John Christmann

Phil 1200
9/17/2014

Russells Argument in Chapter Seven

The argument in the beginning of chapter seven of The Problems of Philosophy is
stated succinctly by Russell,
In all our knowledge of general principles, what actually happens is that first of all we
realize some particular application of the principle, and then we realize that the
particularity is irrelevant, and that there is a generality may equally truly be affirmed
(Russell 48-49).
Russells argument seems to break down to this: First, we, as a matter of fact, recognize the
appropriate application of a general principle in a particular circumstance. Second, we move
from particularity to generality by abstracting the irrelevant particularity from the application of
the principle. Third, we recognize the principle as such and see its truth upon reflection (they
become self-evident).
His argument appears to be a recounting of the way in which humans come to learn
general principles of reasoning or inference. Russell uses the example of learning 2+2=4 by
looking at particular couplings being put together. Once we recognize the general principle being
employed, we abstract it away from the particular demonstration and can apply it to any instance.
This is Russells conception of how we come to become conscious of general principles such
that we can say we actually know them. He doesnt seem to deny some latent knowledge of
them, but instead thinks we know of them in the particular applications of them, but we need to
reflect on these particular instances to abstract away the irrelevant bits to get at the principles. So
this is not an argument that we dont know a principle, then we learn it upon reflecting on it
instead, we implicitly know the principles by virtue of employing them in particular
circumstances and make them explicit by reflecting on various circumstances where they are
employed.
The argument is similar but not identical to Lewis Carrolls argument in his famous
paper, What Achilles said to the Tortoise. In that paper, the point seemed to be that one cant
instill knowledge of very basic inferential rules where it doesnt already exist, but instead one
must use anothers implicit knowledge of inferential rules to bring that persons knowledge of
them to the surface. By making a distinction between principles of inference and premises about
principles of inference, Achilles was able to ward off Tortoises infinite regress. One can have
knowledge-how, which is necessary to use a principle of inference without having the
propositional knowledge which is necessary to make the principle explicit in a sentence or
proposition. While Carrolls argument isnt identical to Russells, and doesnt aim at the same
target, they are in the same general area of conceptual space.
So, Russell seems to be arguing that we implicitly know general principles by virtue of
their use in particular inferences, and we require some sort of conscious reflection on particular
instances of their application to abstract the particularity away and reveal the general principle at
play.