The Canadian Army and the Battle for Normandy

The success of the Canadians during the Normandy Campaign has been a debated and
contested issue since the battle occurred. To this day, historians continue to analyze the
performance of the troops and commanders, as well as the strategies and tactics employed in the
campaign. Scholars present different points of view ranging from failure to success as well as a
variety of factors to take into consideration when studying the degrees of effectiveness in the
Canadian divisions.
C.P. Stacey was the official military historian for Canada during World War II. He
offered two different viewpoints, one as part of an analysis of D-Day, and the other, specifically
focused on the battle of the Falaise Gap. In The Canadian Army, 1939-45, Stacey regarded the
Canadian performance on the Normandy beaches as exceptional saying:

Let no one think, however, that the Normandy landing was a cheap or an easy victory. It
was an extraordinary military performance. The legendary fortified line upon which a most
ingenious and painstaking enemy had lavished so much art during the years of his occupation of
France was broken and reduced to nullity in the short hours of a summer morning.
1

As for the Canadian performance in Falaise, Stacey drew a different conclusion. He was
clear in pointing out the failure of the Canadian army during the battle of the Falaise Gap. He
narrowed this down to a lack of training for Canadian troops, as well as a number of missed
opportunities by the Canadian divisions. Stacey claims that had the Canadians not been so
overcautious the destruction of the German army would have been much quicker and more
effective. The Canadians were overcautious, they failed to maintain the momentum of the

1
C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, 1948) p.179.
attacks and were too easily satisfied. The army as a whole failed to make the most of its
opportunities, especially in August, when the capture of Falaise was long delayed.
2

Reminiscent of Stacey, former Canadian solider and historian, John Englishs account of

Normandy revolved around the failure of the Canadians. English, however, did not blame their

failure on troops or missed opportunities, but rather the inexperience and incompetence of their

divisional commanders both on the battlefield and during training. As written in The Canadian

Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, English stated:

In very large measure, responsibility for the relatively lackluster showing of Canadian
arms in Normandy must be laid at the feet of the division commanders. Clearly, neither Keller or
Foulkes were as tactically competent as Simonds. The available evidence plainly suggests that
the hard-fisted Keller experienced serious personal and command failings in leading the 3
rd

Division.
3


He regarded Guy Simonds highly, although was quick to note that he was not enough to
compensate for the countless shortcomings among the divisional commanders. Unfortunately,
Simonds stood alone. Too little staff or tactical depth existed either above or below to adequately
support him
4
. Furthermore, English asserts the commanders lack of training as a significant
cause of their failure. From virtually the beginning, serious inadequacies at the high-command
level undermined Canadian training efforts in Britain. McNaughton proved incapable of training
his division commanders who, in turn, failed to train their own brigades and units
5
.
Echoing Stacey and English, Russell Hart and Martin Van Crevald concluded that the
failure of the Canadians was due to a lack of inexperience in both their troops and commanders.
These conclusions were all drawn when comparing the Canadians to other allied armies and the

"
C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign (Ottawa, 1960) p.276.
3
John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command (New
York, 1991) p.306.
4
Ibid., pg.313.
5
Ibid., p.311.
German army. Author of The Second World War: Northwest Europe, Russell Hart believed the
Canadians were the least successful of the allied armies, comparing them to the United States
who demonstrated an ability to learn quickly. He said the British and especially Canadian
armies were poorly trained, badly led, and slow to learn.
6
Secondly, Military historian and
theorist, van Crevald believed The Germans had greater fighting power due to morale, unit
cohesion and resilience. The Canadians were tired, the poor, the huddled masses, commanded by
officers who were less than mediocre.
7

Military historian, Terry Copp expresses a more optimistic view of the Canadian army in
Normandy. He advocates that they were extremely successful during the Normandy Campaign.
In Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, Copp declares The defeat and near destruction
of two German armies in just seventy-six days was one of the most remarkable military victories
in the Second World War
8
. Moreover, he contrasts the Canadians with the other armies
involved and concludes Their performance at both the tactical and operational level was far
from perfect but it compares favourably with that of any other army in Normandy
9
.
Additionally, Copp claims that the facts regarding their training period and ineffective operations
are often exaggerated and not entirely truthful. Earlier accounts of the pre-invasion training
period and previous discussions of Anglo-Canadian battle doctrine were based on assumptions
about inadequate performance in Normandy
10
.
Ultimately many historians make the mistake of comparing the Canadian forces to the
German army. The fact is the Canadians were launched into a war that the Germans had been

#
Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003) p.13.
$
Martin Van Crevald, Fighting Power. German and U.S. Performance, 1939-1945 (New York, 1982) p.122.
8
Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto, 2003) p.13.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid., p.31.
preparing for since 1933. In war, success should be measured by an armys ability to complete
their ultimate goal with the least amount of casualties along the way. The Canadians mobilized
and did the best they could under the circumstances. Despite their obvious military inferiority,
they overcome insurmountable odds and defeated the enemy in Normandy, ultimately liberating
North West Europe.