Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50908 January 31, 1984
MAR CONCEPC!ON "AUT!STA an# ENR!$UE %. "AUT!STA, petitioners,
vs.
AL&RE%O L. JU!N!O, ROMEO &. E%U an# &!%EL '. RAMOS, respondents.
Mary Concepcion Bautista for and in his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

&ERNAN%O, C.J.:
The validity of an energy conservation easure, !etter of "nstruction No. #$%, issued on May &', '%(% ) the response to the
protracted oil crisis that dates bac* to '%(+ ) is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary
Concepcion Bautista and Enri,ue -. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and e,ual protection
guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of private otor vehicles .ith / and E/ plates on .ee*0ends and holidays .as banned
fro 12'34556 a.. 7aturday orning to 8455 a.. Monday orning, or '455 a.. of the holiday to 8455 a.. of the day after the
holiday.1 ( Motor vehicles of the follo.ing classifications are e9epted4 :a; 7 :7ervice;< :b; T :Truc*;< :e; -P! :-iploatic;< :d; CC
:Consular Corps;< :e; TC :Tourist Cars;. 3 Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo !. =uinio, then Minister of Public >or*s,
Transportation and Counications and respondent Roeo P. Edu, then Coissioner of !and Transportation Coission
issued on =une '', '%(%, Meorandu Circular No. &%, .hich iposed 1the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and
cancellation of registration on o.ners of the above0specified vehicles1 found violating such !etter of "nstruction. 4 "t .as then
alleged by petitioners that 1.hile the purpose for the issuance of the !?" #$% is laudable, to .it, energy conservation, the provision
banning the use of / and E/ 2vehicles6 is unfair, discriinatory, 2aounting to an6 arbitrary classification1 and thus in
contravention of the e,ual protection clause. 5 Moreover, for the, such !etter of "nstruction is a denial of due process, ore
specifically, 1of their right to use and en@oy their private property and of their freedo to travel and hold faily gatherings, reunions
and outings on .ee*0ends and holidays,1 inviting attention to the fact that others not included in the ban en@oying 1unrestricted
freedo.1 ) "t .ould follo., so they contend that Meorandu Circular No. &% iposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the
vehicle and cancellation of license is li*e.ise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of 1undue delegation of legislative
po.er.1* "t is to be noted that such Meorandu Circular does not ipose the penalty of confiscation but erely that of
ipounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety
days .hichever is longer.
This Court gave due course to the petition re,uiring respondent to ans.er. There .as adission of the facts as substantially
alleged e9cept, as previously noted, that the ban starts at '3455 a.. rather than '455 a.. of a 7aturday or of a holiday and as to
the ention of a >illyAs Baiser @eep being registered in the nae of a certain Teresita Crbina, about .hich respondents had no
*no.ledge. There .as a denial of the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy / and e9tra heavy :E/; on the other
hand and light and banta on the other hand .as violative of e,ual protection and the regulation as to the use of the forer cars
on the dates specified a transgression of due process. The ans.er li*e.ise denied that there .as an undue delegation of
legislative po.er, reference being ade to the !and Transportation and Traffic Code. 8 There .as also a procedural ob@ection
raised, naely, that .hat is sought aounts at ost to an advisory opinion rather than an a@udication of a case or controversy.
Petitioners filed a otion to be allo.ed to reply to the ans.er. "t .as granted. The reply, considering its e9haustive character
serving as its eorandu, stressed ane. .hat it ephasiDed as the arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive aspects of the
challenged !etter of "nstruction and Meorandu Circular No. &%. "t disputed .hat it characteriDed as an 1erroneous and arbitrary
presuption that heavy car o.ners unnecessarily use and therefore .aste gasoline .henever they drive their cars on .ee*0ends
and holidays<1 9 it stigatiDed the ban as defeating its 1avo.ed purpose in the case of the affluent .ho o.n not only heavy
liousines but also any sall cars 2as6 they ay be copelled to use at least t.o sall cars<1 10 referred to the high cost of
ta9is or other public transports for those 1not able to afford e9pensive sall cars 2possibly6 only one heavy and possible old
odel<1 11 cited the case of 1any eight cylinder vehicles .hich because of their .eight have been registered as light but in fact
consue ore or as uch gasoline as the banned vehicles.1 1( Their conclusion is that 1the ban iposed, in result and effect is
class legislation.1 13
The parties .ere re,uired to subit eoranda. Respondents did so but not petitioners. They relied on their reply to the ans.er
) as noted, a rather coprehensive pleading. Eor reasons to be set forth, this Court holds that the petition cannot prosper.
'. Eirst as to the procedural ob@ection. "n the eorandu for respondents, one of the issues raised .as .hether 1the po.er of
@udicial revie. ay be invo*ed considering the inade,uacy of the record and the highly abstract and acadeic ,uestions raised by
the petitioners.1 14 "t is inaccurate to say that the record is inade,uate. "t does not adit of doubt that the ban applies to
petitioners .ho are 1the registered o.ners of an eight cylinder '%$% Buic*, and the vendees of a si9 cylinder >illyAs *aiser @eep,
.hich are both classified as heavy or /.1 15To that e9tent, therefore, the enforceent of the assailed !etter of "nstruction .ill
aount to a deprivation of .hat other.ise .ould be a valid e9ercise of a property right. Thus they fall s,uarely .ithin 1the
unchallenged rule1 as to .ho ay raise a constitutional ,uestion, naely, to ,uote the language of =ustice !aurel in the leading
case of People v. Vera, 1) 1that the person .ho ipugns the validity of a statute ust have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or .ill sustain direct in@ury as a result of its enforceent. 1* Moreover, that rule has been
considerably rela9ed. 18 The ,uestion then is neither abstract nor acadeic as contended by respondents.
3. There is, ho.ever, this foridable obstacle that confronts petitioners. >hat they see* is for this Court to hold that a !etter of
"nstruction, a regulatory easure precisely enacted to cope .ith the serious and grave proble of energy conservation, is void on
its face. 7uch a tas* is rendered unusually difficult by .hat has been referred to by =ustice !aurel in the leading case of Angara v.
lectoral Co!!ission 19 as the 1presuption of constitutionality1 and by the sae @urist in the case of People v. Vera (0 in slightly
different .ords 1a presuption that such an act falls .ithin constitutional liitations.1 There is need then for a factual foundation of
invalidity. "n the language of r!ita"Malate #otel $ Motel %perations Association& 'nc. v. City Mayor or Manila4 1"t adits of no
doubt therefore that there being a presuption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute
or ordinance is void on its face, .hich is not the case here. The principle has been no.here better e9pressed than in the leading
case of %(Gor!an $ )oung v. #artford *ire 'nsurance Co., .here the Aerican 7upree Court through =ustice Brandeis tersely
and succinctly sued up the atter thus4 AThe statute here ,uestioned deals .ith a sub@ect clearly .ithin the scope of the police
po.er. >e are as*ed to declare it void on the ground that the specific ethod of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of la.. As underlying ,uestions of fact ay condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the presuption of constitutionality ust prevail in the absence of soe factual foundation of record for overthro.ing
the statute.A 1 (1
&. "t is true, of course, that there ay be instances .here a police po.er easure ay, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or
un@ust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, ay, .hen challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of the. A recital of the .hereas clauses of the !etter of "nstruction
a*es it clear. Thus4 12>hereas6, developents in the international petroleu supply situation continue to follo. a trend of liited
production and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of iediate relief in supplies .ithin the foreseeable future<
2>hereas6, the uncertainty of fuel supply availability underscores a copelling need for the adoption of positive easures
designed to insure the viability of the countryAs econoy and sustain its developental gro.th< 2>hereas6, to cushion the effect of
increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is iperative to adopt a progra directed to.ards the @udicious use of our
energy resources copleented .ith intensified conservation efforts and efficient utiliDation thereof< F F F.1 (( That is undeniable
is that the action ta*en is an appropriate response to a proble that presses urgently for solution. "t ay not be the only
alternative, but its reasonableness is iediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, .hich is the epitoe of
reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, uch less infringed.
+. "n the interplay bet.een such a fundaental right and police po.er, especially so .here the assailed governental action deals
.ith the use of oneAs property, the latter is accorded uch lee.ay. That is settled la.. >hat is ore, it is good la.. -ue process,
therefore, cannot be validly invo*ed. As stressed in the cited Erita0Malate /otel decision4 1To hold other.ise .ould be to unduly
restrict and narro. the scope of police po.er .hich has been properly characteriDed as the ost essential, insistent and the least
liitable of po.ers, e9tending as it does Ato all the great public needs.A "t .ould be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to
destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allo.ed itself to be deprived of its copetence to proote public
health, public orals, public safety and the general .elfare. Negatively put, police po.er is Athat inherent and plenary po.er in the
7tate .hich enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the cofort, safety, and .elfare of society.A 1 (3
8. The due process ,uestion having been disposed of, there is still the ob@ection based on the e,ual protection clause to be
considered. A governental act ay not be offensive to the due process clause, but ay run counter to such a guarantee. 7uch is
the case .hen there is no rational basis for the classification follo.ed. That is the point raised by petitioners. Eor the, there is no
rational @ustification for the ban being iposed on vehicles classified as heavy :/; and e9tra0heavy :E/;, for precisely those
o.ned by the fall .ithin such category. Tested by the applicable standard that ust be satisfied to avoid the charge of a denial of
e,ual protection, the ob@ection of petitioners is sho.n to be lac*ing in erit. 7uch a classification on its face cannot be
characteriDed as an affront to reason. A legal nor according to +.M. Tuason $ Co.& 'nc. vs. ,and Tenure
Ad!inistration& (4 1.hether ebodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against anarchy at one e9tree and
tyranny at the other. Thereby, people living together in a counity .ith its yriad and cople9 probles can iniiDe the
friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of e9istence. The "deal situation is for the la.As
benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. ?nly thus could chance and favor be
e9cluded and the affairs of en governed by that serene and ipartial unifority, .hich is of the very essence of the "dea of la..
The actual, given things as they are and li*ely to continue to be, cannot appro9iate the "deal. Nor is the la. susceptible to the
reproach that it does not ta*e into account the realties of the situation. F F F To assure that the general .elfare be prooted, .hich
is the end of la., a regulatory easure ay cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected ay under such
circustances invo*e the e,ual protection clause only if they can sho. that the governental act assailed, far fro being inspired
by the attainent of the coon .eal .as propted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discriination that finds no
support in reason. "t suffices then that the la.s operate e,ually and uniforly on all persons under siilar circustances or that all
persons ust be treated in the sae anner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
iposed. Eavoritis and undue preference cannot be allo.ed. Eor the principle is that e,ual protection and security shall be given
to every person under circustances, .hich if not "dentical are analogous. "f la. be loo*ed upon in ters of burden or charges,
those that fall .ithin a class should be treated in the sae fashion, .hatever restrictions cast on soe in the group e,ually binding
on the rest.1 (5
$. Nor does it ilitate against the validity of the !etter of "nstruction @ust because the ban iposed does not go as far as it could
have and therefore could be less efficacious in character. That .as the solution .hich for the President e9pressing a po.er validly
lodged in hi, recoended itself. There .as a situation that called for a corrective easure. /e decided that .hat .as issued
by hi .ould do @ust that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. That it did not cover other atters .hich could very .ell
have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President, to paraphrase,ut- v. Araneta& () 1is not re,uired by
the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none.1 (* "t is ,uite obvious then that no e,ual protection ,uestion arises.
(. "t ay not be aiss to refer to a '%#' Aerican 7upree Court decision, Minnesota v. Clover ,eaf Crea!ery
Co!pany. (8 Respondent along .ith several other business corporations adversely affected involved in the anufacture and
utiliDation of plastic il* containers filed suit in a Minnesota district court see*ing to en@oin enforceent of a Minnesota statute
banning the retail sale of il* in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but peritting such sale in other nonreturnable,
nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard, il* cartons. After conducting e9tensive evidentiary hearings, the Minnesota court
en@oined enforceent of the statute, finding that it violated aong others the e,ual protection clause of the Eourteenth
Aendent to the Eederal Constitution. The Minnesota 7upree Court affired. ?n certiorari, the Cnited 7tates 7upree Court
reversed, .ith only =ustice 7tevens dissenting. The opinion by =ustice Brennan noted that 1proponents of the legislation argued
that it .ould proote resource conservation, ease solid .aste disposal probles, and conserve energy.1 (9 That sufficed for the
Court to conclude 1that the ban on plastic nonreturnable il* containers bears a rational relation to the 7tateAs ob@ectives, and
ust be sustained under the E,ual Protection Clause.1 30 "t does sho. that not.ithstanding the 1ne. e,ual protection approach1
.ith its ephasis on 1suspect classification1 and 1fundaental rights and interests standard,1 a concept so ably e9pounded by
professor Gunther, the 1rational relation test1 31 still retains its validity. Not that there could be any ob@ection to the classification
here follo.ed as being in any .ay susceptible to such a pe@orative e9pression as 1suspect1 or that the assailed !etter of
"nstruction does not ,ualify under 1the fundaental rights and interests1 standard
#. There .as set forth in the petition .hat .ere referred to as 1other reasonable easures .hich the authorities concerned .ith
energy conservation can ta*e iediately, .hich are in fact acceptable and obviously called for and should have been done long
ago, to .it4 '. re,uire and establish ta9i stands e,uipped .ith efficient telephone and counication systes< 3. strict
ipleentation and observance of cargo truc* hours on ain arteries< &. strict observance of traffic rules< +. effective solution of
traffic probles and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and ,uic* repair of roads and efficient operation of double dec*er
buses< 8. rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car o.ner the option and responsibility of deciding on the
use of his allocation< $. allo. neon and electrically devised advertising signs only fro five oAcloc* p.. to nine oAcloc* p.. (.
prohibit iediately the iportation of heavy and lu9ury cars and seriously re0e9aine the car anufacturing
progra.1 3( Adittedly, such easures are conducive to energy conservation. The ,uestion before us ho.ever is liited to
.hether or not !etter of "nstruction #$% as ipleented by Meorandu Circular No. &% is violative of certain constitutional
rights. "t goes no further than that. The deterination of the ode and anner through .hich the ob@ective of iniiDing the
consuption of oil products ay be attained is left to the discretion of the political branches. 33 Absent therefore the alleged
infringeent of constitutional rights, ore precisely the due process and e,ual protection guarantees, this Court cannot ad@udge
!etter of "nstruction No. #$% as tainted by unconstitutionality.
%. "t .as li*e.ise contended that Meorandu Circular No. &%, issued by the then respondent Minister of Public >or*s,
Transportation and Counications, and then respondent !and Transportation Coissioner, iposing the penalties 1of fine,
confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of license is li*e.ise unconstitutional,1 petitioners invo*ing the principle of non0delegation
of legislative po.er. 34 To that e9tent that a !etter of "nstruction ay be vie.ed as an e9ercise of the decree0a*ing po.er of the
President, then such an arguent is futile. "f, ho.ever, vie.ed as a copliance .ith the duty to ta*e care that the la.s be faithfully
e9ecuted, as a conse,uence of .hich subordinate e9ecutive officials ay in turn issue ipleenting rules and regulations, then
the ob@ection .ould properly be considered as an ultra vires allegation. There is this relevant e9cerpt fro Teo.on v. Me!ber of
the Board of Ad!inistrators/ 35 1'. The recognition of the po.er of adinistrative officials to proulgate rules in the
ipleentation of the statute, necessarily liited to .hat is provided for in the legislative enactent, ay be found in the early
case of 0nited States v. Barrias decided in '%5#. Then cae, in a '%'+ decision,0nited States v. Tupasi Molina, a delineation of
the scope of such copetence. Thus4 A?f course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular departent
ust be in harony .ith the provisions of the la., and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the la. itself can not be e9tended. 7o long, ho.ever, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect
the provisions of the la., they are valid.A "n '%&$, inPeople v. Santos, this Court e9pressed its disapproval of an adinistrative
order that .ould aount to an e9cess of the regulatory po.er vested in an adinistrative official. >e reaffired such a doctrine in
a '%8' decision, .here .e again ade clear that .here an adinistrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the
provisions of the Act, Athe andate of the Act ust prevail and ust be follo.ed.A =ustice Barrera, spea*ing for the Court
in Victorias Milling Co!pany& 'nc. v. Social Security Co!!ission, citing Par*er as .ell as -avis did tersely su up the atter thus4
AA rule is binding on tile courts so long as the procedure fi9ed for its proulgation is follo.ed and its scope is .ithin the statutory
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreeent .ith the policy stated therein or its innate .isdo F F F. ?n the
other hand, adinistrative interpretation of the la. is at best erely advisory, for it is the courts that finally deterine .hat the la.
eans.A "t cannot be other.ise as the Constitution liits the authority of the President, in .ho all e9ecutive po.er resides, to
ta*e care that the la.s be faithfully e9ecuted. No lesser adinistrative e9ecutive office or agency then can, contrary to the e9press
language of the Constitution, assert for itself a ore e9tensive prerogative.1 3) "t .as alleged in the Ans.er of 7olicitor General
Estelito P. MendoDa that !etter of "nstruction #$% and Meorandu Circular No. &% .ere adopted pursuant to the !and
Transportation and Traffic Code. 3* "t contains a specific provision as to penalties. 38 Thus4 1Eor violation of any provisions of this
Act or regulations proulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less than ten nor ore than
fifty pesos shall be iposed.1 39 Meorandu Circular No. &% cannot be held to be ultra vires as long as the fine iposed is not
less than ten nor ore than fifty pesos. As to suspension of registration, 40 the Code, insofar as applicable, provides4 1>henever
it shall appear fro the records of the Coission that during any t.elve0onth period ore than three .arnings for violations of
this Act have been given to the o.ner of a otor vehicle, or that the said o.ner has been convicted by a copetent court ore
than once for violation of such la.s, the Coissioner ay, in his discretion, suspend the certificate of registration for a period
not e9ceeding ninety days and, thereupon, shall re,uire the iediate surrender of the nuber plates F F F.1 41 "t follo.s that
.hile the iposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the !and
Transportation and Traffic Code, the ipounding of a vehicle finds no statutory @ustification. To apply that portion of Meorandu
Circular No. &% .ould be ultra vires. "t ust li*e.ise be ade clear that a penalty even if .arranted can only be iposed in
accordance .ith the procedure re,uired by la.. 4(
>/EREE?RE, the petition is disissed.