporate logo.
certain climate change is happening, but because the possibility can't be ignored."
BP Amoco changed its name to BP in 2000, and introduced a new corporate slogan: Beyond
Petroleum. It replaced its Green Shield logo with the helios symbol, a green and yellow sunflower
pattern that was supposed to highlight the companys interest in "green" fuels.
BP has supported research in "low carbon" energy and climate change at Scripps Institution,
Princeton University, and the California Institute of Technology. BP is investing $500 million over 10
years to establish the Energy Biosciences Institute (EBI) hosted by the University of California at
Berkeley with its associated strategic partners University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.
In its biofuels operations and planning, BP claims to apply a series of global standards and processes
such as undertaking environmental impact assessments that cover issues such as water
andbiodiversity. For example, BP claims it will not produce biofuels from areas of high conservation
value as defined by the High Conservation Value Network.
BP was one of the first major energy companies to develop solar energy, and BP Solar is one of the
largest solar manufacturers in the world with manufacturing plants in Australia (Sydney), Spain
(Madrid), USA (Frederick, MD), India (Bangalore) and China (Xian).
BP began investing in wind power in 2005, and by 2010 had gross generating capacity of more than
1,200 megawatts (MW), enough to provide electricity for a city the size of Washington DC. BP has
interests in operating wind farms in Fowler Ridge, Indiana, a large wind farm in the U.S. Midwest
(600MW); Cedar Creek I, Colorado (300MW); and two projects in Texas (more than 200MW).
1
This section is drawn directly from a National Research Council (2003) report.
Associated Press, Spill-related investigation finds bad cement jobs often a problem with rigs (with video), Accessed 24 May, 2010.
Associated Press,Influence game: Drilling regulators move from government to industry through revolving door, 26 May, 2010,
Accessed 26 May 2010.
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Citation
Cutler J. Cleveland (Lead Author); C Michael Hogan and Peter Saundry (Topic Editor);. 2010. "Deepwater Horizon oil spill." In:
Encyclopedia of Earth. Eds. Cutler J. Cleveland (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for
Science and the Environment). [First published in the Encyclopedia of Earth May 24, 2010; Last revised June 10, 2010;
Retrieved June 13, 2010]<http://www.eoearth.org/article/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill>
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