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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIM NO. 3:13CR113(J CH)
:
V. : FILED UNDER SEAL
:
RALPH CROZIER : August 29, 2014

UNITED STATES TRIAL MEMORANDUM AND NOTICE
OF INTENT TO OFFER EVIDENCE

The United States of America, by and through the undersigned Assistant United States
Attorney, respectfully submits this omnibus trial memorandum as an aid to the Court and
addressing issues that may arise concerning the admission of evidence at trial. J ury selection is
scheduled for September 3, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. Part I summarizes the nature of the
Governments case, and the nature of the charges. Part II specifically addresses the following
evidentiary issues:
The admissibility of evidence of the attempted money laundering charged in Count Two
for the conspiracy charged in Count One, and the admissibility of evidence of the
conspiracy charged in Count One for the attempted money laundering charged in Count
Two;
The admissibility of testimony that provide a context to, and background of, the
investigation;
; and,
The admissibility of the defendants prior false statement conviction should he decide to
testify.
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I. The Governments Case
A. Factual Background
The Government will prove its case through the testimony of cooperating witnesses, law
enforcement testimony whose testimony is corroborated by video surveillance, business records,
and other physical evidence.
In April 2011, Bruce Yazdzik, a Waterbury oxycodone dealer informed Officer J ames
Comstock of the Stamford Police Department in Connecticut that an oxycodone dealer was
traveling from Florida through Westchester County Airport (in New York) to Stamford,
Connecticut, to sell thousands of oxycodone pills. Officer Comstock relayed the information to the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and together, on April 8, 2011, the DEA and
Stamford Police Department arrested the dealer, CW-1, in a hotel in Stamford, Connecticut. He
was found with approximately 6,000 oxycodone pills. CW-1 immediately agreed to cooperate
proactively with the DEA.
CW-1 explained that during the past year he had regularly purchased oxycodone from pain
clinics and individuals in Florida, transported the oxycodone to Connecticut by commercial
airplane or car, and sold the oxycodone to Connecticut dealers for much higher prices than he had
paid. CW-1 traveled from Florida to Connecticut two to three times a week carrying up to 8,000
oxycodone pills per trip. CW-1 sold the oxycodone pills to large scale Connecticut-based
distributors, including Bruce Yazdzik, for $11 - $13 per pill. After exchanging any
low-denomination currency for larger notes, CW-1 moved the proceeds of his oxycodone sales
back to Florida through commercial airline or car.
On September 12, 2011, Bruce Yazdzik and others were arrested for their role in the
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute oxycodone in Connecticut.
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Yazdzik pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846, and also entered into a cooperation agreement. At his sentencing
on November 14, 2012, the government filed a 5K motion based on Yazdziks cooperation, which
this Court granted, and Yazdzik received a sentence of 120 months imprisonment.
As part of his cooperation, Yazdzik informed the government that he had laundered money
through his state criminal attorney, Ralph Crozier. In 2010, Ralph Crozier represented Yazdzik
in the Waterbury Superior Court. Thereafter, in March 2011, Yazdzik told Crozier that he wanted
to get out of the drug dealing business. It was Crozier who suggested that Yazdzik speak to the
Stamford Police about the Florida drug dealer. Though Yazdzik did voluntarily speak to the police,
he soon resumed selling oxycodone and was arrested in New York with oxycodone, a charge for
which Crozier provided legal advice to Yazdzik.
Yazdzik also advised DEA agents that, at the time he advised Crozier that he wanted to
stop selling drugs, he also told Crozier that he wanted to find a way to invest $30,000 in cash.
According to Yazdzik, Crozier knew that the $30,000 that he was looking to invest was the
proceeds of drug sales. Crozier advised Yazdzik to invest the money in Croziers law partners
solar energy company, Brightside. When Yazdzik agreed, Crozier took the cash and drafted a
note stating that the solar energy company would provide a 10% return per annum and that the note
could be converted to a 10% ownership in the company. Since Yazdzik was already incarcerated,
he instructed his mother to provide DEA agents with a copy of the note, which she did.
Records from Croziers IOLTA accounts at TD Bank and at First Niagara (successor
entity) showed a May 13, 2011 deposit of $8,000 cash into the TD Bank account and a deposit of
$8,000 into the First Niagara account. Two days later, $5,000 cash is deposited into TD Bank.
Crozier then issues a check for $13,000 to Brightside Solar from TD Bank and a check for $8,000
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to Scott Maser, who endorses it to Brightside, from the First Niagara account. Additionally,
Maser makes three cash deposits of $3,500 on May 13, 2011, $3,000 on May 16, 2011, and $2,300
on May 20, 2011 into the Brightside account. One of the owners of Brightside recalled a meeting
in May 2011 during which Crozier introduced him to an investor. Crozier related that the investor
had just won a large lawsuit.
After Yazdziks sentence, Yazdziks mother, Debra Rost, agreed to wear a recording
device and cooperate on Yazdziks behalf. Accordingly, the DEA, in conjunction with the FBI,
arranged for Rost to meet with Crozier in order to discuss Yazdziks prior investment.
On February 21, 2013, Rost met with Crozier in his office. During the course of a recorded
conversation, the following exchange took place:
CROZIER: Does he, does he, does he still owe the feds?

ROST: No they took everything.

CROZIER: No! My question is was there an order at the time of his sentencing for . . .

ROST: Money? No.

CROZIER: For restitution?

ROST: No. They took his Lincoln, they took cash, they. . .

CROZIER: Well they didnt take everything because I know he was hiding in (UI)
(whispers)

ROST: Well they took what he had that was in his name.

CROZIER: Well yeah, they didnt, they didnt know where his cash was.

ROST: Right.

CROZIER: Cash was hidden and he told me where some of the places where the cash
was hidden.

On April 11, 2013, at the direction of law enforcement, Rost again met with Crozier at his
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office. Rost brought with her $11,000 of DEA funds, which Rost represented to Crozier was
money that Yazdzik hid behind a loose stone in her boiler room. During their meeting, the
following recorded conversation took place:
ROST: OK. Now I did talk to Bruce.

CROZIER: Um, huh, okay.

ROST: I told him that you know I did finally make it here and all that, . . .

CROZIER: Good.

ROST: and he said, well I told him what you told me you know, about hiding his
money from, from shipments. So, he said ok. And hes so paranoid . . .

CROZIER: Hiding his, hiding his money from . . .

ROST: the shipments. When hes doing the thing.

CROZIER: Right.

ROST: Okay, so hes so paranoid, its unbelievable. But anyway, he kind of
eventually told me where one of it was.

CROZIER: Okay.

ROST: So he asked me to try to get it to you to give to, to so that when he gets out,
hell have money . . .

CROZIER: Okay, what are we talking about?

ROST: This one he gave - the one I just found out about was like about 11,000,
which I have.

CROZIER: Okay, Okay.

ROST: And hes got another one he said about thirty

CROZIER: Okay.

ROST: So . . .

CROZIER: He should have a few more than that.
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ROST: Well, thats what he told me. I guess he took some before. Because he
had stopped, you know, he had stopped doing that

CROZIER: He had stopped for a while but he should have a lot more than that.

ROST: So, well thats all hes telling me about and it took me forever to figure out
where to find this one you know?

CROZIER: Because it was hidden.

ROST: Yeah.

CROZIER: And you have it with you?

Rost gave Crozier the bag containing the DEA funds, and Crozier said that he would
deposit the money. Crozier added, I am not only going to help Bruce, but Im going to make out
this receipt to him. Crozier continued, I dont want to put your name on anything because I
dont want you involved with hiding things from the Feds. DEA agents arrested Crozier as soon
as Rost left the building. They recovered all the DEA funds.
After the arrest, Crozier waived his rights per Miranda. Over four hours, he provided a
statement to agents. Initially, he said that neither Yazdzik nor the woman who had come in before
his arrest were his client. Crozier said the woman came in because she wanted to send her son
money in jail. Later he stated that Yazdzik had been one of a hundred of his clients. He stated
that Yazdzik had brought third party checks to Crozier from Yazdziks car business to invest in the
solar company. Crozier stated that he had given the money Rost provided to his bookkeeper to
deposit in a trust account in the name of Yazdzik. Crozier then stated that he had not heard Rost
say the word shipments and that he fucked up and had not done his due diligence in
accepting the money.
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B. The charges
Crozier is charged in two counts of the indictment. Count One charges Crozier with
conspiracy to launder money, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(h), and
encompasses the time period from May 2011 through September 2011. The charge requires
that the following elements be proven:
1. Two or more persons entered into an unlawful agreement to conduct a financial
transaction, which involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity and which
the defendant knew represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,
with the intent to conceal its origin, to promote the unlawful activity or to avoid
reporting requirements; and

2. The defendant knowingly and willfully became a member of the conspiracy and
did so with the intention of furthering an objective of the conspiracy.

Count Two charges Crozier with (attempted) laundering of monetary instruments, in
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(3)(b), in April 2013. The charge
covers both an attempt and a completed action. The charge requires that the following elements
be proven:
1. The defendant conducted or attempted to conduct;
2. A financial transaction;
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3. Involving property which is represented by a law enforcement officer to be
proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or property used to conduct or facilitate
specified unlawful activity;

4. While acting with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity.

A financial transaction includes the transfer of cash to another party. See United States
v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) (when a person accepts a transfer or delivery of funds,
he has participated in the conclusion of that transfer or delivery, and has therefore conducted a
transaction . . . . the delivery or transfer of cash to another person is a financial transaction);
United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 751 (6th Cir. 2000) (transfer of cash by third party to
defendant is a disposition of a monetary instrument and therefore a transaction under the money
laundering statute); United States v. Gough, 152 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1998) (defendant who hired
co-defendant to deliver van loaded with drug proceeds to a third party and waited in a nearby room
while the money was unloaded was involved in a financial transaction); United States v. Otis, 127
F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (drug dealers delivery of cash to money launderer is a transaction);
United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1995)(en banc)(transfer of cash to a courier is a
transaction); United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 1996) (delivery of cash to another
person and subsequent storage of cash in third persons residence are each transactions because
they involve a disposition).
With regard to the defendants knowledge that the financial transaction involved the
proceeds of unlawful activity, it is enough that the Government prove that the defendant knew that
the transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity that constitutes a felony
under state or federal law. See United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 692 n.2 (2d Cir.
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1992)(defendant need not know that the underlying activity is unlawful or that it constitutes a
felony; it is sufficient for the government to show that the defendant knew that the property was
the proceeds of an activity, such as gambling involving more than a certain amount of money, that
is defined as a felony under state or federal law); see also United States v. Reiss, 186 F.3d 149 (2d
Cir. 1999) (defendant need only know money is criminally derived; he does not need to know
money was drug proceeds).
II. Evidentiary Issues
A. The Attempted Money Laundering as Proof of the Conspiracy
The money laundering conspiracy took place in 2011 and involved Crozier and Yazdzik.
Although the 2013 attempted money laundering by Crozier was distinct from the conspiracy
charged in Count One, its proof, through tape-recordings that reference and confirm the
existence of the 2011 conspiracy are inextricably intertwined.
It is well settled in the Second Circuit that evidence of uncharged criminal activity is not
considered other crimes evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) if it . . . is inextricably intertwined
with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the
crime on trial. See United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United
States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997)). Where uncharged crimes constitute important
proof of any element of the act charged, evidence of the uncharged crime does not fall within a
Rule 404(b) analysis. See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2007)
(defendants uncharged death threats to two informants against him were admissible without
reference to Rule 404(b) in his trial for the murder of another informant against him). In
describing the test to determine if alleged other acts evidence is actually intrinsic to the charged
crime, the Seventh Circuit has instructed:
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Acts satisfy the inextricably intertwined doctrine if they complete the story of the
crime on trial; their absence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the
story of the crime; or they are so blended or connected that they incidentally
involve, explain the circumstances surrounding, or tend to prove any element of the
charged crime.

United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2002); accord United States v. Weeks, 716
F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir. 1983)(in trial for assaulting federal officer, the agents investigation into
stolen vehicles explained the agents presence with Weeks and his associates, and their animosity
towards the agent. The investigation was inextricably linked to the charged offense of assault,
was reasonably necessary to complete the story of the crime, and therefore was not extrinsic under
Rule 404(b)).
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Here, proof of the 2013 attempt and proof of the 2011 conspiracy are inextricably
intertwined in that proof of each crime provides context and proves elements of the other crime.
Thus, the February and April 2013 recordings together confirm that Crozier remained steadfast
in his agreement with Yazdzik to hid[e] money from the feds in 2011. That Crozier knew that
Yazdziks 2011 monies were illegal proceeds of narcotics trafficking in 2011 confirms that he
knew that the money, ostensibly located from a secret hiding spot in 2013, was also illegal
proceeds of Yazdziks narcotics trafficking.
Even if the evidence of the conspiracy was not inextricably intertwined with the charged
attempted money laundering, it is properly admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to prove
Croziers intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, knowledge of
Yazdziks secreted illegitimate funds, and a motive for so doing. A prior intent to launder a

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Evidence that is inextricably intertwined with charged conduct must nonetheless satisfy the balancing test
promulgated in Fed. R. Evid. 403. See United States v. Graziano, 558 F. Supp. 304, 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(applying Rule 403 balancing test to evidence deemed inextricably intertwined).
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narcotics dealers illegal proceeds is probative of a later intent to launder that same dealers
proceeds. Where intent is at issue evidence of [his] involvement in prior narcotics transaction
was probative of [his] intent or knowledge in connection with the crime charged. United
States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1119 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Caputo, 808 F.2d 963,
968 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Should the Court believe that the evidence of Count Two is not inextricably intertwined
with the evidence of Count One, but that it is admissible under Rule 404(b), the Government has
no objection to the Courts inclusion of a limiting instruction during the jury charge.
B. Hearsay Evidence
The bulk of the Governments evidence in this case will be in the form of cooperating
witness testimony, law enforcement testimony, business records and consensually recorded taped
conversations. Federal Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as a statement (1) the declarant
does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. The rule, however, excepts from the
hearsay definition certain statements, including statements made by the [opposing] party in an
individual or representative capacity, statements of which the party has manifested an adoption
or belief in its truth, and statements made by the partys coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)((2)(A), (B) & (E).
In this case, the government seeks to admit evidence that Yazdzik informed Officer
Comstock that a large-scale oxycodone distributor was coming to Stamford to conduct a
narcotics transaction in April 2011. Officer Comstock will testify that he relayed the
information to the DEA, and DEA Group Supervisor Eileen Dinnan will testify that the
oxycodone distributer from Florida was stopped, agreed to cooperate, ultimately resulting in the
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arrest of Yazdzik. These statements are offered for the limited purpose of providing context
and background for Yazdziks arrest. See United States v. Gaytan, 649 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir.
2011) ( [A] confidential informants out-of-court statements are not hearsay if they are offered
not for the truth but to put the defendants statements in context or to make what he said and did
in reaction to the informants statements intelligible to the jury.), see also United States v.
Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (non-conspirator half of a recorded conversation
is not proffered for its truth, but rather to put conspirators statements in context); United States
v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 2006) (applicable to emails); United States v. Barone, 913
F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1990) (So long as the informants recorded statements were not introduced
for the truth of the matter asserted, but only to establish a context for the recorded statements of
the accused, the defendants Sixth Amendment rights are not transgressed.); United States v.
Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 683-84 (6th Cir. 2009) (FBI agents testimony about informants statements
was offered to provide mere background information about why FBI followed defendant, not
to prove the truth of what informant asserted); United States v. Mayes, 370 F.3d 703 (7th Cir.
2004) (out-of-court statements by two informants that they could purchase cocaine at particular
address were not hearsay, since they were admitted at trial for conspiracy to distribute narcotics
not for their truth, but rather to explain why police officers took steps to make controlled buys
and to execute search warrants at that address).
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Pages 13 through 15 redacted for the following reasons:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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D. Admissibility of prior false statement conviction
On May 18, 2007, the defendant was conviction of second degree making a false

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District courts have discretion to respond to events that arguably trigger the rebuttal waiver.
Specifically, courts can employ remedies other than permitting the introduction of proffered statements,
such as striking a particular question or statement, instructing the jury to disregard it, or reminding the
jury that assertions by defense counsel are not evidence. United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119.
These alternative remedies are particularly appropriate where defense counsels assertion is inadvertent or
brief. Id. at 119-120. But Barrow cautions that such responses are improper when defense counsels
assertion is unambiguous or direct. Id.

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statement, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-157b. This offense is a misdemeanor.
Should the defendant choose to testify, the Government respectfully requests that it be able to
cross examine him as to the existence of this prior conviction.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 609, The following rules apply to attacking a witness character for
truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction: . . . for any crime regardless of the
punishment, the evidence must be admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing
the elements of the crime required proving--or the witnesss admitting--a dishonest act or false
statement.
Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-157b provides: (a) A person is guilty of false statement when
such person (1) intentionally makes a false written statement that such person does not believe to
be true with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of such public servant's
official function, and (2) makes such statement under oath or pursuant to a form bearing notice,
authorized by law, to the effect that false statements made therein are punishable.
It appears undisputed that, should the defendant testify, the Government, under Rule 609,
can cross-examine him on the existence of his 2007 false statement conviction.


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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should permit the Government to introduce the
relevant evidence discussed above.

Respectfully submitted,
DEIRDRE M. DALY
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/

RAHUL KALE
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
FEDERAL BAR NO. phv 02526
1000 LAFAYETTE BLVD, 10
TH
FLOOR
BRIDGEPORT, CT
(203) 696-3000
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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that on August 29, 2014, a copy of the foregoing trial memorandum and
notice of intent to offer evidence was filed electronically and served by mail on anyone unable to
accept electronic filing. Notice of this filing will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of
the courts electronic filing system or by mail to anyone unable to accept electronic filing as
indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing. Parties may access this filing through the courts
CM/ECF System.


/S/ Rahul Kale
RAHUL KALE
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
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