Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for
him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the
Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture
of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States)
was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain
cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of
American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and
unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not
be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-
General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem
it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to
make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings
had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and
is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own
views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided
that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute
is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of
labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and
induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the
Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity
and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum
"canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the
rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out
that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court
have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity
of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed.
1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906,
80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.)
This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a
limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v.
national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir.,
93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law.
ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United
States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated
hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining
the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards
of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision
are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural
dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public
official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect
the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of
work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is
solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right
to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it
is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all
the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
"records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein."
We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we
have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the
hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be
and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.



Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
En Banc, Laurel (p): 6 concur.
Facts:
<Incomplete story except facts provided that 89 laborers were laid off due to shortages of leathermaterials; that Toribio
Teodoro allegedly dominates the National Workers Brotherhood of Ang Tibay and wasbiased against he National Labor Union.>
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion fornew trial of
the National Labor Union.The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General, as it found no substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due totheir union affiliation or activity. The Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire
record of thiscase shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as
maybe relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid concept of separation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the lawof its creation (CA
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of thenation. It is not intended to
be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which isessentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to itby the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Rel ations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and
dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functionsi n t he det e r mi nat i on of di s put es bet ween
empl oyer s and empl oyees but i t s f unc t i ons ar e f ar mor e comprehensive and extensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide,and settle any questi on, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting, employers andemployees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between them,subject to, and in accordance with, the
provisions of CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposesof prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement,
of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely tocause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
wageshares or compensation, hours of labor orconditions of tenancy or employment, between employers and
employees or laborers and between landlordsand tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of
employees, laborers or tenants or farm-laborersinvolved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretaryof Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and
certified by the Secretary of Labor as existingand proper to be death with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, beforehearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to
reconcile the parties and induce them tosettle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of thePhilippines, it shall investi gate and st udy all pertinent facts rel ated to the
industry concerned or to theindustries established in a designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity
and fairness of fixingand adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborer s or
tenants, or a maximumcanon or rental to be paid by the inquilinos or tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section
5, ibid.) In fine,it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ
mediation orconciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and
compulsoryar bi t r at i on i n or der t o det er mi ne s pec i f i c c ont r over s i es bet ween l abor and
c api t al i n i ndus t r y and i n agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which
is a departure fromthe rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
2 . T h e C I R f r e e f r o m r i g i d i t y o f c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s ,
b u t n o t f r e e t o i g n o r e o r d i s r e g a r d f u n d a me n t a l a n d e s s e n t i a l
r e q u i r e me n t s o f d u e p r o c e s s i n v o l v i n g p r o c e e d i n g s o f
Administrative Law, 2003 ( 1 )

Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
administrative character
The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as i t may deem
just and equitable. (Section 20, CA 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (Section 13) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
3 . C a r d i n a l p r i ma r y r i g h t s r e s p e c t e d i n a d mi n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s ; G u i d e l i n e s
a . R i g h t t o a h e a r i n g wh i c h i n c l u d e s t h e r i g h t o f t h e p a r t y i n t e r e s t e d o r a f f e c t e d
t o p r e s e n t h i s own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected bythe rudimentary requirements of fair play.b. The t r i bunal mus t c ons i der t he ev i denc e
pr es ent ed, af t er t t he par t y i s g i ven an oppor t uni t y t o present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on
the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such ri ght is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. c . Wh i l e t h e d u t y t o
d e l i b e r a t e d o e s n o t i mp o s e t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o d e c i d e r i g h t , i t d o e s i mp l y a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental
principle that the genius of constitutional government is c ontrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.d . N o t o n l y mu s t t h e r e b e s o me e v i d e n c e
t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g o r c o n c l u s i o n b u t t h e e v i d e n c e must be substantial. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion
of t ec hni c al r ul es s o t hat t he mer e admi s s i on of mat t er whi c h woul d be deemed
i nc ompet ent i n j udi c i al proceedings would not invali date the administrative order. But this
assurance of a desirabl e flexibil ity in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence.e . T h e d e c i s i o n mu s t b e r e n d e r e d o n t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t h e
h e a r i n g , o r a t l e a s t c o n t a i n e d in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by
confini ng the administrative tribunal to theevidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case againstthem. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see
that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material andr el ev ant t o t he c ont r over s y . Boar ds of i nqui r y may be
appoi nt ed f or t he pur pos e of i nves t i gat i ng and determining the facts in any given case, but their report
and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.)The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter
under its consideration or advisement
Administrative Law, 2003 ( 2 )

Haystacks (Berne Guerrero)
to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of thePhilippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public officialsuch powers and functions
as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise ofthe Court itself of any of its powers
(Section 10)f . T h e C I R o r a n y o f i t s j u d g e s , t h e r e f o r e , mu s t a c t o n i t s o r h i s o wn
i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at adecision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally
impossible for the titular heads of theCIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no
statutory authority to authorizeexaminers or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board
or commission, to solvethe difficulty.g . T h e C I R s h o u l d , i n a l l c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s , r e n d e r
i t s d e c i s i o n i n s u c h a ma n n e r t h a t t h e parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Theperformance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
4 . N e w t r i a l g r a n t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
thehearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issueinvolved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. Thefailure
to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected bythe result.
[2]Carino vs. CHR [G.R. No. 96681. December 2, 1991.]
En Banc, Narvasa (CJ): 9 concurring, 1 concurring in result, 1 concurring in separate opinion, 1 dissenting inseparate
opinion
Facts:
On 17 September 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among
themmembers of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers(ACT)
undertook what they described as mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plightresulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again beenbrought to the latters
attention. Accordi ng to them they had deci ded to undertake sai d mass concertedactions after the
protest rally staged at the DECS premises on 14 September 1990 without disrupting classesas a last call for the
government to negoti ate the granti ng of demands had el icited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at theLiwasang Bonifacio,
gatheri ng i n peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representati ves, the teachers participating in the
mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in24 hours or face dismissal, and
a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissalp r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t t h o s e wh o
d i d n o t c o mp l y a n d t o h i r e t h e i r r e p l a c e me n t s . T h o s e d i r e c t i v e s notwithstandi ng, the
mass actions conti nued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days thatfollowed. Among those
who took part in the concerted mass actions were Graciano Budoy, Julieta Babaran,Elsa Ibabao, Helen Lupo, Amparo
Gonzales, Luz del Castillo, Elsa Reyes and Apolinario Esber, teachers atthe Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila,
who had agreed to support the non-political demands of theMPSTA. For failure to heed the return-to-work
order, Budoy, et. al. were administratively charged on thebasis of the principals report and given 5 days to answer the
charges. They were also preventively suspendedfor 90 days pursuant to Section 41 of PD 807 and temporarily
replaced. An investi gation committee wasconsequently formed to hear the charges. In the administrative case
(Case DECS 90-082) in which Budoy, et.al . f i l ed s epar at e ans wer s , opt e d f or a f or mal i nves t i gat i on,
and
al s o moved f or s us pens i on of t he
Administrative Law, 2003 ( 3 )


to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of thePhilippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public officialsuch powers and functions
as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise ofthe Court itself of any of its powers
(Section 10)f . T h e C I R o r a n y o f i t s j u d g e s , t h e r e f o r e , mu s t a c t o n i t s o r h i s o wn
i n d e p e n d e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at adecision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally
impossible for the titular heads of theCIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no
statutory authority to authorizeexaminers or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board
or commission, to solvethe difficulty.g . T h e C I R s h o u l d , i n a l l c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s , r e n d e r
i t s d e c i s i o n i n s u c h a ma n n e r t h a t t h e parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Theperformance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
4 . N e w t r i a l g r a n t e d u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
thehearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issueinvolved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. Thefailure
to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected bythe result.