Equity regards done what ought to be done

This maxim means that when individuals are required, by their agreements or by
law to have done some act of legal significance, Equity will regard it as having
been done as it ought to have, even before it has actually happened. This makes
possible the legal phenomenon of equitable conversion(Equitable conversion is a
doctrine of the law of real property under which a purchaser of real property becomes
the equitable owner of title to the property at the time he/she signs a contract binding
him/her to purchase the land at a later date. The seller retains legal title of the property
prior to the date of conveyance, but this land interest is considered personal property (a
right to the payment of money, rather than a right to the property). The risk of loss is then
transferred to the buyer if a house on the property burns down after the contract has
been signed, but before the deed is conveyed, the buyer will nevertheless have to pay the
agreed-upon purchase price for the land. Such issues can and should be avoided by parties
by stipulating in the contract who will bear the loss in such occurrences. The above rule
varies by jurisdiction, but is the general rule).
Sometime this is phrased as "equity regards as done what should have
been done. "The consequences of this maxim, and of equitable conversion, are
significant in their bearing on the risk of loss in transactions. When parties enter a
contract for a sale of real property, the buyer is deemed to have obtained an
equitable right that becomes a legal right only after the deal is completed.
Due to his equitable interest in the outcome of the transaction, the buyer
who suffers a breach may then be entitled to the equitable remedy of specific
performance (although not always, see below). It also is reflected in how his
damages are measured if he pursues a legal, substitutionary remedy instead of
an equitable remedy. At law, he is entitled to the value at the time of breach,
whether it has appreciated, or depreciated.
The fact that the buyer may be forced to suffer the depreciation means
that he bears the risk of loss if, for example, the improvements on the property he
bought burn down while he is still in escrow.
Additional Examples: Problems may sometimes arise because, through
some lapse or omission, cover is not in force at the time a claim is made. If the
policyholder has clearly been at fault in this connection, because, for example, he
has not paid premiums when he should have, then it will normally be quite
reasonable for an insurer to decline to meet the claim. However, it gets more
difficult if the policyholder is no more at fault than the insurer. The fair solution in
the circumstances may be arrived at by applying the principle that equity regards
that as done that ought to be done [See para 1, above]. In other words, what
would the position have been if what should have been done had been done?
Thus, in one case, premiums on a life policy were overdue. The insurer' s
letter to the policyholder warning him of this fact was never received by the
policyholder, who died shortly after the policy consequently lapsed. It was clear
that if the notice had been received by the policyholder, he or his wife would have
taken steps to ensure the policy continued in force, because the policyholder was
terminally ill at the time and the cover provided by the policy was something his
wife was plainly going to require in the foreseeable future. Since the policyholder
would have been fully entitled to pay the outstanding premium at that stage,
regardless of his physical condition, the insurer (with some persuasion from the
Bureau) agreed that the matter should be dealt with as if the policyholder had
done so. In other words, his widow was entitled to the sum assured less the
outstanding premium. In other similar cases, however, it has not been possible to
follow the same principle because there has not been sufficiently clear evidence
that the policy would have been renewed.
Another illustration of the application of this equitable principle was in
connection with motor insurance. A policyholder was provided with cover on the
basis that she was entitled to a ' no claims' discount from her previous insurer.
Confirmation to this effect from the previous insurer was required. When that was
not forthcoming, her cover was cancelled by the brokers who had issued the
initial cover note. This was done without reference to the insurer concerned,
whose normal practice in such circumstances would have been to maintain
cover, but to require payment of the full premium until proof of the no claims
discount was forthcoming. Such proof was eventually obtained by the
policyholder, but only after she had been involved in an accident after the
cancellation by the brokers of the policy. Here again, the fair outcome was to look
at what would have happened if the insurer's normal practice had been followed.
In such circumstances, the policyholder would plainly have still had a policy at
the time of the accident. The insurer itself had not acted incorrectly at any stage.
However, in the circumstances, it was equitable for it to meet the claim.
Equity regards as done that which ought to be done. This relates most obviously to
specifi c performance. If vendor and purchaser have entered into a specifi cally
enforceable contract (for example, for the sale of land), in equity the purchaser acquires
a benefi cial interest and the vendor holds the land on constructive trust for the
purchaser. However, it should be noted that the duty of the constructive trustee is
simply to convey the land to the purchaser in accordance with the terms of the contract.
The trustee does not take on all the other duties normal to trusteeship, nor, for
example, is the purchaser entitled to rents from the property until sale. As Cotton LJ
stated in Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1:
An unpaid vendor is a trustee in a qualifi ed sense only, and is so only because he
has made a contract which a Court of Equity will give effect to by transferring the
property sold to the purchaser, and in so far as he is a trustee he is so only in respect of
the property contracted to be sold. The purchaser was not therefore able, as the law
then stood, to recover insurance money obtained by the vendor for a fi re which
occurred after he had contracted to sell the house (see further at page 309). The maxim
was also applied to a bribe received by a fi duciary in A-G for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1
All ER 1 (see further at page 289 below).

Equality is equity
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, equity will tend towards the
adoption of equal division of any fund to which several persons are entitled. One
example of this and one which it will be seen has wide-reaching implications, is
to be found in Burrough v Philcox, discussed in Chapter 5 at page 125. The
testator having left his estate to certain relatives or such of them as his child
should nominate, and the child having failed to nominate, the court held that the
funds were held on trust for all the relatives in equal shares. There is even some
authority for the proposition that, upon failure of an express trust for uncertainty
of benefi cial share, the property is to be held on trust for all the benefi ciaries
equally. Another instance is the division of a joint bank account upon divorce
where it is impractical to make an accurate division of the fund between husband
and wife: the court will order equal division. The adoption of equal division is,
however, subject to any evidence to the contrary; so, for example, the court in
McPhail v Doulton, discussed in Chapter 5 at page 126, would not order equal
division, which in any event would have been impossible, because it was clearly
not what the settlor intended.

The Burden
The burden of proof lies on him who asserts the fact, not on him who
denies it, because from the very nature of things a negative cannot be
proof.

This is the law in every court of our land.
It is also a key to winning in a court of law, for decisions courts are called upon to
make are always subject to this maxim. The burden of proof is a critical issue in every
dispute. The burden is always on the person who seeks to prove his point.
The other party does not have a burden to disprove his opponents point.
It is remarkable how few people are aware of this simple truth, yet every victory in court
depends on it. If the other side says you did something wrong, you dont have to prove you
didnt do it. The other side has to prove you did.
Put the burden where it ought to be.
The burden may shift from one party to the other in a dispute. For example, the
first party may complain that the second party failed to pay a bill. At this point the first
party has the burden to prove his point. The second party may then say he did pay the
bill. At this point the second party now has the burden to prove the bill was paid. The
burden may shift back and forth at various times, depending on who is claiming what, but
always the burden is on the party who must prove his point.
The burden never shifts to require a party to prove the other party is wrong.
Maxims such as this protect the innocent. They are an important part of our
American legal heritage. They deserve public attention and should be taught in all our
schools, for by the wisdom of these maxims and the self-evident truths they teach our
people are protected from adversity, and justice is preserved for al


























Villavert v. Employees Compensation Commission
Case No. 313
G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
FACTS:
The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine Constabulary.
She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, as
amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner
had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC
which affirmed the denial.

ISSUE:
W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of
the Petitioner.

HELD:
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the
duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a bout of
alcoholic intoxication shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he used
drugs. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor.

LATIN MAXIM:
9a
9. Ratio legis est anima legis.
The reason of the law is the soul of the law.













De Joya v. Lantin
Case No. 31
G.R. No. L-24037 (April 27, 1967)
FACTS:
Respondent Francindy Commercial purchased bales of textile from Cebu Company Ernerose
Commercial. However, the Bureau of Customs discovered that the goods to be delivered by
Ernerose were different from those declared. Customs took custody of the shipment.
Francindy Commercial filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for Customs to release the
goods. Francindy insisted that the CFI had jurisdiction on the basis of the Judiciary Act and
not the Bureau of Customs. RA 1937 and 1125, on the other hand, vest exclusive jurisdiction
over seizure and forfeiture proceedings to the Bureau of Customs.

ISSUE:
Who has jurisdiction over the shipment.

HELD:
The Bureau of Customs does. RA 1937 and 1125 are special laws, whereas the Judiciary Act is a
general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general ones.

LATIN MAXIM:
50 Generalia specialibus non derogant.
A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.



Chapter X AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL
A. REPEAL
49. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
Later statutes repeal prior ones which are repugnant thereto.
50. Generalia specialibus non derogant.
A general law does not nullify a specific or special law.











ab initio : from the beginning. locus
standi
: signifies a right to be heard.
ad hoc : for particular purpose,
pertaining to or for the
purpose of, this case only.
mens rea : a guilty mind.
ad
interim
: in the meantime mesne
profits
: intermediate profits, the profits which a
person in wrongful possession of the
property actually received or might with
ordinary diligence have received
therefrom together with interest on such
profits excluding the profits due to
improvement made by the person in
wrongful possession.
amicus
curiae
: friend of the court; one who
voluntarily or on invitation
of the court, and not on the
instructions of any party,
helps the court in any
judicial proceedings.
modus
operandi

: mode of operating; the way in which a
thing, cause etc. operates.
audi
alteram
: hear the other side. Both
sides should be heard
before a decision is arrived
at.
mutatis
mutandis
: with the necessary changes in points of
detail, with such change as may be
necessary.
caveat
emptor
: let the purchaser beware. A
maxim implying that the
buyer must be cautious, as
the risk is his and not that
of the seller.
nexus : bond, link or connection.
cestui que
trust
: a beneficiary under a trust,
the person for whose
benefit a trust is created.
non
obstante
: "notwithstanding clause." A legislative
device which is usually employed to give
overriding effect to certain provisions
over some contrary provision that may
be found either in the same enactment,
or some other enactment, that is to say,
to avoid the operation and defect of all
contrary provisions.
de facto : in fact : an expression
indicating the actual state of
circumstances
independently of any
question of right or title.

de jure : in law : independent of
what obtains in fact.
obiter
dictum
: an opinion of law not necessary to the
decision. An expression of opinion
(formed) by a judge on a question
immaterial to the ratio decidendi, and
unnecessary for the decision of the
particular case. It is no way binding on
any court, but may receive attention as
being an opinion of high authority.
dehors : outside of : unconnected
with, unrelated to;
pendente
lite
: during litigation.
de novo : anew. per
incuriam
: through carelessness, through
inadvertence. A decision of the court is
not binding precedent if given per
incuriam, that is, without the court's
attention having been drawn to the
relevant authorities, or statutes.
ejusdem
generis
: of the same kind or nature.
Where a list of specific items
is followed by general
concluding clause, this is
deemed to be limited to
things of the same kind as
those specified.
pro tanto : to that extent, for so much, for as much
as may be.
ex gratia : as a matter of grace or
favour.
quid pro
quo
: the giving of one thing of value for
another thing of value; one for the other;
thing given as compensation.
ex officio : by virtue of an office. ratio
decidendi
: reasons for deciding, the grounds of
decision.
ex parte : expression used to signify
something done or said by
one person not in the
presence of his opponent.
res
integra
: an untouched matter; a point without a
precedent; a case of novel impression.
fait
accompli
: an accomplished act. res
judicata
: a case or suit already decided.
in limine : at the outset. rule nisi : a rule to show cause why a party should
not do a certain act, or why the object of
the rule should not be enforced.
in pari
materia
: upon the same matter or
subject
rule
absolute
: when, having heard counsels, court
directs the performance of that act
forthwith.
in
personam
: against the person; an act
or proceeding done or
directed against or with
reference to a specific
person.
sine die : without day.
in rem : an act/proceeding done or
directed with reference to
no specific person or with
reference to all whom it
might concern.
sine qua
non
: an indispensable requisite.
inter alia : amongst other things. stare
decisis
: to stand by things decided; to abide by
precedents where the same points come
again in litigation.
inter vivos : between living persons status
quo
: existing condition.
intestate : a person is deemed to die
intestate in respect of
property of which he or she
has not made a
testamentary disposition
("will") capable of taking
effect.
sub judice : before a judge or court, pending decision
of a competent count.
intra vires : within the powers; within
the authority given by law.
ultra vires : beyond one's powers.
ipse dixit : he himself said it; there is
no other authority for it.

ipso facto : by the mere fact,
automatically

ipso jure : by the law itself; by the
mere operation of law.

lis
pendens
: a pending suit.




















Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Case No. 11
G.R. No. L-72873 (May 28, 1987)
Chapter III, Page 89, Footnote No.54
FACTS:
Five siblings inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same
vendee. By virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales,
2/5 of the lot, representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their
portion with a fence and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a
complaint invoking the right to redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this
complaint because the time had lapsed, not having been exercised within 30 days
from notice of the sales.

ISSUE:
1. W/N there was a valid notice.
2. W/N Art. 1088 of the Civil Code was interpreted correctly.

HELD:
Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the
sales satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were
unaware of the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While
Art. 1088 of the Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners
claimed that because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge
of it, the 30-day period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the
lawmakers was to ensure that the redemptioner was properly notified of the sale and
to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of
redemption. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given to them.

LATIN MAXIM:
1, 8, 9a, 10, 11d, 11e, 12a, 17











Co v. Electoral Tribunal, House of Representatives
Case No. 66
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 and 92202-03 (July 30, 1991)
Chapter XI, Page 457, Footnote No.82
FACTS:
Respondents declared Jose Ong Jr., elected representative of Northern
Samar, as a natural born Filipino citizen. Petitioners contend that based on the 1987
Constitution, Jose Ong, Jr. who was born on June 19, 1948 (during which the 1935
Constitution was operative), is not a natural born Filipino citizen having been born to
a Chinese father, Jose Ong Chuan and a Filipina mother Agrifina Lao.
ISSUE:
1. W/N people who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935
Constitution are to be considered natural born Filipino citizens.
2. W/N this provision should be applied retroactively.
HELD:
Yes. Under of Art. 4 Sec. 1 par. 3 of the Constitution, children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973 shall be accorded natural born status if they elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. They need not perform any
act of election granted that his father was naturalized and declared a Filipino
citizen by 1957, when he was only 9 years old. The provision in question must be
applied retroactively since it seeks to remedy the inequitable situation under the 1935
Constitution wherein people born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers were
considered natural born while children born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers were
not.
LATIN MAXIM:
8a, 9a, 42a - Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis.
Equity never acts in contravention of the law.



B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
8. Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis.
Equity never acts in contravention of the law.
Aequum et bonum est lex legume.
What is good and equal is the law of laws.
Jus ars boni et aequi.
Law is the art of equity.




Chapter IV ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM,
LANGUAGE OF STATUTE LITERAL
INTERPRETATION

Malanyaon v. Lising et. al
Case No. 160
GR No. L-56028 (July 30,1981)
Chapter V, Page 188, Footnote No.52

FACTS:
A Municipal Mayor was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was
pending. The case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner sought payment of his salary
during his period of suspension pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 3019 which provides, Should he be
convicted by final judgment he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits w/c he
failed to receive during suspension.

ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of the case due to death of the accused constitutes acquittal.

HELD:
No. It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted" it
means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court found
that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case is not equal
to acquittal of the accused. In People vs. Salico (84 Phil. 722), " Acquittal is always based on the
merits but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty.

LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a, 25a ( Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law.)












Velasco v. Lopez
Case No. 308
G.R. No. 905 (February 12, 1903)

FACTS:
Santiago Velasco died in Namacpacan, La Union on December 4, 1895, leaving a last will and
testament. The Plaintiff seeks to declare such will void on several grounds, most importantly
that the hour is not stated.

ISSUE:
W/N the will of Santiago Velasco is void because the hour of its execution is not stated.

HELD:
Yes. Book III, Title II, Chapter I, Article 695 and 687 of the civil Code explicitly states that said
wills without necessary formalities will be void: The testator shall express his last will to the
notary and to the witnesses. After the testament has been drafted in accordance with the
same, stating the place, year, month, day and hour of its execution its shall be read aloud, (art
695) Any will, in the execution of which the formalities respectively established in this chapter
have not been observed, shall be void. (art 687) The law explicitly defines what shall consist in
open wills (art 695) and what the sanctions shall be if such formalities arent met. (art 687)
It was stated that if the decision would be in favor of the Defendant (overlooking the absence
of the hour) the Court may disregard one formality after another until eventually they had to
repeal the entire system established by the code.

LATIN MAXIM:
6d, 7a ( Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but it is the law.)



















Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines
Case No. 307
G.R. No. L-6379 (September 29, 1954)
Chapter VI, Page 263, Footnote No.61
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents in Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental n October 6, 1927. After finishing primary and secondary education here in
the Philippines, he went to the United States to further his studies from the year
1947-1950. In April of the same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months
vacation. On July 15, 1950, he filed for naturalization. Forthwith, he returned to the
United States and took a post-graduate degree which he finished in July 1951l but he
did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951. Hence, the original date of
hearing the case, originally scheduled to take place on July 12, 1951, had to be
postponed.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact
that petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did
not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.
2. W/N domicile and residence are synonymous.

HELD:
1. No. Section 7 of C.A. No. 473(Commonwealth Act - Section 7. Petition for citizenship.
Any person desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the competent court, a
petition in triplicate, accompanied by two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name
and surname; his present and former places of residence; his occupation; the place and date
of his birth; whether single or married and the father of children, the name, age, birthplace
and residence of the wife and of each of the children; the approximate date of his or her
arrival in the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and, if he remembers it, the
name of the ship on which he came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required by
this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not disqualified for naturalization under the
provisions of this Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section five of this Act;
and that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition
up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The petition must be signed by the
applicant in his own handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible
persons, stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to
be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of
good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way
disqualified under the provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the names and
post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the
hearing of the case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of intention must be made
part of the petition.) requires applicant for naturalization to reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to
Philippine citizenship.
2. No. Although the words residence and domicile are often used
interchangeably, each has, in strict legal parlance, a meaning distinct and different
from that of the other. Actual and substantial residence within the Philippines, not
legal residence or domicile, is required. Residence indicates permanency of
occupation, distinct from lodging or boarding, or temporary occupation. Domicile is
residence with intention to stay.

LATIN MAXIM: 7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.
6c, 7, 11a, 25a, 37 When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.



7. Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent.
When the language of the law is clear, no explanation is required.
Dura lex sed lex.
The law may be harsh but it is the law.
Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est.
It is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written.