PRELIMINARIES

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA
METHOD AND INTERPRETATION
ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND
THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
ROBERT CLINTON (1987)
CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL
PRINCIPLESAND CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS
TIMOTHY ZICK (2003)
ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION
MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC
TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997)
FROMMCKINLEYS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW
CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
VICENTE MENDOZA
(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER)
MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO
GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; November 9, 1967
TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; October 16, 1971
PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; January 22, 1973
JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVESECRETARY
; March 31, 1973
SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; October 12, 1976
MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
; April 4, 1981
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V
AQUINO
EN BANC; May 22, 1986
FACTS/ISSUES
- Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government.
- Her govt was said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973
Consti.
- Proclamation No. 3- Aquino govt is installed through direct exercise of
power of the Filipino people, in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.
- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.
- April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrewpetitions and said that they would pursue it by
extra-judicial methods.
HELD
Petitions have no merit.
(1) Petitioners haveno personalityandno cause of action.
(2) Legitimacy of govt is NOT justiciable, and is a political question where
people are the only judge.
(3) People have already accepted such govt, which is in effective control of the
country, making it a de jure govt.
(4) Community of nations has also accepted it.
(5) Eleven members of SChave sworn to uphold lawunder her govt.
IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ
;October 24, 1986
DE LEON V ESGUERRA
; August 31, 1987
SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
DAVIDE; March 19, 1997
FACTS
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELECa petition to amend the Constitution
through a peoples initiative. In his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of
Article 6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the termlimits
of all elective government officials. He asks the COMELECto assist themin
gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature stations all
over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The
COMELECtook cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing.
Senator Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC,
stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly cognizable before the
COMELEC. Sen. MiriamDefensor Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special
civil action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as the
initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She further alleges that
what the petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments, but revisions.
Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI filed their motions for intervention,
arguing on the same points.
ISSUES
1. WONthe court can take action of this case despite there being a pending
case before the COMELEC
2. WONRA6735 is an adequate enabling lawfor peoples initiative
3. WONthe COMELECresolutionno. 2300 is valid
4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition
HELD
1. Yes. Comelecs failure to act on rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence
to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec
2 rule 65 of rules of court
- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didnt
come up with the minimumnumber of signatures
- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance.
2. No. The lawis inadequate.
- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word
Constitution was a delayed afterthought. The word Constitution was neither
germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves that it is silent to
amendments in the constitution.
- Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative
on the constitution.
- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution.
- Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and
referendum of national and local laws. It failed to provide for details in
implementation of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the lawis incomplete as it fails to
provides a sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power.
3. No. It only follows that since the RA6735 is incomplete, it does not have the
power to prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires
jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory
pleading.
Decision Petition granted
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [concur and dissent]
RA6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to provide for a lawfor
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks
of Roco)
VITUG
The COMELECshould have dismissed the petition, since it did not have the
required number of signatures.
FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]
looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly intends to
include amendments to the Constitution.
PANGANIBAN
RA6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC
Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives.
RESOLUTION
;
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
FACTS
- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against himuntil his
termis over
- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10
million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a
6-year term.
- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estradas "sharp decent frompower" began; Chavit Singson,
Estradas long time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estradas family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos fromjueteng lords.
- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I
ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of
jueteng money fromGov. Singson fromNovember 1998 till August 200 and
obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still fromGov. Singson
- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon
Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation
- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson.
- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor
spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.
- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement
asking Estrada to step down fromthe presidency as he had lost the moral
authority to govern
- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCPalso cried out for Estradas resignation
- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and
former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well.
- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWDSecretary and
also asked for Estradas resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and
refused to resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.")
- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House
Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was
based on the grounds of bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust
and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to the
Senate.
- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took
their oath as judges with SCChief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.
- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.
- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa
Ocampo, the SVPof Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one
foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on
documents involving a 500 million pesosinvestment account with their bank on
Feb 4 2000.
- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January
came, more bombshells were exploded.
> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW
Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of
insider trading.
> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against
opening the 2
nd
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under the name
"Jose Velarde."
> In short, this resulted to what we knowas "EDSAII"
- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support fromthe Armed Forces, PNPand
mass resignations ensued
- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the
oath to Arroyo as the President of the Philippines.
> Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement saying that he now
leaves Malacaang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation.
> He alsowrote a letter saying that the VPshall be the acting president and
said letter was transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres.
Pimentel.
- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency.
The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12
members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath
of office to GMA.
- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estradas letter, House of Reps. passed
House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMAs administration
and also HRno. 176
- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estradas letter claiming inability, Senate
passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMAs nomination of Teofisto Guingona
as VPand the Senates support of the newgovt. and also in the same date,
Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is functus
offictio.
- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate.
- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from
participating in this case as per Saguisags motion. They of course debunked
his charge "that they have compromised their weight on one side" but
nonetheless recused themselves.
ISSUES
1. WONthe petitions present a justiciable controversy
2. WONthe petitioner resigned as president
3. WONthe petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president
4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys
immunity, the extent of the immunity)
5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to
prejudicial publicity.
HELD
1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WONthe change in the
presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In
this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I fromEDSAII saying that EDSAI
was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally
whereas EDSAII was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of
the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMAswore
to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better
understanding. Also, the Court is interpretingART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8and
ART VII Sec 11in this case so look at those provisions too.)
2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined fromthe totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8)
3. The Court held that the question WONit may reviewand revise the decision
of both Houses of Congress recognizing GMAas the de jure President of the
Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estradas claimof inability to
rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a political
question and the Court cannot reviewCongress decision without violating the
principle of separation of powers.)
4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his
tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President
is immune fromsuit or frombeing brought to court during his period of his
incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)
5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by
the barrage of publicity.
Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent
Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14
th
President of the Republic are
DISMISSED.
GONZALES V NARVASA
GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000
FACTS
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reformor PCCRwas created by
then President Joseph Estrada on Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order
No. 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the 1987Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
> The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30,
1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which
extended the time frame of the PCCRs work until Dec 31 1999.
> The PCCRsubmitted its recommendations to the President on Dec 20,
1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day.
- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the
PCCRon two grounds:
> it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law
> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from
which he is totally excluded by the Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the
fundamental charter.
- In this regard, Gonzales:
> seeks to enjoin the PCCRand the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants fromacting as such
> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora fromenforcing their advice
and recommendations
> seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit
expenditures for the PCCRand the presidential consultants, advisers and
assistants
> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with
information on certain matters.
ISSUES
1. WONthe case has become moot and academic
2. WONpetitioner has standing as a citizen
3. WONpetitioner has standing as a taxpayer
4. WONthe President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the
President and appoint presidential consultants (20), advisers (22) and
assistants (28)
5. WONthe Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo
Zamora to provide petitioner with names of executive officials holding multiple
positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the
recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over
to Malacaang.
HELD
1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved havebecome academic or dead. It is
beyond the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion.
Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as the PCCRhas
already ceased to exist. Relief prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is
impossible to grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to be
enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the PCCRwould only be in the
nature of an advisory opinion.
2. Ratio Acitizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal. He must be able to showthat the lawis invalid, but also
that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way.
1
3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is
established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of
the lawor the Constitution, the action of which is properly brought only when
there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Obiter Under Sec 7 of EONo 43 which created the PCCR, the amount of P3
million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced fromthe
funds of the Office of thePresident. The appropriations were authorized by the
President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all since
appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the
Treasury. The funds for the PCCRwas taken fromthe funds intended for the
Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to
transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of Constitution.
4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.
- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not
proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result
of the appointment, and he has not alleged the necessary facts to enable the
Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest.
5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
- The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore
part of the general public which possesses the right.
- matters of public concern is a termwhich embrace(s) a broad spectrumof
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a
case tocase basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.
Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is
ordered to furnish petitioner with information requested.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
1
inKilosbayanvMoratocitingValmontevPhil CharitySweepstakesOffice
(ART I, II, IV, V)
STATE DEFINED
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDA
FERNANDO; October 29, 1971
FACTS
- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator
of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of
P 161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of
intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish
national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from1931 up to the time
of her death in 1955.
- Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of
Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claimfor
tax exemption. However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that
there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere
principality, not a foreign country.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression foreign country, used in the
last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a
government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in
the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon
intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law
allows a similar exemption fromsuch taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that
Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the
petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our
Tax Code.
ISSUE
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may
be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be
satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code
HELD
- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.
- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with
Pounds formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community
independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme
within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of
law.
- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to
exact obedience to its commands.
- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will
over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international
personality.
- State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming
within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover,
similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain
within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international
relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international lawdoes not exact
independence as a condition of statehood.
- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that
California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite
of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country
within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of
Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did
fall under this exempt category.
SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ARTII DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates formthem.
ARTVSUFFRAGE
Sec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein
they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the
election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage
Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a systemfor securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to
vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed
to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections
may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot.
TANADA V ANGARA
PANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997
FACTS
- Petition for Certiorari
- DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he
agreed on behalf of the Philippines
o To submit the WTOagreement to competent authorities for
their approval
o Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions
(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and
strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting
growth and development.)
- The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay
Round Final Act for their concurrence
- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he submits the Uruguay
Final Round Act, the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.
- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which expresses their
concurrence in the ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing
the WTO.
- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement
Establishing the WTOand the agreements and associated legal instruments of
that agreement.
- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand, embodies not
only the WTOagreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions
and the understanding on commitments in financial services.
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also claimthat since
the Senate only concurred with the WTOagreement and not on all the contents
of the Final act, they impliedly rejected the Final act.
ISSUES
1. WONthe case is justiciable.
2. WONthe parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO
agreement violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the
Constitution (economic nationalism clauses).
3. WONthe WTOagreement unduly limits, restricts and impairs legislative
power of the Congress.
4. WONthe WTOagreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.
5. WONthe concurring of the senate only in the WTOagreement and not in
the final act implies rejection of the final act.
HELD
- Petition dismissed.
1. Yes.
- The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress
2. No
- The declaration of principles are not intended to be self-executing,
rather, they are just aid and guides by the judiciary injudicial review, and
by the legislature in enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative
enactments to implement them.
- The economic nationalismprovisions should be read with other constitutional
mandates, especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12.
- The WTOprotects the weak economies. There are specific provisos in the
agreement with respect to tariffs, domestic subsidies and protection fromunfair
competition which are intended to help developing economies.
- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. Independence refers
to the freedomfromundue foreign control of the national economy.
- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any
business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that
Filipino companies should be pampered with total prescription of foreign
competition.
- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary
events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown
circumstances.
3. No
- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to restrictions and
voluntarilyagreed to by the Philippines.
- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country.
- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty
- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution
- Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the
family of nations.
- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations
- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict its soverign rights
under the concept of auto-limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal
Revenue)
- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states granting the same privilege and
immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
4. No.
- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. It is still
on the patent owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged
identical product.
- The newrule should not really present any problemin changing the rules of
evidence as the present lawon the subject, RA165 (Patent Law), provides a
similar presumption in cases of infringement of patent design.
- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.
5. No.
- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself. Rather, it is just a
summary of the proceedings. The final act only required that the senate concur
with the WTOagreement, which they did.
- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the
members deliberations.
REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FERNANDO; December 27, 1969
FACTS
APPEAL froma decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
Petitioner: William Reagan civilian employee of an American corporation
providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines
Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue
July 7, 1959Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base
April 22, 1960 He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at
$6,443.83
July 11, 1960 petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car
which was granted provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed
Forces or a UScitizen employed in the Philippine military bases. On the same
date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine
Corps.
- As a result of the transaction, respondent, after deducting the landed cost of
the car as well as petitioners personal exemption, fixed his net taxable income
arising fromthe sale at P17,912.34 rendering himliable for P2,979.00 income
tax. After paying the sum, petitioner sought a refund claiming that he was
exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the case with the Court of
Tax Appeals which denied his petition.
- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt frompaying the income tax. He contends
that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and
therefore beyond its jurisdiction to tax.
- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v. Collector of
Internal Revenue: While in army bases or installations within the Philippines
those goods were in contemplation of lawon foreign soil. The court resolved
this by pointing out that the statement was merely obiter dictumin that case
and therefore, cannot be invoked in this case.
ISSUE
WONthe Clark Field Air Baseis Philippine territory
HELD
Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory.
- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be
exercised over its entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus,
there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It is not precluded from
allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such
areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They
are not and cannot be foreign territory.
- Therefore, the Philippines jurisdictional rights over the bases, certainly
not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax
matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.
- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not take part)
The decisionof the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2,979.00
as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
CORONA; July 15, 2003
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government or PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan,
entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by
his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA1379
2
.
- PCGGwas created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on
February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon Aquino, and was
charged with the task of assisting the President in the recovery of
all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and
entities owned or controlled by them during is administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) sought:
a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million
(estimated to be US$658 million inclusive of interest as of the time
of decision) deposited in escrow
3
in the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), as ill-gotten wealth.
*The ff account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain
Swiss banks, previously held the funds:
1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts
2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-
2
An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any
Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Procedure Therefor.
3
Money or a deed or other instrument deposited with a third person for a delivery to a given party upon the
fulfillment of some condition. While in the keeping of the third party, the money or instrument is said to be in
escrow. (Random House Websters Legal Dictionary, Random House, New York, 1996)
Avertina-Foundation accounts
3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts
4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts
5. Maler Foundation accounts
b. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes
which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income
as well as income from legitimately acquired property. These
treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by
virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG.
- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda RMarcos, Ma. Imelda MManotoc, Irene M
Araneta and Ferdinand RMarcos, Jr. filed their answer.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements
- Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and
then PCGGChairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family
- The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate,
cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the
Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.
- It was stated in one of the whereas clauses the fact that petitioner Republic
obtained a judgment fromthe Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the
US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided
certain conditions are met. The decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey granting
legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the various deposits in the
name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be
frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.
- Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the
General/Supplemental Agreements.
- Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment
on the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition.
- Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to
approve the compromise agreement (took) precedence over the motion for
summary judgment
- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to
the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned
90%of the funds with the remaining 10%belonging to the Marcos estate.
The Fund Transfer
- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich,
Switzerland an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to
an escrowaccount in PNB. This was granted.
- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District
Attorney of Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in
1998.
The Petition for Summary Judgment
- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining
to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds:
a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are
admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions
made in the course of the proceeding
b. respondents admission made during pre-trial that they do not have
any interest or ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue
or controversy as to any material fact in the present action
- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by co-respondents
Marcos children.
- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted
- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary
judgment, stating that there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation
of evidence, and declared the funds, which were deemed unlawfully acquired
as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the State.
- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 262000; Marcos children
followed.
- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision,
stating that the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not
prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses
because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the
Marcoses of the funds, and thus denied petitioners motion for summary
judgment. Hence, the present petition.
- Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed graveabuse
of discretion in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of
the authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their
authenticated translations have not been submitted to the Court, when in fact
the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in
denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that nowhere in
the respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss
decisions ever challenged.
- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be denied.
Analysis of Respondents Legitimate Income
- the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income
over a period of 20 years from1965 to 1984.
- This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos salary as Senate President in 1965,
(P15,935) and as President from1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year;
1977-1985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos salary as Minister of Human
Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year), income from legal practice
(P11,109,836), plus other sources.
- Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal
practice before he became President, and that he was still receiving payments
almost 20 years after
- Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda,
for the years 1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming
income fromlegal practice is valid)
- The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.
ISSUES
1. WONpetitioner Republics action for certiorari is proper.
2. WONrespondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify
or negate summary judgment.
3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in
accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA1379.
HELD
1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest,
public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed
notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.
Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search for and reversion of ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such
cases on the merits is long overdue.
2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible
in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and
will not defeat a motion for summary judgment
Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue
of fact in their pleadings. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of
right.
- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished froman issue which is fictitious and contrived, set
up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance.
- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained
in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Their answers include they have no sufficient
knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a long time ago or
the funds were lawfully acquired without stating the basis of such assertions.
- Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies as the
specific denial called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation
directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or
committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, performor commit,
a categorical and express denial must be made.
- The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits, not
having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed
admitted pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
a. Propriety of Summary Judgment
- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as
to any material fact in the action. The Court is justified in dispensing with
the trial and rendering summary judgment if it is demonstrated by
affidavits, depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine but
shamor fictitious.
- motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption
that the issues presented need not be tried either because
these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no
genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.
- It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in
which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine
issue as to any material fact.
b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had
legally waived right it had to move for summary judgment.
- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment
any time after the respondents answer was filed or, for that matter, at
any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to
proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it frommoving for summary
judgment.
c. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on
Mar 10 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against
petitioner.
- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues
as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate
an act that contravenes lawor public policy.
- estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier,
warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his
right or declined to assert it.
- in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must
show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair
injury to themmight result unless the action is barred.
3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is
unlawfully acquired when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to
the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it
stands as proved unless defendant shows, and proves, that these were lawfully
acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of income.
Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show
by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully
acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. Apresumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and, unless the fact thus prima facie
established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.
- the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made
admissions in their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to
present sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the
Marcoses participation in the illegal acquisition of funds.
RESOLUTION
CORONA; November 18, 2003
- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new
mattersfor the Court to resolve.
Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of due
process?
- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence they are
entitled to constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused.
- SC: Due process of lawhas two aspects: substantive and procedural. There
must be a compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in
order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process
clause.
- substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law
that interferes with the rights of a person to his property
- there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair,
unreasonable or unjust. Respondents were not
deprived of their property through forfeiture for
arbitrary reasons.
- procedural due process means compliance with
procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the
statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called
upon to administer it.
- forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil in nature,
contrary to respondents contention that they are penal in
character. The proceedings under RA1379 do not terminate in
the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture in favor of
the State of properties illegally acquired.
- Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA
1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence. The
Government is required only to state the known lawful income
of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal
provenance to attach. Petitioner Republic having established
this presumption, burden of proof shifted to respondents to
showby clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits
were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate
sources of income. Respondentsfailed on this part.
- essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit ones evidence in support of his
defense
- Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity
to present their case, defenses and pleadings. They
obstinately refused to do so and have tried to confuse the
issues and the Court and to delay the disposition of the
case
- the people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free
fromvexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary
objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits
to the rightful owner that is, the Republic of the Philippines
in the shortest possible time.
Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.
DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
HOLMES; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot fromthe Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of
application of registration of their ancestral landthrough writ of error.
- Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and
pastured parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris
(April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot
custom.
- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of
title was issuedby Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under
mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established
possessory title.
- Procedure
- Court -applicationof land registrationgranted(March 4, 1904 )
- CFI of Benguet appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and
US having taken possession of property for military and public purposes;
application dismissed
- Philippine SCaffirmeddecision of CFI Benguet
- Federal SCwrit of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC
- Respondents argue:
- Given that
- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land
in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired
- No prescription against the Spanish Crown
- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a
limited time to make the title good
- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of
Paris)
- Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all rights and a
mere trespasser
- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain
whether registration granted was under Spanish laws
- Plaintiff argues:
- Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout
an important Island of Luzon
ISSUE
WONCarino owns the land
HELD
Ratio Prescription, mentioned in theroyal cedula of 1754 states: Where such
possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall showthat ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be
deemed owners; cultivated land 20 years, uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiffs
father was owner of land by the very terms of this decree.
- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by
the United States are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof.
Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court
(Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
- Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like
present.
- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to
occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the
internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit
their country for private gain.
- The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
Decision REVERSED
- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of
what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his
property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten lawof Spain.
KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA
MORAN; November 15, 1947
FACTS
- Appeal froma judgment of the CFI of Manila
- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot fromthe Magdalena
Estate. Inc
- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.
- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of
Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot
acquire land in this jurisdiction.
- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of aconsulta.
- CFI affirmed RDMs refusal hence this appeal.
- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion to withdrawthe
appeal.
- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being
prepared.
- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Courts discretion to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented.
- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor
General was agreeable to it.
- While the motion was pending, a newcircular of the Department of Justice
(Circular No. 128) dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of
deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.
- RDMnaturally obeyed the circular.
ISSUE
J urisdiction:
WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the
issuance of the said circular of the DOJ
Primary Issue:
WONan alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
HELD
The Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawal of
appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented.
- It cannot grant appellants motion withdrawing his appeal only because the
constitutional issue should be avoided.
- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances,
particularly (1) the circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was
pending before the Court and ordering all registers of deed to accept for
registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, together with the
circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again
before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion
reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive
deliberations on the constitutional question.
- To allowthe withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating
an offense to the constitution, offense that may be permanent.
- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural
lands, including residential lands. (The votes were: 8-3)
- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution
which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it
PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE
AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDINGRESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS
ORIGINMIGHT HAVEBEEN.
- This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens hands.
- This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII
"natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited
to Filipino citizens.
- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.
- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all,
they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands
in the hands of the Filipino citizens.
- RatioThe Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal
if such a withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution.
- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are
not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of
the prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null and void per
seandab initio.
LEE HONG HOK V DAVID
FERNANDO; December 27, 1972
FACTS
- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEEHONGHOK, petitioners
- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
Director of Lands and Court of Appeals
- APPEAL by certiorari froma decision of the Court of Appeals.
- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void Davids Torrens Title (OCT No.
510) because they alleged to own the disputedlot (226 m
2
22
Lot 2892, which is a
portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) throughaccretion.
- Jun 18, 1958Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot
- Aug 26, 1959 Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued
David a Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209
- Oct 21, 1959Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. 510
ISSUES
1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion,
therefore a privatenot public- domain (this court says it does not warrant any
further consideration)
2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the
government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court says it does)
3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year
should not be recognized (this court says it should be).
HELD
1. Imperiumis the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominiumis the
states capacity to own or acquire property. Dominiumenables the state to
provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. The present
Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all lands in
Spain and its earlier decrees were held by the Crown, and the present
Constitution holds that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cario v
Insular Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands held without
proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the Spanish state) according
as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seemnecessary for public squares,
ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into
consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their
probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary
for tillage and pasturage, confirming in themin what they nowhave and giving
them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and
unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.
In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting
the public domain the sole power is vested in Congress.
The land in question is not private property; the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the
public character thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which
the petitioners claim).
Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance
on the ground of fraud committed by respondents.
There was no fraud; everything was done in the open notices were
published, sale and awarding of land to David were public official acts of a
Government officer.
The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a public land.
2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a
void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private
parties and not government officials, and therefore cannot institute for the
nullification of Davids Torrens Title, since they are not the registered owners of
the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.
Maninang v Consolacion states that [t]he fact that the grant was made by the
government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the lawor
not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the
government and set aside, the defendant (in this case, the respondents)
cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee
and the government.
Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.
3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the
proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of
the sales patent in his favor, the appellants did not put up any opposition or
adverse claimthereto. This is fatal to thembecause after the registration and
issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public
land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation
of RA496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.
After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land is automatically covered by RA496 ---
RA 496 48says that any question concerning the validity of the certificate of
title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible.
In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), [t]he proceedings under the Land
Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land
Laware the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature
of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is
conclusive and final.
In Cabacug v Lao, a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more
favorably situated than that of an owner of registeredproperty. Not only does a
free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person
to whomit is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a
period of five years.
Davids application was a renewal of his deceased wifes application, wherein
his deceased wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938.
The decisionof Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 andits resolution of
March 14, 1969 are affirmed
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
FACTS
- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO30 as an impermissible encroachment by
the President on the legislative prerogative
- EO30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under
the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to awaken our
peoples consciousness in the nations cultural heritage and encourage its
preservation, promotion and development
- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by
the Center as coming from donations and contributions and not a single
centavo raised by taxation
- Respondents argue EO30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and
that 2) this is supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA4165 creating the
National Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have
the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO30 as the
funds held by the Cultural Center came fromdonations and contributions and
not one centavo came fromtaxation
- Later, PD15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines
ISSUES
1. WONpetitioner has standing
2. WONEO30 encroached on the legislative prerogative
3. WONthe issue on the validity of EO30 became moot and academic
HELD
1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive
acts that do not involve the use of public funds
2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust
created by an agreement with a foreign country
3.EO30 was superseded by PD15, hence the suit has assumed a moot and
academic character
Obiter
(1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from
donations and contributions and not by taxation
-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest
(2) As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in domestic and
foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate as parens patriae, the President has
authority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the
Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to administer the private
contributions and donations given not only by the USgovernment but also by
private persons
-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently
exercised by the President and Congress
Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still no
encroachment and that it is already moot and academic
CRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RES
PER CURIAM; 6 December 2000
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 8371(Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)
- Indigenouspeoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)
-Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who
have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory;
- Ancestral lands(sec.3b IPRA)
- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IPsince time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual
or traditional group ownership,... including residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies, private forests, swidden farms, andtree lots.
- Ancestral domains(sec.3a IPRA)
- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IPcomprising lands, inland waters, coastal
areas and natural resources therein, held under a claimof ownership, occupied
or possessed by ICC/IP, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally
or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present... including
ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodiesof
water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively
by ICCbut to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of
ICCwho are still nomadic or shifting cultivators.
- Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpayers(upon the
plea that questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), filed for
PROHIBITION(directing NCIPto cease fromimplementing IPRAand its IR;
DENRSecretary to cease fromimplementing Circular 2; DBMSecretary to
cease fromdisbursing public funds) and MANDAMUS(commanding DENR
Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the States constitutional
mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ISSUES
The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were
questioned-
(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to anunlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over LANDSOF THEPUBLICDOMAIN(including the
minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN
DOCTRINE.
(2) Sections 3a and 3bviolate the RIGHTSOF PRIVATELANDOWNERS.
(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIPand make customary lawapplicable to the settlement of disputes
involving ancestral domains and lands, violate the DUEPROCESSclauseof
the Constitution.
(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIPAdmin. Order No.1, which provides
that "the administrative relationship of the NCIPto the Office of the President is
characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy
and programcoordination", is invalid asit infringes upon the Presidents
power of control over executive departments.
HELD
There wasNOMAJORITYVOTEreached as the Justices were equally divided
at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the
same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSEDpursuant to Rule 56, Section 7
of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
- Those in favor of dismissing petition:
J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J.
Mendoza
- Those in favor of granting petition:
J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De
Leon
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PUNO [dismiss]
- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System
A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion
of the Spanish Crown.
B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the
right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length
of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the
proper administrative officers, and obtain fromthemhis deed, and until he did
that the State remained the absolute owner."
C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the PLA, "public
land" referred toall lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government. The Torrens systemrequires that the government issue anofficial
certificate of titleattesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of
such property described. The certificate of title is indefeasible and
imprescriptible.
D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was established 1935
Constitution, and it was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti.
-Provisions of IPRAdo NOT contravene the Constitution
(1) ADand AL are the private property of the IPand do not constitute part
of the land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties
by NATIVETITLE(AD/AL) and TORRENSTITLE(AL).
a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is
the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title.
b. For purposes of registration under the PLAand the Land Registration Act,
the IPRAexpressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be
disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private.
(2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IPto their ADis a
LIMITEDformof ownershipand does not include the right to alienate
such AD.
a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But the ADis owned
in common by the ICC/IPand not by one particular person. Communal rights to
the land are held not only by the present possessors but extends to all
generations of the ICC/IP.
b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP; in
accord with customary laws; and subject to the right of redemption of IPfor a
period of 15 years if transferred to a non-member of IP.
c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title.
(3) The Regalian Doctrine has not beenviolated as the right of ICC/IPto
develop lands and NRwithin the ADdoes not deprive the State of
ownership over the NR, and of control and supervision in their
development and exploitation.
a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the Implementing Rules of
IPRAincluded the term"natural resources" in such rights of ownership which is
CONTRARYto Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.
b. The small-scale utilization of NRin Sec.7b of the IPRAis allowed under
par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. Managing and conserving these
resources, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
c. The large-scale utilization of NRin Sec.57 of IPRAmay be harmonized with
par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies
that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and who has the
power to grant such preferential rights.
(4) IPRAis a recognition of our active participation in the International
Indigenous Movement.
VITUG [grant]
(1) IPRAeffectively withdraws fromthe public domain the ancestral domains,
as the notion of community property involves matters of proprietary interest
ANDalso some formsof self-governance over the property.
(2) The decision of the USCourt in Carino vs. Insular Government cannot
override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.
(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aimis to get Congress tolook closely
into the customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew
themto, and make thempart of the streamof laws." There should be a
balancing of interests between specific need of IPand imperatives of national
interest.
KAPUNAN [dismiss]
~Preliminary issues-
(1) The petition presents an actual controversy.
(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing.
As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony
is not alienated and diminished in violationof the Constitution. As taxpayers,
they possess the right to restrain officials fromwasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.
(4) Notwithstandingthe failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts,
(petition should have been filed in the lower court first) the Court assumes
jurisdiction in viewof the importance of the issues raised.
~Substantive issues-
(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IPover the ancestral lands
and domains are not unconstitutional.
a. The Regalian theory doesnot negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial.
b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which are
"absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," shall then be owned by
the State.
c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IPto their
AL." Framers did not intend Congress to decide whether ADshall be public or
private property, as they have acknowledged that ADshall be treated as
private property.
(2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the States ownership
over the natural resources within the ancestral domains.
a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such
natural resources as private property of the IP.
b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has
NOT been recognized in the Philippines.
(3) The provisions of IPRApertaining to the utilization of natural
resources are not unconstitutional.
a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale utilization of natural
resources by its citizens. The State retains full control over such activities,
through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the exploration,
development and utilization of the NR.
b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IPare duly circumscribed and are limited:
to manage and conserve NRwithin territories;
to benefit and share the profits fromallocation and utilization of NR;
to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NRin the
area (refers only to the preliminary activity of search and
prospecting of mineral resources);
to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project that will affect AD;
to receive just and fair compensation for any damages sustained by
such projects;
to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference
with these rights
c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said priority rights is
not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations.
~Corollary issues-
(1) IPRAdoes not violate the Due Process clause.
a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should
be protected") belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or
non-indigenous. Where the lawdoes not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish.
b. The fact that NCIPshall be composed exclusively of members of IPdoes not
mean that the NCIPis incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of
delivering justice to the non-IP.
c. The application of customary lawis limited to disputesconcerning property
rights or relationsin determining the ownership and extent of the AD, where
ALL parties involved are members of IP.
(2) Implementing Rules of IPRAdoes not infringe upon the Presidents
power of control over the Executive Department.
Although NCIPis independent to a certain degree, it wasplaced by Congress
"under the Office of the President" and as such, is still subject to the
Presidents power of control and supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.
MENDOZA [dismiss]
(1) It is not a justiciable controversy.
Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual
cases or controversies without upsetting balance of power.
(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.
In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest. But in this case, what public right is there
for petitioners to enforce when the IPRAdoes not apply to themexcept in
general and in common with other citizens??
PANGANIBAN [grant]
- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that-
A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public
domain which are owned by the State."
B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources" which should under be
the full control and supervision of the State."
(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution.
Because of the States implementation of policies considered to be for the
common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions,
even vested rights of ownership.
(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a collective right, still
perpetually withdraws such property fromthe control of the State and fromits
enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. Ownership of NRis in ALL the
Filipino people.
(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no
more than 12 hectares of alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area
or termlimits to ancestral lands and domains. Based on ethnographic surveys,
solicitor general estimates that ADcover 80%of our mineral resources and
between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the country.
(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake
exploration, development and utilization of NRor it could enter into co-
production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens
or entities at least 60%Filipino-owned (and such agreements shall not exceed
25 years). RA8371 relinquishes this power in favor of ICC/IPand they may
even exercise such right without any time limit.
(5) Yes, ICC/IPshould be given priority in the use of their ADand AL but they
should not be granted perpetual ownership and control of the nations
substantial wealth to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citizens.
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 3: TheState shall not be sued without its consent
SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS
REGALADO; November 27, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who
is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of
Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air
Base, for which she is eminently qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance
Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS1710-9 level for approximately four
years at the time sheapplied for the same position in 1976. her application was
forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shaufs
work experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate
immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office
(CORRO). Persi was then informed by CORROthat an Edward B. Isakson was
selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on
January 1977.
By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida Shauf filed an
equal employment opportunity complain against respondents for alleged
discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. Trial
court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of Appeals reversed decision.
ISSUES
1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official
functions in accordance with the powers vested in themunder the
Philippine American Military Bases Agreement are immune from
suit (even w/o consent of the State).
2. WoNthe respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner
Shauf.
3. WoNShauf should be awarded compensatory damages.
HELD
As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the state may not be
sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of International
law under Art II, Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a suit
against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be taken fromfunds of the US.
However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by theminthe discharge of their duties. Unauthorized
acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials by one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is not a suit
against the State covered by the rule of immunity. The respondents are being
sued in their private and personal capacity. The rationale for this ruling is
that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice. Apublic official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act
done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
DoctrineYes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla,
and Sarmiento.
1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the
consent of the State.
2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf.
Despite Shaufs qualifications, Persi did not even consider the
formers application. Since the petitioner was able to prove the
discrimination in the non-consideration of her application, the
burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however
answered with mere denials of the charges.
3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There was
no proof that she really was to earn $39,662 if she was employed
at the time. Damages which are merely possible are
speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss.
WYLIE V RARANG
GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992
FACTS
Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and
commanding officer, respectively, of the USNaval base in Subic. Respondent
Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned
as the merchandise control guard.
Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the Plan of the Day
a daily publication that featured among others, an action line inquiry. On
feb.3,1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being
consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and
that a certain Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being
the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for
damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang
was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology
letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.)
She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious
defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official
functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune fromsuit (2) US
Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US
Government and (3) the RTChas no jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties involved.
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official
acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not
included in the rule that a sovereign country cant be sued without its consent).
Suit against USNaval Base was dismissed.
ISSUES
1. WONofficials of the USNaval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge
of their official duties, are immune fromsuit.
2. Are USofficers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official
functions still covered by the principle of state immunity fromsuit?
HELD
1. Yes, they are immune.
RatioOfficers of the USNavy as instrumentalities of the US government are
immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official
functions. this is part of the second issue)
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its
consent. But even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of
incorporation
4
. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but
also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by themin
discharge of their official duties.
The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State frombeing sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.
Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii)
and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity nowextends only to acts jure imperii.
There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in
screening the features and articles in the PODas part of their official functions.
Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions
are immune fromsuit, thenit should followthat the petitioners may not be held
liable for the questioned publication.
It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal
capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.
2. No.
4
principlesaredeemedincorporatedinthelawof everycivilizedstateasaconditionandconsequence
of itsmembershipinthesocietyof nations. Uponitsadmissiontosuchsociety, thestateisautomatically
obligatedtocomplywiththeseprinciplesinitsrelationswithother states
RatioOur laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allowthe
commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that
public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra
vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged
status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the PODdated February 3, 1978 is
a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent.
Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal
explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were
published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their
direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such
act or omission isultra viresand cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their
personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private
respondent.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO
CRUZ; February 26, 1990
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to reviewthe
decision of the RTCof Angeles City
- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all involving state
immunity.
G.R. No. 76607
- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U.S.
Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them
for contracts for barbering services in the said base.
- Respondents sought to compel the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX) and
individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct
rebidding and to allowrespondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating concessions pending litigation.
- Respondent court issued an order directing petitioners to maintain the status
quo.
- Petitioners filed motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for
preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was a suit against
the United States, which has not waived its non-suability, and that as
officials/employees of the U.S. Air Force, defendants were also immune
fromsuit.
- Trial Court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction as well as
the motion to dismiss.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
in the SC.
G.R. No. 79470
- Genove filed a complaint for damages against Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and
Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at
John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. After investigation, the ff: facts were
ascertained:
- Genove poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking vegetables
served to club customers.
- Lamachia, as club manager, suspended Genove andreferred the case
to the Board of Arbitrators, which found himguilty and recommended his
dismissal.
- Defendants, joined by the United States of America, moved to dismiss
the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the U.S. Air Force,
was immune fromsuit, and that the suit was in effect against the United
States, which has not given its consent to be sued.
- Said motion was denied.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
in the SC.
G.R. No. 80018
- Luis Bautista, was employed as barracks boy in Camp O Donnel, an
extension of Clark Air Base.
- He was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by individual
petitioners King, Dye and Bostick, officers of the United States Air Force and
special agents of the United States Air Force Office of Special Operations, for
violating R.A. 6425, or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
- Bautista was dismissed fromemployment.
- He then filed a complaint for damages against individual petitioners.
- Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
the defendants were acting in their official capacity when they did the
acts complained of and that the suit was against the United States
without its consent.
- Motion was denied by respondent judge.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
in the SC.
G.R. No. 80258
- Private respondents filed a complaint for damages for injuries sustained as a
result of the acts of herein petitioners.
- According to plaintiffs (hereinrespondents), defendants (herein petitioners)
beat themup, handcuffed themand unleashed dogs on themwhich bit them
and caused themextensive injuries.
- According to defendants, the plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten
by the dogs becausethey were struggling and resisting arrest.
- The United States of America and the individually named defendants
moved to dismiss the case and argued that the suit was in effect a suit
against the United States which has not given its consent to be sued. The
defendants also claimed immunity for acts done by themin the
performance of their official functions.
- Trial court denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the motion for
reconsideration.
- Petitioners filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
in the SC.
ISSUES
1. WONthe cases against the petitioners were suits against the United States,
to which it has not consented
2. WONthe individual petitioners may invoke immunity fromsuit by mere
assertion that the acts were done by themin the performance of their official
functions as officers or agents of the United States
HELD
1) RatioIf the case involves the state entering into a contract in the discharge
of its commercial, proprietary and private function, then the state will be
deemed to have impliedly consented to the suit.
Reasoning
- The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent nowexpressed in
Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law.
- All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over the other.
- The rule says that a state may not be sued without its consent, which clearly
imports that it may be sued if it consents.
- Consent may be express or implied.
- Express-embodied in a general or special law
- Implied-when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation
- However, not all contracts operate as a waiver of non-suabilitya distinction
must be made between contracts entered into in a states governmental and
sovereign capacity or private, proprietary and commercial capacity
- The latter implies waiver of non-suability, the former does not.
* If it is not proven that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in the
performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the United States,
then they may not invoke immunity formsuit.
- The doctrine of state immunity is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by themin the
discharge of their duties.
- The fact that the acts were done by the individual petitioners in
the performance of their official functions as officers or agents of the
United States is a matter of evidence, and charges against themmay not be
dismissed just by mere assertion. If the individual petitioners are found liable
for personal torts in which the USitself is not involved, then they alone must
satisfy the judgment.
2) Ruling: (Application of ratio in the different cases)
G.R. No. 76607
- Barbershops subject of the concessions granted by USare commercial
enterprises operated by private persons. The contracts being decidedly
commercial, petitioners cannot plead any immunity.
- Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 79470
- Restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature
of a business enterprise undertaken by the USgovernment in its proprietary
capacity. Petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the
dismissal of the damage suit against them.
- However, notwithstanding these considerations, complaint in the court below
must still be dismissed. Although suable, the petitioners are not liable because
of the strength of evidence that they acted properly in terminating Genove for
his disgusting offense.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
G.R. No. 80018
- Individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions, and not in their private or unofficial capacity.
- It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they
cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not
given its consent to be sued.
- Petition is granted, case against petitioners is dismissed.
G.R. No. 80258
- The court hesitatesto make a conclusion because the record is too meager to
indicate if the individual petitioners were acting in the discharge of their official
functions, or had actually exceeded their authority.
- Only after needed inquiry in the lower court shall have determined in what
capacity the individual petitioners were acting will the Court determine if the
doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
- Petition is dismissed and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision.
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC
PUNO; December 15, 1994
FACTS
- Florencio Sacramentowas one of the 74security assistance support
personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAGPhils.; he had been with JUSMAGfor
more than 20yrs (1969-1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992
- He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment (March 31,
1992) on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed; asked for
reinstatement
- JUSMAGfiled a Motion to Dismiss invoking itsimmunity fromsuit as an
agency of US; also alleged lack of employer-employee relp and it has no
juridical personality to sue and be sued
- Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of jurisdiction
- NLRCreversedJUSMAGhad lost its right not to be sued based on: 1)
estoppel- JUSMAGfailed torefute the employer-employee relp under the
control test and 2) it has waived its right to immunity fromsuit when it hired
Sacramentos services.
- NLRCrelied onHarry Lyons vs. USA(USGovt waived its immunity
fromsuit by entering into a contract of stevedoring services, and thus, it
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of local courts)
- JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in reversing the labor arbiters decision, in saying that
JUSMAGwaived its immunity fromsuit, in finding an employer-employee
relp between JUSMAGand Sacramento, and in considering JUSMAG
estopped from denying that respondent is its employee for failure to
present proof.
ISSUE
Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the RP(JUSMAG-PHIL)
immune fromsuit?
HELD
RatioAs it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity fromsuit has
been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities. The mantle of state
immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts.
Reasoning
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was performing a
governmental function on behalf of the USpursuant to the Military Assistance
Agreement. The suit is, in effect, one against the USand, considering that the
UShas not waived or consented to the suit, the complaint cannot prosper.
- Immunity of State fromsuit is one of the universally recognized principles of
international lawthat the Phils. Recognizes and adopts as part of the lawof the
land. This is anchored on theprinciple of sovereign equality of states (an equal
has no power over an equal).
Discussion
- Historical Background of JUSMAG
- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated
March 21, 1947 between the Philippines and the US; primary taskwas to
advise and assist the Philippines on air force, army and naval matters
- in 1991, USmanifested its preparedness to provide funds to cover the
salaries of SASP and security guards, the rent of bldgs, and housing,
and cost of utilities
- Memorandumof Agreement between AFPand JUSMAG-Phils
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP
- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total operational
control of the Chief JUSMAG-Phils; AFP to assume the
severance/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP
- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private
respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the
US. Hence, the suit is, in effect, one against the USGovernment.
- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a universally accepted principle.
Immunity is understood as the exemption of the state and its organs from
the judicial jurisdiction of another state.
- A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, without its
consent or waiver. An exception to the doctrine, however, was
recognized in Santos, et al vs. Santos, et al: the state itself may be
sued, even without its consent, because by entering into a contract, the
sovereign state has descended the level of the citizen and its consent to
be sued is implied fromthe very act of entering into such contract.
- it was in this light that the state immunity issue inHarry Lyons vs. USA
was decided
- Exception evolved: existence of contract does not, per se, mean that
sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts.
- US vs. Ruiz: ...does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions
- USvs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine
of state immunity...the reason is that by entering into the
employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity fromsuit.
- SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently contended by
JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from denying employer-employee
relationship
Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRCis reversed and
set aside
PNB V CIR
FERNANDO; January 31, 1978
FACTS
- Petitioner PNBreceived a notice of garnishment which was served upon its
branch on QCby an authorized deputy sheriff of the court
*** What was sought to be garnished was the money of the Peoples Homesite
and Housing Corporation deposited at the petitioners branch in QCin order to
satisfy the decision of the respondent court
- PNBfiled a motion to quashthe notice based on 2 grounds:
1. the appointment of respondent Gilbert Lorenzo as authorized deputy
sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law
*** PNBcontends that the service of notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of
this court contravenes Sec. 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105
5
*** It argues that it is the sheriff of QC and not the Clerk of this court who
is its Ex-officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of
5
All writsandprocessesissuedbythecourt shall beservedandexecutedfreeof chargebyprovincial
sheriffsor byanypersonauthorizedbythiscourt, inthesamemanner aswritsandprocessesof Courts
of First Instance
garnishment and that the actual service of the latter officer of said notice is
therefore not in order
2. the funds subject of the character may be public in character
- COIRdenied PNBs motion to quash a notice of garnishment
ISSUE
WONan order of Court of Industrial Relations (COIR) denying, for lack of merit,
petitioner PNBs motion to quash a notice of garnishment
6
can be stigmatized
as a grave abuse of discretion.
HELD
No. Theres no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio
1. RANo. 4201 has already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under
this law, it is nowthe Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio
Sheriff. Therefore, the Clerk of this Court has the authority to issue writs of
execution and notices
2. First, the tone in asserting this argument was even irresolute. And 2
nd
, the
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling
it to sue and be sued. The premise that the funds spoken of are public in
character may be accepted in the sense that it was government-owned.
However, it does not followthat they were exempt fromgarnishment.
SSS v CA
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983
FACTS
- In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Cancio Cruz applied for
and were granted a real estate loan by the SSSwith their residential lot located
at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal its collateral. Pursuant to this
real estate loan said spouses executed on March 26, 1963 the corresponding
real estate mortgage originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later
increased to P48,000.00 covering said property.
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSSfiled an application with the Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the
plaintiffs on the ground, among others that the conditions of the mortgage have
been broken since October 1967 with the default on the part of the mortgagor
to pay in full the installments then due and payable on the principal debt and
the interest thereon, and all of the monthly installments due and payable
thereafter up to the present date. Notice of the Sheriffs Sale of the mortgaged
property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its issue of July 14,
1968 announcing the sale at public auction of the said mortgaged property.
Despite plaintiffs letter to defendant demanding the latter to withdraw
foreclosure and discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their
property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment of their monthly
amortizations, defendant SSSstill went on to publish second and third
publications of foreclosure.
- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorneys fees against the
SSSand the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they
had fully and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted
in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment against defendant SSS. Court
of Appeals affirmed Trial Courts decision. Hence, this petition for reviewon
certiorari.
6
Garnishment alegal warningconcerningtheattachment of propertytosatisfyadebt
-- alsotheattachment of suchproperty
ISSUES
(1) WONthe Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real estate mortgage
contract with the SSSas would have warranted the publications of the notices
of as would have foreclosure
(2) WONthe SSSis immune fromsuit
(3) WONSSScan be held liable for damages.
HELD
(1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence, factual findings of the
lower court are not subject to reviewby this Court.
Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this ratio. Applying
the rule, it can be said therefore, that the findings of the Court of Appeals that
the mortgage-debtors have not in fact violated their contract because SSS
accepted their installment payments although given late will not be disturbed
on appeal.
(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit
provision of an enabling law, is deemed to have waived immunity fromsuit,
although it does not thereby concede its liability.
Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence, citing Rayo v.
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, (110 SCRA457), which involved the
National Power Corporation as an entity performing governmental functions. In
that case it said, It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a
private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to site and be sued in
any court under its charter. The enabling lawis R.A. No. 6395. Applying this
rule in the present case, the SSS own organic act specifically provides that it
can sue and be sued in Court, the enabling lawbeing R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24.
Hence, theres a statutory consent by the SSSto waive right of immunity from
suit.
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be adjudged against a
party which commenced foreclosure proceedings in viewof the irregular
payments of the debtor of his installments.
Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is true that the
payments of the monthly installments were previouslynot regular, it is a fact
that as of June 30, 1968 the appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz
were up-to-date and current in the payment of their monthly installments.
Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly installments, the
appellant could no longer suddenly and without prior notice to the mortgagors
apply for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
(2) SSSis deemed to have waived its immunity fromsuit.
(3) SSScannot be held liable for damages.
Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
MAKASIAR[dissent]
What was committed in this case was a tortious act (grossly negligent
bordering on malice or bad faith) of the employees of the SSSin foreclosing
the mortgage of the wrong mortgage-debtor
SSScannot be held liable for the damages caused by the tortious acts of its
employees in the performance of their regular functions
SSSas a public instrumentality for social welfare is immune fromsuit
despite its Charter provision that it can sue and be sued.
SSSexercises purely governmental functions and cannot be sued without
its consent for the tortious acts of its personnel
COMMISIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS V BURGOS
DE CASTRO; March 31, 1980
FACTS
- Appeal froma decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
- The facts of the case is as per above except that the compensation
determined is nowthe issue. The value of the property was pegged at P2.37
per square meter based on the price used in the conveyance of several pieces
of property in the same area at about the same time. However, the court a quo
in determining due compensation, considered the value of the pesos to the
dollar at the time the case was being decided. So instead of just P14,615.79
the amount awarded became P49,459.34. (the original amount of 14,615.79
divided by 2 {the exchange rate at the time of the taking to be P2.00 to
US$1.00} and the product being multiplied by 6.775). Based on this amount,
the court determined interest to be P145,410.44. Total due from the
government, including attorneys fee of ten percent amounted to P214,356.75.
- Apparently, the court a quo, in revising upward the compensation, relied on
Article 1250 of the NewCivil Code which provides for payment of an obligation
in an amount different from what has been agreed on because of the
supervention of extra-ordinary inflation or deflation.
- The government, through the Solicitor General, appealed the decision
contending that the court a quo erred in applying its method and violated the
high courts order to make as a basis of compensation the price or the value of
the land when it was taken. The Solicitor General also took issue with the
award of ten percent as attorneys fees as exhorbitant considering that
Amigable only sought P5,000.00.
ISSUES
1. WONthe compensation awarded by the court is proper
2. WONthe attorneys fees awarded were exorbitant
HELD
1) In a reviewof the relevant Article of the NewCivil Code, the Court noted
that the provision applies only if there was a contract or agreement. Using the
precedent, Velasco vs Manila Electric (L-19390 December 29, 1971), the court
expressed the viewthat the taking of private property by the government in the
exercise of its eminent domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation.
Since there is nocontract to speak of because the obligation of the government
sought to be enforced does not originate from contract, then Article 1250 does
not apply. The just compensation is the value of the property at the time it was
taken.
- Amigable is still entitled to interest on the price of the land as there was
no motion of reconsideration from the Solicitor General before the
decision became final.
2) The Court noted that Amgable only sked for P5,000 attorneys fees
and hence the amount requested is reasonable.
Dispositive Judgment appealed is reversed as to the basis of determining the
price of the land. And the price of P2.37 per square meter or total amount is
P14,615.79 plus six percent per annuminterest reckoned fromthe time the
property was taken to the time the compensation is paid.
GOVERNMENT
UNITED STATES V DORR
LADD; May 19, 1903
FACTS
The defendants, Fred Dorr et al., have been convicted upon a complaint
charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a
scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of
Act No. 292 of the Commission
7
. The alleged libel was published as an editorial
in the issue of Manila Freedom of April 6, 1902. Virulent attacks on the Civil
Commission and its members, for instance the appointment of one Tecson as
justice of the peace and the branding of Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera as a
coward and a rascal, were explicitly raised among others. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. What is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression the Insular
Government of the Philippines?
8
2. Whether the article constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292?
HELD
1. Ratio The termgovernment as employed in Act No. 292 of the United
States Philippine Commission is used in the abstract sense of the existing
political system as distinguished from the concrete organism of the
Government the Houses of Congress and the Executive.
Reasoning There are two admissible meanings of the term government
provided: a. in a general and abstract sense, the existing laws and institutions
of the Islands, or b. the aggregate of the individuals by whomthe Government
of the Islands is, for the time being, administered. The first admissible definition
is derived fromthe act of (the U.S.) Congress on July 14, 1798, commonly
known as the Sedition Act)
9
2. Ratio The publication of an article can not be punished under Act No. 292
of the United States Philippine Commission as having seditious tendencies
unless it has a tendency to produce disaffection or a feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to its laws.
- The publication of an article abusive of the United States Philippine
Commission and its members is not a libel upon the Government and does not
fall within said Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.
Reasoning The article in question contains no attack upon the government
system of the U.S., and though grossly abusive as respects both the
Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no
attack upon the governmental systemby which authority of the U.S. is enforced
in these Islands. Furthermore, it is the character of the men who are intrusted
with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into
disrepute by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and
their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the
article therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no offense
under section 8 of Act No. 292)
Dispositive The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are
acquitted.
7
Everypersonwhoshall utter seditiouswordsor speeches, write, publish, or circulatescurrilouslibels
against theGovernment of theUnitedStatesor theInsular Government of thePhilippineIslands, or which
tendtodisturbor obstruct anylawful officer inexecutinghisoffice, or whichtendtoinstigateothersto
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or whichsuggest or inciterebelliousconspiraciesor riots, or
whichtendtostir upthepeopleagainst thelawful authorities, or todisturbthepeaceof thecommunity,
thesafetyandorder of theGovernment, or whoshall unknowinglyconceal suchevil practices, shall be
punishedbyafinenot exceedingtwothousanddollarsor byimprisonment not exceedingtwoyears, or
both, inthediscretionof thecourt. (Italicsmine)
8
N.B. Weneedtoanswer thisquestionfirst inorder tobeabletoresolvethenext issue.
9
It ismadeanoffensetowrite, print, utter, publishor causetoprocuretobewritten, printed, uttered, or
publishedor toknowinglyandwillinglyassist or aidinwriting, printing, uttering, or publishinganyfalse,
scandalous, andmaliciouswritingor writingsagainst theGovernment of theUnitedStates, or the
President of theUnitedStates, withintent todefamethesaidGovernment, or either Houseof said
Congress, or thesaidPresident, or tobringthem, or either of them, intocontempt or disrepute, or to
exciteagainst themor either anyof themthehatredof thegoodpeopleof theUnitedStates"
TERRITORY
ART I NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and water embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines
has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial
domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, formpart of the internal waters of the Philippines.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046
An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines
- Approved: 17 June 1961
Whereas clauses
1. The following formpart of territorial sea of the Phils:
All waters within limits set forth in Treaty of Paris (1898), US-Spain
treaty (1900), and US-Britain treaty (1930).
All waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the
archipelago.
All waters beyond outermost islands of archipelago but within limits of
boundaries set forth in such treaties.
2. The baselines fromwhich the territorial sea of Philippines is determined
consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of
the archipelago.
Section 1It defines and describes the baselines for the territorial sea of the
Phils.
Section 2All waters within the baselines provided in sec1 are considered
inland or internal waters of the Phils.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446
R.A. 5446 is simply an Act to correct typographical errors in Section 1 of R.A.
3046 defining the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippines. It further
says that the definition of the baselines of the territorial seas of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Phils. has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. Approved September 18, 1968.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596
June 11, 1978 - Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1596 declaring certain area (the
Kalayaan Island Group or more commonly known as the Spratly Islands) as
Philippine territory as well as providing for its Government and Administration.
said area is vital to the security and economic survival of the
Philippines and much of it is part of the continental margin of the
Phil. archipelago
the area does not legally belong to any state or nation and by
reason of history, indispensable need, effective occupation and
control established in accordance with international law, said area
(including its sea-bed, subsoil, continental margin and air space)
must be deemed to belong to and subject to the sovereignty of the
Phil.
other states claims to some of the area cannot prevail over the
claims of the Philippines on legal, historical, and equitable grounds
named it Kalayaan and constituted it as a distinct and separate
municipality of Palawan
administration and government shall be vested in the Secretary of
National Defense or in other Civil govt. or AFPofficers as may be
designated by the Pres.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1599
Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone and for Other
Purposes
- Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) is a seazone over which astatehas special
rightsover the exploration and use of marine resourcesWikipedia
- It extends fromtwo hundred nautical miles beyond and fromthe baselines
fromwhich the territorial sea
- when it overlaps another EEZ, the common boundaries shall be determined
by countries
- What can be exercised in EEZ?
o Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation,
conservation and management of the natural resources
o Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the establishment and
utilization of artificial islands, off-shore terminals, installations and
structures, the preservation of the marine environment, including the
prevention and control of pollution, and scientific research
o Other rights recognized by international lawor state practice
- It also restricts other countries fromexercising the rights above in our EEZ.
- Recognizes that other countries have EEZs
- The President may authorize a government agency to promulgate rules for
the purposes of this decree
- Anyone who violates any provision of the decree shall be subject to a fine
(P2,000-P100,000) or imprisonment (6 mos10 yrs) or both. Vessels and
other equipment or articles used shall be confiscated.
PEOPLE
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order
to build a just and humane society and establish s Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of lawand a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
ART II DECLARATIONOF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
Sec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates fromthem.
Sec 4: The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military or civil service.
Sec 15: The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
Sec 16: The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful
ART III BILL OF RIGHTS
Sec 2:
Sec 7:
ART VII EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec 4:
ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec 2:
ART XVIII TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Sec 25:
TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
VITUG; March 3, 2004
FACTS
- On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP).
- In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a
natural-born citizen.
- His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan
Poe, born in Manila on August 20, 1939.
- On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC
to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy on the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
- According to Fornier, FPJs parents were foreigners his mother
Bessie Kelley Poe was an American and his father Allan F. Poe was a
Spanish national being a son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
- Even if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ because FPJ was
illegitimate.
- Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before marrying Bessie Kelley according to
an uncertified copy of a supposed certification of the
marriage in July 5, 1936.
- Even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe
married Bessey Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ.
The marriage certificate of their marriage reflected the date
of their marriage to be on September 16, 1940 where Allan
was 25, unmarried and Filipino, and Bessie was 22,
unmarried and American.
- FPJs earliest established ascendant was his grandfather Lorenzo Pou.
- No birth certificate for Lorenzo but his death certificate issued upon
his death in September 11, 1954 at age 84 identified himas a Filipino
residing in San Carlos, Pangasinan.
- Lorenzo married Marta Reyes and their son Allan was born on May
17, 1915. The birth certificate of Allan showed that his father was an
Espaol father andto a mestiza Espaol mother.
Procedure
- In the January 19, 2004 hearing before the COMELEC, Fornier presented the
following pieces of evidence:
- Copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ
- Certified photocopy of an affidavit by Paulita Gomez-Poe attesting
that she had filed a bigamy case against Allan F. Poe because of his
relationship with Kelley (in Spanish)
English translation of (b)
- Certified copy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe
- Certification from the director of the Records Management and
Archives Office stating that a Lorenzo Poe/Pou resided in the
Philippines before 1907
- Certification from OIC of the Archives Division of the National
Archives stating that there was no available information regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe
- FPJ presented the following pieces of evidence among others:
- Certification that there was no available information regarding the
birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan
- Certification by the OIC of the Archives Division of the National
Archives that there was no available information about the marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
- Certificate of birth of Ronald Allan F. Poe
- Original Certificate of Title if the Registry Deeds of Pangasinan in
the name of Lorenzo Pou,
- Copies of tax declarations under the name of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou
- Copy of marriage contract of Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley
- Certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos,
Pangasinan statingthat the records of the birth of the said office from
1900 to May 1946 were destroyed during World War II
- January 23, 2004COMELECdismissed the Fornier petition for lack of merit
and Fornier filed a motion for reconsideration on January 26, 2004. The
motion was denied by the COMELECen banc on February 6, 2004.
- February 10, 2004 Fornier filed a petition before the Supreme Court,
praying for TRO, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that
would stay the finality and/or executionof the COMELECresolutions.
- The two other petitions (Tecson and Desidero v. COMELEC and Velez v.
Poe) challenge the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and assert that only the
Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue
on the case.
ISSUES
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
2. Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he
materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-
born Filipino?
HELD
1. Ratio Jurisdiction issue
- The COMELECs decision on disqualified cases involving a
presidential candidate could be elevated to and could be taken
cognizance by the Supreme Court.
- The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would not include cases
directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Reasoning
- Does the Court have jurisdiction over the three cases filed?
- Fornier petition- Yes
- In seeking the disqualification of FPJ before the COMELEC, Fornier
relied on the following:
- Averified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 is false (Omnibus
Election Code, Sec. 78)
- the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections for the purpose of enduring free, orderly
and honest elections (Sec. 52, same)
- any interested party authorized to file a verified petition to
deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance
candidate (Art. 69, same)
- Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court under the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rule 65). Aside fromthat, according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of
the Constitution, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days fromreceipt thereof.
- Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court which includes the
duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of
the government. (Art. 8, Sec. 1, Constitution).
- Tecson petition and Velez petition- No
- The Tecson and Velez petitions make use of Art. 7, Sec 4(7) of the
Constitution in assailing the COMELECs jurisdiction when it took
cognizance of the Fornier petition because theSupreme Court sitting
en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
- Acontest refers to a post-election scenario. Election contests are
either election protests or a quo warranto which would have the
objective of dislodging the winner from office. The Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal state:
- Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contestsrelating to
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
Philippines. (Rule 12)
- An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
contest or a petition for quo-warranto against the President or
Vice-President. (Rule 13)
- Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President
who received the second or third highest number of votes may
contest the election of the President or the Vice-Presidentby
filing a verified petitionwithin 30 days after the proclamation
of the winner. (Rule 14)
- The rules speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President and
the Vice President and not candidates for President or Vice-
President.
2. Ratio FPJs citizenship issue (Voting 6 concur, 7 dissent, 1 abstention and
1 separate opinion)
- The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should only
remain in the sphere of civil lawand should not unduly impinge on the
domain of political law.
- The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino regardless of whether such children are legitimate
of illegitimate.
Reasoning
- Can FPJ be disqualified as a presidential candidate on the ground that he
materially misrepresented in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-
born Filipino?
- Concept of citizenship
- Aristotle described a citizen as a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office and the state
would be composed of such individuals in order to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.
- Citizenship deals with rights and entitlements on the one hand and
with concomitant obligations on the other.
- Citizenship underwent changes in the 18
th
to 20
th
centuries.
- In the 18
th
century, the concept was civil citizenship which
established the rights necessary for necessary for individual
freedom(eg. Rights to property, personal liberty and justice)
- In the 19
th
century, it expanded to include political citizenship
which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.
- In the 20
th
century, there was the development of social
citizenship which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security.
- Internationalization of citizenship is an ongoing development.
- Citizenship in the Philippines fromthe Spanish times to the present
- During the Spanish period, no such termas Philippine citizens,
only Spanish subjects. In church records, natives were identified as
indios.
- Spanish laws on citizenship included:
- Order de la Regencia of 1841
- Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 (defined the political
status of children born in the Philippines)
- Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 1870
- The 1876 Spanish Constitution was not extended to the
Philippines because the colony was to be governed by special
laws.
- According to the Civil Code of Spain, the following were
Spanish citizens:
- Persons born in Spanish territory
- Children of a Spanish father or mother even if they were
born outside Spain
- Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers
- Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy
- Article 10 of the Treaty of Paris stated that the civil and political
status of the native inhabitants would be determined by the US
Congress. Spanish subjects and natives who choose to remain in the
territory may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
making a declaration of their decision within a year fromthe date of
the ratification of the treaty. If no such declaration is made, their
allegiance shall be held renounced and they would have adopted the
nationality of the territory in which they reside.
- Upon ratification of the treaty, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines became Spanish subjects.
- They did not become American citizens but were issued
passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to protection of the US.
- Philippine Organic Act of 1902 first appearance of the term
citizens of the Philippine islands. Acitizen of the Philippine islands
under this Act was:
- An inhabitant of the Philippinesand a Spanish subject on April
11, 1899.
- An inhabitant meant:
- Anative born inhabitant
- An inhabitant who was a native of Spain
- An inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before
April 11, 1899.
- Controversy as to the citizenship of a child born between April
11, 1899 and July 1, 1902 as there was no citizenship lawin
the Philippines. The common lawprinciple jus soli (principle of
territoriality) was said to govern those born in the Philippines
during this time.
- Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law) Anative born inhabitant of
the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of
April 11, 1899 if:
- ASpanish subject on April 11, 1899
- Residing in the Philippines on the said date
- Since that date, not a citizen of another country
- 1935 Constitution provided that jus sanguinis (blood relationship)
be the basis for citizenship, as stated in Sec. 1, Art. 3:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution
- Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands
- Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
- Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines andupon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- 1973 Constitution Corrected Sec. 1, Art. 3 (4) of the 1935
Constitution, which, when taken together with the existing civil law
provisions would provide that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands. This
was deemed discriminatory in that it incapacitated the Filipino woman
from transmitting her citizenship to her legitimate children and
required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The provisions of Sec.
1, Art. 3 of the 1973 Constitution state that the following are citizens
of the Philippines:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines
- Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law
- Add Sec. 2 of the same article which provided that a female
citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retainers her
Philippine citizenship unless by her act or omission she is
deemed to have renounced her citizenship under the law.
- 1987 Constitution aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution which
outlines in Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino citizens:
- Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
- Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the
Philippines
- Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
- Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
- The Constitution requires that the President of the Philippines should
be, among the many requirements, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 2).
- Natural born citizen citizens of the Philippines frombirth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship
- Citizenship of FPJ in relation to grandfather Lorenzo Pous
citizenship and father Allan F. Poes citizenship
- Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen because his father Lorenzo
was also Filipino.
- Conclusions with some degree of certainty to be drawn
fromthe documents presented:
- The parents of FPJ were Allen Poe and Bessie
Kelley.
- FPJ was born to themon August 20, 1939.
- Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each
other on September 16, 1940.
- The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou.
- At the time of his death on September 11, 1954,
Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
- The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy.
- The three documents (birth certificate of FPJ,
marriage certificate of Bessie and Allan and the death
certificate of Lorenzo) were certified true copies of the
originals.
- The Rules of Court (130, Section 3) state that when
the subject of the inquiry is the content of the
document, no evidence shall be admissible except the
original document itself. One of the exceptions
however is when the original is a public record in the
custody of a public office is recorded in a public office.
- As public documents, the threedocuments are prima
facie proof of their contents as stated in the Rules of
Court (130, Section 44) that the entries in official
records made by a public officer in the performance of
his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. This is grounded on: of official duty in the
preparation of the statement made. The penalty
affixed to a breach of that duty. Routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements. Publicity
of the record which makes more likely the prior
exposure of such errors as might have occurred
- It is safe to assume that Lorenzo Pous place of residence
at the time of death was the same as his residence before
death in the absence of evidence that would attest
otherwise. In that case, Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill
effected in 1902. This citizenship would then extend to his
son Allan F. Poe, FPJs father.
- Lorenzo born sometime in 1870 during the Spanish
colonization period.
- Fornier argues that Lorenzo was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of 1898 to 1902
but there is no existing record to attest to that claim.
- Fornier failed to show that Lorenzo was out of the
country during that same time period.
- Lorenzos residence at the time of death was in San
Carlos, Pangasinan.
- For proof of filiation or paternity, the mandatory rules of civil
lawwould not apply in this case. The duly notarized declaration
by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, FPJs maternal aunt and sister of
his mother Bessie, proving the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing
his own paternal relationship with FPJ (living with Bessie and
the children in one house as one family) would be accepted.
- Fornier argues that the mandatory rules under civil rule should
apply because FPJ was an illegitimate son.
- Acknowledgement needed to establish paternity (eg.
Acknowledgement in the birth certificate by signing
name)
- In the FPJ case, there was no signature of Allan F.
Poe in the birth certificate of FPJ.
- 1950 Civil Code acknowledgement of illegitimate
children of three types which had to be done during
the lifetime of the presumed parent:
- Voluntary (expressly made in record birth, will
or a statement before the court in authentic
writing)
- Legal (in favor of full blood brothers and
sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized as natural)
- Compulsory (demanded generally in cases
when the child had in his favor any evidence to
prove filiation)
- The Family Code has liberalized the rules as
stated in Articles 172, 173 and 175 and the
rules have retroactive effect (Article 255).
These provisions are there to govern the private
and personal affairs of the family. There is little
indication that this should also govern his
political rights.
- This should be taken in the context of civil law, being that
branch of law which is concerned with the organization of
the family and regulation of property. The relevance of
citizenship is exemplified in Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
- The proof of filiation for purposes of determining citizenship
status should be deemed independent from those
prescribed for civil code purposes. The ordinary rules
should govern.
- DNAtesting to prove paternity could also be resorted to.
- There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot
inherit his fathers citizenship.
- Fornier argues that even if Allan F. Poe were Filipino, Allans
citizenship would not have been transmitted to FPJ because
FPJ was illegitimate.
- FPJ was alleged to be illegitimate because of the bigamous
marriage between his parents Allan and Bessie for the reason
that Allan allegedly had a prior existing marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez. The Court held that the veracity of this
marriage between Paulita and Allan is doubtful.
- Fornier also contended that even if Allan and Bessies
marriage was not bigamous, FPJ was still illegitimate because
his parents were married after he was born. Fornier based his
arguments on the cases of Morano v. Vivo, Chiongbian v. de
Leon and Serra v. Republic.
- In the cases cited above, it is important to note the lis
mota in each case. If the pronouncement of jus
sangunis was in the lis mota, it would constitute
doctrine courtesy of stare decisis. If not, it is mere
obiter dictum.
- In all of the mentioned cases, there was no jus
sanguinis inthe lis mota of the cases. If there was jus
sangunis mentioned, it was mere obiter dictum.
- The pronouncement that an illegitimate child cannot inherit the
fathers citizenship has no textual basis in the Constitution and
violates the equal protectionclause.
- For jurisprudence that regarded an illegitimate child to inherit
the mothers citizenship, it was there to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the child with the assumption that the mother
would gain custody.
- The 1935 Constitution applies to FPJ since he was born
during that time period and it states that Filipino citizens include
those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
Decision
1. The evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs citizenship but the
evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC
DISMISSED for failure to showgrave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELECfor dismissing the original petition.
2. Tecson v. COMELECand Velez v, PoeDISMISSEDfor want of jurisdiction.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
Jurisdiction
- SCis unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction
- Tecson and Valdez petitions petitioners cannot invoke Art VII S4
of the Constitution because the word contest means that the Court
can only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President
or Vice President. There can be no contest before a winner is
proclaimed.
- Fornier petition as a reviewunder R64 in relation to R65 of the
RoC, Court has jurisdiction.
- COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that
petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that FPJ deliberately
misrepresented that he is a natural-born Filipino citizan in his CoC
- Certiorari power of the SCto reviewCOMELECdecisions is a limited power
- Can only reverse or change the COMELECdecision on the ground
that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion (despotic,
arbitrary or capricious)
- The ruling of the COMELECdenying the petition to disqualify respondent Poe
is based on substantial evidence, hence is not despotic, whimsical or
capricious
- Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC misrepresentation must not only
be material but also deliberate and willful
- Petitioner has burden to prove evidence to showthat (1) respondent
made misrepresentation in his CoC, (2) that misrepresentation is
material to the position to which he is candidate and (3) that material
misrepresentation was made deliberately and willfully
- Analysis of petitioners evidence
- Certificateof birthonly proved the date of birth of FPJ, not that he
is not a natural-born citizen
- Sworn statements of Paulita Gomez charging Allan Poe with bigamy
and marriage license of between Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez,
presented thru Dir. Manapat pulled out because they were
fabricated
- Respondent submitted affidavits that show that the files
submitted by the petitioner are fabricated by Manapats
instructions
- Petitioner claims that the affidavits must not be considered
because of technical grounds
- SCruled that the COMELECis a quasi-judicial body and are
not bound by the technical rules of evidence.
- Birth certificate of Allan Poe also fabricated; does not prove
anything besides birth
- Certification of Dir. Manapat that the National Archives has no
record that Lorenzo Pou entered or resided in the Philippines before
1907manufactured
- Certification of Estrella Domingo, OICArchives Div that the Register
of Births that there is no information on the National Archives on the
birth of Allan Poe to the spouse Lorenzo Pou and Marta Reyes lack
of information is not proof
- Poe from the time of his involuntary birth has always conducted
himself as Filipino
- For failure of the petitioner to discharge the burden of proof, Poe is
entitled to an outright dismissal of the Fornier petition. Poe does not
need to present contrary evidence for the burden of proof is not
shifted to him.
- Assuming that COMELEC gravely abused its jurisdiction and the issue of
whether respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen Filipino should now be
resolved, the Fornier petition need not be remanded to the COMELEC for
further reception of evidence
- Remand to the COMELEC to give the petitioner a second opportunity to
prove his case is a palpable error
- In light of these erudite opinions of our amici curae, it is daylight
clear that petitioner Fornier is not only wring with his facts but also
wrong with his law.
- Remand means a newround of litigation in the COMELECwhen its
proceedings have long been closed and terminated; to give another
chance to prove facts which he failed to prove before
- Favors of remand cannot be extended to the litigant because of
political neutrality
- Remand will change the nature of a Sec 78 proceeding by judicial legislation,
hence, unconstitutional
- Principal issue: whether respondent deliberately made a material
misrepresentation in his CoCwhen he wrote that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen
- Remanding the case to COMELECwill change the character of a
S78 proceeding (WON FOJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen will be
the main issue and not just an issue incidental to the issue of material
misrepresentation)
- SC cannot engage in judicial legislation as it is something only
legislature can change by another law
- Remand will violate respondent Poes right to due process, hence,
unconstitutional
- If case were remanded to the COMELEC, the body is no longer an
impartial tribunal is there are three of the seven members of the
commission that have given firmviewthat Poe is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen
- Remand will delay the resolution of the issue of whether respondent Poe is
qualified. Delay will also prejudice his candidacy and will favor his political
opponents.
- The right to run for public office includes the right to equal chance
to compete. The right to run is empty if the chance to win is
diminished of denied a candidate.
- To avoid delay, the court should itself decide the issue and declare
respondent Poe as a natural-born citizen on the basis of the evidence adduced
before the COMELEC
- Whether respondent Poe is illegitimate is irrelevant in determining his status
as natural-born citizen--- that is the law.
- The lawdoes not make any distinction in applying jus sanguinis to
illegitimate children.
- Morano v Vivo WONthe stepson was to file the natural cerebral
house.
- Chiongbian v de Leon a legitimate son whose father became
Filipino because of election to a public office before the 1935
constitution
- Serra v Republic an illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother
- Paa v Chan Quintin claims that his father is Filipino because his
grandmother is a Filipina. The court ruled that since there is no proof
that his grandmother is Filipino then his father is not Filipino thereby
not making him Filipino as well. The courts ruling should have
stopped here but the SCfollowed with an obiter dictumthat even if
Quintins father were Filipino, he would not be Filipino because he
was illegitimate.
- The statements on the illegitimate child were unnecessary and
were just obiter dicta and not ratio decidendi, therefore do not
constitutestare decisis.
- Obiter dicta do not establish doctrine even if repeated
endlessly.
- Reasons why court should create newdoctrine:
- There is no textual foundation
- It violates the equal protection clause
- People v Cayat established the doctrine on constitutionally
allowable distinctions. Such distinction must be germane to the
purpose of the law.
- Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor The duty of this Court is to
forsake and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in
violation of the lawin force.
- Ubi les non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus, especially
if the distinction has no textual
- Merlin Magallonatransmissive essence of citizenship
- To establish that respondent Poe is a natural-born citizen, all that is needed is
proof of his filiation to his father Allan Poe, a Filipino citizen--- that is the critical
fact.
- Filipino citizenship of Allan Poe, respondents father is well established.
- To disqualify respondent Poe because he is illegitimate will violate our treaty
obligation.
Dispositive Whether respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. is qualified to run for
President involves a constitutional issue but its political tone is no less
dominant. The Court is split down the middle on the citizenship of respondent
Poe, an issue of first impression made more difficult by the interplay of national
and international law. Given the indecisiveness of the votes of the members of
this Court, the better policy approach is to let the people decide who will be the
next President. For on political questions, this Court may err but the sovereign
people will not. To be sure, the Constitution did not grant to the unelected
members of this Court the right to elect in behalf of the people.
INVIEWWHEREOF, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824
are DISMISSED.
DAVIDE
FACTS
- January 9, 2004 Fornier filed petition to disqualify FPJ and to cancel his
certificate of candidacy for the May 10 elections because of heis not a natural-
born Filipino citizen
- January 23, 2004 COMELEC dismissed the case declaring that its
jurisdiction is limited to all matters relating to election, returns and qualifications
of all elective regional, provincial and city officials, but not those of national
officials like the president.
- but it has jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of citizenship of national
officials under sec 78 of OECon petitions to deny due course or
cancel certificates of candidacy on the ground of false material
representation.
- Findings:
- Fornier evidence is not substantial
- FPJ did not commit any falsehood in material representation
when he stated that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen
- Tecson and Desiderio, Jr prayed special civil action of certiorari under R65
RoCto challenge jurisdiction of COMELECover the issue of FPJs citizenship.
They claimthat only the Sc has jurisdiction (ArtVII S4, consti)
- January 29, 2004- Velez filed petition with the ff issues:
- Whether COMELEChas jurisdiction over the petitions to deny due
course or cancel certificated of candidacy of Presidential candidates
- Whether SChas jurisdiction over the petitions of Tecson, Velez and
Fornier
- Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen, and if so, if hes a natural-born
Filipino citizen
Jurisdiction
- Tecson and Velez petitions
- The provision in the constitution only refers to past-election
remedies, they should have resorted to pre-election remedies in the
OECwhich are implemented by the COMELECRules of Procedure
- Pre-election remedies are not within the jurisdiction of the SC
- Under the OEC, COMELEC has original jurisdiction to determine
whether a candidate for an elective office ineligible for the office for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy because of any of the
recognized grounds for disqualification.
- Fornier petition
- SChas jurisdiction over the case under (Art IX-AS7 Consti )
- SC can take cognizance of issue of WON COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
inthe challenged resolution by virtue of (ArtVIII S1 Consti)
WONFPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen
Facts:
1. FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 in Manila, Philippines.
2. FPJ was born to Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley.
3. Bessie Kelley and Allan Poe weremarried on 16 September 1940.
4. Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish
subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue of
the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Ratio For the purposes of citizenship, an illegitimate child whose father is
Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough
for the child to followthe citizenship of the father
COMELECdid not commit any grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is
a Filipino citizen pursuant to Art IVS1 per 3 consti. The provision did not make
any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers.
Petitions are dismissed.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
May court exercise judicial power to disqualify a candidate before the
election?
- Court may not. It will wreck the constitutional right of the people to choose
their candidates.
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC
- Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a retired member of this Court, in his
Separate Opinion said, In my view, the issue in this case is whether the
Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground
that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think
that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an
election protest in the appropriate forum.
- Ruling of COMELECis the same as Mandoza opinion.
- Disqualifying respondent Poe will be viewed as directed against the masses,
a situation not allowed by the Constitution. The SC may become like the
Iranian Guardian Council.This Court, as the last guardian of democracy, has
the duty to protect the right of our nation to a genuine, free and fair election.
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissinGForniers petition for disqualification against respondent
- Salcedo v COMELEC the only instance when a petition raising the
qualifications of a registeredcandidate is before election (S78 OEC)
- To justify the cancellation of CoC, false representation mentioned
must pertain to material matter
- There must be deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide fact
which would render a candidate ineligible
- Fornier petition brought under R65 RoCP where COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in Jan 23 and Feb 6 resolutions holding that
considering the evidence presented by the petitioner is not substantial, we
declare that the respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation
when he stated in his CoCthat he is a natural born Filipino citizen
Allegations in the COMELECpetition:
1. Respondent Poe committed false material representation by
stating in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a natural born
Filipino citizen; and
2. He knowingly made such false representation.
- FPJ is not a citizen because both his parents are aliens.
- Director Manapat of the National Archives falsified the marriage
contract of FPJs parents and his fathers birth certificate.
- Ei incumbit probation qui decit, non que negat. he who asserts, not
he who denies, must prove; S1 R131 RroE; Borlongan v Madrideo
burden of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative of an issue
- Fornier failed to prove allegations; writ of certiorari can only be
granted if it can be proven that COMELECcommitted a grave abuse
of discretion;
-Grave abuse of discretion capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment so patent and gross that it amounted to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to performthe
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
- We cannot discern from the records any indication that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Forniers petition. Indeed, his
availment of theextraordinary writ of certiorari is grossly misplaced.
Whether the respondent committed a material and false representation when
he declared in his CoCthat he is a natural-bron Filipino citizen
- COMELECheld that the FPJ did not commit any material misrepresentation
in his CoCbecause his father is a Filipino by virtue of jus sanguinis and under
the 1935 constitution.
- Valles v COMELECPhilippine lawon citizenship adheres tojus sanguinis
- FPJ is Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father
- Petitioners claim that Allan Fernando Poe is a citizen of Spain
because his
- Marriage Contract with Paulita Gomez shows that his parents are
citizens of Spain.
- The marriage certificate was shown to have been falsified.
- Fornier did not dispute that Allan Fernando Poe is the father of FPJ
- Allans father, Lorenzo Pou is a Spanish subject and an inhabitant of
the Philippines on April 11, 1899 when Spain ceded the Philippines
(Treaty of Paris, Phil Bill 1902 and Jones Law)
- In re Bosqueexpiration of the termof 18 months without making an express
declaration of intention to retain their Spanish nationality resulted in the loss of
the latter and thereby becoming subjects of the new sovereign in the same
manner as the natives of these islands
- Palanca v Republic
- A person, who was an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands and a
naturalized subject of Spain on the 11
th
day of April 1899, is a Filipino
citizen, by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 4 of the Act of Congress on
1 July 1902 and of Sec. 2 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916.
Under the Constitution, he is also a citizen of the Philippines because
he was such at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
- Constitution did not specify in referring to those whose fathers are
Filipino citizens as to whether this only applies to legitimate children
or not.
- Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus, especially if the
distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no
state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. (Fr
Bernas)
- To introduce a distinction between legitimacy or illegitimacy in the
status of the child vis--vis the derivation of his citizenship fromthe
father defeats the transmissive essence of citizenship in blood
relationship. (Dean Merlin Magalona)
In fine, I reiterate that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
rendering its assailed Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6,
2004.
WHEREFORE, I concur with Justice Jose C. Vitug in his ponencia and with
Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno in his Separate Opinion DISMISSING
Forniers petition
CARPIO-MORALES
Issues for Resolution:
1) Whether this Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of presidential candidates;
2) Whether the COMELECacted with grave abuse of discretion when it issues
its Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004, dismissing the Petition for
Disqualification;
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino and therefore qualified to seek
election as President.
1) Jurisdiction:
- Petitions in G.R. Nos. 161464 and 161634
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez assert that this Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether FPJ is qualified
to be a candidate for President: paragraph 7, Section 4 of Article
VII of the Constitution:
- The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President,
and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
- refers to this Courts jurisdiction over electoral contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President, andnot to the qualifications or disqualifications of
a presidential candidate. FPJ is still just a candidate;
petition: premature.
- Petitioners Tecson et al. and Velez claimthat the issue of FPJs
qualification for the Presidency may also be brought directly to this
Court on the basis of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
specially considering that the instant case is one of transcendental
importance.
- a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is not available where there is another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of lawlike in this
case: (to intervene in the Petition for Disqualification)
- in determining whether procedural rules, such as standing,
should be relaxed on the ground of transcendental
importance, the following should be considered: the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised. Considering that the
substantive issues raised by petitioners Tecson et al. and
Velez in G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, respectively, are
virtually identical to those raised by petitioner Fornier in G.R.
No. 161824, this Court is not convinced that the
transcendental importance of the issues raised herein
justifies a direct resort to this Court under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court or the exercise of its expanded certiorari
jurisdiction under Sec. 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
- Petition in G.R. No. 161824
- this Court definitely has jurisdiction over the petition for Certiorari
questioning the Resolutions of Jan. 23, 2004 and Feb. 6, 2004,
issued by COMELEC: Section 7 of Art. IX-A of the Constitution
vests this Court with the power of reviewover decisions, orders, or
rulings of the COMELEC.
- COMELECs Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Petition for
DisqualificationUnder Section 78 of the Omnibus ElectionCode.
- not really a constitutional question
2) Whether The COMELEC Acted with Grave Abuse of Discretion in
Dismissing the Petition for is qualification for Lack of Merit.
- the COMELECdid indeed act with grave abuse of discretion inissuing them:
- By resolving to dismiss the petition in the Petition for Disqualification
without stating the factual bases therefore:
- Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution provides that [n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the lawon which it is based.
- By resolving to dismiss the Petition for Disqualification without ruling
categorically on the issue of FPJs citizenship.
- To justify its evasion of the duty to rule squarely on the issue of
citizenship, the COMELECrelies on this Courts ruling in Salcedo
II v. Commission on Elections, and held that held that Fornier
should have presented proof of misrepresentation with a
deliberate attempt to mislead on the part of FPJconfined the
issue in the Petition for Disqualification towhether FPJ must have
known or have been aware of the falsehood as [allegedly]
appearing on his certificate.
- Carpio-Morales: it is impossible for the COMELECto determine
whether FPJ was aware of a false material representation in his
Certificate of Candidacy without first determining whether such
material representation (in this case, his claim of natural-born
citizenship) was false. The fact alone that there is a public
document (i.e., his birth certificate) which FPJ might have relied
upon in averring natural-born citizenship does not automatically
exclude the possibility that (a) there is other evidence to showthat
such averment is false, and (b) that FPJ was aware of such
evidence.
3) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino
- Five crucial factual questions
(1) Whether Lorenzo Pou has been established to be a Filipino citizen at
the time of the birth of his son, Allan F. Poe;
- the evidence presented does not show that Lorenzo Pou
acquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of the Treaty of Paris or
the Organic Acts covering the Philippine Islands. (no evidence as
to his residence, only prima facie evidence.)
(2) Whether Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ was a Filipino at
the time of the birth of the latter;
- Claim: Allan F. Poe acquired Filipino citizenship independently of
his fathers by virtue of jus soli, Allan F. Poe having been allegedly
born in the Philippines on November 27, 1916.
- even assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe was born in the
Philippines on November 27, 1916, such fact, per se, would not
suffice to prove that he was a citizen of the Philippine Islands
absent a showing that he was judicially declared to be a Filipino
citizen: In Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, this Court ruled that
the principle jus soli or acquisition of citizenship by place of birth
was never extended or applied in the Philippine Islands:
(3) Whether FPJ is a legitimate or illegitimate child;
- FPJs birth certificate indicates that his parents were married, and
that he is a legitimate child. However, the Marriage Contract of his
putative parents, Fernando R. Pou and Bessie Kelley, is dated
September 16, 1940, thereby indicating that he was born out of
wedlock. Since, in the Marriage Contract, the two contracting
parties, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, participated in its
execution, the entry therein with respect to the date of their
marriage should be given greater weight than the birth certificate,
which was executed by a physician who had to rely on hearsay as
regards FPJs legitimacy.
- FPJ was born out of wedlock, and was thus an illegitimate child
at birth.
(4) Whether Allan F. Poe has been legally determined to be the father
of FPJ (Assuming arguendo that Allan F. Poe has been shown to have
acquired Philippine citizenship)
- As proof of his filiation, FPJ relies upon (1) the stipulation by
petitioner Fornier, both before the COMELECand this Court that
Allan F. Poe is indeed the father of FPJ; (2) the declaration of
Ruby Kelley Mangahas; and (3) a certified copy of an affidavit of
Fernando R. Poe for Philippine Army Personnel.
- none of the proofs supplied are sufficient proofs of filiation under
Article 172 of the Family Code.
(5) Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
- Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an
alien-mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may
be considered a natural-born citizen if he was duly
acknowledgedby the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate
child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship
(nothing more to do to acquire citizenship = natural born).
- no evidence has been submitted to showthat Allan F. Poe did
indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own sonat birth
- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not
acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at
the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is not
a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISSthe petitions in G.R. Nos.
161434 and 161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC
Resolutions dated January 23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, rendered in
COMELECSPANo. 04-003 NULL ANDVOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC
to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a.
Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation.
IN RE: CHING
KAPUNAN; October 1, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for Admission to the Phil Bar
- April 1964: Vicente D Ching born as the legitimate son of sps Tat Ching,
Chinese citizen, and Prescila Dulay, Filipina, in La Union. Since birth, Ching
has resided in the Phils
- During this time, the governing charter is the 1935 Constitution.
Fathers citizenship is followed, with a right to elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority
- July 1998: Ching, after graduating fromSt. Louis University in Baguio City,
filed an application to take the 98 Bar Examinations.
- Sept 1998: Court allowed Ching to take the exams provided he must submit
proof of his Phil citizenship
- Nov 1998: Ching submitted certification that he is CPA, Voter Cert from
COMELEC, and Cert as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union also fromCOMELEC.
- April 1999: results of Bar Exams were released and Ching passed. He was
further required to submit more proof of citizenship.
- July 1999: Ching filed Manifestation w/ Affidavit of Election of Phil Citizenship
and his Oath of Allegiance.
- OSGcommented that Ching being the legitimate child of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother and born under the 1935 Consti was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Phil citizenship. If Ching formally elects Phil citizenship, it would already be
beyond the reasonable time allowed by present jurisprudence
- Two conditions of an effective election of Phil citizenship (fromOSG):
1
st
the mother of the person making the election must be a Phil citizen
2
nd
election must be made upon reaching the age of majority (w/c
means a reasonable time interpreted by the Sec of Justice as 3 yrs,
from the Velayo case; in Cuenco, noted that this pd not inflexible,
however, held in the same case that 7 yrs not reasonable time)
- Ching, to support his cause, invokes these special circumstances: continuous
and uninterrupted say in the Philippines, being a CPA, a registered voter, and
elected public official
ISSUE
1. WONChing has elected Phil citizenship w/in a reasonable time
and if so, WONhis citizenship has retroacted to the time he took the bar.
2. WONChings special circumstances entitle himto citizenship
HELD
1. No, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the
allowable pd w/in which to exercise the privilege. Being born in April 1964, he
was already 35 yrs old when he complied w/ the requirements of C.A. No 625
in June 99. He was already more then 14 yrs over the age of majority.
Although the Court is sympathetic of his plight, controlling statues and
jurisprudence compel the Court in its decision. Also, Ching has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Phil citizenship, the latter not being a
tedious and painstaking process.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. It should be availed
of with fervor, enthusiasmand promptitude.
2. No, the abovementioned special circumstances cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Decision Court denies Vicente D Chings application for admission to the
Philippine Bar
BENGZON III V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
KAPUNAN; May 7, 2001
FACTS
- Constitutional requirement for members of the House of Representatives: no
person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural born citizen.
- Teodoro Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in
Tarlac on April 27, 1960. On November 5, 1985 he enlisted in the USMarine
Corps without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines. He took an oath
of allegiance to the USand as a consequence he lost his Filipino Citizenship
because under the Commonwealth Act no. 63 a Filipino may lose his
citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed
forces of a foreign country. Any doubts as to his citizenship at the time was
settled by his naturalization as a UScitizen on June 5, 1990.
- May 17, 1994 he reacquired his citizenship through repatriation under RA
2630.
- He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
1998 and his opponent was Bengson.
- Bengson filed a case Quo Warranto Ad Cautelamwith HRET claiming Cruz,
not being a natural-born citizen by the contention that Aricle IV, Sec 2 of the
Consti defines natural-born citizens as citizens frombirth without having to
performany act to acquire or perfect such citizenship, was not eligible to be
member of the House.
ISSUES
1. WONCruz, a natural born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship via Repatriation, so that the question of WONhe is eligible to be a
member of the House might be addressed
2. - WONthe HRET committed serious erros and grave abuse of discreation
amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ruling in favour of Cruz as natural-born
citizen
HELD
1. Yes.
Ratio Two ways of acquiring Filipino citizenship
o By birthnatural born citizens
o Naturalization Naturalized citizens (those who become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under the Commonwealth
Act no. 473. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications andnone of the disqualifications
- 1987 Constitution only provides for 2 classes of citizens:
o Natural born
o Naturalized
- Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may reacquire it by
naturalization, repatriation or by direct act of Congress.
o Naturalization mode for acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
o Repatriation available for those who have lost their
citizenship due to desertion of the armed forces, service in
the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII, service in the
armed forces of the US at any other time, marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien, and political and economic
necessity. Process: taking an oath of allegiance to the RP
and registering it in the Local Civil Registrar of the place
where the person concerned resides or last resided.
- Repatriation would result in the recovery of the original nationality. He will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born citizen. Cruz recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen because of his repatriation.
Note: As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of taking an oath of allegiance to the RPand
registering said oath with the Local Civil Registry
- 1987 Constitution does not provide a separate category for persons who after
losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquires it because they are either
natural born or naturalized depending on the reason for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable lawfor reacquisition.
- Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
2. No.
Ratio HRET has been empowered by the Consti to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elction, returns andqualificationsof the members of the
House. Courts jurisdiction is merely to check WON there has been grave
abuse; absent such showing, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power
SEPARATE OPINION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Additional Facts:
- In the 1995 local elections, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor
declaring himself to be anaturalizedFilipino citizen
- Thereafter, Cruz ran for Congres, this time declaring himself asnatural-born
- Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretation of the phrase from
birth in Art IV, Sec 2 of the Consti
- Petitioner avers: means starting from a definite point and must be
continuous, constant and without interruption
- Respondent contends: refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born
- J. Sandoval-Gutierrez holds:
- Natural-born citizens are so by virtue of birth without performing any
acts. To repatriate, Cruz had to performcertain acts before he could
again become a Filipino citizen. Therefore, he does not reaquire natural-
born citizenship
- The history of the Consti shows that the meaning and application of the
requirement of being natural-born have become more narrow and
qualified over the years, more stringent; and the decision of HRET in the
case at bar reverses the historical trend and clear intendment of the
Consti, a matter which can only be accomplished through consti
amendment; clearly, HRET has acted with grave abuse of discretion.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 473
An Act to Provide for the Acquisition of the Citizenship by
Naturalization, and to repeal Acts 2927 and 3448
Sec 1: Title: Revised Naturalization Law Sec 2: Qualifications: Who may
become citizens of the Philippines by naturalization?
1. >21 years old at the day of the hearing of the petition
2. resided in the Philippines for CONTINUOUSperiod of >10yrs
3. of good moral character
+ believes in principles underlying the Philippine Constitution (1935 Consti)
+ conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during entire period
of residence in the Philippines in relation with constituted government and
community with community in which he is living
4. (must own real estate in the Philippines > P5000) or Philippine currency or
lucrative trade/profession/lawful occupation
5. able to speak and write English/Spanish + any one of the principal
Philippine language
6. enrolled his MINOR children of school age in any of the public
schools/private schools during the entire period of residence in the Philippines
requiredof himprior to the hearing of his petition
School:
- recognized by the Office of Private Education of the Philippines
- teaches Philippine history, government and civics and prescribes it as
part of the school curriculum
Sec 3: Special qualifications: when the 10 year qualification required in
Sec2(2) could be reduced to a continuous 5 years?
1. had honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines/ under
that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political subdivisions
thereof [aliens, particularly American citizens, were the ones who were
governing the country prior to the Commonwealth]
2. established newindustry/ introduced a useful invention in the Philippines
3. married to a Filipino woman
4. engaged as a teacher in the Philippines for >2 yrs
school: public/recognized private school + not established for exclusive
instruction of children of persons of particular nationality/race
5. born in the Philippines
Sec 4: Who are disqualified? Persons
a. opposed to organized government/affiliated withany association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized govt
b. defending/teaching the necessity or propriety of violence/personal
assault/assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas
c. Polygamists/believers of polygamy
d. Convicted of crimes (moral turpitude)
e. Suffering frommental alienation/incurable contagious disease
f. Not mingled socially w/ Filipinos, have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace customs, traditions, and ideals of Filipinos
g. Citizens/subjects of nations w/whomUS and the Philippines are at war
during such war
h. Citizens/subjects of foreign country [OTHERTHANUS!] whose laws dont
grant Filipinosright to become naturalized citizens/subjects
Sec 5. Declaration of intention: file declaration that it is his bona fide
intention to become a citizen of the Philippines
- under oath
- 1 year prior to the filing of petition for admission to Philippine citizenship
of the Bureau of Justice
-contents+ name
+ age
+ occupation
+ personal description
+ place of birth
+last foreign residence and allegiance
+date of arrival
+name of vessel/aircraft (if any) in which he came to the Philippines
+place of residence in the Philippines at the time of making the declaration
*to be valid: establish lawful entry for permanent residence + issued
certificate showing date, place, and manner of arrival
*also state that he had enrolled his minor children in school (see sec2(6))
*2 pictures of himself
Sec 6. Widow and minor children of aliens dying after declaration of
intention not required to file declaration of intention
Sec 7. Petition for citizenship: requirements filed with competent court
*a petition in triplicate
contentsof petition:
+name and surname
+present and former places of residence
+occupation
+place and date of birth
+status; if married and the father, include name, age, birthplace and
residence of wife and each child
+approximate date of his/her arrival in the Philippines
+name of the port of debarkation + name of ship (if remembered)
+declaration of qualifications and non-disqualification
+declaration that he has complied with sec. 5
+declaration of continuous residence in RP fromdate of filing petition to
admission as RPCitizen
*2 photographs of petitioner
*petition signed by applicant + supported by affidavit of at least 2 credible
persons (see provision for requirements)
Sec 8. Competent court: CFI of province in w/c the petitioner has resided for
at least 1 yr immediately preceding the filing of the petition
Sec 9. Notification and appearance. Tasks of clerk of court
publish petition for 3 consecutive weeks in OGand in one of gen circulation
newspapers in the province where petitioner resides
post copies of petitions in conspicuous places (contain name, birthplace and
residence of petitioner, date and place of arrival, names of witnesses, date of
hearing the petition)
*hearing shall not be held w/n 90 days fromdate of last publication of notice
forward copies of the petition, sentence, naturalization certificate and
pertinent data to Department of the Interior, Bureau of Justice, Provincial
Inspector of the Philippine Constabulary of the province, and justice of peace of
the municipality where petitioner resides
Sec 10. Hearing of the petition.
*no hearing w/n 30 days preceding any election
*public hearing
*Solicitor-General/representative/provincial fiscal appear for Commonwealth at
all proceedings
*upon belief of court of qualifications and non-disqualification of petitioner,
court order proper naturalization certificate in proper civil registry (required in
Sec. 10, Act No. 3753)
Sec 11. Appeal: to the SC
Sec 12: Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization: 30 days after and from
date of notice to the parties (in case of appeal, SCconfirmed deci), clerk of
court issue naturalization certificate
contents of certificate of naturalization
*file no. of petition
*number of naturalization certificate
*signature of the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk of
court
*personal circumstances of the person naturalized
*dates of filing of declaration of intention and petition
*date of decision granting petition
*name of the judge who rendered deci
*photograph of peti with dry seal of court w/c granted petition
*oath declared in open court [refer tothe original]
Sec 13. RecordBooks: clerk of court keep 2 books: (1) record of petition and
declarations of intentions in chronological order; (2) record of naturalization
certificate
Sec 14. Fees.
*P30.00 (for recording of petition and for proceedings +issuance of certificate)
*P24.00 (for each appeal and for connected services rendered)
sec 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and children
*on wife: shall be deemed a citizen of Philippines (if just married or also
naturalized)
*on minor children:
if born in the Philippines: Filipino
if foreign-born but dwelling in the Philippines during
naturalization of parent: Filipino
if foreign-born, not dwelling in the Philippines during
naturalization of parent: Filipino during minority, unless
resides inthe Philippines permanently and still a minor, then
legally Filipino upon age of majority
if foreign-born after naturalization of parent: Filipino unless fails
to register and take oath 1 yr after age of majority
Sec 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners_who_have_died:
continue proceedings, same legal effect
Sec 17. Renunciation of title or orders of nobility: unless w/ express
consent of the National Assembly
Sec 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificates issued
*upon motion made in proper proceedings by Solicitor-
General/representative/proper provincial fiscal
*cancelled by competent judge on the ff. grounds:
a. naturalization certificate obtained fraudulently/illegally
b. person naturalized establishes permanent residence outside Philippines
w/n 5 yrs after issuance of naturalization certificate
c. petition made on invalid declaration of intention
d. minor children shown to have failed to graduate fromschool in sec 2 (6)
through fault of parents either by neglect to support or by transferring them
to another school(s)
e. naturalized citizen only used as a dummy to violate constitutional or legal
provision requiring Philippine citizenship
Sec 19 Penalties for violation of this Act: fine < P5,000.00 or imprisonment<
5 yrs or both, naturalization cancelled
Sec 20. Prescription: file complaint w/n 5 yrs from detection/discovery of
commission of offense
Sec. 21. Regulation and blanks.
*Secretary of Justice: issue necessary regulations
*Solicitor-General, subject to approval of Secretary of Justice: naturalization
certificate blanks, etc.
Sec 22. Repealing clause: Repeals Act. No. 2927 as amended by Act No.
3448 [Naturalization Law]
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530
An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization
- Requires the publication of petitions for citizenship (also required by previous
law, prob. Act 423, below)
- Court will hear petitions for citizenship 6 months after the publication
- Decisions granting the application become executory only after 2 years, and
- The Solicitor General or his representative finds that during the intervening
time, applicant has:
NOT left the Philippines
Dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling or profession
NOT been convicted of any offense or violation of govt. rules
NOT committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any govt. announced policies
- After the finding, the order of the court granting citizenship will beregistered
and theoath takenby the applicant beforehe will be entitled to the privileges of
citizenship.
- Repealed inconsistent parts of Act No. 423.
- Approved, June 16, 1950.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63
An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine
Citizenship may be lost or reacquired
Section 1. Howcitizenship may be lost.
(1) naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support constitution or laws of
foreign country upon +21y.o.: a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine
citizenship while the RPis at war;
(4) rendering services to/accepting commission in, the armed forces of foreign
country: rendering of service to/the acceptance of such commission in, the
armed forces of foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of RP, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the ff. is present:
(a) RPhas defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign
country; or
(b) said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory w/
consent of RP: Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service/or acceptance of said commission, & taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with
his service to said foreign country: & provided that any Filipino citizen
who is rendering service to/or is commissioned in, the armed forces of
foreign country under (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor
vote in any election of RPduring period of service to/commission in, the
armed forces of said foreign country. automatically entitled to full
enjoyment of civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen upon his
discharge;
(5) cancellation of certificates of naturalization;
(6) having been declared by competent authority, adeserter of the AFPin time
of war, unless pardon or granted amnesty; &
(7) woman: marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
*** Sec 1 amended by RA106, section 1, approved June 2, 1947
*when dual citizenship was allowed at that time:
acquisition of citizenship by natural born Filipino citizen from
Iberian/democratic Ibero-American countries/ United Kingdomif the law of
that country grants same privilege to its citizens agreed upon by treaty
between the Philippines and foreign country from which citizenship is
acquired.
Section. 2. Howcitizenship may be reacquired.
(1) naturalization: applicant possess none of the disqualifications prescribed in
sec 2, Act No. 2927 (repealed by CA473so sec 4)
(2) repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp: Provided, woman by
sec 1(7) may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after
the termination of the marital status;(see PD725 for more details)
(3) direct act of the National Assembly.
Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Apply Act No. 2927 (nowCA473) to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by naturalization provided for in the next preceding sec: Provided, qualifications
and special qualifications prescribed in sec 3 & 4 of Act 2927 shall not be
required (sorry guys, I cant find a copy of Act 2927 in the net so I dont know
what these sections are in CA473): further, applicant
(1) at least 21 y.o. + resided in RP at least 6 mos. before he applies for
naturalization;
(2) have conducted himself in proper and irreproachable manner during
+the entire period of his residence in RP
+in his relations with the constituted government
+with the community in which he is living; and
(3) subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority/state/sovereignty of
which he was a citizen or subject.
Section 4. Repatriation: effected by merely taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Commonwealth of the Philippines (RP) and registration in the
proper civil registry. (used in the Bengzon Case)
Section 5. Similar to Sec 21 of CA473
YU V DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
PADILLA; January 24, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for Habeas Corpus
- 1971 Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971 valid for 5 years &
renewed for same period upon presentment before Portuguese consular officer
- Feb. 10, 1978He was naturalized as a Phil. citizen
- April 1980 signed commercial documents in Hong Kong (Companies
Registry of Tai Shun Estate, Ltd.) and he declared his nationality as
Portuguese
- July 21, 1981 He applied & was issued another Portuguese passport in
Tokyo. Passport will expire July 20, 1986.
Procedural Facts:
- July 4, 1988 He filed for a petition for habeas corpus. He was detained
because the Commission on Immigration & Deportation was processing his
deportation. CIDclaims that his acts are tantamount to an express renunciation
of his Philippine citizenship.
- July 20, 1988oral arguments
- Nov. 10, 1988 SCresolution denied petition for habeas corpus &resolved
issued on jurisdiction of CID over naturalized Filipino citizen & validity of
warrantless arrest & detention. Yu filed MFR, denied w/finality. Filed urgent
motion for issuance of restraining order, denied.
- Dec. 5, 1988Yu filed motion for clarification w/prayer for restraining order.
- Dec. 7, 1988SCissued TRO. CIDordered to cease &desist fromdeporting
Yu pending conclusion of hearings before Board of Special Inquiry of CID.
- Dec. 13, 1988Respondent commissioner filed motion to lift TROsaying the
commission already issued a summary judgment of deportation against Yu on
Dec. 2, 88.
- Dec. 13, 1988Yu filed an urgent motion for release fromarbitrary detention.
Opposed vigorously to lifting of TRO.
- Yu ordered to explain why he should still be considered a Phil citizen. He
complied. His reply revealed aforementioned substantive facts.
ISSUE
WON the acts of Yu constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
HELD
Yes. Motion for release fromdetention denied. TROlifted.
Ratio
- Renunciation made known distinctly &explicitly and not left to interference
or implication (BI Commissioners vs. Go Gallano). His resumption/reacquisition
of his Portuguese citizenship and passport and representation as a Portuguese
even after he has acquired Filipino citizenship are proof enough of his
renunciation.
- He does not dispute the facts. He was given the opportunity to showproof of
continued Philippine citizenship but he failed. There is no denial of due
process.
- Trial court should have jurisdiction over this case. But due to petitioners
insistence, SChad to do it.
- Philippine citizenship is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ[concur]
Yu has failed to overcome presumption that he has forfeited his status as
naturalized Filipino by obtaining Portuguese passport. Passports are generally
issued only to nationals. No proof of Yus unequivocal &deliberate renunciation
of Phi. Citizenship w/ full awareness of its significance & consequences as
provided for in CANo. 63. Commercial documents signed are not proof enough
of renunciation.
FERNAN [dissent]
Summary procedure & pieces of documentary evidence are not enough to
reach such decision. Evidence must be clear & express w/o room for
interference or implication. In a deportation proceeding where alien claims
citizenship w/substantial evidence, hes entitled to have his status determined
by judicial & not an executive tribunal. He deserves a full-blown trial under
more rigid rules of evidence in a court proceeding. SCis not a trier of facts.
GUTIERREZ[dissent]
Summary procedure would not suffice. Something as important as
denaturalization should be filed &prosecuted in proper trial court in accordance
w/the due process clause. When a person pleads vigorously that he has not
renounced his citizenship, he should at least be given a full trial where his
actions may be explored &the facts fully ascertained. Dangerous precedent to
allow administrative officials to rule that one has renounced his citizenship
based on informal evidence. Mere use of a foreign passport is not express
renunciation. He may have passport for other purposes (employment,
convenience). Some high govt officials have done acts w/c are more indicative
of express renunciation than mere use of passport or different citizenship has
been signed. SCis not a trier of facts. Yus morality is beside the point. He
deserves his full day in court.
CORTES[dissent]
CIDfindings are subject to judicial review. Loss of Yus Filipino citizenship has
not been established. Evidence presented were not authenticated by proper
Philippine consul, thus not substantial and are inadequate.
PEOPLE V AVENGOZA
RELOVA; December 7, 1982
FACTS
- Criminal Case; Appeal fromDecision of CFI of Camarines Sur
- Anselma Avengoza and husband Go Gam, a Chinese, together with the
formers mother Gavina Avengoza andRafaela Anfante are being charged with
violation of the Anti-Dummy Law on transactions for the spouses to own
agricultural lands in the Philippines.
- Anselma Avengoza, upon marriage to Go Gam, acquired Chinese citizenship
- The Anti-Dummy Law provides that only Filipino citizens may own local
agricultural land.
- Pending litigation, Go Gamand Gavina passed away.
- Upon Go Gams passing, Anselma executed an oath of allegiance to the RP
and filed it with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer for the purpose of
reacquiring her citizenship by repatriation, averring by reason whereof that her
criminal liability is thereby extinguished; and that the issue of the criminal case
is rendered moot and academic
- Trial court dismissed case principally predicated on its opinion that Anselma
had validly reacquired Philippine citizenship
ISSUES
1. WONAnselma reacquired citizenship after executing an oath of allegiance
to the RPand filing it with the Municipal Treasurer
2. if so, WONsuch reacquisition of citizenship exempted her fromliability for
the violation of the Anti-Dummy Law
HELD
1. No.
Ratio Mere taking of oath of allegiance insufficient for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship. Would-be repatriate should showconclusive proof that she has the
qualifications to be so repatriated. Anselma became an alien by reason of her
lawful marriage to a Chinese citizen; however this does not necessarily mean
that she was a Filipino citizen prior to such marriage.
2. No.
Ratio Even had she been considered repatriated, like an alien who became a
naturalized Filipino citizen, her repatriation will not exempt her fromcriminal
liability for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
JAO V REPUBLIC
VASQUEZ; March 29, 1983
FACTS
- Modesta Jao claims to be a Philippine citizen because she was born of a
Chinese father and an illiterate Filipina mother who were not legally married. -
She married a Chinese man and therefore lost her Philippine citizenship but he
is nowdead.
- Her handicapped mother erroneously registered her as analien and she was
issued an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR).
- She is claiming back her Phil. citizenship, by way of a petition for repatriation
filed in CFI of Davao.
- CFI issued an order declaring petitioner as judicially repatriated, and
ordered cancelled her ACR.
- Provincial Fiscal in behalf of the Republic, appealed the case.
ISSUE
WONthe judicial decree by the RTCwas necessary for repatriation.
HELD
Ratio Proceedings to declare a person as judicially repatriated are a
complete nullity. There is no law requiring or authorizing that repatriation
should be effected by a judicial proceeding.
Reasoning In Limv. Republic, 37 SCRA 783, it was held that there is no
proceeding established by lawor the rules by which any person claiming to be
a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in regard to
his citizenship. All that is needed for a female citizen of the Phil. who lost her
citizenship to an alien to reacquire her Phil. citizen, upon the termination of her
martial status, is for her to take necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Phil. and to register the said oath in the proper civil registry.
Disposition Decision appealed from is revoked and set aside. 5 Justices
concur.
Obiter Petitioners claimof Phil. citizenship prior to her marriage for being
allegedly an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipina mother may not
be established in an action where the mother or her heirs are not parties. It is
the consistent rule in thisjurisdiction that Phil. citizenship may not be declared
in a non-adversary suit where the persons whose rights are affected by such a
declaration are not parties, such as an action for declaratory relief, petition for
judicial repatriation, or an action to cancel registration as an alien.
VILLAVICENCIO V LUKBAN
MALCOLM; March 25, 1919
FACTS
- Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing
of the citys red light district. The brothels were closed and the workers (170
women) were rounded up and kept confined to their houses in the district by
the police for a little more than a week. On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the
women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor and Negros and
sent off to Davao to work as laborers without their consent, without opportunity
to consult with friends/family or to defend their rights. They reached Davao 4
days later and were met by Francisco Sales, governor of Davao and by
hacendero Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo, etc.
- During their voyage, the womens relatives and friends initiated an
application for habeas corpus, alleging that Justo Lukban, along with Anton
Hohmann (the police chief), and others deprived the women of their liberty. The
court awarded the writ of habeas corpus (wof hc) and ordered Lukban and co.
to bring the women before the court. Although they returned with none of the
women, they were given another chance. The court issued another order this
time calling for the respondents to produce all of the women not in Manila. The
respondents were only able to bring forward 8 women and challenged the
issuance of the writ.
ISSUES
1. Re: the proper granting of the writ:
a. WONthe petitioners had standing
b. WONthe S.C. erred in assuming jurisdiction
c. WONthe women were actually restrained of their liberty
2. WONthere was compliance with the court orders
3. On contempt of court
HELD
1a. Yes
Ratio When it is is impossible for a party to sign an application for the wof hc,
another person may submit it in his/her behalf.
Reasoning It was impossible for the women to have signed a petition for
habeas corpus with the way their expulsion was conducted. They were first
isolated fromsociety and then shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ
to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
1b No
Ratio The wof hc may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
enforcible anywhere in the Philippines. The SCcan decide upon where the writ
shall be made returnable to (whether before the SCor before a lower court).
Reasoning The CFI of Davao was not in session. The case involves parties
fromdifferent parts of the country. Habeas Corpus was devised as a speedy
andeffectual remedy to relieve persons fromunlawful restraint.
1c. Yes
Ratio The forcible taking, isolation, and transfer of the women is constitutive of
deprivation of freedomof locomotion.
Reasoning The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished fromvoluntary
and to relieve a person fromsuch restraint if it is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedomof action is sufficient.
2. 1
st
order: No. Respondents were not able to bring the women before the
court on the day named. The court could have sent the respondents to jail
however, the court forebore drastic action because it did not want the public to
see a clash between executive officials and the judiciary and because it wanted
to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to
mitigate their wrong.
2
nd
order: Yes. Respondents (through better effort) were able to produce 8
women. The mandate called for all of the women not in Manila. However, the
court decided that there was substantial compliance, noting the effort (placards
were posted, police helped, free shipping to Manila was provided) and the fact
that they had a sincere desire to see the unhappy incident finally closed.
3. RatioOnly Lukban is guilty of contempt. His intentions were commendable,
his methods were unlawful. An officers failure to produce the body of a person
in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is
contempt committed in the face of the court.
Reasoning He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of
events and had under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the
return of the women to Manila but failed. The rest of the respondents other
than Lukban are not guilty of contempt. Some were merely following the orders
of their superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was merely drawn into the
case through miscommunication.
Disposition No further action on the wof hc. Lukban found in contempt of
court and shall pay Php 100 within 5 days. Rest of respondents found not to be
in contempt of court.
KURODA JALANDONI
MORAN; March 26, 1949
FACTS
Kuroda, a high ranking Japanese army official is being charged by the Military
Commission with failure to perform duties as commander in preventing
crimes/atrocities against civilians, and POWs. In defense, he is alleging that
Executive Order No. 68 (EO68) which established a Natl. War Crimes Office is
unconstitutional and that 2 prosecuting attorneys, Hussey and Port (both
American) have no authority to practice law in the country. As such, the
respondents should be prohibited fromproceeding with this case.
ISSUES
1. WONEO68 is unconstitutional
2. Re: Attys. Hussey and Port
A. WONthey are qualified to practice in accordance with the Rules of Court
B. WoNtheir appointment as prosecutors is violative of the Constitution
HELD
1. Ratio The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate an unfinished aspect of war which is the trial and punishment of
war criminals through the issuance andenforcement of EO68.
Reasoning EO68 was issued by the President to establish a Natl. War Crimes
Office and provide for rules and regulations in trying accused war criminals. It
conforms to the generally accepted principles/policies of international law,
including the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention, which are part of
the lawof the nation. Its promulgation was an exercise of the President of his
powers as Commander in Chief of the whole armed forces. Iin Yamashita v.
Tyer, the court held that the power to create a military commission for the trial
and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. A military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues.
2A. Ratio The Military Commission is special military tribunal governed by a
special lawand not by the Rules of Court.
Reasoning There is nothing in EO68 which requires that counsel appearing
before said commissions must be attys. qualified to practice lawin the Phil. in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
2B. No
Ratio The appointment of the 2 American attorneys is not violative of our
national sovereignty.
Reasoning It is only fair and proper that the US, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her govt. and her people to a tribunal of our
nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes.
Disposition The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a
valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the
provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere
with the due processes of such Military Commission. Petition denied. With
costsde oficio.
ICHONG V HERNANDEZ AND SARMIENTO
LABRADOR; May 31, 1957
FACTS
- Injunction and Mandamus
- The Legislature enacted RA 1180 entitled An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business. It prohibits aliens and associations, partnerships, or corporations,
which are not wholly owned by citizens, to engage directly or indirectly in the
retail trade. In effect it nationalizes the retail business.
- Procedure Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien
residents, corporations, and partnerships adversely affected by RA1180 fileda
petition for Injunction and Mandamus against Jaime Hernandez, Secretary of
Finance and Marcelino Sarmiento, City Treasurer of Manila.
- Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
A. Police Power
- the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable
- necessary esp. in a modern democratic framework
B. Equal Protection Clause
- against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality; it requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
- is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within
a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not.
- Criteria for Test of EPC
1. presence of public interest and welfare
2. existence of reasonable relation between purposes and means
3. existence of reasonable basis for distinction and classification made
C. Due Process clause
- has to do with reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the
police power
- Questions for test:
1. Is there is a public interest/purpose?
2. Is the Act is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
3. Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used or is it
merely an unjustified interference with private interest?
ISSUES
1. WONRA1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws.
2. WONRA1180 deprives alien residents of their liberty and property without
due process of law.
3. WONthe title of the Act is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real
purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens
fromengaging therein.
4. WONRA1108 violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic
of the Philippines.
HELD
1. No. The act does not transcend the limit of equal protection established by
the Constitution if there is a question of public interest involved or pursued and
the classification or distinction used by the legislature, in this case between
nationals and aliens, is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded.
Reasoning
a. Based on experience of the country, alien retailer has shown disregard for
his customers and the people on whomhe makes his profit. Aliens lack spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasmfor the country. Alien participation in the retail trade has
been attended by intolerable practices like the ff:
- hoarding essential commodities
- violating price control laws
- boycotting honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield
to their demands
- believed to have evaded tax laws
- bribing public officials
b. Economic reason alien retailer never really makes a genuine contribution
to national income and wealth since the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the countrys economy and increase
national wealth.
c. precedents
Smith Bell &Co. vs. Natividad, Gibbon vs. Ongden Commonwealth vs. Hana,
Anton vs. Van Winkle, Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners
- Essentially held that the difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police
power.
Takahashi vs. Fish and game Commission, Fraser vs. McConway &Tarley
- held that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not valid
because the laws were found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,
or were the result or product of racial antagonismand hostility, and there
was no question of public interest involved or pursued.
2. No. There is due process if the laws passed are seen to have reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, the means are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
Reasoning
a. legitimacy of the purpose of the law
- Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from
having a strangle hold upon our economic life\
- Freedomand liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the
economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or
country.
bNationalistic protective policy laid down in the Constitution
- Section 8 of Article XIVprovides that no franchise, certificate, or any other
formof authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines
c. Provisions of lawnot unreasonable
- The legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of
any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and
though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdomof the law, it
may not annul the legislation if not in excess of the legislative power.
3. No. The provisions of the laware clearly embraced in the title. The general
rule is for the use of general terms in the title of the bill and the title need not be
an index to the entire contents of the law.
Reasoning
a. The termregulate is a broader termthan either prohibition or nationalization.
Both of thesehave always been included within the termregulation.
4. No treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional
agreement.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA
CONCEPCION; October 22, 1963
FACTS
- Respondent Exec. Sec. authorized importation of foreign rice and created rice
procurement committee. Gonzales, a rice planter and President of Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, filed petition.
Procedure Case is anoriginal action for prohibition with preliminary injunction
to restrain implementation of decision of Exec. Sec. to import rice.
Respondents were required to file answer and hearing was set.
- on WONrespondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
Petitioners stand:
- Yes, bec. RA3452 explicitly prohibits importation of rice and corn by Rice
and Corn Administration and any other govt agency.
Respondents stand:
- Petitioner has no sufficient interest to file petition.
- Petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies available before
coming to court.
- Petitioners action is not sufficient and not governed by RA3452 because
importation was authorized by President as Commander in Chief for military
stock pile purposes. As such, Pres must prepare for threats without waiting for
any special authority.
- Also, they say its not under RA3452 bec. the RAs prohibit importation of rice
and corn by government agency and not the government itself.
- Even if the proposedimportation violated the RAs, it can still be permitted
because it is for the benefit of the people.
- The Phils is already under executive agreements with contracts for purchase
of rice with Vietnamand Burma. In case of conflict between the RAs and the
contracts, the contracts should prevail because it came later. These contracts
have been consummated bec. the Phils. has already paid.
ISSUE
WONrespondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction
HELD
- RA3452 says that the govt policy is to purchase basic foods directly from
farmers in Phils. Petitioner has sufficient interest.
- Case at bar involves question which is a purely legal one. It falls under the
exemption fromthe doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
- The proposed importation is governed by RA2207 and RA3452 bec it
covers all importations of rice and corn into the Phils.
- RA2207 and 3452 also applies to importations of the government itself bec.
RA2207 talks about imports authorized by the President, by and on behalf of
government. RA3452 also indicates that only private parties may import rice
under its provisions. These RAs are only in addition to Commonwealth Act No.
138 which says that in all purchases by govt, incl. those for armed forces,
preference is given to materials produced in the Phils.
- The benefit of the people argument cant be accepted because there is no
local rice shortage. And the importation is said to be for stockpile of Army, not
for the civilian population.
- The contracts w/ Vietnamand Burma are not executive agreements. Even if
they were, they are unlawful, being against the RAs. The alleged
consummation does not render this case academic. The contracts may have
already been entered into and the payment may have been made but the
actual importation has not yet taken place.
Disposition- For lack of requisite majority, injunction prayed for is DENIED.
- It is declared that Exec. Sec. has no power to authorize importation in
question and he exceeded jurisdiction in granting authority. The importation is
not sanctioned by lawand is contrary to its provisions.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SECRETARY
OF DAR
CRUZ; July 14, 1989
FACTS
- The Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the, less
privileged.
- In 1973, the newConstitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition
of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.
Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement
an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil."
- The 1987 Constitution, besides echoing these sentiments, also adopted one
whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights. One of its
sections:
- SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary landsharing.
- R.A, No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land ReformCode, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in
line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost
a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972,
along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximumretention limits
for landowners.
- On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well
as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reformprogram(CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
- With its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines (formally
convened on July 27, 1987) took over legislative power fromthe President and
started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the
improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of
spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives themsuppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
ISSUES
1. WONpetitions are justiciable.
2. WONP.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. Nos. 228 and
229 and R.A. 6657 contravene the Constitution on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Sub issues
a. The determination of just compensation may be made only by a court of
justice and not by the President of the Philippines.
b. The just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable only in
money or in cash but not in the formof bonds or other things of value.
c. In considering rentals as advance payment on the land, E.O. No. 228
deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process.
d. The equal protection clause is violated when the burden of solving the
agrarian problems is placed on the owners only of agricultural lands.
e. In declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the
lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so
violated due process.
f. The power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgramas
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President.
Although petitioners agree that the President could exercise legislative power
until the Congress was convened, they contend that she could do so only to
enact emergency measures during the period.
g. The money needed to create the P50 billon special fund under Proc. No. 131
is in futuro, not in esse, i.e., it has yet to be raisedand cannot be appropriated
at that time.
h. The sugar planters argued that they are a separate group with problems
exclusively their own and by being lumped in the same legislation with other
farmers, their right to equal protection has been violated.
i. There was a failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the
necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of
the fundamental right to own property.
j. The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which
is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government
assessors valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the
landowner declares his own valuation, he is unjustly required to immediately
pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
10
k. E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only
one subject, to be expressed in its title.
HELD
1. RD: Yes. The Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question
only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied but even if they are not covered by the definition, it is
10
Thiswasnot discusseddirectlybut maybeconstruedasbeingunder No. 1above. It will still bethe
courtswhowill decidewhat just compensationwouldbe.
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious
constitutional questions raised.
2a. The determination made by the DARis onlypreliminary unless accepted by
all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to
reviewwith finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a
judicial function. (Sec. 16f)
2b. It cannot be denied that the traditional mediumfor the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just
compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not
deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.
11
This is
not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited
area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
2c. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are nowdeemed full owners as of October 21,
1972 of the land theyacquiredby virtue of P.D. No. 27.
It was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said
decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and
full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the
Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the
landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer
of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.
2d. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.
The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of
owners that is clearly visibleexcept to those who will not see.
12
2e. The CARPLawconditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DARof the compensation in cash or LBPbonds
with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner. No
outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
2f. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 was authorized under Section 6 of theTransitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution. It is not correct to say that these measures ceased to be
valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to
be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent lawor declared invalid
by the courts. Astatute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because
of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. Significantly, the Congress
she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall
be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.
2g. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for
the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation
lawis one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release
of public funds fromthe treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to
the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. Section 24
11
Thepower of eminent domainisoneof thethreeinherent powersof theState. It isthepower to
forciblyacquireprivatelandsintendedfor publicuseuponpayment of just compensationtotheowner. It
isinherent becauseit existswithout needfor legislation, i.e., evenif it isnot sanctionedbyanylawor
eventheConstitution, theStatemayexerciseit. Why?Becausethesepowersarenecessaryfor astateto
exist. Theother twoarepolicepower andtaxation.
12
Frankly, I dont likethewaythisponenteargues. Heslikesaying, nowI dont want toexplainwhy. If
youcant seethereasoningitsyour fault. Anyway, wereinfallibleremember?Hisnext sentence:
Thereisnoneedtoelaborateonthismatter. Tsk
and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to
Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple
reason that the House of Representatives, which nowhas the exclusive power
to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the
proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the
President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of
Congress.
2h. No evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the
members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met
by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
2i. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute. The limitation is found
in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has
evolved fromthe interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for
a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
13
Some of the petitioners invoked their right of maximumretention under Art. XIII,
Sec. 4 of the Constitution and under P.D. 316 which was promulgated in
implementation of P.D. 27.
2j. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits nowin Sec. 6 of the law, which in
fact is one of its most controversial provisions. (Sec 6: Max per landowner is 5
hec. 3 hec may be awarded to each child at least 15 yrs old and actually tilling
or directly managing the land)
2k. It is settled that the title of a bill does not have to be a catalogue of its
contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other.
Decision
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon
full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D.
No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the
conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SOORDERED. (Unanimous court)
LUZ FARMS V SECRETARY OF DAR
PARAS; December 4, 1990
FACTS
- Petition for prohibition to reviewthe decision of the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform
13
Therewasashift insubject after this. Hetackledtheargument onwhytheStatedidnot distribute
publiclandsonlybypointingout theConstitutionsthejust distributionof all agricultural lands clause.
Thenheplaysthepolitical questioncardontheissueof whythedistributionwouldbeprivatelandsfirst.
- 6/10/88: Pres. Aquino approved RA6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
ReformLawwhich includes the raising of livestock, swine and poultry
1/2/89: Sec. of Agrarian Reform(SAR) promulgated Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing for RA6657 (S13 &
S32)
- 1/9/89: SARpromulgated Rules and Regulations implementing S11
(commercial farms)
-Luz Farms, petitioner, is a corporation engaged in livestock/poultry, adversely
affected by RA6657
-petition prays that RAbe declared unconstitutional; it is also prayed that a
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the enforcement of the said law
(injunction denied)
8/24/89: court granted motion for reconsideration on injunctive relief
-Luz Farms questions the following provisions of RA6657:
S3(b): includes raising of livestock in definition of Agricultural
Enterprise/Activity
S11: defines commercial farms as agricultural lands devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising
S13: calls for production-sharing plan (distribute 3%of gross sales &
10%of gross profits to workers as additional compensation)
S16(d) &17: vests in DARauthority to determine compensation to be
paid for lands covered by RA6657
S32: spells out production-sharing plan in S13
-the constitutional provision under consideration is A13, S4, Agrarian and
Natural Resources Reform
which grants farmers and farm-workers who are landless, the right to directly or
collectively own the land they are tilling
-livestock and poultry raising is different fromcrop farming in that land is not a
primary input in the former
ISSUE
WONS3(b), 11, 13 &32 of RA6657 are constitutional insofar as said law
includes theraising of livestock, poultry and swinein its coverage as well as in
its Implementing Rules and Guidelines
HELD
Instant petition GRANTED. S3(b), 11, 13 &32 of RA6657 are constitutional
insofar as said lawincludes theraising of livestock, poultry and swinein its
coverage as well as in its Implementing Rules and Guidelines are hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued is hereby made permanent
Ratio the question raised is one of constitutional construction; in construing
any ambiguous provisions, the courts may look to the debates of the concon
-the transcripts of the 1986 concon clearly showthat the meaning of the word
agricultural (its dictionary meaning aside) was never meant to include
livestock and poultry industries in its coverage;
there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in agrarian reform
-S13 &32 calling for production-sharing is confiscatory and is thus violative of
due process
SEPARATE OPINION
SARMIENTO
-agrees that petitionbe granted but not that main issue is one of consti
construction and interpretation
A13, S4: ..in case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereofthis phrase provides a possible coverage of livestock, poultry and
swine
-everypresumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute
ISSUE: WONassailed provisions violate equal protection clause of the consti
-clearly, livestock &poultry lands and crop &tree farms are not similarly
situated, hence the inclusion of the former in CARPwould be violative of the
equal protection clause
GARCIA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CRUZ; December 2, 1991
FACTS
Petitioner challenges RA7042on the ground that:
- It defeats the constitutional policy of developing a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos and the protection of
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices
- He claims that the lawabdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this
country and gives themunfair advantages over local investments which are
practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own
government
- Under Section 5 of the said lawa foreign investor may do business in the
Philippines or invest in a domestic enterprise up to 100%of its capital without
need of prior approval
o All that it has to do is register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer
Protection in the case of a single proprietorship
o The SECor BTRCP, as the case may be, shall not impose any
limitations on the extent of foreign ownership in an enterprise
additional to those provided in the Act
- Under Section 7, non-Philippine nationals may own up to one hundred
percent (100%) of domesticmarket enterprises unless foreign ownership
therein is prohibited or limited by existing lawor the Foreign Investment
Negative List under Section 8 hereof."
- However, the systemof negative list under Section 8 abandons the positive
aspect of regulationand exercise of authority over foreign investments. In
effect, it assumes that so long as foreign investments are not in areas covered
by the list, such investments are not detrimental to but are good for the national
economy.
o List Amerely enumerate areas of activities already reserved to
Philippine nationals by mandate of the Constitution and specific laws
o List B- contain areas of activities and enterprises already regulated
according to lawand includes small and medium-sized domestic
market enterprises or export enterprises which utilize rawmaterials
fromdepleting natural resources with paid-in equity capital of less
than the equivalent of US$500,000.00; meaning, SMEs are for
Filipinos. Or even, Filipinos are not encouraged to go big.
o List C- contain areas of investment mwhich "existing enterprises
already serve adequately the needs of the economy and the
consumers and do not need further foreign investments."; However,
existing enterprises must be qualified as Filipino, if not, it shall protect
foreign enterprises too
- Section 9 is also attacked, because if a Philippine national believes that an
area of investment should be included in list C, theburden is on himto show
that the criteria enumerated in said section are met
- Articles 2, 32, &35 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1982 are done away
with by RA7042.
- By repealing Articles 49, 50, 54 and 56 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments
Code, RANo. 7042 further abandons the regulation of foreign investments by
doing away with important requirements for doing business in the Philippines.
- The Transitory provisions of RA7042, which allowpractically unlimited entry
of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory
Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign
investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their
own country.
Sol-Gen answers:
- phrase "without need of prior approval" applies to equity restrictions alone
o prior to the effectivity of RA7042, Article 46 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 (EONo. 226), provided that a non-
Philippine national could, without need of prior authority fromthe
Board of Investments (BOI), invest in: (1) any enterprise registered
under Book I (Investments with Incentives); and (2) enterprises not
registered under Book I, to the extent that the total investment of the
non-Philippine national did not exceed 40%of the outstanding capital
o On the other hand, under Article 47 thereof, if an investment by a
non-Philippine nationals in an enterprise not registered under Book I
was such that the total participation by non-Philippine nationals in the
outstanding capital thereof exceeded 40%, prior authority fromthe
BOI was required.
- With the introduction of the Negative List under Sections 8 &15, the areas of
investments not open to foreign investors are already determined and outlined;
hence, registration with the SECor BTRCP, as the case may be, is nowthe
initial step to be taken by foreign investors.
- This registration constitutes regulation and exercise of authority over foreign
investments. Under SECand BTRCPrules and regulations, foreign investors
must first comply with certain requirements before they can be issued a license
to do business in the Philippines.
- Section 7 of RA7042 allows non-Philippine nationals to own up to 100%of
domestic market enterprises only in areas of investments outside the
prohibitions and limitations imposed by lawto protect Filipino ownership and
interest.
- The Foreign Investment Negative List under Section 8 reserves to Filipinos
sensitive areas of investments. List Cprohibits foreign investors fromengaging
in areas of activities where existing enterprises already serve adequately the
needs of the economy and the consumer.
o The Act opens the door to foreign investments only after securing to
Filipinos their rights and interests over the national economy.
o List A The provisions of the Constitution and other specific laws
regulate or limit the extent of foreign ownership in enterprises
engaged in areas of activity reserved for Filipinos
o List B- contains areas already regulated pursuant to lawalready
makes it clear that it is regulatory. It channels efforts at promoting
foreign investments to bigger enterprises where there is an acutelack
of Filipino capital; scheme is for foreign investments to supplement
Filipino capital in big enterprises.
o List C- to allowhealthy competition, Activities which do not
adequately meet-the needs of the consumers should not be included
in list C; if not, consumers would be at the mercy of unscrupulous
producers
o Foreign Corporations under a valid license prior to the enactment of
RA7042 necessarily come within the protection of the law.
- Section 9 provides for the criteria to be used by NEDAin determining the
areas of investment for inclusion in List C
o Petition for inclusion therein requires "a public hearing at which
affected parties will have the opportunity to showwhether the
petitioner industry adequately serves the economy and the
consumers."
o Provision is designed to protect the consumers as not all existing
enterprises satisfy the criteria inclusion in List C.
- Regarding the repealing of provisions of the Omnibus Investment Code
o purposely removed because the determination of the areas of
investment open to foreign investors is made easy by the Foreign
Investment Negative List formulated and recommended by NEDA
following the process and criteria provided in Sections 8 &9 of the Act
- Re the Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List
o it practically includes the same areas of investment reserved to
Filipino under Section 5", and the SECshall disallowregistration of
the applying non-Philippine national if the existing joint venture
enterprises, particularly the Filipino partners therein, can reasonably
prove they are capable to make the investment needed for the
domestic market activities to be undertaken by the competing
applicant.
Senator Paterno as Intervenor:
- the over-all strategy embodied in the Act to develop a self-reliant economy, as
well as the provisions designed to promote full employment for Filipinos
- suggests that the constitutional challenge should be rejected outright for
noncompliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional
question, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the
constitutional question must be necessary to thedecision of the case.
ISSUES
1. WONthere is actual controversy
2. WONpetitioners have legal standing
3. WONconstitutionality lis mota of the case
4. WON this entails a political question
HELD
1. There is at this point no actual case or controversy, particularly because of
the absence of the implementing rules that are supposed to carry the Act
into effect
a. Acontroversy must be one that is appropriate or "ripe" for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory
2. The petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, and particularly as a member of
the House of Representatives, comes under the definition that a proper
party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of.
3. The constitutional question has not beenraised tardily but in fact, as just
remarked, prematurely.
- The constitutional challenge must be rejected for failure to showthat there is
an indubitable ground for it, not to say even a necessity to resolve it.
a. Policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and
to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To
doubt is to sustain.
b. based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
eachdepartment a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments
c. theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a lawhas been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental lawbefore it was finally enacted.
- the cause of unconstitutionality has not been proved by the petitioner
d. Act does not violate any of the constitutional provisions the petitioner
has mentioned
4. What we see here is a debate on the wisdomor the efficacy of the Act, but
this is a matter on which we are not competent to rule.
a. In Angara v Electoral Commission: "the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."
b. allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable," 5 and may not annul an act of
the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or
impractical.
c. There is no irregularity also, that shows that there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Decision Petition dismissed.
CALALANG vs. WILLIAMS
LAUREL; December 2, 1940
FACTS
- The Secretary of Public Works and Communications (PWC) approved with
modification the recommendation that originated from the National Traffic
Commission (NTC), which was favorably indorsed by the Director of Public
Works (PW), that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours from7 a.m. to
11 p.m., for a period of one year fromthe date of the opening of the Colgante
Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of
Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulationsthus
adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal drawn
vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-
mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as
well.
- Commonwealth Act No. 548 gives the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Public Works and Communications the
authority to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.
Procedure Maximo Calang, in his capacity as private citizen and as a
taxpayer of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the Chairman
of NTC, Director of PW, Acting Secretary of PWC, Mayor of Manila and Acting
Chielf of Police of Manila.
ISSUES
1. WONCommonwealth Act No. 548 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.
2. WON the rules and regulations promulgated constitute an unlawful
interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal
liberty and freedomof locomotion.
3. WON the rules and regulations complained of infringe the upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being of all the people.
HELD
1. No.The Legislature cannot delegate power to make law; but it can make a
lawto delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the lawmakes, or intends to make, its own action depend.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, Wayman vs. Southardit was held here
that discretion may be delegated to executive departments or subordinate
officials the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.
2. textual interpretation of Commonwealth Act No. 548
The provision that .the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national
roads, is anadministrativefunction which cannot be directly discharged
by the National Assembly.
3. practicality
The complexities of modern governments, the multiplication of the subjects of
govtl regulations, and the increased difficulty in administering the lawgive
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, the delegation of greater powers by
the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative
and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the
promulgation of certain rules and regulations.
2. No. The state may enact laws that may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupation if the said laws are intended to
promote the welfare of the public. (police power of the State)
Reasoning
1. precedents(USvs. Gomez, Dobbins vs. LosAngeles &People vs. Pomar)
2. Paradox - The apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preservation
3. No. Social justice is promoted if the greatest good is brought about to the
greatest number.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- PAGCORwas created by virtue of PD1067-Aand was granted franchise
under PD1067-Bto establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos.
PAGCORproved to be a potential source of revenue. Thus, PD1399 was
passed for PAGCORto fully attain its objectives. PD1869 was passed later on
to enable PAGCOR/government to regulate and centralize all games of
chance, giving it territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines.
PAGCORbecame 3
rd
largest sourceof govt revenue, next to BIRand Bureau
of Customs. It sponsored socio-cultural and charitable projects and at that time
employed 4,494 employees in its 9 casinos.
Procedure This is petition seeking to annul the PAGCORcharter PD1869
ISSUES
Procedural Issue
WONpetitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers can question and seek
the annulment of PD1869
Substantive Issue/s
WONPD1869 should be annulled based on the ff grounds:
1. it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order
2. it waived and intruded into the Manila City governments right to impose
taxes and license fees
3. it violates equal protection clause in that it legalizes PAGCORbut outlaws
other forms of gambling and vices
4. it violates trend of government away frommonopolistic and crony economy
HELD
Procedural Issue:
- Considering transcendental public interest and the Courts duty to check on
limits of other branches of govt, SCbrushed aside technicalities of procedure
and took cognizance of the petition.
Substantive Issues:
1. Gambling, unless allowed by law, is prohibited. But prohibition does not
mean that govt cant regulate it in exercise of police power. Police power is
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote general welfare. PAGCORhas been beneficial,
not just to govt, but to society as well.
2. Manila, being a mere municipal corporation, has no inherent right to impose
taxes, its power to tax must always yield to a legislative act. Municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress, therefore Charter of Manila is
subject to control by Congress. If Congress can grant a municipal corporation
the power to tax, it can also provide exemptions or even take back the power.
Also, Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling has long been
revoked. The power is nowvested exclusively on national government.
Local governments, too, have no power to tax instrumentalities of national
government, such as PAGCOR. PAGCORis exempt fromlocal taxes.
The power of local govt to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limits
w/c Congress may provide. It cant be violative, but consistent with principle of
local autonomy.
Local autonomy doesnt make local govt sovereign w/in state; it simply means
decentralization. The local govt has been described as a political subdivision
of state constituted by lawand has substantial control of local affairs. It can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of a sovereign nation, it cant be an
imperiumin imperio.
3. Equal protection doesnt preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded diff. treatment as long as classification is not unreasonable/arbitrary.
The fact that some gambling activities (e.g. sweepstakes, lottery, races,
cockfighting, etc.) are legalized while others are prohibited does not render
applicable laws such as PD1869 unconstitutional.
Whether or not PD1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
But as of now, every lawhas in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
For a lawto be nullified, there must be a showing of clear and unequivocal
breach of Constitution.
4. If PD1869 runs counter to govt policies, it is for Executive to recommend to
Congress its repeal or amendment. Judiciary does not settle policy issues.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED.
OPOSA V FACTORAN
DAVIDE; July 30, 1993
FACTS
- The overarching theme of the case deals with the prevention the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth.
- In 1991 a case was filed by minors (represented by their parents) and the
Philippine Ecological Network (PENI) against the then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio
Factoran, Jr. who was substituted by the new secretary, Angel Alcala. The
complaint was instituted to be a taxpayers class suit as it alleges that all
citizens of the Philippines are entitled to benefit, use and enjoyment of the
countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The suit also alleges that this suit
represents people who are sharing the same sentiment towards the
preservation of our natural resources (since not all of themcould go before the
court). Furthermore, this was also asserted to be representative of the current
generation and generation that are yet to be born.
- The suit calls for two primary actions that orders the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), its agents, representatives, and
those acting on its behalf to, 1. Cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and 2. to cease and desist fromreceiving, accepting, processing,
and renewing or approving newtimber license agreements.
- The suit starts off with statement of facts regarding the country, the countrys
islands, its natural resources, and scientific evidences pointing to the
requirement for the country to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology (54%
should be use for forest cover and 46%for agricultural, residential, industrial,
commercial, and other uses). They asserted that deforestation resulted in, a.
water shortages b. salinization c. massive erosion and loss of soil fertility d.
extinction of some of the countries flora and fauna e. disturbance and
dislocation of indigenous cultures f. siltation of rivers and seabed g. drought h.
increasing velocity of typhoon winds i. flooding of lowlands j. siltation and
shortening of the life span of dams k. reduction of earths capacity to process
carbon dioxide.
- Initially the petition was dismissed on the grounds of lack of cause of action,
of being political question, and of causing the impairment of contracts. The
petitioners filed for certiorari hence this case. They contend that there is a
cause of action using articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code (the right to a
sound environment), Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 that calls for the
creation of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to
safeguard the peoples right to a healthful environment, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1151 ( Philippine Environmental Policy), and Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution that recognizes the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology. As well as the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation in natural law.
ISSUES
1. Locus Standi: WONthe case is a class suit?
2. WONminors can assert that they represent other generations and those
succeeding theirs?
3. Merits: WONthe respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction by declaring the petitioners to have no legal
right?
4. Whether or not granting the petition would violate the non-impairment
clause found in the Constitution?
HELD
1. Yes it is a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest to all citizens of the Philippines and that it would
be impracticable to bring them all to court. The plaintiffs in this case are
numerous and representative enough to ensure that all interests is protected.
2. Yes they can, following the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Every
generation has a responsibility to the next topreserve the rhythmand harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful environment.
3. Yes respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction because it failed to recognize the legal right of the petitioners
which is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology that is incorporated in the
1987 Constitution under Section 16 Article II.
- Moreover, this rights need not be written in the Constitution for this deals with
rights that are assumed fromthe very inception oh humankind. The reason why
it was written was because the framers feared that without a mandate as stated
in the state policies future generations would inherit nothing to sustain life. It is
clear then that there is a legal right for a balanced healthful ecology and the
right to health. Given that it could also be said that this right is further
supported by Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
making the cause of action existent.
4. No it does not violate the non-impairment clause because licenses are not
contracts, properties or a property right that is protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. As the court held in Tan v. Director of Forestry, a
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful
and is not a contract. It is not irrevocable. The Chief Executive may validly
amend, modify, replace, or rescind licenses when national interests so require.
Given that it is not a contract, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
- Even if the licenses are contracts, the action stated in the case still does not
affect it given that no lawor action by the Chief Executive to amend, modify,
replace, or rescind licenses so it is could not as of the moment be invoked. And
furthermore, if there would be a lawpassed it would not be considered as a
violation of the non-impairment clause as the very nature of the lawdeals with
the exercising of the police power of the state to advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology. The non-impairment clause yields
to the police power of the state.
Decision Petition is granted. Petitioners may amend complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
DECS V SAN DIEGO
CRUZ; December 21, 1989
FACTS
- decided en banc, unanimous decision
- Respondent Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a BSZoology graduate fromUE.
He has taken the NMAT four times and flunked it as many times. His
application to take a fifth examination was denied by petitioner DECS on the
basis of the three-flunk rule under MECSOrder #12, Series of 1972.
San Diego filed a petition for mandamus at the Valenzuela RTC, invoking his
constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In an
amended complaint, he raised the additional grounds of due process and equal
protection and also challenged the constitutionality of the aforementioned
order.
- Pendente lite, with the agreement of both parties, he was allowed to take a
fifth attempt at NMAT. This attempt he also failed.
- RTC decision released 4 July 1989 granted the petition and declared the
challenged order invalid. It held that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police
power.
ISSUE
WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
Or, WONthe three-flunk rule is a proper exercise of the police power of the
State
HELD
Ratio Measures, such as admission exams and thethree flunk rule, designed
to gauge the academic preparation of an applicant fall within the
valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Reasoning
1. use of precedent: In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, unanimous Court upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.
- analogy: Tablarin case &case at bar issue is academic preparation of
the applicant. Admission test and the three-flunk rule are both valid
measures in the regulation of the medical profession. The regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches is a reasonable method of protecting
the health and safety of the public. This power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine also includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine.
2. Thepolice power of the State is validly exercised if
- (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished fromthose of a
particular class, require the interference of the State <lawful subject>; &
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished, not unduly oppressive upon individuals
<lawful method>
- The case at bar complies with this requisites...
<subject> It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives andhealth.
<method> The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.
3. The right to quality education is NOT absolute. The Constitution also
provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
- It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a
guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it
because of his preparation and promise.
4. What theequal protection clause requires is equality among equals. Alaw
does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable toArticle III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
- A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other
students who are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The
medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other
careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The
accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the
physician and so need not be similarly treated.
- There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed
the tests are admitted and others who have also qualified are denied
entrance.
Note While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have
a constitutional right to be a doctor. The Court suggests the notion of
appropriate calling. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our systemof education by directing the student to the
course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations.
Decision Petition is granted. Decision of Valenzuela RTC reversed. Costs
against private respondent San Diego.
CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT
MALCOLM; February 23, 1909
FACTS
- An appeal to review the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands which affirmed a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Benguet, dismissing an application for the registration of certain
land.
- Mateo Carino, an Igorot, filed an application for the registration of a certain
land in the Province of Benguet. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of
Paris, in 1899, the applicant and his ancestors had held the land as owners.
His grandfather had lived upon it and maintained fences sufficient for the
holding of cattle. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts for
pasturing cattle. He had received the land fromhis father in accordance with
Igorot customs and had used it for pasture. They all had been recognized as
owners of the land by the Igorots. No document of title, however, had issued
fromthe Spanish crown and although I, in 1893-1894, and again in 1896-1897,
he made application for one under the royal decrees then in force, nothing has
come of it. In 1901, he filed a petition, allegingownership, under the mortgage
law, and the lands were registered to him, that process establishing only a
possessory title.
- Applicant claims that he now owns the land, and is entitled to registration
under the Philippine Commissions Act No,496 of 1902, which established a
court for that purpose with jurisdiction throughout the Philippine Archipelago,
and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons claiming
to own the land.
- The government claims that Spain had title to all the land in the Philippines
except so far as it sawfit to permit private titles to be acquired; that there was
no prescription against the crown and that, if there was, a decree of June 25,
1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that the
applicants land was not registered, and therefore became public land; that he
United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and that the he has no rights that
the Philippine government is bound to respect.
ISSUE
WONthe applicant owns the land
HELD
- Yes. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired
by the United States are to be administered for the benefits of the inhabitants
of the Philippines. Thus, when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the
land has beenheld by individuals under a claimof private ownership, it shall be
presumed to have been held in the same way before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land.
- Under the laws of Spain, there is no clear proof that he does not own the
land. Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitant of the
Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain.
- Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754Where such possessor shall not be able
to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient
possession, as valid title by prescription. As prescription, even against the
Crown, was recognized by the laws of Spain, the court sees no sufficient
reason to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over
which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
- Decree of June 25, 1880 For private ownership, there must have been a
grant by competent authority. For all legal effects, those who have been in
possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated land, 20
years; for uncultivated, 30 years. When this decree went into effect, the
applicants father was owner of the land by the very terms of the decree. This
being the case and the fact that his possession was not unlawful (no attempt at
any such proceedings against himor his father was ever made), the regulation
for the registration of royal land wrongfully occupied does not apply to him.
Moreover, the decree was not calculated to the mind of an Igorot Chief the
notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it.
Disposition Judgment reversed. Law and justice require that the applicant
should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what by
practice and belief of those among whomhe live, was his property.
RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
MALCOLM; February 28, 1919
FACTS
- Rubi and various other Manguianes in the Province of Mindoro were ordered
by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to establish themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the
Province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if
they escaped. This reservation, as appears fromthe resolution of the provincial
board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately
2,000 acres, on which about three hundred Manguianes are confined. One of
the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in
hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because
he escaped fromthe reservation. The Manguianes sued out a writ of habeas
corpus in this court, alleging that they are deprived of their liberty in violation of
law.
- The return of the Solicitor-General alleges that on February 1, 1917, the
provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 signed by the provincial
governor, Hon. Juan Morente, jr.. The laws primary objective is the
advancement of the welfare of the non-Christian people of Mindoro. In one of
the Whereas clauses, it was stated that the provincial governor is of the opinion
that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the
Mangyanes to live on. Pursuant to the Governors powers under section 2077
of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake was selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of
the Interior. Under the resolution of the Provincial Board, any Mangyan who
shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceeding sixty days in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code. The resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied
in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of the same province
copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the
Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
ISSUES
1. WON the Mangyans were deprived of due process when their liberty to
choose their homes were limited by the law.
2. WONthe Legislature exceeded its authority in enacting the lawmandating
the forcible transfer of the Mangyanes.
HELD
1. NO. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth
College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in
forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection
of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law,"
as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite, a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a lawto particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of
Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty.
"Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age
and custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in
furtherance of the public good which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs.
California [1883], 110 U. S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply * * *
"first, that there shall be a lawprescribed in harmony with the general powers
of the legislative department of the Government; second, that this lawshall be
reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable
alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U. S. vs. Ling Su Fan
[1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.1)
"What is due process of law depends on circumstances it varies with the
subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peabody [1909],
212 U. S., 82.)
- There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of
liberty and does not practise liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as
the right to do anything they will-going from one place to another in the
mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practicing the same rightfully, howcan
they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
- But does the Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of lawapply to a class of persons whodo not have
a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practice liberty in a rightful way?
- To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of
such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that
the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
should be let alone in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery
without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
noble sense. In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the
Government has been placed in the alternative of either letting themalone or
guiding themin the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the
one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
- The Mangyans will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and on
account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if
not they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them.. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will-going
fromone place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and
making illegal caigins thereon. To allow them to successfully invoke that
Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse
to pursue the works of civilizing themand making themuseful citizens. They
will thus be left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable
point of attack by those who doubt, may challenge the ability of the nation to
deal with our backward brothers.
- Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law, has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of lawand equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the lawseems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.
2. NO. Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the
courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority.
It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an
equally drastic remedy.
- As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which in case
of doubt, would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid, is the
attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the
Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gamble vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio
decidendi. Every really newquestion that comes before the courts is, in
the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by
differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the
aid of analogies furnished by such prior cases. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes
will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general
rule 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of lawand does not deny to himthe equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary
servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section
2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Decision Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their
liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARSON
- The legislative and administrative history of the Philippine Islands clearly
discloses that the standard of civilization to which a specific tribe must be found
to have advanced, to justify its removal fromthe class embraced within the
descriptive term"non-Christian," as that termis used in the Philippine statute-
book, is that degree of civilization which results in a mode of life within the
tribe, such that it is feasible and practicable to extend to, and enforce upon its
membership the general laws and regulations, administrative, legislative, and
judicial, which control the conduct of the admittedly civilized inhabitants of the
Islands; a mode of life, furthermore, which does not find expression in tribal
customs or practices which tend to brutalize or debauch the members of the
tribe indulging in such customs or practices, or to expose to loss or peril the
lives or property of those who may be brought in contact with the members of
the tribe.
- So the standard of civilization to which any given number or group of
inhabitants of a particular province in these Islands, or any individual member
of such a group must be found to have advanced, in order to remove such
group or individual fromthe class embraced within the statutory description of
"non-Christian," is that degree of civilization which would naturally and normally
result in the withdrawal by such persons of permanent allegiance or adherence
to a "non-Christian" tribe had they at any time adhered to or maintained
allegiance to such a tribe; and which would qualify themwhether they reside
within or beyond the habitat of a "non-Christian" tribe, not only to maintain a
mode of life independent of and apart fromthat maintained by such tribe, but a
mode of life as would not be inimical to the lives or property or general welfare
of the civilized inhabitants of the Islands with whomthey are brought in contact.
- The contention that in this particular case, and without challenging the validity
of the statute, the writ should issue because of the failure to give these
petitioners as well as the rest of the fifteen thousand Manguianes by the
reconcentration order an opportunity to be heard before any attempt was made
to enforce it, begs the question and is, of course, tantamount to a contention
that there is no authority in lawfor the issuance of such an order.
MOIR
- I realize that a dissenting opinion carries little weight, but my sense of justice
will not permit me to let this decision go on record without expressing my
strong dissent fromthe opinion of Justice Malcolm, concurred in by a majority
of the court. I shall not attempt to analyze the opinion or to go into the
questions in detail. I shall simply state, as briefly as may be the legal and
human side of the case as it presents itself to my mind.
- The Manguianes are not a separate state. They have no treaty with the
Government of the Philippine Islands by which they have agreed to live within a
certain district where they are accorded exclusive rights. They are citizens of
the Philippine Islands. Legally they are Filipinos. They are entitled to all the
rights and privileges of any other citizen of this country. And when the
provincial governor of the Province of Mindoro attempted to take themfrom
their native habitat and to hold them on the little reservation of about 800
hectares, he deprived themof their rights and their liberty without due process
of law, and they were denied the equal protection of the law. The majority
opinion says "they are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines." They are to be made to accept the civilization of the more
advanced Filipinos whether they want it or not. They are backward and
deficient in culture and must be moved fromtheir homes, however humble they
may be and "brought under the bells" and made to stay on a reservation. Are
these petitioners charged with any crime? There is no mention in the return of
the Solicitor-General of the Philippine Islands of any crime having been
committed by these "peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people."
- It has been said that this is a government of laws and not of men; that there is
no arbitrary body of individuals; that the constitutional principles upon which
our government and its institutions rest do not leave roomfor the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power, but that all in authority are
guided and limited by these provisions which the people have, through the
organic law, declared shall be the measure and scope of all control exercised
over them. In particular the fourteenth amendment, and especially the equal
protection clause, thereof, forbids that the individual shall be subjected to any
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government; it was intended to prohibit, and
does prohibit, any arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of
property.
- As we have seen, a statute which makes a purely arbitrary or unreasonable
classification, or which singles out any particular individual or class as the
subject of hostile and discriminating legislation, is clearly unconstitutional as
being opposed to the fourteenth amendment and especially to the equal
protection clause thereof. This is a plain case, and requires no further
discussion." (Vol. 4, Encyclopedia of U. S. Supreme Court Reports, p. 366.)
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government,
the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and reviewthe history of
their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to
leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power.
Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is the author and source
of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the
agencies of government, sovereignty itself remain with the people by whom
and for whomall government exists and acts. And the lawis the definition and
limitation of power. It is, indeed, quite true, that there must always be lodged
somewhere, and in some person or body, the authority of final decision; and, in
many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political, no
appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised
either in the pressure of opinion or by means of the suffrage. But the
fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as
individual possessions, are secured by those maxims of constitutional law
which are the monuments showing the victorious progress of the race in
securing to men the blessings of civilization under the reign of just and equal
laws, so that, in the famous language of Massachusetts Bill of Rights, the
Government of Commonwealth may be a government of lawand not of men.
For the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or themeans
of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will
of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedomprevails, as
being the essence of slavery itself." (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 374.)
- It is said that the present lawis an old Act being in substance Act No. 547 of
the Philippine Commission. But it has never been brought before this court for
determination of its constitutionality. No matter howbeneficient the motives of
the lawmakers if the lawtends to deprive any man of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, it is void. In my opinion the acts complained of
which were taken in conformity with section 2145 of the Administrative Code
not only deprive these Manguianes of their liberty, without due process of law,
but will in all probability deprive themof their life, without due process of law.
History teaches that to take a semi-nomadic tribe fromtheir native fastnesses
and to transfer themto the narrowconfines of a reservation is to invite disease
and suffering and death.
- Frommy long experience in the Islands, I should say that it would be a crime
of little less magnitude to take the Ifugaos fromtheir mountain homes where
they have reclaimed a wilderness and made it a land of beauty and fruitfulness
and to transfer themto the more fertile, unoccupied, malaria infested valleys
which they look down upon from their fields-than it would be to order their
decapitation en masse. There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-
Christians," or "wild tribes" and are in exactly the same category as the
Manguianes. If the Manguianes may be so taken fromtheir native habitat and
reconcentrated on a reservation-in effect an open air jail-then so may the
Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who have made more progress than the
Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
- There are "non-Christian" in nearly every province in the Philippine Islands.
All of the thirty-nine governors upon the prior approval of the head of the
department have the power under this lawto take the non-Christian inhabitants
of their different provinces fromtheir homes and put themon a reservation for
"their own good and the general good of the Philippines," and the courts will
grant themno relief. These unfortunate citizens of the Philippine Islands would
hold their liberty, and their lives, may be subject to the unregulated discretion of
the provincial governor. And who would be safe? After the reservation is once
established might not a provincial governor decide that some political enemy
was a non-Christian, and that he would be safer on the reservation. No matter
what his education and culture, he could have no trial, he could make no
defense, the judge of the court might be in a distant province and not within
reach, andthe provincial governors fiat is final.
- There can be no denial that the Ifugaos are "non-Christians," or "wild tribes"
and are in exactly the same category as the Manguianes. If the Manguianes
may be so taken fromtheir native habitat and reconcentratedon a reservation-
in effect an open air jail-then so may the Ifugaos, so may the Tinguianes, who
have made more progress than the Ifugaos, and so may the Moros.
- I think this Court should declare that sections 2145 and 2759 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are unconstitutional, null and void, and that the
petitioners are illegally restrained of their liberty, and that they have been
denied the equal protection of the laws, and order the respondents immediately
to liberate all of the petitioners.
PIT-OGV PEOPLE
FERNAN; October 11, 1990
FACTS
- Appeal fromthe decision of the Court of Appeals
- There was a communal land in Laog, Mainit, Mt. Province called the tayan. It
was owned by the tomayan group whose members were descendants of the
original owners thereof named Jakot and Pang-o. One of their descendants,
Pel-ey Cullalad, was requested by the tomayan to act in their behalf in selling
the 400-sqmresidential portion of the tayan, in order that the tomayan would
have something to butcher and eat during a celebration called ato. The sale
was made in consideration of P1,500 and was made in favor of Edward
Pasiteng, whose house had been built thereon. It was agreed that the
unregistered property would be registered under Sec. 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Besides Cullalad, several
members of the tomayan affixed their signatures or thumb marks on the
notarized deed of sale. Thereafter, Pasiteng declared the property as his own
for taxation purposes and paid taxes thereon.
- In 1983, while Pasiteng was out hunting, Erkey Pit-og (aka Mary Pit-og) and
her companions destroyed the fence erected by Pasiteng and cut down and
took away the sugarcane worth P1,000 and the banana fruits valued at P100
found in the area. Pasitengreported the matter to the police. Three days later,
the police filed a complaint for theft against Erkey Pit-og in the Municipal Trial
Court of Bontoc.
- Pit-og pleaded not guilty of theft on the ground that the tayan belonged to her,
her father Lobchoken being a descendant Jakot. She did not declare the land
for taxation purposes because no one in the tomayan was allowed to declare
the land as his own. However, any member of the tomayan could make
improvements on the land and claimthemas his own. Anyone who abandoned
the land would be succeeded only by other members. No person outside the
tomayan could succeed to the cultivation of thetayan.
- Lobchoken, planted sugarcane in the tayan in Loag and when he died, his
widowPidchoy and their children continued cultivating the land. They also built
a granary thereon. The land was later given to Pit-og by Pidchoy for
cultivation. Thereafter, the family allowed Pasiteng to build a house behind the
place where Pit-og and her family used to have a house becauseEdward was
Erkeys uncle being the brother of her father. Erkey planted the bananas and
avocado trees in the area and harvested the sugarcane. No one had ever
prevented her fromcutting the sugarcane and the other plants.
The municipal trial court discredited Pit-ogs story emphasizing that her claim
of continuous occupation and possession of the land was baseless as she had
"no papers to show" or prove such claim. It found that an the elements of theft
under Article 308 of the RPC were present and accordingly rendered the
judgment of conviction.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower courts
with the following findings and observations:
- Pasitengs claimof ownership is documented by a Deed of Conveyance, a
public document which was executed between himand the members of the
tomayan group. The validity of this public document has never been
questioned by any one of the previous owners belonging to the tomayan group.
Furthermore, the tax declarations in the name of and the realty tax payments
by, Pasiteng, although not conclusive proofs of ownership, are, nevertheless,
prima facie evidence of his possession of the land in question. In contrast to
these documentary evidence, petitioner offers nothing better than her bare
claim. The personal property taken by accused-petitioner not being hers but
those of Pasiteng, and she gained fromthe taking thereof without the consent
of the owner, accused-petitioner is guilty of the crime of theft.
ISSUES
1. WONPit-og had criminal intent in taking the sugarcane and the bananas.
2. WONthe present case is criminal or civil in nature.
HELD
1. Erkey Pit-og could not have had criminal intent because she took the
sugarcane and bananas believing themto be her own.
- Edward Pasiteng relied heavily on his documentary evidence to prove
ownership over the sugarcane and bananas. A careful study of these
documents, in conjunction with the testimonial evidence extant in the record,
however, discloses matters which put a cloud of doubt upon Pit-ogs culpability.
The deed of sale describes the property as containing an area of 400 sqm,
while the tax declarations showthat the property contains an area of 512sqm.
The testimonies presented by the prosecution and the defense showthat the
areas cultivated by Pasiteng and Pit-og were adjacent and so close to each
other that the possibility of confusion as to who planted which plants is not
remote. In fact, before the filing of this case, Pit-og had sued Pasitengs son,
Donato, who allegedly cut down bananas she had planted in the area. The fact
that Edward had built a fence around the area he claimed as his does not
necessarily prove that he enclosed only the 400 square meters he had
purchased fromthetomayan. After all, he had declared as his own for taxation
purposes 112 square meters more than the area he bought.
- There is on record a survey plan of the 512 square-meter area claimed by
Edward but there are no indications therein of the exact area involved in this
case. Proof on the matter, however, is important for it means the Identification
of the rightful owner of the stolen properties. It should be emphasized that to
prove the crime of theft, it is necessary and indispensable to clearly Identify the
person who, as a result of a criminal act, without his knowledge and consent,
was wrongfully deprived of a thing belonging to him.
2. The legal issues that must be ironed out with regard to claims of ownership
over the tayan should be threshed out in an appropriate civil action.
- Obiter dicta related to Article II Section22 re Indigenous Community
- We see this case as exemplifying a clash between a claimof ownership
founded on customs and tradition and another such claimsupported by written
evidence but nonetheless based on the same customs and tradition. when a
court is beset with this kind of case, it can never be too careful More so in this
case, where the accused, an illiterate tribeswoman who cannot be expected to
resort to written evidence of ownership, stands to lose her liberty on account of
an oversight in the courts appreciation of the evidence.
Disposition Erkey Pit-og is ACQUITTEDfor lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt that she committed the crime of theft. No costs.
KILOSBAYAN, INC V MORATO
MENDOZA; November 16, 1995
FACTS
- Petitioners seek reconsideration of our decision in this case
Petitioners contend that the decision in the first case has already settled
(1) whether petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc. has a standing to sue and
(2) whether under its charter (R.A. No. 1169, as amended) the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office can enter into any form of association or
collaboration with any party in operating an on-line lottery, and these
questions can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners argue that the two justices who changed their votes did not act
according to lawand that the two newappointees regardless of the merits of
the case must of necessity align themselves with all the Ramos appointees
who were dissenters in the first case and constitute the new majority in the
secondlotto case.
- SC said the decision in the first case was a split decision: 7-6. With the
retirement of one of the original majority (Cruz, J.) and one of the dissenters
(Bidin, J.) it was not surprising that the first decision in the first case was later
reversed.
- SCcited the case of Feliciano v. Aquinas (also a split decision) which was
overturned in People v. Yang.
ISSUES
1. WONthe constitutional policies and principles (Art II Sec 5 ,Sec 12, Sec 13,
Sec 17) invoked by the petitioners may be resorted to for striking down laws or
official actions which are inconsistent with them
2. WONthe petitioners have standing to sue on constitutional grounds, given
that the Constitution guarantees to peoples organizations effective and
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision
making (Art XIII Sec 16).
3. WON, as settled in the first case, the PCSO under its charter (R.A. No.
1169, as amended) cannot enter into any formof association or collaboration
with any party inoperating an on-line lottery.
HELD
1. NO. As already stated, however, these provisions are not self-executing.
They do not confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide
guidelines for legislative or executive action. By authorizing the holding of
lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that consistently with
these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSOmay be given this
authority. That is why we said with respect to the opening by the PAGCORof a
casino in Cagayan de Oro, "the morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit." (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA255, 268
[1994]).
2. NO. It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law
allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the PCSOand the PGMC
which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise issues of
constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to
the agreement, cannot raise.
- Kilosbayans status as a peoples organization does not give it the requisite
personality to question the validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution
provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent peoples
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall
not be abridged." (Art. XIII, 15-16)
- These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional
questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5.
This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what
differentiates decision-making in the courts fromdecision-making in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party.
- Petitioners right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained because this case
does not involve illegal disbursement of public funds. Nor as concerned
citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by themis
alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of Congress, their right to sue
as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any
infringement of their rights as legislators.
3. Indeed in the first case it was held that the PCSOunder its charter (R.A. No.
1169, as amended) cannot enter into any formof association or collaboration
with any party in operating an on-line lottery HOWEVER THE QUESTIONS
RAISED IN THIS CASE ARE LEGAL QUESTIONS AND THE CLAIMS
INVOLVED ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROMTHOSE INVOLVED
IN THE PRIOR CASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. AS ALREADY STATED,
THE ELA IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE CONTRACT OF
LEASEDECLAREDVOIDINTHEFIRST CASE.
Also, the Court noted in its decision that the provisions of the first contract,
which were considered to be features of a joint venture agreement, had been
removed in the newcontract.
VALMONTE V BELMONTE, JR
CORTES; February 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioners are media practitioners who wish to confirmreports that certain
members of the Batasang Pambansa, including some members of the
opposition, were granted clean loans from the GSIS before the February
1986 elections. Petitioner Valmonte filed a special civil action for mandamus
with preliminary injunction, praying that respondent Belmonte, in his capacity
as GSISGeneral Manager, be directed to:
1. Furnish petitioners with a list of the names of the members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure clean loans fromthe GSIS
immediately prior to the February 7, 1986 elections through the intercession of
then-First Lady Imelda Marcos.
2. Furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing
said loans.
3. Allowpetitioners access to public records for the subject information.
ISSUES
Procedural: Have petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies?
Substantive:
1. Does the information sought by petitioners fall under matters of public
concern?
2. Does a confidential relationship exist between GSISand its borrowers?
3. Are loan transactions of the GSIS, being merely incidental to its insurance
function, private in nature?
HELD
Procedural: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of lawis
involved. The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of
the scope of the constitutional right to information, can be passed upon by the
court more competently than GSISor its Board of Trustees.
Substantive:
1. Yes. The public nature of GSIS funds and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern.
2. No. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and
not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. The right cannot be
invoked by juridical entities, as a corporation has no right to privacy in its name.
The entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for
relief. However, even the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if
they chose to invoke this right. Public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public
scrutiny.
3. No. The constituent-ministrant dichotomy characterizing government
function has long been repudiated. The government, whether carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function
of service to the people. That the GSISwas exercising a proprietary function in
granting the loans would not justify the exclusion of the transactions fromthe
coverage and scope of the right to information. Transactions entered into by
the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation,
are within the ambit of the peoples right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
Petitions are entitled to access to the documents subject to reasonable
regulations. The petition is held to be meritorious as to the 2
nd
and 3
rd
alternative acts sought by petitioners.
The same cannot be said, however, of the 1
st
act sought. Although
citizens are entitled to access to official records, the Constitution does
not accord thema right to compel custodians of public records to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern. It is essential for a writ of
mandamus to lie that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of the
defendant to performthe act required.
CHAVEZ V PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
PANGANIBAN; December 9, 1998
FACTS
- These are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to
prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately
entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos x x x relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or
abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard; and (2) to compel
respondentsto make publicall negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
agreement between the PCGGand the Marcos heirs.
- Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, former solicitor general, brought this action in
response to news reports in September 1997 referring to (1) the alleged
discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded
accounts in Swiss banks, and (2) the reported execution of a compromise
between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to
split or share these assets. Actingon a motion of petitioner, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order dated March 23, 1998, enjoining respondents, their
agents and/or representatives from entering into, or perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos relating to and concerning their ill-gotten wealth. On August 19, 1998,
Gloria, Celnan, Scarlet and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed before the Court
a motion for intervention. They aver that they are among the 10,000 claimants
whose right to claim from the Marcos family and/or the Marcos estate is
recognized by the decision inIn re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos.
ISSUES
Procedural:
1. WONthe petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant
petition; and
2. WONthis Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.
Substantive:
1. WON this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the
details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses; and
2. WON there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement
between the Marcoses and the PCGG relative to the Marcoses ill-gotten
wealth.
HELD
Procedural:
1. Yes. When the issue concerns a public right and the object of mandamus is
to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a
citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action.
2. Yes. Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. The argument of respondent
that petitioner should have properly sought relief before the Sandiganbayan in
which enforcement of the compromise agreements was pending resolution
seems to have merit, if petitioner was merely seeking to enjoin the
enforcement of the compromise and/or to compel the PCGG to disclose to the
public the terms contained in said Agreements. However, petitioner is here
seeking the public disclosure of all negotiations and agreement, be they
ongoing or perfected, and documents related or relating to such negotiations
and agreement between the PCGGand the Marcos heirs. In other words, the
petition is not merely confined to the Agreements that have already been
drawn, but likewise to any other ongoing or future undertaking towards any
settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. The core issue boils down to the precise
interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional provisions on
public transactions.
Substantive:
1. Yes. There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten
wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. Ill-gotten
wealth, by its very nature, assumes a public character. The assets and
properties referred to supposedly originated fromthe government itself. To all
intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. Considering the
intent of the framers of the Constitution that transactions contemplates
inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of a transaction, it is
incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth.
2. Yes. A cursory perusal of the General and Supplemental Agreements
between thePCGGand the Marcos heirs reveals serious legal flaws.
i) While a compromise in civil suits is expressly authorized by law, there is no
similar general sanction as regards criminal liability. The authority must be
specifically conferred. In the present case, the power to grant criminal
immunity was conferred on PCGGby Section 5 of EONo. 14 as amended by
EONo. 14-A. However, the Agreements do not conformto the requirements of
EONos. 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcoses,
who are the principal defendants in the spate of ill-gotten wealth cases now
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The provision is applicable mainly to
witnesses who provide information or testify against a respondent, defendant
or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.
ii) Under ItemNo. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGGcommits to exempt
fromall forms of taxes the property to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is
a clear violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to grant tax
exemptions is vested in Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local
legislative bodies. The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten
wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts the law exempting the
Marcoses frompaying taxes on their properties, such lawwill definitely not
pass the test of the equal protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special
grant of exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class
legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that taxation shall be
uniformand equitable.
iii) The government binds itself under the General Agreement to cause the
dismissal of all cases against the Marcos heirs, pending before the
Sandiganbayan and other courts. This is a direct encroachment on judicial
powers, particularly in regard to criminal jurisdiction. Well settled is the doctrine
that once a case has been filed before a court of competent jurisdiction, the
matter of its dismissal or pursuance lies within the full discretion and control of
the judge. Jurisdiction, once acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite a
resolution, even by the justice secretary, to withdraw the information or to
dismiss the complaint. Thus, the PCGGcannot guarantee the dismissal of all
such criminal cases against the Marcoses pending in the courts, for said
dismissal is not within its sole power and discretion.
iv) The government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether past,
present, or future, matured or inchoate, against the Marcoses. This all-
encompassing stipulation is contrary to law. Under the Civil Code, an action for
future fraud may not be waived. This is a palpable violation of the due process
and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. It effectively ensconces
the Marcoses beyond the reach of the law.
v) The Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable period within
which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations. It may take a lifetime
before the Marcosessubmit an inventory of their total assets.
vi) The Agreements do not state with specificity the standards for determining
which assets shall be forfeited by the government and which shall be retained
by the Marcoses. While the Supplemental Agreement provides that the
Marcoses shall be entitled to 25 per cent of the $356 million Swiss deposits
(less government recovery expenses), such sharing arrangement pertains only
to the said deposit. No similar splitting scheme is defined with respect to the
other properties. Neither is there, anywhere in the Agreements, a statement of
the basis for the 25-75 percent sharing ratio.
vii) The absence of then-President Fidel Ramos approval of the principal
Agreement, an express condition therein, renders the compromise incomplete
and unenforceable. Nevertheless, even if such approval were obtained, the
Agreements would still not be valid.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; May 19, 1999
FACTS
Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Irene Marcos-
Araneta filed before the court a motion for leave to intervene and a motion for
partial reconsideration, alleging that they were parties and signatories to the
General and Supplemental Agreements which this Court declared NULL AND
VOID for being contrary to law and the Consitution. They claimto have a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties
or an interest against both as to warrant their intervention. They add that their
exclusion fromthe instant case resulted in a denial of their constitutional rights
to due process and to equal protection. They also the raise the principle of
hierarchical administration of justice to impugn the Courts cognizance of
petitioners direct action before it.
ISSUES
Procedural:
WONthe Motion for Leave to Intervene should be allowed.
Substantive:
1. WON the exclusion of the movants from the proceedings regarding the
Agreements to which they were parties and signatories was a denial of their
property right to contract without due process of law;
2. WONthe Court violated the principle of hierarchical administration of justice
by ruling upon the validity of the Agreements;
3. WONthe issue of right to information raised by petitioner was rendered moot
and academic by the submission by the movants of the Motion for Approval of
Compromise Agreements to the Sandiganbayan;
4. WONthere was ratification of the Agreements by partial implementation; and
5. WON the issue raised by petitioner presented an actual case and a
justiciable question.
HELD
Procedural:
No. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, provides that a motion to
intervene should be filed before rendition of judgment. Intervention can no
longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.
Substantive:
1. No. Acontract that violates the Constitution and the lawis null and void ab
initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. In legal terms, the
movants have really no interest to protect or right to assert in this proceeding.
Moreover, the movants are merely incidental, not indispensable, parties to the
instant case. The petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to enforce a
constitutional right against the PCGGand to determine whether the latter has
been acting within the bounds of its authority.
2. No. The principle of hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases
involving factual questions, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions
concerning public interest, the Court resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction
on the matter.
3. No. The Chavez petition was not confined to the concluded terms contained
in the Agreements, but likewise concerned other ongoing and future
negotiations and agreements, perfected or not. It was therefore not rendered
moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.
4. No. The PCGGs grant to the claimants mother of access rights to one of
their sequestered properties cannot ratify the Agreements. Being null and void,
theyare not subject to ratification.
5. Yes. Mandamus, over which this Court has original jurisdiction, is a proper
recourse for a citizen to enforce a public right. There is no political question
involved. The power and authority of the PCGGto compromise isnot the issue.
But, clearly, by violating the Constitution and the laws, the PCGG gravely
abused its discretion.
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN) V
ZAMORA
BUENA; October 10, 2000
FACTS
- This is a consolidation of 5 petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
Visiting Forces Agreement. (Trivia: Si Prof Te ang counsel para sa ibang
petitioners)
- March 14, 1947The Philippines and USAforged a Military Bases
Agreement, formalizing, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine
territory by USmilitary personnel.
- August 30, 1951The Philippines and USAentered into a Mutual Defense
Treaty. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.
- 1991- RP-USMilitary Base Agreement expired. Senate rejected proposed
RP-USTreaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security. (Goodbyebut Mutual
Defense Treaty still in effect.)
- February 10, 1998President Ramos approved Visiting Forces Agreement,
after a series of conferences and negotiations.
- October 5, 1998President Estrada, through Secretary of Foreign affairs,
ratified VFA.
- May 27, 1999- Senate passed Resolution No. 18, concurring with the
ratification of the VFA. (Who concurred: Fernan, Ople, Drilon, Biazon, Tatad,
Cayetano, Aquino-Oreta, Barbers, Jaworski, Magsaysay Jr, Osmea, Flavier,
Defensor-Santiago, Ponce-Enrile, Sotto, Revilla, Coseteng, Honasan.
Total=17. Who rejected: Guingona, Roco, Osmea III, Pimentel, Legarda-
Leviste. Total=5)
- The VFAprovides for the mechanismfor regulating circumstances and
conditions under which USArmed Forces and defense personnel may be
present in the Philippines. The VFAis an agreement which defines treatment of
UStroops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It also defines the rights of the
USand the Phil government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of
vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies.
ISSUES
1. WONthe petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA.
2. WONthe VFAis governed by the provisions of Sec 21, Article VII
(concurrence of 2/3 of the members of the Senate) or Sec 25 Art XVIII of the
Constitution(foreign military bases, troops, or facilities not allowed in the Phils
except under a treaty duly concurred in by Senate, and when Congress
requires, ratification by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national
referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State)
3. WONVFAconstitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty.
a. WONthe Philippine Courts will be deprived of their jurisdiction to hear
and try offenses committed by the USMilitary personnel.
b. WONthe Supreme Court will be deprived of its jurisdiction over
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the
Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA?
5. WONthe VFAviolates Sec 1 Article III (equal protection clause), Sec 8
Article II (prohibition against nuclear weapons), and Sec 28(4) Article VI
(taxation) of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD
1. No (and Yes). As taxpayers, petitioners have NOlegal standing as there are
no public funds raised by taxation in the case. Also, petitioner-legislators do not
possess the requisitelocus standi as there is absence of clear showing of any
direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong.
HOWEVER, the issues raised in the petitions are of paramount importance and
of constitutional significance. It is of TRANSCENDENTAL importance, so the
Court brushes aside procedural barriers and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. It is governed byBOTHprovisions. Section 25 Article XVIII applies as it
specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities. (The or is important to take note as it signifies independence of one
thing fromthe others. Thus, it can just be an agreement covering only troops
not baseslike the VFA. Also, Section 25 Article XVIII makes no distinction
whether the troops or facilities will be transient or permanent, so the VFAis
covered by this provision). On the other hand, Section 21 Article VII find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining
the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate
(Sec 21 Art VII requires 2/3 of the members of the Senate, while Sec 25 Art
XVIII just says duly concurred in by the Senate with no specified number).
- Were the requirements of Section 25 Art XVIII complied with?
Section 25 Art XVIII requires the following conditions:
a) it must be under a treaty. -- Complied with. We treat VFAas a
treaty.
b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and so
required by the Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the
people in a national referendum. -- Complied with. 17 of 23 Senators
concurred(Senator Gloria Arroyo was elected VP). Requirement of
ratification in a national referendumunnecessary since Congress has not
required it.
c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State (US).--
Complied with. Ambassador Hubbards letter states that the VFAis
binding on the USgovt and that in international legal terms such
agreement is a treaty.
- Atreaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Lawof Treaties, is an
international instrument concluded between States in written formand
governed by the international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or
in two or more related instruments.
- In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
3. Section 2 Article II of the Constitution declares that the xxx Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international lawas part of the law
of the land xxx (this doesnt really answer the issue above, but the ponente
didnt really discuss ananswer WONthe VFAis an abdication of sovereignty..
oh wellhere goes)
- With the ratification of the VFA, it becomes obligatory and incumbent on our
part to be bound by the terms of the agreement. As a member of the family of
nations, the Philippinesagrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the
conduct of its international relations. We cannot readily plead the Constitution
as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and
responsibilities under international law.
- Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the
International LawCommision 1949 provides that every state has a duty to
carry out in good faith its obligations. Article 26 of the Convention: pacta sunt
servanda.
4. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the President, and of the
Senate in ratifying/concurring with the VFA?No.
- Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, whenthe power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despostic manner.
- The Constitution vests the power to enter into treaties or
International agreements in the President, subject only to the concurrence of
the members of Senate. The negotiation of the VFAand the ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts of the the President, in the lawful exercise of his
vast executive and diplomatic powers granted by the Constitution.
- As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with
the Senate alone. Thus once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its
prerogative within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution, the
concurrence cannot be viewed to constitute an abuse of power.
Decision Petitions Dismissed
11 concurring, 3 dissenting, 1 take no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO [dissent]
- Most significant issue is whether the VFAviolates Sec 25 Art XVIII of the
Constitution(see requirements above).
- POINT 1: Respondents claimthat the requirements do not apply as the VFA
contemplates a temporary visit of the troops, while the provision applies to a
permanent presence of foreign troops.
The said temporary nature of the VFAcannot stand. Neither the VFAnor the
Mutual Defense Treaty between RPand USprovides the slightest suggestion
on the duration of the visits. VFAdoes not provide for a specific and limited
period of effectivity.
- POINT 2: The requirement that it be recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state is crystal clear and was put there by the framers inorder not
to repeat the anomalous asymmetry of the 1947 Military bases agreement
where we recognized it as a treaty but the UStreated it as an executive
agreement.
- The VFAis equivalent to a sole executive agreement in the US. The Court will
be standing onunstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the
VFAon the same constitutional plateau as a treaty, as there are still questions
on the constitutional basis and legal effects of sole executive agreements
under the USlaw.
- With the cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole
executive agreements under the USconstitutional law, this Court must strike a
blowfor the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright line between the
dignity and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole executive agreement.
However we may wish it, The VFAas a sole executive agreement cannot climb
to the same lofty height that the dignity of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it
falls short of the requirement set by Sec 25 Art XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Phil soil
must be recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state. I vote to grant
the petitions.
KILOSBAYAN, INC. VGUINGONA, JR.
DAVIDE; May 5, 1994
FACTS
Nature: Special civil action for prohibition and injunction, praying for a TRO
and preliminary injunction, to prohibit and restrain implementation of "Contract
of Lease" between PCSOand PGMCin connection with on-line lottery system
a.k.a. "lotto".
1. Pursuant to Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), PCSO decided to
establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its
revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before
March 1993, after learning that PCSOwas interested inoperating an on-
line lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company in
Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to
PCSO and organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC).
2. Before August 1993, PCSO finally formally issued a Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the Lease of Contract of an on-line lottery systemfor
PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement in the RFP("Lessor shall
be a domestic corporation, with at least 60%of its shares owned by
Filipino shareholders"), PGMCclaims that Berjaya Group undertook to
reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40%, by selling 35%out of the
original 75%foreign stockholdings to local investors.
3. Aug. 15, 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to PCSO. The bids were
evaluated by the Special Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards committee
(SPBAC) for the on-line lottery and its Bid Report was thereafter
submitted to the Office of the President. (This was preceded by
complaints fromthe Committes Chairperson, Dr. Mita Pardo de Tavera.)
4. Oct. 21, 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given
PGMC the go-signal to operate the countrs on-line lottery system.
Announcement was published in Manila Times, PDI, and Manila
Standard on Oct. 29.
5. Nov. 4, 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos
strongly opposing the setting up of an on-line lotttery system on the
basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. KILOSBAYAN
reiterated its vigorous opposition to lotto at the meeting of the
Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on Nov. 12, 1993
6. Nov. 19, 1993, the media announced that despite the opposition,
Malacanang will push through with operation of lotto, that it is actually
PCSO which will operate the lottery while winning corporate bidders
merely lessors.
7. Dec. 1, 1993, KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents
pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., who informed KILOSBAYANthat the documents will be
transmitted before the end of the month. However on the same date, an
agreement denominated as Contract of Lease was finally executed by
PCSOand PGMC.
8. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and
the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only
a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and the imminent
implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994,
KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this
petition.
PETITIONERS CLAIM
- Petitioners claimthat PCSOcannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of
Lease with the PGMCbecause it is an arrangement wherein the PCSOwould
hold and conduct the on-line lottery systemin "collaboration" or "association"
with the PGMC, in violation of Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSOfromholding and conducting charity
sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities "in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity,
foreign or domestic." And that there are terms and conditions of the Contract
"showing that respondent PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not
respondent PCSO."
- The petitioners also point out that the Contract of Lease requires or
authorizes PGMCto establish a telecommunications network that will connect
all the municipalities and cities in the territory. However, PGMCcannot do that
because it has no franchise fromCongress to construct, install, establish, or
operate the network pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3846, as amended.
- Moreover, PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and
cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, since "the subscribed
foreign capital" of the PGMC"comes to about 75%, as shown by paragraph
EIGHT of its Articles of Incorporation," it cannot lawfully enter into the contract
in question because all forms of gambling and lottery is one of themare
included in the so-called foreign investments negative list under the Foreign
Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) where only up to 40% foreign capital is
allowed.
- Finally, the petitioners insist that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMCdo not
authorize it to establish and operate an on-line lottery and telecommunications
systems.
RESPONDENTS COMMENTS
- Private respondent PGMC asserts that "(1) [it] is merely an independent
contractor for a piece of work and (2) as such independent contractor, PGMC
is not a co-operator of the lottery franchise with PCSO, nor is PCSOsharing its
franchise, in collaboration, association or joint venture with PGM.
- Finally, it states that the execution and implementation of the contract does
not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of the
lottery franchise granted to the PCSOis political and not judicial or legal, which
should be ventilated in another forum; and that the "petitioners do not appear to
have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining
the reliefs sought."
- Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary
Renato Corona, and the PCSOmaintain that the contract of lease in question
does not violate Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and
that the petitioners interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or
joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of
logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with
the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or
contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and
objectives." What the PCSOcharter "seeks to prohibit is that arrangement akin
to a "joint venture" or partnership where there is "community of interest in the
business, sharing of profits and losses, and a mutual right of control," a
characteristic which does not obtain in a contract of lease." They further claim
that the establishment of the telecommunications system stipulated in the
Contract of Lease does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC
will not operate a public utility
- They also argue that the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act
of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMCauthorize it to enter into the
Contract of Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of
acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial review."
Finally, they allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the
instant suit.
ISSUES
Procedural: WONthe petitioners have locus standi.
Substantive: WONthe Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of RA1169
as amended by BP Blg. 42, which prohibits PCSO from holding and
conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association, or joint venture with any
person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
HELD
1. The preliminary issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed,
be resolved in their favor. Apartys standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in viewof
the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
- The Court found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to
the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays
of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the
envisioned on-line lottery systemare as staggering as the billions in pesos it is
expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves
recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take
advantage of
2. Contract of Lease is void for being contrary to law. PGMC is not only a
Lessor, PCSO in the least will be conducting lotteries in collaboration or
association and in the most in joint vernture with PGMC. The manegerial and
technical expertise of PGMCare indespensible to the operation of the on-line
lottery system, whereas PCSOonly has its franchise to offer.
- By the exception explicitly made in paragraph B, Section 1 of its charter, the
PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration,
association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such
franchise.
- It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to individuals or
corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken
most strongly against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege
in derogation of the common rights of the public must prove his title thereto by
a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot enlarge it by
equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not
unequivocally granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication."
- Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is
merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the
title or designationof the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be
gathered fromthe provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima
scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
- A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a
consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC
indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under
which the PGMCis merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but
one where the statutorily proscribedcollaborationor association, in the least, or
joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties.
(Collaboration is defined as the acts of working together in a joint project.
Association means the act of a number of persons in uniting together for
some special purpose or business. Joint ventureis defined as an association
of persons or companies jointly undertaking some commercial enterprise;
generally all contribute assets and share risks. )
- The contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and the PGMC reveal that the
PCSOhad neither funds of its own nor the expertise to operate and manage an
on-line lottery system, and that although it wished to have the system, it would
have it "at no expense or risks to the government." Because of these serious
constraints and unwillingness to bear expenses and assume risks, the PCSO
was candid enough to state in its RFP that it is seeking for "a suitable
contractor which shall build, at its own expense, all the facilities needed to
operate and maintain" the system; exclusively bear "all capital, operating
expenses and expansion expenses and risks."
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [concurring]
- PGMCis plainly a partner of PCSOin violation of the law no matter howthe
assistance is called or the contract denominated.
PADILLA[concurring]
- Contract of Lease between PCSOand PGMCis a joint venture because each
part contributes its share in the enterprise project. PGMC contributes the
facilities, technology and expertise, while PCSOcontributes the market through
the dealers and in the totality the mass of Filipino gambling elements. PGMC
will get its 4.9%of gross receipts; the residue of the whole exercise will go to
PCSO, this is a joint venture plain and simple.
MELO[dissenting]
- This case does not involve a challenge on the validity of a statute nor an
attempt to restrain expenditure of public funds. The contract involves strictly
corporate money.
- By considering this case as a taxpayers suit could not cure the lack of locus
standi on the part of the petitioners. The contract does not involve an illegal
disbursement of public funds. No public fund raised by taxation is involved.
PUNO [dissenting]
- Courts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor
are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming a grievance.
- It is clear that the requirement of locus standi has not been jettisoned by the
Constitution for it still commands courts in no uncertain terms to settle only
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable/
- Rationale for the standard of locus standi is to assure a vigorous adversary
presentation of the case, and perhaps more importantly to warrant the
judiciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected
organ of government.
KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET AL. VS. MORATO
MENDOZA; July 17, 1995
FACTS
- As a result of our decision in G.R. No. 113375 (Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA110 (1994) invalidating the Contract of Lease between
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming
Management Corp. (PGMC) on the ground that it had been made in violation of
the charter of the PCSO, the parties entered into negotiations for a new
agreement that would be "consistent with the latters [PCSO] charter . . . and
conformable to this Honorable Courts aforesaid Decision."
- On January 25, 1195 the parties signed an Equipment Lease Agreement
(thereafter called ELA) whereby the PGMC leased on-line lottery equipment
and accessories to the PCSOin consideration of a rental equivalent to 4.3 %of
the gross amount of ticket sale derived by the PCSOfromthe operation of the
lottery which in no case shall be less than an annual rental computed at
P35,000.00 per terminal in Commercial Operation. The rental is to be
computed and paid bi-weekly. In the event the bi-weekly rentals in any year fall
short of the annual minimumfixed rental thus computed, the PCSOagrees to
pay the deficiency out of the proceeds of its current ticket sales. (Pars. 1-2)
Under the law, 30%of the net receipts fromthe sale of tickets is alloted to
charity. (R.A. 1169, (B) )
The term of the leases is eight (8) years, commencing from the start of
commercial operation of the lottery equipment first delivered to the lessee
pursuant to the agreed schedule. (Par. 3)
- In the operation of the lottery, the PCSOis to employ its own personnel. (Par.
5) It is responsible for the loss of, or damage to, the equipment fromany cause
and for the cost of their maintenance and repair. (Pars. 7-8) Upon the
expiration of the leases, the PCSOhas the option to purchase the equipment
for the sumof P25 million.
- Acopy of the ELAwas submitted to the Court by the PGMCin accordance
with its manifestation in the prior case. On February 21, 1995 this suit was filed
seeking to declare the ELA invalid on the ground as the Contract of Leases
nullified in the first case. Petitioners seek the declaration of the amended ELA
as null and void.
- The PCSOand PGMCfiled a separate comments in which they question the
petitioners standing to bring suit. The Kilosbayan, In. is an organization
described in its petition as "composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests,
nuns and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and
national renewal." Its trustees are also suing in their individual and collective
capacities as "taxpayers and concerned citizens." The other petitioners (Sen.
Freddie Webb, Sen. Wigberto Taada and Rep. Joker P. Arroyo) are members
of the Congress suing as such and as "taxpayer and concerned citizens."
- Respondents question the right of petitioners to bring this suit on the ground
that, not being parties to the contract of lease which they seek to nullify, they
have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the
enforcement of the contract. Petitioners on the other hand contend that the
ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing to challenge the validity of
the first contract for the operation of lottery is nowthe "lawof the case". and
therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.
- Petitioners likewise invoke the following Principles and State Policies set forth
in Art. II of the Constitution:
The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
employment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. (5)]
The natural and primary right and duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (12)
The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
promote their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotismand nacionalism, and encourage their
involvement in public and civic affairs.
The state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotismand nationalism, accelerate social progress, and
promote total human liberation and development. (17)
(Memorandumfor Petitioners, p. 7)
ISSUES
1. Does Kilosbayan et. al. have standing to sue?
2. Does the decision in Kilosbayan v. Guingona constitute the lawof the case,
thus precluding respondents fromassailing the legal standing of petitioners?
3. May the provisions under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies be
readily invoked by any person in the absence of Congressional legislation (i.e.,
self-executing)?
HELD
Ratio
1. Aruling in a previous case is binding only insofar as the specific issue in that
case is concerned. Parties may be the same but cases are not.
2. Provisions under the Declaration of Principles and States are not self-
executing.
General Reasoning
- Neither the doctrine of stare decisis nor that of "lawof the case", nor that of
conclusive of judgment poses a barrier to a determination of petitioners right to
maintain this suit.
- Stare decisis is usually the wise policy. But in this case, concern for stability in
decisional lawdoes not call for adherence to what has recently been laid down
as the rule. The previous ruling sustaining petitioners intervention may itself be
considered a departure fromsettled rulings on "real parties in interest" because
no constitutional issues were actually involved. Just five years before that
ruling this Court haddenied standing to a party who, in questioning the validity
of another formof lottery, claimed the right to sue in the capacity of taxpayer,
citizen and member of the Bar. (Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes,
G.R. No. 78716, Sept . 22, 1987) Onlyrecently this Court held that members of
Congress have standing to question the validity of presidential veto on the
ground that, if it true, the illegality of the veto would impair their prerogative as
members of Congress. Conversely if the complaint is not grounded on the
impairment of the powers of Congress, legislators do not have stnding the
question the validity of any law or official action (Philippine Constitution
Association v Enriquez, 235 SCRA506 (1994))
- There is an additional reason for a reexamination of the ruling on standing.
The voting on petitioners standing in the previous case was a narrowone, with
seven (7) members sustaining petitioners standing and six (6) denying
petitioners right to bring the suit. The majority was thus a tenuous one that is
not likely to be maintained in any subsequent litigation. In addition, there have
been changes in the members of the Court, with the retirement of Justices
Cruz and Bidin and the appointment of the writer of this opinion and Justice
Francisco. Given this fact it is hardly tenable to insist on the maintenance of the
ruling as to petitioners standing.
Specific Reasoning
1. NO. The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the
Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will presently be shown, the ELA,
which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially
different fromthe 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSOwith the
PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior case (G.R. No. 113375) that the
petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease
of the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present
suit.
- Not only is petitioners standing a legal issue that may be determined again in
this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, SINCE
STANDING IS A CONCEPT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND HERE NO
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONISACTUALLYINVOLVED.
14
The issue in this
case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning
of Rule 3, 2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action may be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest."
- Noting this distinction, petitioners have not shown that they are the real party
in interest. They have not demonstrated that the Contract entered into by the
PCSOwould directly injure or affect their rights.
2. NO. Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by
the doctrine of "lawof the case." We do not think this doctrine is applicable
considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not
its continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a
second time after a ruling by an appellate court.
- The lawof the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate court,
,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has
been decided. It differs from res judicata in that the conclusive of the first
judgment is not dependent upon its finality. The first judgment is generally, if
not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined
in its questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals,
93 SCRA503, 521 (1979) )
- It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he
parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the ruling there cannot in any sense be
regarded as "the lawof this case." The parties are the same but the cases are
not.
- Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the
related doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment." According to the doctrine, an
issue actually and directly passed upon the and determined in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same
14
COMMENTOFBRYAN_SJ: Thelogicof theCourt inthiscasenowbecomesclearer: The
concept of legal standingisaconstitutional lawconcept whichisINAPPLICABLEINCASES
WHERETHEREARENOCONSTITUTIONALISSUESRAISED. Incaseswherenoconstitutional
issuesareraisedthegoverningprincipleshouldbetheconcept of real partyininterest inthe
Rulesof Court.
parties involving a different of action. (Pealosa v. Tuason , 22 Phil. 303, 313
(1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 (1960))
- It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of
issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. (Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210 , 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER, MISHKIN
AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988)) Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a taxpayer assigned to
his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the
money paid to his wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment
was not part of his taxable income, this determination is not preclusive in a
second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed
of assignment for other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is
decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contract
which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on
collateral estoppel. it was held, "must be confined to situations where the
matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in
the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules
remain unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if
the relevant facts in the two cases are separate even though they may be
similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which
occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an
instrument or transaction identical with but in a formseparable form, the one
dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. .
. ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at 908)
3. NO. These are not, however, self executing provisions, the disregard which
can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
- They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines
for legislation. Thus, while constitutional policies are invoked, this case involves
basically questions of contract law. More specifically, the question is whether
petitioners have legal right which has been violated.
SEPARATE OPINION
FELICIANO [dissent]
- I find myself regretfully quite unable to join the majority opinion written by my
distinguished brother in the Court, Mendoza, J.
- I join the penetrating dissenting opinions written by my esteemed brothers
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ. In respect of the matter of locus standi, I would
also reiterate the concurring opinion I wrote on that subject in the first
Kilosbayan case.1 All the factors which, to my mind, pressed for recognition of
locus standi on the part of petitioners in the first Kilosbayan case, still exist and
demand, with equal weight and insistence, such recognition in the present or
second Kilosbayan case, I fear that the Court may well have occasion in the
future profoundly to regret the doctrinal ball and chain that we have today
clamped on our own limbs.
PADILLA [concur]
- I join the majority in voting for the dismissal of the petition in this case. It is the
duty of the Supreme Court to apply the laws enacted by Congress and
approved by the President, (unless they are violative of the Constitution) even
if such laws run counter to a Members personal conviction that gambling
should be totally prohibited by law.
- In my separate concurring opinion in the first lotto case (G.R. No. 113375),
expressed the view that the rule on locus standi, being merely a procedural
rule, should be relaxed, as the issue then was of paramount national interest
and importance, namely, the legality of a lease contract into by PCSOwith
PGMCwhereby the former sought an "on-line high-tech" lottery, undeniably a
form of gambling, the terms of which clearly pointed to an "association,
collaboration or joint venture" with PGMC.
REGALADO [dissent]
- Be that as it may, since the majority opinion has nowevolved other adjective
theories which are represented to be either different fromor ramifications of the
original "standing to sue" objection raised in the first lotto case. I will hazard my
own humble observations thereon.
1. There is, initially, the salvo against the adoption of the "law of the case"
doctrine in the original majority ponencia. It is contended that this doctrine
requires, for its applicability, an issue involved in a case originating froma
lower court which is first resolved by an appellate court, that case being then
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and with the prior
resolution by the higher court of that issue being the "lawof the case" in any
other proceeding in or a subsequent appeal from the same case. It is
insinuated that said doctrine exists only under such ascenario.
- It may be conceded that, in the context of the cited cases wherein this
doctrine was applied, two "appeals" are generally involved and the issue
resolved in the first appeal cannot be reexamined in the second appeal. If so,
then what is necessarily challenged in the first recourse to the higher court is
either an interlocutory order of the court a quo elevated on an original action for
certiorari or an appealable adjudication which nonetheless did not dispose of
the entire case belowbecause it was either a special proceeding or an action
admitting of multiple appeals.
- That is the present reglementary situation in the Philippines which,
unfortunately, does not appear to have been taken into account when the
double-appeal procedure involved in one particular American concept was
cited as authority in the majority opinion. No attempt was made to ascertain
whether in the American cases cited the lex fori provided for identical or even
substantial counterparts of our procedural remedies of reviewby a higher court
on either an appeal by certiorari or writ of error, or through an original action of
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Yet on such unverified premises, and
without a showing that the situations are in pari materia, we are told that since
the case at bar does not posses the formatted sequence of an initiatory action
in a lower court, an appeal to a higher court, a remand to the lower court, and
then a second appeal to the higher court, the "lawof the case" doctrine cannot
apply. I have perforce to reject that submission as I cannot indulge in the luxury
of absolute espoused by this majority view.
- I fear that this majority rule, has unduly constricted the factual and procedural
situations where such doctrine may apply, through its undue insistence on the
remedial procedure involved in the proceedings rather than the juridical effect
of the pronouncement of the higher court. Even in American law, the "lawof the
case" doctrine was essentially designed to express the practice of courts
generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided 5 and, thereby, to
emphasize the rule that the final judgment of the highest court is a final
determination of the rights of the parties. 6 That is the actual and basic role that
it was conceived to play in judicial determinations, just like the rationale for the
doctrines of res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment.
- Accordingly, the "lawof the case" may also arise froman original holding of a
higher court on a writ of certiorari, 7 and is binding not only in subsequent
appeals or proceedings in the same case, but also in a subsequent suit
between the same parties. 8 What I wish to underscore is that where, as in the
instant case, the holding of this highest Court on a specific issue was handed
down in an original action for certiorari, it has the same binding effect as it
would have had if promulgated in a case on appeal, Furthermore, since in our
jurisdiction an original action for certiorari to control and set aside a grave
abuse of official discretion can be commenced in the Supreme Court itself, it
would be absurd that for its ruling therein to constitute the law of the case,
there must first be a remand to a lower court which naturally could not be the
court of origin fromwhich the postulated secondappeal should be taken.
2. Obviously realizing that continued reliance on the locus standi bar to
petitioners suit is not an ironclad guaranty against it, the majority position has
taken a different tack. It nowinvoked the concept of and the rules on aright of
action in ordinary civil actions and, prescinding from its previous positions,
insists that what is supposedly determinative of the issue of representation is
contract lawand not constitutional law. On the predicate that petitioners are not
parties to the contract, primarily or subsidiarily, they then are real parties in
interest, and for lack of cause of action on their part they have no right of
action. Ergo, they, cannot maintain the present petition.
As a matter of a conventional rule of procedure, the syllogismof the majority
can claimthe merit of logic but, even so, only on assumed premises. More
importantly, however, the blemish in its newblueprint is that the defense of
lack of a right of action is effectively the same as lack of locus standi, that is,
the absence of the remedial right to sue. As the commentators of Castille
would say, the objection under the new terminology is "lo mismo perro con
distinto collar." That re-christened ground, as we shall later see, has already
been foreclosed by the judgment of the Court in the first lotto case.
It is true that a right of action is the right or standing to enforce a cause of
action. For its purposes, the majority urges the adoption of the standard
concept of a real party in interest basedon his possession of a cause of action.
It could not have failed to perceive, but nonetheless refuses to concede, that
the concept of a cause of action in public interest cases should not be
straitjacketed within its usual narrowconfines in private interest litigations.
Thus, adverting again to American jurisprudence, there is the caveat that "the
adoption of provision requiring that an action be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest does not solve all questions as to the proper person or
persons to institute suit, although it obviously simplifies procedures in actions
at law. . . There is no clearly defined rule by which one may determine who is
or is not real party in interest, nor has there been found any concise definition
of the term. Who is the real party in interest depends on the peculiar facts of
each separate case, and one may be a party in interest and yet not be the sole
real party in interest." 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority opinion quotes the viewof a foreign author but unfortunately fails
to put the proper emphasis on the portion thereof which I believe should be that
which should correctly be stressed, and which I correspondingly reproduce:
It is important to note. . . that standing because of its constitutional and public
policy underspinnings, is very different fromquestions relating to whether a
particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has the capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain
parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as of broader policy concerns relating to the
proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. 10 Indeed, if the majority would
have its way in this case, there would be no available judicial remedy against
irregularities or excesses in government contracts for lack of a party with legal
standing or capacity to sue. This legal dilemma or vacuum is supposedly
remediable under a suggestions submitted in the majority opinion, to wit:
Denial to petitioners of the right to intervene will not leave without remedy any
perceived illegality in the execution of government contracts. Questions as to
the nature or validity of public contracts or the necessity for a public bidding
before they may be made can be raised in an appropriate complaint before the
Commission on Audit or before the Ombudsman. . . In addition, the Solicitor
General is authorized to bring an action for quo warranto if it should be thought
that a government corporation . . . has offended against its corporate charter or
misused its franchise. . .
- The majority has apparently forgotten its own argument that in the present
case petitioners are not the real parties, hence they cannot avail of any
remedial right to file a complaint or suit. It is, therefore, highly improbable that
the Commission on Audit would deign to deal with those whomthe majority
says are strangers to the contract. Again, should this Court now sustain the
assailed contract, of what avail would be the suggested recourse to the
Ombudsman? Finally, it is a perplexing suggestion that petitioners ask the
Solicitor General to bring a quo warranto suit, either in propria persona or ex
relatione, not only because one has to contend with that officials own views or
personal interests but because he is himself the counsel for respondents in this
case. Any proposed remedy must take into account not only the legalities in the
case but also the realities of life.
3. The majority believes that in viewof the retirement and replacement of two
members of the Court, it is time to reexamine the ruling in the first lotto case. A
previous judgment of the Court may, of course, be revisited but if the ostensible
basis is the change of membership and known positions of the newmembers
anent an issue pending in a case in the Court, it may not sit well with the public
as a judicious policy. This would be similar to the situation where a judgment
promulgated by the Court is held up by a motion for reconsideration and which
motion, just because the present Rules do not provide a time limit for the
resolution thereof, stays unresolved until the appointment of members
sympathetic thereto. Thus, the unkind criticisms of "magistrate shopping" or
"court packing" levelled by disgruntled litigants is not unknown to this Court.
- I hold the viewthat the matter of the right of petitioners to file and maintain
this action- whether the objection thereto is premised on lack of locus standi or
right of action - has already been foreclosed by our judgment in the first lotto
case, G.R. No. 113375. If the majority refuses to recognize such right under
the "lawof the case" principle, I see no reason why that particular issue can
still be ventilated nowas a survivor of the doctrinal effects of res judicata. 11
It is undeniable that in that case and the one at bar. there is identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action. Evidently, the judgment in G.R. No. 113375
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, it was an adjudication on the
merits, and has long become final and executory. There is, to be sure, an
attempt to showthat the subject matter in the first action is different fromthat in
the instant case, since the former was the original contract and the latter is the
supposed expanded contract. I amnot persuaded by the proffered distinction.
The removal and replacement of some objectionable terms of a contract, which
nevertheless continues to operate under the same basis, with on the property,
fore the same purpose, and the same contracting parties does not suffice to
extinguish the identity of the subject matter in both cases,. This would be to
exalt formover substance. Furthermore, respondents themselves admitted that
the new contract is actually the same as the original one, with just some
variants in the terms of the latter to eliminate those which were objected to.
The contrary assumption now being floated by respondents would create
chaos in our remedial and contractual laws, open the door to fraud, and
subvert the rules on the finality of judgments.
- Yet, even assuming purely ex hypothesi that the amended terms in the
expanded lease agreement created a discrete set of litigable violations of the
statutory charter of the Philippines Charity Sweepstakes Office, thereby
collectively resulting in a disparate actionable wrong or delict, that would
merely constitute at most a difference in the causes of action in the former and
the present cases. Under Section 49(c). Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, we
would still have a situation of collateral estoppel, better known in this
jurisdiction as conclusiveness of judgment. Hence, all relevant issues finally
adjudged in the prior judgment shall be conclusive between the parties in the
case now before us and that definitely includes at the very least the
adjudgment therein that petitioners have the locus standi or the right to sue
respondents on the contracts concerned.
In their case- whether of res judicata, on which I insist, or of conclusiveness of
judgment, which I assume arguendo - what is nowbeing primarily resisted is
the right of petitioners to sue, aside from the postulated invalidity of the
contract for the government-sponsored lottery system. It does seemodd, if not
arcane, that petitioners were held to have the requisite locos standi or right of
action on said G.R. No. 113375 and, for that matter, were likewise so
recognized in the expanded value added tax (EVAT) case, 12 but are now
mysteriously divested of the "place of standing" allegedly due to, for legal
purposes, a compelling need for reexamination of the doctrine, and, for
economic reasons, an obsession for autarky of the nation.
4. I repeat what I said at the outset that this case should be decided on the
merits and on substantive considerations, not on dubious technicalities
intended to prevent on inquiry into the validity of the supposed amended lease
contract. The people are entitled to the benefit of a duly clarified and
translucent transaction, just as respondent deserve the opportunity, and should
even by themselves primarily seek, to be cleaned of any suspicions or lingering
doubts arising fromthe fact that the sponsors for jail alai and, now, of lotto are
different.
- On the merits, to obviate unnecessary replication I reiterate my concurrence
with the findings and conclusions of Mr. Justice Davide in this dissenting
opinion, the presentation whereof is completely devoid of strained or
speculative premises, and moreover has the virtue of being based on his first-
hand knowledge as a legislator of the very provisions of the lawnowin dispute.
In this instance and absent any other operative data. I find the same to be an
amply sufficient and highly meritorious analysis of the controversy on the
contract.
- One concluding point. I amnot impressed by their stance of the majority that
our taking cognizance of this case and resolving it on the merits will hereafter
invite others to unduly overburden this Court with avoidable importunities. This
sounds like a tongue-in-riposte since the Court has clearly indicated that it sets
aside objections grounded on judge-made constitutional theories only under
cogent reasons of substantial justice and paramount public interest.
On the contrary, to pay unqualified obedience to the beguiling locos standi or
right of action doctrines posited by the majority in this case would only not be
an abdication of a clear judicial duty. It could conceivably result in depriving the
people of recourse to us from dubious government contracts through
constitutionally outdated or procedurally insipid theories for such stultification.
This is a contingency which is not only possible, but probable under our
oligarchic society in esse; and not only undesirable, but repugnant within a just
regime of lawstill in posse.
DAVIDE [dissent]
- I register a dissenting vote.
- I amdisturbed by the sudden reversal of our rulings in Kilosbayan, Inc., et al.
vs. Guingona, et al. 1 referred to as the first lotto case) regarding the
application or interpretation of the exception clause in paragraph B, Section 1
of the Charter of the PCSO(R.A. No. 1169), as amended by B.P. Blg. 442, and
on the issue of locus standi of the petitioners to question the contract of lease
involving the on-line lottery systementered into between the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC). Such reversal upsets the salutary doctrines of the lawof
the case, res judicata, and stare decisis. It puts to jeopardy the faith and
confidence of the people, specially the lawyers and litigants, in the certainly
and stability of the pronouncements of this Court. It opens the floodgates to
endless litigations for re-examination of such pronouncements and weakens
this Courts judicial and moral authority to demand fromlower courts obedience
thereto and to impse sanctions for their opposite conduct.
- It must be noted that the decision in the first lotto case was unconditionally
accepted by the PCSOand the PGMC, as can be gleaned fromtheir separate
manifestations that they would not ask for its reconsideration but would,
instead, negotiate a new equipment lease agreement consistent with the
decision and the PCSOs charter and that they would furnish the Court a copy
of the newagreement. The decision has, thus, become final on 23 May1994. 2
- As the writer of the said decision and as the author of the exception to
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended, I cannot accept the
strained and tenuous arguments adduced in the majority opinion it justly the
reversal of our rulings in the first lotto case. While there are exceptions to the
aforementioned doctrines and I amnot inexorably opposed to upsetting prior
decisions if warranted by overwhelming considerations of justice and
irresistible desire to rectify an error, none of such considerations and nothing of
substance or weight can bring this case within any of the exceptions.
- In the said case, we sustained the locus standi of the petitioners, and in no
uncertain terms declared:
We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public.
The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even
higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of
such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of
the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-
productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system
are as staggering as the billions of pesos it is expected to raise. The legal
standing thanof the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which
the respondents tried to take advantage of.
- In this concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano further showed
substantive grounds or considerations of importance which strengthened the
legal standing of the petitioners to bring and maintain the action, namely: (a)
the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the contract of
lease; (b) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or legal
provision by the public respondent agency; (c) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specified interest in raising the questions involved therein; and
(d) the wide range of impact of the contract of lease and of its implementation.
Only last 6 April 1995, in the decision in Tatad vs. Garcia, 3 this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason who had joined in the
dissenting opinions in the first lotto case the petitioners, locus standi therein,
invoked and applied the ruling on locus standi in the first lotto case. He stated:
The prevailing doctrines in taxpayers suits are to allowtaxpayers to question
contracts entered into by the national government or government-owned or
controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of the law(Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994] and to disallow the same when only
municipal contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development
Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA240 [1989].
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have
no choice but to follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as
taxpayers to institute the present action.
- Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, who had also dissented in the first lotto
case on the issue of locus standi; unqualifiedly concurred with the majority
opinion in Tatad. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the writer of the ponencia in
this case, also invoked the locus standi ruling in the first lotto case to deny
legal standing to Tatad, et al. He said:
- Nor do petitioners have standing to bring this suit as citizens. In the cases in
which citizens were authorized to sue, this Court found standing because it
though the constitutional claims pressed for decision to be of "transcendental
importance," as in fact it subsequently granted relief to petitioners by
invalidating the challenged statutes or governmental actions. Thus in the Lotto
case [Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994)] relief by the
majority for upholding petitioners standing, this Court took into account the
"paramount public interest" involved which "immeasurably affect[ed] the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people . . . and the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system." Accordingly,
the Court invalidated the contract for the operation of the lottery.
- Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Associate Justice Abdulwahid ABidin,
Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Jose C. Vitug, and Ricardo J. Francisco,
joined himin his concurring opinion. Except for the Chief Justice who took part
in the first lotto case and Justice Francisco who was not yet a member of this
Court at the time, the rest of the Justice who joined the concurring opinion of
Justice Mendoza had dissented in the lotto case on the said issue.
- Under the principle of either the lawof the case of res judicata, the PCSOand
the PGMCare bound by the ruling in the first lotto case on the locus standi of
the petitioners and the application or interpretation of the exception clause in
paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Moreover, that
application or interpretation has been laid to rest under the doctrine of stare
decisis and has also become part of our legal systempursuant to Article 8 of
the Civil Code which provides: Judicial decisions applying interpreting the laws
or the constitution shall frompart of the systemof the Philippines."
- These doctrines were not adopted whimsically or capriciously. They are
based on public policy and other considerations of great importance and
should not be discarded or jettisoned in a cavalier fashion. Yet, they are now
put to naught in this case.
- The principle of the lawof the case "is necessary as a matter of policy to end
litigation. There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by
repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticism on their opinions, or
speculate on chances fromchanges in its members." 7
- It is, however, contended that the lawof the case is inapplicable that doctrine
applies only when a case is before an appellate court a second time after its
remand to a lower court. While indeed the statement may be correct, it
disregards the fact that the case is nothing but a sequel to and is, therefore, for
all intents and purposes, a continuation of the first lotto case. By their conduct,
the parties admitted that it is, for which reason the PGMC and the PCSO
submitted in the first lotto case a copy of the ELA in question, and the
petitioners commenced the instant petition also in the said case. Our resolution
that the validity of the ELAcould not be decided in the said case because the
decision therein had became final does not detract fromthe fact that this case
is but a continuation of the first lotto case or a new chapter in the raping
controversy between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the PCSOand the
PGMC, on the other, on the operation of the on-line lottery system.
Equally unacceptable is the majority opinions rejection of the related doctrine
of conclusiveness of judgment of the ground that the question of standing is a
question, as this case involves a different or unrelated contract. The legal
question of locus standi which was resolved in favor of the petitioners in the
first lotto case is the same in this case and in every subsequent case which
would involve contracts relating or incidental to the contract or holding of
lotteries by the PCSOin collaboration, association; or joint venture with any
person, association, company or entity. And, the contract in question is not
different fromor unrelated to the first nullified contract, for it in nothing but a
substitute for the latter. Respondent Morato was even candid enough to admit
that no newand separate public bidding was conducted for the ELAin question
because the PCSOwas of the belief that the public bidding for the nullified
contract was sufficient.
Its reliance on the ruling in Montana vs. United States 8 that preclusion or
collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved, is misplaced. For one thing, the question of the
petitioners legal standing in the first lotto case and in this case is one and the
same issue of law. For another, these cases involve the same and not
substantially unrelated subject matter, viz., the second contract between the
PCSOand the PGMCon the operation of the on-line lottery system.
The majority opinion likewise failed to consider that in the very authority it cited
regarding the exception to the rule of issue preclusion (Testament of the Law,
2d Judgments $ 28), the second illustration stated therein is subject to this
NOTE: "The doctrine of the stare decisis may lead the court to refuse to
reconsider the question of sovereign immunity," which simply means that stare
decisis is an effective bar to a re-examination of a prior judgment.
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maximthat a principle or rule
of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling
jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is
founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and
does not require identity or privity of parties. 9 This is explicitly fleshed out in
Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the constitution shall formpart of the legal system. Such decisions
"assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to aside
thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."10
Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons -
which I do not find in this case- otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictabiity
which is expected fromthis Court would be immeasurably affected and the
publics confidence in the stability of itssolemn pronouncements diminished.
The doctrine of res judicata also bars a relitigation of the issue of locus standi
and a re-examination of the application or interpretation of the exception clause
in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended. Section 49 (b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court on effects of judgment expressly provides:
(b)In all other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter cases
the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
other matter that could have been parties and their successors in interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceedings,
litigating for the same thing in the same title and in the same capacity.
This doctrine has dual aspects: (1) as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; and (2) as preclusion
to the relitigation of particular facts of issues in action between the same
parties on a different claim or cause of action. 11 Public policy, judicial
orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants as well as the
peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded
judgments: that controversies once decided on their merits shall remain in
repose; that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be made on the same set
of facts; and that there be an end to litigation which, without the said doctrine,
would be endless. It not only puts an end to strife, but recognizes that certainty
in legal relations must be maintained. It produces certainty as to individual
rights and gives and respect to judicial proceedings. 12 The justifications given
in the majority opinion to underrate the ruling locus standi and to ultimately
discard it are unconvincing. It is not at all true, as the majority opinion
contends, that "[t]he previous sustaining petitioners intervention may in fact be
considered a departure fromsettled ruling on real party in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved."
It must be pointed out that the rule in ordinary civil procedure on real party in
interest was never put in issue in the previous case. It was the clear
understanding of the Members of the Court that in the light of the issues raised
and the arguments adduced therein, only locus standi deserved consideration.
Accordingly, the majority opinion and the separate dissenting opinions therein
dwelt lengthily on locus standi and brought in the process a vast array of
authorities on the issue. Moreover, as explicitly stressed in the concurring
opinion of Justice Feliciano, both constitutional and legal issues were involved
therein. Finally, as shall hereafter be discussed, in public lawthe rule of real
party in interest is subordinate to the doctrine of locus standi.
- Equally unconvincing is the majority opinions contention that the ruling locus
standi in the first lotto case may not be preserved because the majority vote
sustaining the petitioners standing was a "tenuous one" that may not be
maintained in a subsequent litigation, and that there had been changes in the
membership of the Court due to the retirement of Justices Isagani A. Cruz and
Abdulwahid A. Bidin and the appointment of Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and
Ricardo J. Francisco. It has forgotten that, as earlier stated, the ruling was
reiterated in Tatad vs. Garcia. Additionally, when in his concurring opinion in
the Tatad case, Justice Mendoza denied locus standi to Tatad, et al., because
their case did not have the same importance as the lotto case, he thereby
accepted the concession of standing to the petitioners in the lotto case. I wish
to stress the fact that all the Justices who had dissented in the first lotto case
on the issue of locus standi were either for the majority opinion or for the
concurring opinion in the Tatad case. Hence, I can say that the Tatad case has
given vigor and strength to the "tenuous" majority in the first lotto case.
The majority opinion declares that the real issue in this case is not whether the
petitioners have locus standi but whether they are the real parties-in-interest.
This proposition is a bold move to set up a bar to taxpayers suits or cases
invested with public interest by requiring strict compliance with the rule on real
party in interest in ordinary civil actions, thereby effectively subordinating to
that rule the doctrine of locus standi. I amnot prepared to be a party to that
proposition.
- The downgrading of locus standi and its subordination to the restrictive rule
on real party in interest cannot be justified by the claimthat is involved here is
contract law, not constitutional law. True, contract lawis involved. We are not,
however, dealing here with an ordinary contract between private parties, but a
contract between a corporation wholly owned by the government - hence, an
instrumentality of the government - and a private corporation for the contract of
the lotto, which is invested with paramount and transcendental public interest
and other public policy considerations because the lotto has counter -
productive and retrogressive effects which are as staggering as the billions of
pesos it is expected to raise and provokes issues that immeasurably affect the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people. We said so in the first
lotto case.
GARCIA V BOARDOF INVESTMENTS
GUTIERREZ; November 9, 1990
FACTS
- A petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments
(BOI)/ Department of Trade and Industry approving the transfer of site of the
proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of
feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleumgas (LPG).
- P.D. No. 1803 reserved 576 hectares of public domain in Lamao, Libay,
Bataan for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the administration,
management and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
- Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a
newdomestic producer of petrochemicals. It specified Bataan as plant site, and
one of the terms and conditions for registration was the use of naphtha cracker
and naphtha as feedstock for fuel for its plant, which was to be a joint venture
with PNOC. BPCwas issued a certificate of registration onFeb. 24, 1988.
- BPCwas given pioneer status ands accorded fiscal and other incentives, like,
(1) exemption fromtaxes on rawmaterials, (2) eliminating the 48%ad valorem
tax on naphtha if and when it is used as rawmaterials for the petrochemical
plant.
- In February 1989, A.T. Chong, Chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the
major investor in BPC expressed to DTI Secretary his desire to amend the
original registration certification of its project by changing the job site from
Bataan to Batangas because of the insurgency and unstable labor situation in
Bataan and the presence in Batangas of a huge LPG depot owned by
Philippine Shell Corporation. Other requested amendments are as follows: (1)
increasing the investment amount from $220 million to $320 million; (2)
increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant and
polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock fromnaphtha only to naphtha
and/or LPG.
- On May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision stating that, The BOI recognizes
and respects the principle that the final choice is still with the proponent who
would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project.
- In the petition entitled Congressman Enrique T. Garcia v. The Board of
Investments, this court ordered BOI as follows: (1) to publish the amended
application for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to
allowthe petitioner to have access to its records on the original and amended
applications for registration, as a petrochemical manufacturer, of the
respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding, however, privileged
papers containing its trade secrets and other business and financial
information, (3) to set for hearing the petitioners opposition to the amended
application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence in his
possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC
petrochemical plant to Batangas.
- Garcia filed motion for reconsideration asking the Court to rule on whether or
not the investor given the initial inducements and other circumstances
surrounding its first choice of plant site may change simply because it has the
final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to
havelost interest in the case by his failure to appear in the hearing that was set
by BOI.
- Amotion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed, asking that the Court
resolve whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of plant
site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the
decision was not yet final and executory, and therefore petitioner has not
waived his right. Court resolution stated that BOI, not the investor has final
choice on the matter andthat even a choice approved by BOI may not be final
for supervening circumstances and changes in the conditions of a place may
dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant site in order that the
project will not fail. However, petition was denied.
- Instant petition relies on the ruling that investor has no right of final choice.
ISSUES
1. WON the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be
transferred to Batangas
2. WONits feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha
and/or LPG the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon
Petrochemical Corporation (LPC)
3. WONthe categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the
final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national
interest notwithstanding
HELD
1. On Justiciablity: There is an actual controversy. The Court has constitutional
duty to step into this controversy to determine theparamount issue.
2. The decision to transfer to Batangas and to shift the use of feedstock is
unjustified.
- The Bataan site is ideal, the result of careful study.
- The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and
order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer to the
plant site in Batangas.
- The Bataan Refining Corporation, a government owned Filipino corporation,
can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant in Bataan, whereas the
country is short of LPGand there is a need to import for the use of the plant in
Batangas. Transfer will divert scarce dollars unnecessarily.
- R.A. 6767 exempted naphtha as feedstock fromad valoremtax but excluded
LPG from the exemption. This law was specifically for the petrochemical
industry. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene
expressed policy by shifting the feedstock fromnaphtha to LPG.
- Capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPCdoes not have to buy
the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha.
- With the plant site in Bataan, the PNOCshall be a partner, thus giving the
government participation in the management of the project instead of a firm
which is a huge multinational corporation.
3. BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the
petrochemical plant fromBataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of
feedstock fromnaphtha only to naphtha and/or LPGfor the main reason that
the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary not
withstanding.
- The government has already granted incentives for this particular venture.
Through the BOI decision, it surrenders even the power to make a company
abide by its initial choice, a choice free fromany suspicion of unscrupulous
machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the
Filipino people.
- This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed
in numerous laws (i.e. Art. 2, 1987 Omnibus Investments Code) and the
Constitution (Sec. 1 and 10, Art. XII; Sec. 19, Art. II) to run its own affairs the
way it deems best for the national interest.
Disposition: Petition granted. Decision set aside as null and void.
SEPARATE OPINION
GRINO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting the
amendment of the investors application for registration of its project, neither
does the lawprohibit the BOI fromapproving the amended application.
- The matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investors project is a
political and economic decision which only the executive branch, as
implementer of policy formulated by the legislature, is empowered to make. It is
not for this Court to determine what is, or should be, the BOIs final choice of
plant site and feedstock.
- The petitioners recourse against the BOIs action is by an appeal to the
President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments Code), not to this Court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [dissenting]
- [The majority Decision] has made a sweeping policy determination and has
unwittingly transformed itself into what might be termed a government by the
Judiciary, something never intended by the framers of the Constitution when
they provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
government and excluded the Judiciary frompolicy-making.
ART VI: LEGISLATURE
TOLENTINO V SECRETARY OF FINANCE
MENDOZA; August 25, 1994
FACTS
- These are original actions in SC. Certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality of RA7716.
- RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system by
amending National Internal Revenue Code.
- Bet Jul 22, 1992 and Aug 31, 1993, bills were introduced in House of Reps to
amend NIRCrelative to VAT. These were referred to HouseWays and Means
Committee w/c recommended for approval HNo 11197.
- HNo. 11197 was considered on second rdg and was approved by House of
Reps after third and final rdg.
- It was sent to Senate and was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways
and Means. The Committee submitted report recommending approval of SNo
1630, submitted in substitution of SNo 1129, taking into consideration PSRes
No 734 and HNo 11197
- Senate approved SNo 1630 on second rdg, and on third rdg by affirmative
votes of 13 and 1abstention.
- HNo 11197 and SNo 1630 were referred to conference committee w/c after
meeting 4 times, recommended that HBin consolidation w/ SBbe approved in
accordance w/ bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
- The Conference Committee Bill was approved by House of Reps and
Senate. The enrolled bill was presented to President who, on May 5, 1994
signed it. It became RA7716. On May 12, it was published in 2 newspapers
of gen circulation and it took effect on May 28.
- RA7716 amended 103 and made print media subject to VAT in all aspect
of operations. However, Sec of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-
94 exempting circulation income of print media. Income fr advertisements are
still subject to VAT.
- Implementation was suspended until Jun 30 to allowtime for registration of
businesses. Implementation was stopped by TROfr Court, by vote of 11 to 4.
- Petitioners contend:
Re: Art VI Sec 24
1. Although HNo 11197 originated fr House of Reps, it was not passed by
Senate but was consolidated w/ Senate version in the Conference
Committee to produce the bill. The verb shall originate is qualified by the
word exclusively.
2. The constitutional design is to limit Senates power in revenue bills to
compensate for the grant to the Senate of treaty-ratifying power.
3. SNo 1630 was passed no in substitution of HNo 11197 but of another
Senate bill (SNo 1129). Senate merely took HNo 11197 into consideration
in enacting SNo 1630.
Re: Art VI Sec 26(2)
1. The second and thirdrdgs were on the same day, Mar 24, 1994.
2. The certification of urgency was invalid bec there was no emergency.
The growing budget deficit was not an unusual condition in this country.
3. Also, it was SNo 1630 that was certified urgent, not HNo 11197.
Re: BCCacted within its power
1. RA7716 is the bill which the BCCprepared. BCCincluded provisions
not found in the HBor SBand these were surreptitiously inserted. BCC
met behind closed doors.
2. Incomplete remarks of members are marked in the stenographic notes
by ellipses.
3. The Rules of the two chambers were disregarded in preparation of BCC
Report because Report didnt contain detailed and explicit statement of
changes
4. It is required that the Committees report undergo three rdgs in the two
houses.
- Petitioner Philippine Airlines Inc contends:
Re: Art VI Sec 26(1)
1. Neither HNo 11197 nor SNo 1630 provided for removal of exemption of
PAL transactions fr payment of VAT and this was made only by the BCC.
This was not reflectedin the title.
2. Besides, amendment of PALs franchise may be made only by special
lawwhich will expressly amend the franchise (24 of PD1590).
- Petitioner Cooperative Union of the Philippines contends:
Re: Art III Sec 1
1. Withdrawal of exemption of some cooperatives while maintaining that
granted to electric cooperatives not only goes against policy to promote
cooperatives but also violate equal protection of law.
Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:
2. VAT will reduce mark up of its members by as much as 90%.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
3. VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation.
- Petitioner Philippine Press Institute contends:
Re: Art III Sec 4
1. It questions lawbec exemption previously granted to press under NIRC
was withdrawn. Although exemption was subsequently restored, PPI says
theres possibility that exemption may still be removed by mere revocation
by Secretary of Finance.
Also, there is still unconstitutional abridgment of press freedombecause of
VAT on gross receipts on advertisements.
2. RA7716 singled out press for discriminatory treatment, giving broadcast
media favored treatment.
3. Imposing VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000
but not more than P750,000 is discriminatory.
4. The registration provision of the lawis invalid when applied to the press.
- Petitioner Philippine Bible Society contends:
Re: Art III Sec 5
1. Secretary of Finance has no power to grant tax exemption because that
power is vested in Congress and the Secretarys duty is to execute the law
and the removal of exemption of religious articles violates freedom of
thought/conscience.
- Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association contends:
Re: Art III Sec 10
1. Imposition of VAT violates constitutional provision on no lawimpairing
obligation of contracts
- Petitioner Philippine Educational Publishers Association contends:
Re: Art II Sec 17
1. Increase in price of books and educ materials will violate govt mandate
to prioritize education
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON theres violation of Art VI 24 of Consti (revenue bill originating
exclusively fr House of Reps)
2. WON theres violation of Art VI 26(2) of Consti (three readings on
separate days)
3. WONtheBicameral Conference Committee acted within its power
4. WONtheres violation of Art VI 26(1) of Consti (only one subject which is
expressed in title) / WONamendment of 103 of NIRCis fairly embraced in
title of RA7716 although no mention is made therein
Substantive:
5. WON Art III 1 (deprivation of life/liberty/property; equal protection) is
violated
6. WONArt III 4 (freedomof speech/expression/press) is violated
7. WONArt III 5 (free exercise of religion) is violated
8. WONArt III 10 (no lawimpairing obligation of contracts) is violated
9. WON Art VI 28(1) (uniform/equitable; evolve progressive system of
taxation) is violated
10. WONArt VI 28(3) (church/parsonage etc. for religious purpose exempt)
is violated
11. WONArt II 17 (govt priority on education, science and tech) is violated
HELD
- Not all are judicially cognizable, bec not all Consti provisions are self
executing. Other govt depts. are also charged w/ enforcement of Consti.
Procedural
Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of the RA must be
resolved in its favor. An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also of its due enactment. This is not to say that the enrolled bill
doctrine is absolute. But where allegations are nothing more than
surreptitiously inserting provisions, SCdeclines going behind enrolled copy of
bill. SCgives due respect to other branches of govt.
1. NOthere is no violation of Art VI Sec 24
a. Its not the lawbut the revenue bill which is required to originate exclusively
in the House of Reps. A bill originating in House may undergo extensive
changes in Senate. To insist that a revenue statute (and not the bill) must be
the same as the House bill would deny the Senates power to concur with and
propose amendments. It would violate coequality of the legislative power of
the two houses.
b. Legislative power is issue here. Treaty-ratifying power is not legislative
power but an exercise of check on executive power.
c. Theres no difference bet Senate preserving house bill then writing its own
version on one hand and on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its
own on the subject matter. Consti simply says that its the initiative for filing the
bill that must come fr House of Reps. The Reps are expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs.
Nor does Consti prohibit filing in Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of bill fr House so long as action by Senate is withheld pending receipt
of House bill. It was only after Senate rcvd H No 11197 that legislation in
respect of it began w/ referral to Senate Committee on Ways and Means.
2. NOthere is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(2)
a. It was because Pres certified S No 1630 as urgent. This certification
dispensed w/ printing and rdg the bill on separate days. The phrase except
when the President certifies to the necessity qualifies two stated conditions:
(1) the bill has passed 3 rdgs on separate days and (2) it has been printed in
final formand distributed 3 days before finally approved. To construe that the
except clause dispenses only with printing would violate grammar rules and
would also negate the necessity of the immediate enactment of the bill.
Example is RA5440 which had 2
nd
and 3
rd
rdgs on the same day after bill had
been certified urgent.
b. No Senator controverted factual basis of the certification and this should not
be rvwd by the Court.
c. It was SNo 1630 that Senate was considering. When matter was before the
House, Pres likewise certified HNo 9210 then pending.
3. YESthe BCCacted within its power
a. Give and take often marks the proceedings of BCC. There was also
nothing unusual in the executive sessions of the BCC.
Under congressional rules, BCCs are not expected to make material changes
but this is a difficult provision to enforce. The result could be a third version,
considered an amendment in nature of substitute, the only requirement that the
3
rd
version be germane to subject of the HBand SB. It is w/in power of BCCto
include an entirely newprovision. After all, report of BCCis not final and still
needed approval of both houses to be valid.
b. This could have been caused by stenographers limitations or to incoherence
that sometimes characterize conversations.
c. Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is
standard practice in bill-drafting.
Also, SCis not proper forumfor these internal rules.
d. If this were the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house
may seek modifications of the compromise bill. That requirement must be
construed only to mean bills introduced for the first time in either house, not the
BCCreport.
4. NO, there is no violation of Art VI Sec 26(1)
a. Since the title states that the purpose is to expand the VAT system, one way
is to widen the base by withdrawing some exemptions. To insist that PD1590
in addition to 103 of NIRCbe mentioned in title, would be to insist that title of
a bill be a complete index of its content.
b. That was just to prevent amendment by an inconsistent statute. And under
Consti, grant of franchise for operation of public utility is subject to amendment,
alteration, repeal by Congress when common good requires.
Substantive
- as RA7716 merely expands base of VAT as provided in the orig VAT law,
debate on wisdomof lawshould be in Congress.
5. NOthere is no clear showing that Art III Sec 1 is violated
- When freedomof the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedomthat commands
respect; when property is imperiled, lawmakers judgment prevails.
a. This is actually a policy argument.
b. This is a mere allegation.
c. This is also short of evidence.
6. NOArt III Sec a is not violated
a. Theres no violation of press freedom. The press is not immune fr
general regulation by the State.
b. Its not that it is being singled out, but only because of removal of
exemption previously granted to it by law. Also, the law would be
discriminatory if the only privilege withdrawn is that to the press. But that is
not thecase. The statute applies to a wide range of goods and services.
c. It has not been shown that the class subject to tax has been
unreasonably narrowed. This limit does not apply to press alone but to all
sales.
d. The fixed amount of P1000 is for defraying part of the cost of registration.
Registration is a central feature of the VAT system. It is a mere
administrative fee, not a fee on exercise of privilege or right.
7. NOArt III Sec 5 is not violated
a. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax
on sale of religious materials by religious org.
8. NOArt III Sec 10 is not violated
a. Parties to a contract cant fetter exercise of taxing power of State.
Essential attributes of sovereign is read into contracts as a basic postulate
of legal order.
9. VAT distributes tax burden to as many goods and svcs as possible,
particularly to those w/in reach of higher income grps. Business
establishments with annual gross sales of < P500,000 are exempted.
Also, regressivity is not a negative standard. What is required is that we
evolve a progressive taxation system.
10. Consti does not prohibit imposing generally applicable sales and use tax on
sale of religious materials by religious org.
11. NOthere is no violation of Art II Sec 17
a. Same reason/ratio under issues on free speech/press.
Decision Petitions are dismissed.
Notes VAT is levied on sale, barter/exchange of goods and svcs. Then, its
equal to 10%of gross selling price
Narvasa, Separate Opinion
Cruz, Separate Opinion
Padilla, Separate Opinion
Vitug, Separate Opinion
Regalado, Dissenting Opinion
Davide, Dissenting Opinion
Romero, Dissenting Opinion
Bellosillo, Dissenting Opinion
Puno, Dissenting Opinion
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST V ERMITA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
FACTS
- The increasing budget problems of the government in the form of fiscal
problems, revenue generation, and fiscal allocation inadequacy prompted the
congress to create a law to address such problems. This gave way to the
Expanded Vat Law(E-Vat Law) otherwise known as Republic Act No. 9337.
The case revolves around the constitutionality of the Republic Act 9337 that
increased the Value-Added Tax percentage from10%to 12%. In this case
there were 4 different petitioners: Abakada Guro Party List, Association of
Pilipinas Shell Dealers/Petron/Caltex, Senators Pimentel/ Estrada, L./ Estrada,
J. / Lacson/ Lim/ Madrigal/ Osmea, Congressman Escudero, and Governor
Garcia. All of themquestion the constitutionality of RA9337.
- Backgrounder on Value-Added Tax (VAT):
>VAT is a tax on spending or consumption. It is levied on the sale, barter,
exchange, or lease of goods or properties and services.
> It is an indirect tax on expenditure. The seller of goods or services may
pass on the amount of tax paid to the buyer. VAT is intended to fall on the
immediate buyers and end-consumers.
- RA9337s legislative history is as follows:
It originated fromHouse Bill 3555 that was approved on the 27
th
of January
2005 and House Bill 3705 that was approved on the28
th
of February 2005 and
Senate Bill 1950 that was approved on the 13
th
of April 2005. This was later
consolidated the Bicameral Conference Committee. The Bicameral Conference
Committee inserted and deleted some of the original provisions. The Bill was
approved on the 11
th
of May 2005 by the Senate and 10
th
of May 2005 by the
House of Representatives.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the Bicameral Conference Committee has strictly complied with the
rules of both houses thereby remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it
by congress.
2. WONthe Bicameral Conference Committee violated Article VI Sec 26 that
states that no amendment would be done after three readings.
3. WONthere was a violation of the Origination Clause as stated in Art VI Sec
24.
Substantive
4. WON there was undue delegation to the President and Secretary of
Finance.
5. WONa VAT lawsuch as that of RA9337 is in violation of the Constitutional
provision Art VI Sec 28 (1) that requires taxation to be uniform, equitable and
that the Congress shall evolve a progressive systemof taxation.
HELD
1. The Supreme Court decided that it would not rule on the violation of the
senate and house rules unless there is a showing that it is in clear violation of a
constitutional provision or of the rightsof private individuals. (favorite ratio )
2. No, because the amendment rule refers only to the procedure to be followed
by each house of Congress with regard to bills in each of the said respective
houses before the bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence and
amendment.
3. No, the Senate within the said provision only proposed amendments after
the House Bills were approved. The Bill still originated through the House of
Representatives.
4. No, because the President is just executing thelawand is still working within
the standard and policy of the law. The Secretary of Finance is also not given
undue delegation as he is considered as an alter ego of the president thus
following the same logic, he is only executing the law.
5. While the VAT is currently not yet progressive it still is directed towards a
goal of a progressive taxation.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of RA9337 is unconstitutional as 1) the increase of tax
rates on domestic, resident foreign and nonresident foreign corporations, 2) the
increase of tax credit against taxes due fromnonresident foreign corporations
on intercorporate dividends, and 3) the reduction of the allowable deduction for
interest expense were not really part of the House version of the E-VAT Law
therefore in violation of the origination clause in Article VI Section 24.
BENGZON V SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
PADILLA; November 20, 1991
FACTS
- Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee
- 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan the civil case no. 0035, RP
vs. Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, et al.
-The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took
advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to
engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the
Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others:
-obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc.,
selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon LawOffices), the
concealment of the assets subject to the complaint fromthe PCGGunder the
veil of corporate identity, etc.
8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M
(far belowmarket value) without PCGGapproval to the Ricardo Lopa Group,
owned by Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa
Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of
RA3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative
of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3
rd
civil degree, to
intervene in any transaction w/ the government
-the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers(Blue Ribbon Committee)
-the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify on
what they know about the sale of the 36 Romualdez corporations
-at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the
due process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would unduly
prejudice the defendants of civil case no.0035
-petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose
-the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its
committees frommaking inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of
separation of powers (quotingAngara v. Comelec)
-the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and
extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee
ISSUES
1. WONthe Blue Ribbon Committeesinquiry is in aid of legislation.
2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another
branch of government.
3. WONthe inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
HELD
1. NOBlue Ribbon Committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation
- Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WONRicardo Lopa had any
part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporationsthere was no intended
legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault
v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v.
USit was held that Congress power of inquiry is broad but limited, that is, it
may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a
legitimate task of congressno inquiry is an end in itself.
2. YESCongress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of
government
- Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further
investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce
conflicting opinionsas held inBaremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into
matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.
3. YESthe inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process
- It has been held that a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to
all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,
includingthe Bill of Rights. As held inHutcheson v. US, it cant be assumed
that legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot
tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the
Constitutional right against self-incrimination extends to all proceedings
sanctioned by lawand in cases in w/c the witness is an accused.
Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to
appear, testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would
not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle
separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as
ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED.
SEPARATE OPINION
GUTIERREZ [dissent]
Re: WONthe Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.
-the power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent and needs no
textual granteven so, it is expressly granted by A6 S21.
Barsky v. US: the possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue
froman inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry
US v. Deutch: Congress has the right to secure information in order to
determine WONto legislate on a particular subject matter on w/c it is w/in its
constitutional powers to act.
US v. Orman: where the information sought concerns what Congress can
legislate, a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed.
-the requirement that an inquiry be in aid of legislation is easier to establish
here where Congress legislative field is unlimited unlike in the US. Also, it is
not necessary that every question be material to the proposed legislation, but
directly related to the subject of the inquiry.
-the legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose;
Congress may investigate for its own purposes even thought the subjects of
the investigation are currently under trial.
Re: WONthe inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
-A6 S21 provides that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
However, such a restriction does not call for the complete prohibition of such
investigations where a violation of a basic right is claimed, but rather only
requires that such rights berespected.
-the right against self-incrimination may only be invoked when incriminating
questions are posed, but the witness may not refuse to take the witness stand
completely. In the case at bar, no incriminating questions had been asked,
hence the allegation of violation of rights is premature.
CRUZ [dissent]
Re: WONthe Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Arnault v. Nazareno: the Court is bound to presume that an action of a
legislative body is w/ legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and
It has no right to assume the contrary.
-an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money, in this case, the possible
violation of RA 3019 in the disposition of the Romualdez corporations, is an
indispensable duty of the legislature
Mcgrain v. Daugherty: it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an
investigation expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain data in
aid of proposed legislation
Re: WONthe inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process.
-the petitioners are not facing criminal charges; as ordinary witnesses, they
may only invoke the right against self-incrimination only when such a question
is posed, and cannot refuse taking the witness stand outright.
SENATE V ERMITA
CARPIO-MORALES;
FACTS
- this is a consolidation of various petitions for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of E.O. no. 464
15
issued Sept. 28, 2005
- Consti Provisions allegedly violated: Art. VI Sec. 1, 21, 22,; Art. III Sec. 4, 7;
Art. II Sec. 28; Art. XI Sec 1; Art. XIII Sec. 16
- Between Sept. of 2005 to Feb. 2006, various Senate Investigation
Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Dept.
including the AFPand PNPfor themto appear in public hearings on inquiries
concerning mainly: (A) The alleged overpricing in the NorthRail Project (B) the
Wire-Tapping activity (C) the Fertilizer scam(D) the Venable contract
- The respective officials of the Executive Dept. filed requests for
postponement of hearings for varying reasons such as existence of urgent
operational matters, more time to prepare a more comprehensive report, etc.
Sen. Drilon, however, did not accede to their requests because the requests
were sent belatedly and that preparations and arrangements have already
been completed.
- On Sept. 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which took effect
immediately. Citing E.O. 464, the Executive Dept. officials subject to Senate
investigations claimed that they were not allowed to appear before any Senate
or Congressional hearings without consent (written approval) from the
President, which had not been granted unto them; their inability to attend due
to lack of appropriate clearance from the Pres. pursuant to E.O. 464.
Thereafter, several cases were filed challenging E.O. 464 and praying for the
issuance of a TROenjoining respondents fromimplementing, enforcing, and
observing the assailed order. Respondent Executive Secretary Ermita et al.,
prayed for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit.
ISSUES
Primary Issue
1. WONE.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress
Secondary Issues
2. Justiciability of the case:
a. Legal standing of petitioners:
G.R. 169777 Senate of the Phils.
G.R. 169659 BAYANMUNA, COURAGE, CODAL
G.R. 169660 Francisco Chavez
G.R. 169667 Alternative LawGroups (ALG)
G.R. 169834 PDP-Laban
G.R. 121246 Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP)
b. Actual Case or Controversy
3. WONE.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern.
4. WON respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
HELD
15
E.O. 464 Ensuring observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executiveprivilegeandrespect for therights of public officials appearinginlegislativeinquiries inaidof
legislationunder theConstitution, andfor other purposes.
Primary Issue
1. Ratio It is impermissible to allow the executive branch to withhold
information sought by the Congress in aid of legislation, without it asserting a
right to do so, and without stating reasons therefor.
- Although the executive Dept. enjoys the power of executive privilege,
Congress nonetheless has the right to knowwhy the executive dept. considers
requested information privileged. E.O. 464 allows the executive branch to
evade congressional requests for information without the need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By mere
expedient of invoking provisions of E.O. 464, the power of Congress is
frustrated. Resort to any means by which officials of the executive branch could
refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed to be valid.
Reasoning
Executive Privilege
-The power of the President and other high-level executive branch officers to
withhold certain types of information of a sensitive character fromCongress,
the courts and the public.
- The Power of Inquiry (in aid of legislation) Art. VI Sec.21
This is the power of the Legislature to make investigations and exact testimony
that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively. It gives
the Congress the power to compel the appearance of executive officials to
comply with its demands for information.
- Inquiry in Art. VI Sec. 22 (question hour)
As determined fromthe deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, this
provision was intended to be distinguished frominquiries in aid of legislation, in
that attendance here is merely discretionary on the part of the department
heads.
- Sec. 1 of E.O. 464
Its requirement to secure presidential consent, limited only to executive dept.
heads and to appearances in the question hour (because of its specific
reference to sec. 22 of art VI) makes it valid on its face.
- Sec. 2 (a) of E.O. 464
It merely provides guidelines binding only on the heads of office mentioned in
section 2(b), on what is covered by the executive privilege. It does not purport
to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may be construed as
a mere expression of opinion by the Pres. regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
- Sec. 2(b) of E.O. 464
Provides that once the head of office determines that a certain info. is
privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority
and has the effect of prohibiting the official fromappearing before Congress,
only to the express pronouncement of the Pres. that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. It allows the Pres. to authorize claims of privilege
by mere silence, and such presumptive authorization is contrary to the
exceptional nature of the privilege. Due tothe fact that executive privilege is of
extraordinary power, the Pres. may not authorize its subordinates to exercise it.
Such power must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive
hierarchy.
- Sec. 3 of E.O. 464
Requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The
enumeration is broad. It is invalid per se. In so far as it does not assert but
merely implies the claimof executive privilege. It does not provide precise and
certain reasons for the claim. Mere invocation of E.O. 464 coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent, is woefully
insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is
justified under the circumstances of each case, severely frustrating its power of
inquiry.
Secondary Issues
2. a. Regarding Legal Standing of petitioners:
Rule 1: Legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they
claiminfringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Rule 2: To be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental
importance there must be a showing of: 1. the character of the funds
(public)/assets involved 2. a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or
statutory prohibition 3. lack of a party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions raised.
The Senate of the Philippines
- The Senate, including its individual members, by virtue of their fundamental
right for intelligent public decision-making and sound legislation is the proper
party to assail an executive order which allegedly stifles the ability of the
members of Congress to access information crucial to law-making. It has a
substantial and direct interest over the outcome of such a controversy.
Party List (BayanMuna, COURAGE, CODAL)
- The party-list representatives have standing, it is sufficient that a claimis
made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as
members of Congress to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and
conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
IBP, Chavez, ALG(invoking right to info. on matters of public concern)
- When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws must be direct and personal. The Court held in
Francisco v. Francisco that when a proceeding involves assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that the person filing is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
PDP-Laban(claiming standing due to the transcendental importance of issue)
- There being no public funds involved and there being parties with more direct
and specific interest in the controversy (the Senate and BayanMuna), gives
PDP-Laban no standing.
b. Actual case or controversy (was not taken up by the Court)
- A challenged order which has already produced results consequent to its
implementation and where such results are the subject of questions of
constitutionality, is ripe for adjudication.
- The implementation of E.O. 464 has resulted in the officials excusing
themselves from attending the Senate hearings. It would be sheer
abandonment of duty if the Court would refrain from passing upon the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.
3. Yes. Congressional investigations in aid of legislation are presumed to be a
matter of public concern, therefore, it follows that any executive issuance
tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
deprives the people of information.
4. Yes. Although E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it
has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern therefore it is not exempt fromthe need of publication. Due process
requires that the people should have been apprised of the issuance of E.O.
464 before it was implemented.
Decision Petitions are PARTLYGRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464
are declared void while sections 1 and 2(a) are VALID.
GUINGONA V CARAGUE
GANCAYCO; April 22, 1991
FACTS
- The 1990 budget consisted of P98.4Bin automatic appropriation (86.8 going
to debt service) and P155.3 fromthe General Appropriations Act or a total of
P233.5B; only P27B was allotted for DECS. Petitioners, as members of the
Senate, question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service in the said budget as provided for by Presidential Decrees 81, 117, and
1967.
- Petitioners allege that the allotted budget runs contrary to Sec. 5(5), Art. XIV
of the Constitution. And as provided by Art. 7 of the Civil Code, when statutes
run contrary to the Constitution, it shall be void.
- They further contend that the Presidential Decrees are no longer operative
since they became functus oficio after President Marcos was ousted. With a
new congress replacing the one man-legislature, new legislation regarding
appropriation should be passed. Current appropriation, operating on no laws
therefore, would be unenforceable.
- Moreover, they contend that assuming arguendo that the said decrees did not
expire with the ouster of Marcos, after adoption of the 1987 Constitution, said
decrees were inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution which
stated that:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be
passed by Congress to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further,
petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the
President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt
service.
- SolGen argues, on the other hand, that automatic appropriation provides
flexibility: ". . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage
of a favorable turn of market conditions by redeeming high interest securities
and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term to long-term
instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding
debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes.
Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt
servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously
programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one
year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in laymans
parlance, basket of foreign exchange and interest rate assumptions which
may significantly differ fromactual rates not even in proportion to changes on
the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the
Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action,
which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended
conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed. In the
meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only
to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to
penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.
- Clearly, the claimthat payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned
upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative
power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purposeis foreseen
to subsist with or without the person of Marcos."
ISSUES
1. WON appropriation of P86.8B for debt service as compared to its
appropriation of P27.7Bfor education in violation of Sec. 5(5), Article XIVof the
Constitution.
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education
and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of
the best available talents through adequate remuneration and
other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
2. WONthe Presidential Decrees are still operative, and if they are, do they
violate Sec. 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitutional.
3. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power by automatic
appropriation.
HELD
1. The Court disagrees that Congress hands are hamstrung by the
provision provided. There are other imperatives of national interest
that it must attend to; the amount allotted to education, 27.8B, is the
highest in all department budgets thereby complying with the
mandate of having the highest priority as stated above. The
enormous national debt, incurred by the previous administration,
however, still needs to be paid. Not only for the sake of honor but
because the national economy is itself at stake. Thus, if Congress
allotted more for debt service such an appropriation cannot be
considered by this Court as unconstitutional.
2. Yes, they are still operative. The transitory provision provided in Sec. 3,
Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
- This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its
framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless
they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed
or revoked.
- Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned
upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution
and lawis generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so
clearly stated.
3. No. The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be
automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become
due without the need to enact a separate lawappropriating funds therefore as
the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to
make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain
the credit standing of the country.
- Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be
paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problembeing addressed, the
amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided
in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts
to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of
indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and
when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive
implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of
the Treasury.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
He sees that an essential requirement for valid appropriation is that the sum
authorized for release should bedeterminate or determinable. The Presidential
Decrees do not satisfy this requirement. As to the ponencias reference to
legislative parameters provided by law, Cruz says no such regulatory
boundaries exist.
PADILLA [dissent]
- He agrees with Cruz but furthers the argument by saying that Sec.
29(1)Article VI implies that a lawenacted by Congress (and approved by the
President) appropriating a particular sum or sums must be made before
payment fromthe Treasury can be made. Laws should be construed in light of
current laws and not those made by a one-man legislative branch.
- Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service
were tailored for the periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress
that should determine and approve the proper appropriations for debt servicing,
as this is a matter of policy that, in his opinion, pertains to the legislative
department, as the policy-determining body of the Government.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V ENRIQUEZ
QUIASON; August 19, 1994
FACTS
- House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GABof 1994),
was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17,
1993.
- On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared
the same to have become Republic Act No. 7663
16
, the General Appropriation
Act (GAA) of 1994. On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential
Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he
imposed certain conditions. No step was taken in either House of Congress to
override the vetoes.
- In G.R. No. 113105, Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) et al.
prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a)
Article 41 on the Countrywide Development Fund or pork barrels, the special
provision in Article I entitled Realignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, (b) Article 48 on the Appropriation for Debt Service or the amount
appropriated under said Article 48 in excess of the P37.9 Ballocated for the
DECS; and (c) the veto of the President of the Special Provision of Article 48 of
the GAAof 1994
- In G.R. No. 113174, 16 Senators question: (1) the constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAAof 1994: (a) for
the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs); and (2) the
16
Entitled"ANACTAPPROPRIATINGFUNDSFORTHEOPERATIONOFTHEGOVERNMENTOF
THEPHILIPPINESFROMJANUARYONETODECEMBERTHIRTYONE, NINETEENHUNDREDAND
NINETY-FOUR, ANDFOROTHERPURPOSES"
constitutionality of the vetoof the special provision in the appropriation for debt
service.
- In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Romulo and Taada together with the
Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sued as
taxpayers, challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of the
special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefor.
- In G.R. No. 113888, Senators Romulo and Taada contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the
GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for
the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
- In viewof the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four
petitions, the Court invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and
former Associate Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae.
G.R. No. 113105
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WONthe petitioners have legal standing
17
Substantive
2. WON the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) or pork barrels is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an
appropriation act is in implementation of a law
3. WON the act of Congress giving debt service and not education
18
as the
highest priority in the allocation of budget unconstitutional
4. WON the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category is
unconstitutional, as it is contrary to Article VI Section 25(5) of the 1987
Constitution
19
HELD
Procedural
1. Amember of Congress has the legal standing to question the validity of a
presidential veto or any other act of the Executive which injures the institution
of Congress.
Reasoning: Ponencia relied on precedent (Gonzales v. Macaraig) and a US
case (United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co) as secondary source to
recognize legal standing. Then in forming the ratio decidendi, it again relied on
UScases as secondary sources (Coleman v. Miller, Holtzman v. Schlesinger)
as well as the opinion of Justice Fernando as Amicus Curiae.
Substantive
2. The power of appropriation lodged in Congress carries with it the power to
specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can
be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
Reasoning: The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure,
purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
17
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he
claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes) in
effect sayingthat theydonot havetherequisitelegal standingtobringthesuits.
18
Article XIV Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that: "The State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority toeducationandensurethat teachingwill attract andretainits rightful shareof thebest
availabletalentsthroughadequateremunerationandother meansof jobsatisfactionandfulfillment."
19
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of theSenate, theSpeaker of theHouseof Representatives, theChief Justiceof theSupreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any itemin
the general appropriations lawfor their respective offices fromsavings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries" It was Congress itself
that determined the purposes for the appropriation. Executive function under
the CDF involves implementation of the priority projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Hence, under Article 48 of the
GAAof 1994, if the proposed projects qualify for funding under the CDF, it is
the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
3. The constitutional provision which directs the State shall assign the highest
budgetary priority to education is merely directory.
Reasoning: It relied on precedence, Guingona, Jr. v. Carague. While it is true
that under Section 5(5), Article XIVof the Constitution, Congress is mandated
to assign the highest budgetary priority to education it does not thereby follow
that Congress is deprived of its power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
4. The members only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings
in the allotments for their operating expenses but it is the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall approve the
realignment.
Decision
Procedural
1. Petitioners, as members of Congress have locus standi
Substantive
2. No. The CDF is not an encroachment by the legislature on executive power,
hence constitutional
3. No. Congress act is not unconstitutional. It simply exercises its power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objectives.
4. No. It is not unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
ISSUE
WON veto of the special provision of Article 48 of the GAA of 1994 in the
appropriation for debt service without vetoing the entire P86.3 B for said
purpose is unconstitutional
Or, simply put: WONthe President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by
the Constitution
20
HELD
Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which extends in
its operation beyond an itemof appropriation, is considered an inappropriate
provision
21
which can be vetoed separately froman item.
Reasoning: The issue, according to the ponencia is a mere rehash of the one
put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. Hence, it used this case as precedent.
It also cited another case, Henry v. Edwards to support its ratio. Citing
Gonzales: As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can
include in an appropriations bill must "relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any
particular item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
20
Article VI Section 27(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that: The President shall have the power to
veto any particular itemor items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but veto shall mot affect the
itemor items towhichhedoesnot object.
21
Also included in the category of inappropriate provisions which are intended to amend our laws,
becauseclearlytheselawshavenoplaceinanappropriationsbill, andthereforeunconstitutional.
appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed
separately froman item. CitingHenry v. Edwards: When the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be
treated as items for purposes of the Governors (Presidents) itemveto power
over general appropriation bills.
Decision
Yes. The President vetoed the entire paragraph 1 of the Special Provision of
the item on debt service, including the provisos that the appropriation
authorized in said item"shall be used for payment of the principal and interest
of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." The
said provisos, being appropriate provisions since they germane to and have a
direct connection with the itemon debt service, cannot be vetoed separately.
Hence the itemveto of said provisions is void.
G.R. No. 113174
G.R. No. 113766
G.R. No. 113888
ISSUES
1. WONthe veto for revolving funds of State Universities and Colleges (SUCs)
is unconstitutional
2. WON the veto of the provision in the appropriation for the Department of
Public Works and Highways on 70%(administrative) / 30%(contract) ratio for
road maintenance is unconstitutional
3. WON the veto of the provision on purchase of medicines by AFP is
unconstitutional
4. WON the veto of special provisions on prior approval of Congress for
purchase of military equipment is unconstitutional
5. WONthe veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFPpension funds
is unconstitutional
6. WON the Presidents directive that the implementation of the Special
Provision to the itemon the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential
approval is tantamount to an administrative embargo of the congressional will
to implement the Constitutions command to dissolve the CAFGUs, therefore
unconstitutional (Issue on Impoundment
22
)
7. WON veto of the President setting conditions or guidelines in the
appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, DPWHand CHRis
unconstitutional
HELD
[1] to [5] Any provision which does not relate to any particular item, or which
extends in its operation beyond an itemof appropriation, is considered an
inappropriate provision which can be vetoed separately froman item
23
Reasoning: Same ratio decidendi fromthe issue in the previous section is
applied in the 5 issues in this section. Hence the reasoning for the ratio is the
same as well. (Notice howthe ratio is applied in the ruling or dispositive)
6. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate substantive bill.
22
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue.
Impoundment refers toarefusal by thePresident, for whatever reason, tospendfunds madeavailableby
Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type (Notes: Impoundment of
Funds, HarvardLawReview)
23
Notethat this ratiois alsoappliedinissue[6] asidefromtheratiowhichI formulatedthere. This canbe
implied from, Again we state: a provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or amend
other laws. Hence, thisisaninappropriateprovision whichcanbevetoedseparately.
Reasoning: The ponencia simply cited notes fromjournals
24
in discussing the
issue of Impoundment to support his reasoning in the present case.
7. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his
constitutional duty to see that laws are faithfully executed.
Decision
1. No. There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said
special provisions.
2. Yes. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said itemshall be
expended- 70%by administrative and 30%by contract.
3. Yes. Being directly related to and inseparable fromthe appropriation itemon
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by
the President without also vetoing the said item.
4. No. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a lawor
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions,
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
5. No. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFPbeing managed by the AFPRetirement
and Separation Benefits Systemis violative of Sections 25(5)
25
and 29(1)
26
of
the Article VI of the Constitution. Thus veto is not unconstitutional.
6. No. The provision in an appropriations act cannot be used to repeal or
amend other laws. Impliedly, this is an inappropriate provision which can be
vetoed separately.
7. No. By setting guidelines or conditions in his veto, the President is simply
exercising his constitutional duty to implement the laws faithfully.
Dispositive
Petitions DISMISSED, except with respect with respect to [1] G.R. Nos.
113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of
the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein
appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign
and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the
liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and [2] G.R. No. 113888
only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the 2
nd
paragraph of
Special Provision No. 2 of the itemof appropriation for the DPWH; and (b)
Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the AFP which is
GRANTED.
Voting: 14Concur, 1Dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur and dissent]
- I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far
as it re-affirms the Courts decision inGonzalez v. Macaraig
24
Notes: Impoundment of Funds, Harvard LawReview; Notes: Presidential Impoundment Constitutional
Theories and Political Realities, Georgetown Law Journal; Notes Protecting the Fisc: Executive
Impoundment andCongressional Power, YaleLawJournal
25
"No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of theSenate, theSpeaker of theHouseof Representatives, theChief Justiceof theSupreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any itemin
the general appropriations lawfor their respective offices fromsavings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
26
"Nomoneyshall bepaidout of theTreasuryexcept inpursuanceof anappropriationmadebylaw"
- An inappropriate provision is still as provision, not an item and therefore
outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG [concur]
- I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the
President and his colleagues, would have the best feel on the needs of their
own respective constituents. It is not objectionable for Congress, by law, to
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that
authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I
amafraid, would be constitutionally impermissible.
GONZALES V MACARAIG
MELENCIO-HERRERA; November 19, 1990
FACTS
- The Senate questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential veto of special
and general provisions, particularly Sec. 55 of the General Appropriations Bill
for 1989
- The petitioners claimthey have locus standi on the ground of:
- being member and ex-officio members of the Finance Committee
- substantial taxpaers whose vital interests might be affected
- The respondents in this case are member of the Cabinet who are sued in
their official capacity for the implementation of the General Appropriations Act
of 1989
- December 16, 1988 - The House of Representatives passed HB19186 (GA
Bill for 1989)
- eliminated/decreased items included in the proposed Budget of the
President
- presented to President for approval
- December 29, 1988- The bill was signed into law(became RA6688)
- The President vetoed 7 special provisions and Sec. 55
- February 2, 1989- Senate expressed through Senate Resolution No. 381 that
the veto of Sec. 55 was unconstitutional
- April 11, 1989- Petition for prohibition/mandamus was filed
- assailed the legality of veto of Sec. 55
- enjoined the implementation of RA6688
- No restraining order was implemented by the Supreme Court
- September 7, 1989- Court resolved to give due course to the petition
- Jan. 17, 1990- Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplementary Petition
which raised the same issue as the original petition (questioning the
presidential veto)
- The vetoed provisions include:
- Sec. 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 - an item submitted by the
President which has been reduced by Congress cannot be
restored/increased. An item is deemed disapproved if there is no
corresponding appropriation in the Act.
- Sec. 16 of the Appropriations Act of 1990 - similar to Sec. 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Act except that this was lumped together with the use of
savings
- The basic difference between both provisions is that in the 1989
Appropriations Act, the "use of savings" is in Section 12, apart fromSection
55 whereas in the 1990\Appropriations Act, "use of savings" and the vetoed
provision are both in Sec. 16
- The reason for the veto:
- Violates Art. 6, Sec 25(5)
- Nullifies the constitutional and statutory authroity of the President, the
Senate President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court and the Heads of Con-Coms to augment any itemin
the General Appropriations law
- If allowed, the President and the other abovementioned officials cannot
augment any item and appropriation from their savings even if special
circumstances like calamity
- Petitioners arguments:
1) The presidents lineveto power regarding the appropriations bill is limited
to item/s and does not cover provisions and therefore exceeded her
authority (Sections 55 and 16 are provisions)
2) When the president objects to provisions of an appropriation bill, it is not
possible to exercise the itemveto power but should veto the whole bill as
well
3) The item veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation already (violative of
separation of powers)
4) Power of augmentation in Article 6, Sec. 25(5) is provided by law so
Congress has prerogative to impose restrictions in the exercise of that
power
- SolGens arguments:
1) The issue is a political question and the petitioners have a political
remedy which is to override the veto.
2) Sec. 53 is a rider which is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and
should merit a veto.
3) The power of the president to augment items in appropriations for the
executive branches already provided for in Budget Law(specifically Sec. 44
and 45 of PD1177 as amended by RA6670)
4) The President is empowered to veto provisions of other distinct and
severable parts.
ISSUES
1. WONthe issue is justiciable
2. WONthe veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill
and its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional
and without effect
HELD
1. The issue is justiciable, not political.
a) There is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Senate
and the Executive that the Supreme Court may take cognizance of. The
Demetria v. Alba case declared that the Supreme Court has the duty to
declare acts of a government branch void if beyond that branchs powers
b) Judicial arbitration needed because the petitioners stress the imperative
needfor definitive ruling by the Court
c) The petitioners have locus standi because the suit is a taxpayers suit.
The Sanidad ruling (the Court may or may not entertain a taxpayers suit)
and the Tolentino v. COMELEC ruling (members of the Senate have
personality when a Constitutional issue is raised) were used. This is
also not the first time that the veto power was discussed.
i) Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice - Court upheld the veto but reversed
by the US Supreme Court because of the Appropriations Bill was not
involved.
ii) Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia- rejected the veto in an Appropriations
Bill
2. NOthe veto by the President of Sec. 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and
its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill is constitutional
*The extent of itemveto power still includes the vetoing of provisions.
- Art. 6 Sec. 27- Veto power of the President
Paragraph 1 - general veto power of the President and if exercised would
veto the entire bill
Paragraph 2- the item-veto of line-vbeto allows a veto over a particular item
in an appropriations, revenue or tariff bill. The president may not veto less
than all of an item(no authority to veto part of an itemand approve the
remaining portion of that item).
- Originally referred to veto of items of appropriations bills in the Organic Act of
Aug. 29, 1916
- 1935 Constitution, Art. 6, Sec 11(2) - The veto was more expansive since it
included provisions and items in revenue and tariff bills
- 1973 Constitution- more compact version and refers to the Prime Minister as
the only official who has the power
- 1987 Constitution - verbatimreproduction of 1973 provision except that a
different public official (the President) was now involved and eliminated the
reference to a veto of a provision
- The Court held that even if there was an elimination of any reference to the
veto provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power as previously defined
by the 1935 Constitution has not changed.
- An itemin a bill relates to the particulars, details, distinct and severable parts
of the bill whereas a provision is of a more general nature.
- Arestrictive interpretation as espoused by the petitioners disregards the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of the bill may be the subject of a
separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision
in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to
the appropriation to which it relates.
- Aprovision does not relate to the entire bill.
- The exercise of veto power does not partake of a legislative power as stated
in the Bengzon case:
- The legislature has the power to enact laws while the Chief Executive has
the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat
the will of the legislature.
- The President finds its authority in the Constitution.
- The Courts indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a
veto in the same way that they presume constitutionality of an act passed by
the Legislature.
* Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriately called provisions.
- Even if assuming that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto,
Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are not provisions in the budgetary sense.
- Based on Art. 6, Sec. 25(2), a provision should relate specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Secs. 55 and 16 do not fit this requirement.
a) no relation to a particular or distinctive requirement. They apply generally
to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill.
b) disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found in the Bill.
c) vetoed sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in
respect of augmentation fromsavings rather than a budgetary appropriation.
Secs. 55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as
items for the purpose of the veto power.
*Sections 55 and 16 are inappropriate conditions and are therefore susceptible
to a veto.
- Petitioners argue that Congress is free to impose conditions in an
Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, veto powers do not
have the power to strike themout.
- These rules are settled in the sense that Congress can impose conditions on
expenditure of funds and that the Executive cannot veto a condition of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand.
- But for the rule to apply, restrictions should be in the real sense of the term.
Restrictions should exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary
sense in the schedule of expenditures. The test is appropriateness.
- Secs. 55 and 16 are held to be inappropriate conditions.
- Actually general lawmeasures more appropriate for substantive and therefore
separate legislation.
- Neither shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures.
Items reduced or disapproved by Congress are not on the enrolled bill and can
only be detected when compared with the original budgetary submittals of the
President.
* The power of augmentation and thevalidity of the veto
- The President vetoed Sections 55 and 16 because they nullified the authority
of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to
augment any itemin the General Appropriations Lawfor their respective offices
fromsavings in other items of their respective appropriations (with reference to
Art. 6, Sec. 25(5)).
- The power to augment lies dormant until authorized by law.
- The constitution allowed the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of a government
branch so as to afford considerable flexibility in the use of public funds.
- Separation of powers is endangered in no way.
- Secs. 55 and 16 prohibit this augmentation and impair the constitutional and
statutory authority of the President in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
- The special power of augmentation fromsavings is merely incorporated in the
GABill. The GABill is one of primary and specific aimto make appropriation
of money fromthe public treasury. The power of augmentation fromsavings is
not considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure.
- To sanction this practice would withhold the power fromthe Executive and
other officials and put in jeopardy the exercise of that power.
- If the legislature does believe that the exercise of the veto powers by the
executive were unconstitutional, a veto may be overriden by the votes of 2/3 of
the members of Congress. But Congress made no attempt to do so.
ATITIWV ZAMORA
TINGA; September 30, 2005
FACTS
- This is a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and declaratory relief as
taxpayers, seeking the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the Special
Provisions of RA 8760 (General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2000. Also
seeking the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO to enjoin
implementation of the questioned provision. However, the 2000 GAAhas long
been implemented, the issuance is already moot and academic. But the Court
shall pass upon the constitutional issues.
- Brief historical account of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR):
- President Aquino initiated a series of peace talks to deal with insurgency in
the Cordilleras. These dialogues focused on the establishment of an
autonomous government in the Cordilleras.
- Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras, and
Section 18, Article Xmandates the congressional enactment of the organic
acts for each of the autonomous regions.
- President Aquino promulgated E.O. No. 220 on July 15, 1987, creating the
CAR, which is the interimand preparatory body tasked to administer the
affairs of government in the Cordilleras.
-Pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, on October 23, 1989, Congress enacted
RA 6766 (An Act Providing for an Organic Act for for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region). Aplebiscite was held where the people of the Cordilleras
could ratify the Organic Act. However, the creation of an autonomous region
was overwhelmingly rejected in all of the Cordilleras except for the Ifugao
province. The Court ruled that Ifugao alone cannot validly constitute the CAR
and upheld the disapproval of the Organic Act. The Court also declared E.O.
No. 220 to be still in force and effect.
-February 15, 2000: President Estrada signed into law the 2000 GAA which
includes the assailedSpecial Provisions:
1. Use of Fund. The amounts herein appropriated shall be used to wind up
the activities and operations of the CAR, including the payment of
separation and retirement benefits of all affected officials and employees
-July 20, 2000: President Estrada issued E.O. No. 270 extending the
implementation of the winding up of operations of the CAR.
ISSUES
1. WONthe assailed Special Provisions in RA8760 is a rider and as such is
unconstitutional
2. WON the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally
amend/repeal E.O. No. 220
3. WONthe Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled
out in EO220.
HELD
1. NO the assailed Special Provisions in RA 8760 is not a rider TF it is
constitutional
a. Arider is a provisions which is alien to or not germane to the subject of the
bill in which it is incorporated. 2 provisions of the Constitution prohibit them: Art
VI: Sec 25(2) No provisions or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein and Sec 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be embraced in the title thereof
- The rule should not be construed so strictly as to tie the hands of Congress: it
simply requires that all the provisions are either appropriation items, or non-
appropriaton items which relate specifically to appropriation items.
- Test: It must be 1) Particular if it relates specifically to a distinct itemof
appropriation; 2) Unambiguous when its application is apparent on the face
of the bill and needs no reference to details/souces outside the bill; 3)
Appropriate when its subject does not necessarily have to be treated in a
separate legislation.
- The assailed provision does not constitute a rider: it passes the above test.
Ratio when a provision is particular, unambiguous, and appropriate to the
appropriations bill to which it belongs, it shall not be considered to be a rider
b. Petitioners allege:
- that instead of providing a budget for the CAR, it had the effect of
abolishing the CAR
- since a special lawcreated the CAR, the 2000 GAAis not the place for
amending or repealing a standing law.
- However, the CARwas not abolished. It has only been deactivated.
- Abolishto do away with, annul, abrogate, destroy completely, office ceases
to exist;
- Deactivate render inactive, break up by discharging or reassigning
personnel, office continues to exist, albeit dormant.
- But even if the limitation of the CARs budget had the effect of abolishing
certain offices, the Congress has he power to do so.
- creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function
- office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body,
and it may abolish the office if it sees fit.
c. The CAR created through EO 220 is not the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution. EO220 has not established an autonomous
regional government; rather, it has only created an administrative region. It can
be considered a regional coordinating agency of the National Government.
2, 3: Except for the contention that the assailedparagraph is a rider, the rest of
the arguments look into the wisdomand efficacy of said provisions. Political
questions
Still
1. Contention that Congress cant unilaterally amend or repeal EO 220:
Rejected. There is no such thing as an irrepealable law.
2. Implementation of EO220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of
funds to support CARs activities is legislative. Absent grave abuse of
discretion, the Court cannot correct the acts of the Executive or Congress.
ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL
FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- Petition for reviewof the decision of the HRET
- 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo (JA) ran for
congressman for the lone district of Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A
as winner. AS files an election protest before HRET, seeking revision and
recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts. His grounds: alleged
irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes &massive fraud.
JAfiles counter-protest questioning residence qualification of AS; dismissed by
HRET.
- HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious irregularities found. Justice
Gancaycos Report and Recommendation confirmirregularities and anomalies
engineered by some HRET officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were
consistently reduced while Syjuco was always constant
- Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JAsubmitscertified true
copies of the Revision Reports and election returns. ASsubmits over 200,000
pages of documentary evidence, mere photocopies and not certified or
authenticated by comparison with the original documents or identification by
any witness."
- In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original posture
(revision and recount of ballots) to what he calls a truly innovative and NON-
TRADITIONAL process" the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENT-BASED
EVIDENCES.
- By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which
broaden the scope of his protest, change his theory of the case or introduce
additional causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the
Tribunal), HRET ordered himto show cause why his protest should not be
dismissed.
- 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against
the three Justices-members), HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to
continue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and
thereafter to decide the case on the merits.
- JAmoved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted
thereafter.
- 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed
Decision annulling JAs proclamation, & declaring AS as the duly elected
congressman. Said decision also refers the case to COMELEC&the Office of
the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions.
- Without filing MFR, JAfiles the present case before SC.
ISSUES
1. WONHRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS precinct level document
based anomalies/evidence" theory;
b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in
which the evidence was procured; &
c. annulling election results in some contested precincts.
2. WONSyjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
HELD
1. YESHRET committed grave abuse of discretion
a. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory
- This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election protest beyond
what ASoriginally sought. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election
protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. Impropriety
of private respondents belated shift of theory was sensed by majority members
of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protestthis a clear
indication of grave abuse of discretion. No further hearings were
conductedJAsright to due process was clearly violated.
- Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same
period for the filing of the election protest
15
which, under Rule 16 of the HRET
Rules, is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The rule in an
election protest is that the protestant or counterprotestant must stand or fall
upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to
the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter
protest. Aparty is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he
stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his
theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter
aneweither in the same forumor on appeal. <principle of estoppel>
b. The kind of evidence used and howthey were procured
- Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received
which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence
can be had. Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of
the number of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of
votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority
decision, never offered in evidence by either of the parties.
- Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the
participation of any of the three (3) remaining Justices-members, declared that
10,484 of the contested signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5
of HRET Rules (all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and
presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is required to constitute a valid
quorum).
c. Nullification of election results
- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2
mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud,
irregularities or terrorism:
i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the
precinct or precincts were involved, &
ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such
fraud, irregularities or terrorism.
- Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the
duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so
conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and the
actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent fraud, mere irregularities or
omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the expression
of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results.
Corollarily, the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will
not justify rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case)
where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby, even though the
circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to punishment.
32
These
omissions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered voters
had taken place in the questioned precincts.
- General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to
rectify its error through a motion for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the
majority of the members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown, recourse
for a reconsideration of its decision becomes nugatory and an immediate
recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental principle of due
process. Aprior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if petitioners
fundamental right to due process was violated.
- Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunals own governing rules and
of even the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking
that procedural rules should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same
internal rules expressly makes the Rules of Court, Supreme Court decisions,
and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory application.
- Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of
Court and jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of
experience as the most effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial
controversy. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth
and exactness in elections as in anything else.
- Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its
majority decision in the election protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyos
proclamation as the winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is
deemed not to have been challenged at all.
2. YESSyjuco should be cited for indirect contempt
- Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of
counsel appear to seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the
Court
- Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the
language employed by private respondent for it is a well-known and
established rule that derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning
attached to themby impartial observers
Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED, and public respondent HRETs majority decision dated January 25,
1995 is SET ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been
found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby fined the amount of one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days fromreceipt of this decision.
BONDOC V PINEDA
GRINO-AQUINO; September 26, 1991
FACTS
- In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M.
Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
- On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election with alead of
3,300 votes. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed of (9)
members: 3 Justices of the Supreme Court and 6 members of the House of
Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation fromthe
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
systemrepresented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINAM. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice, SC
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice, SC
FLORENTINOP. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice, SC
HONORATOY. AQUINO Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Benguet, LDP
DAVIDA. PONCEDELEON Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Palawan, LDP
SIMEONE. GARCIA, JR. Member
Cong 2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija, LDP
JUANITOG. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Cong, 1st Dist., Davao del Sur, LDP
JOSEE. CALINGASAN Member
Cong, 4th Dist., Batangas, LDP
ANTONIOH. CERILLES Member
Cong, 2nd Dist., Zamb del Sur, (GAD, nowNP).
- July 1989Bondoc filed petition
- Oct 1990 - Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23) votes.
LDPmembers in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the
ballots cast in some precincts, delaying the finalization of the decision by at
least (4) months. The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted
in increasing Bondocs lead over Pineda to 107 votes. Cong Camasura voted
with the SCJustices and Cong Cerilles to proclaimBondoc the winner of the
contest.
- March 4, 1991 Cong Camasura revealed to Cong. Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr.,
LDP Sec Gen that he voted for Bondoc in the final tally in the case. This
revelation stirred a hornets nest in the LDPwhich went into a flurry of plotting
appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
- March 5, 1991 - HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on
March 4, 1991 in HRET Case No. 25.
- March 13, 1991 Cong. Cojuangco informed Cong. Camasura by letter that
onFeb 28, 1991 LDPhad already expelled himand Cong Benjamin Bautista
for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of "Danding"
Cojuangco, and for having invited LDPmembers in Davao del Sur to join said
political party. Cong Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the
ouster of the two congressmen fromthe LDP, and asked the HoR, through the
Speaker, to take note of it especially in matters where party membership is a
prerequisite.
- March 14, 1991- the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Jus Herrera, received a
letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Sec Gen of the HoR,
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter fromthe LDP, the HoR
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Cong
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal.
- Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the CJ and Assoc
Jus of the SCof this "distressing development and asked to be relieved from
their assignments in the HRET because promulgation of the decision
previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted. The decision
reached (5 to 4 vote) may nowbe expected to be overturned on a motion for
reconsideration by the party-litigant which would have been defeated. It was
also said that:
> Proportional representation in the Tribunal (Art VI, Sec 17 Const) should
be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in
the 1935 Const: (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and (3) of the
party having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component
consisting of three (3) justices fromthe SC
>Suggestions:
+The Senate Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the HoR
and vice versa. So that there would be lesser chances of non-judicial
elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.
+ There should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated
should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political
parties, to insure their independence and objectivity. (like thats possible)
- During HRET open session, Tribunal issued a resolution canceling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25 because the decision lacks
the concurrence of the 5 members without Cong Camasuras vote as required
by Sec 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
- March 19, 1991 - SCdeclined the request of the justices to be relieved of
their membership in the tribunal and directed themto do their duties. The court
even said that all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by
purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before themand that in
the contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, sit in the
Tribunal no longer as reps of their political parties but as impartial judges. The
termof office of every member thereof should be considered co-extensive with
the corresponding legislative termand may not be legally terminated except
only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not
including political disloyalty.
- March 21, 1991 - petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed
by Dr. Bondoc against Reps Pineda, Palacol, Camasura, Jr., or any other rep
who may be appointed ViceRep and HRET praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the HoR of March 13, 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the nomination of Rep. Camasura, Jr. to HRET
2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining whomsoever may be designated in
place of Camasura fromassuming and discharging functions as a member
of the HRET
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering Camasura to immediately reassume
and discharge his functions as a member of the HRET; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
- The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition
>Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
> Cong Marciano M. Pinedas plea for the dismissal of the petition as the
Congress is the sole authority that nominates and elects fromits members.
HRET allegedly has the sole power to remove any member whenever the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion
fromthe political party; that a Tribunal members termof office is not co-
extensive with his legislative term, for if a member of the Tribunal who
changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political
affiliation would be completely nullified; and that the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura fromthe LDP, is "purely a party affair" of the LDP
and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal
is the sole prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives,
hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of judicial review.
> Cong Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of
action against himbecause he has not yet been nominated by the LDPfor
membership in the HRET. Moreover, the petition failed to implead the
House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House,
not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasuras
membership in the HRET.
>Sol Gen also argued that the inclusion of the HRET as a party respondent
is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in
violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the HoRof withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Camasura as a member of
the HRET.
- Bondoc replied that HRET acknowledged that decision by canceling the
promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his prejudice. Bondoc also
explained that Cong Palacol was impleaded as one of the respondents
because after the HoR had announced the termination of Cong Camasuras
membership in the HRET several newspapers reported that the HoR would
nominate and elect Palacol totake Camasuras seat in the Tribunal.
ISSUE
WONthe HoRcan interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the
HRET through "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority
party
HELD
- Sec 17 reechoes Sec 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the
provision on the representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which
is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties,
instead of equal representation of three members fromeach of the first and
second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature.
- The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of
the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives
(Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647,
February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as anonpartisancourt.
It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians.
- To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must beindependent.
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific
purpose of determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
+Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the
HRET.
The resolution of the HoRis a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative
of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest
between Pineda and Bondoc.
+ Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence even independence fromthe political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
+Expulsion of Congressman Camasuraviolates his right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET as "sole judge" of congressional election contests are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for
a just cause, such as, the expiration of the termof office, his death, permanent
disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for "party
disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to showthat Congressman Camasura
has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from
the LDPand fromthe HRET was not for a valid cause; hence, it violated his
right to security of tenure.
- Since the expulsion of Cong Camasura fromthe House Electoral Tribunal by
the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to
unjustly interfere with the tribunals disposition of the Bondoc case and to
deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunals decision in his favor, the action of
the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
- Ratio The House Electoral Tribunal, being an agency independent of the
legislature, may not be interfered with by the House
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is granted. The decision of the HoRwithdrawing the nomination and rescinding
the election of Cong Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House
Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and voidab initiofor being violative of
the Constitution, and Cong Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to
his position as a member of the HRET. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018
dated March 14, 1991, canceling the promulgation of the decision in HRET
Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside.
Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that
decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court,
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby
declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of
copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs
against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [dissent]
-A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of
government are distributed among three (3) great departments. Each separate
from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its
authority directly fromthe fundamental law.
- This does not extend to the point that those in authority in one department
can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant
to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other
department.
- The HoR has the power to nominate the members of the House Electoral
Tribunal provided that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
- The power to appoint or designate a member of the House of
Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must
necessarily include the power to remove said member.
- The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act
is, does the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done
and not whether the House of Representatives should have done what it has
done.
- The judiciary cannot question a legislative act done within the constitutional
authority of the legislature The judicial department has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, taken in
the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the Constitution. To hold
otherwise would be to invalidate the principle of separation of powers.
SARMIENTO[dissent]
- I believe that the questions as Jus Padilla raised it can the Court annul an
act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? is a political
question and a question in which the Court cannot intervene.
- The jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down excesses of
any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle
of separation of powers.
- Evidently, Congressman Camasuras ouster fromthe Tribunal was a result of
political maneuvers within the lower house. This Court, however, is above
politics and Justices should be the last persons to get involved in the "dirty"
world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.
LOZADA V COMELEC
DE CASTRO; January 27, 1983
FACTS
- Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada and Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus as a
representative suit
27
to compel the respondent COMELEC to call a special
election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim
Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution
28
.
- Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and
a transient voter of Quezon City, who desires to run for the position in the
Batasan Pambansa; while Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to
petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the
1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are
deeply concerned with their duties as citizens, and that they filed this petition in
behalf of all other Filipinos since subjects are of profound and general interest.
ISSUES
1. WONpetitioners had standing to file for petition for mandamus
2. WONSChas jurisdiction to entertain this petition
3. WON Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution applies to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa
HELD
1. petitioners had no standing to file for petition for mandamus
- As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein
is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. Action complained of is the
inaction of the COMELECto call a special election, and therefore involves no
expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may
include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of
public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.
- As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to
qualify themto maintain and prosecute the present petition, for to have legal
standing is to have personal and substantial interest in the case, or sustain
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Interest held in common by all
members of the public is of abstract nature (as is the injury that will be
sustained) and may not be used as standing to sue. Concrete injury, whether
27
for andinbehalf of thosewhowishtoparticipateintheelectionirrespectiveof partyaffiliation
28
ArticleVIII, Sec.5(2): IncaseavacancyarisesintheBatasangPambansaeighteenmonthsor more
beforearegular election, theCommissiononElectionshall call aspecial electiontobeheldwithinsixty
(60) daysafter thevacancyoccurstoelect theMember toservetheunexpiredterm.
actual or threatened, is that indispensable element for one to have personality
in a dispute.
2. SChas no jurisdiction to entertain this petition
- The Supreme Courts jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by
certiorari the latters decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in
Article XII-C, Section II of the 1973 Constitution
29
. In this case, there is no such
decision, order or ruling. Even fromthe standpoint of an action for mandamus,
with the total absence of a showing that COMELEChas unlawfully neglected or
refused the performance of a ministerial duty, it is not shown that petitioners
have a clear right to the holding of a special election which is equally the clear
and ministerial duty of COMELEC.
- Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for
special elections, and this power of the may neither be subject to mandamus
by the courts much less may COMELECcompel the Batasan to exercise its
power of appropriation. Fromthe role Batasan Pambansa has to play in the
holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses
thereof, it would seemthat the initiative on the matter must come fromsaid
body, not the COMELEC. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive
prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled
through a petition for mandamus.
4. Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2) in the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim
Batasang Pambansa
- The cited provision of the 1973 Constitution is not intended to apply to the
InterimBatasang Pambansa.
- The strongest reason for this is the fact that the InterimBatasang Pambansa
was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, as well
as the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and the members or the
Senate and House of Representatives of Congress under the 1935
Constitution. With such number of representatives representing each
congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt
absolutely no need for filling vacancies occurring in the Interim National
Assembly, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence.
- The provision is intended to apply to the regular Batasang Pambansa,
because a province or representative district would have only one
representative in said body. The need to fill up the InterimBatasang Pambansa
is neither imperative nor urgent, as there would always be adequate
representation for every province which forms only part of a certain region,
specially considering that the Body is only transitory in character.
- That the provision is found in the main body of the Constitution and not in
included in Transitory Provisions adds to the intention that the provision applies
only to the regular, and not interim, Batasang Pambansa.
DecisionPetition dismissed.
PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION
FERNANDO; July 23, 1971
FACTS
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the
Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato.
He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such.
As his appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to
the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was
29
Anydecision, order or rulingof theCommissionmaybebrought totheSupremeCourt oncertiorari by
theaggrievedpartywithinthirtydaysfromhisreceipt of acopythereof.
unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman
of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a
congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7,
1966, the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as
municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator
Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its
Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the
appointment in viewof derogatory information which he had received.
ISSUES
1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on
Appointments (CA), without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a
confirmation duly made of anad interimappointment.
2. WONthe issue is a justiciable question, with the CAbeing an independent
organ of the Constitution.
HELD
1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force
and effect.
Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter
of then Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to
reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it
was not approved by the body as a whole.
Reasoning
a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted
Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which
reads: Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be
reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day
after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a
reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final
disposition of such a motion. Holding of the Court was that the mere filing
of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a
confirmation. In the case, Aldeguers (respondent in Altarejos case) theory
would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it
would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the
necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the
members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised
Rules of the Commission.
In case of an adjournment sine diethe period for filing the motion for
reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for
reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and
therefore, has no effect whatsoever.
What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a
motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and
approved.
b. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the CAor until the next adjournment of Congress.
- A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative
requiring confirmation by the CAwhen Congress is in session and when it is in
recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of
the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interimappointments, the
appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval
by the CAor until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a
rejection by the CAor nonaction on its part.
2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the
political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts are called
upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded.
- Although the CAis not a power in our tripartite systemof government, it is to
all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the
limits of its authority, an independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its
power to approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the
Philippines is exempt fromjudicial supervision and interference, except on a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will
constitute a denial of due process.
AVELINO V CUENCO
PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949
RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC
FACTS
- Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial reviewof internal affairs of
the legislature. The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a
Senate President, in viewof the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the Senates constitutional power to elect its own president
Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo
Taada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges
30
against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the
session and called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was
confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States, all the Senators
were present.
31
- TAADAsought to be recognized, but AVELINOand his followers prevented
TAADAfromdelivering his privilege speech. Acommotion later ensued, upon
which AVELINOand 9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the
Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
The remaining senators unanimously approved, among others, a resolution
declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designating
Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the
President of the Philippines recognized CUENCOas acting Senate President.
- Hence, the present petition, AVELINOasking the Court to declare himthe
rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO.
ISSUE
WONSChas jurisdiction over the subject matter
HELD
NO(6-4 vote)
Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the newSenate President is a
political question.
Reasoning
- The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of
the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with,
nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are
at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If the
30
BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government
(particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a member);
questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINOs assumption of
office; andjustificationof electoral fraud.
31
Similar tothe1987Const, theSenateiscomposedof 24senatorsunder the1935Const.
majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court.
- The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea
that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state
of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people
as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the
recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCOmakes it advisable,
to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar
nature.
DecisionPetition dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO [dissent]
- There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The power to adjourn
is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective
prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact official
business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is
established in a democratic social order.
- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or
impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one
which authorizes thepresiding officer to decreemotu propio said adjournment,
and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the
United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize
the existence of such a provision.
- AVELINOalleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a
senator to said effect was properly made and met with no objection. The
evidence, however, fails to support AVELINOs claim. The circumstances lead
us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINOand
his supporters fromthe session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least,
delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against AVELINO
and of his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCOsgroup.
- The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINOgroup walkout) had no
valid quorumto transact business. The Constitution provides: Amajority of
each House shall constitute a quorumto do business [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2),
1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the
majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the
above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of Congress.
The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of themcannot be less
than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been
the majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.
FERIA [concur]
- If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it
validly constituted? Yes. At the beginning of the rump session there were at
least 14 senators. Also, in viewof the absence fromthe country of one senator,
12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum,
"the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a
majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12)
of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration
FACTS
- InAvelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent toAvelino I (i.e., refusal
of the Avelino group to return to the session hall despite the compulsory
process served upon them), reversed its original decision and nowassumed
jurisdiction over the case
ISSUES
1. WONSCwill assume jurisdiction over this case
2. WONelection of Cuenco as Senate President is valid
HELD
1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the casein the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention.
2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly
upon the grounds stated by Feria [and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions,
to declare that there was a quorumat the session where CUENCOwas elected
acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the result of the
majoritys pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing fromthe evidence that
any newsession with a quorumwould result in CUENCOs election as Senate
President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the
constitutional] formalismby issuing compulsory processes against senators of
the AVELINOgroup, but to no avail, because of the latters persistent efforts to
block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, [the Chief
Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to satisfy the
requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity
with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCOhas been
legally elected as Senate President and thepetition is dismissed.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERIA [concur]
I maintain my opinion that there was a quorumin the (rump) session. Among
others, the amendment of the quorumprovision from"the majority of all the
members of the National Assembly constitute a quorumto do business," into "a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorumto do business," shows the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the
number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or
incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not
incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or
absence fromthe jurisdiction of the House or for other causes which make
attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive
process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to
attend the session in order to constitute a quorum.
PERFECTO [concur]
- The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the
quorumof the National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as
regards the Houses of Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as
Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of
the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of
said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the majority
of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all themembers.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact
mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can
never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is
composed of 24 senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than
thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units.
No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone
that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers
combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined
10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the
idea of superiority. Majority presupposes the existence of a total and, in the
present case, the total number of 24 senators composing the Senate.
- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are nowinclined to conclude
that for the purpose of choosing CUENCOmerely as Acting Senate President,
the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum. The Constitution
provides: Amajority of each House shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may
provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number"
referred to has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform
the functions specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one
among their number. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number"
has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent members," so as to
avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said
"smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a
quorumfor the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act
until normalcy is restored.
- At the hearing of this case, CUENCOmanifested that he was looking for an
opportunity to renounce the position of Acting Senate President, and that if
AVELINOshould attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the
presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the
sessions. AVELINOs refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding
CUENCOs commitment to allow himto preside over them, can and should
logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.
OSMENA V PENDATUN
BENGZON; October 28, 1960
FACTS
- On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., in a privilege speech
delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against
the President. The House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59,
created a special committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President. It summoned Osmea to appear before it to
substantiate his charges.
- On July 14, 1960, Osmea filed with the Supreme Court a petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the
Special Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said
members of the special committee be enjoined fromproceeding in accordance
with it, particularly the portion authorizing themto require himto substantiate
his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so,
he must showcause why the House should not punish him. Osmea alleged:
(1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for
words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech
constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3)
supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took up
other business, andRule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if
other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words
in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by
the House
- Aware of the petition, thespecial committee continued to performits task, and
after giving Osmena a chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July
18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting
on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its
session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring himguilty as recommended, and
suspending himfromoffice for fifteen months.
- Thereafter, Osmea took the additional position that the House has no power,
under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
- On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the
jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of
Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House Resolution
No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its
session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the sole
respondents-had thereby ceased to exist.
ISSUES
1. WONthe Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary
immunity for words spoken in the House
2. WONthe Speech of Osmea constituted unruly behavior for which he could
be punished
3. WON Osmea can be held to answer for or be censured by the House,
given that other business had intervened after gave the speech inquestion
4. WONthe House has the power to suspend its members
HELD
1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of
Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States, wherein the provision has always been understood to mean that
although exempt fromprosecution or civil actions for their words uttered
in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned
in Congress itself.
- Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedomof expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before thelegislative body itself whenever his words and conduct
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not
only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeas conduct constituted
disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction,
which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of
the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by
this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
- "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to
such limitations as are found in the Republics Constitution. So that any power
deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the
Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)
3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such
approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to
standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conformto parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure."
4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress
have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power
of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members,
including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the
United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that
the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in
a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
DecisionPetition DISMISSED.
ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974
FACTS
- Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction
- HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without
amendments in the House of Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the
Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities
headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested a minor amendment on HB
9266. However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate during
its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto Sen. Tolentinos substantial
amendment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM.
- After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoRthat HB. No.
9266 had been passed by the Senate with amendments. However, the
attached amendments were not Sen. Tolentinos but Sen. Roxasamendments.
The HoRsignified its approval of HBNo. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and
printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the Secretary of the
HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate
President. The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures by way of approval
enacted the bill into R.A. No. 4065
32
- The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA, then Sen.
Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of HB9266 signed by
the President is not the version passed by the Senate since it did not contain
the amendments he made. The Senate President then informed the President
that the enrolled copy of the signed HB9266 was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect, and could not
validate the bill which was not the version approved by the Congress. The
President then withdrewhis signature on the HB9266.
32
AnAct DefiningthePowers, RightsandDutiesof theVice-Mayor of theCityof Manila, Further
Amendingfor thePurposeSection10and11of RANo. 409, OtherwiseknownastheRevisedCharter of
theCityof Manila
- With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and the President
of the Philippines, Villegas issued circulars ordering city government officials
and operators of business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA
4065. He likewise ordered the Chief of Police to recall the police officers
assigned to the vice-mayor presumably under the said RA.
- As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for
Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of
RA4065.
- Respondents argued that RA4056 never became lawsince (1) it was not the
bill approved by Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the
enrolled bill should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor
Villegas was going abroad on an official trip, Court issued restraining order for
Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to himas Acting Mayor under the
RA4065.
ISSUES
1. WONthe Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine
2. WONthe attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the
bill and validates it into a law
3. WONin the absence of the attestation of the presiding officers, the journal
entry in the Journals of Congress could constitute proof of due enactment
4. WONRA4065 was duly enacted andtherefore did not become a law
HELD
1. Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals
are conclusive upon the Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended
by Act. No. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a bill.
Obiter
- compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to
resolve the issue of WONa resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing
an amendment to the 1935 Constitution to be appended as an ordinance
thereto had been passed by a vote for three-fourths of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution, saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doctrine)
which is not in the province of the judiciary.
- using J. Bengzons separate opinion in the same case, J. Makalintal said that
the case at bar is justiciable since enrolled copy of the resolution and the
legislative journals are conclusive upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act
190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of due enactment of provisions of
acts.
- basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and independent
departments which requires the judicial department to accept, as having
passed the Congress, all bills authenticated by it.
2. RatioNO. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking process and the
certification/attestation of the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by
the Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect
already present upon it.
Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of authentication; signify
the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly
approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval
3. RatioYES. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the Constitution
for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.
Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in the Constitution
as a proof of due enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the Congress
proceedings [comparison of Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec
10(4) = Art VI, sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)]
4. Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue regarding the
enrolled bill doctrine, (2) that the Court could use the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress and, in the absence of the latter, the records
of the proceedings of the Congress entered into the Journals of Congress
as proof of the due enactment of RA4065 since the lawis deemed enacted
after the passage of the bill in the 3
rd
reading and the attestation of the
presiding officers just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that,
upon referring to the journal entries of the proceedings of congress, the
Court discovered that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced
to theHBbut were not incorporated in the printed text which was signed by
the President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President of the Philippines
and of the Senate already withdrewtheir signatures, then RA4065 was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.
DecisionRA4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. TROmade permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take
part (I dont knowthe difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]
MARTINEZ V MORFE
FERNANDO; March 24, 1972
FACTS
- Petitioners Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates of the
1971 Constitutional Convention facing criminal prosecution
o Martinez was charged with falsification of a public document for stating
under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to the Constitutional
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth he was born
on June 20, 1946
o Bautista was accused of violating Section 51 of the Revised Election
Code in that he gave and distributed free of charge, food, drinks, and
cigarettes at two public meetings
- Both wanted the respective warrants of arrest issued against them to be
quashed, by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates,
traceable to Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with
Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
ISSUES
1. WONthe petitioners are immune fromarrest
2. WONSection 15 Article VI of the Constitution should be construed together
with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby expanding congressional
immunity
HELD
1. No. Parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal arrests.
Under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the
1971 Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative.
Article VI Section 15 of the Constitution provides: The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of peace, be privileged fromarrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning fromthe same; and for any speech o debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
Immunity fromarrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony
and breach of peace
o Treason-levying war against the Republic and adhering to enemies
and giving themaid and comfort
o Felony-an act or omission punishable by law
o Breach of peace-covers any offense whether defined by RPCor any
special statute
History of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to
exempt members of the National Assembly fromcriminal arrest
The power or right of the State to claimprivileges is due to the fact that it
has the right to carry out its function without obstacle
In England, operation of parliamentary privilege excludes all crimes,
applies only to prosecutions of civil nature
There is a full recognition of the necessity to have members of the
Congress, and likewise, delegates of the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
responsibilities
However, when it comes to freedomfromarrest, it would amount to the
creation of a privileged class if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be immune during their attendance in Congress and
in going to and returning fromthe same.
A legislator or a delegate can performhis functions efficiently and well
without the need for any transgression of criminal law.
If a legislator or delegate is facing criminal prosecution, he should be
treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that a crime should not go unpunished.
2. No. Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code is inoperative.
Article 145 penalizes a public officer or employee who shall, during the
session of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in
case such member has committed a crime punishable under the RPCby
a penalty higher than prision mayor.
RPCtook effect on January 1, 1932, before the enforcement of the 1935
Constitution
Art. XVI, Sec, 2 of the 1935 Constitution states: All laws of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration the Commonwealth
of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines
Article 145 which accords legislators a generous treatment exempting
themfromarrest even if warranted under the penal law, is inconsistent
withthe Constitution, and is consequently inoperative.
JIMENEZ V CABANGBANG
CONCEPCION; August 3, 1966
FACTS
- Ordinary Civil Action for the recovery of several sums of money by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant
Bartolome Cabangbang
- Defendant moved to dismiss upon ground that letter is a privileged
communication and not libelous since he was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of House Committee on National Defense
- The letter in question is an open letter to the President of the Philippines
dated Nov 14, 1958 while congress was presumably not in session.
- Defendant caused the publication of the letter in several newpapers.
- The open letter was an expos on allegedly three operational plans. The first
plan is said to be an insidious plan or a massive political build up of then Sec.
of Natl Defense, Jesus Vagas, by propagandizing and glamorizing himin such
a way as to be prepared to become candidate for President in 1961. (Plan II
Acoup detat;Plan III Amodification of Plan I)
- The letter also implicated that the planners have under their control the
following : (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez , (2)Lt.Col. Jose Lukban,(3) Capt. Carlos
Albert, (4)Col Fidel Llamas, (5) Lt. Col Jose regala, (6)Maj. Jose Reyna.It
is of course possible that the officers mentioned above are unwitting tools of
the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge.
- Lower Court dismissed
- Petitioners appealed
ISSUES
1. WONthe publication is a privileged communication
2. (if not) WONit is libelous
HELD
1. NO. The publication in question is not absolutely privileged. It was an open
letter to the President published by the defendant when the Congress was not
in session. And in thus causing it to be published he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any House
Committee.
- The phrase speech or debate therein as used in Article VI, Sec 15 of the
1935 Constitution refers to utterances made by congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress while it is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress whether it is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the discharge of their duties as members of Congress
and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to performits function as
such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
2. NO. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the
planners, the defendant likewise added that it was possible that plaintiffs are
unwitting tools of the plan which they may have absolutely no knowledge. The
statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling themto
recover damages.
PELAEZ V AUDITORGENERAL
CONCEPCION; September 24, 1965
FACTS
- During the period fromSeptember 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating 33 municipalities.
- RACSection 68
- provides, among others, that the President may by executive order define
the boundary of municipality, increase or diminish its territory provided that
the authorization of the Congress of the Phil shall first be obtained.
- The petitioner argued that these EOs are null and void because of RA2370
Section 3which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries
altered nor their names changed except by Acts of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in
areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality in
which the proposed barrio is situated.
- Procedure Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as
taxpayer, instituted the present civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as
his representatives and agents, frompassing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by
said municipalities.
- The mayors who were adversely affected by the EOs intervened in the case.
- Atty. Enrique Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando appeared as amici
curiae.
ISSUES
1. WONthe executive orders are null and void upon the ground that Section 68
of RAC, which was the basis of the EOs has been impliedly repealed by RA
2730.
2. WONthe power of the President to create municipalities under RACamount
to an undue delegation of legislative power.
HELD
1. Yes. RA2370s denial of the presidential authority to create a newbarrio
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios.
2. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentiallylegislative
in nature. There could only be a due delegation of legislative power if the law
is (a) complete in itself it must set forth the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a standardthe limits of which
the delegate must conformin the performance of his functions.
- Sec 28 of RACdoes not meet these well settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does
not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of
the power the President.
Reasoning
a. adherence to precedent (Schechter Poultry Corp vs. US)
- It was held here that in Recovery Act there was an undue delegation of
legislative power because it supplies no standards for any trade, industry or
activity.
b. Constitutional provision (incompatible and inconsistent with RAC)
- Sec 10 of Art VII of 1935 Constitution ordains:
The President shall havecontrol of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments
as may be provided byLAW. (take note: such control does not include the
authority either to abolish or create)
Decision The Executive Orders are declared null and void ab initioand the
respondent are permanently restrained frompassing in audit any expenditure
of public funds in implementation of said Eos or any disbursement by the
municipalities concerned.
ARNAULT V NAZARENO
OZAETA; July 18, 1950
FACTS
- This refers to two land deals entered into by the Philippine government as
follows:
1. BUENAVISTAESTATE
- The Philippine government leased fromSan Juan de Dios Hospital for twenty
five years the Buenavista estate and had an option to purchase the samefor P
3.0 million. This purchase option was exercised by the then occupation republic
by tendering the owner the sumof P3.0 million and, on its rejection, depositing
the said funds in Court on June 21, 1944 together with the accrued rentals of P
324,000.
- San Juan de Dios on June 29, 1946 sold this same property to Ernest H. Burt,
an non-resident American for P5,000,000 with the initial downpayment of P
10,000 with the balance payable under very favorable terms. Burt was unable
to comply with the terms agreed.
2. TAMBOBONGESTATE
- On May of 1946, the same Burt purchase fromPhilippine Trust Corporation,
the Tambobong estate for P1.2 million with a downpayment of P10,000.00
and terms which are as generuous as those fromSan Juan de Dios. There was
however no other payment received fromBurt.
- The Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration,
acquired this same property fromits original owner for the sumof P750,000
and subsequently instituted a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and
cancellation of his contract of purchase with Philippine Trust for non payment.
The Court of First Instance in this case ordered the cancellation of Burts title
and the issuance of a new one under the name of Rural Progress
Administration.
- For one reason or another, despite the fact the Philippine government already
owned both the above estate, it again bought the same fromBurt for a total
consideration of P5,000,000 (P4.5 million for Buenavista and P500,000 for
Tambobong). The government paid initially P1,000,000 for Buenavista and the
full amount of P500,000 for the Tambobong estate through two corporations
acting as Burts attorneys-in-fact. These two were represented in the trasaction
by one and the same person, Jean L. Arnault.
- It was also brought out that the Rural Progress Administration was headed at
that time by the Justice secretary who was at the same time Chairman of the
Philippine National Bank, the institution that lent the funds to Rural Progress.
- The transactions resulted into a public outcry which led into the Philippine
Senate adopting Resolution 8 which created a special committee to investigate
the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal.
- The committee was tasked, among others, with determining:
a. the validity, honesty, propriety of the purchase
b. the fairness of the purchase price
c. the parties involved/responsible for the deal
- During the public hearings of the Committee, various witnesses were called.
Among themand apparently the most important was Jean Arnault, the person
who represented Burt in the transactions.
- During the said hearing, Arnault confirmed receiving the money from the
government and withdrawing, in cash, P440,000 which he gave to someone
on instruction of Burt. When asked to identifythe person he gave the money to,
he replied that he did not know his name despite the fact that he met the
person on many occasions. When pressed to answer, he also said that
answering the question might incriminate him. Based on this refusal, the
senateapproved a resolution on May 15, 1950 arraigning himfor contempt and
subsequently found himguilty of the charge. He was committed to the custody
of the Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals the name of the person he
gave the money to. The Senate adjourned three days later. The work of the
Committee however was extended via Resolution 16.
- Arnault filed an original action for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus
with the Supreme Court to obtain his release cited the following grounds:
a. the Senatehas no power to punish himfor contempt since the requested
information is not material to the intended legislation and his refusal to
answer has not impeded or obstructed the legislated process. The Senate
has already approved bills related to the transactions.
b. the Senate lacks the authority to commit him in contempt for a term
beyond its legislative session.
c. the information sought will be self-incriminating
- rior to discussing the issues, the Supreme Court went into the general
principles of lawwith regard the power of either house of Congress to punish a
person not a member for contempt as this case is the first of its kind to be tried
under the Philippine constitution. In so doing, the Supreme Court had to draw
fromAmerican precedents in recognition of the fact that the Constitution of the
Philippines were patterned after largely American institutions and practices.
The discussions were as follows:
a. There is no expressed provisions in the constitution which grant power to
either House to investigate or exact testimonies to exercise legislative
function. However, this power of inquiry, and the process to enforce it, is a
necessary element to enable the body to wisely and effectively performtheir
respective legislative functions. In the absence of information that it
requires, Congress has no other recourse but to get the same fromothers
who have them. At times, the information required are not entirely accurate
or complete. Given this, Congress has the implied coercive to obtain such
information.
b. The power to compel is limited to information required in a matter into
which Congress has jurisdiction to inquire.
ISSUES
WONthe writ of Habeas Corpus should be granted
HELD
a. The requested information is needed to comply with the direction of the
senate as contained in Resolution Nos. 8 & 16 to secure the names of the
persons responsible for the transaction. The materiality of the question asked
in the public hearing should be determined by its direct relation to the matter
being inquired into and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The only time that the Supreme Court may interfere with the Senate
is when a petitioner is being forced to answer questions which are not pertinent
to the matter inquiry. In this case and citing McGrain vs Daugherty, Congress
would be guilty of a clear abuse of authority in the exercise of its power. As to
whether the information sought to be elicited is material to an proposed
legislation, the Court could not say as this is not within their scope.
- Citing the caseRe: Chapman, where the petitioner was jailed for contempt of
the US Senate for refusing to answer questions with regard accounts of
Senators in his company, the Supreme Court held that the Philippine Senate
has the authority to compel Arnault and if he so refuses to give the information,
also the power find himin contempt and to imprison himuntil he complies with
said requirement.
b. The power of the Senate to commit Arnault to prison does not end with the
terminationof the legislative session. The opinion of Justice Malcolmwas cited
with regard theCandido Lopez case where he opines that the imprisonment of
Lopez terminates when the House of Representatives adjourns. Citing however
the McGrain case again, the Court said that, unlike the House of
Representatives which losses all its members every four years (hence its term
is only four years), the Senate is deemed as a continuing body whose
members are elected for a six year termand are so divided that only a third of
the seats become vacant every two years. Hence, the power of the Senate to
hold Arnault is a continuing power. The only caveat of the Supreme Court in
this case is that if the Senate disregards the proper limitation to jail parties in
contempt, the remedy is with the Court.
c. Arnaults claimto self incrimination cannot be sustained citing Mason vs US
as a precedent. The Court must be given the chance to determine fromall the
facts and circumstances whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer
any question which could incriminate him. Arnaults testimony was obviously
false. He obviously knewthe name of the person he gave the money to. His
refusal to testify truthfully is punishable with contempt.
DecisionPetition is denied
SEPARATE OPINION
TUASON [dissent]
- The power of the legislative body to punish for contempt is based on the
necessity for its attainment of the ends. The power is however not absolute.
And this is precisely where disagreement occur.
- Justice Tuason is of the opinionthat the question being asked has no relation
whatsoever to the contemplated legislation. Astated reason for the insistence
on getting an answer to the question as to who received the money is
supposedly to vindicate or clear the names of the persons suspected of getting
the money (Antonio Quirino, one of the suspects, is the brother of President
Quirino). The Senate is not the proper forumfor such vindication. The Senate
investigation seems to have only one objective and this is to prepare the way
for court action since they could not expect the Justice department to take the
initiative to investigate and prosecute the responsible parties as it seems that
the Secretary of the Justice department had a hand in the transaction. This is
not the a duty of the Legislative department.
- The Committees report has been submitted to the entire Senate. And as a
matter of fact three bills were passed by the Senate in connection with the
investigation. This being the case there is no need to extract names. The
importance of names is when it comes to a criminal prosecution.
- In ending, Justice Tuason stated that the investigation of the Senate is
commendable and legal. His main objection lies in the fact that the Senate has
overstepped its authority and trespassed on the territory of other braches of
government when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is
unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone moot.
LIDASAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
SANCHEZ; October 25, 1967
FACTS
- On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247,
known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute,
reproduced in haec verba, reads:
SECTION1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-
bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and
constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province
to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The
seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the newmunicipality
shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-seven general elections for
local officials.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
- It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalumjust mentioned are
within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del
Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of Parang, Cotabato, prays that
Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelecs resolutions
of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the same for
electoral purposes, be nullified.
ISSUES
1. WONthe title of RA4790 conforms with the constitutional requirement that
the subject of a bill shall be expressed in the title NO
2. WONRA 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in
Lanao del Sur NO
3. WONpetitioner has legal standing to challenge the statute YES
HELD
1. The title - "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of
Lanao del Sur" 8- projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there
that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this
newLanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. Such title
did not informthe members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did
not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away
fromtheir towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del
Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill.
2. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder
valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. But
when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended themas a whole, and that if all
could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue
independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which
are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. When the
foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the
twenty-one barrios- not nine barrios- was in the mind of the proponent thereof.
That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself, thereafter enacted
into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in
the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a
number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to progressive
community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain
an independent municipality, still apply to a motely group of only nine barrios
out of the twenty-one?
3. Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections His
right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to a newtown is affected.
He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different fromhis actual
residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are formed into the newtown; he may prefer to remain in
the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the
rights and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even knowthe candidates
of the newtown; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone of them;
he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be
shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community affected
thereby, 16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote
on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a
suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
MILLER V MARDO
BARRERA; July 31, 1961
FACTS
- These are different cases taken together as they present only one identical
question
- 1
st
case: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint against Bill Miller at the DoL,
claiming that he is a driver of Miller and was arbitrarily dismissed without
separation pay
- Miller filed petition for prohibition against Hearing Officer Mardo of the DoL on
ground that HOhas no jurisdiction to hear and decide on the case
- Court rendered decision though that Reorg. Plan 2-Adid not repeal Judiciary
Act that conferred to CFI original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money
claims re violations of labor standards
- 2
nd
case: Cresencio Estano filed complaint at the DoL against Chin Hua
Trading Co., for not being paid overtime and vacation leave pay as a driver in
the company
- same circumstances as 1
st
case, and court issued permanent injunction
against hearing the cases by the Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A is null
and void.
- 3
RD
case: Numeriana Raganas filed with CFI a complaint against Sen Bee
Trading Company for being underpaid, not being paid overtime, without sick
leave and vacation leave pay, as a seamstress
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and insisted that CFI does not have
jurisdiction as money claims must be filed with Regional Office of DoL under
Reorg. Plan 2-A
- 4
th
case: Vicente Romero filed case against Sia Seng at the DoL Sia Leng did
noy\t file an answer and a decision was rendered in favor of Romero. But Labor
Administrator Hernando refused to issue the writ of execution of the ecision as
he believed that Sia Seng deserved to be heard
they insist as well that Reorg. Plan is not validly passed as a statute and
unconstitutional
- 5
th
case: Mariano Pabillare filed at the DoL a complaint against Fred Wilson
and Co., as he was summarily dismissed wihout cause, without separation pay,
and without sufficient notice.
- They moved to dismiss as it is only an administrative body, with no power
to adjudicate money claims
- Certiorari, prohibition and injuction was filed as well that Reorg Plan is
null and void insofar as it vest original exclusive jurisdiction over money
claims
ISSUES
1. WONReorganization Plan 20-A, prepared and submitted under the authority
of RA997 as amended by RA1241, is valid, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to
the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor to decide on claims of laborers
for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
2. WONReorganization Plan 20-Awas validly passed by Congress
HELD
1. No it is not valid.
- While the Reorganization Commission could create functions, it referred
merely to administrative and not judicial functions such as deciding on money
claims. Judicial power rests exclusively on the judiciary
- While legislature may confer administrative boards quasi-judicial powers, it
must be incident to the exercise of administrative dunctions
- Conferment of quasi-judicial functions cannot be implied froma mere grant of
power to createfunctionsin connection with reorganization of the Executive
2. No it was not validly passed by Congress
- Alawis not passed by mere silence or non-action of Congress even if it be
stated in Sec 6(a) of RA997
- It is contrary to well-settled and well-understood parliamentary law- that two
houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations and the
determination of the one upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other.
TANADA V TUVERA
ESCOLIN; April 24, 1985
FACTS
- Petition to reviewthe decision of the Executive Assistant to the President.
- Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IVof the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. The respondents would have this
case dismissed on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality to bring
this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns
a public right and its object is to compel public duty, they need not showany
specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication in the OGis not
a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE
WONpublication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the
effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates
HELD
Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern &
corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to
such limitation as may be provided by law(Sec. 6, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Laws, to be valid & enforceable, must be published in the OGor otherwise
effectively promulgated. The fact that a PDor LOI states its date of effectivity
does not preclude their publication in the OG as they constitute important
legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or
of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of its contents.
Decision Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances of general application, and unless so published shall
have no binding force and effect.
Important Point It illustrates howdecrees &issuances issued by one man
Marcosare in fact laws of general application and provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive &legislative powers.
- The generality of law(CCArt. 14) will never work w/o constructive notice. The
ruling of this case provides that publication constitutes the necessary
constructive notice &is thus the cure for ignoranceas an excuse.
- Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime.
TANADA V TUVERA
CRUZ; December 29, 1986
FACTS
- In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect."
- This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the first decision,
specifically, on the following questions:
ISSUES
1. What is meant by "lawof public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws
which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
HELD
1 &2. The term"laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to themdirectly. We hold therefore that all
statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered
by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing lawpursuant also to a valid
delegation.
3. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.
This is not even substantial compliance.
33
4. We have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days fromsuch
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.
5. We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon
as possible, to give effect to the lawpursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a lawcould be
rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever
reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we
do not need to examine at this time.
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO VCOMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
TINGA; February 24, 2004
FACTS
- LDPtogether with other political parties formed a coalition calledKoalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
- KNPhas chose Fernando Poe as its Standard Bearer for the President of the
Phils in the May 2004 elections
- LDPfiled with COMELECa petitionto certify nomination of candidates for the
upcoming elections
- on Dec. 8, 2003, LDPfiled a Manifestation informing the COMELEC
a) that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo Angara or his authorized
representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official
candidates
33
Thiswasthemanner inwhichtheGeneral AppropriationsAct for FY1975, apresidential decree
undeniablyof general applicabilityandinterest, was"published" bytheMarcosadministration. The
evident purposewastowithholdrather thandiscloseinformationonthisvital law.
b) that LDP had placed its Secretary General, Representative Agapito
Aquino, on indefinite forced leave and Ambassador Enrique Zaldivar was
the Acting Sec-Gen
- Rep. Aquino contended that the Party Chairman does not have authority to
impose disciplinary sanctions on the Sec-Gen and asked COMELEC to
disregard the Manifestation
- pending resolution, a Certificate of Nomination was filed with COMELEC,
naming Sen. Panfilo Lacson as LDPs Standard Bearer for president; the
certificate was signed by Rep. Aquino
- the COMELEC, noting that the conflict was an internal party matter and that
the period for filing for the Certificate of Nomination was about to end, granted
the petition for both Petitioner (Angara) and Oppositor (Aquino) in that it
recognized all the candidates nominated by both parties as the official
candidates of the LDPidentifying each set of candidates as the Angara Wing
and the Aquino Wing
- Angara filed the present petition assailing the COMELEC Resolution for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
ISSUE
WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it applied equity and
divided LDPinto wings
HELD
YESthere was grave abuse of discretion. The only issue to be resolved by the
Commission was who as between the Chairman and the Secretary General
had the authority to sign the certificates of candidacy. To resolve the issue, the
COMELECneed only to refer to the Party Constitution. Equity is applied only if
there absence of lawthat can be applied to resolve the issue which is not the
case here.
- as provided in the 1987 Constitution the COMELEChas the authority to
ascertain the identity of the political parties and its legitimate officers;
consequently it has the power to settle any controversy regarding leadership
of the party as an incident to its power to register political parties. This
matter is important in determining as to who between Aquino and Angara
had the authority to certify LDPs candidates
- According to the Party Constitution, it is the Chairman who has the power
to sign documents in behalf of the party; the Sec-Gen has power to sign
documents only when authorized by the Chairman. That Aquino had been
given authority in the past, as found by the COMELEC during the 2001
elections, it does not followthat said authority is still existing since it can be
gathered in Angaras Manifestation that Aquinos authority had been
revoked, which the Chairman may do so in his discretion as implied in his
authority to grant such power
- However, the lack of authority of Aquino to certify candidates does not
cancel the certificates he signed. The candidates named will only be treated
as independent candidates following COMELEC Resolution No. 6453,
section 7
- The COMELEC, by allowing two wings to nominate their own candidates,
confused the electorate as to which set of candidates truly represent the
ideologies that the LDPrepresents
- The constitutional policy towards a free and open party systemenvisions a
systemthat shall evolve according to the free choice of the people and not
one molded by the COMELEC
BRILLANTES V COMELEC
CALLEJO; June 15, 2004
FACTS
- On 12/22/97, Congress enacted RA8436, authorizing COMELECto use an
automated election system(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes
and canvassing/consolidating results of the national and local elections for May
11 98. Also allowed the acquisition of automated counting machines (ACM)
and other devices to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
However, the failure of the machines to read ballots correctly deferred
implementation of modernization plan.
- 10/29/02, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 02-0170, a three-phase
modernization programfor the 2004 elections.
o Phase 1computerized registration andvalidation
Encountered problems in implementation because machine was reverting to
old listing of voters
o Phase 2computerized voting and counting
Scrapped because COMELEChad to maintain manual voting and counting
systemdue to the problems encountered with validation
o Phase 3 Electronic transmission of unofficial results (which is
challenged in this case)
- Despite failure of the first 2 phases, COMELEC through its commissioners
still decided to implement Phase 3
- GMAissued EO172 which allocated P250,000,000 to fund the AESfor the
May 10 04 elections. Also issued EO175, giving an additional P500Mbudget
for the AESproject.
- Senate President Drilon had misgivings about the proposed electronic
transmission of results because according to the Constitution (Art VII, Sec 4),
Congress has the sole authority to canvass votes for President and VP.
Implementing Phase 3 would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress and
would also lack constitutional authority
- Aside from Drilons apprehension, there were budget problems for
implementation because the money allocated by GMAhad already been used
for phases 1 and 2. COMELEC, however, still conducted a field test of the
electronic transmission of results (phase 3) on 04/27/04 (Separate opinions of
COMELECofficials found on p. 277. Read just in case.)
- COMELEC, 2 weeks before the national and local elections, approved
RESOLUTION6712 stating the implementation of phase 3 and declared that
results of each city/municipality shall be electronically transmitted in advance to
COMELEC, Manila. They established a National Consolidation Center (NCC),
Electronic Transmission Centers (ETC) for each city/municipality and a special
ETCat COMELECfor the absentee voters. (procedure p. 278). Note that the
results garnered in the procedure are of unofficial character.
- Hence, petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention brought their misgivings to
SC.
ISSUES
1. WONpetitioners have locus standi
2. WONCOMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing RA6712
HELD
1. Petitioners claim their standing as taxpayers and since the Resolution
obviously involves the expenditure of funds, they do have the requisite
standing to question its validity. Most of the petitioners-in-intervention are also
part of NAMFREL, the citizens authorized armto conduct an unofficial quick
count during elections. Lastly, Drilon and De Venecia are heads of Congress,
the sole authority for canvassing votes for President and VP.
2. The resolution usurps the tabulation of election results based on a copy of
the election returns the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass
votes for President and VP. COMELECs claimthat it is not prohibited because
it is an unofficial vote is unacceptable.
- the resolution goes against the constitutional provision that no money shall be
paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
(Sec 29, Art VI). Because the tabulation in the resolution is unofficial in
character, it is not an appropriation made by law. In fact, it may be considered
a felony under Art 217 under the Penal Code (malversation of public
funds/property).
- it disregards existing laws that any unofficial counting of votes is done by
NAMFREL by using a copy of the election returns. Not even COMELEC is
authorized to use a copy of election returns for counting.
- COMELEC failed to notify authorized representatives of accredited political
parties and all candidates of the proposed use of technology for the elections
under Sec 52 of the Omnibus Election Code. There are 2 conditions that
COMELEC must comply with before undertaking technology for electoral
purposes: take into account the situation prevailing and the funds available,
and notify authorized representatives. These conditions give the affected
people an opportunity to object if need be. Details on p 302-303.
- resolution has no constitutional and statutory basis for COMELEC to
undertake a separate and unofficial tabulation of results. It also doesnt make
sense that Phase 3 of the programshould go on when the first two phases
have been scrapped. They should be taken as a whole and not independent of
each other. In the first place, there is a great possibility that the unofficial
results will differ greatly fromthe official count so what is the use of spending
all that money for something uncertain, something that the NAMFREL had
always undertaken? It is an unnecessary waste of government funds and
effort.
- COMELECuses the problemof dagdag-bawas as a reasonfor the resolution.
Accdg to them, modernization of the election will decrease the possibility of
dagdag bawas but it doesnt make sense because dagdag-bawas is a result of
human intervention. No matter how modern the technology for electoral
purposes is, there will always be the need for human intervention so the
problemwill not be eradicated.
Decision PETITIONGRANTED. Resolution No. 6712 is NULL ANDVOID.
PLDT V PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
MAKALINTAL; August 29, 1975
FACTS
- September, 1964 the Public Service Commission assessed several public
utilities for supposedsupervision and regulation fees for that year
- PLDT (P214,353.60); Manila Electric Company - P727,526.00; Bolinao
Electronics Corporation - P11,610.40; Philippine Stearn Navigation Company -
P23.921.60; and General Shipping Company- P33,146.80
- The assessed fees were based upon the value of the respective
properties or equipment pursuant to Section 40(e) of the Public Service Act
as amended by Republic Act 3792
- After paying the demanded amounts, the said corporations sent Separate
letters to the Commission, (except the Philippine SteamNavigation Company
which filed a formal petition instead) requesting for reconsideration of the
assessments their ground: under the said Section 40(e), such
assessments should be based not on the value of the properties but upon
the subscribed and paid up capital stocks of the corporations.
- 28 September 1966Public Service Commission denied request for
reconsideration. Their reason:
o the clause "or of the property and equipment, whichever is higher" in
section 40(e) of the Public Service Act as an alternative base for
supervision fees collectible, applies to both stock and non-stock
corporations.
o to use the value of property and equipment as an alternative base for
fixing the rates only in case of public services not issuing shares would
result in unreasonable discrimination against the latter
o a comma after the words "capital subscribed or paid" and another after
the words "Capital invested," immediately preceding the clause "property
and equipment, whichever is higher," indicates the intention of the
legislature to constitute the latter as an alternative of both stock and non-
stock corp.
ISSUES
1. WONthe lawitself draws a distinction between public utilities issuing shares
and those that do not as the capital invested is difficult to ascertain where no
shares have been issued. Thus, the value of their property or equipment
should provide as an alternative rate base for this class of operators
2. WONrelianceon the use of comma/punctuationshould have bearing
3. WON there is alleged disproportion of the total amount to be collected as
supervisory fees
HELD
1. NO. No showing of difficulty in ascertaining actual capital investment of
public service operators that do not issue stocks. These companies are
required to submit annual reports of finances and operations
2. reliance on punctuation is too risky a method of statutory construction
- the punctuation of the provision in question has undergone no alteration at all
- the consideranda on punctuation was merely employed to reinforce its main
argument that nothing in the law justifies a discriminatory application of the
value of the property or equipment (as alternative rate base) solely to operators
not issuing shares of capital stock.
3. the very statute indicates that such fees as are therein fixed were designed
to raise revenue for the general expenses of the Commission, and were not
limited to reimbursement of actual expenditures in supervision.
- we are in accord with petitioner operators that the Commission was in error in
collecting the fees in question on die basis of the original cost of their property
and equipment without due allowance for depreciation.
Decision judgment MODIEDin the sense that the supervision fees payable
under Republic Act No. 3792 should be computed upon present values of
properly and equipment in use; the appealed resolution of the Public Serviice
Commission is AFFIRMED
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS
V PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
MENDOZA; February 10, 1998
FACTS
- Nov. 5, 1992 APCD brought suit to enjoin PCA from issuing permits to
applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing
plantsissuance would violate PCAs Admin. Order No.02 series of 1991 as
applicants were seeking to operate in congested areas
- Nov.6 trial court issued TROenjoining PCAfromussiung licenses
- Pending the case, PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No.018-93
providing for the withdrawal of the PCAfromall regulation of coconut product
processing industry; registration would be limited to the monitoring of their
volumes of production and admin of quality standards
- PCA then issued certificates of registration to those wishing to operate
desiccated coconut processing plants
ISSUE
- Whether or not the PCAcan renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law
creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is.
HELD
- The power given to the PCA to formulate and adopt a general programof
devt for the coconut and other palms oil industry is not a roving commission to
adopt any programdeemed necessary to promote the devt of the coconut and
other palmoils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of the regulatory
structure.
Reasoning
- PCA was originally created by PD232 on June 30, 1973 to take over the
powers and functions of the Coconut Coordinating Council, the Phil. Coco
Admin, and the Phil. Coco Research Institute
- By PD1468 on June 11, 1978, it was made an independent public
corp...charged with carrying out States policy to promote the rapid integrated
devt and growth of the coco and other palmoil industry and to ensure that the
coco farmers become direct participants and beneficiaries through a regulatory
schemeset up by law
- Aug.28, 1982 by EO826 govt temporarily prohibited the opening of newcoco
processing plants and on Dec.6 phased out some of the existing ones---
because of overproduction in the industry resulting, ultimately, in the decline of
the export performance of coco-based products
- Oct.23, 1987 PCA adopted Resolution No.058-87 authorizing establishment
and operation of additional DCNplants because of increased demand in world
market
- The above measures were adopted within the framework of regulation as
established by law to promote rapid integrated devt and growth of coco and
other palm oil industry and to ensure that the coco farmers become direct
participants and beneficiaries
- the questioned resolution allows not only indiscriminate opening of new
plants, but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure
- PD1468 Art.II Revised Coco Codethe role of the PCAis to formulate and
adopt a general programof devt for the coco and other palmoil industry in all
its aspects
o By limiting the purpose of reg. to merely monitoring volumes of
production and admin. Of quality standards, PCAin effect abdicates its
role and leaves it almost completely to market forces howthe industry
will develop
- Constitution Art.XII
o Sec.6 ...duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands
o Sec.19 State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest
so requires
o Any change in policy must be made by the legislative dept of the govt.
The regulatory systemhas been set up by law. It is beyond the power of
an administrative agency to dismantle it.
DecisionPetition GRANTED; resolution NULL and VOID
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO [dissent]
- The resolution deregulating the coco industry is a valid exercise of delegated
legislation. Such resolution is in harmony with the objectives sough to be
achieved by the laws regarding the coco industry, particularly to promote
accelerated growth and devt of the coco industry and the rapid integrated
devt and growth of the coconut industry
- The time has come for admin policies and regulations to adapt to ever-
changing business needs rather than to accommodate traditional acts of the
legislature
- Trimming down an admin agencys functions of registration is not an
abdication of the power to regulate but is regulation itself
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998
FACTS
- On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular
session of the eleventh Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were
held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of
Senate President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the
Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro
tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader.
- Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority
leader, with the agreement of Senator Santiago. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who
had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
- On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt
of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDPsenators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader
of the Senate.
- On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition
for quo warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of
the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to
them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
ISSUES
1. WONthe Court havejurisdiction over the petition
2. WONthereisan actual violation of the Constitution
3. WONGuingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position
of Senate minority leader
4. WONFernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona
as the minority leader
HELD
1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their
functions and prerogatives
- The petitioners claimthat Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has
not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also
invoke the Courts "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of respondents.
- Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial review;
that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the
Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within
this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of
legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal
"finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in
defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution nowfortifies the
authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the
acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of
duty, viz.:
- "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.
- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for himshall
ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader.
Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
- While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter
says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely
a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not
by this Court.
- Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as
it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no
authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold-
the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a
becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court
fromprying into the internal workings of the Senate.
3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader.
- Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and
exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law. In
order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or
exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear
and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.
- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal toperforma duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility.
- Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President
in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs
to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By
unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate
sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate
their standpoints.
- Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be
accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of
the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly
shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of
discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their
competence and authority.
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM
CARPIO-MORALES; October 24, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioners: John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition, Mateo Carino
Foundation Inc., Center for Alternative Systems Foundation, Inc., Regina
Victoria Benafin represented and joined by her mother Elisa Benafin, Izabel
Luyk represented and joined by her mother Rebecca Luyk, Katherine Pe
represented and joined by her mother Rosemarie Pe, Soledad Camilo, Alicia
Pacalso alias Kevab, Betty Strasser, Ruby Giron, Ursula Perez alias Ba-
yay, Edilberto Claravall, Carmen Caromina, Lilia Yaranon, Diane Mondoc
- Respondents: Victor Lim, President Bases Conversion and Development
Authority; John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation, City of Baguio,
TUNTEX, ASIAWORLD, DENR
- Petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 420, Series of 1994,
Creating and Designating a Portion of the Area Covered by the Former Camp
John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone Pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7227
- RA7227: An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into
other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes
ORBases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
> setting out policy to accelerate sound and balanced conversion into
alternative productive uses of former military bases under the 1947
Philippine-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely
Clark and Subic military reservations including extension Camp John Hay
Station in Baguio
> created Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA), Subic
Special Economic (and free port) Zone (Sebuc SEZ)
> granted Subic SEZ incentives such tax and duty-free importations,
exemption of businesses fromlocal and national taxes
> gave authority to the President to create through executive proclamation,
subject to the concurrence of the local government units directly affected,
other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Clark (Pampanga), Wallace Air
Station (La Union), and Camp John Hay (Baguio)
- Aug 16, 1993 BCDAentered MoAand EscrowAgreement with TUNTEX
and ASIAWORLD, private corporations under laws of British Virgin Islands, in
preparing for a joint venture for development of Poro Point in La Union and
Camp John Hay as a premier tourist destinations and recreation centers
- Dec 16, 1993 BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD executed a Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA) binding themselves to put up a joint venture
company called Baguio International Development and Management
Corporation leasing areas within Camp John Hay and Poro Point for tourism
and recreation
Sangguaniang Panglungsodof Baguio Citys ResolutionstoBCDA
> Sept 29, 1993to exclude all the barangays partly and totally located
within Camp John Hay fromthe reach and coverage of any plan or program
for development
> J an 19, 1994 abdication, waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over
homelots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding CJH
> Feb 21, 1994 15-point concept of the development of CJH which
includes protection of the environment, making of a family-oriented tourist
destination, priority in employment of Baguio residents, free access to base
area, guaranteed participation of the city government in the management
and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously mentioned 9 bgys,
liability for local taxes of businesses
BCDA-TUNTEX-ASIAWORLDresponse
> modified the proposal stressing the need to declare CJH a SEZ as a
condition to itsfull development according to RA7227
- May 11, 1994 sanggunian passed resolution asking mayor to order
determination of realty taxes which may be collected fromreal properties of
CJHchecking if CJHreal properties exempt fromtaxes and economic activity
fromlocal and national taxes
- J une 1994 sanggunian passed Resolution No. 255 (Series of 1994)
seeking and supporting subject to its concurrence, the issuance of Pres.
Ramos of presidential proclamation declaring area of 288.1 hectares of the
camp as a SEZ in accordance to RA7227
- J uly 5, 1994 Ramos issued Proc No. 420 establishing a SEZ on Camp
John Hay which reads
Pursuant to powers vested in me by the law and the resolution of
concurrence by the City Council of Baguiocreate and designateformer
Camp John Hayas John Hay Special Economic Zone
Sec 1. Coverage of John Hay SEZ: 288.1 hectares out of 677 hectares
surveyed and verified by DENR
Sec 2. Governing Body: pursuant to Sec 15 of RA 7227, the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) is established to govern
JHSEZ, authorized to determine utilization and disposition of lands subject
to private rights and in consultation and coordination with the City
Government of Baguio after consultation with its inhabitants, and to
promulgate necessary policies, rules, and regulations to govern and
regulate the zone thru the John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation
(JHPPDC), the implementing arm for its economic development and
optimumutilization
Sec 3. Investment Climate in JHSEZ: pursuant to Sec 5(m) and Section 15
of RA 7227, the JHPoro Point Development Corporation shall implement
necessary policies, rules and regulations governing the zone, including
investment incentives, in consultation with pertinent government
departments. The zone shall have all the applicable incentives of the SEZ
under Sec 12 of RA 7227 and those applicable incentives granted in the
Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991, and new investment laws that will be
enacted.
Sec 4. Role of Departments, Bureaus, Offices, Agencies and
Instrumentalities: All heads of departments, etc of the government are
directed togive full support to BCDAand/or implementing subsidiary or joint
venture to facilitate necessary approvals to expedite programs.
Sec 5. Local Authority: The affected local government units shall retain
basic autonomy and identity.
- April 25, 1995 petition for prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief
challenging Proc. No. 420s constitutionality or validity as well as the legality of
MoAand JVAbetween BCDAand TUNTEXand ASIAWORLD
- Petitioners Allege:
1. Proc. No. 420 grants tax exemptions is invalid and illegal as it is an
unconstitutional exercise by the President of a power granted only to the
Legislature
2. Proc. No. 420 limits the powers and interferes with the autonomy of the
City of Baguiois invalid, illegal and unconstitutional
3. Proc. No. 420 is unconstitutional that it violates the rule that all taxes
should be uniformand equitable
4. MoAhaving been entered into only bydirect negotiationis illegal
5. terms and conditionsof the MoAis illegal
6. the conceptual development plan of respondents not having undergone
environmental impact assessment is being illegally considered without a
valid environmental impact assessment
- a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction prayed to enjoin BCDA,
JHPPDC and the city government fromimplementing Proc. No. 420 and
TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD from proceeding with their plan respecting
CJHs development pursuant to the JVA
- Public respondents(BCDA, JHPPDC, City of Baguio) Allege
1. issues are moot and academic because in November 21, 1995 BCDA
formally notified TUNTEX and ASIAWORLDof the revocation of the MoA
and JVA
2. in maintaining the validity of Proc. No. 420, extending to the JHSEZ
economic incentives to those enjoyed by Subic SEZ (established in RA
7227), the proclamation merely implements the legislative intent of said law
to turn the USmilitary bases intohubs of business activity or investment
3. denying Proc. No. 420 derogates the local autonomy of Baguio City or
violative of the equal protection clause
4. petitioners have no standing to being suit even as taxpayers in the
absence of an actual controversy
5. disregarded hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies
- Petitioners Reply
1. doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply since
they are invoking the exclusive authority of SCunder Section 21 of RA7227
to enjoin or restrain implementation of projects for conversion of the base
areas
2. they possess standing to bring petition as taxpayers
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WONpetitioners violated doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
2. WONissues regarding TUNTEXand ASIAWORLDis moot and academic
3. WONpresent petition complies with the requirements of SCs exercise of
jurisdiction over constitutional issues
Substantive
4. WONProc. No. 420 is constitutional by providing for national and local tax
exemption within and granting other economic incentives to the John Hay SEZ
5. WON Proc. No. 420 is constitutional for limiting or interfering with local
autonomy of Baguio City
HELD
1. Although judicial policy of SC entails not entertaining declaratory relief or
direct resort to it except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the
proper courts, or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of SCs primary
jurisdiction, under Sec 21 of RA 7227, only SC has the power to enjoin
implementation of projects for the development of the former USmilitary
reservationstherefore SCwill take cognizance of this petition.
Reasoning
- Also SCretains full discretionary power to take cognizance of such petition.
Besides, remanding this case to the lower courts may unduly prolong
adjudication of the issues
- transformation of an area in CJHinto a SEZ is not a simple re-classification of
an area TF a crucial issue. Conversion involves
> focal point for investments bylocal and foreign entities
> site for vigorous business activity spurring countrys economic growth
> like Sub SEZ, turning into self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial
and investment center
> critical links to a host of environmental and social concerns affecting
communities are located and nation in general
> challenges in providing an ecologically sustainable, environmentally
sound, equitable transition for city in CJHreversion to government property
e.g. problemof scarcity of water supplyin Baguio City
2. Revocation of the agreements with private respondents made issues
regarding themas moot and academic.
3. Yes, present petition complies with requirements for judicial review.
Reasoning
- Requisites of exercise of power of judicial review
1. existence of an actual or an appropriate case
> not conjectural or anticipatory; definite and concrete; parties pitted
against each other due to their adverse legal interests
> in present case, there is a real clash of interests and rights between
petitioners and respondents arising fromissuance of Proc. No. 420
converting a portion of CJHinto a SEZwhere petitioners insist Proc.
No. 420 has unconstitutional provisions and the respondents claiming
otherwise
> Pimentel, Jr. v Aguirre: By the mere enactment of the questioned
lawor the approval of the challenged act, the dispute is deemed to
have ripened into a judicial controversy even without an overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or law is
enough to awaken judicial duty
2. personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question
> RA 7227 requires concurrence of the affected local government
units to the creation of SEZs and this grant by lawon LGUs of the
right to concurrence is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on LGUs
(recognition of real interests of communities in the utilization of such
base areas)
> as INHABITANTSOF BAGUIO, assailing Proc No. 420, is personal
andsubstantial that they have sustained or will sustaindirect injuryas
a result of the government act being challenged; material interest for
what is at stake in the enforcement of Proc. No. 420 is the very
economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City
> Garcia v Board of Investments: residents of Limay, Bataan where
SC characterized their interest in the establishment of a
petrochemical plant in their place as actual, real, vital and legal for it
would affect not only their economic life but even the air they breathe
> Petitioners Edilberto Claravall and Lilia Yaranon were duly elected
councilors of Baguio at the time; duties included deciding for and on
behalf of their constituents on the question of concurrence to Proc.
No. 420; they opposed Res. No. 255 which supported Proc. No. 420
3. pleaded in the earliest opportunity
4. constitutional question is the lis mota of the case
- 3 and 4 no question since action filed purposely to bring forth
constitutionality issues
4. Unless limited by a provision in the Constitution, if there is no express
extension of tax exemption and other economic incentives granted by law, any
presidential proclamation granting such extension through implication is
unconstitutional because it violates Art VI Sec 28(4) which gives the legislature,
not the executive, the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class
of property fromtaxation and its power to exempt being as broad as its power
to tax.
Reasoning
- Art VI Sec 28(4): No lawgranting any tax exemption shall be passed without
the concurrence of a majority of all themembers of Congress.
- Sec 3 Proc. No. 420: Investment Climate in JHSEZ: the zone shall have
all the applicable incentives of the SEZ under Sec 12 of RA7227 and those
applicable incentives granted in the Export Processing Zones, the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987, the Foreign Investment Act of 1991 and new
investment laws that may be hereinafter enacted
> Sec 12 RA7227: Subic SEZ
(b &c) exemption fromtariff or customduties, national and local taxes of
business entities
(d) free market and trade of specified goods or properties
(f) liberalized banking and finance
(g) relaxed immigration rules for foreign investors
- deliberations of Senate confirmexclusivity to Subic SEZ of the tax and
investment privileges
(discussing Sec 12 RA7227)
Angara: we must confine these policies to Subic and provide that
THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE OF SUBIC SHALL BE
ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING
POLICIESit is very clear that these principles and policies are
applicable only to Subic as a free port
so we agreed that we will simply limit the definition of pweors and
description of the zone to Subic but that does not exclude the
possibility of creating other economic zones within the baselands
the provision nowwill be confined only to Subic
> RA7916: The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995
- privilege of export processing zone-based businesses of importing
capital equipment and raw materials free fromtaxes, duties and other
restrictions
> Omnibus Investment Code of 1987
- tax and duty exemptions, tax holiday, tax credit, and other incentives
> RA7042: Foreign Investments Act of 1991
- applicability to the subject zone of rules governing foreign investments
in the Philippines
- It is clear that under Sec 12 RA 7227 ONLY the SUBIC SEZ which was
granted by Congress with tax exemption, investment incentives and the like
and no express extension of the aforesaid benefits to other SEZs still to be
created at the time via presidential proclamation ; also grant of privileges to JH
SEZ finds no support in the other laws specified under Sec 3 Proc. No. 420
which are already extant before the issuance of the proclamation or the
enactment of RA7227
- SCcan void an act or policy of the political departments of the govt on two
grounds infringement of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion and
clearly, Proc. No. 420 infringes upon the Constitution
5. NObecause when the lawmerely emphasizes or reiterates the statutory role
or functions is has been granted.
Reasoning
- under RA7227, BCDAis entrusted with the following
(a) to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air
Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Stationwhich may be
transferred to it by the President
- such broad rights of ownership and administration vested in BCDAover CJH,
BCDAvirtually has control over it subject to certain limitations of law
Decision Sec 3 of Proc. NO.420 is null and void and declared no legal force
and effect. Proc. No. 420, without the invalidated portion, remains valid and
effective
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
YNARES-SANTIAGO; August 12, 2003
FACTS
- June 16, 2000NTC, pursuant to itsrule-making and regulatory powers,
issued MemorandumCircular (MC) No. 13-6-2000. It promulgated rules and
regulations on thebilling of telecommunications services:
1. Billing statements shall be received by the service subscriber (SS) not
later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case it is
received beyond 30 days, SSshall have a grace period within which to
pay the bill. During such period, SS shall not be disconnected from
service by the public telecommunications entity (PTE).
2. There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox,
voice prompt, recorded message or similar facility excluding the
customers own equipment.
3. PTEs shall verify identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid
SIMcards. Prepaid call cards and SIMcards shall be valid for at least 2
years fromthe date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIMcards shall be
given 45 days fromthe date it is fully consumed but not beyond 2yrs 45
days from date of first use to replenish SIM card. The validity of an
invalid SIMcard shall be installed upon request of the SS at no addtl
chargeexcept the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
4. SSshall beupdated of the remaining value of their cards before the start
of every call using the cards.
5. The unit of billing for (Cellular Mobile Telephone) CMT service whether
postpaid or prepaid shall bereduced from1min/pulse to 6sec/pulse. The
authorized rates per minute shall be divided by 10.
- The MCprovided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and three certified copies furnished at the UP
LawCenter.
- June 22, 2000 MC was published in the Philippine Star; MC provisions
regarding sale and use of prepaid cards & unit of billing took effect 90 days
fromeffectivity of MC
- August 30, 2000 NTC issued a Memorandum to all CMT service
operators (SO) which contained measures to minimize incidence of
stealing of cell phone units. It directed CMT SOto:
1. Strictly comply with MCrequiring the presentation and verification of the
identity and addresses of prepaid SIMcard customers
2. Require all respectiveprepaid SIMcard dealersto comply with MC
3. Deny acceptance to the networks those customers using stolen cell
phone units or cell phone units registered to somebody else when
properly informed of all information relative to the stolen cell phone units
4. Share all necessary infoof stolen cell phone units to all other CMT SOin
order to prevent their use
5. Require all existing prepaid SIMcard customers to register and present
valid identification cards.
- October 6, 2000 NTC issued another Memorandumaddressed to all
PTEs, which was for strict compliance.
1. All prepaid cards and all SIMpacks used by subscribers of prepaid cards
sold on Oct. 7, 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least 2 years from
date of first use.
2. The billing unit shall be on a 6sec pulse effective October 7, 2000.
- Procedure
October 20, 2000 ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the NTC an
action for Declarationof Nullity of MC(the BillingCircular) andof the
Oct. 6 Memorandum, with prayer for injunction and TROinthe RTC-QCon
the grounds that-
a. NTChas no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods since
such jurisdiction belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the
Phils
b. MC is oppressive and violative of the Due Process Clause
(deprivation of property)
c. MCwill result in the impairment of the viability of prepaid service by
unduly prolonging the expiration of prepaid SIMand call cards
d. Requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call
balance announcement are unreasonable
GLOBEand SMART filed a joint Motion to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention
October 27, 2000 RTCissued TROenjoining NTCfromimplementing
MC
November 20, 2000RTCdenied NTCs motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Injunction is granted, pending finality of the decision of the case.
October 9, 2001 CA granted NTCs petition for certiorari and
prohibition.
January 10, 2002Motions for Reconsideration were denied by CA
ISSUES
1. WONthe Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear this case
2. WONthe Doctrine onExhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable
HELD
Obiter Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations,
which should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the
legislature to such administrative agency. The regulations must be
germane to the purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to the
standards prescribed by law.
Quasi-judicial power is exercised by an administrative agency when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive
nature, where the power to act in such a manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the administrative duty
entrusted to it.
1. Yes.
Ratio In cases assailing the validity of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency in the performance of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVEfunction,
the regular courts have jurisdiction. The power of JUDICIAL REVIEWis vested
in the courts by the Constitution. The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction is only
applicable when the administrative agency is exercising its QUASI-JUDICIAL
function.
- Art.VIII Sec.1 1987 Consti: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the govt.
- Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: The courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the admin. tribunal to determine technical matters of fact.
2. No.
Ratio In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule issued by an
administrative agency, in exercise of its QUASI-LEGISLATIVEpowers, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. Only judicial
review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine (Assoc. of Phil.
Coconut Desiccators v. PHILCOA).
- Even if the Doctrine on Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is applicable,
records showthat petitioners have complied with such requirement:
- During deliberation stages of MC, petitioners registered their protests and
submitted proposed schemes for the Billing Circular.
- After issuance of MC, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the
suspension and reconsideration of the MC.
- Such letters were not acted upon and instead, NTC issued 10/06/00
Memorandum. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of their
requests.
Decision Consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The decision of CA and its
Resolution are reversed. The case is REMANDED to the RTC-QC for
continuation of the proceedings.
ART VII: EXECUTIVE
GONZALES V MARCOS
FERNANDO; July 31, 1975
(SEEDIGEST UNDER DOMINIUMAND IMPERIUM)
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS
CORTES; September 15, 1989
FACTS
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family filed a petition for
mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to themand to enjoin the implementation of the Presidents
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners state that the right of
the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under Sections 1 and 6
of the Bill of Rights, arguing that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority/agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
They also invoke generally accepted principles of international law: (1) Art. 13,
par. 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that
everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his own country, and (2) Art. 12, par. 2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
the right to enter his own country. Respondents contend that the issue of
whether the two rights claimed by the Marcoses collide with the more
primordial and transcendental right of the state to security and safety of its
nationals involves a political question and is non-justiciable. In support thereof,
they cite Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They also point out that the
decision to bar Marcos and family fromreturning to the Philippines for reasons
of national security and public safety has international precedents.
ISSUES
1. WON the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcoses fromreturning to the Philippines.
2. WON the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return
of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare and decided to bar their return.
HELD
1. Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than
the sumof the specific powers so enumerated.
- The request/demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in light solely of the constitutional provision
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to
safeguard and protect general welfare.
2. No. The President did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in
determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the
national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The documented
history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country and the precarious stateof the economy were the factual bases for the
President to conclude that the return of the Marcoses during that time would
only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and
instigate more chaos. The State, acting through the Government, is not
precluded from taking preemptive action against threats to its existence if,
though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.
The preservation of the State the fruition of the peoples sovereignty is an
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend
the Constitution and to see the faithful execution of the laws, cannot shirk from
that responsibility.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNAN[concur]
History and time-honored principles of constitutional lawhave conceded to the
Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative
national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: residual,
inherent, moral, implied, aggregate, emergency. Whatever they may be
called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if the governance
function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently.
GUTIERREZ[dissent]
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
lawmay be impaired only upon lawful order of the court, not of an executive
officer, not even the President. I do not think that we should differentiate the
right to return home fromthe right to go abroad or to move around in the
Philippines. If at all, the right to come home must be more preferred than any
other aspect of the right to travel.
CRUZ[dissent]
Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that Aquino
then invoked.
PARAS[dissent]
The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has the right to return to his own
country, except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and
national security.
PADILLA[dissent]
With or without restricting legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or
restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, and public health.
Power of the state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant support in police
power. The government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat
Marcos right to return to this country.
SARMIENTO[dissent]
The right to return to ones own country cannot be distinguished fromthe right
to travel and freedomof abode. While the President may exercise powers not
expressly granted by the Constitution but may necessarily implied therefrom,
the latter must yield to the paramountcy of the Bill of Rights. Under the new
Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only within the limits provided
by law. The President has been divested of the implied power to impair the
right to travel. The determination of whether the Marcos return poses a threat
to national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive; the Court
itself must be satisfied that the threat is not only clear but also present.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO
PUNO;
(SEEDIGEST UNDER REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION)
VILLENA V SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
LAUREL; April 21, 1939
FACTS
- Jose D. Villena, then Mayor of Makati, sought to restrain the Secretary of the
Interior (SI) and his agents fromproceeding with the investigation against him
until this case was settled by the SC.
- Upon the request of the SI, the Division of Investigation of the Department of
Justice conducted an inquiry into the conduct of Villena. He was found to have
committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized
practice of the lawprofession.
- Feb. 8, 1939 ~SI recommended to the President that Villena be suspended
so as to prevent the coercion of witnesses. The President verbally granted the
recommendation on the same day.
- Feb. 9,1939~ SI suspended Villena fromoffice and instructed the Provincial
Governor of Rizal to advise Villena of his suspension.
- Feb. 13,1939~SI wrote Villena specifying the charges against him and
notifying himthat Emiliano Anonas was the special investigator of the case.
- Feb. 17, 1939~ the date set by Anonas when the formal investigation would
begin. But eventually postponed to March 28,1939 due to several incidents and
postponements.
- Hence, this petition for PrelimInjunction. Villena contends that:
> SI has no jurisdiction or authority to suspend him, to file administrative
charges against him, and to decide the merits of the charges because the
power to suspend, to try and punish municipal elective officials is lodged in
some other agencies of the government.
>SIs acts are null and void because:
+SI usurped the power given by the Constitution to the President when
SI suspended him(Villena).
+ SI must exercise the power to supervise in accordance with the
provisions of law and the provisions of law governing the trials and
charges of against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec.
2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.
+ SI is exercising an arbitrary power by converting himself into a
complainant and at the same time the judge of the charges he filed
against him.
+ SIs action didnt follow the procedure under Sec. 2188 of the AC,
which requires that a complaint be based on a private persons or
citizens sworn statement.
- Villena prays that a writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued to stop the SI and
his agents from proceeding further with the investigation until this case is
heard; that SI be declared as without authority to suspend himand order his
reinstatement in office; that SI be declared as without authority to file charges
against himand to investigate such charges.
- His petition for the writ of preliminary injunction was denied.
- The Solicitor General contends that:
> Sec. 79 (C) in relation with sec. 86 of the Revised AC expressly
empowers the SI to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any
person in the service of any bureau or office under his department and in
connection therewith to designate an official or person who shall conduct
such investigation.
>Sec. 2188 of the Revised AC, invoked by Villena, doesnt preclude SI from
exercising the powers stated in Sec. 79 in connection to Sec. 86. Also, that
invoked section, must be read in relation to sec. 37 of the Reorganization
Lawof 1932.
> Villena didnt question the jurisdiction of the SI at the start of the
investigation but merely contended that such charges were not in
accordance with lawfor the reason that they didnt bear the oaths of the
complaints.
> The authority of a department head to order the investigation of a
subordinate necessarily carries with it by implication the authority to take
such measures as he may deemnecessary to accomplish the purpose of
the investigation, including suspending the officer; plus, the President
authorized the suspension.
> Courts of Equity have no power to restrain public officials by injunction
fromperforming any official act, which they are required by lawto perform,
or acts, which are not in excess of the authority, and discretion reposed in
them.
ISSUES
1. WONthe SI has the legal authority to order an investigation, by a special
investigator appointed by him, of the charges of corruption and irregularity
against Villena.
2. WON the SI has the legal authority to suspend Villena pending the
investigation of the charges.
HELD
1. The SI is invested with authority to order the investigation of the charges
against the petitioner, Villena, and to appoint a special investigator for that
purpose.
- Sec. 79 of the Revised ACspeaks of direct control, direction and supervision
over bureaus and offices under the jurisdiction of the SI but it should be
interpreted in relation to sec. 86 of the same Code which grants to the Dept of
Interior executive supervision over the administration of provinces,
municipalities, chartered cities and other local political subdivisions.
- Citing Planas v. Gil: Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active
power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to
inquire into facts and conditions in order to render the power real and effective.
If supervision is to be conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal,
it must be founded upon knowledge of actual facts and conditions disclosed
after careful study and investigation.
2. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a
mayor of a municipality who is under investigation.
- NOTE: There was an argument regarding the verbal approval or
acquiescence of the President to the suspension. It was said that if the justices
were to accept that the President had the authority to suspend the petitioner,
then the suspension made by the SI, since the President approved it, should
be sustained. Then this was followed by the discussion regarding certain acts
of the President that could not be validated by subsequent approval or
ratification. There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive that should be exercised in person (i.e. suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus and proclamation of martial lawand the exercise of pardon.)
But there were doubts regarding the verbal approval by the President of the
suspension if such could be considered as ratification in law(with lawgiving
the power to suspend being the Chief Exec.) Hence, the ratio.
Ratio xxxunder the presidential type of government which we have adopted
and considering the departmental organization established and continued in
force by par. 1, sec. 12, Art.VII of our (1935) Constitution, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or the law to act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.
Obiter With reference to the Executive Dept of the Govt, there is one purpose
which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial
searchlight, and that it is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive.
- The First Section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.
- Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is reality but the projection of that of the President.
- Citing Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. US~ each head of a department is, and
must be, the Presidents alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by lawto exercise authority.
- As a matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy
as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the executive, in the
absence of valid legislation in the particular field.
- The President should be answerable for the acts of administration of the
entire Executive Department before his own conscience
Note Read this case in relation to Sec. 1 and 17 of Art. 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
SECRETARY OF THEDEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONSV MABALOT
BUENA; February 27, 2002
FACTS
- On February 19, 1996, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. issued
MemorandumOrder No. 96-735addressed to Land Transportation Franchising
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Chairman Dante Lantin directing himto effect the
transfer of regional functions of that office to the DOTC-CAR Regional
Office
- On March 13, 1996, Roberto Mabalot filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order against
DOTCSecretary and LTFRB chair, praying among others that Memorandum
Order No. 96-735 be declared illegal and without effect.
- On March 20, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
DOTC Secretary from implementing Memorandum Order No. 96-735. The
lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction on April 8, 1996.
- On January 29, 1997, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo issued
Department Order No. 97-1025 establishing the DOTC-CAR Regional Office
as the Regional Office of the LTFRB-CAR and shall exercise the regional
functions of the LTFRBin the CAR
- On March 31, 1999, the lower court rendered a decision declaring
MemorandumOrder Nos. 96-735 and 97-1025 null and void and without any
legal effect as being violative of the provision of the Constitution against
encroachment on the powers of the legislative department and also of the
provision enjoining appointive officials from holding any other office or
employment in the Government.
ISSUE
WONthe assailed memorandumorders establishing the DOTCRegional Office
as an LTFRBRegional Office is unconstitutional for being an undue exercise of
legislative power.
HELD
- The President may, through his/her duly constituted political agent and alter
ego, legally and validly decree the reorganization of the National Government
in exercise of authority granted by law.
- Apublic office may be created through any of the following modes: (1) by the
Constitution (fundamental law), (2) by law(statute duly enacted by Congress),
or (3) by authority of law. The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR
Regional Office was made pursuant to the third mode.
- The President, through Administrative Order No. 36 directed the various
departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the
creation and establishment of their regional offices in CAR.
- It is as if the President himself carried out the creation and establishment of
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, when in fact, the DOTC Secretary directly
and merely sought to implement the Chief Executives Administrative Order.
- The Presidents control over all executive departments come fromSection 17,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, while the continuing authority to reorganize
the national government is vested by Presidential Decree No. 1772 which
amended Presidential Decree No. 1416 (as ruled in Larin Vs. Executive
Secretary).
- Villena vs Secretary of the Interior: without minimizing the importance of the
heads of various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of
that of the President. Thus, their acts, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
- The designation and subsequent establishment of DOTC-CAR as the
Regional Office of the LTFRB in CAR and the concomitant exercise and
performance of functions by the former as the LTFRB-CARRegional Office fall
within the scope of the continuing authority of the President to effectively
reorganize the DOTC(and other departments).
- In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in
good faith. Areorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in this
case was decreed in the interest of service and for purposes of economy and
more effective coordination of the DOTCfunctions in CAR.
- The assailed orders are also not in violation of Sections 7 and 8 of Article IX-
B of the Constitution since the organic personnel of the DOTC-CAR are, in
effect, merely designated to performthe additional duties and functions of an
LTFRB Regional Office subject to the direct supervision and control of the
LTFRB Central Office, pending the creation of a regular LTFRB Regional
Office.
BENGUET EXPLORATION V DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
FERNANDO; February 28, 1977
FACTS
- Sofia Reyes filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim against a
domestic Mining corporations (Benguet Exploration, Inc.) Lode Lease
Agreement covering three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province.
- Bureau of Mines dismissed the adverse claim
- Reyes appealed to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource
maintaining the sufficiency of her adverse claim
- At first the Department dismissed the appeal but on a second motion for
reconsideration and ordered a formal hearing of the case
- Benguet Exploration, Inc. filed petition for review
ISSUES
1. WON the decision rendered by the Director of Lands approved by the
Secretary, upon a question of fact, is justiciable
2. WONthe Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can be precluded
fromconducting his own inquiry
3. WON Secretary Pascual, in calling for a hearing, failed to abide by the
requirements of the law
HELD
1. Adecision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not
subject to be reviewed by the courts unless there is a showing that such
decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition or mistake, other
than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless
of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of evidence, so long
as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made
Reasoning
Acts of a department head, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumably the acts of the Chief Executive
2. The State acting through the legislature through its power of imperiumacting
as a sovereign regulating property to come up with rules with which to exercise
its power of dominiumas owner of the property cannot act arbitrarily but in
accordance with law
Reasoning
Indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an
investigation by the Director of Lands as to howsuch title has been acquired
3. The Mining Act speaks of findings of facts of the Director of Mines when
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources being final and
conclusive, in which case the aggrieved party may file a petition for review
with this Court where only questions of lawmay be raised
Reasoning No such affirmance by the secretary thats why he ordered a
hearing. It is but a right and proper in the interest of justice that a formal
hearing on the merits of this case be conducted
Decision: petition for reviewis DISMISSEDfor lack of merit. Unanimous
LANSANG V GARCIA
CONCEPCION; December 11, 1971
FACTS:
- 8 consolidated petitions of writ of habeas corpus.
Other petitions:
L-33965 Arienda vs Sec of National Defense
L-33973 David vs Garcia
L-33982 Prudente v Yan, Garcia
L-34004 Tomas vs Garcia
L-34013 Rimando vs Garcia
L-34039 De Castro vs Rabago
L-34265 Oreta vs Garcia
L-34339 Olivar vs Garcia
- August 21, 1971Plaza Miranda bombing. 8 persons died, several injured
- August 23, 1971- President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 889 suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, by virtue of the powers vested upon
the President by ART VII Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution. His reason was
that lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder
affecting public safety and the security of the State and that public safety
requires immediate and effective action
- Several people were apprehended and detained including the petitioners on
reasonable belief that they had participated in the crime of insurrection or
rebellion.
- August 30, 1971Proclamation 889-Aamended Proclamation 889.
- September 18 and 25, October 4, 1971 -- Proclamations 889-B, 889-Cand
889-D lifted the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
some provinces, sub-provinces, cities, EXCEPT in Bataan, Benguet, Bulacan,
Camarines Sur, Ifugao, Isabela, Laguna, Lanao, North and South Cotabato,
Nueva Ecija, Nueva Viscaya, Pampanga, Quezon, Rizal, Tarlac, Zambales,
Aurora, Quirino, and 18 cities including Manila.
ISSUES
1. WONthe Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the
factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ
2. WONthe Proclamation was valid/ constitutional. WONit complied with ART
III Section 1 par 14
34
and ART VII Section 10 par 2
35
of the Constitution?
3. WONthe President act arbitrarily in issuing PN889
4. WON the Petitioners are covered by PN 889. WON petitioners detained
should be released
34
Theprivilegeof thewrit of habeascorpusshall not besuspendedexcept incasesof invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit, inanywayof whicheventsthesamemaybe
suspendedwherever duringsuchperiodthenecessityfor suchsuspensionshall exist.
35
ThePresident shall becommander-in-chief of all armedforcesof thePhilippines, and, whenever it
becomesnecessary, hemaycall out sucharmedforcestoprevent or suppresslawlessviolence,
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. Incaseof invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit, hemaysuspendtheprivilegesof thewrit of habeascorpus, or
placethePhilippinesor anypart thereof under martial law.
HELD
1. YES. Upon deliberation, the Court abandoned the doctrine in Barcelon v
Baker and Montenegro v Castaeda (determination by the President of
existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus should be conclusive upon the courts.
The President, with all the intelligence sources was in a better position than the
SC to ascertain the real state of peace and order). The grant of power to
suspend the privilege is neither absolute no unqualified. The authority to
suspend the privilege of the writ is circumcised, confined, restricted (more so
because it is stated in the negative shall not beexcept), and like the
limitations and restrictions imposed upon the legislative department, adherence
thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into
by courts of justice.
- The Executive is vested with the power to suspend the privilege of the writ,
and the Executive is supreme within its own sphere, however, the separation of
powers goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances. The
authority to determine whether or not the Executive acted within the sphere
allotted to himis vested in the Judiciary.
2. YES.
a. Proclamation 889, as amended by Proclamation 889-A, declared the
existence of an uprising -- lawless elements xxx joined and banded their
forces together for the avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and
are actually engaged inan armed insurrection and rebellion xxx
b. The 2 conditions for a valid suspension a) there must be invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof and b) public safety
must require the aforementioned suspension are PRESENT.
c. The 1
st
condition can be attested through jurisprudence (there were a lot of
cases already HUKBALAHAP, etc). The emergence and establishment of
CPPNPAis proof of the existence of a rebellion.
d. The 2
nd
condition is justified through the reports of the acts of the NPA(its
infiltration of several mass-based organizations, various killings and bombings,
encounters with the military, etc) and the threat it poses to the public safety.
According to intelligence reports, the CPP and its front organizations are
capable of preparing powerful explosive, and that there was a plan of a series
of assassinations, kidnappings, mass destruction of property, etc.
3. NO. The President did not act arbitrarily. He had possession of intelligence
reports, he consulted his advisers, and had reason to feel that the situation was
critical. The suspension of the privilege of the writ inthe entire Philippines was
justified as he could not have ascertained the places to be excluded at the time
of the proclamation, and he gradually lifted the suspension.
4. Some petitioners were already released and with respect to them, the issue
is moot and academic. As to petitioners David, Felipe, Olivar, de los Reyes,
del Rosario and Sison, still under detention, they have been charged with
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act/ accused of overt acts coveredby the PN
889. The PN889 being valid, their release may not be ordered by the SC, but
the CFI is directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary
investigation of the charges and to issue corresponding warrants of arrest if
probable cause is found or otherwise , to order their release.
Decision President did not act arbitrarily. PN 889 not unconstitutional.
Petitions L33964, L33965, L33982, L34004, L34013, L34039, L34265
dismissed. CFI to conduct investigation and issue warrants of arrest or order
of release as to petitioners still under detention.
All concur. Fernando dissents only as to the fourth issue.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [dissent]
- I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that the six petitioners still under
detentionshould be set free.
- The petitioners ought not to be further deprived of their liberty in the absence
of a warrant of arrest for whatever offense they may be held to answer, to be
issued by a judge after a finding of probable cause. That is to comply with the
constitutional requirement against unreasonable search and seizure.
- To keep themin confinement after ordinary processes of the laware to be
availed of is to ignore the safeguard of the Bill of Rights that no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
AQUINO V PONCE ENRILE
MAKALINTAL; September 17, 1974
FACTS
- September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Proclamation
No. 1081, proclaiming a state of Martial Lawin the Philippines
- September 22, 1972, General Order No. 2 was signed by the President which
provided an order to the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into
custody the individuals named in the list for being participants in the conspiracy
to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the
government by force
- Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, immediately effected the
arrest of the herein petitioners
- Petitioners sought relief fromCourt, filing petitions for habeas corpus
- Respondents filed their Return to Writ and Answer to the Petition and
prayed that the petition be dismissed
- Pending resolution of these Petitions, petitioners, except for two (Sen.
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Sen. Jose Diokno), were released fromcustody on
different dates under a Conditional Release
- December 28, 1973, Diokno filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition, imputing
delay in the disposition of his case, and asseverating that because of the
decision of the Court in the Ratification Cases and the action of the Members
of the Court in taking an oath to support the New Constitution, he cannot
reasonably expect to get justice in this case
- The respondents opposed the motion on the grounds that there is a public
interest in the decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the
motion to withdrawareuntrue, unfair and contemptuous.
- The Court denied Dioknos motion with a vote of 5 to 7
- Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Muoz-Palma, Aquino and
Barredo voted to grant Dioknos motion to withdrawpetition
ISSUES
1. WONthe Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional sufficiency of
the proclamation of martial law
2. WONProclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances required
by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law
3. WONpetitioners were illegally detained entitling themthe relief of habeas
corpus
HELD
All petitions dismissed except those which have been previously withdrawn by
the respective petitioners with the approval of this Court.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., in a separate opinion, explains his reasons for his concurrence in
the dismissal of all the petitions.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in a separate opinion.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs in the dismissals in a separate opinion.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
WON the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the constitutional
sufficiency of the proclamation of martial law(justiciability of the martial
lawproclamation)
CASTRO [justiciable]
- cited Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court asserted the power to inquire into
the existence of the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus in order to determine the sufficiency thereof.
- The judicial department can determine the existence of conditions for the
exercise of the Presidents powers and is not bound by the recitals of his
proclamation. But whether in the circumstances obtaining public safety
requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
proclamation of martial law is initially for the President to decide. The
Presidents findings as to necessity is persuasive upon the courts.
FERNANDO [justiciable]
- The action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the formof a
legislative act or an executive order could be tested in court. Where private
rights are affected, the judiciary has the duty to look into its validity. Ashowing
that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be and
obstacle to judicial inquiry. Its improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may
give rise to a justiciable controversy. Necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches
have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political.
- The range of permissible inquiry to be conducted by the Court is necessarily
limited to the ascertainment of whether or not such a suspension, in the light of
the credible information furnished by the President, was arbitrary. The
question before the judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of
the action taken.
- Referred to Lansang vs. Garcia where the Court sustained the presidential
proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as there
was no showing of arbitrariness in the exercise of a prerogative belonging to
the executive, the judiciary merely acting as a check on the exercise of such
authority. Chief Justice Concepcion in his opinion: In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Court is merely to check, not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him
or the determine the wisdomof his act.
TEEHANKEE [justiciable]
"it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases [stated in
the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
placing the country under martial law as the case may be, since the
requirements for the exercise of these powers are the same and are provided
in the very same clause] in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency
thereof."32 The Court stressed therein that "indeed, the grant of power to
suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority
conferred upon by the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the
Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The precept in the Bill of
Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is
more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress its
importance, by providing that (t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended x x x. It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion-or
under Art. VII of the Constitution, imminent danger thereof-when the public
safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist. Far
frombeing full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is
thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting
or the conditions essential to its existence, but also, as regards the time when
and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the
aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the
confines and the limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like
the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the
legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may,
within proper bounds, be inquired into by the courts of justice. Otherwise, the
explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the
frames of our Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a
wasteful exercise in futility."
BARREDO [qualified vote: justiciable]
- The inquiry which the Constitution contemplates for the determination of the
constitutional sufficiency of a proclamation of martial law by the President
should not go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be stated in
the proclamation,, if these are by their very nature capable of unquestionable
demonstration.
- While a declaration of martial law is not absolutely conclusive, the Courts
inquiry into its constitutional sufficiency may not, contrary to what is implied in
Lansang, involve the reception of evidence to be weighed against those on
which the President has acted, nor may it extend to the investigation of what
evidence the President had before him. Such inquiry must be limited to what is
undisputed in the record and to what accords or does not accord with facts of
judicial notice.
- It is entirely up to the Court to determine and define its own constitutional
prerogatives vis--vis the proclamation and the existing martial lawsituation,
given the reasons for the declaration and its avowed objectives.
1. The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. This means among
other things that all the powers of the government and of all its officials
fromthe President down to the lowest emanate fromit.
2. The Judiciary provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court
as the ultimate arbiter of all conflicts as to what the Constitution or any
part thereof means.
3. In the same way the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the
Constitution, the President is the specifically assigned protector of the
safety, tranquility and territorial integrity of the nation. This responsibility
of the President is his alone and may not be shared by any other
Department.
4. The Constitution expressly provides that in case of invasion, insurrection
or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it, the Executive may place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law
5. In the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the
Executive by the Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also,
the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is
the very whole of that power, without any limitation or qualification.
6. Even the basic guarantee of protection of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law readily reveals that the Constitutions concern for
individual rights and liberties is not entirely above that for the national
interests, since the deprivation it enjoins is only that which is without due
process of lawand laws arealways enacted in the national interest or to
promote and safeguard the general welfare.
7. Whereas the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution explicitly enjoins that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, there is
no similar injunction whether expressed or implied against the
declaration of martial law.
- Political questions are not per se beyond the Courts jurisdictionbut that as
a matter of policy, implicit in the Constitution itself, the Court should abstain
frominterferingwith the Executives Proclamation.
ANTONIO [political question]
- The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive
aspect of sovereignty. To protect the nations continued existence, from
external as well as internal threats, the government "is invested with all those
inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution,
were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as
being essential to the exercise of its functions"
- These powers which are to be exercised for the nations protection and
security have been lodged by the Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2)
thereof, on the President of the Philippines, who is clothed with exclusive
authority to determine the occasion on whichthe powers shall be called forth.
- CitedBarcelon vs. Baker : The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and
adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v. Baker. It enunciated
the principle that when the Governor-General with the approval of the
Philippine Commission, under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
declares that a state of rebellion, insurrection or invasion exists, and by reason
thereof the public safety requires the suspension of the privileges of habeas
corpus, this declaration is held conclusive upon the judicial department of the
government. And when the Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist
justifying the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, courts
will presume that such conditions continue to exist until the same authority has
decided that such conditions no longer exist. These doctrines are rooted on
pragmatic considerations and sound reasons of public policy. The "doctrine
that whenever the Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power to any
person, such person is to be considered the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts" has been recognized by all courts and "has never
been disputed by any respectable authority." The political department
according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott, is the sole judge of the
existence of war or insurrection, and when it declares either of these
emergencies to exist, its action is not subject to reviewor liable to be controlled
by the judicial department of the State.
MAKASIAR[political question]
AQUINO[political question]
FERNANDEZ [political question]
- The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaimmartial
law. It is similarly explicit in specifying the occasions for its exercise. "In case of
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public
Safety requires it, he (the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."
- The power to proclaimmartial lawis exclusively vested in the President. The
proclamation and its attendant circumstances therefore form a political
question.
- Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislature
is justiciable there can be no clearer example of a political question than
Proclamation No. 1081. It is the exercise by the highest elective official of the
land of a supreme political duty exclusively entrusted to him by the
Constitution. Our people have entrusted to the President through a specific
provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a
powerful weapon. The people have entrusted to himthe estimation that the
perils are so ominous and threatening that this ultimate weapon of our duly
constituted government must be used.
- The Supreme Court was not given the jurisdiction to share the determination
of the occasions for its exercise. It is not given the authority by theConstitution
to expand or limit the scope of its use depending on the allegations of litigants.
It is not authorized by the Constitution to say that martial law may be
proclaimed in Isabela and Sulu but not in Greater Manila. Much less does it
have the power nor should it even exercise the power, assuming its existence,
to nullify a proclamation of the President on a matter exclusively vested in him
by the Constitution and on issues so politically and emotionally charged. The
Courts function in such cases is to assume jurisdiction for the purpose of
finding out whether the issues constitute a political question or not. Its function
is to determine whether or not a question is indeed justiciable.
- Granted that Proclamation No. 1081 is not political but justiciable, it is still
valid because the president has not acted arbitrarily in issuing it.
ESGUERRA [political question]
- I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding; that
the veracity or sufficiency of its factual bases cannot be inquired into by the
Courts and that the question presented by the petitions is political in nature and
not justiciable. Whether or not there is constitutional basis for the Presidents
action is for himto decide alone.
- RuledBarcelon vs. Baker over Lansang vs. Garcia
MUNOZ-PALMA [justiciable]
With Lansang, the highest Court of the land takes upon itself the grave
responsibility of checking executive action and saving the nation from an
arbitrary and despotic exercise of the presidential power granted under the
Constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or
proclaim martial law; that responsibility and duty of the Court must be
preserved and fulfilled at all costs if We want to maintain its role as the last
bulwark of democracy in this country.
WON Proclamation No. 1081 is valid given then the circumstances
required by the Constitution for the proclamation of a state of martial law
CASTRO [valid]
- Our Constitution authorizes the proclamation of martial lawin cases not only
of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of imminent danger
thereof.
- The so called open court theory does not apply to the Philippine situation
because our 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration
of martial laweven where the danger to public safety arises merely fromthe
imminence of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too
simplistic for our day, what with the universally recognized insidious nature of
Communist subversion and its overt operations
FERNANDO [valid]
While it is beyond question that the 1973 Constitution stipulates, in a transitory
provision, that: All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the
lawof the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and
explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
TEEHANKEE[no pronouncement]
BARREDO [valid]
The proclamation had merely put the Constitution in a state of anesthesia,
since a major surgery is needed to save the nations life.
MUNOZ-PALMA [valid]
The extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire country under
martial lawwas necessary. The Presidents action was neither capricious nor
arbitrary. An arbitrary act is one that arises froman unrestrained exercise of
the will, caprice, or personal preference of the actor, one which is not founded
on a fair or substantial reason, is without adequate determining principle,
nonrational, and solely dependent on the actors will. Such is not the case with
the act of the President, because the proclamation of martial lawwas the result
of conditions and events, not of his own making, which undoubtedly
endangered the public safety and led himto conclude that the situation was
critical enough to warrant the exercise of his power under the Constitution to
proclaimmartial law
WONpetitioners were illegally detained entitling themthe relief of habeas
corpus
CASTRO [legal]
- Given the validity of the proclamation of martial law, the arrest and detention
of those reasonably believed to be engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it is
well nigh beyond questioning.
- In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the arrest and detention of
the petitioners on the ground of reasonable belief in their complicity in the
rebellion and insurrection. Except Diokno and Aquino, all the petitioners have
been released fromcustody, although subject to defined restrictions regarding
personal movement and expression of views. As the danger to public safety
has not abated, I cannot say that the continued detention of Diokno and Aquino
and the restrictions on the personal freedoms of the other petitioners are
arbitrary, just as I amnot prepared to say that the continued imposition of
martial rule is unjustified.
FERNANDO [proclamation of martial law does not
automatically carry the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus]
It is not to be denied that where such a state of affairs could be traced to the
wishes of the President himself, it carries with it a presumption of validity. The
test is again arbitrariness as defined in Lansang. While the detention of
petitioners could have been validly ordered, as dictated by the very
proclamation itself, if it continued for an unreasonable length of time, then his
release may be sought in a habeas corpus proceeding.
BARREDO [legal]
- The imposition of martial lawautomatically carries with it the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any event, the Presidential order of
arrest and detention cannot be assailed as deprivation of liberty without due
process.
- The primary and fundamental purpose of martial lawis to maintain order and
to insure the success of the battle against the enemy by the most expeditious
and efficient means without loss of time and with the minimumeffort. This is
self-evident. The arrest and detention of those contributing to the disorder and
especially of those helping or otherwise giving aid and comfort to the enemy
are indispensable, if martial lawis to mean anything at all.
ANTONIO [legal]
- The Court is precluded frominquiring into the legality of arrest and detention
of petitioners. Having concluded that the Proclamation of Martial Law on
September 21, 1972 by the President of the Philippines and its continuance are
valid and constitutional, the arrest and detention of petitioners, pursuant to
General Order No. 2 dated September 22, 1972 of the President, as amended
by General Order No. 2-A, dated September 26, 1972, may not now be
assailed as unconstitutional and arbitrary.
- It should be important to note that as a consequence of the proclamation of
martial law, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been impliedly
suspended. Authoritative writers on the subject viewthe suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus as an incident, but an important incident of a declaration of
martial law.
FERNANDEZ [the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is ipso facto
suspended upon a proclamation of martial law]
MUNOZ-PALMA [not legal, the proclamation of martial law
did not carry with it the automatic suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus]
- First, fromthe very nature of the writ of habeas corpus which as stressed in
the early portion of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and
most immediately available safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ
cannot be suspended by mere implication. The Bill of Rights (Art. III, Sec.
1(14), 1935 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution) categorically
states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except for causes therein specified, and the proclamation of martial lawis not
one of those enumerated.
- Second, the so-called Commander-in-Chief clause, either under Art. VII, Sec.
10(2), 1935 Constitution, or Art. IX, Sec. 12, 1973 Constitution, provides
specifically for three different modes of executive action in times of emergency,
and one mode does not necessarily encompass the other, viz, (a) calling out
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness, etc., (b) suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) placing the country or a part
thereof under martial law. In the latter two instances even if the causes for the
executive action are the same, still the exigencies of the situation may warrant
the suspension of the privilege of the writ but not a proclamation of martial law
and vice versa.
- Third, there can be an automatic suspension of the privilege of the writ when,
with the declaration of martial law, there is a total collapse of the civil
authorities, the civil courts are closed, and a military government takes over, in
which event the privilege of the writ is necessarily suspended for the simple
reason that there is no court to issue the writ; that, however, is not the case
with us at present because the martial lawproclaimed by the President upholds
the supremacy of the civil over the military authority,and the courts are open to
issue the writ.
IBP V ZAMORA
KAPUNAN; August 15, 2000
FACTS
- In viewof the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, President
Estrada, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNPand the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
- TheSecretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of
Staff of the PNPand the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were
tasked to execute and implement the said order.
- The PNP Chief, through Police Superintendent Edgar Aglipay, formulated
Letter of Instruction 02/2000, which contains the ff:
> Purpose: for the suppression of crime prevention and other serious
threats to national security
> Situation: Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not
only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose members
include active and former police/military personnel. The police visibility
patrol in urban areas will reduce the incidence of crimes specially those
perpetrated by active or former police/military personnel.
> Mission: sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of
high-profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime
syndicates whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined
and well-armed activeor former PNP/military personnel
>Concept in Joint Visibility Patrol Operations:
a. Conducted jointly by the National Capital Region Police Office and
the Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to
preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents and
other serious threat to national security, although the primary
responsibility over Internal Security Operations still rest upon the
AFP.
b. Principle of integration of efforts: work cohesively and unify efforts
to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach in addressing
crime prevention.
c. A provisional Task Force Tulungan shall be organized to provide
the mechanism, structure and procedures for the integrated
planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing the security
situation.
d. Areas for deployment: Monumento Circle, SM City North Edsa,
Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati
Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and
Domestic Airport.
- On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to
declare the deployment of the Marines, null and void and unconstitutional
because no emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work (violates Art 2, Sec. 3),
deployment constitutes an insidious incursion by the military in a civilian
function of government (violates Art. 16, Sec. 5), and deployment creates a
dangerous tendency to rely on the military to performcivilian functions of the
government. It also makes the military more powerful than what it should really
be under the Constitution.
- The President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the
Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the AFP
Chief of Staff and PNPChief. The President expressed his desire to improve
the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through more effective crime
prevention programincluding increased police patrols. He further stated that to
heighten police visibility in the Metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is
necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP
Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of
the Marines to assist the PNPin preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable
period only.
ISSUES
1. WON the Presidents factual determination of the necessity of calling the
armed forces is subject to judicial review
a. WONpetitioner has legal standing
2. WON the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy, over the
military and the civilian character of the PNP
HELD
1. On Judicial Review
Ratio 1: When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can
exercise its power of judicial reviewonly if the following requisites are complied
with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial reviewis pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Ratio 2: When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
a. The IBPhas not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this
case.
>Definition of locus standi
+ a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged
+interest means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest
+gist: whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions
>The mere invocation by the IBPof its duty to preserve the rule of lawand
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with
standing in this case
> IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. It has not shown any specific injury, which it has
suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned government act.
2. The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the
Marines
Definition of political question
- concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) questions which are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive department; if an issue is
clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary
action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves
then it is held to be a political question
- (Baker v. Carr) prominent on the surface of any case held to be a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question
Ratio 3: When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue of whether the prescribedqualifications or conditions have
been met or the limitations respected, is justiciablethe problembeing one of
legality or validity.
Ratio 4: When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned.
- grave abuse of discretion: capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility
- There is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no
justification for calling out the armed forces. Likewise, there is no evidence
to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the
power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional
provision on civilian supremacy over the military.
There is a clear textual commitment under Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 1 of the
Constitution to bestowon the President full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for
the exercise of the calling out power is also implied and further reinforced in the
rest of the said provision.
- Congress may revoke proclamation of martial lawor suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus and the Court may reviewthe sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. There is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or reviewof the Presidents action to call out the armed forces
- Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the terms are expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
- Fr. Bernas: graduated power of the President as Commander-in-Chief;
when he exercises this lesser power of calling on the armed forces, when
he says it is necessary, his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody
- Besides the absence of textual standards that the Court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. On the other hand, the President has a
vast intelligence network to gather information.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause
nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force
Constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian lawenforcement
- limited participation by the Marines
- real authority belongs to the PNP
Deployment of the Marines does not unmake the civilian character of the
police force
- the real authority in these operations is lodged with the head of a
civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military
- since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members
of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to
speak of
- the Marines render nothing more than assistance required in
conducting the patrols; there can be no insidious incursion of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution
Military assistance to civilian authorities in various forms persists in
Philippine jurisdiction
- Military assistance in: elections, administration of the Phil. Red
Cross, relief and rescue operations, conduct of licensure exams,
sanitary inspections, conduct of census work, etc.
- Systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of Congress and, yet, never before questioned
- Mutual support and cooperation between the military and civilian
authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy
Decision Petition dismissed
- 10 concur (Kapunan, Davide, Melo, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon)
- 5 concur in the result (Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing)
- 1 on official leave(Bellosillo)
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO
- Political questions are defined as those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of government They have two aspects: (1) those matters
that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity and (2)
matters which have been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act.
- (Barcelon v. Baker) Under our formof government, one department has no
authority to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the
discretion of the other department. Whenever a statute gives discretionary
power to any person, to be exercised by himupon his own opinion of certain
facts, the statute constitutes himthe sole judge of the existence of those facts.
The exercise of this discretion is conclusive upon the courts. Once a
determination is made by the executive and legislative departments that the
conditions justifying the assailed acts exist, it will presume that the conditions
continue until the same authority decide that they no longer exist. The
executive branch, thru its civil and military branches, are better situated to
obtain information about peace and order fromevery corner of the nation, in
contrast with the judicial department, with its very limited machinery
- (Alejandrino v. Quezon) Under the Jones Law, the power of the Senate to
punish its members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend an
appointive member fromthe exercise of his office. The Supreme Court does
not possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any
particular action. The Philippine Legislature or any branch thereof cannot be
directly controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial
process
- (Vera v. Avelino) Legislature has the inherent right to determine who shall be
admittedto its membership
- (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito) A proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
- (Arnault v. Balagtas) The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt
with by the legislature is a necessary concomitant of the legislative process
and the legislatures exercise of its discretionary authority is not subject to
judicial interference
- (Osmena v. Pendatun) The Court did not interfere with Congresspower to
discipline its members
- (Avelino v. Cuenco) The Court could assume jurisdiction over the controversy
in light of the subsequent events justifying intervention among which was the
existence of a quorum
- (Tanada v. Cuenco) The Senate is not clothed with full discretionary
authority in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations, which are
mandatory in nature.
- (Cunanan v Tan, Jr.) The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the
Constitution and its power does not come from Congress but from the
Constitution
- (Gonzales v. Comelec) The question of whether or not Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly in proposing amendments to the Constitution violates the
Constitution was held to be justiciable and not a political issue. The power to
amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. As a constituent assembly,
the members of Congress derive their authority fromthe fundamental lawand
they do not have the final say on whether their acts are within or beyond
constitutional limits
- (Tolentino v. Comelec) Acts of a constitutional convention called for the
purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution are at par with acts of
Congress acting as a constituent assembly
- In sum, this Court brushed aside the political question doctrine and assumed
jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of
powers conferredupon the Legislature
- The Court hewed to the same line as regards the exercise of Executive
Power
- (Severino v. Governor-General) When the Legislature conferred upon the
Governor-General powers and duties, it did so for the reason that he was in
a better position to knowthe needs of the country than any other member of
the executive department, and with full confidence that he will performsuch
duties as his judgment dictates
- (Abueva v. Wood) Under the principle of separation of powers, it ruled that
it was not intended by the Constitution that one branch of government could
encroach upon the field of duty of the other. Each department has an
exclusive field within which it can performits part within certain discretionary
limits.
- (Forbes v. Tiaco) The Presidents inherent power to deport undesirable
aliens is universally denominated as political, and this power continues to
exist for the preservation of peace and domestic tranquility of the nation
- (Manalang v. Quitoriano) The appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President upon which no limitations may be imposed by
Congress except those resulting fromthe need of securing concurrence of
the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited
legislative power to prescribe qualifications to the given appointive office
- (Untal v. Chief of Staff, AFP) As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, the President has the power to determine whether war, in the legal
sense, still continues or has terminated. It is within the province of the
political department and not the judicial department of government to
determine when war is at the end
- (Montenegro v. Castaneda) The authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring the suspension of the privilege belongs to the President
and his decision is final and conclusive on the courts.
- (Lansang v. Garcia) The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was not
a political question. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is neither absolute nor unqualified because the Constitution sets
limits on the exercise of executive discretion on the matter. These limits are:
(1) that the privilege must not be suspended except only in cases of
invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof; and (2) when
the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be
suspended wherever during such period the necessity for the suspension
shall exist. The extent of the power, which may be inquired into by courts is
defined by these limitations. The function of the Court is not to supplant but
merely to check the Executive; to ascertain whether the President has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in himor to determine the wisdomof his act.
- (Javellana v. Executive Secretary) While a majority of the Court held that
the issue of whether or not the 1973 Constitution was justiciable, a majority
also ruled that the decisive issue of whether the 1973 Constitution had
come into force and effect, with or without constitutional ratification, was a
political question
- (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile) The Court upheld the Presidents declaration of
martial law. On whether the validity of the imposition of martial lawwas a
political or justiciable question, the Court was almost evenly divided.
- (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile) The issuance of the Presidential Commitment
Order by the President was not subject to judicial inquiry. In times of war or
national emergency, the President must be given absolute control for the
very life of the nation and government is in peril
- (Morales, Jr. v. Enrile) By the power of judicial review, the Court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of a persons detention from the
moment he was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon
the merits of the petition
- The language of Art. VIII, Sec. 1 clearly gives the Court the power to strike
down acts amounting to grave abuse of discretion of both the legislative and
executive branches of government
- It is clear that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of
the Philippines, may call out the armed forces subject to two conditions: (1)
whenever it becomes necessary; and (2) to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. Undeniably, these conditions lay down the sine
qua requirement for the exercise of the power and the objective sought to be
attained by the exercise of the power. They define the constitutional
parameters of the calling out power. Whether or not there is compliance with
these parameters is a justiciable issue and is not a political question.
- On the use of Bernas opinion: The Constitution does not derive its force from
the convention which framed it, but fromthe people who ratified it, the intent to
be arrived at is that of the people.
- When private justiciable rights are involved in a suit, the Court must not
refuse to assume jurisdiction even though questions of extreme political
importance are necessarily involved.
VITUG
The act of the President in simply calling on the armed forces of the
Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the PNPin joint visibility patrols
in the metropolis, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now
warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so
envisioned by the fundamental law.
MENDOZA [concur and dissent]
- The judgment on the substantive constitutional issues raised by petitioner
must await an actual case involving real parties with injuries to showas a result
of the operation of the challenged executive action
- A citizens suit challenging the constituti0onality of governmental action
requires that (1) the petitioner must have suffered an injury in fact of an actual
or imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury
and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action by this Court
- Only a party injured by the operation of the governmental action challenged is
in the best position to aid the Court in determining the precise nature of the
problempresented.
- Because of the absence of parties with real and substantial interest to protect,
we do not have evidence on the effect of military presence in malls and
commercial centers
- Dismiss suit on the ground of lack of standing of petitioner and the
consequent lack of an actual case or controversy
SANLAKAS V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TINGA; February 3, 2004
FACTS
- July 27, 2003Some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of AFP, armed
with ammunitions and explosives, stormed into Oakwood apartments in Makati.
They demanded the resignation of GMA, Defense Secretary and the PNP
Chief.
- Later that day, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4 both declaring a state of rebellion and callingout the AFPto suppress
the rebellion.
- Oakwood occupation ended in the evening after negotiations.
- August 1, 2003President lifted the declaration.
- PARTIES
>Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PD)
o Sec 18, Art 7 does not require declaration of a state of rebellion to call
out the armed forces
o There is no sufficient factual basis for an indefinite period since
Oakwood occupation had ceased.
>Social Justice Society (SJS) as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, lawprofessors
and bar reviewers
o Declaration is constitutional anomaly that confuses because
overzealous public officers acting pursuant to the proclamation are
liable to violate the constitutional rights of citizens
o Circumvention of the report requirement in Sec 18, Art 7,
commanding the President tosubmit a report to Congress within 48
hours fromproclamation of martial law
o Presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of
emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to
the President
>Rep. Suplico et al as citizens and members of House of Representatives
o Their rights, powers, and functions were allegedly affected
o Declaration is a superfluity and is actually an exercise of emergency
powers and therefore is a usurpation of the power of the Congress in
Art 6, Sec 23 par 2
>Sen. Pimentel
o Issuances are unwarranted, illegal, and abusive exercise of a martial
lawpower that has no constitutional basis
>Solicitor-General
o Case has become moot because of the lifting of the declaration
ISSUES
1. WONissue is justiciable given mootness of the issue and legal standing
of the parties
b. WONpetitioners have legal standing
2. WONissuances of the President are valid
HELD
1. The President, in declaring state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on
the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article 7 as opposed to the delegated
legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article 6.
- Justiciableeven if moot
- Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review
- Lacson v. Perezmootness preclude the Court fromaddressing its
Constitutionality
- Only Rep Suplico et al and Sen Pimentel have legal standing because when
an act of the Executive injures the institution of the Congress and causes a
derivative but substantial injury, then any member can file suit (Phil.
Constitution Association v. Enriquez)
- Sanlakas, PM, and SJShave no legal standing because they did not obtain
any direct injury fromthe governmental act that is being challenged. Peoples
organization status would not vest themwith the requisite personality to
question the validity of the presidential issuances (Kilosbayan v. Morato)
- SJSas taxpayers and citizens have no legal standing because there was no
illegal disbursement of public funds derived fromtaxation
2. Presidential issuances are valid
- Art 7, Sec 18Sequence of graduated powers: 1.calling out power, 2.power
to suspendwrit of habeas corpus, 3.power to declare martial law.
- 2 and 3 require concurrence of actual invasion or rebellion ANDthat public
safety requires the exercise of such power. These are not required in calling-
out power (IBPv. Zamora)
- It does not expressly prohibit the President fromdeclaring a state of rebellion.
The Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief
powers but with first and foremost, Executive powers
- USConstitutional history: commander-in-chief powers are broadenough as it
is and become more so when taken together with the provision on executive
power and presidential oath of office
- Presidents authority to declare state of rebellion springs in the main fromher
powers as chief executive and at the same timedraws strength fromher
commander-in-chief powers
- The declaration of state of rebellion only gives notice to the nation that such a
state exists and the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
- Declaration cannot diminish or violate constitutionality protected rights
(Lacson)
- President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity of the exercise of such power. There is no proof that
the President acted without factual basis.
- Declaration of state of rebellion does not amount to declaration of martial law.
DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; May 3, 2006
FACTS
- On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20
th
Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that:
The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out
(the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
- The declaration is premised military and police intelligence containing
concerted efforts of Left and Right wing factions to bring down the Arroyo
Government.
- On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP1017
(hence, the same premise as PP1017), thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of
the powers vested in me under the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic
of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated
February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorismand lawless violence in the country;
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFPand the Chief of the PNP,
as well as the officers and men of the AFPand PNP, to immediately
carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of terrorismand lawless violence.
- On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national
emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP
1017.
ARGUMENTSOF THEGOVERNMENT
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP1017 and G.O. No.
5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances
was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
[4]
They considered the aimto oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear
and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor
General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP1017 and G.O. No. 5.
SIGNIFICANTLY, THERE WAS NO REFUTATION FROM PETITIONERS
COUNSELS.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First
Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and Patricio Bumidang,
members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their
detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed
to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people
to showand proclaimour displeasure at the shamregime. Let us demonstrate
our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest, but also by wearing red
bands on our left arms.
[5]
On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document
entitled Oplan Hackle I which detailed plans for bombings and attacks during
the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecomingin Baguio City. The plot
was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and
President Arroyo herself.
[6]
Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo
decided not to attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of
the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMAparade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a
communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his possession were
two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the
Magdalo Group and the National Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio
cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.
[7]
Prior to
his arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRHthat the Magdalos D-Day
would be on February 24, 2006, the 20
th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted
information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force were planning to
defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino
Franco, Jr. todisavow any defection. The latter promptly obeyed and issued a
public statement: All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible
and trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping
Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen and mid-level
government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration.
Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime
Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if
President Arroyo is ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta.
Saycon identified himas B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite
Scout Ranger. Lim said it was all systems go for the planned movement
against Arroyo.
[8]
B/Gen. Danilo Limand Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin
confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to
provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be
held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no
way they could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the
chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the President. However,
Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain
of command. He immediately took custody of B/Gen. Limand directed Col.
Querubin to return tothe Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and
revolutionary work within the military and the police establishments in order to
forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPAspokesman Gregorio
Ka Roger Rosal declared: The Communist Party and revolutionary
movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming
year of accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime;
of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it will not take much longer to
end it.
[9]
On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National
Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly announced: Anti-
Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by
the economic difficulties suffered by the families of AFP officers and enlisted
personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field. He
claimed that with the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-
Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have been
reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing
its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of
telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also
considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of
three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ordering its front organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals
and 25,000 more fromthe provinces in mass protests.
[10]
By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her
security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the gravity of the
fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFPand the PNP
to account for all their men and ensure that the chain of command remains
solid and undivided. To protect the young students fromany possible trouble
that might break loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all
levels in the entire National Capital Region.
PETITIONERSARGUMENTS
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed
PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of
Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedomof the press, of speech and of assembly.
InG.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares andTribune
Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of raiding the Daily Tribune
offices as a clear case of censorship or prior restraint. They also claimed
that the term emergency refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and
similar occurrences, hence, there is absolutely no emergency that warrants
the issuance of PP1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis
Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of the House of
Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano,
Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP1017
and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of legislative powers; violation of
freedomof expression and a declaration of martial law. They alleged that
President Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces
without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence
and a showing that there is necessity to do so.
In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their
members averred that PP1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because
(1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees;
(2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedomof
expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their
grievances.
InG.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative LawGroups, Inc. (ALGI)
alleged that PP1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate
(a) Section 4
[15]
of Article II, (b) Sections 1,
[16]
2,
[17]
and 4
[18]
of Article III, (c)
Section 23
[19]
of Article VI, and (d) Section 17
[20]
of Article XII of the
Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al.,
alleged that PP1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of
her Martial Law powers. And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a
declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that it amounts to an exercise by
the President of emergency powers without congressional approval. In
addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 goes beyond the nature and
function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda
maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional for being
violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as
freedomof the press and the right to access to information on matters of public
concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. In
this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully
prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
- In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that:
first, the petitions should be dismissed for being moot; second,
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMUet
al.), 171485 (Escuderoet al.) and 171489 (Cadizet al.) have no legal standing;
third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP
1017 does not violate the peoples right to free expression and redress of
grievances.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the moot and academic principle precludes the Court
fromtaking cognizance of the cases
2. WONpetitioners in171485(Escuderoet al.), G.R. Nos. 171400
(ALGI), 171483 (KMUet al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424
(Legarda) have legal standing
Substantive
3. WONSupreme Court can reviewthe factual basis of PP1017
4. WONPP1017 andG.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge
HELD
Procedural
1. NO. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution;
[31]
second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
[32]
third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public;
[33]
and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
[34]
Reasoning
- Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution;
[31]
second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
[32]
third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public;
[33]
and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
[34]
- All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts
assumption of jurisdiction over theinstant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the
issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no
question that the issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as
they do the peoples basic rights to freedomof expression, of assembly and of
the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the
military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional
guarantees.
[35]
And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In their
attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganibans Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary.
[36]
However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very
statement that an otherwise moot case may still be decided provided the
party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or
damaged as a direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right within
this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice.
2. YES. The requirement of Locus standi which is the right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question shall be set aside by the Court whenever it
is shown that the case is of transcendental importance.
Reasoning
- Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question.
[37]
In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in
interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the
real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[38]
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief
sought.
- By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases
decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators
may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are
met:
1. the cases involve constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claimof illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election lawin question;
4. or concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
5. or legislators, there must be a claimthat the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
- Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
- The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and
Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true with petitioners in G.R. No.
171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged direct
injury resulting fromillegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not
question their legal standing.
- In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was
usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue of whether or not
the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers
incident to Martial Laware used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that
those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in
bringing to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.
- In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa
v. Enriquez,
[60]
Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas,
Inc. v. Tan,
[61]
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
[62]
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation,
[63]
and Taada v. Tuvera,
[64]
that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in
the execution of the laws.
- In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated
its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed sufficient to give it legal
standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of
their members.
[65]
We take judicial notice of the announcement by the Office
of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public
assemblies following the issuance of PP1017 and G.O. No. 5.
- In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to
allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its
members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and
G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[66]
the Court held
that the mere invocation by the IBPof its duty to preserve the rule of lawand
nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing
in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. However, in viewof the transcendental importance of
the issue, this Court declares that petitioner havelocus standi.
- In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file
the instant petition as there are no allegations of illegal disbursement of public
funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can
no longer sue as a legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a
lawmaker have been impaired by PP1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claimthat
she is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no
showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her frompursuing
her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is likewise of no relevance. She has not
sufficiently shown that PP1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case.
But considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue
involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
- It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but
corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. This is the
underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be
doubted that the validity of PPNo. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question
which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase
Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society nowwaits with bated breath the
ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The petitions thus call for the
application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the
standing requirements for the petitioners in the PP1017 cases.
- This Court holds that all the petitioners herein havelocus standi.
- Incidentally, IT IS NOT PROPERTOIMPLEADPRESIDENT ARROYOAS
RESPONDENT. SETTLED IS THE DOCTRINE THAT THE PRESIDENT,
DURINGHISTENUREOF OFFICEORACTUAL INCUMBENCY,
[67]
MAYNOT
BESUEDINANYCIVIL ORCRIMINAL CASE, ANDTHEREISNONEEDTO
PROVIDE FOR IT IN THE CONSTITUTION OR LAW. It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable himto fully attend to the performance of his official duties
and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes
the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the
discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon himby the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However,
this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any
other official, he remains accountable to the people
[68]
but he may be removed
fromoffice only in the mode provided by lawand that is by impeachment.
[69]
Substantive
3. The Presidents calling-out power is a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or
whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. This ruling is based on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987
Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under
the newdefinition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts
of justice to reviewwhat was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government.
[81]
It speaks of judicial
prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.
[82]
- However, judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that
the Presidents decision is correct, but that the President did not act
arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
[83]
It is incumbent upon the petitioner to showthat the Presidents decision
is totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to
support his assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.
- Petitioners failed to showthat President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out
power, by issuing PP1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. Areading of the
Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandumshows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting
reports forming part of the records. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced
that the President was justified in issuing PP1017 calling for military aid.
4. YES. Notwithstanding the discretionary nature of the constitutional exercise
of the President of his/her calling out of power, the Courts shall have authority
to inquire into the factual basis of such exercise to determine whether it was
within the constitutionally permissible limits or whether grave abuse of
discretion attended its exercise. (This interpretation was based on Article VIII,
section 1
a. Facial Challenge. Facial invalidation of laws (overbreadth doctrine) shall
not be resorted to in the absence of clear showing that (1) the lawinvolves
the exercise of free speech; (2) that there can be no instance that the assailed
law may be valid; and that (3) the Court has no other alternative remedies
available.
- Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a lawshall be facially invalid only if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.
Reasoning
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its
overbreadth. They claim that its enforcement encroached on both
unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution
and sent a chilling effect to the citizens.
- Afacial reviewof PP1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. Aplain reading of PP
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFPto prevent or suppress all forms of
lawlessviolence. InUnited States v. Salerno,
[104]
the USSupreme Court held
that we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment (freedom of speech). Moreover, the
overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally
unprotected conduct.
- Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong
medicine, to be used sparingly and only as a last resort, and is
generally disfavored;
[107]
The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the
traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a
person to whoma lawmay be applied will not be heard to challenge a lawon
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e.,
in other situations not before the Court.
[108]
- Andthird, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there
can be no instance when the assailed lawmay be valid. Here, petitioners
did not even attempt to showwhether this situation exists.
- Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine
which holds that a lawis facially invalid if men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaningand differ as to its application.
[110]
It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it
is also an analytical tool for testing on their faces statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute
on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitioners did not even attempt to showthat PP1017 is vague in all its
application. They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence
cannot understand the meaning and application of PP1017.
b. Constitutional Basis. The authority of the President to exercise his calling
out power to suppress lawless violence shall not be deemed to include the
power to authorize: (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban
on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and agencies and press
censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, as these powers can be
exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief onlywhere there is a valid
declaration of Martial Lawor suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
- The take care power of the President, which includes the power to enforce
obedience of laws shall not be deemed to include calling the military to enforce
or implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like.
- The ordinance power of the President shall not include the power to make
decrees with the same force and effect as those issued by President Marcos.
- In the absence of delegated authority fromCongress, the authority of the
President to declare a state of emergency shall not be deemed to include the
power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest.
- Acts of terrorism no matter how repulsive shall not be deemed to be
punishable in the absence of legislation clearly defining said acts and providing
specific punishments therefor.
Reasoning
Calling-out Power
- The Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence
of graduated powers. These are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Considering the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it
necessary to issue PP1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network,
she is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.
- Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to
aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This
involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents
calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a
President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a
greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the
wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.
- It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the
Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the
authority to proclaima state of national emergency. While President Arroyos
authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates fromher powers as Chief
Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2,
Book II of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the
existence of which the operation of a specific lawor regulation is made
to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the
force of an executive order.
- President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration
allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of
Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In
these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a
provision on the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned
public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP1017 calls
for the exercise of anawesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot
be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the case
of Sanlakas.
- Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a
declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines the character of PP1017
are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her
calling-out power.
- In his Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13,
2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said that of the three powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial Lawposes the
most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be
resorted to lightly. It cannot be used to stifle or persecute critics of the
government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of
enabling himto secure the people fromharmand to restore order so that they
can enjoy their individual freedoms.
- Justice Mendoza also stated that PP1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law.
It is no more than a call by the President to the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only
under a valid declaration of Martial Lawcan be done. Its use for any other
purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to
its command is ultra vires. Specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial
warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies; (c) take-over of news media and
agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are
powers which can be exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only
where there is a valid declaration of Martial Lawor suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus.
- Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP1017 is not a declaration
of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless
violence.
Take Care Power
- The second provision of PP1017 pertains to the power of the President to
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article
VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
- As the Executive in whomthe executive power is vested,
[115]
the primary
function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies
to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the
officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is
required to take an oath or affirmation to the effect that as President of the
Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws.
[116]
In the exercise of
such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his
office as the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,
[117]
including the Philippine National Police
[118]
under the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
[119]
Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?
- PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and
decreesx x xpromulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
- The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of
Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), which allows her to
issue executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum
orders/circulars, general or special orders. President Arroyos ordinance power
is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to
those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential
Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes
because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative
power during the period of Martial Lawunder the 1973 Constitution.
[121]
- The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President
Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Lawnor a state of rebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative
power by issuing decrees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the
military?
- As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact
decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be
enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or
implement certain laws, such as customs laws, laws governing family and
property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only
order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to
suppress lawless violence.
Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders, and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution dohereby
declare a state of national emergency.
- The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of
national emergency under PP 1017, can call the military not only to enforce
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to
the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the
public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by
it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with
public interest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision
when she issued PP1017?
- During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP1017 purports to
grant the President, without any authority or delegation fromCongress, to take
over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest.
- This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution. In effect at the
time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over
the management, control and operation of the Manila Electric Company, the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority, the Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines,
Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by
the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national
emergency.
- Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim
that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an
encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers.
- Adistinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a
state of national emergency and toexercise emergency powers. To the first,
Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold
constitutional issues arise.
- Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in
joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power
to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn
by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
- It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers
not only to war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of the
Framers of our Constitution was to withhold fromthe President the authority to
declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII
(calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly,
they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he
can declare a state of national emergency. Therefore, President Arroyo could
validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the
absence of a Congressional enactment.
- But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different
matter. This requires a delegation fromCongress.
- Constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together.
Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution
which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other.
[123]
Considering that Section 17 of Article
XII and Section 23 of Article VI relate to national emergencies, they must be
read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
- Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is
evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such
powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not
reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may
not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers,
the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant
emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be awar or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for alimited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the
Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised tocarry out a national
policydeclared by Congress.
[124]
- Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public
interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is
dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to himpursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
- Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly
intensifying the degree of existing danger to life or well-being beyond that
which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of
intensity, variety, and perception. Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or
executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a wide
range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,
b) natural disaster,
[129]
andc) national security.
- Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It
may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood,
or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
[131]
This is
evident in the Records of the Constitutional Commission.
- Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President
Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not
authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without authority fromCongress.
- Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The
President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting
the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have
ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point
out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the
powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an
emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. AppliedChallenge. The Court shall not declare laws as invalid solely on the
basis of their misapplication or abuse or susceptibility to abuse by the people
tasked to implement them.
- The arrest of Randy David and other acts done by the authorities pursuant to
the parts of the laws herein considered unconstitutional are also deemed
unconstitutional without prejudice to the filing of necessary administrative,
criminal or civil actions against specific abusescommitted by authorities.
Reasoning
Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the
basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law
render it unconstitutional?
- Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid
although they may be abused and misabused
[135]
and may afford an
opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.
[136]
The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its
efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not fromits effects ina particular
case.
[137]
PP1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power.
Its general purpose is to command the AFP to suppress all forms of lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which
prompted President Arroyo to issue PP1021. But there is nothing in PP1017
allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or
violate the citizens constitutional rights.
- Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the
ground that its implementor committed illegal acts? The answer is no. The
criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is
the essential basis for the exercise of power, andnot a mere incidental result
arising fromits exertion.
[138]
This is logical.
- President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP
1017. General orders are acts and commands of the President inhis capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They are
internal rules issued by the executive officer to his subordinates precisely for
the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations
create no relation except between the official who issues themand the official
who receives them.
[139]
They are based on and are the product of, a
relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object.
[140]
For
these reasons, one requirement for these rules to be valid is that they must be
reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.
- G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the
necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorismand lawlessviolence.
- Unlike the termlawless violence, the phrase acts of terrorism is still an
amorphous and vague concept. Congress has yet to enact a lawdefining and
punishing acts of terrorism.
- The absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may result in abuse and
oppression on the part of the police or military.
- So far, the word terrorism appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in
P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by President Marcos during the
Martial Lawregime.
- P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist
Party of the Philippines) enacted by President Corazon Aquino on May 5,
1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define acts of terrorism. Since
there is no lawdefining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under
G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism.
Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently,
there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and
residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all
assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be
effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out
power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that the acts of terrorism portion of
G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC ACTS CONDUCTED BY AUTHORITIES
PURSUANT TOPP1017 ANDG.O. NO. 5
- In the Brief Account
[144]
submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are
established: first, he was arrested without warrant; second, the PNPoperatives
arrested himon the basis of PP1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal,
Quezon City where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a
criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who held his
head and tried to push him inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with
Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 880
[145]
and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he
was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was eventually released
for insufficiency of evidence.
- The Constitution enunciates the general rule that no person shall be arrested
without warrant. The recognized exceptions are in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - Apeace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, inhis presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
- Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner
Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP880, all that the arresting officers could
invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts
with the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
[146]
Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge himwith
inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient
evidence for the charge of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known
whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
[147]
- But what made it doubly worse for petitioners Davidet al. is that not only was
their right against warrantless arrest violated, but also their right to peaceably
assemble.
- Assembly under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Constitution means a right on the part
of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It
is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the
right of speech. This right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress
has a right to prevent. In other words, the right to assemble is not subject to
previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior
issuance of a permit or authorization fromthe government authorities except,
of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for
the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.
- The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they
were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing
any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that
warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned fromcircumstances,
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to
justify the arresting officers conduct.
- On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al. (G.R. No. 171483)
unwarranted. Their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs
directive canceling all permits previously issued by local government units.
This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that freedomof assembly is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing of aclear and present danger of
a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
[149]
Tolerance is
the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a showing that an
assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the
citizens right to exercise it.With the blanket revocation of permits, the
distinction between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.
- Moreover, under BP880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is
lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits
and to revoke such permitsafter due notice and hearingon the determination
of the presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even
notified and heard on the revocation of their permits. The first time they
learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal
defect. When a persons right is restrictedby government action, it behooves a
democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and
according to procedure.
- G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom
of speech i.e., the freedomof the press. Petitioners narration of facts, which
the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribunes offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives
seized several materials for publication; third, the search was conducted at
about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was
conducted in the absence of any official of theDaily Tribuneexcept the security
guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity
of theDaily Tribuneoffices.
- Thereafter, a wave of warning came fromgovernment officials. Presidential
Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as saying that such raid was
meant to showa strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive
or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this
government. Director General Lomibao further stated that if they do not
followthe standards and the standards are if they would contribute to
instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in
General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a
takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged
television and radio networks to cooperate with the government for the
duration of the state of national emergency. He warned that his agency will
not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that
violates rules set out for media coverage duringtimes when the national
security is threatened.
- The search is illegal. Rule 126, Section 4of The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Section8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the
CIDGoperatives.
- Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedomof the press. The best
gauge of a free and democratic society rests in the degree of freedomenjoyed
by its media. In theBurgos v. Chief of Staff
[152]
this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners
freedomto express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
- While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the
Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers in the above case, yet it
cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement
duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of
policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant
warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that
officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that
he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he
is permitted to say on pain of punishment should he be so rash as to
disobey.
[153]
Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these
arbitrary intrusions because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court
cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it involves
the most defiant of our citizens. Freedomto comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. It is the duty of the
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta
principiis.
[154]
- Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the
search of the Tribunes offices and the seizure of its materials for publication
and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible for any
purpose,
- The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Suffice it
to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in
implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this
Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
- In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion,
attached hereto, is considered an integral part of thisponencia.
Decision
- WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP1017
is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
However, the provisions of PP1017 commanding the AFPto enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President,
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017
declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President
to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation.
- G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the
AFPand the PNPshould implement PP1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.
- The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their
rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the
imposition of standards on media or any formof prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
BAUTISTA V SALONGA
PADILLA; April 13, 1989
FACTS
- Petition for certiorari to reviewdecision of Commission on Appointments
- Pres designated petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chair of
CHR, who took oath of office before CJ Fernan. She discharged
functions/duties of Chair of CHR.
- Bautista rcvd letter fr Sec of Commission on Appointments requesting her to
submit info and docs in connection w/ her confirmation as Chair of CHR.
- Secretary again wrote to Bautista to request her presence at a meeting to
deliberate on her appointment.
- Bautista wrote to Chair of Commission on Appointments, saying why she
considered Comm on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her
appointment.
- As conveyed in a letter to theExec Secretary, Commission on Appointments
disapproved Bautistas ad interim appointment as Chair.
- Bautistas motion for reconsideration was denied.
- A Manila Standard news item reported that Pres designated Mallillin as
Acting Chair of CHRpendingresolution of Bautistas case.
- Bautista filed this petition w/ prayer for issuance of restraining order to enjoin
Commission of Appointments not to proceed w/ deliberation on her
appointment.
- Bautista filed amended petition for restraining order impleading Mallillin as
respondent. She also filed ex-parte motion to stop Mallillin fr exercising fcns of
Chair and fr demanding courtesy resignations fr officers.
- Court issued TRO regarding Mallillin but not regarding Commission on
Appointments, being instrumentality of coequal branch.
- Bautista was extended by Pres to permanent appointment as Chair on Dec
17, 1988. This appointment was for Pres solely to make.
ISSUES
1. WONappointment by Pres of Chair of Commission on Human Rights is to
be w/ or w/o confirmation of Commission on Appointments
2. WONPres could extend another appointment to petitioner on Jan 14, 1989
an ad interin appointment or any other kind of appointment to same office of
Chair of CHRthat called for confirmation by Commission onAppointments.
3. WON in appointments solely for Pres to make, the Pres can voluntarily
submit such appointment to Commission on Appointment for confirmation.
4. WONthe petition has become moot and academic.
HELD
1. NO
- CHRChair position is not among positions mentioned in Sec 16 Art 12 of
Consti. Therefore, appointment must be w/o review of Commission on
Appointments.
- Unlike Chair/Members of CSC, COMELECand CoA, the position of CHR
Chair does not have express provision that appointment should be with
consent of Commission on Appointments.
- Sec 2(c) of EO163 says CHRChair is among those w/c Pres is authorized
by lawto appoint.
2. NO
- Bautistas appointment on Dec 17, 1988 as Chair was a completed act on the
part of the Pres.
- No newappointment could be made to position already filled by a previously
completed appointment, accepted by appointee through qualification and
assumption of duties.
- Even if Pres could submit to Commission on Appointments an appointment
that belongs solely toher, still, there was no vacancy on Jan 14 1989.
- Nor can respondents contend that the newappointment on Jan 14 was an ad
interimappointment bec it does not apply to appointments solely for Pres to
make. It extends only to those where review of Common Appointments is
needed. That is why those types of appointments remain valid until
disapproval by Commission on Appointments or until next adjournment of
Congress.
3. NO
- To say otherwise is to say that Pres w/ Congress can fromtime to time move
power boundaries in Consti.
- Neither Exec nor Legislative can create power where Consti confers none. If
Consti made appointment exclusive for Pres, Pres cant grant power of
participation in Commission on Appointments. Nor can Commission on
Appointments create power to confirmappointments that Consti has reserved
to Pres alone.
4. NO
- Respondent contends that w/ or w/o confirmation, Bautista can be removed fr
office anytime at pleasure of Pres. And w/ disapproval of
appointment/nomination by Commission on Appointments, there was greater
reason for her removal. Thus, issue is moot and academic. SCdisagrees and
says petitioner came in timely manner and didnt showintention of abandoning
her petition.
- EO163 speaks of termof office (7 yrs without reappointment) while EO163-
Aspeaks of tenure in office (at pleasure of Pres). The diff bet termand tenure
is impt. Consistent w/ CHRs needed independence, tenure in office cant be
later made dependent on pleasure of Pres.
Obiter
- Sarmiento III V. Mison
- Issue: Which appointments under 1987 Consti are to be w/ and w/o
reviewof Commission on Appointments?
- Ratio: Only appointments mentioned in 1
st
sentence of Sec 16 Art VII are
to be reviewed by Commission. Other appointments by President are to be
made w/o participation of Commission.
- Held: Appointment of Mison as Bureau of Customs head is valid.
- Marbury V. Madison
- Ratio: Once appointment is made, Pres power over the office is
terminated in all cases, where by lawthe officer is not removable by him.
Decision Petition is granted; TRO is made permanent against Mallillin;
Petitioner Bautista is lawful Chair of CHR, she may be removed only for cause.
Gutierrez Jr., Dissenting Opinion
Cruz, Dissenting
Grio-Aquino, Dissenting
SARMIENTO V MISON
PADILLA; December 17, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners Sarmiento and Arcilla who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and Constitutional Lawprofessors seeks to
enjoin Salvador Mison fromperforming the functions as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. In addition, they would want to enjoin Budget Secretary
Guillermo Carague from disbursing Misons salary and emoluments. The
grounds for the petition was that Misons stay in Office is unconstitutional as
there was no confirmation coming fromthe Commission on Appointments that
is required by the Constitution. The Commission on Appointments was
allowed to intervene in the court proceeding.
- The case was considered justiciable given that there is great public interest
such as the need for stability in public service. This disposed the question of
whether this is the proper remedy to question respondents right to the Office of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and also that of the legal standing
of the petitioners.
- The Constitutional Provision under careful examination is Article VII Section
16, which states that:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces fromthe rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in himin this Constitution. He shall also appoint all
other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by lawand those whomhe may be authorized by lawto appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
ISSUE
WONMisons stay in Office was Constitutional
HELD
- Yes it is constitutional.
- Reading Article VII Section 16 there are 4 groups of officers who the
President is able to appoint. The first group would be the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces fromthe rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in himin this Constitution. The second
group is composed of those officers of the Government whose appointments
are not otherwise provided for by law. The third group are those whomthe
President may be authorized by lawto appoint. Lastly, the fourth group, are
those officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by lawvest
in the President alone.
- To interpret the lawthe Justices went back in history to look at the previous
constitutions, the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. In the 1935 Constitution all
appointments is subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments
while this was removed in the 1973 Constitution wherein the President is able
to appoint without the need for the approval of the Commission on
Appointments. Both were problematic as the 1935 provision became a venue
of horse-trading (used for political leverage) while the 1973 provision gave too
much power to the President. The court held that the 1987 provision on
appointment was the middle ground that was sought by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
- Looking through the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission they said
that the clear and positive intent of the framers were to make those officers in
the first sentence the individuals that are subject to the approval and
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments while those on the second
and third sentence need not seek such confirmation. Given that the position as
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not under those specified in the
first sentence but the second, therefore petitioner Mison is not in need of the
approval of the Commission on Appointments and thus should be able to
exercise full authority and functions and be entitled to his salary and
emoluments.
Decision Petition DISMISSED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Teehankee,
Melencio-Herrera, Sarmiento- concurring (11)
Gutierrez, Cruz- dissenting (2)
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
There is a need to look at the provision in its entirety. The focus of the records
was merely on the first sentence of the provision and the not on the following
sentences. Those are crucial given that the position in question falls under the
latter. Also, the records of the Constitutional Commission are merely extrinsic
aids and are at best persuasive only and not necessarily conclusive. In
addition, strictly interpreting the third sentence may create an absurdity for it
gives Congress the discretion of not creating a law that would give the
President the power to appoint those who are lower in rank. An irony arises
when those in a lower position require the approval of the Commission on
Appointments while those who are higher in position would not.
PIMENTEL V ERMITA
CARPIO; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- 7/26/2004: Congress commenced their regular session
- 8/25/2004: The Commission on Appointments (composed of members of
Congress) was constituted
+ meanwhile, GMA issued appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments:
Arthur Yap (DOA), Alberto Romulo (DFA), Raul Gonzales (DOJ), Florencio
Abad(DOE) Avelino Cruz (DND),
Rene Villa (DAR), Joseph Durano (DOT), Mike Defensor (DENR)
+ the aforementioned respondents took their oaths of office and assumed
their duties as acting secretaries
- 9/8/2004: a group of senators, headed by Sen. Pimentel, filed this present
petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction
to declare these appointments by GMAunconstitutional
- 9/23/2004: GMA issued ad interim (temporary) appointments, replacing
respondents acting capacity
- Sol Genargues
+ petition is moot because GMA had issued the ad interimappointments
after the recess of Congress; prohibition may not enjoin acts already done.
+ the power to appoint is executive in naturethe Commission of
Appointments, though it be composed of members of Congress, is a body
independent of Congress, and its executive power emanates from the
Consti.
+ only Senators Enrile, Lacson, Angara, Ejercito-Estrada and Osmena, as
members of the Commission, possess standing in the present petition.
- Petitioners Argument
+petitioners assert that GMAcannot issue such appointments because no
lawgrants such a power
S10 Ch2 B4, EO292: in case of a vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it
is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting Secretary
+ while Congress is in session, no appointments can be made w/o the
consent of the Commission
Respondents Argument:
-respondents assert that GMAcan issue such appointments for the reason that
no lawprohibits it
S16 Ch5 T1 B3, EO292: The Pres. shall exercise the power to appoint such
officials as provided bythe law
S17 Ch5 T1 B3, EO292: the Pres. may appoint an officer already in service or
any other competent person
ISSUE
WON GMAs appointment of respondents as acting secretaries w/o the
consent of the Commission of Appointments while Congress is in session is
unconstitutional
HELD
- the court held that the President may make such appointments, as the law
expressly provides it
S17 Ch5 Title 1 Book 3, EO 292: the President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the function of an office in the executive
branch
- EO292 applies to appointments vested in the President by lawCongress is
not the only source of law
S17(3) of the previous provision states: In no case shall a temporary
designation exceed one (1) year. Petitioners fail to consider that this
provision acts as a safeguard against the abuse of such appointments
- a department secretary is considered an alter ego of the President, that is, it
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Hence, Congress cannot impose
that the undersecretary automatically be appointedthe Pres. must appoint an
alter egoof her choice.
J. Bernas, SJ.: acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy; ad interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress and require submission to the Commission of Appointments for
approval or rejection.
- notwithstanding Bernas textbook definition, the court finds no abuse of
appointments in the present case as such were issued immediately upon the
recess of Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
Decision Petition DISMISSED
MATIBAG V BENIPAYO
CARPIO; April 2, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Petition for Prohibition w/ prayer for a writ of preliminjunction and
TRO. Petitioner questions the appointment and the right of respondents to
remain in office as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC
- On Feb.2, 1999, Petitioner Ma. Angelina Matibag was appointed by the
COMELEC en banc as Acting Director IV of the Education and Information
Dept. (EID), her appointment was renewed on Feb 15, 2000 in a Temporary
capacity and renewed yet again on Feb 15, 2001 in the same Temporary
capacity.
- On March 22, 2001 PGMA appointed ad interim, respondents Alfredo
Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Borra, and Florentino
Tuason as COMELEC commissioners respectively, for a term of 7 years,
expiring on Feb. 2, 2008. They took their oaths and assumed their positions
with the President submitting their ad interimappointments to the Commission
on Appointments on May 22, 2001 for confirmation. The Commission on
Appointments, however, did not act on their appointments.
- On June 1, 2001, PGMArenewed their ad interimappointments with the term
and the expiration remaining the same (for 7 years and expiring on Feb 2,
2008). The newappointees took oath a 2
nd
time and the same was transmitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation on June 5, 2001. The
Congress adjourned before the Commission could act on the appointments
resulting in the renewal of their ad interimappointments by the President for
the 3
rd
time on June 8, 2001.
- Benipayo, acting as COMELECchairman, assigned a Velma Cinco as officer-
in-chargeof EIDand reassigned petitioner to the LawDept, a move which she
requested reconsideration for, citing Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular no. 7 (transfer of employees prohibited during election period: Jan.2-
June 13, 2001). Benipayo denied the request and citing COMELECResolution
no. 3300. Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, filed an administrative and
criminal complaint with the LawDept against Benipayo and while the complaint
was pending, she also filed this action. She claims that ad interim
appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC, and on temporary appointments and reappointments of its
Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails her reassignment to the Law
Dept, the appointment of Cinco as well as the disbursements made by the
COMELECFinance Services Dept officer by way of salaries and emoluments
in favor of respondents.
- PGMA, on Sept. 6, 2001 renewed once again the ad interimappointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for a termof 7 years expiring on Feb. 2, 2008.
ISSUE
1. WON Benipayos ad interim appointment and assumption of office as
COMELECchairman is constitutional
2. WONissue is justiciable
3. If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were indeed appointed lawfully, WON the
renewal of their appointments and subsequent assumption of office was
constitutional
4. WONpetitioners removal and reassignment is illegal (done w/o approval of
the COMELECas a collegial body)
5. WONthe Officer-in-charge of COMELECFinance Services Dept, in making
disbursements in favor of the newappointees, acted in excess of jurisdiction.
HELD
1. Anad interimappointment is a permanent appointment made by the Pres. in
the meantime that Congress is in recess. It is not an appointment in a
temporary or acting capacity. It takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the Pres. once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not
alter its permanent character.
Reasoning
- Although the last sentence of Art IX-CSec 1(2) of the Constitution says, In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity, an ad interim appointment is not a temporary appointment. A
distinction was made between the two inPamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
v IAC, where it was held that an ad interimappointment as defined in Blacks
LawDictionary is one that is appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the
duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular
incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of
Phil. law. Ad interimis used to denote the manner in which said appointments
were made, that is, done by the President, in the meantime, while the body,
which is originally vested with the power or appointment, is unable to act.
- Although the 1935 Consti did not have the provision prohibiting temporary or
acting appointments, this Court then decided such an appointment in
Nacionalista Party v Bautista as unconstitutional declaring that, It would be
more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers of the
Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to designate one to
act temporarily. Likewise, In Brillantes v Yorac, decided under the present
Constitution, this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by then
Pres. Aquino of Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC.
- Art. IX-A 1 should be harmonized with Art. VII 16. for to hold that the
independence of the COMELECrequires the Commission on Appointments to
first confirmad interimappointments before the appointees can assume office
will negate the Presidents power to makead interimappointments.
- The original draft of Art. VII 16 did not provide for ad interimappointments,
however, it was reinstated to avoid interruptions in vital govt services that
would result from prolonged vacancies in govt offices. The ad interim
appointment has since been practiced by Presidents Aquino, Ramos and
Estrada.
2. Justiciability of the case: The Court determined the justiciability of the case
by tackling the requisites of judicial review raised by the respondents which
they claimed to be lacking (actual case/controversy was not raised)
>personal and substantial interest of the party
Petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the case.
If Benipayos appointment is unlawful, petitioners reassignment is
without legal basis; if it is lawful, then she has no cause to complain
provided that it was done in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
Because of her personal and material stake in the resolution of the
constitutionality of respondents assumption of office, she has locus
standi to raise it as a constitutional issue
>exercise of judicial reviewmust be pleaded at the earliest opportunity
It is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the
constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest
opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings
before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it is not
raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not
considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interimappointments
when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest
opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent
body.
>the constitutional issue must be thelis motaof the case
The Respondents claimthat the legality of petitioners reassignment from
the EID to the Law Dept. is the issue. The Court, however, held that
unless the constitutionality of Benipayos appointment is determined, the
legality of petitioners assignment cannot be determined, therefore thelis
motaof this case is clearly the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
3. The phrase without reappointment in Art. IX-C 1(2) applies only to
appointments by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, regardless of WoNsuch person appointed completes the term
of office.
Reasoning The phrase without reappointment does not apply to the renewal
of appointments to Benipayo, Tuason and Borra because there were no
previous appointments that were confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
- The renewal of their appointments was by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments. It was not acted upon on the merits at the close of the session
of Congress. There was no final decision by the Commission onAppointments
to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the
Constitution. It is therefore neither fixed nor an unexpired term. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renewthe ad interimappointment of a by-
passed appointee as recognized in Sec.17 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments. Moreover, their appointments were all for a fixed termexpiring
on Feb. 2, 2008, clearly not in breach of the 7 year termlimit.
4. The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to
transfer or reassign COMELECpersonnel and the person holding that office, in
ade jure capacity, is Benipayo. He has full authority to exercise all the powers
of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective.
Moreover, in COMELEC Resolution no. 3300, the COMELEC en banc,
approved the transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel during the
election period.
5. Because Benipayo is held to be the lawful COMELECchairman, the Officer-
in-Charge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction, in the disbursement of their
salaries.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Concurred with by JJs: Davide, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, and Sandoval-Gutierrez.
Puno and Vitug, JJs, were on official leave.
Consti Provisions cited:
Art. IX-A1The Consti CommissionsCOMELECshall be independent
Art. IX-C 1(2) Nature and term of appointment of Comelec chairman and
commissioner: (7 years w/o reappointment). In no case shall there be
appointment in a temporary or acting capacity.
Art. VII 16power of Pres. to make appointments during recess of Congress
effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress.
CONSTANTINO V CUISA
TINGA; October 13, 2005
FACTS
- This Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assails said contracts
which were entered into pursuant to the Philippine Comprehensive Financing
Programfor 1992. It seeks to enjoin respondents fromexecuting additional
debt-relief contracts pursuant thereto.
- The Financing Program was devised under President Corazon Aquino to
manage the countrys external debt problem through a negotiation-oriented
debt strategy by means of two debt-relief options: 1) cash buyback of portions
of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount, or 2) allowed creditors to convert
existing Philippine debt instruments into bonds/securities.
- Petitioners challenge the Programas follows:
1. That it is beyond the powers granted to the President under Section 20,
Article VII of the Constitution:
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines
That buyback and securitization/bond conversion schemes are
neither loans nor guarantees, and hence, beyond the power of the
President.
2. That assuming the above as constitutionally permissible, it is only the
President who may exercise the power to enter into these contract and such
power may not be delegated.
3. That the Programwas made available for debts fraudulently contracted or
void. Petitioners rely on 1992 Commission on Audit report identifying
several behest loans contracted or guaranteed fraudulently during the
Marcos regime. That since these were eligible for buyback or conversion,
they would be void for being waivers of the Republics right to repudiate the
void or fraudulently contracted loans.
- For their part, respondents dispute the points raised by petitioners. They also
question the standing of petitioners and the justiciability of the issues
presented.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WONthe petitioners havelocus standi.
2. WONthe case is ripe for adjudication
Substantive
3. WON the scope of section 20, Article VII includes bond-conversion and
buyback
4. WON the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the
Constitution in the person of the President and may not be delegated
5. WONthere has been grave abuse of discretion and violation of constitutional
policies
HELD
1. The Courts cognizance of this petition will not only determine the validity or
invalidity of the subject pre-termination (buyback) and bond-conversion of
foreign debts but also create a precedent for other debts or debt-related
contract executed or to be executed in behalf of the President by the Secretary
of Finance. Seen in this light, the transcendental importance of the issues
herein cannot be doubted.
- Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context of alleged facts,
procedural questions acquire a relatively minor significance. By the very
nature of the power wielded by the President, the effect of using this power on
the economy, and the well-being in general of the Filipino nation, the Court
must set aside the procedural barrier of standing and rule on the justiciable
issues presented by the parties.
2. The Court holds that some issues are not ripe for adjudication.
One such issue raised by petitioners is the allegation that respondents waived
the Philippines right to repudiate void and fraudulently contracted loans is not
justiciable.
- Records do not showwhether the so-called behest loans were subject of the
debt-relief contracts.
- Moreover, asserting a right to repudiate void or fraudulently contracted loans
begs the question of whether indeed particular loans are void or fraudulently
contracted. Petitioners theory depends on a prior annulment or declaration of
nullity of the pre-existing loans, which thus far have not been submitted to this
Court.
- As a final point, petitioners have no real basis to fret over a possible waiver of
the right to repudiate void contracts. Respondents unequivocally assert that
the Republic did not waive any such right, it having incorporated a no-waiver
clause in the agreements.
- Obiter Many advocates that the Republic should renege on obligations that
are considered as illegitimate. However, such course of action would have
adverse repercussions. Among the consequences is that the standard cross-
default provisions in Philippine foreign loans may come into effect, in which
case, default even in one loan would be ground for other creditors to declare
default on other loans.
- In any event, the discretion on the matter lies not with the Courts but with the
executive.
3. On Bond-Conversion
- An investor who purchases a bond is lending money to the issuer, and the
bond represents the issuers contractual promise to pay interest and repay
principal according to specific terms. The language of the Constitution is
simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and
guarantee foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain
kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more
onerous than others.
- The only restriction that the Constitution provides aside from the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, is that the loans must be subject to
limitations provided by law. In this regard, it is noted RA245 as amended by
PD142 entitledAn Act Authorizing the Secretary of Finance to Borrowto Meet
Public Expenditures Authorized by Law, and for Other Purposes, allows foreign
loans to be contracted in the formof bonds thus:
the Secretary of Finance, with the approval of the Presidentafter
consultation with the Monetary board, is authorized to borrowand to issue
therefore evidences of indebtedness may be of the following types:
Treasury bonds
- Also under the foregoing provision, sovereign bonds may also be provided for
the purchase, redemption, or refunding of nay obligation, either direct or
guaranteed, of the Philippine Government.
On the Buyback Scheme
- It is true that in the separation of powers, it is Congress that manages the
countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing and spending powers. However, the
law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic
appropriations provision for debt servicing. The Court inGuingona v. Carague,
held:
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since
authorization therefore already exists under RA4860 and 245, as amended,
and PD1967. In the light of this subsisting authorization, Congress does
not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive. Upon
such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated
its wisdomto the Executive.
- Specific legal authority for the buyback even without further action from
Congress is established under Section 2 of RA240 thus:
the Secretary of Finance shall cause to be paid out of any moneys in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriatedany interest falling due, or
accruing on any portion of the public debt authorized by law. He shall also
cause to be paid outthe principal amount of any obligations which have
maturedor, if redeemed prior tomaturity, such portion of the face value
as is prescribed by the terms and conditions under which such obligations
were originally issued.
- Buyback is a necessary power which springs fromthe grant of the foreign
borrowing power. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provisions as may be necessaryto effectuate its object and purpose.
- Also, the Constitution, as a rule, does not enumerate let alone enumerate
all the acts which the President (or any other public officer) may not do, and
the fact that the Constitution does not explicitly bar the President from
exercising a power does not mean that he or she does not have that power.
4. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the
decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest
by the fact that the process of establishing and executing strategy for
managing the governments debt is deep within the realmof the expertise of
the Department of Finance. If the President were to personally exercise every
aspect of the foreign borrowing power, this would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are
accorded, and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the
government.
- Necessity thus gave birth to the doctrine of qualified political agency. Though
the President is the Executive of the Government and no other, the heads of
the executive department occupy political positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity and should be of the Presidents bosomconfidence and alter
ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by lawto
exercise authority subject to the direction of the President. And it is upon the
Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to deal with matters
regarding the sound and efficient management of the financial resources of
Government.
- And although there are powers vested in the President that may not be
delegated are only those that call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government, e.g.
power to suspend the write of habeas corpus and proclaimmartial law(Par. 3
Sec 11, Art VII) and the benign prerogative of mercy (Par. 6 Sec 11, Art VII),
the power to contract or guarantee foreign debts does not fall within the same
exceptional class.
- Another important qualification is that the Secretary of Finance or any
designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latters prior
consent to or subsequent ratification of his acts. A lack of showing that
President Aquino countermanded the acts of respondents leads us to conclude
that the said acts carried presidential approval.
5. Petitioners cite an article by Jude Esguerra that under the Programa best
case scenario would give a yield significantly lower than estimated by the
Programand a worst case scenario where what can be gained in the best case
is lesser than what can be lost in this worst case. In addition, petitioners
postulate a more simple rescheduling agreement in place of the debt-relief
package. Petitioners allege therefore that the Programviolates constitutional
state policies to promote a social order that will ensure the prosperity and
independence of the nation and free the people frompoverty, foster social
justice in all phases of national development, and develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
- The Court held that the policies set by the Constitution as litanized are not a
panacea that can annul every governmental act sought to be struck down.
Insofar as the case at bar, the court can make no conclusion other than that
respondents efforts were geared towards debt-relief with marked positive
results and towards achieving the aforementioned constitutional policies.
SEPARATE OPINION
PANGANIBAN
- Indubitably, former President Aquinos decision to honor outstanding debts of
the Republic was purely an executive call; hence, beyond judicial scrutiny. For
this reason, neither can respondents be faulted for implementing the Program
executed pursuant to that constitutional executive policy.
- Also, that petitioners question the legality of several foreign loans
necessitates a reviewof the assailed contracts. Because the petitioners failed
to substantiate the charges, the argument cannot be addressed. A
determination of the validity of such allegations requires a review of factual
matters. The Supreme Court is not a trier or facts. The proper action for
petitioners is to file their petition in the lower courts, which had concurrent
jurisdiction over the subject matter and which are better equipped to conduct a
firsthand examination of factual evidence in support of their allegations. This
notwithstanding, there is nothing in this decision to preclude the Department of
Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman frominitiating an investigation of the
alleged fraudulent loans. Suppletorily, probable cause must be shown in order
that prosecution may be brought to bear.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS V MINISTER
FERNANDO; October 30, 1981
- Free Telephone Workers Union, herein petitioner, attacks the constitutionality
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
36
(BP130) in so far as it amends Art. 264 of the
Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor and Employment the power and
discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration
to the National Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the
law on free collective bargaining. Petitioner contends that [a] BP 30 is an
undue delegation of legislative powers [b] such conferment of authority may
also run contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers right to self-
organization and collective bargaining.
- Procedure
+ Sept. 14, 1981 notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor
practices stating the following grounds: 1) Unilateral and arbitrary
implementation of a Code of Conduct; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions
of officers and members as a result of the implementation of said Code of
Conduct; and 3) Automatic treatment as of sick leaves as AWOL with
suspensions, in violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement
+ Sept. 15, 1981, notification to the Ministry of compliance with the 2/3 strike
vote and other formal requirements of the law and Implementing Rules.
Conciliation meetings called by the Minister followed.
+ Sept. 25, 1981, respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any
strike at the private respondents establishment.
+Hearing at NLRCwas set onSept. 28. Petitioner filed petition to SCthe next
day. Court issued resolution for respondents to file answer. After parties were
duly heard y SCon Oct. 8, case was ripe for decision.
ISSUES
1. WON BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the
same to the NLRCis unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-
delegation of legislative power
2. WONthere is unconstitutional application of BP130
HELD
36
"Inlabor disputes causingor likely tocausestrikes or lockouts adversely affectingthenational interest,
suchasmayoccur inbut not limitedtopublicutilities, companiesengagedinthegenerationor distribution
of energy, banks, hospitals, and those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impendingstrike or lockout. If one has already takenplaceat the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work
and the employers shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may
issuetoenforcethesame."
1. The delegation to the Minister of Labor of the power to assume jurisdiction in
a labor dispute likely to affect the national interest or to certify the same to the
NLRCfor arbitration does not constitute undue delegation of legislative powers.
Reasoning:
First. It lays down the premise. The power which would be denied the Minister
of Labor by virtue of such principle is within the competence of the President,
who inits opinion can best determine national interests, but only when a strike
is in progress. Such admission is qualified by the assumption that the President
"can make law." But what possesses significance for the purpose of this
litigation is that it is the President who "shall have control of the ministries." It
points that the adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary systemin the
amended Constitution does not alter its essentially presidential character.
37
Then it cites the expanse of the powers of the President by the provisions in
the Constitutions both of 1935 and 1973. (Note: My reading here is that the
power by the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction in a labor dispute is an
executive function)
Second. The ponencia cited precedence to develop its argument. Villena v.
Secretary of Interior says that "all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive. In other words,
without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various departments,
their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. (Note: It
used this doctrine in a later case Phil. American Management Co. v. Phil.
American Management Employees Association)
Third. Even on the assumption that the authority conferred to the Minister of
Labor partakes of a legislative character, still no case of an unlawful delegation
of such power may be discerned. It cites Edu v. Ericta: To determine whether
or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must be
directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature
does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. [a] Distinction between
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion
as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, anddelegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made; [b] To avoid
unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least
that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy; [c] Thereafter, the executive or administrative office
designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations. InPeople v Exconde: regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction with it; but conformto the standards that the lawprescribes. BP
130 did not violate these guidelines.
Fourth. The ponencia stressed the ruling in People v. Vera, saying that though
scholarly and erudite, it aroused apprehension for being to rigid. The liberal
approach in the ruling in Edu v. Ericta as reinforced in Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices recognized that: It would be self-
defeating in the extreme if the legislation intended to cope with the grave social
and economic problems of the present and foreseeable future would founder
on the rock of an unduly restrictive and decidedly unrealistic meaning to be
affixed to the doctrine of non-delegation.
37
Article VII on the presidency starts with this provision: "The President shall be the head of state and
chief executive of the Republic of the Philippines." Its last section is an even more emphatic affirmation
that it is apresidential systemthat obtains inour government. Thus: "All powersvestedinthePresident of
thePhilippines under the1935Constitutionandthelaws of thelandwhicharenot hereinprovidedfor or
conferreduponany official shall bedeemedandarehereby vestedinthePresident unless theBatasang
Pambansaprovidesotherwise."
- Also quoting Professor Jaffe: The occasions for delegating power to
administrative offices [could be] compassed by a single generalization. Thus:
Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be
performed and it cannot be effectively performed by the legislature without the
assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of time so great as to lead
to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly
indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their
regulation requires a course of continuous decision.
2. In the absence of factual determinations (by the Ministry of Labor and the
NLRC), this Court is not in a position to rule on whether or not there is
unconstitutional application.
Decision
[1] No. BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts
adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the
same to the NLRC is NOT on its face unconstitutional since there was no
undue delegation of legislative power.
[2] There is no ruling on the question of whether or not BP 130 has been
unconstitutionally applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-
organization and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by
private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination
Dispositive Petition Dismissed.
Voting11concur, no dissent.
AYTONA V CASTILLO
BENGZON; January 19, 1962
FACTS
- December 29, 1961 Pres. Carlos P. Garcia appointed Aytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took his oath of office on that day.
- December 30, 1961 President-elect Diosdado Macapagal took his oath of
office
- December 31, 1961 Macapagal issued Administrative Order # 2 recalling,
withdrawing and cancelling all ad interimappointments made by Garcia after
December 13, 1961 (the date Macapagal was proclaimed as the elected
president by Congress)
- January 1, 1962 Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim
governor of the Central Bank
- January 2, 1962 Both Aytona and Castillo exercised the powers of their
office but Castillo informed Aytona of his appointment. The next day, Aytona
was prevented fromholding office
- Aytona instituted a quo warranto which challenged Castillos right to exercise
the powers of Governor of Central bank. Aytona claims he was:
1. validly appointed
2. qualified for the post
3. and that the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was
void because the occupation was occupied by him
- Castillo argued that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by AO2.
ISSUE
WONthe newPresident (Macapagal) had the power to issue the order of the
cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President
(Garcia) even after the appointees had already qualified.
HELD
Castillo is the rightful governor of the Central Bank.
- December 29, 1961 Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments (not
yet in session) a communication submitting for confirmation ad interim
appointments of several officials including the Central Bank Governor in the
person of Aytona. There were three other communications regarding the same
matter submitted on the same day.
- All in all there were 350 midnight appointments by Garcia.
- In revoking the appointments, Macapagal acted based on the following
reasons:
1) outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies to
give the newPresident the opportunity to consider names in the light
of newplicies
2) Scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall within the
intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the
issuance of ad interimappointments
3) Appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust because they were
issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately
qualify obviously to prevent a recall by the incoming President which
would result to those deserving the appointment of the newPresident
to be declinedand by-passed
4) Abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications
evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President to merely
subvert the policies of the incoming administration
- Many of the persons mentioned in the December 29 communication did not
qualify.
- It is Malacanangs practice to submit ad interimappointments only when the
Committee on Appointments is in session so that only those who have
accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation.
- It is common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of
Macapagal, Garcias administration was no more than a caretaker
administration. He was supposed to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President and he should not do acts which he ought
to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor.
- The appointment of 350 people in one night could be regarded as abuse of
Presidential prerogatives.
- When the President makes appointments with the consent of theCommission
of Appointments, he has the benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim
appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to
insure approval of his selection either by previous consultation with the
members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to themthe reason for
such selection.
- But in this case Garcia should have been doubly careful because:
the Commission that would consider the appointments is different
fromthe one existing during the time the appointments were made
the names are to be submitted by his successor who may not fully
approve of the appointments
- The Court chose not to disregard Administrative Order 2 and cancelled the
midnight appointments. There are precedents that once an appointment has
been issued, it cannot be reconsidered. But none of the precedents have
involved mass ad interimappointments.
QUIMSINGV TAJANGLANGIT
BARRERA; February 29, 1964
FACTS
- May 20, 1960- Quimsing designated Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo City
- Dec. 20, 1961- Pres. Garcia extended anad-interimappointment to Quimsing
to the same position
- Dec. 28, 1961- Quimsing took his oath of office, continued discharging
functions of Chief of Police
- May 16, 1962- Quimsings, as well as other peoples appointments were
confirmed
- May 17, 1962- at the session of the Commission on Appointments, a motion
for reconsideration of all the confirmed appointments was approved, and the
Commission was adjourned with no future date fixed for its next meeting
- June 11, 1962- President Macapagal designated Eduardo Tajanglangit as
Acting Chief of Police of Iloilo.
- Hence this -Petition for prohibition to restrain Eduardo Tajanglangit from
occupying the position of Chief of Police to which petitioner Quimsing had
previously been appointed and duly qualified and the functions of which he was
actually discharging.
ISSUE
WON Quimsings appointment was not lawfully confirmed, because of the
motion for reconsideration of his confirmation, which has, to the present,
remainedunacted upon
HELD
The appointment of Tajanglangit to the position of Chief of Police of Iloilo City
was null and void, because said position was not vacant.
- The revised rules of the Commission on Appointments provide:
SEC. 21: Any motion to reconsider the vote on any appointment may be laid
on the table, and this shall be a final disposit on such a motion
SEC. 22: Notice of confirmation or disapproval of an appointment shall not be
sent to the President of the Philippinesbefore the expiration of theperiod for its
reconsideration, or while a motion for reconsideration is pending.
- The Commission had not disapproved of Quimsings appointment, it was
merely under reconsideration. It has been established that on July 19, 1962,
Quimsings appointment was delivered to Malacanang. This, as well as the
provisions above, supports the conclusion that the laying of a motion for
reconsideration on the table does not have the effect of withholding the
effectivity of the confirmation, nor is it synonymous with disapproval of the
appointment. In fact, it is recognition that the appointment was confirmed.
PEOPLE V VERA
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
- 15 October 1931: information for criminal case People v. Mariano Cu
Unjieng, et al. filed in CFI Manila. In the said case, HSBC, being the offended
party, intervened as private prosecutor.
- 8 January 1934: after a protracted trial, CFI rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing MCUto imprisonment.
- 26 March 1935: SCupholds sentence of conviction w/ a slight modification of
the duration of imprisonment.
- 17 December 1935: MFRand 4 motions for newtrial by MCUdenied by Phil
SC.
- 18 December 1935: final judgment was entered by Phil SC. MCUseeks to
elevate the case to USSC.
- November 1936: USSCdenies petition for certiorari.
- 24 November 1936: Phil Sc denies MCUs petition for leave to file a 2
nd
alternative MFRor newtrial; &remands the case to CFI Manila for execution of
the judgment.
- 27 November 1936: MCUfiles application for probation under the provisions
of Act No. 4221 of the Phil Legislature. CFI Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason
presiding, refers the application to the Insular Probation Office (IPO)
- 18 June 1937: IPOrecommends denial of MCUs application for probation
- 5 April 1937: hearing of the petition before CFI Manila, 7th branch with Judge
Jose O. Vera presiding. HSBC&the Fiscal of the City of Manila file separate
oppositions to the granting of probation. HSBCattacks constitutionality of Act
No. 4221 on the following grounds: equal protection of the laws (its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue delegation of
legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows provl boards w/ power to
make said laweffective or otherwise in their respective provinces).
- 28 June 1937: Judge Jose O. Vera of CFI Mnla promulgates resolution with a
finding that MCU is innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but
denying the latters petition for probation.
- 3 July 1937: counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution denying
probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a series of
alternative motions for newreconsideration or newtrial. Amotion for leave to
intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys was also
filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a petition for
leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground that the
motion was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU&that he signed
the same "without mature deliberation & purely as a matter of courtesy.)
HSBCfiles opposition to motion for intervention.
- 6 August 1937: the Fiscal of the City of Mnla files motion w/ TCfor issuance
of an order to execute judgment of Phil SCin said case &to commit MCUto
jail in obedience to said judgment.
- 19 August 1937 is the date set for hearing on the various motions for CFIs
consideration. On this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SCto
put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation case may
look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does
not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court, either
directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance was
merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the parties. If
each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling
decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial
chaos would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in the Philippine judicial
system>
ISSUES
1. WONthe constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these
proceedings
2. if YES, WONsaid Act is constitutional
a. WON Act No. 4221 encroaches upon the pardoning power of the
Executive
b. WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute an undue delegation of
legislative power
c. WON the Probation Act violates Bill of Rights provisions on equal
protection of the laws
3. WONthe entire Act should be avoided
HELD
1. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case. <lis mota> The
question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised
in ordinary actions BUT resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies,
particularly where the remedies in the ordinary course of laweven if available,
are not plain, speedy and adequate. <e.g. in mandamus proceedings, in an
action of quo warranto, in habeas corpus proceedings, on an application for
injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute, & even on an
application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the
constitutional question is necessary to a decision of the case, or through
petitions for prohibitionandcertiorari.
- Code of Civil Procedure of the Philippine Islands, section 516: Philippine SC
is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition with courts of first instance over
inferior tribunals or persons, and original jurisdiction over courts of first
instance, when such courts are exercising functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction.
- General rule: the question of the validity of the criminal statute must be
raised by a defendant in the trial court and be carried regularly in reviewto the
Supreme Court. BUT in cases where a newact seriously affected numerous
persons and extensive property rights, and was likely to cause a multiplicity of
actions, the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to bring the issue of the
acts validity promptly before it and decide in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice.
- The writ of prohibition is anextraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal fromusurping a jurisdiction with which it is not
legally vested. General rule: the merit of prohibition will not lie where the
inferior court has jurisdiction independent of the statute the constitutionality of
which is questioned. BUT where the inferior court or tribunal derives its
jurisdiction exclusively froman unconstitutional statute, it may be prevented by
the writ of prohibition fromenforcing that statute. A CFI sitting in probation
proceedings is a court of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction in such proceedings
is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221 of the Philippine Legislature. It is
unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been squarely presented not
only before this court by the petitioners but also before the trial court by the
private prosecution.
- The power to enforce begets inherently a discretion to permanently refuse to
do so. The authority to define and fix the punishment for crime is legislative and
includes the right in advance to bring within judicial discretion, for the purpose
of executing the statute, elements of consideration which would be otherwise
beyond the scope of judicial authority, and that the right to relieve fromthe
punishment, fixed by law and ascertained according to the methods by it
provided belongs to the executive department.
- Cooley on Constitutional Limitations: A court will not consider any attack
made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in
defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The power to
declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the
fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink fromexercising in any case where
he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility.
- General rule: only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that
since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the
issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the
attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute.
- General rule: the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered on
appeal. BUT courts, in the exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the
time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be
presented. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at
any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Same is true
in civil cases if it appears that a determination of the question is necessary to a
decision of the case. Also, a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below
- General rule: the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. The People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having Act No. 4221 set aside. Of greater import than the damage
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental lawby the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the
well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. The
constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts, the legislature,
and the people must bow. The state is always interested where the integrity of
its Constitution or statutes is involved.
- A judge should not judicially declare a statute unconstitutional until the
question of constitutionality is tendered for decision, and unless it must be
decided in order to determine the right of a party litigant. An officer on whoma
statute imposes the duty of enforcing its provisions cannot avoid the duty upon
the ground that he considers the statute unconstitutional, and hence in
enforcing the statute he is immune from responsibility if the statute be
unconstitutional. Executive officers (e.g., the state auditor and state treasurer)
should not decline to perform ministerial duties imposed upon them by a
statute, on the ground that they believe the statute is unconstitutional.
- The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past
and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of
Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from nor assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional questions only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is not
a valid reason for refusing to allowit to be raised later. The fiscal and all others
are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held void
by the courts in proper cases.
- Is the determination of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to
resolve the instant case? While the court will meet the question with firmness,
where its decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and just respect for
the legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can
be decided on other points.
- General rule: the determination of a constitutional question is necessary
whenever it is essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a
party is founded solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. There is no
doubt that Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely fromAct No. 4221
nowbeing assailed.
- Moreover, the Probation Act is a newaddition to our statute books and its
validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; many persons
accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; some of themare already on probation; more people will likely take
advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and the respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first
conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that
the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be nowresolved.
- Also, in Phil SCs ruling in an analogous situation in Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, the Court said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of
nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and
inasmuch as Act No. 2972 is a newlawnot yet interpreted by the courts, in the
interest of the public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have
determined to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may
decide the main issue. We havehere an extraordinary situation which calls for
a relaxation of the general rule." Phil SCs ruling on this point was sustained by
the USSC. Amore binding authority in support of the viewwe have taken can
not be found.
2. <the essence of judicial duty> It is the office and duty of the judiciary to
enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication fromthe provisions of
section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the Constitution, may
declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in conflict with the
fundamental lay. It will not shirk fromits sworn duty to enforce the Constitution.
And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect to the supreme law by
setting aside a statute in conflict therewith.
- Fundamental criteria: all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of
the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The members of
the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath to support the
Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true to this oath and
that in enacting and sanctioning a particular lawthey did not intend to violate
the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise its power to
overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand departments of the
governments. The judiciary ought to reflect the wisdom of the people as
expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief Executive.
- The President of the Philippines had already expressed his opinion against
the constitutionality of the Probation Act. In a message dated September 1,
1937, he recommended to the NA its immediate repeal, resulting in the
approval of Bill No. 2417 of the NA repealing the probation Act, subject to
certain conditions therein mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the
President on September 13, 1937, much against his wish. In vetoing the bill
referred to, the President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may
express the reasons which he may deemproper for taking such a step, but his
reasons are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies
submitted for our determination. Whatever opinion is expressed by himunder
these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment on way or another
and prevent us fromtaking what in our opinion is the proper course of action to
take in a given case. We are independent of the Executive no less than of the
Legislative department of our government independent in the performance
of our functions, undeterred by any consideration, free frompolitics, indifferent
to popularity, and unafraid of criticismin the accomplishment of our sworn duty
as we see it and as we understand it.
- The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds:
(1) That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2)
that its constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it
denies the equal protection of the laws.
a. Jones Law, in force at the time of the approval of Act No. 4221 vests in the
Governor-General of the Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and
reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures". This power is now vested in the
President of the Philippines (A7, s11(6)). Our Constitution also makes specific
mention of "commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the
pardons he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may
deemproper; and to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the NA. But the
pardoning power has remained essentially the same.
- Jones Lawvests the pardoning power exclusively in the Chief Executive. The
exercise of the power may not, therefore, be vested in anyone else. Where the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied
limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise such
power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper
exercise thereof.
- Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case: USSCruled in 1916 that an
order indefinitely suspending sentenced was void. Under the common lawthe
power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and the right to
suspend sentence absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive
branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress to
establish probation by statute was conceded.
- US v Murray: when a person sentenced to imprisonment by a district court
has begun to serve his sentence, that court has no power under the Probation
Act of March 4, 1925 to grant himprobation even though the termat which
sentence was imposed had not yet expired. In this case of Murray, the
constitutionality of the probation Act was not considered but was assumed. US
SC denied the right of the district courts to suspend sentence. The court
pointed out the necessity for action by Congress if the courts were to exercise
probation powers in the future.
- Riggs v US: the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit held that the
constitutionality of Probation Act of March 4, 1925 have been sustained by the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (7 F. [2d], 590), and the same was
held in no manner to encroach upon the pardoning power of the President.
- 1916: US SC, in plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as
possessing the requisite power to enact probation laws. Afederal probation law
was actually enacted in 1925. The constitutionality of the Act has been
assumed by the US SC in 1928 and consistently sustained by the inferior
federal courts in a number of earlier cases. The Philippine Legislature, like the
USCongress, may legally enact a probation lawunder its broad power to fix
the punishment of any and all penal offenses. Indeed, the Philippine
Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation.
Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts --
particularly the trial courts -- large discretion in imposing the penalties which
the lawprescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be
served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best
determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced,
should suffer. <Revised Penal Code, Indeterminate Sentence Law, Parole Act,
Juvenile Delinquency Law, (Adult) Probation Law, etc showthe intention of the
legislature to humanize the penal laws.>
- Some US cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the
power to suspend the operation of a sentenced, by probation or otherwise, as
to do so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. Other
cases, however, hold contra. Phil SC elects to follow the long catena of
authorities holding that the courts may be legally authorized by the legislature
to suspend sentence by the establishment of a systemof probation however
characterized.
- Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are
actually district and different from each other, both in origin and in nature.
Probation, the power to suspend sentence, was always a part of the judicial
power. It simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely,
but the conviction and liability following it, and the civil disabilities, remain and
become operative when judgment is rendered. The power to grant reprieves
and pardons, on the other hand, was always a part of the executive power. A
pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of
the offender. It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so
that in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores
himto all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a newman, and gives hima
newcredit and capacity.
- Probation should also be distinguished fromreprieve and fromcommutation
of the sentence. Snodgrass vs. State: the power to suspend the sentence does
not conflict with the power of the Governor to grant reprieves. A reprieve
postpones the execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a
suspension is for an indefinite time. A commutation is but to change the
punishment assessed to a less punishment.
- State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court: A "pardon" is an act of grace,
proceeding from the power intrusted with the execution of the laws which
exempts the individual on whomit is bestowed fromthe punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is a remission of guilt, a forgiveness of
the offense. "Commutation" is a remission of a part of the punishment; a
substitution of a less penalty for the one originally imposed. "Reprieve" or
"respite" is the withholding of the sentence for an interval of time, a
postponement of execution, a temporary suspension of execution.
- The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary
sentences, remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never
been enacted. The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it
beyond the power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.
b. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among 3 coordinate and
substantially independent organs: legislative, executive and judicial. Each
department derives its authority fromthe Constitution, the highest expression
of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral
Legislature by the Jones Law(sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly
by the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the National
Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare
potest, an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of legislative
powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in USterritories as Congress
may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4) to those whomthe Constitution
itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President). The case before
us does not fall under any of these exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute was complete in all
its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
BUT to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and
regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and
hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board
does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to
decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.
The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involvesa discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular
community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it may
itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power which
may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the
existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law.
That is a mental process common to all branches of the government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course,
come fromCongress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the
Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate. The
legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other
person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has
arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical effect,
endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Lawin
their respective provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a
law, a lawmay not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law
to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be
made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise
what is delegated to themaccording to the constitution. It is manifestly contrary
to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our
constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and
advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that ant
one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions from which all
others under like circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from
those applicable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of
subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in
different localities placed under different circumstances. While we do not deny
the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of purely
local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small
communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of general
legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the
general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so
unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity of a lawis
not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under its
provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and
execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive
and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further
restrained under our systemthan by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment,
have that effect. (Angara case)
- We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.
c. This basic individual right sheltered by the Constitution is a restraint on all
the tree grand departments of our government and on the subordinate
instrumentalities and subdivision thereof, and on many constitutional power,
like the police power, taxation and eminent domain. BUT what may be
regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws in a question not
always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated.
- Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in
prohibited. But classification on a reasonablebasis, and nor made arbitrarily or
capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must
be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
- In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flowfrom
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not
necessarily the result in every case. While inequality may result in the
application of the lawand in the conferment of the benefits therein provided,
inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the
case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in
which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed.
- There is no difference between a lawwhich denies equal protection and a law
which permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is
within the constitutional prohibitions. Statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. If the lawhas the effect of
denying the equal protection of the lawit is unconstitutional.
3. In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any mutilation of
a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only where an
unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute otherwise valid, and is so
independent and separable that its removal will leave the constitutional
features and purposes of the act substantially unaffected by the process.
- Where part of the a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable fromthe valid, may stand
and be enforced. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing
results affecting the main purpose of the Act, in a manner contrary to the
intention of the Legislature. What remains must express the legislative will,
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.
- In the case at bar, section 11 (which makes the Probation Act applicable only
in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards provided for the
salaries of probation officers) is so inseparably linked with the other portions of
the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare
idealismof the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of
people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial result of that system.
- Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of
legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a lawbetter otherwise than
it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read
into the lawmatters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
not even to save a statute fromthe doomof invalidity. The clear intention and
policy of the lawis not to make the Insular Government defray the salaries of
probation officers in the provinces but to make the provinces defray them
should they desire to have the Probation Act apply thereto.
- Probation as a development of a modern penology is a commendable
system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to
permit what modern criminologist call the "individualization of the punishment",
the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the
circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
aid in the rehabilitation of a penitent offender. It takes advantage of an
opportunity for reformation and avoids imprisonment so long as the convicts
gives promise of reform.
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional
and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
TORRES V GONZALES
FELICIANO; July 23, 1987
FACTS
- an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S.
Torres, presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
- Sometime before 1979, Torres was convicted by the CFI of Manila of the
crime of estafa(two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison termof
from(11) yrs, (10) mos and (22) days to (38) yrs, (9) mos. and (1) day, and to
pay an indemnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the CA.
The maximumsentence would expire on2 Nov 2000.
- On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted by the President on
condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law." Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and
was consequently released fromconfinement.
- On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to
the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the
petitioner. In making its recommendation, the Board relied upon the decisions
of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons and Espuelas us. Provincial
Warden of Bohol. The petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa,
which were then pendingtrial before the RTC, and convicted by the RTCof the
crime of sedition, which was then pending appeal before the IAC. Many other
charges have been brought against the petitioner, although some have been
identified as dismissed.
- On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President
informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the
conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.
- On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner.
- On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority
of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The
petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpiredportion of his sentence.
- Petitioner nowimpugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment.
He claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been
convicted by final judgment. Petitioner also contends that he was not given an
opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison, and
accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE
WONconviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of
his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original
sentence.
HELD
- Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons. - It was held that the determination if the
parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound judgment of the
GovGen and that such determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As
Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the
power that had granted it, the Court held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of
the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered." Tesoro had in effect agreed that the GovGens
determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had
breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing adultery while he
was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.
- Sales vs. Director of Prisons - The executive clemency is extended upon the
conditions named in it, and it is accepted upon those conditions. The governor
may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and the governor shall
himself determine when that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with
full competency to bind himself in the premises, had expressly contracted and
agreed that, whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the
conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to
prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him.
- Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol - The Court reaffirmed the Tesoro
and Sales rulings. "Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had
had his day in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during
his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition with which he was charged, that
brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and confinement in the
penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous exercise
by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof
by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the
Executive to determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or
have been violated To no other department of the Government [has] such
power been entrusted."
The status of our case lawon the matter under consideration may be summed
up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of
a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a
pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Art 159 RPC.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) RAC, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefore by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may
be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Sec 64 (i) RAC is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
- A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who is
recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the
subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal
penalty for such subsequent offense(s) ran be imposed upon him. Since Art
159 RPCdefines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is
regarded as having violated the provisions thereof must be charged,
prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer
the penalty prescribed in Art 159.
- In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against himunder Sec 64 (i) RAC;
or (ii) to proceed against himunder Art 159 RPC, upon a convict who "having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon."
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Sec 64
(i) RAC.
Decision Petition dismissed
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ [dissent]
- As many as such charges may be, none of themso far has resulted in a final
conviction, without which he cannot be recommitted under the condition of his
pardon.
- Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA
59). Aprima facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information,
but proof beyond reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction.
- The executive can only allege the commission of crime and thereafter try to
prove it through indubitable evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court
will then affirmthe allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction.
The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Sec 64(i) RAC, the President may
in his judgment determine whether the condition of the pardon has been
violated.
- I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as the condition does not
involve the commission of a crime but, say, merely requires good behavior
fromthepardonee.
BARRIOQUINTO V FERNANDEZ
FERIA; January 21, 1949
FACTS
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced
to life imprisonment, while Barrioquintos trial was delayed because he was
arrested later than Jimenez. Both submitted their cases to the Guerilla
Amnesty Commission pursuant to Proclamation No. 8
38
which the said
commission remanded to the CFI of Zamboanga without deciding if they were
entitled to amnesty or not on the ground that neither of themhas admitted to
the commission of the offense.
ISSUE
WON confession to the crime is necessary to be entitled to the benefits of
Proclamation No. 8 (grant of amnesty)
HELD
- In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of
September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should admit having committed
the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as
a defense. For whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the
offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should conduct summary
hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a
patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation.
- Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts and Amnesty
Commissions should apply the benefits granted to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with
such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is
entitled to said benefits.
- If the courts have to proceed to the trial or hearing of a case and decide
whether the offense committed by the defendant comes within the terms of the
38
ProclamationNo. 8(dispositive): I, Manuel Roxas, President of thePhilippines, inaccordancewiththe
provisions of Article VII, section 10, paragraph 6 of the Constitution, do hereby declare and proclaiman
amnesty in favor of all persons who committed any act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in thewar effort of the enemy, and
committed during the period from December 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the
Philippines was actually liberatedfromtheenemy control andoccupation. This amnesty shall not apply to
crimesagainst chastityor toactscommittedfrompurelypersonal motives.
Amnesty Proclamation although the defendant has pleaded not guilty, there is
no reason why the Amnesty Commissions can not do so.
- (This case is under Executive of our outline, and the following, although
really obiter, is most relevant to this section)
Difference of Amnesty fromPardon
Pardon Amnesty
-granted by theChief Executive, thus
a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned
and which the courts may not take
notice of.
-by proclamation of thepresident
with the concurrence of the
Congress, and is a public act of
which the courts may take judicial
notice.
Granted tooneafter conviction Granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty,
generally before or after institution of
prosecution and sometimes after
conviction
-looks forward and relieves offender
of consequences of crime; abolishes
and forgives punishment, but doesnt
abolish civil liability
-looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself,
as though he had committed no
offense
Doesnt restore rights to hold public
office, suffrage, unless expressly
restored by pardon
Rights not affected as the offender is
treated as if he committed no crime
at all
Decision respondents ordered to hear and decide the applications for
amnesty of petitioners unless courts have already decided WoN they are
entitled to benefits of amnesty.
SEPARATE OPINION
PERFECTO[concur]
To entitle aperson to have his case heard and decided by a Guerrilla Amnesty
Commission only the following elements are essential:
1. that he is charged or may be charged with an offense penalized under
the RPC, except those against chastity or for purely personal motives;
2. that he committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy;
3. that it was committed during the period fromDecember 8, 1941, to the
date when the area where the offense was committed was actually
liberated fromenemy control and occupation.
If these three elements are present in a case brought before a Guerrilla
Amnesty Commission, the latter cannot refuse to hear and decide it under the
proclamation. There is nothing in the proclamation to even hint that the
applicant for amnesty must first admit having executed the acts constituting the
offense with which he is charged or may be charged.
TUASON[dissent]
- As to the determination of the pretended right of the defendants, to the
benefits of amnesty, the two orders of the Commission are decisions on the
merits, definite and final as far as the Commission is concerned. The fact that
the defendants denied having committed the crime imputed to themwas cited
by the Commission as ground for its decision to turn down their application.
That circumstance was not given as ground for refusal to act. The Commission
has thus amply performed the duties required of it by the Amnesty
Proclamation in both the matters of investigating and deciding.
- The Amnesty Commissions are executive instrumentalities acting for and in
behalf of the President. They are not courts; they are not performing judicial
functions, and this Court has no appellate jurisdiction over their actuations,
orders or decisions.
- Mandamus is ordinarily a remedy for official inaction. (Guanio vs. Fernandez)
- The Court can order the Commission to act but it can not tell the Commission
howto act. Howor for whoma case should be decided is a matter of judgment
which courts have no jurisdiction to control or review. The writ of mandamus
will not issue to control or reviewthe exercise of discretion of a public officer
where the lawimposes upon a public officer the right and the duty to exercise
judgment. In reference to any matter in which he is required to act, it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. (Blanco vs. Board of
Medical Examiners)
- Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime. When an accused says
that he has not committed a crime he cannot have any use for amnesty. It is
also self-evident that where the Amnesty Proclamation imposes certain
conditions, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of those
conditions. Apetition for amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance. The pleader has to confess the allegations against himbefore he is
allowed to set out such facts as, if true, would defeat the action. It is a rank
inconsistency for one to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act of which,
according to him, he is not responsible.
MONSANTO V FACTORAN
FERNAN; February 9, 1989
FACTS
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City)
and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of
public documents and sentenced themto imprisonment and payment of fine.
Petitioner appealed her conviction to the SCwhich affirmed the same. She filed
a motion for reconsideration, but while the motion was pending, she was
extended absolute pardon on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos,
which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of said pardon,
petitioner wrote Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she be reinstated to
her former post. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to
her position without the necessity of a newappointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon, but she still has to pay. Seeking
reconsideration, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon
bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted, and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982. Petitioner contended that:
she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50.
ISSUES
1. WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the
Chief Executive, isentitled to reinstatement to her former position without need
of a newappointment.
2. WONpetitioner is still liable to pay civil indemnities notwithstanding pardon.
HELD
1. Ratio Pardon is defined as an act of grace, proceeding fromthe power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on
whomit is bestowed, fromthe punishment the lawinflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate xxx
and not communicated officially to the Court. This was governed by the 1973
Constitution.
Reasoning
- People v. Lising
xxx acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only
ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to
payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to himduring the
period of his suspensionpendent elite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position. xxx
- The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification fromthe right of
suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary
absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment,
such disqualification to last during the termof the sentence.
- In the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after the conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted thepardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her
appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed
the character of finality. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof, as opposed to the Ex
Parte Garland, Pelobello, and Cristobal cases. It involves forgiveness, and not
forgetfulness.
- While the Court is prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give a meaning to the fiat that
a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots
out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated
as if he were innocent. Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the
crime.
- Public offices are intendedprimarily for the collective protection, safety
and benefit of the commongood. They cannot be compromised to favor
private interests. Apardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power fromrefusing appointment toanyone deemed tobe of
bad character.
2. As for the exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity, the Court
cannot oblige her. Civil liability is governed by RPC, and subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not
served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Decision The assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. is affirmed.
1. Petitioner is not automatically reinstated, and must apply for appointment to
her former position.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to any backpay, and must pay the proportionate
share of the amount of P4,892.50.
MACAGA-AN V PEOPLE
FELICIANO; July 39, 1987
FACTS
- The 22 petitioners include municipal treasurers of various municipalities of
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, and the Officer-in-Charge of the Provincial
Treasurers Office of Lanao del Sur, as well as the Provincial Auditor and the
Assistant Provincial Auditor of Lanao del Sur. Petitioners were charged and
convicted in 33 cases for estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents (Article 315, in relation to Article 17 1, Revised Penal Code) in a
decision of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on 15 July 1981. The total amount
of Government funds (treasury warrants) involved was somewhat over P2.7
million.
- The petitioners state that they applied for amnesty through the 3rd and 11th
Amnesty Commission (sic) of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City and that on 2
February 1985, they were granted conditional amnesty by the said
Commission, subject to the approval or final action of the President of the
Philippines pursuant to P.D. No. 1082, dated 2 February 1977. The Amnesty
Commission, the petitioners continue, endorsed the amnesty applications of
the petitioners to the President, recommending approval thereof or grant of
executive clemency to the petitioners. The petitioners amnesty applications are
said to have been submitted to the Office of the President by the then
Presidential Assistant Victor Nituda. Former Governor Mohammed Ali
Dimaporo, the petitioners further state, made written representations dated 27
January 1986 with former President Marcos concerning the petitioners
applications during a political rally of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan on 22
January 1986. Mr. Marcos apparently wrote on the upper righthand corner of
former Governor Dimaporos letter the following: "Approved" and signed the
same with a partly illegible date. The petitioners state, finally, that the original
copies of the amnesty papers were in the possession of then Presidential
Adviser Joaquin Venus and were lost or destroyed at Malacaang "during the
February 1986 bloodless military revolution" and could not nowbe located.
- The respondent court held that the benefits of amnesty were never available
to the petitioners under P.D. No. 1182 as amended by PD1429. They further
contend that the applicable lawto themis PD1082, which granted amnesty to
those resisting the duly constituted authorities in several parts of Mindanao.
ISSUE
WONPresident Marcos grant of amnesty to the petitioners is in accordance
with law.
HELD
NO. Acts of the President in contravention with the laws, which he himself
promulgated in the exercise of his concurrent legislative powers, are void and
of no effect.
Reasoning
The benefits of amnesty were never available to the petitioners under PD1182.
- Under said law, the crimes to be amnestied must have been for violations
of subversion lawsor for crimes against public order under the RPC. Among
those disqualified from amnesty under PD 1182 are those who, while
holding public office or employmentdiverted public funds fromthe lawful
purpose for which they had been appropriated. In the instant case,
petitioners were charged with and convicted of Art. 315 viz Art 171, RPC.
Art. 315 is under Crimes Against Property, while Art. 171 is under Crimes
Against Public Interest. Clearly, petitioners are among those expressly
disqualified under PD1182.
Neither were petitioners able to avail of amnesty under PD1082.
- The offenses for which amnesty may be granted under PD1082 are acts
penalized by existing laws in the furtherance ofresistance to the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic by members and supporters of
MNLF, Bangsa Moro Army and other anti-government groups with similar
motivations and aims. The resistance referred to is typified by the
offenses of rebellion, insurrection, sedition, or conspiracy to commit
rebellion or sedition, all offenses with a political character and all of which
are embraced in the RPCunder Crimes Against Public Order. On the other
hand, the acts of which petitioners were convicted were ordinary crimes
without any political complexion and consisting simply of diversion of public
funds to private profit.
- We do not discount the possibility that the former President did in fact act
in contravention of PDs 1082 and 1182 by granting the amnesty claimed by
petitioners, and that by such act, he may indeed have aroused expectations
(however unjustified under the terms of existing law) in the minds of the
petitioners. If such be the case, then the appropriate recourse of petitioners
is not to this Court, nor to any other court, but rather to the Executive
Department.
DecisionPetition denied.
ARANETA V DINGLASAN
TUASON; August 26, 1949
FACTS
- The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President
avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases
Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is
under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the
provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive
Order No. 192, which aims to control exports fromthe Philippines. In this case,
Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both officials refuse to issue the required
export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes fromthe Philippines
is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive
Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government
of the Republic uf the Philippines during the period fromJuly 1, 1949 to June
30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner, Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a
tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines fromdisbursing money
under this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No.
226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with,
and incidental to, the holding of the national elections to be held in November,
1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks
this Court to prevent the respondents fromdisbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it.
- Petitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the C.A. No. 671 ( An
Act Declaring a State of Total Emergency as a Result of War involving the
Philippines and Authorizing the President to Promulgate Rules and Regulations
to Meet such Emergency) has ceased to have any force and effect, thereby
rendering the assailed Executive Orders null and void.
ISSUE
WON the emergency powers delegated to the President had ceased when
Congress held its regular session
HELD
YES. Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in
regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225
and226 were issued without authority of law.
- Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the
object to be published, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the
Constitution.
- Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
"In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy."
- The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question
intended to mean restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the
delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to
be an emergency." It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was
approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law
repugnant to the Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its
powers.
- The assertion that newlegislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in
harmony with the Constitution either. If a newand different lawwere necessary
to terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation would be unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain; that which was intended to meet a
temporary emergency may become permanent law; for Congress might not
enact the repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the
approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the
veto. Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might
delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them
except by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to
delegate its powers than to take themback. This is not right and is not, and
ought not to be, the law.
- Section 4 of Act No. 671 stipulates that "the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of
the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the lawregarding the
repeal of the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal
of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of
the belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide
for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the
Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assembly failed to
make a provision for its termination in the same way that it did for the
termination of the effects, and incidents of the delegation. There would be no
point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under a
lawif the lawitself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President
could not only make newrules and regulations but he could restore the ones
already annulled by the legislature.
- More anomalous than the exercise of legislative functions by the Executive
when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that
there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating
concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each others actions. Even
if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while
Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the anomaly
would not be eliminated. Congress by a 2/3 vote could repeal executive orders
promulgated by the President during congressional recess, and the President
in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws
enacted by the latter. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best
interests of the country as they sawthem, a former President promulgated an
executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the
subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an
executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the
measure.
- Quite apart fromthese anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act
No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the
emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
fromholding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the
war. Section 3 provides:
"The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the
convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules
andregulations promulgated by himunder the powers herein granted."
- The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of
Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The
section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had
been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report
mentioned in section 3 was to be the first and last and did not think that upon
the convening of the first Congress Act No. 671 would lapse, what reason
could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms for the
filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to
continue making laws in the formof rules, regulations and executive orders,
were as important, or as unimportant, as the initial one.
- As a contemporary construction, President Quezons statement regarding the
duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight,
considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Pres.
Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who
recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was
not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its
execution, statedin his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was
only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted." These
phrases connote automatic extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a
certain period. Together they denote that a newlegislation was necessary to
keep alive (not to repeal) the lawafter the expiration of that period. They signify
that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed if the grant should
be prolonged.
- Pres. Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of
the answer. He said he issued the call for a special session of the National
Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against
air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its
next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." It can easily be
discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the
President was decided upon with specific viewto the inability of the National
Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have
motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by
the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law
so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been
conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and
dislocation of the normal processes of government. The period that best
comports with the constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general
context of the lawand with what we believe to be the main if not the sole raison
detre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress
to function, a period ending with the convening of that body.
- In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special
session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the purpose and
intention of the National Assembly is given effect. In a special session, the
Congress may "consider general legislation or only such subjects as the
President may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a
regular session, the power of Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except
by the limitations imposed by the organic law.
- After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the
systemof the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has
set up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in
preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The
Filipino people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that
they share the faith of other democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all
its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government,
legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of crisis
no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic
features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to
another department, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or
when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The
truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme
perils more than in normal circumstances the various branches, executive,
legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to performthe
duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to themrespectively.
Decision Petitions GRANTED.
QUA CHEE GAN V DEPORTATION BOARD
BARRERA; September 30, 1963
FACTS
- Appeal froma decision of the CFI of Manila denying the petition for writ of
habeas corpus and/or prohibition, certiorari, and mandamus filed by the
petitioner-appellants
- The petitioners were charged before the Deportation Board (DB) with having
purchased $130,000.00 US dollars without the necessary license from the
Central Bank of the Philippines and having remitted the same to HK; and three
of the petitioner-appellants with having attempted to bribe officers of the
Philippine and US Governments in order to evade prosecution for said
unauthorized purchase of USdollars.
- After filing of deportation charges, presiding member of the DB issued a
warrant of arrest for the said aliens but upon filing of a surety bond and cash
bond, the petitioner-appelants were provisionally set free.
- The petitioner-appellants then filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on
the grounds that (1) deportation charges do not constitute legal ground for
deportation of aliens and (2) the DB has no jurisdiction to entertain such
charges, but was denied by the DB. The petitioner-appellants then filed a
petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition which was remanded to the
CFI of Manila. The CFI issued awrit of preliminary injunction, restraining DB
from hearing the deportation charges against the petitioners, pending final
termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings. DB filed its
answer to the original petition, maintaining that the DB, as an agent of the
Prexi, has jurisdiction over the charges and the authority to order their arrest.
CFI dismissed the petition, hence this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WONthe deportation charges constitute legal ground formdeportation of the
petitioner-appellants
2. WON, conceding without deciding that the President can personally order
the arrest of the alien complained of, such power can be delegated by himto
the DB
HELD
1. Yes. The act of profiteering, hoarding, or blackmarketing of US dollars
violate Central Bank regulations and could be treated as ECONOMIC
SABOTAGE, which is a ground for deportation under RA503 amending Sec 37
of CA613.
2. No. Official functions requiring the exercise of discretion such as the power
to arrest cannot be delegated to an agent of the President.
Obiter
2 ways to deport an undesirable alien:
Section 37, CANo. 613 (Immigration Act of 1940): Commissioner of
Immigration empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien,
after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of ground or grounds therefore BUT did not concentrate
exercise power to deport to the Commissioner, as seen in Sec 52
[which is the repealing clause of the Immigration Act, which expressly
exemptedSec 69 of Act 2711
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code (Act No. 2711): only
indicates that the Executive or his authorized agent could only
deport/expel/exclude from RP aliens upon conducting a prior
investigation of the ground of such action and the rest of it indicates the
procedure concerning the protection of the said alien during the
deportation proceedings. [indication of the recognition of the existence of
power of the executive to deport aliens]
Presidents power under Sec. 69, Act 2711 may be delegated: proofs
through history
EONo. 494 (first EOof Gov-Gen Murphy, 1934): constitute a board to
take actions on complaints against foreigners, conduct investigations and
make recommendations
EO No. 33 (Quezon, 1936): creation of DB to receive complaints
against aliens, to conduct investigations (under Sec 69, Act 2711) and
make recommendationsauthorized by President
***TAKE NOTE: Power to INVESTIGATE, not POWER TO ORDER
ARREST OF THEALIEN
EO69 (Roxas, 1947): orders respondents in deportation proceedings to
file a bond with the Commissioner of Immigration to ensure their
appearance and facilitate execution of deportation order whenever the
President decides the case against the respondent
***TAKE NOTE: Filing of BOND, NOT AUTHORIZE ARREST OF THE
RESPONDENT
EO398 (Quirino, 1951): reorganized the DBand authorized the DB, upn
filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue
warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold himunder
detention during the investigation unless he files a bond (so here,
PRESIDENT ALREADY AUTHORIZED ARREST OF RESPONDENT
ALIENS)
On rights of the accused: Sec 1, ART III of 1935 CONSTI = Sec 2, ART III,
1987 CONSTI
This provision specifies that the probable cause must be determined by the
judge after examination under oath of the complainant and the witness
produced unlike that of the 4
th
Amendment, Philippine Bill, or Jones Act
which does not determine who exactly would determine the probable cause
for the order of arrest. The Consti is silent on whether a warrant of arrest
may be issued upon determination of the probable cause by other authority
besides the Judge.
*DURINGINVESTIGATION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT THE ALIENBE
ARRESTED. IT ISENOUGHTHAT ABONDBEREQUIREDTOINSURETHE
APPEARANCEOF THEALIENDuriNGTHEINVESTIGATION.
Decision EO 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the DB to issue
warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and
to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said
aliens, is declared illegal.
Order of arrest null and void, bonds filed decreed cancelled. Decision appealed
fromaffirmed with modification.
ART VIII: J UDICIARY
DEMETRIA V ALBA
FERNAN; February 27, 1987
FACTS
- Petitioners, in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget ReformDecree
of 1977 on the ff. grounds:
o it infringes upon the fundamental lawby authorizing the illegal transfer
of public moneys
o it is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives
and purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made
o it allows the President to override the safeguards, formand procedure
prescribed by the Constitution in approving appropriations
o it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers
o the transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof
by the Budget Minister and the Treasurer are without or in excess of
their authority and jurisdiction
- Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners. He further contended that:
o The provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section
16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution
o Prohibition will not lie form one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the
latters sphere of responsibility
- On February 27, the Court required petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment
- Petitioners stated that as a result of the change in the administration, there is
a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance
- The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss setting forth as
ground therefore, abrogation of Section 16(5), Art.VIII of the 1973 Constitution
by the FreedomConstitution, rendering the petition moot and academic
ISSUES
1. WONthe case is justiciable
2. WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES
- The court cited Ecelio Javier v. COMELECwhere it said that: This Court will
not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext
that the case has become moot and academic.
- As regards taxpayers suit, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain
the same or not
- Where the legislature or the executive branch acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the
other branches of the government had assumed to do, as void. This is the
essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
2. YES. Paragraph 1of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, being
repugnant to Section 16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, is null and void.
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices
and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after
its enactment.
- Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows: No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of constitutional commissions may by lawbe authorized to augment any itemin
the general appropriations lawfor their respective offices fromsavings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical
- For flexibility, the Constitution provided a leeway
- The purpose and condition for which funds may be transferred were specified
- Paragraph 1 of Section 44 unduly over-extends the privilege granted under
Section 16(5), and empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds
fromone department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project
or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard to WONthe
funds to be transferred are savings, or WONthe transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the itemto which the transfer is to be made
- It completely disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, amounting
to an undue delegation of legislative power
DE AGBAYANI V PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
FERNANDO; April 29, 1971
FACTS
- Francisca De Agbayani obtained a P450.00loan fromPNB dated July 19,
1939 maturing on July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage
- As of November 27, 1959 the loan balance was P1,294.00
- July 13 1959, PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the
office of Pangasinan Provincial Sherriff for the recovery of the unpaid loan
balance
- August 10, 1959 Plaintiff filed suit against PNB and Sheriff alleging that 15
years having elapsed fromthe date of maturity the mortgage have prescribed.
- PNBprayed for the dismissal since the defense of prescription would not be
available in the period of March 10, 1945 , when EO 32 providing for a
moratorium on debts was issued, to July 26, 1948 when RA 342 which
extended the period of moratoriumwas declared invalid, were to be deducted
fromthe time during which PNBtook no legal steps for the recovery of the loan
- Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani
ISSUES
1. WONa statute subsequently adjudged as invalid should be deemed to have
force and effect before the declaration of its nullity.
2. (if yes) WONprescription ran during the eight year period that EO32 and
RA342 was in force.
HELD
1. YESPrior to the declaration of nullity a challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and effect.
- The actual existence of a statute, prior to the determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored.
2. NOBecause of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferer the
SC has made clear its view in a series of cases that during the eight year
period that EO32 and RA 342 was in force, prescription did not run. (cases
decided: Day v. CFI, Republic vs. Hernaez.
- Orthodox view on an unconstitutional act: An unconstitutional act, for that
matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering fromthat
infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify
any official act taken under it.
- SCsaid, in Agbayani vs. PNBthat orthodox viewis unrealistic and that until
after the judiciary declares its invalidity it is entitled to obedience and respect.
DE LA LLANA V ALBA
FERNANDO; March 12, 1982
FACTS
- The National Assembly enacted the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An
Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other
Purposes". BP129 mandates that Justices and Judges of inferior courts from
the Court of Appeals to municipal courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the
Judiciary. The intent of this Act is to attain (1) more efficiency in thedisposal of
cases, (2) improvement in the quality of justice dispensed
by the court, (3) democratization of social and economic opportunities and the
substantiation of the true meaning of social justice.
- Procedure De La Llana,a judge, together with other petitioners filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or Prohibition, seeking to enjoin respondent
Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of theCommission on Audit, and
respondent Minister of Justice fromtaking any action implementing BP 129.
ISSUES
1.WONthe petitioners have legal standing.
2.On Constitutionality of BP129
a. WON there was lack of good faith on the part of Legislature in its
enactment.
b. WONthe abolition of an office by the Legislature is valid.
c. WON the provision of BP 129 (regarding fixing of compensation and
allowances of members of Judiciary by the Executive) constitutes an undue
delegationof legislativepower.
d. WONBP129 is violative of the security of tenure (Art. XSec 7 of 1973
Constitution) enjoyed by incumbent justices and judges and the Supreme
Courts power to discipline and remove judges.
HELD
1.YES. The petitioners, being members of the bar and officers of thecourt and
taxpayers, have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as aresult of its enforcement.
2.a. NO. The Legislature, after careful study and evaluation of the judicial
systemin the country, found out that institutional reforms is both pressing and
urgent.
b. YES. The abolition of an office,if within the competence of alegitimate body
and if done in good faith suffers fromno infirmity.
Reasoning
0adherence to precedent (in Bendanillo Sr. v. Provincial Gov and inZandueta
v. De La Costa, the Court also held that the abolition of an
office is valid)
- Interpretation of the Consti provision - Article VII Sec 2 of 1973Consti "vests
in the NA the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, subject to certain limitation in the case of SC." In short, the NA
has the power to abolish anoffice that it created.
c. NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power if the lawis complete
and provides for a standard.
Reasoning
- In this case, the Act provides a clear standard. The President may be
authorized to fix the allowances and compensation but guided by the
Letter of Implementation No. 93 and pursuant to PD985.
d. NO. Removal from office is different from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant
who would thereby lose his position. In the case of abolition, there is in lawno
occupant. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office.
Reasoning
- Conflicting constitutional provisions, the power of the NAto abolish an office
on one hand and the security of tenure, on the other, must be reconciled and
harmonized. Reconciliation and balancing is well high unavoidable under the
fundamental principle of separation of powers.
- Political theory (Holmes and Tuazon): There is more truismand actuality of
interdependence among different branches of government
than in independence and separation of powers.
Decision: Dismissed. The unconstitutionality of BP129 has not been shown.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
The express constitutional guarantyof security of tenure of judgesmust prevail
over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust judges.
Such subjection of a judge to public "harassment and humiliation ....can
diminish public confidence in the courts." The ills the judiciary suffers fromwere
caused by impairing its independence: they will not be cured by totally
destroying their independence. It would be ironical if Judges who are called
upon to give due processcannot count it on themselves.
BARREDO [concur]
Inferior courts are mere creatures of law(of the Legislature) . It follows that it is
within the legislature s power toabolish or reorganize themno matter what the
cost is. He personally believes that the present situation in the judiciarycalls for
its reorganization. He believes that the Constitution is a living instrument which
translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances (realist
approach in interpreting the Consti)
AQUINO [concur in the result]
For himthe suit is premature, but affirming expressly that the abolition was in
good faith. CONCEPCION(concurs in the result)
GUERRERO [concur]
Social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its
constitutionality is the ratio decidendi of this case. For him, inquiring into the
wisdomof the lawis a political question. Public office is a privilege in the gift of
the State and not a right. Dura lex sed lex, even though it is harsh.
ABAD SANTOS[concur and dissent]
Concurs but dissented on the ground that the statute being free from any
constitutional infirmity, the "Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional
power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to
consult with the Supreme Court and to accord its views the fullest
consideration.
DE CASTRO [concur except as qualified]
The power of the Legislature to create courts also includes the power to
abolish them. When there is a conflict between public welfare(the duty of the
legislature to provide a society with a fair and effective judicial system) and
personal benefit (security of tenure), the latter must of necessity to yield to the
former. The abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent intowhich no
judicial inquiry is proper. Petition is premature. No actual controversy yet. Not
until the abolition of courts is not done, can there be possibly a violation of the
securityof tenure. "Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is
thesupreme law.
MELENCIO-HERRERA [concur]
Tenure of Judges is different fromtenure of Courts. Alegislature is not bound
to give security of tenure to courts. The constitutional guarantee of tenure of
Judges applies only as their Courts exist.
ERICTA [concur]
No law is irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to
abolish them. "Salus populi est suprema lex" - The welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
PLANA [concurs anddissent]
Actual and not merely presumptive good faith attended its enactment. His
qualification being that the "President is under no obligation to consult with the
SC and the SC as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the
President."
PEOPLE V CUARESMA
NARVASA; April 18, 1989
FACTS
- On the basis of affidavits of Luz Lumacao and her witness, Soledad Tanilon,
both dated August 21,1978 which were sworn to before the First Assistant City
Fiscal of Dumaguete City, said Assistant Fiscal filed on the same day an
information with the City Court Judge of Dumaguete City charging Rosie
Cuaresma with oral defamation. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case
Number 7238.
- Rosie Cuaresma moved to quash the case contending that the case had
been commenced by an information by the fiscal instead of a complaint of the
offended party as required by Article 360 of the revised Penal Code. The said
article provides that criminal action for defamation cannot be prosecuted de
oficio except at the instance of and upon the complaint expressly filed by the
offended party.
- The Judge, on August 4, 1980, denied the motion on the basis of the
Supreme Court ruling in Fernandez v. Lantin, 74 SCRA 338 (1976), which
stated that the error can be correctedby the filing of the sworn statement of the
complainant, assuming it contains all the information required under the Rules,
with the Court to comply with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
Alternatively, the fiscal can file with the court a verified complaint of the
offended party. In the order denying the quashal, the judge, however, required
the fiscal to file the verified complaint within ten days. The fiscal complied with
the order by filing the needed document on the same day.
- Cuaresma filed another motion to quash three months later alleging that the
offense had prescribed since the filing of the original information o August 2,
1978 did not interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the crime ( two
months fromdiscovery) and that said prescriptive period had long lapsed prior
to the submission of the corrective complaint on august 4, 1980. Judge granted
her the motion stating that it was the filing of the verified that conferred
jurisdiction upon the Court and this was on August 4, 1980.
- The fiscal belatedly filed a motion for consideration on Jube 26, 1981 which
was denied for lack of merit and for having been filed out of time.
- Hence this action for certiorari with the Supreme Court as filed by the Second
Assistant City Fiscal on May 31, 1984 or three years after the dismissal of the
motion to reconsider.
ISSUE
WON the Supreme Court should give due course to the application for
certiorari
HELD
1. The order of dismissal dated April 4, 1980 is a final order having been
disposed of by the Court. The appeal, if taken in a timely fashion, could have
succeeded as the order of the Court was tainted by an error of law. The filing of
the complaint in the formof an affidavit, the investigation by the fiscal, and the
subsequent filing of the information with the Court did indeed toll the period of
prescription.
2. The filing of the writ for certiorari was also improper in several counts:
a. The filing should have been done by the Solicitor General instead of the
Second Assistant City Fiscal and was dismissible on this account [Republic
v Partisala , 118 SCRA870 (1982)].
b. Remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any agency or officer
exercising judicial functions or of any judge which are claimed to be without
or in excess of itsor his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. In the case at bar, the correct procedure is the filing of
an appeal as the judgment rendered is an error in lawand not grave abuse
of discretion.
c. The Supreme Courts jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs (e.g.
certiorari, mandamus, etc.) is not exclusive and granted to lower courts.
There is also a hierarchy that should be followed in matters of this nature.
Direct action to the Supreme Court will be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefore. And these reasons should be
clearly set out in the petition.
DecisionPetition dismissed.
YNOT V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
CRUZ; March 20, 1987
FACTS
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat fromMasbate to
Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of EO No. 626-A. The
petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a
writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined torule on the constitutionality
of the executive order, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also
for its presumed validity. The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claimis that the
penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and
so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper
exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment
No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES
1. WONthe SCimpliedly affirmed the constitutionality of EONo. 626-A
2. WONlower courts have authority to rule on constitutionality of statute
3. WONEONo. 626-Aviolates due process
4. WONEONo. 626-Ais an invalid exercise of police power
5. WONEONo. 626-Ais an invalid delegation of legislative power
HELD
1. NO. While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v.
Angeles is not applicable here. The question raised there was the necessity of
the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could
be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of
due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by
the Solicitor General, impliedly affirmthe constitutionality of EONo. 626-A.
2. YES. While lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented fromresolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to reviewby the highest tribunal. We
have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirmon appeal or certiorari, as the lawor rules of court may provide," final
judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of
such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
3. YES. The minimumrequirements of due process are notice and hearing
which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. In the instant case, the
carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were
returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeasbond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon
his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The
executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
4. YES. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State
to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. To
justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The carabao, as the poor mans
tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a
lawful subject of EONo. 626-A. But while the amendatory measure has the
same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that there be a lawful
method. To strengthen the original measure, EO No. 626-A imposes an
absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or
purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
5. YES. Section 1 of EO No. 626-A reads: The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving
farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos. There is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the
officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. The phrase "may see fit" is an
extremely generous and dangerous condition. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks
that keep it fromoverflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
BENGZON V DRILON
GUTIERREZ; April 15, 1992
FACTS
- Petition to reviewthe constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain
provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Fiscal Year 1992
- Petitioners are retired justices of the SC and the CA who were receiving
monthly pensions under RANo.910 as amended by RANo. 1797
- Respondents Drilon et al are sued in their official capacities of the Executive,
involved in the implementation of the release of funds under the GAA
- RA910 was enacted in 1953 to provide retirement pensions to Justices of the
SC and the CA who have rendered service at least 2o years either in the
judiciary or in any branch of govt, or in, both, or having attained the age of 70,
or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office; he
shall receive until his death the salary which he has received at the time of his
retirement
- RA910 was amended by RA1797. Identical retirement benefits were given to
Consti Commissions and the AFP, under RA1568, as amended by RA3595,
andPD578, respectively
- Marcos issued successive decrees which automatically readjusted the
retirement pensions of military officers and enlisted men. But those in the
judiciary and the Consti Commissions were not included in this automatic
readjustment, as Marcos repealed the automatic readjustment provisions
(Section 3-a of RA1797 and RA3595) for the judiciary and the Consti
Commissions
- Realizing this unfairness, Congress in 1990 sought to reenact the repealed
provisionsby approving a bill on the matter (HB16297 and SB740)
- Pres. Aquino vetoed the HBon the ground that it would erode the foundation
of the policy on standardization of compensation under the Salary
Standardization Law, RA6758
- On the other hand, retired CAjustices Barcelona and Enriquez filed a petition
for readjustment of their pensions in accordance with RA1797 by reasoning out
that PD644 repealing RA1797 did not take effect as there was no valid
publication pursuant to Tanada v Tuvera, supposedly promulgated in 1975 but
published onlyin the OGin 1983; Court authorized it as a result
- As a result of the resolution by the Court, Congress included in the GAA
appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of adjusted pensions
rates for the retired justices
- In Jan 1992, President vetoed portions of Section 1, and the entire Section 4
of the Special Provision for the SCand the Lower Courts on the ground that
the President vetoed the HB on the matter already, and such appropriation
would erode the policy of salary standardization
ISSUE
WON the veto by the president of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pension of the retired Justices of the SCand the CA
HELD
- The President did not veto items but provisions of the lawin the GAA.
- While veto power is generally all or nothing, vetoing the entire bill or
none at all, it does not hold when it comes to appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills.
o The Constitution has a itemveto power to avoid inexpedient riders
being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure; only a particular itemor items may be vetoed
o Itemin a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts; it is a specific appropriation of money, not some
general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill
o The President did not veto the general fund adjustment of 500M,
to meet certain obligations WHICHis an ITEM.
o What she vetoed wereprovisions methods and systems placed
by Congress to insure that obligations would be paid when they fell
due
o Thus, augmentationof specific appropriations found inadequate to
pay retirement benefits is a provision and not an item
o Actually, what she really vetoed were RA1797 and the Resolution
of the SCdated Nov 1991. WHICHSHECANNOT VETO.
- The repealing decrees (PD644) of Marcos re taking away the automatic
readjustment for the judiciary never became valid law because it was never
published, pursuant to the Tanada v Tuvera doctrine; RA 1797 was never
repealed and there was no need for an HB in 1990 to restore it so even the
presidents veto of the HB does not even have any effect in the continuing
implementation of the law
- The Veto by the president trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal
autonomy to the Judiciary
o Guaranty of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with
the wisdomand dispatch that their needs require
o Power to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation
not exceeding highest rates authorized by law
o Veto is tantamount to dictating to the judiciary howits funds should
be utilized
- The Justices have a right to their pensions pursuant to RA1797
o The purpose retirement laws like such is to entice competent men
and women to enter the government service and retire with relative
security
GARCIA V MACARAEG
BARREDO; May 31, 1971
FACTS
- Administrative complaint filed by Paz M. Garcia against Hon. Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., Judge of the CFI of Laguna Branch VI, nowUndersecretary of
Justice, in his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his
oath of office as judge ... gross incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58
thereof.
- Judge Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo
City with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112
newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. After
consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of
Calamba and the Department of Justice, he decided to accept the offer of the
Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroomand
offices of the court, to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna
provincial government for the purchase of the necessary supplies and
materials and to rely on the national government for the equipment needed by
the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these
items must be furnished by the provincial government The provincial officials of
Laguna, however, informed himthat the province was not in a position to do
so).
- As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba
assured himthat the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the
Calamba municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer
and his personnel are transferred to another location. When the projected
transfer of the municipal treasurers office was about to be effected, the
treasurer and several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then
requested Macaraig to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba,
with the commitment that the municipal government will shoulder the payment
of the rentals. Respondents first choice was the second floor of the Republic
Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the
building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space
selected by Macaraig was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank.
After a months negotiations, the municipality finally signed a lease agreement
with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another month passed before the
municipal government could release the amount necessary for the
improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a big hall
without partitions, into a courtroomand offices for the personnel of the court
and for the assistant provincial fiscal. Thereafter, upon Macaraigs
representations, the provincial government appropriated the amount of P5,000
for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in
December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary equipment
with the Property Officer of the DOJ but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the
equipment of the CFI was released only on December 23, 1970 and the
procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under
way.
- When Macaraig realized that it would be sometime before he could actually
preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years
he had worked in the DOJ, Macaraig had, due to pressure of duties, never
gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had
earned beyond the maximumten months allowed by the law). The Secretary
of Justice, however, prevailed upon himto forego his leave and instead
to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was
not busy attending to the needs of his court.
- Complainant Garcia alleged:
>That fromJuly 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, respondent has
not submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed,
disposed of, decided and/or resolved, the number of cases pending
decisions for one month, two months to over three months, together with the
title, number, number of hours of court session held a day.
> That he has not submitted his certificate of service (NewJudicial Form
No. 86, Revised 1966) fromJuly to December, 1970 and fromJanuary to
February, 1971 inclusive.
>That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, CFI of Laguna and San Pablo and
knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or
discharged the duties appertaining to his office, he has collected and was
paid his salaries fromJuly 1970 to February 1971 in flagrant violation of
Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
> That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports on the
accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55
and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
ISSUE
WONrespondent is guilty of dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge,
gross incompetence and violation of Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of
the Department of Justice and RA296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948 particularly
Sections 5, 55 and58
HELD
- Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 of the
Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging
his judicial duties. Respondents inability to performhis judicial duties under the
circumstances does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every
lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial
duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces
and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his
judicial duties. Respondents collection of salaries as judge does not constitute
dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he spent in
Organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department of Justice.
- None of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the
practice of long standing of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the
Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may
doandwhat he may not doin collaboratingor working withother offices
or officers under the other great departments of the government must
always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of
separation of powers on which our government tests by mandate of the
people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The
fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional
precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or
passing governmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave
importance to the Judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of
government that no Judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to himfor
action or resolution would be subject to reviewand prior approval and, worst
still, reversal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say,
the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
Decision Complaint dismissed. (8 votes to dismiss, Castro &Teehankee took
no part.)
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO[concur]
- Respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise accountable. No
taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do
was in accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the Department of
Justice. He is, under the statute in force, under the administrative supervision
of its head. Nor can the good faith of Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be
impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance with what
previous secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil
then is the statutory authority of the Department of Justice over courts of
first instance and other inferior courts. While a distinction could be made
between the performance of judicial functions which in no way could be
interfered with by the Department and the task of administration which is
executive in character, still the conferment of such competence to a
department head, an alter ego of the President, is to my mind, not only unwise
but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing administrative rules and
regulations over matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the
discretion of judges which should be exercised according to their conscience
alone. What is more, the influence that the Secretary has over them is
magnified. It is already unavoidable under our scheme of government that they
court his goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it. With this grant of
authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more difficult. it is thus
objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That certainly is not the
way to reduce to the minimum any participation of the executive in judicial
affairs arising fromthe power to appoint. As it is, even when the government as
the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right,
a favorable decision fromthe lower courts could be looked upon with suspicion.
The judiciary must not only be independent; it must appear to be so.
- The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight
then, is, to my mind, anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power
granted the department head, respondent Judge in this case could not have
been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that the
Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be hoped that it be
made clear that the judiciary is to be totally freed fromany supervisory
authority of an executive department. (Take note guys that this casewas decided just a
day before the Manila Hotel inaugural session of the con-con that created the 1973 Consti. And
remember that the supervision of the CFI and other inferior courts (under the DOJ in the 1935 Consti)
was transferred to the SCunder the newConsti whichprovision was copied in the 1987 Consti. I guess
thiscasewasinfluential inmakingthat changepossible. Bytheway, Macaraigwasaformer UPlawprof.)
BADUA V CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION
GRINO-AQUINO; February 14, 1991
FACTS
Respondent David Quema alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land
which he mortgaged to Dra. Valera. He was able to redeemthe property but
only after 22 years. On the other hand, petitioner spouses claimthe property
was sold to themby Dra. Valera. Quema filed a case before the Barangay
Council but when it failed to settle, he filed a complaint in the tribal court of the
Maeng Tribe. (The disputed land is located in Villaviciosa, Abra) The tribal
court decided in favor of Quema. But as the spouses did not immediately
vacate the land, they received a warning order fromthe Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army (CPLA). Petitioners filed this action alleging that respondent
Cordillera Bodong Administrations decision is void for lack of judicial power or
jurisdiction. Respondent contends the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over
tribal courts because they are not part of the judicial system.
ISSUE
WONa tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid
and executory decision
HELD
NO. Decision of tribal court is annulled for lack of jurisdiction. The creation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected in a plebiscite by the provinces
and cities of the Cordillera Region hence the Cordillera Bodong Administration,
the indigenous and special courts for the indigenous cultural communities and
the CPLA as a regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines do
not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court not being constituted into an
indigenous court, it is but an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs
and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts are
not part of the Philippine J udicial Systemwhich consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which havebeen established by law. They do
not possess judicial power.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY V COURT OF APPEALS
ROMERO; February 5, 1996
FACTS
- Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) entered into three contracts regarding
various services at the South Harbor:
> With Ocean Terminals Services, Inc. (OTSI). OTSI was granted exclusive
right to manage and operate stevedoring services at the South Harbor
> With Marina Port Services Inc. (MPSI). MPSI was granted exclusive
management and operation of arrastre and container handling services at
the South Harbor
> With 7-RPorts Services. 7-Rwas granted warehousing services
- On November 28, 1991, the contract with MPSI was renewed. Part of the
contract required the MPSI to cause integration of storage, arrastre and
stevedoring services at the South Harbor. Consequently, OTSI and 7-R
assigned their respective stevedoring and warehousing services to MPSI. In
effect MPSI had the duty and responsibility to manage, operate and render the
following services:
- Arrastre- receiving, handling, checking as well as custody and delivery of
cargo services. These are services done on land.
- Stevedoring- all work performed on board vessel, that is, the process of
loading and unloading cargo, stowing inside hatches, compartments and on
deck or open cargo spaces on board vessels.
- Container Terminal Handling- the services of handling container discharged
or loaded unto vessels.
- Storage- storing of containers, bulk and break bulk cargoes in all storage
areas at the South Harbor.
- April 2, 1992, PPAentered into a contract with petitioner Manila Floating Silo
Corporation (MAFSICOR) whereby the latter was granted right, privilege,
responsibility and authority to provide, operate a floating bulk terminal facilities
for bulk cargoes bound for the South Harbor with a proviso that use of such
facility shall not be compulsory to bulk shippers or importers. Contract would be
enforced for 5 years and shall be on an interimbasis until an actual land based
bulk terminal plant for the Port of Manila.
- Sept. 8, 1192, PPA and MAFSICOR entered a supplemental agreement
stating that manpower needed for stevedoring services shall be hired from
OTSI.
- MPSI filed a petition against PPAand MAFSICORfor declaratory relief, final
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
prohibitory injunction claiming that said contract was in complete derogation of
their rights under their contract with PPA.
- RTC of Manila through judge Veridiano II, issued TRO directing PPA to
maintain status quo and enjoining MAFSICOR from bringing in the floating
terminal and set a hearing on the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
- PPAfiled an opposition to the issuance of said writ stating PPA-MAFSICOR
contract actually supports PPA-MPSI contract as stevedoring manpower would
be hired fromMPSI. And that on a 2-day public hearing, most of the registrants
agreed to the operation of the floating terminal.
- MAFSICORalso filed an urgent motion for the lifting of the TROand a denial
of the the preliminary injunction on the ground that an injunctive relief is not
available in an action for declaratory relief. Theyfiled another motion to dismiss
complaint stating that declaratory relief was not available to MPSI because
MAFSICORwas not a party in the PPA-MPSI contract therefore they were not
a party-in-interest.
- AUGUST 25, 1993, trial court denied writ of preliminary injunction and lifted
TROstating that first, the right to operate a floating terminal was not on the
PPA-MPSI contract and there would be no conflict between contracts with
MPSI and MAFSICORsince MPSI is not the sole entity authorized to render
stevedoring services in the South Harbor and besides, stevedoring services for
MAFSICORshall be provided by OTSI. Second, contract with MAFSICORwas
noon-exclusive meaning MPSI could also operate a floating terminal. Third,
injunctive relief may not be granted for an action for declaratory relief. Further,
MPSI could not question PPA-MAFSICOR contract they being not a party
thereto.
- MPSI filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court on
Sept. 15, 1993.
- Meanwhile on Sept. 3 1993, Katipunan ng mga Manggagawa sa Daungan
(KAMADA) the bargaining agent or the 4000 stevedores employed by MPSI,
filed a complaint against MPSI, PPA and MAFSICOR for the annulment of
PPA-MAFSICORcontract alleging that the operation of the floating bulk would
duplicate their function of stevedoring in the South Harbor. They also alleged
that MAFSICORhad not contacted themon the matter regarding the hiring of
their services in the supplemental contract. Also, KAMADA said that the
requirement of MAFSICORof trained and qualified stevedores (since services
in the floating terminal would be done by machine), certainly some of their
member employees would be deprived.
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Mabunay. Court granted TRO
stating great and irreparable injuries upon the applicant would result before the
matter can be heard on notice.
- MAFSICORfiled a motion to dismiss civil case and for the lifting of the TRO
(complete reasons in p.224-25). Reasons included Court Circular No. 13-93
which prohibits the issuance of injunction against certain government agencies
including public utilities. Motion was denied.
- Sept. 10, 1993, MAFSICORfiled a supplement to its motion to dismiss and to
lift TRO, raising as an additional reason, Section 1 of P.D. no. 1818 which
states that:
no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure projectincluding
among others public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity
or government office fromproceeding withthe operation of such public
utility
- MPSI opposed stating MAFSICORis not a public utility nor is performing a
public function and thus non public interest may be affected.
- Judge Mabunay denied MAFSICORs motion.
- Sept. 28,1993, KAMADAcase was resolved by Judge Mabunay in which writ
was denied due to failure of KAMADA to present clear and convincing
evidence of any damages it will suffer.
- Another case was filed by yet another party. This was a case for injunction
with provisional remedy of preliminary injunction involving the same PPA-
MAFSICORcontract. This was filed by the Chamber of Customs Brokers Inc.,
the only accredited association for customs brokers in the country, stating that
they were never informed of the proposal to put up a floating grains terminal
and that operation of such would adversely affect and prejudice its members
(reason in p.226-227).
- Case was raffled and was presided by Judge Bayhon. Court issued a
restraining order. In due course, on October 1, 1993, lower court issued a
preliminary injunction upon the filing of MPSI of an injunction bond.
- PPA and MAFSICOR filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for an issuance of a TROand/or preliminary injunction.
Petition impleaded Judge Verdiano as a public respondent. Petition also
prayed Judges Mabunay and Bayhon be administratively dealt with for
disregarding Circular No. 13-93.
- Pursuant to Sec. 9(1) of B.P. 29, SCreferred case to Court of Appeals.
- October 13, 1993, CAissued a writ of preliminary injunction finding that MPSI
has exclusive stevedoring rights at the South Harbor and that the operation of
a floating grains terminal by MAFSICORwould overlap on the rights of MPSI.
On the applicability of PD1818 and Circular No. 13-93, court stated that what
is being stopped temporarily is private respondents operation of the floating
bulk terminal facility that would lessen MPSIs stevedoring services as it
infringes on the latters contractual right.
- MAFSICORfiled a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
- On June 8, 1994, CA decided that writ of preliminary injunction is made
permanent and that Judge Bayhon be permanently enjoined from issuing
injunctive orders during the trial of the case in the court.
- Thus, CAaffirmed the exclusivity of the stevedoring contract in favor of MPSI.
That being so, it precluded infringement of the PPA-MPSI contract by the PPA-
MAFSICORcontract. CAexplained that the floating grains terminal is simply a
mechanized unloading of grains cargo fromthe vessel to the barge or other
transport facilities. And also that what is solely done by stevedores is
substituted by machines complemented by needed stevedores. With respect to
the supplemental agreement which states that stevedores would be hired by
MAFSICORfromOTSI, court stated that it was just an adjustment in order not
to violate PPA-MPSI contract. And that MAFSICOR can legally excuse
themselves fromthe contract because OTSI already assigned its stevedoring
services to MPSI. As regards to forumshopping allegation of MAFSICOR(filing
of separate petitions by MPSI, KAMADAand Chamber), court said that there
was no forumshopping because petitioners had separate and distinct legal
personalities. There also was no proof that they confabulated to forum-shop.
On the applicability of PD1818, CAaffirmed its Oct.13 ruling.
- PPAand MAFSICORfiled a motion for reviewon certiorari alleging that Court
of Appeals decision: a) violates PD 1818 and Circular No. 13-93, the
constitutional principle of separation of judicial and executive powers and
prescription against forum shopping, b) supplants the discretion of the trial
court to pass upon the propriety of a preliminary injunction and c) is contrary to
the evidence on record.
ISSUE
WONPD1818 applicable to the case
HELD
YES
Ratio no court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in
any case, dispute or controversy involving an infrastructure projectincluding
among others public utilities for the transport of goods or commodities,
stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity
or government office from proceeding withthe operation of such public
utility
- Clearly, the prohibition in PD 1818 does not cover infrastructure alone. It
includes among others stevedoring services. The lawbeing clear, there is no
roomfor interpretation or construction. Averbis legis non est recendum(from
the words of a statute there should be no departure).
- PD1818 applies in controversies involving facts or the exerciseof discretion
in technical cases. It is founded on the principle that to allow courts to
determine such matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery.
- InRepublic v. Capulongdiscretion was defined as a power or right conferred
upon themby lawof acting officially under certain circumstances, uncontrolled
by the judgment or conscience of others.
- Entering into a contract for the operation af a floating grains terminal
notwithstanding the existence of other stevedoring contracts pertaining to the
South Harbor is undoubtedly an exercise of the discretion on the part of the
PPA. No other persons or agencies are in a better position to gauge the need
for the floating terminal than the PPA; certainly not the courts. Courts have no
brooding of such administrative agencies (Hon. Reinerio Reyes et al v. Hon
Doroteo Caneba et al). courts will intervene only to ascertain whether a branch
or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its constitutional
boundaries (Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President). Under the separation of
powers, the courts may not tread into matters requiring the exercise of
discretion of a functionary or office in the executive and legislative branches,
unless it is clearly shown that the government official or office abused his or its
discretion. In this case there is no showing that the PPA abused its
discretion in entering into the contract with MAFSICOR. Judge Veridiano
correctly concluded that there is no provision for the putting up of a
floating grains terminal in the PPA-MPSAcontract. All it covers are the
general services of stevedoring. While the operation of a floating grains
terminal may be considered as part and parcel of stevedoring as such
operation merely entails the mechanization of stevedoring, it was
considered by the PPA, in the exercise of its discretion, as necessary to
improve the services rendered in the South Harbor in the meantime that
no land-based bulk terminal is yet operational.
- There are actually instances when PD 1818 should not find application.
These are a) where there is clear and grave abuse of discretion b) where the
effect of the non-issuance of an injunction or a restraining order would be to
stave off implementation of a government project. In this case the operation
of a floating bulk terminal would augment and improve the over-all operations
at the port of Manila and/or stevedoring services awarded to MPSI.
- Another contention against the applicability of PD1818 is that MAFSICORis
a private entity. Such contention betrays a failure to comprehend the functions
of the PPA. One of the duties of the PPAis to provide services (whether on its
own, by contract or otherwise) within the Port Districts to make or enter
contracts of any kind or nature to enable it to discharge its functions under its
decree.
- Section 1 of PD1818 clearly states that an injunction may not be issued to
prevent any person or persons, entity or government official fromundertaking
the protected activities enumerated. The prohibition therefore applies
regardless of whether or not the entity or person being enjoined is a public or
private person or entity, provided that the purpose of the law to protect
essential government projects in pursuit of economic development is attained.
- court did not resolve main issues offered (such as the exclusivity of the PPA-
MPSI contract) for resolution therein which necessitates trial on merits.
However court took note of the allegations against two judges
Decision Petition on certiorari granted decision of the CAis reversed and set
aside.
IN RE: VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA
NARVASA; November 9, 1998
FACTS
- The Resolution of the Court En Banc, handed down on May 14, 1998, sets
out the relevant facts.
- Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief Justice are the appointments
signed by the President under date of March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court
of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively.
- received at the Chief Justices chambers on May 12, 1998
- view by Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Consultant of the
Council, who had been a member of the Committee of the Executive
Department and of the Committee on the Judicial Department of the 1986
Constitutional Commission: that on the basis of the Commissions records, the
electionbanhad no application toappointments tothe Court of Appeals.
Without any extended discussion or any prior research and study on the part of
the other Members of the JBC, this hypothesis was accepted, and was then
submitted to the President for consideration, together with the Councils
nominations for eight (8) vacancies in the Court of Appeals
- April 6, 1998: Chief Justice received an official communication from the
Executive Secretary transmitting the appointments of eight (8) Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals all of which had been duly signed on March
11, 1998 by the President
- In viewof the fact that all the appointments had been signed on March 11,
1998 - the day immediately before the commencement of the ban on
appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution - which
impliedly indicated that the Presidents Office did not agree with the hypothesis
that appointments to the Judiciary were not covered by said ban, the Chief
Justice resolved to defer consideration of nominations for the vacancy in the
Supreme Court created by the retirement of Associate Justice Ricardo J.
Francisco
- May 4, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter fromthe President, addressed to
the JBC, requesting transmission of the "list of final nominees" for the vacancy"
no later than Wednesday, May 6, 1998," in viewof the duty imposed on himby
the Constitution "to fill up the vacancy . . . within ninety (90) days fromFebruary
13, 1998, the date the present vacancy occurred."
- May 5, 1998: Secretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III requested the Chief
Justice for "guidance" respecting the expressed desire of the "regular
members" of the JBCto hold a meeting immediatelyto fill up the vacancy in the
Court in line with the Presidents letter . The Chief Justice advised Secretary
Bello to await the reply that he was drafting
- May 6, 1998: the Chief Justice sent his reply to the President-- stating that no
sessions had been scheduled for the Council until after the May elections
because of the "need to undertake further study of the matter," prescinding
from"the desire to avoid any constitutional issue regarding the appointment to
the mentioned vacancy"; delivered to Malacaang May 6, 1998, and a copy
given to the Office of Justice Secretary Bello
- Justice Secretary and the regular members of the Council had already taken
actionon May 6, 1998 they came to an agreement on a resolution: they drew
attention to Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution (omitting any mention
of Section 15, Article VII) as well as to the Presidents letter of May 4, with an
appeal that the Chief Justice convene the Council for the purpose "on May 7,
1998
- CJ convoked the Council to a meeting at 3 oclock in the afternoon of May 7,
1998
- May 7, 1998: Chief Justice received a letter fromPresident: "the election-ban
provision applies only to executive appointments or appointments in the
executive branch of government," the whole article being "entitled EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT.", "firmly and respectfully reiterate(d) . . . (his) request for the
Judicial and Bar Council to transmit . . . the final list of nominees for the lone
Supreme Court vacancy."
- May 8, 1998: Chief Justice replied: --Section 15 of Article VII imposes a direct
prohibition on the President which is the general rule, the only exception being
only as regards "executive positions"(judicial positions are covered by the
general rule)
- Section 4 (1) of Article VIII, unlike Section 15, Article VII, the duty of filling the
vacancy is not specifically imposed on the President
- normally, when there are no presidential elections Section 4 (1), Article
VIII shall apply but when (as now) there are presidential elections, the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII comes into play: the President shall
not make any appointments
- requesting the regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council to defer
action on the matter until further advice by the Court
- May 8, 1998: another meeting was held; closed with a resolution that "the
constitutional provisions be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc for
appropriate action
- May 12, 1998: Chief Justice received fromMalacaang the appointments of
two (2) Judges of the Regional Trial Court mentioned above; places on the
Chief Justice the obligation of transmitting the appointments to the appointees
so that they might take their oaths and assume the duties of their office (trouble
is that in doing so, the Chief Justice runs the risk of acting in a manner
inconsistent with the Constitution)
- the Court Resolved that pending the foregoing proceedings and the
deliberation by the court on the matter, and until further orders, no action be
taken on the appointments of Hon. Valenzuela and Hon. Vallarta which in the
meantime shall be held in abeyance and not given any effect and said
appointees shall refrain fromtaking their oath of office and the Judicial and Bar
Council is INSTRUCTEDto defer all action on the matter of nominations
- Valenzuela took his oath on May 14, 1998 -- In his "Explanation" he stated
that he did so because on May 7, 1998 he "received fromMalacaang copy of
his appointment . . ." which contained the following direction: "By virtue hereof,
you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office"
- The Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Section 15, Article VII:
"Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein prejudice public service or endanger public safety."
Section 4 (1), Article VIII:
"The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in divisions of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days fromthe
occurrence thereof ."
Section 9, Article VIII:
"The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be
appointed by the President froma list of at least three nominees prepared by
the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety
daysfromthe submission of the list."
ISSUE
WONduring the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill
vacancies in the judiciary, in viewof Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII
HELD
The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 were
unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Such appointments come
within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are
consideredto be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election.
Reasoning
- While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public
interest there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the
making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand,
there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made
within the period of the ban.
- Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required
to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless
prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII.
- journal of the commission which drewup the present Constitution discloses:
desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for
any substantial period as a result of vacancies, the insertion in the provision of
the same mandate that "INCASEOF ANYVACANCY, THESAMESHALL BE
FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." was
proposed
- Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those
made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first
refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists
of the so-called "midnight" appointments
- the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important
positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new
President. Such appointments, so long as they are "fewand so spaced as to
afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the
need for the appointment and the appointees qualifications," can be made by
the outgoing President
- The exception allows only themaking of temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the
President during the period of the ban.
- Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in
the courts and the restriction on the Presidents power of appointment, it is this
Courts view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former
should yield to the latter
- the Constitution must be construed in its entirety as one, single instrument;
instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during
the period of the ban, not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court.
- concerning Valenzuelas oath-taking and "reporting for duty"--
Standing practice is for the originals of all appointments to the Judiciary to be
sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice, the
appointments being addressed to the appointees "Thru: the Chief Justice,
Supreme Court, Manila." It is the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in the
Chief Justices behalf, who thereafter advises the individual appointees of their
appointments and also of the date of commencement of the pre-requisite
orientation seminar to be conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for
newJudges.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION V OCURT OF
APPEALS
MARTINEZ; July 23, 1998
FACTS
- Oil &Natural Gas Commission(petitioner)- a foreign corporation owned and
controlled by the Government of India
- Pacific Cement Company (respondent) -a private corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
- The two parties entered into a contract on Feb 26, 1983, where respondent
undertook to supply the petitioner (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement;
petitioner to pay ($477,300.00)
- The oil well cement was loaded on the ship MVSURUTANANAVAin Surigao
City, for delivery at Bombay and Calcutta, India.
- respondent had already received payment but failed to deliver the oil well
cement due to a dispute between the ship owner and respondent, the cargo
was held up in Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination
- so they just agreed that the private respondent will replace the entire 4,300
metric tons of oil well cement with Class "G" cement cost free. However, upon
inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform to the petitioners
specifications.
- The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its
claimto an arbitrator pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract
- July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator (Shri N.N. Malhotra) resolved the dispute
in petitioners favor
- Respondent- to pay $ 899,603.77 + 6%interest
- To enable the petitioner to execute the award, it filed a Petition before the
Court in India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of
Court" in India which the said court granted
- The plaintiff shall also be entitled to get fromdefendant US$899,603.77 with
9%interest per annumtill the last date of realization
- However, respondent refused to pay
- Petitioner filed a complaint to RTCof Surigao
- RTCand CAdismissed the complaint
ISSUES
1. WONthe arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner
and the private respondent under Clause 16 of the contract; phrased
differently, WON the non-delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for
arbitration under the above-quoted Clause 16
2. WONthe judgment of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction
HELD
1. YES. the correct interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in the
contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes arising fromor
relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials of the supply order/contract, and for Clause 15 to cover all other
claims or disputes.
- For the sake of argument, granted that the non-delivery of the oil well cement
is not a proper subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to
conformtothe specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling within the
ambit of Clause 16.
2. YES.
- This Court has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by
the lex fori or the internal lawof the forum. 32 Thus, if under the procedural
rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid judgment may be rendered
by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded respect
- if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court
becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees,
then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign
court simply because our rules provide otherwise
- the private respondent herein, as the party attacking a foreign judgment, has
the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity which it failed to do in
the instant case.
Decision Petition GRANTED
ART X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ABBAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CORTES; November 10, 1989
FACTS
- Petitioner Abbas, a representative of other taxpayers in Mindanao,
filed this petition to(1) enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of
Budget and Management fromreleasing funds to the COMELEC for
that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional
- The 1987 Constitution provides for regional autonomy through Article
X, section 15 which provides that "there shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
- To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by
this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
and representative of the constituent political units. The organic
acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family,
and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall,
within eighteen months from the time of organization of both
Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
MuslimMindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourismdevelopment;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions
shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies which shall
be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance
with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall
be the responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted
and signed into law on August 1, 1989.The present controversy
relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in
Mindanao and Palawan, scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao."
ISSUES
1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli
Agreement.
2 .WONR.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution.
HELD
1. No, RA 6743 does not conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
SCfinds it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on
the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the
Philippine Government whether under public international or internal
Philippine law. The Constitution itself provides for the creation of an
autonomous region in MuslimMindanao. The standard for any inquiry
into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so
provided inthe Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions
of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not
have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a
binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part
of the lawof the land. But as internal lawit would not be superior to
R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines,
rather it would be in the same class asthe latter.
2. No, R.A. No. 6734 does not violate 1987 Constitution.
a. Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates
an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted
provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make
the creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the
plebiscite.
The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over
for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall
take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second,
there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of
the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same
requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao
shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this
Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days
or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this
Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. Theprovinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote
for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the
autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority
of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities
wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and
R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there
shall be an autonomous region in MuslimMindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall
compromise it.
b. Equal protection of the lawPetitioner insists that R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities
of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and
nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence
in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics.
By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristic
as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the
scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has
prescribed to be limited.
Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the
standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional
criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share
common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislatures
discretion. Any reviewof this ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdomof the law. SC cannot do this without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The
guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the
classification having been made by Congress on the basis of
substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.
c. Free exercise of religion Petitioner questions the validity of R.A.
No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on
free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a
provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any
conflict between the MuslimCode [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code
(still be enacted) on the one had, and the national lawon the other
hand, the Shariah courts created under the same Act should apply
national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shariah) is
derived fromthe Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may
not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas
supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict
between provisions of the MuslimCode and national law, wherein an
application of national lawmight be offensive to a Muslims religious
convictions.
Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. [Art.
VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised,
an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. In the present
case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national lawresulting in
an alleged violation of religious freedom. The Court in this case may
not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential
conflict between the provisions the MuslimCode and national law.
TANO V SOCRATES
DAVIDE; August 21, 1997
FACTS
- special civil action for certiorari and prohibition praying to:
1. declare as unconstitutional:
(a) Ordinance No. 15-92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa
(b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued
by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and
(c) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19
February 1993, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan;
2. enjoin the enforcement thereof; and
3. restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City and Judges of the Regional Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan fromassuming jurisdiction over and hearing
cases concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.
- Ordinance No. 15-92
- took effect on January 1, 1993
- entitled: "ANORDINANCEBANNINGTHESHIPMENTOF ALL LIVEFISH
ANDLOBSTEROUTSIDEPUERTOPRINCESACITYFROMJANUARY1,
1993 TOJANUARY1, 1998 ANDPROVIDINGEXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES
ANDFOROTHERPURPOSESTHEREOF,"
- Purpose: to effectively free our water fromCyanide and other Obnoxious
substance
- unlawful for any person, business enterprise, company to ship out from
Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft
of any live fish (all alive, breathing not necessarily moving, used for foor and
for aquariumpurposes) and lobster except SEABASS(apahap), CATFISH
(hito-hito), MUDFISH(dalag), ANDMILKFISHFRIES.
- Penalty: fine of not more than P5,000.00, imprisonment of not more than
12 mos and/or cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of
Puerto Princesa
- Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993
- pursuant to City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74 (requirement of mayors
permit) and Ordinance No. 15-92 (banning of shipment of live fish and
lobster), authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections
on cargoes containing live fish and lobster to ascertain whether the shipper
possessed the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the
shipment is covered by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
- Resolution No. 33
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming fromPalawan waters
(mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant clams,
tiger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquariumfishes) for a period of five
years
- WHEREAS
- studies disclose only 5%of the corals of Palawan remain to be in
excellent condition
- cannot be gainsaid that destruction and devastation of the corals of our
province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like dynamite
fishing, sodiumcyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances
- need to protect and preserve the existence of the remaining excellent
corals and allowthe devastated ones to regenerate within 5 years
- RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) empowers the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties e.g. to dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing
- Ordinance No. 2
- prohibits catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment
of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms coming fromPalawan
waters (mameng, suno, panther/senorita, taklobo, mother of pearl, giant
clams, tiger prawn, loba/green grouper, tropical aquariumfishes) for a
period of five years
- Policy Considerations:
- Sec. 2-A(RA7160: policy of the state that subdivisions of the State
shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to be self-reliant
communities, more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization whereby local
government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.
- Sec. 5-A (RA 7160): Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local
Government Unit concerned
- Sec. 5-C (RA 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code
shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGU in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community.
- Sec. 16 (RA7160). Every LGUshall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare.
- Policy of the Province of Palawan: to protect and conserve the marine
resources of Palawan
- Penalty: fine of not more P5,000.00, and/or imprisonment of 6 mos to
12 mos and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalia
- Petitioners Allege:
- Ordinances deprived themof due process of law(no consultation), their
livelihood (all the fishermen of Palawan), and unduly restricted themfrom
the practice of their trade (Airline Shippers Association of Palawan), in
violation of Art XII Sec 2 (2) (3)
39
and Art XIII Sec 2
40
, 7
41
(1987).
- Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation or condition under which the
Mayors permit could be granted or denied (Mayor - absolute authority WON
to issue permit)
- Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without
any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing
method
- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways
- members of Airline Shippers Association were unduly prevented from
pursuing their vocation and entering contracts essential to carry out their
business endeavors to a successful conclusion
- if Ordinance No. 2 is null and void, TF criminal cases against Tano et al
have to be dismissed
- Interests of petitioners
- Tano et al: to prevent prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal
cases until constitutionality or legality of the said Ordinances they allegedly
violated shall have been resolved
- Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and 77 fishermen: declaratory relief
because Ordinances adversely affects them
ISSUES
1. WONSChas jurisdiction
2. WONOrdinances 15-92, Office Order 23, Ordinance 2 of Resolution 33 are
constitutional
HELD
1.NObecause there is clear disregard for hierarchy of courts and petitioners
have no cause of action BUT SC opt to resolve this case because of the
lifetime of the challenged Ordinances is about to end (1993-1998).
Reasoning
Petitioners Tano, et al WRT cause of action
- no cause of action because there is no showing that the petitioners filed a
Motion to Quash the information in their respective criminal cases that would
have this remedy proper therefore the petitioners cannot allege the lower
courts of having acted in excess of their jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion
39
Art XII Sec 2(2): TheStateshall protect thenations marinewealthinits archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, andexclusiveeconomiczone, andreserveitsuseandenjoyment exclusivelytoFilipinocitizens.
(3) The Congress may, by law, allowsmall-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fisherworks in rivers, lakes,
baysandlagoons.
40
Art XIII Sec 2: The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic
opportunitiesbasedonfreedomof initiativeandself-reliance.
41
Art XIII Sec 7: The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, andconservesuchresources. Theprotectionshall extendtooffshorefishinggrounds of
subsistencefishermenagainst foreignintrusion. Fisherworks shall receiveajust shareformtheir labor in
theutilizationof marineandfishingresources.
- If petitioners filed motion to quash information, it should have contained that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in
question are unconstitutional. BUT if their Motion to Quash was denied, the
remedy is not certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating special
defenses and if an adverse decision is rendered, an appeal should have been
the proper remedy. And if there is an exceptional circumstance where special
civil action for certiorari may be filed, the lower court must be accorded a
Motion for Reconsiderationto allowitself to correct any errors
Petitioners Airline Shipperset al WRT Declaratory Relief
- SCis not possessed of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved being settled that the SC merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions
People v Cuaresma
- There is after all hierarchy of courts. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policystrict adherence thereto in the
light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on the part of litigants and
lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writsdirectly
and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land...
Santiago v Vasques
- judicial policy that SCwill not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction
BUT, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of
powers under the newLGC relative to the protection and preservation of
the environment and are thus novel and or paramount importance. No
further delay then may be allowed.
2. YES, since it is settled that laws, including ordinances of LGUs enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and the petitioners did not present clear,
convincing and unequivocal evidence to overthrowthis assumption.
Reasoning
Peralta v COMELEC
- presumption of constitutionality of laws including ordinances of LGUs and
to overthrowthis presumption, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Subsistence or Marginal Fishermen
- There is no showing that any of the petitioners qualify as subsistence or
marginal fishermen
> Airline Shipping Association of Palawan: a private association
composed of marine merchants
> Virginia and Robert Lim: merchants
> the rest of petitioners: fishermen without any qualification to their status
- Since consti does not provide for the definition of subsistence or marginal
Marginal Fisherman
- Generally, an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or
reward in his harvest of fish is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the
cost of gathering fish
- Sec 13 RA7160 an individual engaged in subsistence fishing which shall
be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products
produced by himself and his immediate family
Subsistence Fishermen
- Generally, one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his
livelihood
Art XII Sec 2
- aimprimarily not to bestowany right of subsistence fishermen but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth
- provision merely recognizes priority to subsistence fishermen
Sec 149 of LGC
- only provision of law which speaks of preferential right of marginal
fishermen
Joint Administrative Order No. 3 (1996)
- prescribed guidelines concerning preferential treatment of small fisherfolk
relative to fishery right in Sec 149 but this case does not involve such
fishery right
Protection of the Environment v Right of Marginal Fishermen
Art XIII Sec 7
- speaks not only of communal marine and fishing resources but of their
protection, development, and conservation
Art XII Sec 2 (Regalian Doctrine)
- marine resources belong to the State and EDUshall be under full control
and supervision of the State
Constitutional Commission
- between Rodrigo and Bengzon
- marginal fishermen subject to rules and regulations and local laws
Oposa v Factoran
- even though balanced and healthful ecology is under Declaration of
Principles and State Policies it does not followthat is less important the civil
and political rights enshrined in the Bill of Rightsfor it concerns self-
preservation and self-perpetuationthis basic right need not be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind
Sec 16 LGC
- right of people to a balanced and healthful ecology in General Welfare
Clause
Realization of the General Welfare Clause, Decentralization and Exercise of
Police Power
Sec 5(c) LGC
- general welfare provisions of the LGCshall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to the LGU in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life
Fishery Laws
- that LGUmay enforce under Sec 17 in municipal water include
- PD704
- PD1015closed season
- PD 1219 exploration, exploitation, utilization, conservation of coral
resources
- PD5474unlawful to catch, sell, etc. ipon during closed season
- PD6451prohibits and punishes electrofishing
Memorandumof Agreement (1994)
- between Dept of Agriculture and DILG
- issuance of permits to construct fish cages, gather aquariumfishes, gather
kapis shells, gather/culture shelled mollusks, establish seaweed farms,
establish culture pearls, transports fish and fishery products and
establishment of closed season
RA7611 Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan Act
- comprehensive framework for sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
endangered environment of the province which shall serve to guide the local
government of Palawan nd the government agencies concerned in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting
Palawan
Principal Objectives of Ordinances
1) establish closed season for the species covered in the said ordinances
for a period of five years
2) to protect the corals in the marine waters of Puerto Princesa and
Palawan fromfurther destruction due to illegal fishing activities
Jurisdiction of BFARor LGU
- Bellosillo: Lack of authorityof Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to
enact Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the
jurisdiction and respoinsibility of BFAR (Fisheries and Aquatic Resources)
under PD704 otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for
lack of approval by the Secretary of DNR(Natl Res)
- Majority: BFARjurisdiction over management, conservation, development, etc
not all-encompassing; excludes municipal waters; BFARno longer under DNR,
now under DoA TF incorrect to challenge that ordinances unenforceable
because no approval of Sec of DENRbut of Sec of DoAinstead; BUT this can
be dispensed with because of Repealing Claus of LGC insofar as those
provisions are inconsistent and power to enact ordinances to enhance right of
people to a balanced ecology contained in the General Welfare Clause in the
LGC
Decision Petition dismissed for lack of merit and TROlifted
Voting 10 concur, 4 dissent, 1 on leave
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA [concur]
- fully concurs with the decision
- two important points: uphold presumption of validity of the ordinances in view
of total absence of evidence that undermine their factual basis ANDneed not
allowshortcircuiting of the normal process of adjudication on the mere plea that
unless we take cognizance of petitions like this, by-passing the trial courts,
alleged violations of constitutional rights will be left unprotected, when the
matter can be very well be looked into by trial courts and in fact it should be
brought there
BELLOSILLO [dissent]
- Lack of authority of Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to enact
Ordinance 15 Series of 1992 because supposed to be within the jurisdiction
and respoinsibility of BFAR(Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) under PD704
otherwise known as Fisheries Act of 1975 TF unenforceable for lack of
approval by the Secretary of DNR(Natl Res)
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO
CALLEJO; May 30, 2004
FACTS
- EO 48 issued by Pres. Estrada on 12/07/98 entitled Establishing a
Programfor Devolution Adjustment and Equalization:
Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fundwas created
DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the
Oversight Committee based on appraisal surveys by DILG
Oversight Committee(which was constituted under Local Govt Code of
1991) has been tasked to issue implementing rules and regulations
governing equitable allocation and distribution of the said fund to the
LGUs
- GAAof 1999In this General Appropriations Act, the programwas renamed
asLocal Govt Service Equalization Fund(LGSEF)
Php96.78Bwas the allotted share of the LGUs in the IRtaxes
Special Provisions included that the amount of Php5B shall be
earmarked for LGSEF, and it shall be released to the LGUs subject to
the IRR (Implementing Rules and Regulations) prescribed by the
Oversight Committee
Internal Revenue Allotment shall be released directly by the DBMto the
LGUs concerned
- OCDResolutionsOversight Committeeallocated Php5Bas follows:
Php2B in accordance with formula sharing scheme prescribed under
LGCof 1991
Php2Ballocated with a modified CODEF sharing scheme
Php1B to be earmarked to support local affirmative action projects and
other priority initiatives; proposals were to be submitted by the LGUs to
the Oversight Committee subject to its approval (OC prescribed a
Criteria for Eligibility)
- GAAof 2000Also contained a proviso earmarking Php5Bof the IRAfor the
LGSEF (similar to GAAof 1999)
Php3.5B shared by the LGUs using a percentage-sharing formula
agreed upon by the various Leagues of LGUs
Php1.5Bto be earmarked for projects, which are to be endorsed to and
approved by the Oversight Committee
- GAA of 2001 GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted and OC allocated
Php5BLGSEF as follows:
Php3Baccording to the modified codal formula
Php1.9Bis earmarked for priority projects
Php100Mfor capability building fund subject to OCs approval
- Procedure
Province of Batangas, represented by Gov. MANDANASfiled a petition for
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, and MANDAMUSto declare as unconstitutional
the assailed provisos in GAA of 99, 00, 01 and OCDResolutions and was
issued against Exec. Sec. ROMULO (Chairman of Oversight Committee on
Devolution), Sec. BONCODIN(Dept. of Budget and Mngmt.), and Sec. LINA
(DILG)
- Petitioners grounds
Violative of Sec.6 Art.10 of 1987 Consti (just share must be automatically
released to the LGUs)
Vesting the Oversight Committee with authority in determining
distribution and release of LGSEF is contrary to the principle of local
autonomy
Improper sharing scheme (provisos modified sec.285 of LGC) resulting
to an illegal amendment by the Executive branch of substantive law
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WONpetitioner has legal standing
2. WONpetition involves factual questions properly cognizable by lower courts
3. WONpetition has been rendered moot and academic
Substantive
4. WONassailed provisos violate constitutional provision on local autonomy
5. WONthe assailed provisos result to a proper amendment of sharing scheme
provided in LGC
HELD
1. Yes.
- The petitioner seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate its own
interests, which pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes (IRA).
The potential injury it stands to suffer is the diminution of its share in the IRA,
which is clearly a plain, direct and adequate interest.
2. No.
- It involves a legal question (on what is the proper legal interpretation)
which is to be settled by the SC. Also, the facts necessary to resolve the
issue need not be determined by a trial court since they are not disputed.
3. No.
- Even if the LGSEFfor 99, 00, and 01 have already been released, there is
still compelling reason for the SCto resolve substantive issues.
- Even in cases where supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to
resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
Obiter
- Sec.25 Art.2: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
- Sec.2 Art.10: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
- Presidents power over LGUs is one of general supervision, and this excludes
power of control. (Drilon v. Lim: The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them.)
- Autonomy is either DECENTRALIZATION of ADMINISTRATION or
decentralization of POWER.
- LOCAL AUTONOMY means a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a systemof decentralization. LGUs are
subject to regulation, however limited, for no other purpose than to enhance
self-government.
- Local autonomy includes both ADMINISTRATIVE(autonomy in the exercise
of its functions) and FISCAL AUTONOMY (power to create own sources of
revenue, in addition to equitable share in national taxes.)
4. Yes.
- Sec.6 Art.10mandates that -
o LGUs shall have a JUST SHAREin the NATIONAL TAXES
o Just share shall be DETERMINEDBYLAW
o Just share shall be AUTOMATICALLYRELEASEDto the LGUs
- As such, the LGUs are NOT required to performany act to receive the
just share accruingto themfromnational taxes(Sec.286 LGC: It shall be
released to them without need of further action.) The provision is
IMPERATIVE. Any retention is prohibited.
- Ratio To subject the distribution and release of the LGSEF to implementing
rules and regulations, including mechanisms prescribed by the OC, as
sanctioned by the provisos in the GAAs of 99, 00, 01 and the OCD
Resolutions makes the release NOT automatic, which violates the Constitution.
- OCexercising jurisdiction and control contradicts principle of local autonomy.
There is also NOSTATUTORYBASISfor this power since the OCwas created
merely to formulate rules and regulations for efficient implementation of the
LGC(only ad hoc character)
- As evident fromthe Con-Comdeliberations, the Automatic release provision
was intended to GUARANTEEprinciple of local autonomy.
5. No.
- The sharing scheme provided for in the LGCis fixed and may not be
reduced except in the event that the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit. (Sec.285 LGC: Provinces 23%,
Cities23%, Municipalities34%, Barangays20%)
- Congress may amend LGCbut should do so through a separate law,
and not just through an appropriations law.
Decision Petition granted.
Provisions relating to LGSEF declared unconstitutional.
Respondents are directed to rectify unlawful distribution of LGSEF.
Entire IRAto be released automatically without further action by LGUs.
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
PUNO; September 16, 1999
FACTS
- Special Civil Action in Supreme Court. of prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction.
- Petitioners are Miranda, mayor of Santiago City at time of filing of petition,
and residents of Santiago City (located in Province of Isabela)
- Respondents are executive, local government and budget secretaries, and
public officials of the province of Isabela
- Intervenor is winner of additional seat in provincial board brought about by the
reallocation.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA8528ANACT AMENDING
CERTAIN SECTIONS OF RA 7720(AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT
CITYTOBEKNOWNASTHECITYOF SANTIAGO.)
- The RAdeletes the word independent and treats Santiago City
just as a component city. Its territory and territorial jurisdiction remains
unchanged.
- Petitioners believe that this amounts to a conversion of Santiago
City and must therefore be decided by the citys citizens in a plebiscite, of
which the RAhas no provisions provided for. Respondents, on the other hand,
deemthat this is a mere reclassification.
ISSUES
1. WONissue isjusticiable
2. WONa plebiscite must be provided
HELD
1. RatioThe enumeration in Section 10, Article Xof the 1987 Constitution shall
include any material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit(s) directly affected.
- Petitioners have standing. The change will affect the powers of the mayor and
the votingexercise of residents.
- Not a political question. Petitioners claimthat under Sec. 10, Art. X of the
1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove RA 8528 in a
plebiscite before it can be enforced. The Court has the duty to ensure that
Congress complies with the Constitution in law-making.
2. RatioThe change fromindependent component city to component city shall
amount to a conversion which therefore requires a plebiscite as contemplated
in Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code.
- Sec. 10, Art. Xof the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided,
merged, or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
- Respondents emphasize that the change provided in the RA is not among
those enumerated in the foregoing provision. Moreover, the territory and
boundaries of Santiago City remained unchanged.
- But the ponente points out that there is a common denominator among those
enumerated in the provision all of themresult to a material change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected and
the people therein. The same applies to the present case.
- As the petitioners mentioned, the change of Santiago City fromindependent
component city tocomponent city will have the following effects:
Frombeing directly under the Office of the President, the city will be
reverted to the Provincial Government of Isabela, thereby increasing
its land area and subsequently increasing its share in the internal
revenue allotment.
Taxes which the city collects for its benefit will be redefined and may
be shared with the province.
Allocation of operating funds will nowcome fromthe Province which
amounts to a decrease in the citys funds.
Registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as
provincial officials
City officials, especially the mayor, will nowbe under the control of
the Provincial Governor
Resolutions and ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod will now
be subject to reviewof theSangguniang Panlalawigan
- Clearly this amounts to a conversion if not a downgrade of Santiago City.
- Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it
provides that:
- (f) Plebiscite (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs shall take effect unless approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU
or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the lawor ordinance prescribing such action, unless said lawor
ordinance fixes another date.
Decision Petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to desist fromimplementing said law.
Voting10 concur; 4 dissent
TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY
MELENCIO-HERRERA; January 29, 1987
FACTS
- Residents and taxpayers of Butuan City with Torralba, a member of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the same city contend that Batas Pambansa
(BP) 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur,
violated Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 Constitution: No province, city, municipality,
or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject tothe approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. Petitioners argue that under the
said provision, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine
the criteria of the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of the boundary of any province, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local
Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP56 was passed,
the statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent
Municipality was created. Hence, it is null and void.
- The Local Government Code was enacted only on 10 February 1983 so that
when BP56 was enacted, the Code was not yet in existence. Aplebiscite had
also been conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the
creation of the new Municipality, who expressed approval thereof; and that
officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and had
assumed there respective positions as such.
ISSUE
WONBPBlg 56 is unconstitutional.
HELD
- No. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment
did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create
municipal corporations. Sec. 3, Art. 11 of the 1973 does not prohibit the
modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the
Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government
Code is a condition sine qua non for creating a newmunicipality, in much the
same way that creating a newmunicipality does not preclude the enactment of
a Local Government Code. What the constitutional provision means is that the
once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local
government units should conform to the criteria thus laid down. In the
interregnum, before the enactment of such code, the legislative power remains
plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be
approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
- The creation of the newMunicipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A
plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed
and approved the creation of the new local government unit. Further, it is a
long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is
essentially legislative in nature. Absent any constitutional limitations, a
legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more
efficient administration of government. The creation of the newmunicipality of
Sibagat was a valid exercise of the legislative power then vested by the 1973
Constitution in the InterimBatasang Pambansa.
TAN V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
ALAMPAY; July 11, 1986
FACTS
- A plebiscite was held on January 3, 1986 which divided the province of
Negros Occidental into twoNegros del Norte and Negros Occidental.
- The petitioners, residents of the province of Negros Occidental, challenge the
constitutionality of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the act which created Negros
del Norte. The said law provides that some cities fromthe island of Negros
would be separated in order to create the new province, subject to a
concurrence of the majority in a plebiscite.
- The petitioners contend that the act is not in accord with the Local
Government Code as in Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that a plebiscite be held in the unit or units affected. The
petitioners said that Negros Occidental is a unit affected by the creation of the
newprovince, thus, they should be allowed to vote. Also, they contend that the
minimum requirement of 3500 square kilometers for the creation of a new
province (as provided by the Local Government Code) has not been complied
since the Negros del Norte is only comprised of 2856.56 square kilometers.
They pray that the plebiscite be declared null and void, and that the Court order
the COMELEC to conduct another plebiscite which includes Negros
Occidental.
- The respondents, meanwhile, argue that the termunit or units affected does
not include Negros Occidental. As such, they cited a Paredes vs. Executive
Secretary, where the court ruled that only the members of the newly created
barangay are allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Also, they contend that Negros
del Norte actually is comprised of 4,019.95 square kilometers, thus, it has met
the requirement of the LGC. Lastly, they argue that since the plebiscite has
already happened, the case is moot and academic.
ISSUES
1. WONthe case is moot and academic
2. WONthe act complied with the constitutional requirements
HELD
1. No. The case cannot be truly viewed as moot and academic. The legality of
the plebiscite itself is being challenged by the petitioners. The Court has the
duty to repudiate acts which run counter to the Constitution, done by whatever
branch of government.
2. No.
Plebiscite
- The province of the Negros Occidental should be allowed to vote in the
plebiscite. It is clear that they are part of the units affected by the creation of
the newprovince, it being the parent province.
- The case cited by the petitioners, Paredes vs. Executive Secretary, is
different with the case at bar. It merely includes the division of a barangay, the
smallest political unit. This case refers to a division of the largest political unit, a
barangay, thus there will be more problems involved. The Court also looked at
the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos in that case, which mimics they
decision of the Court in this case.
- Looking at Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, the bill wherein BP Blg. 885
originated, it clearly said that a plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas
affected. BP Blg. 885, on the other hand, says that a plebiscite shall be
conducted in the proposed newprovince which are the areas affected. The
Court found nolegal basis for the change.
- The Court also declared the pronouncement in Paredes vs Executive
Secretary is abandoned.
- However, the act being unconstitutional, the Court cannot direct the conduct
of a newplebiscite, there being no legal basis to do so.
Minimumarea requirement
- Upon examining the certification issued by the Provincial Treasurer, the new
province, at most, has a land area of only 2765.4 square kilometers.
Respondents contention that the termland area is meant to include not only
land, but water also cannot be appreciated. The Court looked at the last
sentence of the first paragraph of Sec 197 of the LGCwhich states that the
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands. It is clear
that the use of the word territory has reference only to land mass since it
speaks of territory not needing to be contiguous or adjacent to each other.
Decision Petition granted. BP Blg. 885 declared unconstitutional. The
plebiscite is void as well as the proclamation of Negros del Norte as a new
province and the appointment of its newofficials.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE
- congratulated the Court in its unanimity in the decision.
- Additional facts: Act was approved in deep secrecy and inordinate haste in
the last day of session, Dec 3, 1985. Though the act provided that a plebiscite
be conducted 120 days its approval, but the plebiscite was held in Jan 3, 1986.
The petitioners filed the case in Dec 23, 1985, even as no printed copies of the
Act were available, since its has not been published. Since it was Christmas
break at that time, the petition was only acted upon by the Court only on
January 7, 1986, after the plebiscite has been held.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
CORTES; January 29, 1990
FACTS
- Note Read first sec. 15-21, Art. Xof the 1987 Constitution for this case.
- The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July 15,1987, which
created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary ground
that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress (see sec. 18,
Art. X) and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional
on the approval of the act through a plebiscite.
- Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her
legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the
Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra,
Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of
Baguio [secs. 1 and2].
- It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras [sec.
3].
- Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local
government units as well as with the executive departments of the National
Government in the supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning,
monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region [sec. 5)].
- It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local
government projects in the region.
- The CARshall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy formulating
body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm(secs. 7, 8 and
10].
- The CARand the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time
as the autonomous regional government is established and organized [sec.
17].
- Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas"
clause provides:
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment
of the organic act for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent
need, in the interest of national security and public order, for the President
to reorganize immediately the existing administrative structure in the
Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein and the
Governments legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-
empt the constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation
of an autonomous region on a permanent basis.
- During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was
enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes the CARand the offices and
agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its transitory nature.
ISSUE
1. WONEONo. 220 is unconstitutional because it pre-empts the enactment of
an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in
the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the said organic act through a
plebiscite
2. WONEONo. 220 created a newterritorial and political subdivision with CAR
3. WONthe creation of the CARcontravened the constitutional guarantee of
the local autonomy for the provinces
HELD
1. EO. No. 220 is constitutional.
- Petitioners assertions that the President has pre-empted Congress fromits
mandated task of enacting said organic act.
- EONo. 220 does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the
Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
short, it prepares the ground for autonomy.
- The President is actingon a contingency. The complex procedure in Art. X
of the Constitution will take time.
o The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first
Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some
measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the
meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the
autonomous region created.
- The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as
petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interimautonomous region in
the Cordilleras."
o EO No. 220 created a region, covering a specified area, for
administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the
planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and
5].
o The bodies created byE.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local
governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government
agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella"
that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of
the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and
non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur
development in the Cordilleras.
- The Congress was convened. It enacted Republic Act No. 6658, which
created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. (per Sec. 18, Art.
X). The President then appointed its members.
o The commission prepared a draft organic act, which became the
basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic
act for the Cordillera autonomous region, which was signed into law
on October 23, 1989.
o A plebiscite for the approval of the organic act, to be conducted
shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution, in the
meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than
two years and despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras is still to be created. Events have shown that petitioners
fear that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
2. It did not create a newterritorial and political subdivision or merge existing
ones into a larger subdivision.
- The CARis not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and
municipalities.
o Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public
corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own
and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of
revenue, etc.
o As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered
areas.
- Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the
CARand the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the
indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government,
the CAR may be considered more than anything else as a regional
coordinating agency of the National Government, similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under the Constitution
(Art. X, see. 14).
o These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices, and
representatives from non-governmental organizations within the
region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen
the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and
social growth and development of theunits in the region."
3. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions.
Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government
with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and property lawjurisdiction
in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
- The concept of local autonomy:
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy
in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v.
Subido, G.R. No. L31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA11.]
The CARis a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare
the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the
resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent
territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or
administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with
political autonomy.
Decision Petition to declare EONo. 220 as unconstitutional isDISMISSEDfor
lack of merit.
Voting All 15 justices concurred with J. Gutierrez, Jr. concurring in the result
since for himthe issue has become moot and academic because Republic
Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766 superseded the assailed EOalready.
ORDILLO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GUTIERREZ; December 4, 1990
FACTS
- January 30, 1990, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region, the people
of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite.
- Results of plebiscite: approved by majority of 5,889 votes in Ifugao, rejected
by 148,676 in the rest provinces and city. The province of Ifugao makes up
only 11%of total population, and as such has the second smallest number of
inhabitants, of the abovementioned areas.
- February 14, 1990, COMELECissued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the
Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of
votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. Secretary of Justice also issued a
memorandumfor the President reiterating COMELEC resolution, stating that
Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably then. Alone, legally
and validly constitutes CAR.
- March 8, 1990, Congress ebacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting elections in
CARof Ifugao on first Monday of March 1991.
- Even before COMELECresolution, Executive Secretary issued February 5,
1990 a memorandumgranting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera
Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive
Order No. 220.
- March 30, 1990, President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring
among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional
Assembly and all offices under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in
viewof the ratification of Organic Act.
- Petitioners: there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one
province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said
Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
- Petitioners therefore pray that the court:
a. declare null and void COMELECresolution No. 2259, the memorandum
of the Secretary of Justice, Administrative Order No. 160, and Republic
Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds for the purpose
b. declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still
in force and effect until another organic lawfor the Autonomous Region
shall have been enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by
the voters in the constituent units.
ISSUE
WONthe province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for
the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such region.
HELD
- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
a. The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that
region is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
region used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of
the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the
sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional
provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
b. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera
Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the
sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.
- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region.
- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of
having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set
of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers
over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest
provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art
V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA6766)
- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial
organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a
lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]
- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials coming fromdifferent
provinces and cities in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the
development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI
sec 3; Art VII; Art XVRA6766)
- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELECwould not
only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
but would be impractical and illogical.
Decision Petition (both a and b) granted.
BASCO V PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT GAMING
CORPORATION
PARAS; May 14, 1991
FACTS
- Petitioners are taxpayers and practicing lawyers. Petitioner Basco is the
Chairperson of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila. On July
1981 PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law
- Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of PD1869 and they pray for its
annulment based on the ff. grounds:
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person willing right
recognized bylaw. It waived the Manila City governments right to impose
taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law.
"B. The lawhas intruded into the local governments right to impose local
taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally
enshrined principle of local autonomy.
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
legalizes PAGCOR - conducted gambling. while most other forms of
gambling are outlawed. together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other
vices;
"C. It violates the avowed trend of the government away frommonopolistic
and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.
ISSUES
1. WONpetitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD
1869
2. WONPD1869 violates the principle of local autonomy of Manila
3. WONPD1869 violates the equal protection clause
HELD
1. Yes, petitioners have standing to question and seek the annulment of PD
1869.
- Considering the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping
with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or riot
the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition.
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the
cases before the Supreme Court, it holds that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of themhas sustained or is in danger
of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures
complained of." And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the
requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.
2. No, PD1869 does not violate the local autonomy of Manila with regard to its
exemption clause.
a. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation hits no inherent
right to impose taxes. Its "power to tax" must always yield to a legislative
act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has
the "inherent power to tax"
b. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. The
City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 197.5, the power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of "franchise. licenses or permits" was withdrawn by
P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government.
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses
or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand
or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses
or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
3. No, PD1869 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
- The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse
racing (R-A. 306 as amended by RA983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races
(RA1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions. while
others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one.
unconstitutional.
JUDGE LEYNES V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CORONA; December 11, 2003
FACTS
- Petitioner is the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calapan City,
Oriental Mindoro, was formerly assigned in the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental
Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court.
- His salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were
drawn from the budget of the Supreme Court. In addition, he received a
monthly allowance fromthe local funds of the Municipality of Naujan starting
1984.
- March 15, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No.
057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget
Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance
by the municipality to petitioner judge.
- May 7, 1993- the Sangguniang Bayan unanimously approved Resolution 101,
increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance starting May 1993.
- February, 17, 1994- Provincial Auditor Salvacion M. Dalisay sent a letter to
the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan directing themto
stop the payment of the monthly allowance and to require the immediate refund
of the amounts previously paid. Her directive was based on the following:
1. Section 36, RANo.7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993
2. National Compensation Circular No. 67 of the Department of Budget
and Management
- Petitioner Judge appealed to Commission on Audit, Regional Director upheld
opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and added that Resolution No. 101 Series
of 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan failed to comply with Section 3 of
the Local Budge Circular No. 53 outlining the conditions for the grant of the
allowances to judges and other national officials or employees by the local
government units.
- Petitioner judge appealed the unfavorable resolution of the Regional Director
to the Commission on Audit.
- September 14, 1999- Commission on Audit issued its decision affirming
Resolution of the Regional Director.
1. the main issue is whether or not the municipality can validly provide
RATAto its municipal judge
2. Section 36 of RA7645 states:
- Payable fromthe programmed/appropriated amount and others from
personal services savings of the respective offices where the officials
or employees drawtheir salaries;
- Not exceeding the rates prescribed by the Annual General
Appropriations Act;
- Officials/amployees on detail with other offices or assigned to serve
other offices or agencies shall be paid fromtheir parent agencies
- No one shall be allowed to collect RATAfrommore than one source.
3. The municipal government may provide additional allowances and
other benefits to judges and other national government officials or
employees assigned or stationed in the municipality, provided, that
the finances of the municipality allow the grant thereof pursuant to
Section 447, Par. 1 RA 7160, and provided further that similar
allowances/additional compensation are not granted by the national
government to the official/employee assigned to the local government
unit as provided under Section 3(e) of local Budget Circular No. 53.
4. Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 101 is null and void. The
Honorable Judge Tomas C. Leynes, being a national government
official is prohibited to receive additional RATA from the local
government fund pursuant to Section 36 of the General
Appropriations Act and National Compensation Circular No. 67.
- Position of Commission on Audit
> The municipality could not grant RATA to judges in addition to the RATA
already received fromthe Supreme Court
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67
- the RATA of national officials and employees shall be payable from
the programmed appropriations or personal services savings of the
agency where such officials or employees drawtheir salary and
- no one shall be allowed to collect RATAfrommore than one source
2. General Appropriations Act of 1993 (RA7645)
- the RATAof national officials shall be payable fromthe programmed
appropriations of their respective offices
3. Local Budget Circular No. 53
- prohibits local government units fromgranting allowances to national
government officials or employees stationed in their localities when
such allowances are also granted by the national government or are
similar to the allowances granted by the national government to such
officials or employees
- Position of Petitioner
> Municipality is expressly and unequivocally empowered by RA 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991) to enact appropriation ordinances granting
allowances and other benefits to judges stationed in its territory.
> DBMcannot amend or modify a substantive lawlike the Local Government
Code 1991 through mere budget circulars.
ISSUE
WONJudge Leynes can validly receive allowance frommunicipality
HELD
- Ratio When a national official is on detail with another national agency, he
should get his RATA only fromhis parent national agency and not fromthe
other national agency he is detailed to.
-Respondent COAerred in opposing the grant of the monthly allowance by the
Municipality of Naujan to petitioner Judge Leynes
- Reasoning
RA7645 is amended by NCCNo. 67. No, administrative circular cannot
supersede, abrogate, modify, or nullify astatute.
The Constitution guarantees the principle of local autonomy
- Article 10, Section 2
An ordinance must be presumed valid in the absence of evidence
showing that it is not in accordance with the law.
ART XI: ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS
FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PER CURIAM; September 27, 2005
FACTS
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. vs. The House Committee on Justice, represented by
Its Chairman, Rep. Simeon Datumanong, The House of Representatives,
represented by Its Speaker, Rep. Jose de Venecia and President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo
MINUTERESOLUTION
- Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 13 September 2005: DENIEDWITH
FINALITYas no substantial arguments were presented to warrant the reversal
of the questioned resolution
- Urgent Motion for Consolidation dated 24 September 2005 DENIEDfor lack
of merit
- Letter dated 26 September 2005 NOTEDWITHOUT ACTION
FRANCISCO V NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC.
CARPIO-MORALES; November 10, 2003
FACTS
- Art 11, Sec 8 Constitution Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this Section.
- November 2001 - 12
th
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted
and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) superseding the Rules approved by 11
th
Congress
> Section 16. Impeachment Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In cases
where a Member of the House files a verified complaint of impeachment
or a citizen files a verified complaint that is endorsed by a Member of the
House through a resolution of endorsement against an impeachable
officer, impeachment proceedings against such official are deemed
initiated on the day the Committee on Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against such official, as the case may be, is
sufficient in substance, or on the date the House votes to overturn or
affirmthe finding of the said Committee that the verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may be, is not sufficient in substance. In cases
where a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the Members
of the House, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated at the time
of the filing of such verified complaint or resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.
> Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of Impeachment Proceedings.
Within a period of one (1) year fromthe date impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated as provided in Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be initiated against the same official.
- July 2002 House of representatives adopted a Resolution directing
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation in aid of legislation on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Judiciary Development Fund
- June 2003 Pres. Estrada filed the first impeachment complaint against
Davide and 7 associate justices for culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes; endorsed by Rep. Suplico,
Zamora, and Dilangalen House Committee on Justice dismissed the
complain because insufficient in substance
- October 2003 Rep. Teodoro and Fuentebella filed second impeachment
complaint founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry; resolution of
endorsement/impeachment was signed by at least 1/3 of all the members of
the House of Representatives
ISSUES
1. WONissue is justiciable
2. WON Rules of Procedure for Impeachment Proceedings adopted by 12
th
Congress is constitutional and second impeachment complaint is valid
HELD
1. Justiciable. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of
impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
judicially discoverable standards for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion through power of judicial review.
o Locus standi - Case is of transcendental pubic importance.
o Ripe for adjudication - the second complaint had been filed and the
2001 rules had been promulgated and enforced.
o Lis mota - (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12
th
Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
o Judicial Restraint not an option because the Court is not legally
disqualified; no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred.
2. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of
Article XI of the Constitution.
o Interpretation of the terminitiate takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by filing by at least 1/3 of the members of
the HRwith the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Sec
3 (5) of Art XI becomes clear.
o Sec 3 (5) of Article XI once an impeachment complains has been
initiated, another complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a period of one year.
o Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings aredeemedinitiated(1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance
or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the terminitiate a meaning different meaning fromfiling and referral.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DACOYCOY
PARDO; April 29, 1999
FACTS
- Respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy was charged with habitual drunkenness,
misconduct and nepotismbefore the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly,
the Commission conducted a formal investigation, and thereafter, promulgated
its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of habitual
drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Commission found respondent
guilty of nepotismon two counts as a result of the appointment of his two sons,
Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their
assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational
School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on
himthe penalty of dismissal fromtheservice.
- The Commission denied respondents motion for reconsideration.
- Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari
with preliminary injunction to set aside the Civil Service Commissions
resolutions. The Court of Appeals then reversed and set aside the decision of
the Civil Service Commission, ruling that respondent did not appoint or
recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence, was not guilty of nepotism.
The Court of Appeals further held that it is "the person who recommends or
appoints who should be sanctioned, as it is he who performs the prohibited
act." It likewise declared null and void the Civil Service Commissions
resolution dismissing himfromthe service.
- The Commission then filed an appeal viaceriorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. WONrespondent is guilty of nepotism
2. WONthe Commission is the "party adversely affected by the decision" of
the Court of Appeals who may file an appeal therefrom
HELD
1. YES
- Under the definition of nepotism(Section 59 of Executive Order 292), one is
guilty of nepotismif an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
- the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or
recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that
an appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the
person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
- Respondent is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. He did not appoint or recommend his two
sons to the positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades. It was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of
the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of Rito. Mr. Daclags authority
to recommend the appointment of first level positions such as watchmen,
security guards, drivers, utility workers, and casuals and emergency laborers
for short durations of three to six months was recommended by respondent
Dacoycoy and approved by DECSRegional Director Eladio C. Dioko, with the
provision that such positions shall be under Mr. Daclags immediate
supervision. Atty. Victorino B. Tirol II, Director III, DECS Regional Office VIII,
Palo, Leyte, appointed Rito Dacoycoy driver of the school. Mr. Daclag also
appointed Ped Dacoycoy as casual utility worker. However, it was respondent
Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available for the proposed appointment
of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated his performance as very satisfactory. On
the other hand, his son Ped stated in his position description formthat his
father was his next higher supervisor. The circumvention of the ban on
nepotismis quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He
authorized Mr. Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees
under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the
appointment of respondents two sons and placed themunder respondents
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both
positions are career positions.
- To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was
behind the appointing or recommending authority in the appointment of his two
sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism.
- Nepotismis one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of
its personnel. The basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against
nepotism also strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a
comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of
the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive. If not within
the exceptions, it is a formof corruption that must be nipped in the bud or
bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier
case "what we need nowis not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the
outstanding civil servants, but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of
corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal
procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the
law."
2. YES
- There is no question that respondent Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of
Appeals fromthe decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He
was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal fromthe service.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court required the petitioner therein,
here respondent Dacoycoy, to implead the Civil Service Commission as public
respondent as the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
- Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Civil Service
Commission and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who nowmay appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the
respondent, who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant
George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the government. Consequently,
the Civil Service Commission has become the party adversely affected by such
ruling, which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence, as an
aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. By this ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule
extant jurisprudence that "the phrase party adversely affected by the
decision refers to the government employee against whomthe administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the formof
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from
office" and not included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more then thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days
salary" or "when the respondent is exonerated of the charges, there is no
occasion for appeal." In other words, we overrule prior decisions holding
that the Civil Service Law"does not contemplate a reviewof decisions
exonerating officers or employees fromadministrative charges."
- The Court of Appeals reliance on Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, to
support its ruling is misplaced. The issues in Debulgado are whether a
promotional appointment is covered by the prohibition against nepotismor the
prohibition applies only to original appointments to the civil service, and
whether the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and
disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner after the
Commission had earlier approved that appointment. Debulgado never even
impliedly limited the coverage of the ban on nepotismto only the appointing or
recommending authority for appointing a relative. Precisely, in Debulgado, the
Court emphasized that Section 59 "means exactly what it says in plain and
ordinary language: x x x The public policy embodied in Section 59 is clearly
fundamental in importance, and the Court had neither authority nor inclination
to dilute that important public policy by introducing a qualification here or a
distinction there."
Decision Petition granted. The Court of Appeals decision is reversed and the
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are revived and affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [dissent and concur]
- Although I completely agree with the result and likewise with the wisdomin
which the issues relating to nepotismare threshed out in the majority opinion, I
do not agree with the majority opinion stating that the Civil Service Commission
may appeal a judgment of exoneration in an administrative case involving
nepotism. And Mr. Justice Puno would go further by allowing even a private
complainant and by implication, a complainant office, to appeal a decision
exonerating or absolving a civil service employee of charges against, or even
imposing a penalty upon him. This totally contravenes our well-settled ruling in
several cases.
- The Court of Appeals exonerated respondent Dacoycoy of the charge of
nepotism. From such adverse decision, the Civil Service Commission,
through its Office for Legal Affairs, interposed the present appeal by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under
existing laws and jurisprudence this is not allowed, so this Court ruled in the
above-cited cases. If this point is not stressed by the Court, the present
decision might be misconstrued as a watering down of the settled doctrine.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
- A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as The Philippine Civil
Service Law shows that said lawdoes not contemplate a reviewof decisions
exonerating officers or employees fromadministrative charges.
- Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides:
- "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more that thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or
salary or transfer, removal or dismissal fromoffice."
- Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D.
805 (should be 807) which contemplates:
"Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision."
- The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the
government employee against whomthe administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The
remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the respondent is
found guilty of the charges against him. But when the respondent is exonerated
of said charges, as in the case, there is no occasion for appeal.
- Based on the above provision of law, appeal to the Civil Service Commission
in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the
decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted
out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal fromoffice. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and
not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed
within fifteen days fromreceipt of the decision.
- It is my submission that the prerogative to now determine whether this
practice of disallowing appeals in cases of exoneration should still continue or
not, exclusively belongs to Legislature. The Court cannot and should not
arrogate this policy-making power of Congress unto itself, not even in the guise
of the exercise of its expanded power of judicial review under the 1987
Constitution. Only Congress has authority to remedy inadequacies in the
wisdomof a law, should it find any, especially when the definite intention of the
existing lawwas to disallowthe State to appeal fromjudgments of exoneration.
Any attempt by the Court to transgress this most basic principle in the
separation of powers between these two branches of government would to my
mind, result in the abhorrent act of judicial legislation.
- Effective June 1, 1995, Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 ordained
that, appeals from awards, judgments or final orders or resolutions of or
authorized by any quasi-judicial agency (which includes the Civil Service
Commission) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions shall be taken by
filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although in
general, appeal by certiorari froma judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals may be filed via a verified petition for reviewon certiorari with
this Court (where pure questions of law, distinctly set forth therein, may be duly
raised), an appeal involving a judgment or final order of the Court of Appeals
exonerating a government employee in an administrative case, in particular,
falls within the ambit of the provisions of Section 39, paragraph (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 807. It is elementary that a special law such as
Presidential Decree No. 807 takes precedence over general rules of procedure
such as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. No appeal may, therefore, be taken
under Rule 45.
- Moreover, it is recognized in our jurisdiction that an administrative case which
could result in the revocation of license, or similar sanctions like dismissal from
office, constitutes a proceeding which partakes of a criminal nature. Being
such, provisions of lawpertaining thereto must perforce be construed strictly
against the State, just as penal laws are strictly construed strictly against the
State. Any ambiguity, should there be any, must be resolved in favor of the
respondent in the administrative case. The term "party adversely affected"
should not be construed as to include the State in administrative charges
involving nepotism.
- To allowappeals fromdecisions, be they exonerative or otherwise, against
civil service employees would, to my mind, be stocking the stakes too much
against our civil servants. It should be noted in this regard that the greater bulk
of our government workers are ordinary people, working under supervision
and, more often than not, exposed to political pressure and the influence of
peddlers of power. Their simple status notwithstanding, they are not easily
cowed and intimidated. Many, though, are threatened with complaints, transfer
of station, or demotion, if they refuse to do the bidding of some unscrupulous
superiors or politicians. I can, therefore, understand why the law and our
jurisprudence disallow appeal by the complainant from decisions in
administrative cases, be they exonerative or otherwise. Verily, an employee
may be hounded into spending up to his last resources and losing his self-
respect and honor by successive appeals.
- What will happen, if for instance, the respondent government employee is
initially exonerated or given a light penalty, and the complainant may appeal,
insisting that the employee is guilty or that he deserves a heavier penalty? And,
if the Civil Service Commission thereafter metes out a penalty not to the liking
of the complainant, the matter may still be elevated to the Court of Appeals or
even this Court? Where else will all this end, if not in the physical and financial
exhaustion of the respondent civil servant? Again, I wish to stress that I speak
here of the ordinary employees. The big shots in government who commit
wrongs may somehow hereby benefit, but then we shall be content in
concluding that we decided in favor of the many, that the good of the majority
prevailed.
- A judgment of exoneration by the Court of Appeals, as in the case of a
judgment of exoneration by the Civil Service Commission or the nowdefunct
Merit SystemProtection Board, may indeed prove to be truly adverse to the
government agency concerned and eventually to the State as a whole. This is
especially so when there had been lapses in the interpretation and/or
application of the lawas in the present case. This notwithstanding, the right to
appeal, which is merely statutory may not be invoked, much less exercised,
when the lawdoes not provide any. Again, until and unless Congress exercises
its prerogative to amend such law, this Court is bound by it and has no other
recourse except to apply the same. Fortunately for petitioner but not so for
respondent, the latter failed to invoke the foregoing general rule. In a similar
case, we held that the party favored by such law who fails to interpose any
objection to an appeal may be deemed to have waived this right.
- Premises considered and with the above observations, I vote to grant the
petition as stated in the dispositive thereof.
PUNO [concur]
- Appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended
to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person of the
respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for
more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary,
demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal fromoffice. The
decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil
Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not
more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary.
Appeal in cases allowed by lawmust be filed within fifteen days fromreceipt of
the decision.
- It is axiomatic that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
- By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a
case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him. But
when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this case, there is no
occasion for appeal.
- The phrase party adversely affected by the decision refers to the
government employee against whomthe administrative case is filed for the
purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal fromoffice.
- With humility, I make the submission that is time to strike down the doctrine
disallowing appeals to the Civil Service Commission when the decision
exonerates a government official or employee froman administrative charge.
The doctrine is principally based on a constrictedinterpretation of Section 39 of
P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law) which states:
Sec. 39. (a) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affectedby the decision within fifteen days fromreceipt of the
decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which
petition shall be decided within fifteen days. x x x
- According to Paredes, Mendez and Magpale, the phrase party adversely
affected by the decision refers alone to the respondent government official or
employee against whomthe administrative case is filed. They excluded fromits
compass the party complainant whose charge is dismissed. Hence, when the
respondent government official or employee is exonerated, the decision is
deemed final as the party complainant isprecluded fromappealing.
- I find it difficult to agree with the above interpretation which is not only too
narrowbut is subversive of the essence of our civil service law. In the case at
bar, private respondent is the Vocational Administrator of the Balicuatro
College of Arts and Trades. His charged with the offense of nepotismfor the
appointment of two sons as driver and utility worker under his immediate
control and supervision. It is beyond argument that nepotismis prohibited by
our civil service lawfor it breeds inefficiency, if not corruption, in government
service. The critical question, therefore, is: who has the standing to prevent the
violation of this lawand protect public interest? I submit that a taxpayer has the
standing to bring suit to void nepotic acts for he has an interest that
appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness x x x. Ataxpayer has a right to good government and good government
cannot result fromappointments determined by bloodlines. The Civil Service
Law itself recognizes that there are offenses which can be the subject of a
complaint by any private citizen. Thus, Section 37 of the lawallows anyprivate
citizen to file a complaint against a government official or employee directly
with the Commission. Section 38 also recognizes that administrative
proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by
the head of the department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors or upon sworn written
complaint of any other persons. The general rule is that one who has a
right to be heard has standing to seek reviewof any ruling adverse to
him. Hence, if a private citizen has the right to file an administrativecomplaint,
he must also have the right to appeal a dismissal of his complaint, unless the
lawclearly precludes his right of appeal for indubitable policy reasons. A
contrary rule will diminish the value of the right to complain. The cases of
Paredes, Mendez and Magpale do not give any policy reasons why the
dismissal of a charge of nepotismcannot be appealed. They merely resort to
doubtful inferences in justifying the bar to appeals. Such an approach goes
against the rule that preclusions of judicial reviewof administrative action . . .
is not lightly to be inferred.
- In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by
the Civil Service Law. For what the lawdeclares as "final" are decisions of
heads of agencies involving suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an
amount not exceeding 30 days salary. But there is a clear policy reasons for
declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They
are numerous for they are the usual offenses committed by government
officials and employees. To allow their multiple level appeal will doubtless
overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative system and
defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative
agencies. Nepotism, however, is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect
on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a stubborn evil. The
objective shouldbe to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions
allowing nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially
judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to contend that since some decisions
exonerating public officials fromminor offenses can not be appealed, ergo,
even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like
nepotismcannot also be appealed.
- Similarly, the doctrine barring appeal cannot be justified by the provision
limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission to review decisions
involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount
exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4)
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Again, there is nothing in this
provision indicating legislative intent to bar appeal fromdecisions exonerating a
government official or employee fromnepotism. Statutory preclusion of appeals
is the exception rather than the rule, for as stressed by Mr. Justice Douglas,
"tolerance of judicial reviewhas been more and more the rule against the claim
of administrative finality." Yet the cases of Paredes, Mendez and Magpale
precisely barred all appeals despite lack of an explicit, positive provision in the
Civil Service Law.
- Moreover, the case at bar involves the right of a party adversely affected to
resort to judicial review. This case does not involve the appellate jurisdiction
of the Civil Service Commission, i.e., whether or not it has the power to review
a decision exonerating a government official froma charge of nepotism. The
facts showthat it was the Civil Service Commission that at the first instance
found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism. It was Dacoycoy who appealed the
decision of the Civil Service Commission to our regular court, more exactly, the
Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of Court. As Dacoycoy only impleaded
Suan as respondent, the Court of Appeals ordered that the Civil Service
Commission should also be impleaded as party respondent. The Court of
Appeals then reversed the Commission as it cleared Dacoycoy fromthe charge
of nepotism. The question therefore is whether or not this Court is precluded
fromreviewing the decision of the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari
under Rule 45. Again, I submit that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this
review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the jurisdiction of this Court has even
been expanded "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government." The question is not our lack of jurisdiction
but the prudential exercise of power. Incertiorari cases alleging grave abuse of
discretion, our given task is to determine howmuch is too much of an abuse.
- To my mind, it is also of de minimis importance that the petition of thus Court
was filed by the Civil Service Commission. The records will reveal that Suan,
the original complainant, wrote to the Civil Service Commission urging it to
make the appeal ostensibly for lack of means. But even without Suan, I submit
that the nature of the issue in the case at bar and its impact on the
effectiveness of government give the Civil Service Commission the
standing to pursue this appeal. The issue in the case at bar is basically a
legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted of nepotism,
and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritative say on howto interpret laws.
Administrative agencies have always conceded that the final interpretation of
laws belongs to regular courts. And the issue has broad implications on the
merit and fitness philosophy of our civil service system. Under Sec. 3, Article IX
(B) of our Constitution, it is the Civil Service Commission that has oversight of
our civil service system. It is thus the party better equipped to argue the diverse
dimensions of the issue. It is also the most affected, for it has the duty not to
stand still when nepotic practices threaten the principle of meritrocacy in our
government. It seems to me self evident that this type of injury to public interest
can best be vindicated by the Commissionand not by a private person.
- There areother disturbing implicationif we do not junk the doctrine of non-
reviewability of decisions exonerating government officials from charges of
nepotism. For one, the doctrine unduly favors officials charged with nepotism,
for while we allowfurther reviewof their conviction, we disallowreviewof their
exoneration, regardless of the errors. This distorted rule contravenes our
distaste against nepotism, a practice whose continuance can fatally erode faith
in government. For another, perpetuating a nepotic act, an evil that should be
extirpated wherever found, can never be the intent of our legislators who
crafted our Civil Service Law. For still another, completely cutting off
access tojudicial reviewgoes against the spirit of the 1987 Constitution
expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. Putting up borders of non-
reviewability weakens the judiciarys checking power. Indeed, shielding
abusive administrative actions and decisions fromjudicial oversight will
ultimately erode the rule of law. As Justice Brandeis opined, "supremacy of
law demands that there shall be an opportunity to have some court decide
whether an erroneous rule of lawwas applied and whether the proceeding in
which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly."
- I join the majority opinion.
ROMERO [dissent]
- Does the Civil Service Commission have the legal personality to appeal a
decision of the Court of Appeals exonerating an employee charged in an
administrative case, which decision, in effect, reversed and nullified the
Commissions finding that the respondent employee is guilty as charged?
- After an exhaustive and careful scrutiny of P.D. No. 807 (otherwise known as
the Civil Service Law), Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987) as well as the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, I find no legal basis to
support the contention of the majority that the Commission has that legal
personality.
- The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the
government. Corollarily, it is equipped with the power and function to hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments and to reviewdecisions and actions
of its offices and the agencies attached to it. This is in consonance with its
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers
and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution or by law. It is thus clear that the Civil Service
Commission has been constituted as a disciplining authority.
- Section 34, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 provides the answer as to who may appear before the
Commission, thus:
"Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate
officer or employeebythe following officials and employees:
(a) Secretary of department;
(b) Head of Office of Equivalent rank;
(c) Head of Local Government Unit;
(d) Chief of Agency;
(e) Regional Director; or
(f) Upon Sworn, Written complaint of Any other Person."
- Consequently, thecomplaint can either be the Secretary of department, head
of office of equivalent rank, head of a local government unit, chief of agency,
regional director or any other person or party. The phrase any other party has
been understood to be a complainant other than the head of department or
office of equivalent rank or head of local government or chiefs of agencies or
regional directors.
- The respondent, on the other hand, is any subordinate officer or employee.
Nowhere can be found, expressly or impliedly, in Section 34 of Rule XIV of
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book Vof E.O. No. 292, the Commission as one
of the parties, either as complainant or respondent in an administrative case.
Logically and by necessary implication, it cannot considered either a complaint
or a respondent. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of
one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Based on
the foregoing, there is no other conclusion but that the Civil Service
Commission is not a party to an administrative proceeding brought before it. As
provided by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 1-95, decisions, orders or
rulings of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court, nowto the
Court of Appeals, on certiorari by the aggrieved party. By inference, an
aggrieved party is either the one who initiated the complaint before the
Commission or the respondent, the person subject of the complaint. In fact, the
question as to who is an aggrieved party has long been settled in a litany of
cases. An aggrieved party in an administrative case is the government
employee against whoman administrative complaint is filed. The Civil Service
Commission is definitely not a government employee. Neither is it an agency
against whoman administrative charge is filed. While it may be argued that, in
a sense, the government is an "aggrieved party" in administrative proceedings
before the Commission, it nevertheless is not the "aggrieved party"
contemplated under P.D. No. 807 or the Civil Service Law.
- Having established that the Civil Service Commission is not a party, much
less an aggrieved party, then indubitably, it has no legal personality to elevate
the case to the appellate authority. The Commission, therefore, has no legal
standing to file the instant petition.
- While admittedly, the Civil Service Commission is considered a nominal party
when its decision is brought before the Court of Appeals, such is only a
procedural formality. As with appellate processes, a nominal party is not the
aggrieved party. Its inclusion as a party is based primarily on the fact that the
decision, order or ruling it issued is being contested or assailed and
secondarily, for purposes of enforcement. By analogy, the Commission in the
performance of its quasi-judicial functions is just like a judge who should
"detach himself fromcases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for
review. The raison detre for such doctrine is that a judge is not an active
combatant in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend
their individual positions and for the appellate court to decide the issues without
his active participation. By filing this case, petitioner in a way ceased to be
judicial and has become adversarial instead."
- I dissent fromthe ponencias conclusion that the Commission may appeal a
judgement of exoneration in an administrative case involving nepotismin light
of the foregoing disquisition.
ART IX: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
CIVIL SERVICE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES V CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION
PANGANIBAN; April 3, 2001
FACTS
- Dr. Alfredo De Torres is UPLBAssoc Prof., who went on vacation LOAw/o
pay, during which he served as official rep to the Centre on Integrated Rural
Devt for Asia and the Pacific (CIRDAP). CIRDAP requested UPLB for
extension of LOAbut was denied by Director of ACCI of UPLB. The Director
advised De Torres to report for duty. Also. UPLB Chancellor de Guzman
apprised him on rules of Civil Service and possibility of being considered
AWOL. When De Torres wrote that he will continue with CIRDAP, Chancellor
warned that UPLBwould be forced to drop himfr rolls of personnel.
- After almost 5 yrs of absence w/o leave, De Torres wrote that he was
reporting back to duty at UPLB. Chancellor Villareal said he should have come
fr an approved leave. ACCI Director said De Torres was considered AWOL
and advised himto reapply. But Chancellor Villareal reversed his stand and
said De Torres may report bec records do not showthat he had been officially
dropped. ACCI requested ruling fromCivil Service Commission.
- CSCruled that De Torres have been dropped fr service. Petitioners sought
recourse before the CAbut the petition was dismissed.
ISSUE
WONDe Torres automatic separation fromcivil service was valid
HELD
NO. Automatic dismissal was invalid.
- Section 33, Rule XVI of Revised Civil Service Rules speaks of automatic
separation even w/o prior notice and hearing.
- Quezon v. Borromeo: chief nurse of Iligan City Hospital requested for two
extensions of leave. Both granted. She sought third extension. It was not
acted upon. It was ruled that she violated Sec 33. She was dropped.
- Isberto v. Raquiza: Employee, absent w/o official leave ought to have known
that he was deemed automatically separated.
- Ramo v. Elefao: Petitioner was droppedfr service for her failure to return to
duty after expiration of leave of absence.
- There is sufficient notice when Chancellor advised petitioner and warned of
possibility of being considered AWOL. But in those three cases, the petitioners
were actually dropped. Here, De Torres was never actually dropped. He
remained in the rolls. His salary was even increased several times during his
absence. His appointment was also reclassified. These are acts inconsistent
w/ separation. UP has chosen not to exercise its prerogative to dismiss
petitioner.
- Here, UPexercised academic freedom. It has power to determine who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, who may be admitted to
study. CSC has no authority to dictate UP the outright dismissal of its
personnel.
CUEVAS V BACAL
MENDOZA; December 6, 2000
FACTS
- Justice Cuevas, Executive Secretary Zamora, and Atty. Demaisip v Atty.
Bacal
- This case is a petition for certiorari of a previous ruling of the Court of Appeals
regarding the legality of the appointment and transfer of Josefina Bacal to the
Office of the Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office. Josefina Bacal is
a Career Executive Officer III which she alleges entitled her to the position of
Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorneys Office.
- Bacal passed the Career Executive Services Examinations in 1989 and on
1994 was conferred CESeligibility and was appointed as Regional Director of
the PAO. On January 5, 1995 she was appointed to the rank of CESOIII and
on November 5, 1997 the Secretary of Justice appointed her as Chief Public
Attorney that was confirmed by President Ramos on February 5, 1998, wherein
she took her oath and assumed office.
- On July 1, 1998 Carina Demaisip was appointed Chief Public Defender by
Pres. Estrada while Bacal was appointed Regional Director without her
consent. Demaisip took her oath of office on the 7
th
of July. Bacal filed a
petition quo warranto that questioned her replacement to the Supreme Court
that was dismissed without prejudice for it to refiled in the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals ruled in Bacals favor.
ISSUES
1. WONthe case should be dismissed for its failure to exhaust administrative
remedies through an appeal to the Office of the President
2. WON Bacals removal amounted to a removal without cause (which is
illegal)
3. WON by the mere fact of being appointed would enable the individual to
acquire security of tenure
4. WONa Career Executive Service personnel can be shifted fromone office
to another without violation of their right to security of tenure as their status and
salaries is based on their ranks and not on their jobs
5. WONDemaisip has a security of tenure
HELD
1. No, because the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the
President himself. No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from
the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego
of the former. In addition, exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
when the question raised is purelylegal.
2. No, her appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney requires her to
be appointed to a CESRank Level I which never materialized. If the rank of an
individual is not appropriate to the position her appointment is deemed to be
temporary and she cannot claim security of tenure. The right to tenure is
conferred upon the individual filling the position based on the possession of
required qualifications. The general rule would be that those who were qualified
would be appointed, but as an exception, those with insufficient qualifications
may be appointed but merely in an acting capacity.
3. No, security of tenure is acquired with respect to the rank and not to the
position. In addition, the guaranty of security of tenure is applicable only to
those in the first and second level in the civil service.
4. No, reading through PD No. 1 that created the Integrated Reorganization
Plan, the Career Executive Service provides that reassignments or transfers
are allowed provided that it is made in the interest of public service and
involves no reduction in the rank or salary of the individual and that this should
not be done more oftener than two years. If the individual deems it as
unjustified s/he may appeal to the President. The rule that an employee can
claim security of tenure is applicable only to Election Registrars, Election
Officers, also in the Commission on Elections, and Revenue District Officers in
thewBureau of Internal Revenues. Bacal was just CESOIII therefore, she is
meant to qualify in the position where she was subsequently appointed to
which is Regional Director.
5. No, she does not. The security of tenure is also not permanent following the
same logic that was used for Bacal, Demaisip having not acquired the
qualification of CES Rank Level I implies that her stay in the position is
temporary.
CANONIZADO V AGUIRRE
GONZAGA-REYES; January 25, 2000
FACTS
- PETITITONto declare RA8851 (RA8551) unconstitutional
- the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) was originally created under
RA6975 entitled An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A
Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For other
Purposes.
- under RA 6975, petitioners Alexis Canonizado, Edgar Torres, Rogelio
Pureza, and respondents Jose Adiong and Dula Torres were appointed as
NAPOLCOMcommissioners on Jan. 1991 for six year terms
- 3/6/1998: RA 8551, aka the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998 took effect, declaring the terms of the current
commissioners expired
- the petitioners question the constitutionality of S4 of RA8551 which amends
S13 of RA6975, altering the composition of NAPOLCOMas well as S8, which
removes themfromoffice and allegedly violates their security of tenure.
- as members of the civil service, the petitioners cannot be removed fromoffice
except for causes provided by law, that is, with legal cause and not merely for
reasons deemed fit by the appointing power
- the creation or abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function;
Congress may abolish any office w/o impairing the officers right to continue in
his position. This power may be exercised for reasons such as a lack of funds
or the interests of the economy; abolition must be made in good faith, not
personal or political reasons
ISSUES
1. WONthere was abona fidereorganization of NAPOLCOM
2. WONthere was a valid abolition of the petitioners offices
HELD
1. NO. Under RA6975, the NAPOLCOMwas described as a collegial body
w/in the DILG, and under RA8551 it was defined as an agency attached to
the Department for policy and programcoordination. This increase in the
agencys autonomy does not result in the creation of an entirely newoffice. S4
of RA 8551amends the NAPOLCOMs composition by adding the PNP Chief
as an ex-officio member, requiring the membership of 3 civilian commissioners,
a fourth commissioner fromthe lawenforcement sector and at least one female
commissioner. Such changes are trivial and do not affect the nature of the
NAPOLCOM; in fact, the powers and duties of NAPOLCOM remain
unchanged. Reorganization only takes place when there is an alteration of the
existing structure of the office including lines of control and authority and may
involve a reduction of personnel or abolition of offices if done in good faith
(economic purposes, bureaucratic efficiency, etc.) Despite the new law,
NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,
supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.
2. NO. Respondents stress that S8 of RA8551 discloses legislative intent to
abolish NAPOLCOMpursuant to a bona fide reorganization. As held in UP
Board of Regents v. Rasul, the removal of an incumbent is not justified if the
functions of the old and newpositions are the same, that is, if there is no true
reorganization. The court finds that RA 8551 does not expressly abolish the
petitioners positions upon examination of the changes introduced by the new
law. In the event of a reorganization done in good faith, no dismissal actually
occurs because the office itself ceases to exist. If the abolition merely seeks to
enact a change of nomenclature or attempt to circumvent the constitutional
security of tenure of civil service personnel, then the abolition is void ab initio.
In the case at bar, no bona fide reorganization had been mandated by
congress; hence, petitioners were removed fromoffice with no legal cause,
making S8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional, and entitling them to immediate
reinstatement.
Decision -Petition GRANTED, but only to the extent of declaring S8 of RA
8551 unconstitutional for violating the petitioners rights to security of tenure.
Petitioners are entitled to reinstatement.
GAMINDE V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
PARDO; December 13, 2000
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two
decisions of the Commission on Audit (COA)
- On June 11, 1993, Petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde was appointed as ad
interimCommissioner of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) by then Pres.
Ramos for a termexpiring Feb. 2, 1999. She assumed office after taking her
oath and her appointment was confirmed by Congress.
- Before the end of her term, or on Feb. 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification
fromthe Office of the Pres. as to the expiry dateof her termof office. In reply,
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (now Associate Justice) Corona, in a
letter, opined that petitioners termwould expire on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2,
1999. She thus remained in office after Feb. 02, 1999, relying on the said
advisory opinion.
- On Feb. 04, 1999, CSCChairman Alma De Leon, requested opinion fromthe
COA on whether petitioner and her co-terminous staff should continue to be
paid their salaries notwithstanding the fact that their appointment had already
expired. COA General Counsel issued an opinion that the petitioners
appointment had indeed expired.
- CSCResident Auditor issued a notice disallowing in audit the salaries and
emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her staff, a decision which petitioner
appealed to the COAen banc. The appeal was dismissed, COAaffirmed the
disallowance, and held that the issue of petitioners term of office may be
addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which had Feb. 02,
1999 as expiration date. COA also stated that the Commission is bereft of
power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
acquiescence of the Office of the President. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, she was again denied; hence this petition.
ISSUE
WONpetitioner Atty. Gamindes termof office, as CSCommissioner, expired
on Feb. 2, 1999 or on Feb. 2, 2000
HELD
It expired onFeb. 2, 1999. For Commissioners (5 year term) the count is:
Feb.02, 1987---Feb.02, 1992---Feb.02, 1999---Feb.02, 2006
Ratio The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution
must be on Feb. 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution in
order to maintain the regular interval of vacancy every 2 years consistent in the
previous appointment intervals.
Reasoning
- The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service
Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Art IX-B Sec. 1(2).
The 1973 Constitution introduced the first systemof a regular rotation or cycle
in the membership of the CSC(Art. XII Sec. 1(1), 1973 Consti). It was a copy
of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 Constitution of a
rotational systemfor the appointment of the Chairman and members of the
Commission on Elections (Art. XSec. 1, 1935 Consti, as amended).
- In Republic v Imperial, it was said that the operation of the rotational plan
requires two conditions: (1) that the terms of the first (3) Commissioners should
start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or
disability before the expiration of the termshould only be filled only for the
unexpired balance of the term.
- Consequently, the terms of the first Chairman and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a
common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and
qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expirations of the firs terms of
7, 5 and 3 years should lead to the regular recurrence of the 2-year interval
between the expiration of the terms.
- In the lawof public officers, term of office is distinguished fromtenure of
the incumbent. The termmeans the time during which the officer may claimto
hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the termduring which the
incumbent actually holds the office. The termof office is not affected by the
hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.
- Although Art. XVIII Sec. 15 provides that incumbent members of the
Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the
ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or
become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a
new term, what it contemplates is tenure not term. The term unless
imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions
mean that the incumbent members of the Consti Commissions shall continue
for 1 year after ratification of the Consti under their existing appointments at the
discretion of the appointing power who may cut short their tenure by reasons
the reasons stated therein. However, they do not affect the term of office fixed
in Art. IX, providing for a 7-5-3 yr rotational interval for the 1
st
appointees.
Decision Termof office expired on Feb. 2, 1999. However, petitioner served
as de facto officer in good faith until Feb. 2, 2000 and thus entitled to receive
her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. COA decision
disallowing salaries/emoluments is reversed.
Voting 10 Concur, Bellosillo No part., Related to one of the parties, Puno,
concur (In the result), De Leon, Jr., Concurring and Dissenting opinion
Mendoza, Joins De Leons dissent
SEPARATE OPINION
DE LEON [concur and dissent]
Dissents:
-the term of petitioner expired on Feb. 2, 2000 not on Feb. 2, 1999 as
explained in ponencia.
-the term of the first set of CSCommissioners appointed under the 1987
Constitution commenced on the Feb. 2, 1988 not on the date of its ratification
on Feb. 2, 1987.
Concurs:
-that the salaries and emoluments which petitioner as CSCommissioner
received after Feb. 2, 1999 should not be disallowed by COA.
BLAQUERA V ALCALA
PURISIMA; September 11, 1998
FACTS
- G.R. Nos. 109406, 110642, 111494, and 112056 are cases for certiorari and
prohibition, challenging the constitutionality andvalidity of AO29 and 268
- Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments
and agencies who were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to
EO 292 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, and the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book Vof EO292.
- In 1993, then President Ramos issued AO 29 authorized the grant of
productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximumamount of
P1,000.00and reiteratingthe prohibitionunder Section 7of AO268 (issued by
President Aquino), enjoining said grants without prior approval of the
President. Section 4 of AO29 directed all departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of CY1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess
of the amount authorized under Section 1 hereof to immediately cause the
return/refundof the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the
departments or agencies of the government concerned, who are the herein
Respondents, caused the deduction frompetitioners salaries or allowances of
theamounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.
- To prevent the Respondents from making further deductions from their
salaries or allowances, the Petitioners have come before this Court to seek
relief.
- In G.R. No. 119597, the factsare different but the petition poses a common
issue with the other consolidated cases. The Petitioner, Association of
Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority (ADEPT), is
anassociation of employees of the Philippine TourismAuthority (PTA) who
were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant
toRA 6971, otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990.
Subject bonus was, however, disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the
ground that it was prohibited under AO29. The disallowance of the bonus in
question was finally brought on appeal to the Commission on Audit (COA)
which denied the appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON with regard to G.R. No. 119597, Incentives under RA 6971 are
applicable to ADEPT employees
2. WONAO29 and 268 (being Presidential pronouncements) are violative of
the provisions of EO292 (being a lawpassed by the legislature), and hence
null and void, and WON AO29 and 268 unlawfully usurp the Constitutional
authority granted solely to the Civil Service Commission
3. WONthe forced refund of incentive pay is an unconstitutional impairment of
a contractual obligation
4. WONassuming arguendo that the grant of incentives was invalid, the same
should be the personal liability of officials directly responsible therefore in
accordance with section 9 of AO268
HELD
1. There are generally two types of GOCCs:
1. Those incorporated under the general corporation law.
Employees of this type have the right to bargain (collectively),
strike, and other such remedies available to workers of private
corporations. Functions are mainly proprietary.
2. Those with special charter (a.k.a. original charter), which are
subject to Civil Service Laws, have no right to bargain
(collectively). Incorporated in pursuance of a State Policy.
- Only GOCCs incorporated under the general corporation law, and thus
performing proprietary functions, are included under the coverage of RA6791.
GOCCs created in pursuance of a policy of the state and those whose officers
and employees are covered by the Civil Service are expressly excluded.
- The legislative intent to place only GOCCs performing proprietary functions
under the coverage of RA6971 is also gleanable fromthe other provisions of
the law making reference to remedies available only to laborers akin to the
private sector.
- Also, pursuant to EO292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides
for the establishment of Department or Agency Employee Suggestions and
Incentives Award Systems for GOCCs with original charters, it is thus evident
that the PTAis already within the scope of an incentives award system.
2. In accordance with EO292, the functions of the Civil Service Commission
have been decentralized to the offices and agencies where such functions can
be effectively performed; specifically, the implementation of the Employee
Suggestions and Incentive Award System ahs been decentralized to the
President or to the head of each department or agency (as his/her alter ego).
- The President is the head of government. His/her power includes control
over executive departments. Control means the power to alter what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter. In issuing AO29 limiting the
amount of benefits, enjoining heads of departments from granting benefits
without prior approval fromhim/her, and directing the refund of any excess
over the prescribed amount, the President was just exercising his power of
control over executive departments. Specifically, seeing that the incentives
program was producing demoralization instead of the original goal of
encouragement, owing to the fact that employees not receiving the incentives
felt slighted and underappreciated, the President merely exercised his power of
control by modifying the acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits
without appropriate clearance fromthe Office of the President.
- Neither can it be said that the President encroached upon the authority of the
Civil Service Commission to grant benefits to government employees. AO29
and 268 did not revoke, but rather only regulated, the grant and amount of
incentives.
3. Not all contracts entered into by the government will operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must be made between its sovereign and
proprietary acts. The acts involved in this case are governmental. Besides,
incentive pay is in the nature of a bonus, which is not a demandable or
enforceable obligation.
4. Absent a showing of bad faith, public officers are not personally liable for
damages resulting formthe performance of official duties.
Decision In upholding the Constitutionality of AO 268 and 29, the Court
reiterates the doctrine that in interpreting statutes, that which will avoid a
finding of unconstitutionality is to be preferred.
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, the Court
cannot countenance the refund of the incentives which amount the petitioners
have already received, as a corollary, further deductions fromsalaries are thus
enjoined.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
PADILLA; May 5, 1994
FACTS
- Nature Petitions for prohibition to stop the threatened illegal transfer,
disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution
and the law
- 18 April 1994: Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, an organization of
barangays, represented by petitioner Alex David (as taxpayer and as president
and secretary-general of the organization) filed this petition for prohibition, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order.
- 22 April 1994: Another petition raising the same issues were filed.
- Petitioners question what they perceive as the threatened illegal transfer,
disbursement, and use of public funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution
and the law relative to the conduct of the forthcoming barangay elections.
They claim that in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 1994, only
P137,878,000.00 were appropriated by the Congress for the holding of the said
elections. The petitioners claimthat by early 1994, Congress itself has made
the assessment that the money is insufficient to defray cost of holding the
elections. Petitioners allege that in order to augment said amount, respondents
have threatened and are about to transfer/re-allocate certain moneys to be
sourced from the executive and legislative branches of government to
COMELEC, which in turn will use it to fund the elections: [a] P180Mfromthe
appropriation of the DILG, [b] P160Mfromthe Countryside Development Fund;
P70Mfromthe Senate; P30Mfromthe HReps; and [c] P43Mfromthe Internal
Revenue Allotments (IRA) of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities (Note: This is
the scheme that is being assailed in the issue of this case)
- 21 April 1994: Court resolved to require respondents to submit comment on
the petition within the non-existentiable period of 5 days
- 26 April 1994: Respondents through the Solicitor General filed their comment.
They claimthat petitioners acted solely on the basis of reports made in the
newspaper (Barangay Poll Funds Found article fromthe Manila Bulletin) and
did not bother to confirm the veracity of article. They also claim that said
reports were mere unofficial proposals/suggestions made in the process of
searching for funds. COMELECfurther alleges that that it intends to fund the
barangay elections fromthe money allotted by Congress for the purpose and
from its own savings resulting from unused funds. The Solicitor General
supports the stand of the respondents, as it is according to Sec. 25 (5), Article
VI of the Constitution and Sectoons 17 (Use of Savings) and 19 (Meaning of
Savings and Appropriations) of the GAAfor Fiscal Year 1994.
- Respondents also maintain that funds fromLGUs may also be used to help
defray the cost of the forthcoming barangay elections. They cite Opinion No. 51
of the Secretary of Justice, dated 19 April 1994, which says that under Sec. 50
of the Omnibus Election Code, LGUs are required to appropriate funds for
barangay elections
ISSUE
WON the existence or lack of factual basis on WON the impleaded public
respondents are attempting, or intending to effect the transfer of funds which
would be in direct contravention of Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution
42
HELD
Any threat or attempt to pursue a transfer of funds scheme that exists only in
newspaper reports is not sufficient factual basis to render such scheme by the
COMELECunconstitutional.
Reasoning
1. [a] The threat to pursue the scheme, if ever there was one, existed only in
newspaper reports which could have misled the general public, including the
petitioners, into believing that the same emanated fromimpeccable sources.
[b] Court acknowledges petitioners have displayed vigilance and acted with the
best of intentions, but they should have first obtained an official statement or at
least confirmation fromrespondents as to the veracity of the report instead of
relying on the newspaper article.
2. The court went further in sayingactually, in affirming the arguments of the
respondents that consistent with Art. VI Sec. 25 (5) of the Constitution, the
following may be availed by the COMELEC to defray the cost of the
forthcomingbarangay elections:
[a] Article IV of the Omnibus Election Code provides that LGUs should
appropriate funds for the barangay elections. COMELECmay make arranges
with local governments to comply with this article pursuant to its constitutional
authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of elections. COMELECmay also issue an appropriate directive for the
province city, or municipality to advance election expenses that are chargeable
to it. Since the President exercises general supervision of all local
governments, the COMELEC may course its directives to local governments
through the Office of the President and to be implemented by DILG. (Note: This
is based on the Opinion No. 51, s. 1994 of Sec. of Justice which was cited as
authority)
[b] Sections 17 and 19 of GAAfor FY1994 where it was stated that the Heads
of Constitutional Commissions under Article IXof the Constitutionare hereby
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
Decision Petitions DISMISSEDfor lack of merit.
Voting14 concur, no dissent.
LOONG V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
42
Nolawshall bepassedauthorizingany transfer of appropriations; however, thePresident, thePresident
of theSenate, theSpeaker of theHouseof Representatives, theChief Justiceof theSupremeCourt, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorizedto augment any itemin thegeneral
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
PUNO; April 14, 1999
FACTS
- RA8436 prescribed the adoption of an automated electionsystem
> Was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections in the ARMM which
includes Sulu
> Atty. Jose Tolentino was the head of the COMELECTask Force in Sulu
- Sulu voting readily peaceful except that there was a problem with the
automated counting of votes
> Discrepancies were reported (May 12, 1998) between the election returns
and the votes cast for mayor in the muncipality of Pata (later on confirmed
when checked by Atty. Tolentino)
> The automated counting of ballots in Pata were suspended and the
problem was immediately communicated to the COMELEC technical
experts
> The problemwas caused by the misalignment of the ovals opposite the
names of candidates in the local ballots but nothing was wrong with the
machines.
- Emergency meeting called by Atty. Tolentino participated in by military police
officials and local candidates. Petitioner Loong was among those who
attended along with private respondent Tan.
> Discussed howballots should be counted.
> Shift to manual count recommended by Brig. Gen. Espinosa and Subala,
PNP Director Alejandrino, gubernatorial canddidates Tan and Tulawie and
congressinal candidate Tulawie
> Automated count insisted by gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri.
Written position papers were required to be submitted.
> Local ballots in five municipalities were rejected by automated machines
(Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo). Ballots rejected because of the
wrong sequence code.
> COMELECissued Minute Resolution 98-1747 ordering manual recount in
Pata. By 12 midnight of May 12, Atty. Tolentino had sent an en banc report
to the COMELEC reommending manual recount in the whole province of
Sulu because it is possible that the same problemwould extend to other
provinces in Sulu.
> The COMELEC approved of Atty. Tolentinos recommendation with the
following implementation procedures:
+ Counting machines fromJolo be transported to Manila in the PICC
to keep COMELECaway frombloodshed between AFPand MNLF
+ Authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers concerned
for the conduct of the automated and manual operations of the
counting of votes at PICC
+ To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized
representative of the political parties concerned and the candidate
watchers both outside and inside the perimeters of the PICC
> May 15, 1998 COMELEC laid down rules for manual count through
Minute Resoln 98-1796
> May 18, 1998Loong filed objection to Minute Resolution 98-1796
+ Violates provisions of RA8436 providing for automated counting of
ballots in ARMM. Automated count is mandatory and could not be
substituted by manual counting.
+ Ballots were rejected because ballots were tampered with and/or
the texture was different fromthe official ballot
+ Counting machines designed in such a way as only genuine official
ballots could be read by the machine
+ Other counting machines in other municipalities were in order.
> COMELECstill began with the manual count on May 18.
> Loong filed petition for certiorari with Supreme Court:
+ COMELEC issued Minute Resolutions without prior notice and
hearing to him
+ Order for manual counting violated RA8346
+ Manual counting gave opportunity to election cheating:
< Counting by human hands of fake, tampered and counterfeit
ballots which machines were programmed to reject
< Opportunity to substite ballots in PICC
< 22 Board of Election Inspectors for 1,194 precincts gives
sufficient time to change and tamper ballots
< Opportunity to delay the proclamation of winning candidates
through dilatory moves in pre-proclamation controversy
because the returns and certificates are already made by man
> Tan proclaimed winner in Sulu. Loong garnered 3
rd
highest votes.
ISSUES
1. WONpetition for certiorari was appropriate remedy to invalidate COMELEC
resolutions
2. WONCOMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdisction in order manual count
a. Is there legal basis for manual count?
b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
c. Was there denial of due process when COMELEC ordered manual
count?
3. Won it is proper to call for special election for the position of Sulu governor
assuming the manual count is illegal and result is unreliable.
HELD
1. Certiorari is the proper remedy according to Art. 9, Sec. 7 of the Constitution
- Interpretation of RA 8436 must be made in relation the COMELECs broad
power in Art. 9, Section 2(1) to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election.
- Adjudicatory for the petitioner, private respondent and intervenor so there are
enough considerations for the certiorari jurisdiction.
2. No grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of jurisdiction because the
post election realities show that the order for the manual count was not
arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
a. There was legal basis for the manual count.
- RA8436 cannot be insisted upon after the machines rejected the local
ballots in five municipalities of Sulu. The errors were not machine
related by were because of the ballots.
- Congress failed to provide for remedy when the error in counting is not
machine-related. The vacuumin the lawcannot prevent the COMELEC
from levitating the problem. Article 9, Section 2(1) of the Constitution
gives the COMELECthe broad power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendumand recall.
b. There was reasonable factual basis.
- Automated machines failed to read the ballots correctly in Pata. Local
ballots in Jolo, Siasi, Tapal, Indanan and Talipao were rejected.
> Flaws were carefully analyzed by COMELECexperts and found
nothing wrong with the machines but with the ballots.
> To continue with the automated count would result in a grossly
erroneous result.
- COMELEChad to act derisively in order to restore peace and order,
especially since past election tensions have been created by failures in
automated counting. Military and authorities recommended manual
counting to preserve peace and order.
c. There was no denial of due process when COMELECordered the manual
count.
- They were given every opportunity to oppose the manual count of local
ballots in Sulu.
> Orally heard
> Written position papers
> Representatives escorted transfer of ballots and automated
machines to Manila
> Watchers observed manual count
- The integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were
transferred fromSulu to Manila and when they were manually counted.
- Manual count is reliable because when the COMELECordered manual
count, it issued corresponding rules and regulations to govern the
counting and the ballots were not difficult to understand.
3. Aspecial election for Sulu governor is improper.
- Aspecial election only governs exceptional circumstances. The plea can
only be grounded on a failure of election.
> A failure of election applies when on account of force majeure,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by lawfor the dosing of the voting, or after the
voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody of canvass thereof.
> A plea for special election must also be addressed to the
COMELECnot to the SC(Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code
should be read in relation to RA7166).
> Grounds for failure of election involve questins after the fact. They
can only be determined by the COMELECen banc after due notice
and hearing to the parties. Loong did not do this in the present case.
His plea for special election was an afterthought.
- To hold a specal election would be discriminatory.
> All elected officials in Sulu nowdischarging functions.;
> Tans election cannot be singled out as invalid for alikes cannot be
treated unalikes.
In addition
- COMELECwas organied under Comm. Act 607 in August 1940. The power
to enforce election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised
through the Dept. of Interior.
- 1940 amendments to 1935 Constitution transformed the COMELEC to a
constitutional body. COMELECwas granted power to have exclusive charge
of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections.
- 1973 Constitution broadened powers of the COMELECby making it the sole
judge of all election contests relating to theelections, returns and qualifications
of members of the national legislature and elective provincial and city officials.
It was given judicial power asde from the traditional administrative and
executive functions.
- 1987 Constitution added powers to the COMELECby allowing it to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscites, initiative, referenda and recalls. It also includes contets involving
elective municipal and barangay officals.
SANCHEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
MELENCIO-HERRERA; June 19, 1982
FACTS
- Jan. 30, 1980 local elections- Sanchez and Biliwang ran for Mayor of San
Fernando, Pampanga
- Biliwang was proclaimed winner
- Sanchez filed with COMELEC a Petition to declare null and void the local
elections due to alleged large scale terrorism
- Ultimately, the COMELEC found that after the voting was over in the local
elections, terrorism and irregularities were committed- counters were
threatened by armed goons and policemen into making spurious election
returns in favor of Biliwang.
- Thus, COMELECissued a resolution ordering:
1. The annulment the Jan. 30, 1980 election and the setting aside of the
proclamation of Biliwang
2. To certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa
the failure of election, so that remedial legislation may be enacted, and
pending such enactment, the President/PMmay appoint municipal officials
in San Fernando
- Sanchez sought reconsideration of the COMELECResolution certifying the
failure of election, and praying instead that COMELECcall a special election in
San Fernando
- COMELECdenied reconsideration
- Both Biliwang and Sanchez filed petitions with the SC, which were
consolidated into the following issues:
ISSUES
1. WONthe COMELEChas the power to annul an entire municipal election on
the ground of post-election terrorism
2. WONthe COMELEChas the authority to call for a special election
HELD
1. Biliwang asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of
municipal officials because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the
power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in
the CFI
- SC: It may be true there is no specific provision vesting COMELEC with
authority to annul an election. Under the 1935 Constitution, the SCsaid that
COMELECdid not have this power, and that instead the power lay with the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. Now, however, it is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials. The COMELECmust be deemed possessed of the authority,
in line with its plenitude of powers and its function to protect the integrity of
elections.
2. COMELECopined that it had no powers to order the holding of a newor
special election, because the actual election itself took place, and in a proper,
orderly fashion. According to COMELEC, the Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 grants
COMELEC authority to call for a new or special election only in a failure of
election, but in this case, there was afailure to gauge the true and genuine will
of the electorate, as opposed to a failure of election (tainted casting of ballots
(failure of election) vs. tainted counting of ballots (failure to gauge the will))
- SC: to state that this is not the failure of election contemplated by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 because elections did take place is too tenuous a
distinction. In practical effect, no election has been held; there has been in truth
and in fact, a failure to elect. This interpretation only hampers the effectiveness
of the COMELECand delays the opportunity to the voters to cast their votes.
Decision The SC upholds the power and prerogative of the COMELEC to
annul an election and to call for a special election.
UNIDO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BARREDO; April 3, 1981
FACTS
- Appeal by the UNIDO(a political org campaigning for "NO" votes to
amendments to the 1973 Consti proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa), fromthe resolutions of COMELECdated March 18 and
March 22, 1981.
- 5 March 1981: COMELEC issued 3 Resolutions providing for Rules
and Regulations concerning the plebiscite campaign:
(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for equal opportunity on free
public discussions and debates;
(2) Resolution No.1468 providing for equal time on the use of the
broadcast media (radio & TV) <equal as to duration and qualityat
the same rates or given free of charge>; &
(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for equal spaceon the use of the
print media; but COMELEC recognizes the principle of self-
regulation & shall practice only minimal supervision.
- 10 March 1981: UNIDO writes to COMELEC re: news that Pres.
Marcos will lead the campaign for "Yes" votes in his 2-hr nationwide
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-TV programon March 12, which
will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio stations throughout
the country. Citing the said COMELEC resolutions, they demand
exactly thesame number of TV and radio stations all over the country
to campaign for No votes.
- 17 March 1981: UNIDO writes a follow-up letter to COMELEC,
stating that on March 21, they will hold a public meeting at the Plaza
Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, & requesting that it covered by radio and
television from9:30 to 11:30 P.M. They expect COMELEC to direct
the radio & TV facilities to comply with their request.
- 18 March 1981: COMELEC issued Resolution saying UNIDOs
request "cannot be granted and is herebydenied" & that
(1) Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo is not a political or partisan vehicle
but an innovative system of participatory democracy where the
President as leader of the nation enunciates certain programs or
policies. Its format is intended to result in effective multi-way
consultation between the leader of the nation and the people; and
that
(2) UNIDO, not having the same constitutional prerogatives vested
in the President/Prime Minister, has no right to demand equal
coverage by media accorded President Marcos but is free to enter
into appropriate contracts with the TV or radio stations concerned.
COMEMEC cannot direct these media to grant free use of their
facilities.
- 20 March 1981: UNIDOwrites another letter as MFR. Denied by
COMELECfor lack of merit. Hence, this appeal before SC. Petitioner
raises the following grounds:
(1) COMELEC resolutions in question are contrary to the
Constitution and the law, for being unjust, unfair & inequitable. They
violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, &
are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections;
(2) UNIDOs request/demand for equal broadcast media of its
public meeting/rally at Plaza Miranda was arbitrarily denied. The
campaign for NOvotes should be granted the same right & equal
use of facilities granted Marcos campaign for YES.
ISSUE
WONCOMELECacted with grave abuse of discretion
HELD
for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec
regulations contemplate, for being more than what the opposition is
duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege inherent in
the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when
the occasion demands, for being impractical under prevailing
circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition
indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction
to act, and for these alone among other reasons which there is hardly
time to state herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be
granted.
- The proposed changes of the Charter are of deep and
transcendental importance and the more the people are adequately
informed about the proposed amendments, their exact meaning,
implications and nuances, the better.
- Denial of due process is considered generally as the first and the
most valued right of everyone under the Bill of Rights. UNIDOshould
have made the television and radio stations (who will be directly
affected by any injunction of the Comelec upon SCs orders) parties to
this case. Said parties are indispensable without which the Court
cannot proceed properly.
- In fact, petitioner has not shown, for apparently they have not done
so, that they have requested any TV or radio station to give themthe
same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that which they afforded
the President. Also, there are other groups and aggrupations not to
speak of individuals who are similarly situated as petitioner who would
also want to be heard.
- The "free orderly and honest elections" clause of the Constitution is
applicable also to plebiscites, particularly one relative to constitutional
amendments. It is indispensable that they be properly characterized to
be fair submission: the voters must of necessity have had adequate
opportunity, in the light of conventional wisdom, to cast their votes with
sufficient understanding of what they are voting on.
- Nothing can be of more transcendental importance than to vote in a
constitutional plebiscite. It is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that
the sale of air time by TV and radio stations insures that time equal as
to duration and quality is available to all contending views.
- Curtailment of the freedomof speech and the press of television and
radio stations is permissible for election purposes.
- The head of state of every country in the world must fromthe very
nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally
available to those who are opposed to him. When the head of state
wants to communicate on matters of public concern, no government
office or entity is obliged to give the opposition the same facilities.
They have toavail themselves of their own resources.
- In instances where the head of state is at the same time the
president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily
follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the
governed. When the President spoke in "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo"
he spoke as President-Prime Minister and not as head of the KBL, the
political party nowin power.
- The petitioner had not adequately shown that COMELECacted with
grave abuse of discretion. The Comelec has indeed the power to
supervise and regulate the mass media with respect to the equal
opportunity provisions, but such authority arises only when there is a
showing that any sector or member of the media has denied to any
party or person the right to which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not
supposed to dictate to the media.
- There are other political parties similarly situated as petitioner. To grant to
petitioner what it wants, it must necessarily follow that such other parties
should also be granted. That would be too much to expect fromthe media that
has also its own right to which it or he is entitled. Comelec is not supposed to
dictate to the media.
Decision Appeal dismissed.
CHAVEZ V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
BIDIN; July 3, 1992
FACTS
- Petition for the issuance of a TROenjoining COMELECfromproclaiming the
24
th
highest senatorial candidate.
- May 5, 1992 - Court issued a Resolution of the case "Francisco Chavez v.
Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez fromrunning for Senator in the
May 11, 1992 elections. The petitioner then filed an urgent motion with the
Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate to all its agents and the general public
the resolution; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of
Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates, tally sheets,
election returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor,
Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez . . . ."
- May 8, 1992- Comelec issued a resolution which resolved to delete the name
of Melchor Chavez fromthe list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to
order the crediting of all "Chavez" votes in favor of petitioner as well as the
cancellation of Melchor Chavez name in the list of qualified candidates. On
Election Day, Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified
candidates. Commissioner Rama issued a directive over the radio and TV
ordering that all Chavez votes be credited to the petitioner however it did not
reach all the precincts
- Petitioner claims that the Comelec failed to performits mandatory function
under Sec. 7, RA7166 which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it
shall be the duty of the Commission to instruct without delay the deletion of the
name of said candidate.
- Confusion arose as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or
invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).As a result, "Chavez"
votes were not credited in favor of petitioner.
- May 12, 1992 - Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal
and city election registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of
voting submitted by the BEIs and to credit all the "Chavez" votes, which have
been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of petitioner.
- Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not
reach all the various BEIs throughout the country on time for implementation
and that the minutes of voting did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes
which were declared stray or invalidated.
- May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent
Comelec praying the latter to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with
costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes to scan for the "Chavez" votes
for purposes of crediting thesame in his favor; (3) make the appropriate entries
in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the
proclamation of the 24 winning candidates.
- Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition,
petitioner filed this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
the issuance of a TRO, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th
highest senatorial candidate, without first implementing Comelecs resolution of
May 12, 1992 and acting upon petitioners letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992
and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992. Petitioner alleges that respondent
Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse of
discretion.
- June 8, 1992, Sen Agapito Aquino prayed for the dismissal of the instant
petition on the ground that the lawdoes not allowpre-proclamation controversy
involving the election of members of the Senate.
ISSUE
1. WONSChas jurisdiction over the case
HELD
1. Jurisdiction
- The alleged inaction of Comelec inordering the deletion of Melchor Chavezs
name in the list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the
Courts function of judicial review. The Court can reviewthe decisions or
orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion
committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not
those arising fromthe exercise of its administrative functions.
- Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left undone.
Comelec has ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavezs name not only on the
official list of candidates, but also on the election returns, tally sheet and
certificate of canvass. Hence, petitioners allegation that respondent Comelec
failed to implement the resolutions does not hold water.
- Petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy being in the nature of a
pre-proclamation. While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-
proclamation controversies involving local elective officials, such are not
allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the
House of Representatives.
- Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. - For
purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member
of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed
on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the case
may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person
to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before
it.
xxx xxx xxx
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of
canvassers, or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial
boards of canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area,
shall be specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings."
What is allowed is the correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns." To be manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the
certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
- The petitioners prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in
the certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the
re-opening of the ballot boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein.
He has not even pointed to any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or
election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, the proper
recourse is to file a regular election protest which exclusively pertains to the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
- The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals jurisdiction over
election contests relating to their respective Members is therefore the Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral
Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner
involving, as it does, contest relating to the election of a member of the Senate.
Petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest before the
Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed.
- Petitioner argues that a recount before the Senate Electoral Tribunal would
force himto shell out the expenses imposes not only a property requirement for
the enjoyment of the right to be voted upon but also a price on the right of
suffrage which would ultimately stifle the sovereign will.
- The lawis very clear on the matter and it is not right for petitioner to ask this
Court to abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend
the Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory
procedures laid down by the existing lawin cases like the one at bar must be
faithfully followed. The proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but
the Legislature to enact remedial measures.
- Sanchez v. Commission on Elections: "(1) Errors in the appreciation of
ballots by the board of inspectors are proper subject for election protest and
not for recount or reappreciation of ballots. (2) The appreciation of ballots is not
part of the proceedings of the board of canvassers. The function of ballots
appreciation is performed by the board election inspectors at the precinct level.
(3) The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues
enumerated under Sec. 243 OEC. The complete election returns whose
authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the
purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
"The groundfor recount reliedupon by Sanchez is clearly not amongthe
issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation
of invalidation of "Sanchez" votes intended for himbear no relation to the
correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither
the Constitution nor statute has granted the Comelec or the board of
canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond
the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21
SCRA1252, 1256)."
- Petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of
canvass or election returns before the Comelec which would warrant their
correction.
Decision Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISSthe instant
petition for lack of merit.
Narvasa, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Notes Pre-proclamation controversy is defined as "any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised
by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political
parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised
under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns." [Sec.
241, Omnibus Election Code).
BUAC AND BAUTISTA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND CAYETANO
PUNO; January 26, 2004
FACTS
- Buac and Bautista filed a petition for certiorari andmandamus to compel the
COMELECto take cognizance of contests involving the conduct of a plebiscite
and the annulment of its result.
- In April 1988, a plebiscite was held to ratify the cityhood of Taguig (converting
Tagiug into a highly urbanized city). The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
(PBOC), without completing the canvass of sixty-four (64) other election
returns, declared that the No votes won, indicating that the people rejected
the conversion of Taguig into a city. However, upon order of the COMELEC,
the PBOC reconvened and completed the canvass of the plebiscite
returns, eventually proclaiming that the negative votes still prevailed.
- Alleging that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of
votes, Buac and Bautista filed with the COMELEC a petition seeking the
annulment of the announced results of the plebiscite with a prayer for revision
and recount of the ballots. The COMELECtreated the petition as an election
protest.
- Cayetano intervened in the case. He filed a motion todismiss on the ground
that the COMELEChasno jurisdictionover an action involving the conduct of
a plebiscite. He alleged that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an election
protest, and such must be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
- COMELEC initially gave due course to the petition and ruled that it had
jurisdiction over the case, but this was overturned completely upon the MFRof
Cayetano.
ISSUE
WONCOMELEChas jurisdiction to decide cases regarding plebiscite contests.
HELD
YES
Ratio COMELEChas jurisdiction over plebiscite contest contests as power to
decide such cases is part of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution to the
COMELECunder Art. IX(C) Sec. 2(1)
43
.
Reasoning: there are 7 reasons given.
1. Part of judicial power is the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by
law. Under the present case, there is no involvement of the violation of any
legally demandable right, for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote
of the electorate of Taguig.
2. Jurisdiction of RTCis only on civil actions. APlebiscite is NOT a civil action
but a determination of public will.
3. To grant jurisdiction to RTCwould result to jumbled justice. There would be
confusion if plebiscite contest cases were given to the RTCfor what if the
plebiscite was a national one. Every RTC in the Philippines would have
jurisdiction over nationwide plebiscite, which runs contrary to the principle
that jurisdiction of an RTCis limited to their region.
4. The Consti gives jurisdiction of contests involving only election of officers to
the courts (part of judicial function) or to administrative tribunals (exercising
quasi-judicial power). As such, jurisdiction over plebiscite contests is not
vested on the courts.
43
Sec. 2. TheCommissiononElectionsshall exercisethefollowingpowersandfunctions:
(1) Enforceandadminister all laws andregulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, andrecall.
5. The Constitutional mandate to COMELECto enforce and administer laws
and regulations relative to conduct of plebiscites (among others) includes
the power to ascertain the true results of such plebiscite. It includes the
power to do all that is necessary to achieve honest and credible plebiscites.
*The provision granting COMELEC jurisdiction over contests re: elected
officials is not limiting in the sense that it only limits quasi-judicial power of
COMELECto such cases. The power to ascertain true results is implicit in
its power to enforce all laws relative tothe conduct of plebiscite.
6. COMELECis best suited to have jurisdiction over such cases because of
their indisputable expertise in election and related laws.
7. MFRof Cayetano filed out of time (filed 10 days, not the prescribed 5 days,
after receipt of the Order or Resolution of COMELEC).
Decision COMELECdirected to reinstate the petition to annul the results and
decide it without delay.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES [dissent]
- Quasi-judicial function of COMELECis limited to contests involving election of
regional, provincial, and city officials (limited to what the provision in the Consti
said). As such, jurisdiction must be granted to the RTC, since no other court or
agency has jurisdiction over it.
- Present contest is based on allegations of fraud and irregularities, which
involves a legal question that is determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial
body.
- There is also the involvement of a demandable right (right to a canvass free
fromfraud, anomalies, and irregularities) which arose fromtheir right to to vote
in a plebiscite.
- Jurisdiction is settled upon determining WoNthere is involvement of a judicial
controversy or a purely administrative function. In this case, it is clearly judicial.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
ALLIANCE OF GOVERNMENTWORKERS V MINISTER OF
LABOR
GUTIERREZ; August 3, 1983
FACTS
- Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor
federation while the other petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from
among the employees of the following offices, schools, or government-owned
or controlled corporations: PNB, MWSS, GSIS, SSS, PVTA, PNC, PUP. The
workers in the respondent institutions have not directly petitioned the heads of
their respective offices or their representatives in the Batasang Pambansa.
They have acted through a labor federation and its affiliated unions. The
workers and employees are taking collective action through a labor federation
which uses the bargaining power of organized labor to secure increased
compensation for its members.
- The petitioners contend that they should be included as recipients of the P.D.
851 Christmas bonus which states:
SECTION1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P
1000 a month, regardless of the nature of their
employment, a 13
th
-month pay not later than
December 24 of every year.
SECTION2. Employers already paying their employees a 13
th
-
month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this
Decree.
- Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD851 provides:
Section 3. Employees covered. The Decree shall apply to all employers
except to:
b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except those
corporations operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the
Government;
- The petitioners argue that regulations adopted under legislative authority
must be in harmony with the provisions of the lawand for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. Alegislative act cannot be amended
by a rule and an administrative officer (Minister of Labor) cannot change the
law.
ISSUE
1. WONthe Court has jurisdiction over the case;
2. WON branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the
Government included among the employers under PD 851 are required to
pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of less than P1000 13
th
-month
pay;
3. Whether or not branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of
the Government are allowed to collectively bargain for wages and benefits.
HELD
1. The Court does not have jurisdictionover the petition.
Reasoning The petitioners are faced with a procedural barrier. The petition is
one for declaratory relief, an action not embraced within theoriginal jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. There is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for
petitioners statement that the SChas original and exclusive jurisdiction over
declaratory relief suits where only questions of laware concerned.
HOWEVER, thepetition has far reaching implications and raises questions that
should be resolved.
2. Government employees are not entitled to 13
th
-month pay as provided
in PD851.
Ratio Unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of
any legislation or decree (STATCON).
ReasoningThe Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered
by a general termlike employer unless the language used in the lawis clear
and specific to that effect.
In fact, it has been expressly stated in Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing PD851 that Government subdivisions, etc. are not covered by
the Decree. The benefit is extended only to employees of private companies/
corporations. In addition, Sec. 2 of PD851 bars the petitioners fromreceiving
the bonus, since government offices have instituted an across the board wage
increase.
3. Public officers and employees may not join associations which impose
the obligation to engage in concerted activities in order to get salaries,
fringe benefits, and other emoluments higher than or different fromthat
provided by lawand regulation.
Reasoning Since the terms and conditions of government employment are
fixed by law government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions fromtheir employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private
employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. In
government employment, it is the legislature and the administrative heads
(when properly delegated the power) of government which fix the terms and
conditions of employment.
- Under the present Constitution, government-owned or controlled corporations
are specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil service (Section 1, Article
XII-B). This was to correct the situation where more favored employees of the
government could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. Salaries and fringe
benefits of those embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. As such
petitioners have no standing to bargain collectively (or to bargain at all) for
wages.
SEPARATE OPINION
FERNANDO [concur pro hac vice]
- This is in conformity to the prevailing doctrine of statutory construction that
unless so specified, the government does not fall within the terms of any
legislation or decree.
- ART. XIII Sec. 1: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility xxx
> Under the Constitution there can be no right to strike by themnor to take a
mass leave which is a way of doing indirectly what is not legally allowable.
- Government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in
the private sector to secure concessions fromemployers (terms are fixed by
law).
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- All the whereases are the premises of the decree requiring all employers to
pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1000 a
month. All working masses, without exception whether private sector or public,
are also suffering from ravages of inflation, and are entitled to properly
celebrate Christmas every year.
- Both the employees of the respondents and the employees of the private
sector are similarly situated and have collective bargaining agreements with
their respective employers.
NATIONAL SERVICE CO. V NLRC
PADILLA; November 29, 1988
FACTS
- Nature: Special civil actions for certiorari to reviewthe decision of the NLRC.
- Summary: In NASECO, the Court explained that the civil service under the
1987 Const does not cover employees fromGOCCs organized as subsidiaries
under the general corporation law. Accordingly, employees in such GOCCs are
under NLRCs jurisdiction. By further implication, the auditing power of COA
does not apply over said GOCCs.
- Eugenia Credo was an employee of NASECO, a corporation that provides
manpower services to PNBand its agencies. Because of certain administrative
charges against her such as discourtesy and insubordination, she was
dismissed fromNASECOin 1983. In the same year Credo filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, which was eventually decided by the NLRC in 1984 in her
favor.
- NASECOcontends, among others, that the NLRC
44
has no jurisdiction to
order Credos reinstatement. NASECOclaims that, as a GOCC[by virtue of its
being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation
(NIDC), a subsidiary of the PNB, which in turn is a GOCC], the terms and
conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations. In support of this argument, NASECO cites
National Housing Corporation vs. Juco[134 SCRA172 (1985)], where SCheld
that "employees of GOCCs are governed by the civil service law.
ISSUE
For the purpose of determining whether the case falls under the NLRCor CSC,
WONNASECO(without original charter) covered by the civil service as defined
in the 1987 Constitution
HELD
- GOCCs without legislative charter shall not be deemed to be embraced by
the termcivil service under the Constitution. By implication, labor disputes in
said GOCCs shall fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRC. By further implication,
the auditing power of COAshall not apply to them.
Reasoning In the matter of coverage by the civil service of GOCCs, the 1987
Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 Constitution, upon which NHC is
based. Under the 1973 Const, it was provided that
"[t]he civil service embraces everyinstrumentality of
the Government, including every government-owned
or controlled corporation."
- On the other hand, the 1987 Const provides that [Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)]
[t]he civil service embraces allinstrumentalities
of the Government, including government owned or
controlled corporations with original charters."
- Thus, the situation sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and the
NHC case regarding subsidiary corporations created under the Corporation
Code, whose "officials and employees would be free from the strict
accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the
Commission on Audit, appear relegated to relative insignificance by the above
1987 Constitutional provision. By clear implication [of Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(1)], the
Civil Service does not include GOCCs which are organized as subsidiaries of
GOCCs under the general corporation law.
45
- On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case
because it is the Constitution in place at the time of [SCs] decision thereof, the
NLRChas jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary
of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECOis a GOCCwithout
original charter.
46
NLRCdecision affirmed.
CRISTOBAL V MELCHOR
MUNOZ-PALMA; July 29, 1977
FACTS
44
BRYAN_SJ: NLRCdoesnot havejurisdictionover thosecoveredbytheCSC. It hadjurisdiction
onlabor issuesof privatecorporationsor broadlyspeaking, privatebusinesses.
45
BRYAN_SJ: A corporation can be created generally in two ways: by incorporation under the
Corporation Code, or by special law. Corporations created by special law are also called
corporationswithspecial/original charters.
46
BRYAN_SJ: What the Court seems to mean is that although PNBhas an original charter, and
hence covered by civil service law, NASECO(as PNBs sub-subsidiary) was organized under the
CorporationCode. Hence, NASECOisunder NLRCsjurisdiction.
- Jose Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the
Presidents Private Office in Malacaan, having been appointed to that
position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. On the second
week of January, 1962, the then Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc, thru a
letter, informed the plaintiff that his services as private secretary in the
Presidents Private Office were terminated effective January 1, 1962. Asimilar
letter was addressed by Sec. Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of
the President (OP). The dismissed employees appealed to the President by
means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a
reconsideration of their separation fromthe service. In a letter dated February
21, 1962, their request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc,
acting by authority of the President.
- On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated (excluding
Cristobal) filed a civil action before the CFI of Manila against Secretary Mutuc
and the Cash Disbursing Officer of the OPpraying for reinstatement and the
payment of their salaries effective as of January 1, 1962. Froma judgment
dismissing their complaint, the said employees appealed to the Supreme Court
which rendered a decision promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the
dismissal of their complaint and declaring their removal fromoffice as illegal
and contrary to law, and ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their
salaries fromJanuary 1, 1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
- Sometime in May, 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul Ingles, et al was
still pending in the CFI of Manila, the dismissed employees who filed said
action were recalled to their positions in the OP, without prejudice to the
continuation of their civil action. With respect to the other employees who were
not reinstated Cristobal included, efforts were exerted by Sec. Mutuc to look
for placements outside of Malacaan so that they may be reemployed.
Cristobal waited for Sec. Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be
recalled to the service, until the latter was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at
the opportune time.
- After the decision of the SC promulgated on November 29, 1968, the plaintiff
addressed a letter to the OPdated January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement
to his former position and the payment of salary fromJanuary 1, 1962 up to the
time of actual reinstatement, supposedly in accordance with said decision. This
request was denied repeatedly by the OP in successive letters addressed to
the plaintiff dated September 1, 1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970, May
23, 1970, and May 19, 1971, the last of which declared the matter definitely
closed,
- Consequently, Cristobal filed on August 10, 1971, with the CFI of Manila a
complaint against then Exec. Sec. Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala,
Cash Disbursing Officer of the OP, and praying for the following: 1. Declaring
his dismissal as illegal and contrary to law; 2. Ordering Sec. Melchor to certify
his name in the payroll of the OP, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the
effective date that he was illegally dismissed from the service; 3. Ordering
Arcala to pay all the emoluments and/or salary to which the plaintiff is entitled
effective as of January 1, 1962; and 4. Ordering themto allowhimto continue
with the performance of his duties in the Secretary Office Staff, Office of the
President of the Philippines.
- The defendants, represented by the Solicitor General alleged that Cristobal
had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for
failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year
fromthe date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court,
he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby
in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any
salary fromtermination of his employment.
- On May 18, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint reasoning that: Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that an action against a public office or employee may not
be filed for the plaintiffs ouster fromoffice unless the same is commenced
within one year after the cause of the ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold
much office or position arose. This period of one year is a condition precedent
for the existence of the cause of action for quo warranto. The rationale of this
doctrine is that the Government must be immediately informed or advised if
any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service, as
against another actually holding- it, so that the Government may not be faced
with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually
holding the office although illegally, and another for one not actually rendering
service although entitled to do so. The fact that the petitioner sought to pursue
administrative remedies to secure his reinstatement does not excuse the failure
to file the action within the one year period.
ISSUE
WONCristobal has abandoned his right to seek judicial relief for not having
filed his complaint within the one-year period provided for in Section 16, Rule
66 of the Rules of Court
HELD
NO. The Court agrees that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an
office, the action must be instituted within the period of one year fromthe time
the cause of action arose; Persons claiming a right to an office of which they
are illegally dispossessed should immediately take steps to recover said office
and that if they do not do so within a period of one year, they shall be
considered as having lost their right thereto by abandonment. However, this
doctrine of laches (laches is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it) which is invoked to
defeat Cristobals suit, is not applicable in this case. There are certain
exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule.
Reasoning
1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal
amounting to abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.
> Upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962 advising himof his separation
from the service, Cristobal, with the other dismissed employees, sought
reconsideration in a letter dated January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention
of then Sec. Mutuc that he was a civil eligible employee with eight years of
service in the government and consequently entitled to security of tenure under
the Constitution. This was followed by another letter of January 26, 1962.
Reconsideration having been denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1962,
with the CFI of Manila entitled Ingles vs. Mutuc, which prayed for reinstatement
and payment of salaries as of January 1, 1962, wherein the SCheld that the
removal of the plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to lawand that they
were entitled to be reinstated with payment of their salaries fromJanuary 1,
1962up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
> Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-
participation is not fatal to his cause of action. During the pendency of the civil
case, Cristobal continued to press his request for reinstatement together with
the other employees who had filed the complaint and was in fact promised
reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later. More importantly, Cristobal
could be expected - without necessarily spending time and money by going to
court - to relic upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to
protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the
plaintiffs therein and the identifical relief being sought.
2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more
particularly then Sec. Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the
alleged delay in the filing of Cristobals present complaint for reinstatement.
> After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the dismissed employees, Cristobal
included, continued to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It was then that
Sec. Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the continuation of
the civil action, he would work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some of the
dismissed employees were recalled to their respective positions in the OP
among whomwere the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who were
not parties therein. Sec. Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the
Malacaan Office. In the meantime, however, Sec. Mutuc was replaced by
other Exec. Secretaries to whomCristobal over and over again presented his
request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal
would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportunetime".
> It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led
Cristobal to bide his time and wait for the Office of the President to comply with
its commitment. Furthermore, he had behind himthe decision of the Supreme
Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed should be applied in his favor. But
when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the letter of May 19,
1971 fromthe Office of the President denying his reinstatement and declaring
the matter "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in court
within one year fromhis separation, it was only then that he sawthe necessity
of seeking redress fromthe courts.
> Surely, it would nowbe the height of inequity and injustice, if after Cristobal
relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former
Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who preceded the herein
respondent Sec. Melchor, that the court hold that he lost his right to seek relief
because of lapse of time.
3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to lawon the strength of
the Supreme Courts decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc.
> In Ingles, the defendants maintained that the principal issue in the case was
whether or not the employees were occupying positions primarily confidential in
nature and therefore subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and that this issue was to be resolved in the affirmative. The Court held:
that one holding in the government a primarily confidential positionis "in
the Civil Service" and that "officers or employees in the unclassified" as
well as "those in the classified service" are protected by the provision in
the organic lawthat "noofficer or employee inthe Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4,
Article XII, 1935 Constitution); that while the incumbent of a primarily
confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing
power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not
"removed" or "dismissed" but that his termmerely "expires"; that there
was no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of the dismissed
employees were "primarily confidential" in nature and on the contrary the
compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely or
at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and consequently, considering that
the dismissed employees were admittedly civil service eligibles with several
years of service in the Government, their removal fromoffice was "illegal and
contrary to law".
> No evidence was adduced by the government to show that Cristobals
position was "primarily confidential". On the contrary as stated by this Court in
Ingles vs. Mutuc, the compensation attached to his itemand the designation of
the position indicate the purely clerical nature of his functions. In fact, none of
the letters sent to himfrom the OP ever indicated that he was holding his
position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that his services were
terminated because his termof office had "expired". The only reason given -
and this appears in the letter of September 1, 1969 fromthe OP- was that he
failed to institute the proper proceeding to assert his right, if any, to the position
within the period of one year fromthe date of termination and under settled
jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned his right to said office or
acquiesced in his removal.
> In granting relief to the Cristobal on the matter of back salaries, however,
there is no proof to showthat fromJanuary 1, 1962 up to the promulgation of
this decision, Cristobal at no time worked or was employed at some other
office. The court cannot ignore the probability of Cristobals having sought
employment elsewhere during that period to support himself and his family.
Considering the lapse of almost nine years before he filed this suit, the
resolved to grant back salaries at the rate last received by himonly for a period
of five (5) years without qualification and deduction.
> The Public Officials concerned are directed to reinstate Jose Cristobal, either
in the OPor in some other government office, to any position for which he is
qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject to present requirements
of age and physical fitness; and to pay himback salaries for a period of 5 years
at the rate of P4,188.00 per annumwithout qualification and deduction.
Decision Decision set aside.
ACOLOLA V TANTUICO
SANTOS; June27, 1978
FACTS
- Nature ORIGINAL PETITION for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary
injunction.
- Petitioner Arturo A. Acolola was assigned as Provincial Auditor of Capiz on
April 16, 1972. Sometime before December 12, 1972, an administrative
complaint was filed against himcharging himwith various irregularities in
connection with the discharge of his duties. The complaint was
subsequently dismissed.
- On December 27, 1974 he was again administratively charged with offenses
ranging from "misconduct, neglect of duty to incompetence in the
performance of official duties," which charges were likewise dismissed.
- On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as Acting Highway
Engineering District Auditor of Romblon, private respondent Horacio A.
Martinez, a contractor of Public Works Project in the province of Romblon, filed
another complaint against petitioner charging him, this time, with
(1) Delaying action on payment of vouchers.
(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of accomplished work:
(3) Refusal to assign an auditors representative to check deliveries of
materials at job sites at the time of deliveries;
(4) Piecemeal suspension of vouchers:
(5) Demanding free transportation and meals when on inspection of
materials delivered or work accomplished, and
(6) Demanding P24,000 cost of plane fare for his twin daughters trip to the
United States.
- Upon the recommendation of the Civil Security Office of the Commission on
Audit, an entrapment scheme was devised and executed on December 15,
1976. Petitioner was apprehended by the PCProvincial Command in the act of
receiving fromcomplainant Horacio A. Martinez, the amount of P2,000.00 in
marked P20 bills as bribe money, while he was about to enter his roomat the
Seaside Hotel.
- On January 12, 1977, aformal administrative chargewas preferredagainst
him. At the same time thepreventive suspensionof petitioner was ordered by
the respondent pursuant to Section 41, Presidential Decree No. 807.
Respondent, nowpetitioner, answered the charge.
- On May 12, 1977, petitioner was summarily dismissed fromthe service,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807, dated October 6, 1975. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration praying for a formal investigation denied, appeals to
Court, seeking: (1) the reviewand reversal of the order of May 27, 1977 of the
Acting Chairman Cormnission on Audit, (Hon. Francisco S. Tantuico Jr.)
summarily dismissing himfromthe service, on the grounds that respondent
acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
and the said order is violative of his constitutional rights; and (2) his
reinstatement to his former position. Petition was given due course,
respondents required to file their comments, TROissued.
- On March 18, 1978, the Solicitor General for and in behalf of respondent
Tantuico, Chairman of COA, filed the required comment and prayed that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner filed his rejoinder (should be
reply) to the said comment on April 20, 1978.
ISSUE
WONthe respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit, could summarily
dismiss petitioner pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807.
HELD
Ratio Yes, the respondent Chairman of COA could summarily dismiss
petitioner Pursuant to PD807.
Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically provides:
"SEC. 40. Summary Proceedings.-No formal investigation is necessary and the
respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following
circumstances is present:
(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.
(b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and
there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.
(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
- Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining authority shall be done with
utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed:
Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the President, himself, or
upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission."
- Petitioner was caught red-handed by agents of the Philippine Constabulary in
the entrapment operations, and the evidence against himwas over whelming
which warranted his summary dismissal fromthe service under PD807. The
seriousness of the offense charged, the circumstances surrounding its
commission and the evidence of guilt, being overwhelming and indubitably
strong, the interest of the public service demanded the drastic remedy of
summary dismissal, which respondent Chairman of the Commission -on Audit
judiciously took against petitioner.
Decision Petition DISMISSEd for lack of merit. TROLIFTEDand SET ASIDE.
Voting 4 concur: Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, and Aquino
1 on official leave: Concepcion Jr.
SANDIGANBAYAN
NUNEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO; January 30, 1982
FACTS
- Petitioner Rufino Nuez was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials
- Informations were filed on February 21 and March 26, 1979
- On May 15, petitioner filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
jurisdictional grounds
- Respondent court denied the motion, as well as the MFR
- Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC, assailing
the validity of PD1486, as amended by PD1606, creating the Sandiganbayan
ISSUE
WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the due
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution
HELD
Petition dismissed. Petitioner has been unable to make a case calling for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1606.
Ratio
On the equal protection clause of the Constitution
- Petitioners premise is that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates
petitioners right to equal protection because:
> Appeal, as a matter of right, became minimized into a matter of discretion
> Appeal was limited to questions of law, excluding a reviewof facts and
trial evidence
> There is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the SC,
instead of the traditional two chances
while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a matter of right
covering questions of lawand of facts, and to two appellate courts (CAand
SC)
- Classification satisfies the test announced by this court in People v. Vera
> Must be based on substantial distinction
> Must be germane to the purposes of the law
> Must not be limited to existing conditions only and must apply equally to
each member of the class
- The Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court,
in response to problem, namely, the dishonesty in the public service.
- Petitioners, should therefore have anticipated that a different procedure that
would be prescribed for that tribunal would not be violative of the equal
protection clause
- The general guarantees of the Bill of Rights must give way to specific
provisions of the Constitution, for the promotion of the general welfare, which is
the end of the law
On the ex post facto provision of the Constitution
- Petitioners contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to
the ex post facto law is premised on the allegation that petitioners right of
appeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise.
- Justice Makasiar, in the Kay Villegas Kami decision, defined an ex post facto
lawas one which:
> makes criminal an act done before the passage of the lawand which was
innocent when done, and punishes such an act
> aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed
> changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when committed
> alters the legal rules on evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the lawrequired at the time of the commission of
the offense
> assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful
> deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which
he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty
- the lawful protection to which an accused has become entitled is qualified,
not given a broad scope
- the mode of procedureprovided for in the statutory right to appeal can hardly
be argued to be embraced therein
- the test to whether the ex post facto lawis disregarded, in the language of
Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Utah, is taking froman accused any right that
was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as vital for the
protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him
- the omission of the CA as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive the
petitioner of a right vital to the protection of his liberty
- his innocence or guilt is passed upon by a three-judge court, where a
unanimous vote is required
- if convicted, the SC has the duty to see whether any error of law was
committed
- the SCin determining whether to give due course to the petition for review
must be convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been
overcome
- SC carefully scrutinizes whether the quantum of evidence required for a
finding of guilt has been satisfied
- It is farfetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that the omission of the CA
as a reviewing authority results in the loss of vital protection of liberty.
On the due process clause of the Constitution
- Petitioner alleges lack of fairness
- In Arnault v. Pecson, the court declared that what is required for compliance
with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings is a fair and impartial
trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense
- In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is
informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he has to meet,
with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity
after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being imposed in
accordance with a valid law.
- If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only punished after
inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard,
and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he
has had due process of law.
ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
PER CURIAM; May 19, 1988
FACTS
GRNos. 79690-707
- Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar (Antique Governor) sought to restrain the
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzales from proceeding with the
prosecution and hearing of Criminal cases Nos. 12159 12161 and 12163-
12177
- Petitioner alleged that said cases were filed by Tanodbayan without legal and
constitutional authority since the 1987 Constitution conferred upon the
Ombudsman (not the present Tanodbayan) the authority to file cases with the
Sandiganbayan
GRNo. 80578
- Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, on substantially the same grounds as first
petition, sought to restrain Tanodbayan Gonzales fromconducting preliminary
investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan
ISSUES
1, WONthe Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, have the authority to
conduct preliminary investigations and direct the filing of cases with the
Sandiganbayan
HELD
NO. The incumbent Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution is without
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan
- The Tanodbayan, under the 1987 Constitution, has been transformed into the
Office of the Special Prosecutor which shall continue to function and exercise
its powers provided by law, EXCEPT those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the samConstitution (1987).
- The 1987 Constitution provides that the Ombudsman as distinguished
fromthe incumbent Tanodbayanhas the duty to investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
- The Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is thus a subordinate of the
Tanodbayan(Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon
the latters authority or orders.
Obiter Raul Gonzales does not remain as Ombudsman in as much as he has
not been replaced because he has never been the Ombudsman. The Office of
the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the 1987 constitution
different fromthe Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD1607.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
EXPORT PROCESING ZONE AUTHORITY V COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
GRINO-AQUINO; April 14, 1992
FACTS
- Nature Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition to reviewthe orders
of the Commission on Human Rights
- P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in
Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the Cavite Export Processing Zone
(CEPZ). The area was divided into four four Phases and Phase IVwas bought
by Filoil andwas later sold to EPZA.
- Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals, had
entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without
permission fromEPZAor Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully,
EPZApaid a P10K-financial assistance to those who accepted the same and
signed quitclaims. Among themwere Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, the
father of the respondent Loreto Aledia.
- Ten years later, the private respondents filed in CHRa joint complaint praying
for justice and other reliefs and remedies. The CHR conducted an
investigation.
- According to CHR, EPZA, together with help of PNP, bulldozed and level the
area, despite the fact that the occupants presented a letter fromthe Office of
the President of the Phil ordering postponement of bulldozing.
- Because of this, the CHR issued an Order of injunction to desist from
committing further acts of demolition, terrorismand harassment until further
orders fromthe CHRand to appear before the Commission for a dialogue.
- However, the same group again bulldozed the area and allegedly handcuffed
private respondent Valles, pointed their firearms at others and fired a shot in
the air.
- The CHRissued another injunction Order reiterating the same order.
- Procedure
1. EPZA filed in CHR a motion to lift the Order of injunction for lack of
authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders but this
was denied.
2. EPZAfiled a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer
for issuance of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. It was granted
by the Court.
3. CHRfiled a Motion to lift the restraining order contending that CHRhas
the power not only to investigate but also to provide for preventive
measures andlegal aid services to the under privilegedwhose human rights
have been violated or need protection (Art. 13 Sec. 18, 1987 Consti)
ISSUE
WONthe CHRhave jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order
against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and
desist fromcontinuing the acts complained of
HELD
NO. Not being a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body, the CHRitself
has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, for it may only be
issued by the judge of any court in which the action is pending (within his
district), or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court or by
the judge of the Regional Trial Court.
Reasoning
1. adherence to precedent
- In Hon. Isidro Carino vs. CHRthe Court held that the CHRis not a court of
justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. Fact-finding function is different from
adjudication and cannot be likened to a judicial function.
2, textual interpretation of the text - plain meaning
- The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction
for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by la. It is never derived
by implication.
- preventive measures and legal aid services refer ti extrajudicial and judicial
remedies which the CHR may seek fromthe proper courts on behalf of the
victims.
Decision The petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Orders of
injunction of CHR are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. TRO which the Court
issued is made PERMANENT.
ART XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
KRIVENKO V DIRECTOR OF LANDS
MORAN; November 15, 1947
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUMAND IMPERIUM)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS
BELLOSILLO; February 3, 1997
FACTS
- Respondent GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to
sell through public bidding 30%to 51%of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent MHCwhich owns the historic Manila Hotel. In a closed bidding held
on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51 %of
the MHCor 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
- Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS
dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner
sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33-000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSISrefused to accept.
- On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51%of the
MHCmay be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents fromperfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc
after it was referred to it by the First Division.
- The petitioner argues the following:
1. Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second Par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation
and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippines heritage and culture. To all intents and purpose, it
has become a part of the national patrimony.
2. Petitioner also argues that since 51%of the shares of the MHCcarries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
respondent GSIS, the hotel business of respondent GSISbeing a part of the
tourismindustry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the termnational economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.
3. It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national
economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSISmay offer this
to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share.
- Respondents maintain that:
1. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision
and requires implementing legislation(s). Thus, for the said provision to
operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions under which
business may be done."
2. Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the termnational patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleumand other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and
all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in
the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. While
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events
that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do
not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the
mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSISwhich possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from
the Philippines as a State.
3. Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold
is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51%of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.
Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHCis really contrary to the
Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right fromthe beginning
and not after it had lost in the bidding.
4. The reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. I., of the bidding rules
which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded
the Block of Shares, GSISmay offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing
to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced.
Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has
not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares.
5. The prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should
fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus
should fail as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and
respondents do not have an imperative duty to performthe act required of
themby petitioner.
ISSUES
1. WON Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is non-self-
executing
2. WONthe Manila Hotel falls under the termnational patrimony
3. WON 51% of the equity of MHC can be considered part of national
patrimony
4. WONpetitioner should be allowed to match the highest bid
5. WONGSIScommitted grave abuse of discretion
HELD
1. NO. Aprovision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without
the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in
such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. The argument of respondents that the non-self-executing
nature of Sec. 10, second par. of Art. XII is implied fromthe tenor of the first
and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing
because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and
the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as
it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give preference to
qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws
or rules for its enforcement. Fromits very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
2. YES. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the termnatural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. Its existence is impressed with public interest; its own
historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony.
3. YES. 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the
constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that
anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated fromthe hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and
distinct personality. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
fromthe government are considered "state action" covered by the Constitution
(1) when the activity it engages in is a "public function"; (2) when the
government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS
in selling 51%of its share in respondent MHCcomes under the second and
third categories of "state action." Therefore the transaction, although entered
into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.
4. YES. It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firmoffered the higher
bid it is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated
and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals.
Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly,
respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under
obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the
awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the
bidders and other interested parties. Paragraph V. J. I of the bidding rules
provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the
Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share. The constitutional mandate itself is
reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign
bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid.
Where a foreign firmsubmits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the
Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firmthe award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. The argument of respondents that petitioner
is nowestopped fromquestioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner
was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to
the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies,
or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already preferred at the
inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had
not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Only after it had matched
the bid of the foreign firmand the apparent disregard by respondent GSISof
petitioners matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
5. YES. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by
Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSISis left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHCand to execute
the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not
only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSISto execute the corresponding documents
with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the
bid of the Malaysian firmclearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Voting Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Kapunan, Francisco, and
Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur with the main opinion.
Narvasa, C.J, joins Justice Puno in his dissent.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA [concur]
- Under the 1987 Constitution, "national patrimony" consists of the natural
resources provided by Almighty God (Preamble) in our territory (Article 1)
consisting of land, sea, and air. The concept of national patrimony has been
viewed as referring not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural
heritage of our race. The Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national
patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional protection as to who shall own
it and benefit fromits operation. This institution has played an important role in
our nations history, having been the venue of many a historical event, and
serving as it did, and as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting
foreign heads of state, dignitaries, celebrities, and others.
- "Preference to qualified Filipinos," to be meaningful, must refer not only to
things that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the
very "heart of the existing order." In the field of public bidding in the acquisition
of things that pertain to the national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos
must allowa qualified Filipino to match or equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino;
the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the qualified Filipino and
the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be
made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the
qualified Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-
Filipino bidder if the preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be
significant at all.
VITUG [separate]
- The provision in our fundamental lawwhich provides that "(i)n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is self-
executory. The provision does not need, although it can obviously be amplified
or regulated by, an enabling lawor a set of rules.
- The term"patrimony" does not merely refer to the countrys natural resources
but also to its cultural heritage. A"historical landmark, Manila Hotel has now
indeed become part of Philippine heritage.
- The act of the GSIS, a government entity which derives its authority fromthe
State, in selling 51%of its share in MHCshould be considered an act of the
State subject to the Constitutional mandate.
- On the pivotal issue of the degree of "preference to qualified Filipinos," the
only meaningful preference would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to
match the foreign bid. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly
possible for the competing bids to stand exactly "equal" which alone, under the
dissenting view, could trigger the right of preference.
MENDOZA [separate opinion in the judgment]
- The only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos" is to allow petitioner Philippine
corporation to equal the bid of the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad for the
purchase of the controlling shares of stocksin the Manila Hotel Corporation.
- We are dealing here not with common trades or common means of livelihood
which are open to aliens in our midst, but with the sale of government property,
which is like the grant of government largess or benefits. Therefore no one
should begrudge us if we give preferential treatment to our citizens.
- Nor is there any basis for the suggestion that to allow a Filipino bidder to
match the highest bid of an alien could encourage speculation, since all the
Filipino entity would then do would be not to make a bid or make only a token
one and, after it is known that a foreign bidder has submitted the highest bid,
make an offer matching that of the foreign firm. This is not possible under the
rules on public bidding of the GSIS. Under these rules there is a minimumbid
required. If the Filipino entity, after passing the prequalification process, does
not submit a bid, he will not be allowed to match the highest bid of the foreign
firm because this is a privilege allowed only to those who have "validly
submitted bids."
TORRES [separate]
- History, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of
events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and
acceptance by the collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a
people. The Manila Hotel is part of our history, culture and heritage. The Manila
Hotel is witness to historic events which shaped our history for almost 84 years.
The history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a
purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical
values of our people.
PUNO [dissent]
- The vital issues can be summed up as follows:
1. Whether Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect;
2. Assuming Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII is self executing, whether the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation formpart of our
patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSISis included in the term"State," hence, mandated to
implement Sec. 10, Par. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution;
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it failed to give
preference to petitioner, a qualified Filipino corporation, over and
above Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation;
5. Whether petitioner is estopped fromquestioning the sale of the
shares to Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation.
- 1
st
issue: courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self
executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. If
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by
Congress. Case lawalso lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is not
self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers
the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into
effect. The first paragraph of Section 10 is not self-executing. By its express
text, there is a categorical command for Congress to enact laws restricting
foreign ownership in certain areas of investments in the country and to
encourage the formation and operation of wholly-owned Filipino enterprises.
The second and third paragraphs of Section 10 are different. They are directed
to the State and not to Congress alone which is but one of the three great
branches of our government. Their coverage is also broader for they cover "the
national economy and patrimony" and "foreign investments within [the] national
jurisdiction" and not merely "certain areas of investments." Their language does
not suggest that any of the State agency or instrumentality has the privilege to
hedge or to refuse its implementation for any reason whatsoever. Their duty to
implement is unconditional and it is now.
- The second issue is whether the sale of a majority of the stocks of the Manila
Hotel Corporation involves the disposition of part of our national patrimony. The
records of the Constitutional Commission show that the Commissioners
entertained the same view as to its meaning. According to Commissioner
Nolledo, "patrimony" refers not only to our rich natural resources but also tothe
cultural heritage of our race. The unique value of the Manila Hotel to our history
and culture cannot be viewed with a myopic eye. The value of the hotel goes
beyond pesos and centavos. The Hotel may not, as yet, have been declared a
national cultural treasure pursuant to Republic Act No. 4846 but that does not
exclude it fromour national patrimony.
- The third issue is whether the constitutional command to the State includes
the respondent GSIS. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is
essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original
charter to serve a public purpose. As a state-owned and controlled corporation,
it is skin-bound to adhere to the policies spelled out in the Constitution
especially those designed topromote the general welfare of the people. One of
these policies is the Filipino First policy which the people elevated as a
constitutional command.
- To date, Congress has not enacted a law defining the degree of the
preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules and regulations of
respondents Committee on Privatization and GSISto determine the degree of
preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale.
Alook at the rules and regulations will showthat they are silent on the degree
of preferential right to be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. However, they
cannot be read to mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to
petitioner for Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said
rules and regulations. I submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises
only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In that instance, all things stand equal,
and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder should be preferred. Under the
rules, the right to match the highest bid arises only "if for any reason, the
highest bidder cannot be awarded the block of shares" No reason has arisen
that will prevent the award to Renong Berhad. It qualified as a bidder. It
complied with the procedure of bidding. It was declared as the highest bidder
by the GSISand the rules say this decision is final. It deserves the award as a
matter of right for the rules clearly did not give to the petitioner as a qualified
Filipino the privilege to match the higher bid of a foreigner. What the rules did
not grant, petitioner cannot demand.
- Petitioner is estopped fromassailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad. It
knewthat the rules and regulations do not provide that qualified Filipino bidder
can match the winning bid after submitting an inferior bid. It knewthat the bid
was open to foreigners and that foreigners qualified even during the first
bidding. Petitioner cannot be allowed to obey the rules when it wins and
disregard themwhen it loses.
PANGANIBAN [dissent]
- The majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that,
after a bidding process is concluded, the losing Filipino bidder should be given
the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win. No statute empowers
a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning
foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majoritys strained
interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial
legislation, which makes bidding a ridiculous shamwhere no Filipino can lose
and where no foreigner can win.
- Aside frombeing prohibited by the Constitution, such judicial legislation is
short-sighted and, viewed properly, gravely prejudicial to long-term Filipino
interests. It encourages other countries - in the guise of reverse comity or
worse, unabashed retaliation - to discriminate against us in their own
jurisdictions by authorizing their own nationals to similarly equal and defeat the
higher bids of Filipino enterprises solely, while on the other hand, allowing
similar bids of other foreigners to remain unchallenged by their nationals.
- In the absence of a lawspecifying the degree or extent of the "Filipino First"
policy of the Constitution, the constitutional preference for the "qualified
Filipinos" may be allowed only where all the bids are equal. The Constitution
mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied. But
not when the ballgame is over and the foreigner clearly posted the highest
score.
MINERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V
SECRETARY
ROMERO; January 16, 1995
FACTS
- Controversy is due to the change introduced by Art XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution on the systemof exploration, development and utilization of the
countrys natural resources. Utilization of inalienable lands of public domain
throughlicense, concession or leaseis no longer allowed in the present Consti.
- With the state in full control and supervision, the only options for mineral
exploration development and utilization is only throughdirect undertaking or by
entering into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or
by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale
exploration, development and utilization.
- The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development and utilization of minerals, petroleumand other mineral oils
- In view of these provisions, the President issued Executive Order No. 211
and No. 279. The former prescribes interimprocedures in the processing and
approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of
minerals pursuant to the 1987 Consti. The latter authorizes the DENR
secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production or production-
sharing agreements, and prescribed guidelines for these agreements and
those with foreign-owned corporations
- To implement the legislative acts, the DENRSecretary promulgated AONos
57 and 82. The former converts all existing mining leases or agreements prior
to the 1987 Consti into production-sharing agreements except small-scale
mining leases and those pertaining to sand, gravel and quarry resources cover
an area of 20 hectares or less. The latter laid down the Procedural Guidelines
on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement Through Negotiation
(MPSA).
- It is for these AOs that the MAP, Inc. filed the petition
- They contend that:
o The issuance of the AOs was in excess of his rule-making power
under EO279
o The AOs violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Art 3,
Sec 10 of the 1987 Consti as
AO57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other
mining agreements and converts it into production-sharing
agreements within a year of its effectivity and
AO82 declares that failure to submit Letter of Intent and MPSA
within 2 years of effecitivity of guidelines shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and gravel permits
o AOs have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of EO279 as the Eos
merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of
location and all other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of
Mines and Geo-Sciences under PD463, as amended, until Congress
opts to modify the same
- ATROwas given enjoining the implementation of the AOs. The Continental
Marble Corp. also intervened as its DENRrefused to renewits mining permit
ISSUES
1. WONDENRSec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating AOs
57 and 82
2. WONPD463 continues to subsist insofar as it allows licenses, concessions
and leases for the exploration, utilization and development of mineral
resources
3. WONAO57 and 82 impairs vested frights as to violate the non-impairment
of contract doctrine as guaranteed by Art 3, Section 10 of the Consti
4. WONAO57 and 82 authorizes automatic conversion of mining leases and
agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti into production
sharing agreements
HELD
- There is no clear showing that the DENRSec has transcended the bounds
demarcated by EO279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to
grave abuse of discretion
o The power of administrative officials to promulgate
rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily
limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative
enactment
o By such regulations, the lawcannot be extended. So
long as the relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of law,
they are valid
o The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the lawas it has
been enacted
o In case of discrepancy between the basic lawand a
rule issued to implement said law, the basic lawprevails as rule or
regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law
o Sec 6 of EO269 specifically authorized the said official
to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement the provisions of the law. More so,
the subject sought to be governed and regulated is germane to the
objects and purposes of EO279, specifically issued to carry out the
mandate of the 1987 Consti
- PD463 is not the governing lawanymore as it pertained to the old systemof
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through license,
concession or lease which has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 the
1987 Consti., except those provision in PD463 that are not inconsistent with
the provisions of EO279
o To continue the licenses, concessions or lease would be inconsistent
witht raison detre of EO279 and contravening the express mandate
of the Article XII, Section 2 the 1987 Consti.
o The Consti only orders that the State have full control and supervision
of the mineral resources and the only mode for its exploration,
utilization and development is through a direct act, or may enter into
co-production, joint venture, production sharing agreements or into
agreement with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to
the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country.
- The AOs do not unduly preterminate existing mining leases in general as it
does not apply retroactively to license, concession of lease granted by
government under the 1973 Consti or before the effectivity of the 1987 Consti
but to those granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Consti and shall be subject
to modifications and alterations which Congress may adopt
o As such, by issuing EO279, the President validly modified or altered
the privileges granted as well as the terms and conditions of mining
leases under EO211
o Moreover, even if there were contracts, leases or agreements granted
by the State such as those granted by EO211, these are still subject
to alterations through a reasonable exerciseof the police power of the
State and even the court recognizes the superiority of police power
over the sanctity of the contract especially when such power is
exercised to preserve the security of the state and the means adopted
are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are,
therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
o The State may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on
non-impairment of contract fromaltering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under PD463 or EO211
o The object of this police power is clear the exploration, development
and utilization of mineral resources are matters vital to the public
interest and the general welfare of the people
- There is not provision in AO57 that leads to the conclusion of an authorization
of automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO211, into production-sharing
agreements
o The use of the termproduction-sharing agreement implies negotiation
and cannot be presumed as a unilateral declaration on the part of
government
o The MPSA requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after
negotiations are arrived at in good faith and in accordance with
procedure as laid out in AO82
Decision AO57and 82 are valid and constitutional
REPUBLIC V COURT OF APPEALS AND DELA ROSA
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
FACTS
- Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land divided
into 9 lots in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province on February 11, 1965 on his
own behalf and on behalf of his children. According to the application, Lots 1-5
were sold to Jose dela Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio
and Jaime Alberto, respectively in 1964. Balbalio and Alberto testified that they
had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription.
- It was opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation as to portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic
through the Bureau of Forestry Development as to Lots 1-9. Benguet opposed
on the ground that June Bug mineral claimcovering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934 by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly who located
the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. Atok
alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25,
1930 and recorded on January 2, 1931 in the Office of the mining recorder of
Baguio. The locations of the mineral claims were made in accordance with
Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
- The Bureau of Forestry Development argued that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. By reason of its nature, it was
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
ISSUE
WON the Benguet and Atok Mining Companies have exclusive rights to the
property in question.
HELD
YES. Though the property was considered forest land and included in the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, this did not impair the rights already vested
in Benguet and Atok at that time. The perfection of the mining claimconverted
the property into mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it from
the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land became
the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as
they did, to Benguet and Atok.
- There was insufficient evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants to support their claimof ownership.
They acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965.
- This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land. Thus, if a person
is the owner of agricultural land in which mineral is discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give himthe right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
- Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue
of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain
except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its
adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private
respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use could be
shared simultaneously by themand the mining companies for agricultural and
mineral purposes.
Voting Teehankee (C.J.), Narvasa, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, concur.
ATOK BIG WEDGE MINING V COURT OF APPEALS
PARAS; January 18, 1991
FACTS
- Fredia Mineral claimwas located in Itogon, Benguet by A. I. Reynolds in
1930. The mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining
Recorder. In 1931, the mineral claimwas sold by A.I. Reynolds to petitioner.
Since then petitioner has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and
possession of said claim.
- In 1964, respondent Liwan Consi constructed a house in the land where the
claimwas located. It was only in 1984 when he was told that said lot belonged
to Atok. Respondent contends that he had been paying taxes on said land
which his father had occupied before him. Atok filed a complaint for forcible
entry. The MTCdismissed the case. The RTCdecided in favor of Atok. Upon
appeal by Consi, the CA dismissed the forcible entry action ruling that both
Consi and Atok are holders of possessory titles, the former through long term
occupancy, and the latter by virtue of its being the claimlocator.
ISSUE
WONan individuals long termoccupation of land of the public domain vests
himwith such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that
claim
HELD
NO. The perfection of the mining claimconverted the property to mineral land
and under the laws then in force removed it fromthe public domain. As the
land had become private property of the locators (A.I.) they had the right to sell
it to Atok. Where there is a valid location of mining claim, the area
becomes segregated fromthe public and the property of the locator.
(Note however that the sale in the case took place in 1931) Atok then have
exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining
claims which they validly acquired before the 1935 Constitution prohibited
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption.
- Neither could Consi argue long termpossession. His possession was not in
the concept of owner of the mining claimbut of the property as agricultural
land. Since the subject lot is a mineral land, private respondents possession
did not confer upon himpossessory rights,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V KALAHI INVESTMENTS
MADIALDEA; January 31, 1989
FACTS
- On December 12, 1963, Kalahi Investment Inc., moved for an advanced
hearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca Cadastre. Evidence was presented
and Kalahis title was to be registered under the provisions of Act 496.
- It was later on found out that this lot was a vast land of mountain ranges
covering an area no less than 886,021,588 square meters. This lot contains the
alleged 123 mineral claims of Kalahi. It was also found out that the said lot was
labeled as timber land under RA3092. in the land classification of the province
of Pampanga and Zambales, these lands were also considered part of the
Project No. 11, Timber Land.
- The Bureau of Forestrys opposition on the registration of the lot is based on
the ground that these lands are part of the vast public forest known as TIMBER
LAND. These lots are not yet released as alienable agricultural lands and were
even declared by the President of the Philippines under Proclamation No. 82
as part of the Mt. Dorst Forest Reserve.
- Kalahi thus abandoned its former claimover Lot No. 1851-B. it limited its
claimto two land which when combined, cover an areaof 1,730 hectares. This
land contained the 123 mining claims of Kalahi and where the alleged 500,000
coffee plants were planted. Kalahi claimed and presented evidence that it had
located in 1934 and prior thereto 123 mineral claims in Floridablanca
Mountains; made annual assessments work thereto; made declaration of
location and paid annual assessment work from1965-1966; constructed roads
traversing the mountains and hills and planted 500,00 coffee trees. These
however were not considered by the court as basis sufficient in lawand in fact
for the registration of title under act 496.
- Kalahi thus contended that these mineral lands were nowsegregated from
government lands and its mining claims thereon deemed property rights. These
were based on an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated August 31, 1956
which stated that the legal effect of a valid location of a mining claimis not
only to segregate the area fromthe public domain, but to grant the locator the
beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefore upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by lawthe area is
segregated and becomes the property of the locator.
- Citing the San Mauricio doctrine
Under the Act of Congress of 1902 (Philippine Bill), a right or rights acquired
by a holder of unpatented but valid and existing claimlocated and registered
under its provisions becomes the property of the locatorthe right of the
locator to enjoy the surface ground and the minerals within the limits of his
claim becomes exclusive as against the whole world, limited only by
extralateral rights of adjoining locators. He is not required to purchase the claim
or secure a patent and as long as he could comply with the mining laws, his
possessory rights of ownership are asgood as though secured by patent.
- It also claims registration of title based on its actual, open, public, peaceful,
continuous, adverse possession in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years or confirmation of imperfect title under Sec. 48 (b) CA141 as amended
by RANo. 1942.
- In its decision, the court a quo denied the claimfor registration ruling that a)
the 123 mining claims are governed by mining law; hence under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Mines which is the proper agency to enforce the claims and to
adjudicate the rights of the claimants, which in fact Kalahi recognized when it
filed an application for lease with said Bureau, and b) that the claim for
confirmation of imperfect title based on the evidence of Public Land Law
provisions:
- The lands in the public domain are classified under three main categories:
Mineral, Forest and Agricultural lands in the public domain that title could be
issuedthe Public Lawnever governs private lands.
- The Public Land Lawis not applicable to forest lands nor to mineral lands.
The confirmation of imperfect land title can not be basis for registration of titles
over forest and/or mineral lands.
- On appeal Kalahi assigned as errors the following:
1)the lower court erred in not considering the basis for the registration of
land in question sufficient in lawand in fact.
2)the lower court erred in declaring that the doctrine of the Supreme Court
and the opinion of the Secretary of Justice never contemplate of a
procedure that will entitle the claimants to the registration of the lands in
question.
3)the lower court erred in denying the claimfor registration of the claimants
title over the land in question at last a portion thereof covered by the mining
claims and their gaps.
- On the other hand the Director of Lands contended:
Kalahi admitted that the land in question is a mining property consisting of
mining claims located and registered under the provisions of the Act of the US
Congress of July 1, 1902. and as such, said Act requires Kalahi as holder of
mining claims to do no other act except to proceed with the acquisition of
mining patent in the Bureau of Mines. The Act prescribes an explicit and
definite procedure by which mining patents are to be secured
administratively
- CAthus certified the following questions (issues) for SCresolution:
ISSUES
1. WONmining claims acquired, registered perfected and patentable under the
Old Mining Lawmatured to private ownership would entitle claimant-appellant
to the ownership thereof
2. who has the authority to examine process and find out WON the
requirements of the Act of Congress of 1902 have been complied by applicant-
the Court or the Bureau of Mines
HELD
1. NO. In the recent case of Santa Rosa Mining Co. v Hon Minister of Natural
Resources Jose Leido jr. and Director of Mines Juanito Fernandez the SC
ruled that while it recognized that the right of a locator of a mining claimis a
property right, this right is not absolute. It is merely a possessory right
more so when petitioners claims are still unpatented. Mere location does
not mean absolute ownership over the located claim. It merely segregates the
located land or area fromthe public domain by barring other would-be locators
fromlocating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found
thereinthe intention of the lawmaker is that the locator should faithfully and
consistently comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements
in the located mining claims. This case modifies the San Mauricio doctrine in
that while a perfected location of a mining claimhas the effect of segregating
said land fromthe body of public domain, the area covered does not thereby
become the private property of the locator.
- Concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v Rodriguez
and Abadilla: my opinion is that while the locator, under the circumstances,
secures the beneficial ownership or thedominumutile, the government retains
the bare ownership or the dominiumdirectum, until the locators claimripens
into full ownership upon full compliance with all requirements of the lawfor the
issuance of a patent.
- Dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Gold Creek Mining Corp.
case: To give a broader meaning and give a greater effect to the location of a
mining claim is to contend that location is all that is necessary to acquire
absolute ownership over a located mining claim. This is not the law. Location
without more,confers only the right of possession I maintain that in
prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any existing right, the
Constitution does not refer to the right of location or the inherent right of
possession, or any inchoate or contingent right which are only means to bring
about another right; it refers only to the right to obtain apatent.
- It is not clear if Kalahi has fully complied with the requirements of Act of
Congress of 1902. this is a factual issue which is beyond the issue of the
Court. Nonetheless, even assuming claimant to be a holder of a subsisting and
valid patentable mining clai8m, we hold that it can no longer proceed with the
acquisition of a mining patent in viewof PDNo. 1214 issued in October 14,
1977, directing holders of subsisting an valid patentable mining claims located
under the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1902 to file a mining lease
application within one year of the approval of the Decreenon-filing of the
application within the period prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all his
rights to the claim.
- Records showthat claimant has already filed a mining lease application.
2. Having filed a mining lease application, its mining claims therefore, are
deemed covered by PD 1214 and the Bureau of Mines may accordingly
process the same as a lease application, in accordance with PD463, pursuant
to PD1214. As to whether or not the Bureau of Mines is qualified to rule on
whether there has been full and faithful compliance with the requirements of
Philippine Bill of 1902, SCruled that the Bureau is empowered as a corollary
function in the processing of mining lease applications.
Decision The decision of the CFI of Pampanga is affirmed, with the
modification that Kalahis mining claims may be processed as a mining lease
application by the Bureau of Mines.
TAN V DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
MAKASIAR; October 27,1983
FACTS
- Petitioner-appellant: Wenceslao Vinzons Tan
- Respondents-appellees: Sec. of Agri. And Nat. Resources (DANR) Jose
Feliciano, Director of Bureau of Forestry (BOF) Apolonio Rivera
- Intervenors: Ravago Commercial Co., Jorge Lao Happick, Atanacio Mallari
- April 1961 the Bureau of Forestry issued a notice advertising for public
bidding a tract of public forest land (6,420 hectares) in Olongapo, Zambales. It
was located within the former USNaval Reservation.
- May 5, 1962 petitioner Wenceslao Tan submitted his application plus nine
other applicants
- Thereafter, questions arose as to the wisdomof having the are declared as a
forest reserve or allowthe same to be awarded to the most qualified bidder
- June 7, 1961 then Pres. Carlos Garcia issued a directive to the Dir. Of
Bureau of Forestry to prepare a draft proclaiming the said land as a watershed
forest reserve for Olongapo and to reject the bids they have received
- Sec. Fortich (DANR) however sustained the recommendations of the director
of BOF who concluded that it would be beneficial to the public interest of the
are is made available for exploitation. The Director said that to the declare the
forest are as a forest reserve rather than to open it for timber exploitation under
license and regulation would do more harmthan good to the public interest
since it might just become a Free Zone and Logging Paradise to the problem
loggers of Dinalupihan, Bataan an open target for timber smugglers and
kaingineros; also, rejecting the received bids would cause the department huge
embarrassment
- The area was then awarded to Wenceslao Tan by the BOF against the other
bidders, Rovago Commercial Company and Jorge :Lao Happick
- May 30, 1963 DANRSec. Gozon (who succeeded then Sec. Fortich)
issued a memorandumauthorizing the grant of newordinary timber license for
areas not more than 3,000 hectares each and the extension of ordinary timber
licenses for areas not exceeding 5000 hectares
- Dec. 19, 1963- Gozon was then replaced byactingSec. Jose Feliciano, who
upon assumption of office he revoked the memorandum.
- But that same day, the license of Wenceslao Tan was signed by acting
Director of (BOF), Estanislao Bernal, without the approval of the Secretary of
DANR
- Ravago Commercial Company and Jorge Lao Happick then wrote a letter to
the Sec. of DANRpraying that the license issued to Tan be cancelled on the
ground that it was irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry laws,
rules and regulations
- The license was declared void ab initio
- Petitioner Tan claims that respondents unlawfully, illegally, whimsically,
capriciously and arbitrarily acted w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license
without just cause, by denying petitioner Tan of the equal protection of the laws
and by depriving himof his constitutional right to property w/o due process of
lawby impairing the obligation of contracts
- His petition was dismissed because it did not state a sufficient cause of
action
ISSUE
WONthe facts in the petition constitute a sufficient cause of action
HELD
cause of action3 essential elements
1. legal right of the plaintiff
2. correlative obligation of the defendants
3. the act or omission of the defendant in violation of that right
NO.
- the petition was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claimupon
which relief could be granted; the timber license relied upon by the petitioner
was void ab initio
- also, court takes judicial notive that the are has been declared a forest
reserve on April 39, 1964
- what is important for the validity of a timber license is the date of release of
the license and n the sate of signing. Before the release, not tight is acquired
by the licensee. Tans license was signed Dec. 9, 1963 and was released Jan.
6, 1964by January 6, the Director of Forestry no longer had any authority to
release the license
- the petitioner had not acquired any legal right under such void license
- the petitioner also failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. He should
have appealed the order of the DANRSecretary to the President, who has the
power to review on appeal the orders/acts of the said secretary where
administrative appeal is available, special civil action of certiorari cannot be
availed
- moreover, not only did the petitioner fail to exhaust his administrative
remedies, he also failed to note that his action is a suit against the state which
under the doctrine of immunity fromsuit, cannot prosper unless the state gives
it consent to be dued
- Next, granting that the license granted to himwas valid, still the respondents
can validly revoke this license
REPUBLIC V QUASHA
REYES; August 17, 1972
FACTS
- The case involves a judicial determination of the scope and duration of the
rights acquired by American citizens and corporations controlled by themunder
the Parity Amendment appended to the Constitution as of Sept. 18, 1946
- WilliamQuashais an American citizen who purchased a land in Forbes Park
on Nov.26,1954. He filed a petition on March 1968 where he averred the
acquisition of the said land; that the RP claimed that upon expiration of the
Parity Amendment (PA) on July 3, 1974, rights acquired by US citizens shall
cease; that this claimaffects his right and interest and that the uncertainty as to
the status of his property after the PAends reduces the propertys value and
precludes himfromhaving improvements made on it; and sohe contends that
the ownership of properties during the effectivity of the PA continues
despite its termination
- Sol.Gen. Antonio Barredo: land acquired by Quasha is private agri. land
and that the acquisition violated Sec.5 Art.XIII of the Constitution which
prohibits the transfer of private agricultural land to non-Filipinos except by
hereditary succession; and assuming validity of acquisition, his rights acquired
through the PAwill expire on July 3, 1974
- CFI: rendered decision in favor of plaintiff, holding that acquisition was valid
and he has a right to continue in ownership of property even beyond July 1974.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON by virtue of the so-called PA to the Philippine Constitution Quasha
could validly acquire ownership of the private residential land which is
concededly classified private agricultural land
2. On the assumption that Quashas purchase of the private agricultural land is
valid and constitutional, WONhis rights will expire on July 3, 1974
HELD
1. NO. The Parity Amendment gives Americans no right to validly acquire
ownership of private agricultural land in the Philippines.
-examination of the PAreveals that it only establishes an express exception
to 2 provisionsSection 1 Article XIII (disposition, exploitation, etc. of public
lands) and Section 8 Article XIV(operation of public utilities)
> no other provision was referred to, not Sections 2 &5 of Art.XIII
-Quasha argues that since PA permitted US citizens/entities to acquire
agricultural lands of the public domain, then such citizens/entities became
entitled to acquire private agricultural land in the Phils., even without
hereditary succession
>this argument does not rest uponthe text of the PAbut upon a mere
inference; if it was ever intended to create an exception to Sec.5, it
would have bee mentioned just as Sec.1 and 8 were mentioned
-whether fromthe Phil. Or the American side, the intention was to secure
parity for US citizens only in: 1)exploitation, development and
utilization of public lands and other natural resources, and 2) the
operation of public utilities
-Quasha further contends that when the Constitution was adopted in 1935,
US citizens were already qualified to acquire public agri land, so even
without hereditary succession transfer of private agri lands to Americans is
permitted
>such capacity could exist only during the American sovereignty over
the Islands (before the RPis established)
2. His rights will expire. All the exceptional rights conferred upon US citizens
and business entities owned or controlled by them, under the Parity
Amendment, are to last during the effectivity of the agreement entered into on
July 4, 1946, but in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974.
-text of PA: in no case to extend beyond July 3, 1974in conformity with
Article X, Section 2 this agreement shall have no effect after July 3, 1974. It
may be terminated be either the USor the Phils at any time...
-Quasha argues that the limitative period should not be applicable because
under Art.428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law
> this limitation already existed when he purchased the land
> The cant complain of deprivation of due process because PAis part of
Consti, the highest lawof the land
> if the Philippine Government can not dispose of its alienable public
agricultural lands beyond that date under PA, then, logically, the
Constitution, as modified by PA, only authorizes either of two things: a)
alienation or transfer of rights less than ownership or b) a resoluble
ownership that will be extinguished not later than the specified period.
Discussion
Historical Background
Article XIII Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources
Sec.1 All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain...belong
to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corps. At least 60%of the capital
of which is owned by such citizens...
Sec.2 No private corporation...may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares...
Sec.5 Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
Article XIVGeneral Provisions
Sec.8 No franchise...for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations organized under the laws
of the Philippines, 60%of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the
Philippines...
nationalistic spirit are self-evident in these provisions
1945 Report of the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs: when the
Philippines do become independent next July, they will start on the road to
independence with a country whose commerce, trade and political institutions
have been very damaged; internal revenue have been greatly diminished by
war.
in 1946, USenacted Philippine Trade Act authorizing the President of the US
to enter into an Exec. Agreement with the President of the Philippines, which
should contain a provision thatthe disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization...be open to citizens of the USand to all forms of business enterprise
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by UScitizens.; and that the govt of
the Phil. Will take such steps as are necessary to secure the amendment of the
Constitution so as to permit the taking effect as laws of the Phils. Of such part
of the provisions
Commonwealth Act No.733- authorized the President of the Phils. To enter
into the Executive Agreement
proposed amendment was submitted to a plebiscite and was ratified in Nov.
1946
Parity Amendment: Notwithstanding the provision of section 1, Article 13,
and section 8, Article 14, of the foregoing Constitution, during the effectivity of
the Executive Agreement entered into...on July 4, 1946...but in no case to
extend beyond July 3, 1974, the disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization...be open to citizens of the US and to all forms of business
enterprise owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by UScitizens in the same
manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the
Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of
the Philippines.
Laurel-Langley Agreement (revision of PA enacted in June 1955):
establishes some sort of reciprocity rights between USand Phils.
--no direct application to the case at bar, since the purchase by Quasha of the
property in question was made in 1954, prior to the effectivity of this agreement
LAUREL V GARCIA
GUTIERREZ; July 25, 1990
FACTS
- The subject property in this case (Roppongi) is one of the four (4) properties
in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations
Agreement entered into with Japan in 1956, the other lots being: Nampeidai
Property , Kobe Commercial Property, and Kobe Residential Property. The
properties are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses
inlife and property and their suffering during World War II.
- The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million
would be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments. Rep.
Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. The
Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the
Second Year Schedule.
- On August 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan.
- On July 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of reparations capital goods and services in
the event of sale, lease or disposition.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive has been pushing its
decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
Petitioners have filed two petitions to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
ISSUES
1. WONthe Roppongi property and others of its kind can be alienated by the
Philippine Government
2. WONExecutive Order No. 296, which entitles non-Filipino citizens or entities
to avail of reparations capital goods and services, is constitutional. WONEO
296 violate the following constitutional provisions:
a. constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national patrimony
stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution
b. reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the
public domain to Filipino citizens
c. there is preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony
d. WON there is protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair
competition and trade practices
e. WONthere is guarantee of the right of the people to information on all
matters of public concern
f. WONthere is declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest
HELD
1. NO, the Roponggi property is public domain. As property of public dominion,
the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group.
2. The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless
these questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is
necessary for the determination of the case. The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case
can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute
or general law.
Decision Petitions are GRANTED. Awrit of prohibition is issued enjoining the
respondents fromproceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo,
Japan.
RAMIREZ V VDA. DE RAMIREZ
ABAD-SANTOS; February 15, 1982
FACTS
- APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a
Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal
beneficiaries:
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez
- widow
- French who lives in Paris
- received(as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free portion
Roberto and J orge Ramirez
- two grandnephews
- lives in Malate
- received the (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
- companion
- Austrian who lives in Spain
- received usufructuary rightsof 2/3 of the free portion
- vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez
- Maria Luisa Palacios- administratix
- Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widows usufruct and in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wandas usufruct is
INVALIDbecause first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALIDbecause first heirs not related to
the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII
Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testators interest in the Santa Cruz Building
between widowand appellants violates testators express will to give this
property to them
- LC: approved partition
ISSUE
WONthe partition is valid insofar as
a. widows legitime
b. substitutions
c. usufruct of Wanda
HELD
a. YES, appellants do not question because Marcelle is the widow
47
and
over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution
of any kind whatsoever
48
- the proposed creation by the admininstratix in favor of the testators widowof
a usufruct over 1/3 of the free portion of the testators estate cannot be made
where it will run counter to the testators express will. The Court erred for
Marcelle who is entitled to of the estate en pleno dominio as her legitime
and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to have
anyadditional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will
run counter to the testators intention for as stated above his disposition even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
b. Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying before the testator is not the
only case where a vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according to Art 859
CC, cases also include refusal or incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is
VALID.
BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOIDbecause Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace Ramirez are not related to Wande and according to Art 863 CC, it
47
Art 900 CC: If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to of the
hereditaryestate
48
Art 904(2) CC
validates a fideicommissary substitution provided that such substitution does
not go beyond one degreefromthe heir originally instituted. Another is that
thereis no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufructuary to the
substitutes and in fact the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts the
establishment of the fideicommissary substitution when he permits the
properties be subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the
usufructuaries and naked owners.
c. YES, usufruct of Wanda is VALID
- Art XIII
49
Sec 5 (1935): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of the public
domain in the Philippines.
50
The lower court upheld the usufruct thinking that the Constitution covers not
only succession by operation of lawbut also testamentary succession BUT SC
is of the opinion that this provision does not apply to testamentary succession
for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land BUT an alien may be bestowed
USUFRUCTUARYRIGHTSover a parcel of land in the Philippines. Therefore,
the usufruct in favor of Wanda, although a real right, is upheld because it does
not vest title to the land in the usufructuary (Wanda) and it is thevesting of title
to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
Decision: Marcelle (as legitime), Jorge and Roberto Ramirez (free
portion) in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with
simplesubstitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace Ramirez
CRUZ V NCIP
PER CURIAM; December 20, 2000
(SEE DIGEST UNDER DOMINIUMAND IMPERIUM)
LA BUGAL TRIBAL ASSOCIATION V WESTERN MINING
CORPORATION PHILIPPINES
CARPIO-MORALES; January 29, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONin Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition.
- Assailed is the constitutionality of RA 7942, otherwise known as the
PHILIPPINE MININGACT OF 1995, along with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order 96-40, and of the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into on March 30, 1995 by
the Republic of the Philippines and Western Mining Corporation (Philippines),
Inc. (WMCP), a corporation organized under Philippine laws.
- July 25, 1987 President Aquino issued EO 279 authorizing the DENR
Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of the
Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. In entering
into such proposals, the President shall consider the real contributions to the
49
Art XIII (1935): ConservationandUtilizationof Natural Resources
50
Art XII Sec 7 (1987): Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private [removed agricultural] lands
shall be transferred or conveyed [1935: assigned] except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualifiedtoacquireor holdlandsof thepublicdomain[removedinthePhilippines].
economic growth and general welfare of the country that will be realized, as
well as the development and use of local scientific and technical resources that
will be promoted by the proposed contract or agreement. Until Congress shall
determine otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this Section, shall
mean those proposals for contracts or agreements for mineral resources
exploration, development, and utilization involving a committed capital in a
single mining unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in United States
currency (US$50,000,000.00).
- March 3, 1995 President Ramos approved 7942 to govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. RA 7942
defines modes of mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the
procedure for filing and approval, assignment/transfer, and withdrawal, and
fixes their terms. These also apply to FTAAs.
- The lawalso prescribes the contractors qualifications, grants certain rights
such as timber, water, easement rights and right to possess explosives.
Surface owners or occupants are forbidden frompreventing holders of mining
rights from entering private lands and concession areas. A procedure for
settlement of conflicts is also provided for.
- The Act restricts conditions for exploration, quarry and other permits. It
regulates the transport, sale and processing of minerals, and promotes the
development of mining communities, science and mining technology, and
safety and environmental protection.
- The governments share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated, taxes
and fees are imposed, incentives granted. Aside frompenalizing certain acts,
the law likewise specifies grounds for the cancellation, revocation and
termination of agreements and permits.
- April 9, 1995RA7942 took effect.
- March 30, 1995 Shortly before RA7942 took effect, the President entered
into and FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.
- August 15, 1995 DENR Secretary Ramos issued DENR Administrative
Order (DAO) 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA7942. This was later repealed by DAO96-40, s. 1996 which
was adopted on December 20, 1996.
- January 10, 1997 Counsels for petitioners sent letter to DENR Secretary
demanding that they stop the implementation of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40,
giving them15 days fromreceipt to act thereon. DENRhas yet to respond or
act on petitioners letter.
- Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order.
- Petitioners claimthat the DENRSecretary without or in excess of jurisdiction:
1) In signing and promulgating DAO96-40 implementing RA7942, the
latter being unconstitutional in that:
It allows fully foreign owned corporations to explore, develop,
utilize and exploit mineral resources in a manner contrary to Art.
XII, sec. 2, par. 4, 1987 Constitution
It allows the taking of private property without the determination of
public use and for just compensation
It violates Art. III, sec. 1
It allows enjoyment by foreign citizens as well as fully foreign
owned corporations of the nations marine wealth contrary to Art.
XII, sec. 2, par. 2
It allows priority to foreign and fully foreign owned corporations in
the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources
contrary to Art. XII
2) In recommending approval of and implementing the FTAA between
the President and WMCP because the same is illegal and
constitutional
- They pray that the Court issue an order permanently enjoining the
respondents fromacting on any application for an FTAA; declaring RA7942,
DAO96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional
and null and void; and, canceling the FTAA issued to WMCP as
unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
- Respondents, aside from meeting petitioners contentions, argue that the
requisites for judicial inquiry have not been met, the petition does not comply
with the criteria for prohibition and mandamus, and there has been a violation
of the rule on hierarchy of courts.
- WMCPsubsequently filed a Manifestation dated September 25, 2002 alleging
that on January 23, 2001 WMC sold all its shares in WMCP to Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. (Sagittarius), a corporation organized under Philippine laws, 60%of
the equity of which is owned by Filipinos and/or Filipino-owned corporations
while about 40%is owned byIndophil Resources NL, an Australian company.
- Because of this, the DENR Secretary, by Order of December 18, 2001,
approved the transfer and registration of the subject FTAA from WMCP to
Sagittarius. Said Order, however, was appealed by Lepanto Consolidated
Mining Co. (Lepanto). Because there is no final judgment yet, the case cannot
be considered moot.
ISSUES
1. WONcase is justiciable
2. WONEO279 took effect
3. WONthe WMCPFTAAis constitutional
4. WONRA7942 is constitutional
HELD
1. Case is justiciable.
Ratio In cases involving constitutional questions, the Court is not concerned
with whether petitioners are real parties in interest, but with whether they have
legal standing.
- Petitioners traverse a wide range of sectors. Among them are La Bugal
BLaan Tribal Association, Inc., a farmers and indigenous peoples cooperative
organized under Philippine laws representing a community actually affected by
the mining activities of WMCP, members of said cooperative, as well as other
residents of areas also affected by the mining activities of WMCP. Even if they
are not the actual parties in the contract, they claim that they will suffer
irremediable displacement as a result of the FTAAallowing WMCPto conduct
mining activities in their area of residence.
- And although RA 7942 and DAO96-40 were not in force when the subject
FTAAwas entered into, the question as to their validity is ripe for adjudication.
RA 7942 explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing
arrangements. The WMCP FTAA also provides that any termand condition
favorable to FTAA contractors resulting from a law or regulation shall be
considered part of the agreement.
- The petition for prohibition and mandamus is also the appropriate remedy.
Public respondents, in behalf of the Government, have obligations to fulfill
under said contract. Petitioners seek to prevent them from fulfilling such
obligations on the theory that the contract is unconstitutional and, therefore,
void.
- The contention that the filing of the petition violates the rule on hierarchy of
courts does not likewise lie. The repercussions of the issues in this case on the
Philippine mining industry, if not the national economy, as well as the novelty
thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to
this Court in the first instance. Indeed, when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public, this Court may brush aside technicalities
of procedure.
2. YES.
Ratio When the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
- Petitioners contend that EO279 did not take effect because its supposed
date of effectivity came after President Aquino had already lost her legislative
powers under the Provisional Constitution. But it was explained that the
convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative
powers by the President it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had
previously enacted.
3. NO.
Ratio The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of
legislative powers by the President and did not prevent the effectivity of laws
she had previously enacted.
In accordance with Art. XII, sec. 2 of the constitution, FTAAs should be limited
to technical or financial assistance only. However, contrary to the language of
the Constitution, the WMCPFTAAallows WMCP, a fully foreign-owned mining
corporation, to extend more than mere financial or technical assistance to the
State, for it permits WMCPto manage and operate every aspect of the mining
activity.
- WMCPnevertheless submits that the word technical encompasses a broad
number of possible services, perhaps, scientific and/or technological in basis. It
thus posits that it may well include the area of management and operations.
The Court is not persuaded. Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est a
person, object or thing omitted froman enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally. Moreover, the management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service
contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution
sought to eradicate.
- Respondents insist that agreements involving technical or financial
assistance is just another termfor service contracts. The proceedings of the
CONCOM indicate that the members used the terms interchangeably. The
Court is likewise not persuaded. While certain commissioners may have
mentioned the termservice contracts, they may have been using the term
loosely and not in the context of the 1973 Constitution. Also, the phrase
service contracts has been deleted in the 1987 Constitutions Article on
National Economy and Patrimony. If the CONCOM intended to retain the
concept of service contracts under the 1973 Constitution, it could have simply
adapted the old terminology instead of employing new and unfamiliar terms
(agreementsinvolving either technical or financial assistance).
- The UPLawDraft and Article XII, as adopted, uses the same terminologies.
And the UP Law draft proponents viewed service contracts under the 1973
Constitution as grants of beneficial ownership of the countrys natural
resources to foreign owned corporations. While, in theory, the State owns
these natural resources and Filipino citizens, their beneficiaries service
contracts actually vested foreigners with the right to dispose, explore for,
develop, exploit, and utilize the same. This arrangement is clearly incompatible
with the constitutional ideal of nationalization of natural resources. But the
proponents nevertheless acknowledged the need for capital and technical
know-howin the large-scale exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources. Hence, they proposed a compromise technical or financial
agreements.
4. NO, insofar as said Act authorizes service contracts.
Ratio Financial or technical agreements as contemplated in Art. XII, sec. 2
shall refer to financial agreements and/or technical agreements only and not to
service contracts.
- Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical
agreements, it actually treats these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to fundamental law.
Decision WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Court hereby declares
unconstitutional and void:
1) The following provision of RA7942
a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq)
b) Section 23,
c) Section 33 to 41,
d) Section 56,
e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, and
f) Section 90.
2) All provisions of DAO96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with
this Decision, and
3) The FTAAbetween the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
and WMCPhilippines, Inc.
Voting 8 concur including ponente, 5 dissent, 1 took no part
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG
- It could not have been the object of the framers of the Charter to limit the
contracts which the President may enter into, to mere agreements for financial
and technical assistance; The Constitution has not prohibited the State from
itself exploring, developing, or utilizing the countrys natural resources, and, for
this purpose, it may, enter into the necessary agreements with individuals or
entities in the pursuit of a feasible operation.
PANGANIBAN
- The petition should be dismissed on the ground of mootness. The dispute
claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is between two
Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of which side
wins, the FTAAwould still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino company.
- The word involving signifies the possibility of inclusion of other activities. If
the intention of the drafters were strictly to confine foreign corporations to
financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have
been unmistakably restrictive and stringent.
- The present Constitution still recognizes and allows service contracts (and
has not rendered them taboo), albeit subject to several restrictions and
modifications aimed at avoiding pitfalls of the past.
- In the minds of the commissioners, the concept of technical and financial
assistance agreements did not exist at all apart fromthe concept of service
contracts duly modified to prevent abuses technical and financial
agreements were understood by the delegates to include service contracts
duly modified to prevent abuses.
- Current business practices often require borrowers seeking huge loans to
allowcreditors access to financial records and other data, and probably a seat
or two on the formers board of directors, or at least some participation in
certain management decisions that may have an impact on the financial health
or the long-termviability of the debtor, which of course will directly affect the
latters capacity to repay its loans.
- If the Supreme Court closes its doors to international realities and unilaterally
sets up its own concepts of strict technical and financial assistance, then it may
unwittingly make the country a virtual hermit an economic isolationist in the
real world of finance.
- The commissioners fully realized that their work would have to withstand the
test of time, that the Charter, though crafted with the wisdom born of past
experiences and lessons painfully learned, would have to be a living document
that would answer the needs of the nation well into the future.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN; December 1, 2004
FACTS
- Marivic M.V.F. Leonen, et. al for petitioners
- SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONin Supreme Court. Mandamus and Prohibition
- Ponente: Panganiban, J. (takenote: major dissenter in part1)
- All mineral resources are owned by the State. Their exploration, development
and utilization (EDU) must always be subject to the full control and supervision
of the State. More specifically, given the inadequacy of Filipino capital and
technology in large-scale EDU activities, the State may secure the help of
foreign companies in all relevant matters especially financial and technical
assistance provided that, at all times, the State maintains its right of full
control. The foreign assistor or contractor assumes all financial, technical and
entrepreneurial risks in the EDUactivities; hence it may be given reasonable
management, operational, marketing, audit and other prerogatives to protect its
investments and enable the business to succeed.
- The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be
used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests.
Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient
discretion and reasonable leeway to enable themto attract foreign investments
and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the
blessings of prosperity and peace.
- On the basis of this control standard, this Court upholds the constitutionality
of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations insofar
as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well as the subject
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
ISSUES
1. WON the case been rendered moot by the sale of the WMC shares in
WMCP to Sagittarius and by the subsequent transfer and registration of the
FTAAfromWMCPto Sagittarius
2. Assuming that the case has been rendered moot, WON it would still be
proper to resolve the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the Mining
Law, DAO96-40 andthe WMCPFTAA
3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase Agreements Involving Either
Technical or Financial Assistance contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of
Article XII of the Constitution?
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The courts will decide a questionotherwise moot and academicif it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.
- The dispute claiming the right to purchase the foreign shares in WMCP is
between two Filipino companies (Sagittarius and Lepanto). So regardless of
which side wins, the FTAA would still be in the hands of a qualified Filipino
company. The plea to nullify the Mining Lawhas become a virtual petition for
declaratory relief, over which this Court has no original jurisdiction.
- Petitioners argue that the sale of shares and transfer of the FTAAis invalid.
Government cannot enter into FTAAwith Filipinos.
- It does not take deep knowledge of lawand logic to understand that what the
Constitution grants to foreigners should be equally available to Filipinos.
2. Ratio FTAAs are service contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety,
the grant thereof is subject to several safeguards.
- Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a case becomes moot and
academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits, what is at issue is
not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA but also the constitutionality of RA
7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts of private
respondent cannot operate to cure the lawof its alleged unconstitutionality or
to divest this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes
upon the Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any lawthat offends the
Constitution.
- But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hanging over
the mining industry, which is even nowscaring away foreign investments. It is
evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality
issue be resolved now. And citing Acop v. Guingona, the courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet
evading review.
3. Citing Francisco v. House of Representatives, the ponencia reiterated the
well settled principles of constitutional construction:
Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
Where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers.
Ut magis valeat quampereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole.
- Petitioners claimthat the phrase agreementsinvolving either technical or
financial assistance simply means technical assistance or financial assistance
agreements, nothing more and nothing else.
- But if that was the intention, then what is the point of requiring that they be
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the
country?
- It is also unclear howa verba legis approach leads to the conclusion that the
management or operation of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is
the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters
of the 1987Constitution sought to eradicate. If the framers had intended to put
an end to service contracts, they would have at least left some transitory
guidelines.
- The drafters will have to be credited with enough pragmatismand savvy to
knowthat these foreign entities will not enter into such agreements involving
assistance without requiring arrangements for the protection of their
investments, gains and benefits.
- Using ratio legis est anima, we may now examine the CONCOM
deliberations. It may be observed that the members use the terms financial
and technical assistance agreements and service contracts interchangeably.
Fromtheir statements, it may be concluded that FTAAs are service contracts.
But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards (in accordance with law, President as signatory, reporting to
Congress)
- With ut magis valeat quampereat, we may notice a contradiction between the
States full control and supervision and the safeguarded service contracts with
foreign contractors. It must be pointed out that the full control and supervision
cannot be taken literally to mean that the State controls and supervises
everything involved, down to the minutest details, and makes all decisions
required in the mining operations. Control by State may be on the macro level
establishment of policies, guidelines, regulations, industry standards, etc.
- To further disabuse the notion of these new service contracts, the
governments share in these operations will not be limited to taxes, duties and
fees to be imposed. Those only consist of the basic government share. The law
provides for an additional government share to be determined using formulas
presented in DAO 96-40, either of which results to at least 50%of the net
benefits fromthe mining.
Decision WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVESto GRANT the respondents
and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET
ASIDEthis Courts January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISSthe Petition; and to
issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL 1) RA 7942 (Phil.
Mining Law), 2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO96-
40 insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements
referred to in par. 4 of Section 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution; and 3) the FTAA
dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and WMCP, except
Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAAwhich are hereby INVALIDATEDfor
being contrary to public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Voting 10 concur including ponente, 4 dissent, 1 took no part
SEPARATE OPINION
CARPIO
- Provisions of RA7942 abdicate the States constitutional duty to control and
supervise fully the exploitation of mineral resources.
- The change in language in the Constitution was a clear rejection of the old
systemof license, concession or lease.
- The State as owner of the natural resources must receive income fromits
exploitationtaxes, fees and charges cannot substitute.
- State must receive at least 60%of the net proceeds in FTAAs, which share is
equivalent to the Filipino equity requirement.
- The majority opinion refused to accept that the State is entitled to what the
entire mining industry is willing to pay the State.
CARPIO-MORALES [part 1 ponente]
- Thephrase natural resources are owned by the State simultaneously vests
the legal title to the nations natural resources to the Government, and the
beneficial ownership of these resources in the sovereign Filipino people.
- In the EDUof natural resources, Government acts as trustee. So it cannot,
without violating its sacred trust, enter into any agreement or arrangement
which effectively deprives the Filipino people of their beneficial ownership of
these resources.
- Art. XII, sec. 2 in mentioning based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country articulates the value which the
Constitution places on natural resources, and recognizes their potential
benefits.
- Real benefits are intergenerational benefits because the motherlands natural
resources are the birthright not only of the present generation of Filipinos but of
future generations as well.
- Involving as the majority construes it runs counter to the restrictive spirit of
the provision.
- Either refers to one of two items and any is required when more than two
items are involved.
- Either is not merely descriptive but restrictive.
- Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est a person, object or thing omitted
froman enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
- It is understandable, however regrettable, that a government, strapped for
cash and in the midst of a self proclaimed fiscal crisis, would be inclined to turn
a blind eye to the consequences of unconstitutional legislation in the hope,
however false or empty, of obtaining fabulous amounts of hard currency; As
always, the one overriding the consideration of this Court should be will of the
sovereign Filipino people as embodied in their Constitution.
- The task of reclaiming Filipino control over Philippine natural resources now
belongs to another generation.
FREEDOMFROMDEBT COALITION V ERC AND
MERALCO
TINGA; January 15, 2004
FACTS
- Petitioners filed aPetition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Injunction with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status Quo Order
assailing the Order dated November 27, 2003 of respondent Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC), provisionally authorizing respondent Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO) to increase its rates by an average amount of
12 centavos per kilowatt hour. FreedomfromDebt Coalition (FDC) argues that
the saidOrder of the ERCis void for having been issued without legal basis or
statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Sec. 4 of the Implementing
Rules of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) is
unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDCfurther
asserts that the Order is void for having been issued by the ERCwith grave
abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance
of injunctive relief, FDCclaims that the implementation by MERALCOof the
provisional rate increase will result in irreparable prejudice to the FDC and
others similarly situated unless the court restrains such implementation.
- On Dec. 29, 2003, FDC filed with the Court an Urgent Motion to Grant
Restraining or Status Quo Order. On Jan. 9, 2004, the ERCissued an Order
clarifying that the provisional rate increase granted to MERALCOin its Nov. 27,
2003 Order should be applied beginning Jan. 1, 2004. The Court En Banc
issued on Jan. 13, 2004, a Resolution ordering ERC and MERALCOto file
their respective Comments on the Petition. The Court also enjoined ERCand
MERALCOto observe the status quo prevailing before the filing of thePetition
and set the case for oral arguments on Jan. 27, 2004. On Jan. 26, 2004, ERC,
MERALCO, and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective
Commentson thePetition.
- In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments of the OSG and
insists that it is authorized to issue provisional orders under the law. ERC
argues that it must not have been the intention of Congress to expand the
functions of the ERC, as the successor of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB),
andclip its powers at the same time. The ERCalso asserts that it is authorized
to issue provisional rate increasesex parte, and that it may base its provisional
order on the verified application and supporting documents submitted by the
application, and it is not required to wait for the comments of consumers or
local government units (LGUs) concerned before issuing a provisional order.
The ERC also denies that the Nov. 27, 2003 Order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion. On the contrary, it claims that the Order is supported by
substantial evidence. Finally, ERCcontends that the filing of the instant Petition
is premature because it was denied the opportunity to have a full determination
of the Application after trial on the merits, and is violative of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
- For its part, MERALCOasserts that theOrder is valid, because it was issued
by the ERC pursuant to Sec. 44 of the EPIRA which allows the transfer of
powers (not inconsistent with the EPIRA) of the old ERBto ERC. It also denies
that the assailed Order was issued by the ERCwith grave abuse of discretion,
asserting that on the contrary, the issuance thereof was based on the
Application, affidavits and other supporting documents which it submitted
earlier.
ISSUE
1. WONERChas legal authority to grant provisional rate adjustments under
RANo. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry ReformAct of
2001 (EPIRA)
2. Assuming that the ERChas the authority to grant provisional orders, WON
the grant by the ERCof the provisional rate adjustment in question constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
HELD
1. Yes. The ERC is endowed with statutory authority to approve provisional
rate adjustments under the aegis of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. The
sections read, thus:
Sec. 44. Transfer of Powers and Functions. Thepowers and functions of
the Energy Regulatory Board not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby transferred to the ERC. The foregoing transfer of powers and
functions shall include all applicable funds and appropriations, records,
equipment, property and personnel as may be necessary.
Sec. 80. Applicability and Repealing Clause The applicability provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the
Public Services Act, Republic Act 6395, as amended, revising the charter
of NPC; Presidential Decree 269, as amended, referred to as the National
Electrification Decree; Republic Act 7638, otherwise known as the
Department of EnergyAct; Executive Order 172, as amended, creating the
ERB; Republic Act 7832 otherwise known as the Anti-Electricity and
Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1004; shall continue
to have full force and effect except insofar as they are inconsistent with this
Act. The provisions with respect to electric power of Section 11(c) of
Republic Act 7916, as amended, and Section 5(f) of Republic Act 7277 are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
- Presidential Decree No. 40 and all laws, decrees, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)
The principal powers of the ERBrelative to electric public utilities transferred
to the ERCare the following:
1. To regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies;
2. To issue certificates of public convenience for the operation of electric
power utilities;
3. To grant or approve provisional electric rates.
- It bears stressing that the conferment upon the ERCof the power to grant
provisional rate adjustments is not inconsistent with any provision of the
EPIRA. The powers of the ERBtransferred to the ERCunder Section 44 are in
addition to thenewpowers conferred upon the ERCunder Section 43.
Section 80 of the EPIRA complements Section 44, as it mandates the
continued efficacy of the applicable provisions of the laws referred to
therein. The material provisions of the Public Service Act which continue to
be in full force and effect are contained in Section 16(c), which states thus:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing.
The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the
limitationsand exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, toll charges, classifications,
or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometrage, and
other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed
thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its
discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and
without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within
thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerned parties
operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case public
service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the
promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business shall
be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the
purposes of fixing the rates.
- Similarly, Sections 8 and 14 of EONo. 172 or the ERBCharter continue to be
in full force by virtue of Sections 44 and 80 of the EPIRA. Said provisions of the
ERBCharter read:
SEC. 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief. The Board may, upon the
filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and
without prior hearing, on the basis of the supporting papers duly verified or
authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on
its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should
the Board find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits, documents
and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion,
substantially support of the provisional order; Provided, That the Board shall
immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days
thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties.
SEC. 14. Applicability Clause The applicability (applicable) provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Service Act; Republic Act No. 6173, as amended, otherwise known as the
Oil Industry Commission Act; Republic Act No. 6395, as amended,
revising the charter of the National Power Corporation under CA 120;
Presidential Decree No. 269, as amended, also referred to as the National
Electrification Administration Decree, and Presidential Decree No. 1206, as
amended, creating the Department of Energy, shall continue to have full
force and effect, except insofar as inconsistent with this order. (Words in
parenthesis supplied).
- Furthermore, under Sec. 80, only three specific laws were expressly repealed
or modified. Sec. 8 of EONo. 172 and Section 16(c) of CANo. 146 which both
grant the regulatory body concerned the authority to approve provisional rate
increases are not among the provisions expressly repealed or modified. This
clearly indicates the laws intent to transfer the power to ERC.
- Be it noted that implied repeals are not favored in our jurisdiction. Thus, a
statute will not be deemed to have been impliedly repealed by another enacted
subsequent thereto unless there is a showing that a plain, unavoidable, and
irreconcilable repugnancy exists between the two.
- Likewise, it may not be asserted with success that the power to grant
provisional rate adjustments runs counter to the statutory construction guide
provided in Sec. 75 of the law. This section ordains that the EPIRA shall be
construed in favor of market competition and people power empowerment,
thereby ensuring the widest participation of the people. To the Court, the goals
of market competition and people empowerment are not negated by the ERCs
exercise of authority to approve provisional rate adjustments. The concerns are
taken care of by Sec. 43 of the EPIRAand its IRR. Again for one, even if there
is a ground to grant the provisional rate increase, the ERCmay do so only after
the publication requirement is met and the consumers affected are given the
opportunity to present their side. For another, the rate increase is provisional in
character and therefore may be modified or even recalled anytime. Finally, the
ERC is mandated to prescribe a rate-setting methodology in the public
interest and to promote efficiency. For that matter, there is a plethora of
provisions in Sec. 43 and related sections which seek to promote public
interest, market competition, and consumer protection.
- All the foregoing undeniably lead to the conclusion that the ERC, under
Sections 43(u), 44, and 80 of the EPIRA, in relation to Sec. 16(c) of the Public
Service Act and Sec. 8 of EO. No. 172, possesses the power to grant
provisional rate adjustments subject to the procedure laid down in these laws
as well as in the IRR.
2. Yes. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will, or personal bias.
What makes the challenged Order particularly repugnant is that it involves a
blatant and inexcusable breach of the very rule which the ERCis mandated to
observe and implement. The violated provision which is Sec. 4(e), Rule 3 of the
IRR specifies how the ERC should exercise its power to issue provisional
orders pursuant to Sec. 44 in relation to Sec. 80 of the EPIRA. First, the
application for rate increase must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the locality where the applicant operates; second, ERC must
consider the comments or pleadings of the customers and LGUconcerned in
its action on the application or motion for provisional rate adjustment. Since the
IRRwas issued pursuant to the EPIRA, Sec. 4(e) of Rule 3 as part of the IRR
has the force and effect of lawand thus should have been complied with.
- In view of the infirmities which attended the November 27, 2003 Order,
particularly: 1) the failure of MERALCOto publish its Application or at least a
summary thereof; 2) the failure of ERCto resolve theMotions for Production of
Documents filed by the oppositors to MERALCOs Applicationbefore acting on
the motion for provisional rate adjustment; and 3) the failure of the ERC to
consider the arguments raised by the oppositors in their respective pleadings
prior to the issuance of the assailed Order, the Court declares void the
November 27, 2003Order of the ERCfor having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V ROSEMOOR MINING
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PANGANIBAN; March 30, 2004
FACTS
- The petitioners, after having been granted permission to prospect for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, succeeded in discovering marble
deposits in Mount Mabio, which forms part of Biak-na-bato mountain range.
The petitioners then applied with the Bureau of Mines for the issuance of the
corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was
granted to them. Shortly after respondent Ernesto Maceda was appointed
Minister of the Department of Energy, he cancelled the petitioners license
through his letter to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation dated
Semptember 6, 1986. Because of the cancellation, the original petition was
filed on August 21, 1991.
- The trial court granted the petition and said that the privilege granted under
the license had already ripened into a property right, thus the cancellation of
the license without notice or hearing was against the Constitutional right of the
petitioners against deprivation of their property rights. It was unjustified
because that could be covered by four separate application is 400 hectares.
Finally, they ruled that Proclamation No. 84, which confirmed the cancellation
of the license, was an ex post facto law. Thus, they were allowed to continue
their operations until the expiration of their license.
- On appeal, the CA held that the grant of quary license covering 330.3062
hectares to the respondents was valid because it was covered by four separate
applications, each for an area of 81 hectares. Moreover, it held that the
limitation under PD463 - that any quarry license should not cover not more
than 100 hectares in any given province was supplanted by RA7942, which
increased the mining areas allowed under PD463,
ISSUES
1. WONthe case is moot and academic
2. WONthe license is valid
3. WONProclamation No. 84 is valid
HELD
1. No. With the shift of constitutional policy (Art 12 Sec 2) toward full control
and supervision of the State over natural resources the Court in Miners
Association of the Philippines vs Factoran declared the provisions of PD463
as contrary to the Constitution.
- RA7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 embodies the newconstitutional
mandate. It has repealed all laws that are inconsistent with any of its
provisions. However, it does not apply retroactively to a license granted by the
government under the 1973 Constitution. The Court therefore needs to
determine WONthe license of the respondents falls within the type of licenses
wherein the newlawcannot be applied.
2. No. The license granted to the petitioners is subject to the terms and
conditions of PD463. Proclamation No. 2202, which awarded the license to
Rosemoor, expressly states that the grant is subject to existing policies, laws,
rules and regulations. The license is thus subject to Section 69 of PD 463,
which states that a license cannot cover more than 100 hectares in any one
province. The lawdoes not provide any exception to the number of applications
for a license. Moreover, the license was issued solely in the name of
Rosemoore Mining and Development Corporation, rather than the four
individual stockholders.
3. Yes. Citing Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation vs. Balite Portal
Mining Cooperative, Tan vs. Director of Forestry and Ysmael vs. Executive
Secretary, the Court ruled that licenses may be revoked by executive action
when national interest so requires, because it is not a contract, property or a
property right protected by the due process clause. The license merely
evidences the privilege granted by the state and does not vest any permanent
or irrevocable right. The license likewise contains a provision which says that
the license may be revoked or cancelled at any time by the Director of Mines
and Geo-Sciences when in his opinion, public interest so require. As to the
exercise of prerogative by Maceda, suffice to say that while the cancellation or
revocation of the license is vested in the said director, the latter is subject to
the department head.
- Moreover, granting that the license is valid, it may also by revoked by the
State in the exercise of police power. The exercise of power through
Proclamation No. 84 is clearly in accord with jura regalia, which reserves to the
State ownership of all natural resources.
- Proc No. 84 is also not a bill of attainder since the declaration of the license
as a nullity is not a declaration of guilt. Neither is the cancellation a punishment
within the purviewof the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder.
- Proclamation No. 84 is also not an ex post facto law. It does not fall under the
six recognized instances when a lawis considered as such. Also, an ex post
facto lawis limited in its scope only to matters criminal in nature.
Decision Petition granted
DIDIPIO EARTHSAVERS ASSOCIATION V SECRETARY
CHICO-NAZARIO; March 30,2006
FACTS
- Nature Prohibition and mandamus
- Assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995, together with the Implementing Rules and
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 96-40, s. 1996.
- 25 July 1987 ~ President Aquino promulgated EONo. 279 which authorized
the DENRSecretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals fromforeign-
owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts of agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign
proponent.
- 3 March 1995 ~ President Ramos signed into lawRep. Act No. 7942 entitled,
An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral Resources Exploration,
Development, Utilization and Conservation, otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.
- 15 August 1995 ~ DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 23, Series of 1995, containing the
implementing guidelines of Rep. Act No. 7942.
- 23 January 1997 ~ DAONo. 96-40, s. 1996, which took effect on after due
publication superseded DAONo. 23, s.1995.
- Previously, however, or specifically on 20 June 1994, President Ramos
executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000 hectares
covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area is
Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.
- Subsequently, AMCconsolidated with Climax Mining Limited to forma single
company that now goes under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of stockholders of which are
Australian nationals.
- 7 September 2001 ~ counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed
to then DENRSecretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC
FTAA for the primary reason that Rep. Act No. 7942 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations DAO96-40 are unconstitutional.
- The Office of the Executive Secretary was also furnished a copy of the said
letter.
- There being no response to both letters, another letter of the same content
dated 17 June 2002 was sent to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
- This letter was indorsed to the DENRSecretary and eventually referred to the
Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), Regional
Office No. 02, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for further action.
- 12 November 2002 ~ counsels for petitioners received a letter fromthe Panel
of Arbitrators of the MGBrequiring the petitioners to comply with the Rules of
the Panel of Arbitrators before the letter may be acted upon.
- Yet again, counsels for petitioners sent President Arroyo another demand
letter dated 8 November 2002. Said letter was again forwarded to the DENR
Secretary who referred the same to the MGB, Quezon City.
- In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGBrejected the demand of counsels
for petitioners for the cancellation of the CAMCFTAA.
- Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They pray that the Court
issue an order:
1. enjoining public respondents fromacting on any application for FTAA;
2. declaring unconstitutional the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations;
3. canceling the FTAAissued to CAMC.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WONthe petitioners eminent domain claimis a justiciable issue.
Substantive
2. WONRA7942 and the CAMCFTAAare void becausethey allowthe unjust
and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation, in
violation of Art III Sec 9 of the Constitution
3. WONthe mining act and its implementing rules and regulations are void and
unconstitutional for sanctioning an unconstitutional administrative process of
determining just compensation
4. WON the state, through RA 7942 and the CAMC FTAA, abdicated its
primary responsibility to the full control and supervision over natural resources
5. WON the respondents interpretation of the role of the wholly foreign and
foreign-owned corporations in their involvement in mining enterprises, violates
Art XII Sec 2 (4) of the Constitution
6. WONthe 1987 Constitution prohibits service contracts
HELD
1. YES. It is a justiciable issue. Based on the following considerations:
a. Locus Standi~ In the case, there is aclash of legal rights as Rep. Act
No. 7942 has been enacted, DAO96-40 has been approved and an
FTAAs have been entered into. Petitioners embrace various
segments of the society, like DESAMA representing a community
actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC, as well as other
residents of areas affected by the mining activities of CAMC. These
petitioners have the standing to raise the constitutionality of the
questioned FTAA as they allege a personal and substantial injury.
They are under imminent threat of being displaced from their
landholdings as a result of the implementation of the questioned
FTAA.
b. Ripeness~ By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged act, the dispute is said tohave ripened into
a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even
a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.
c. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and the
magnitude of the public interest involved will have a bearing on the
countrys economy, which is to a greater extent dependent upon the
mining industry. Also affected by the resolution of this case are the
proprietary rights of numerous residents in the mining contract areas
as well as the social existence of indigenous peoples, which are
threatened.
2. On the Validity of Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and DAO96-40
- PETITIONERS contend that Sec. 76 of RANo. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO
96-40 allowthe "unlawful and unjust "TAKING" of private property for private
purposein contradiction withSec. 9, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution mandating
that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the
corresponding payment of just compensation."
- They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a
private property and allowtaking of land without payment of just compensation.
- They cited the case of Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi to illustrate the concept
of taking of property for purposes of eminent domain to wit:
> "taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering upon private
property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color
of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as to substantially oust
the owner and deprive himof all beneficial enjoyment thereof."
- Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no
absolute, physical taking, at the very least, Section 76 establishes a legal
easement upon the surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a
mining contract area sufficient to deprive themof enjoyment and use of the
property and that such burden imposed by the legal easement falls within the
purviewof eminent domain.
(NOTE: An easement is defined to be a liberty privilege or advantage, which
one man may have in the lands of another, without profit; it may arise by deed
or prescription)
- PUBLICRESPONDENTSargue that Section 76 is NOT ATAKINGprovision
but aVALIDEXERCISEOFTHEPOLICEPOWERand by virtue of which, the
state may prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and
that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation
of private property.
- Public respondents concluded that to require compensation in all such
circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.
- Public respondents are inclined to believe that by entering private lands and
concession areas, FTAA holders do not oust the owners thereof nor deprive
themof all beneficial enjoyment of their properties as the said entry merely
establishes a legal easement upon surface owners, occupants and
concessionaires of a mining contract area.
- Hence the distinctions below:
1. Taking in Eminent Domain Distinguished fromRegulation in Police Power
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of
those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to
condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation.
On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
Although both police power and the power of eminent domain have the
general welfare for their object, and recent trends showa mingling of the
two with the latter being used as an implement of the former, there are
still traditional distinctions between the two.
Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose; hence, no compensation shall be paid. (NOTE:
noxious= harmful)
Jurisprudence shows: WHERE A PROPERTY INTEREST IS MERELY
RESTRICTED BECAUSE THE CONTINUED USE THEREOF WOULD
BE INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC WELFARE, OR WHERE PROPERTY IS
DESTROYED BECAUSE ITS CONTINUED EXISTENCE WOULD BE
INJURIOUS TO PUBLIC INTEREST, THERE IS NO COMPENSABLE
TAKING. However, WHEN A PROPERTY INTEREST IS
APPROPRIATED AND APPLIED TO SOME PUBLIC PURPOSE,
THEREISCOMPENSABLETAKING.
In the exercise of its police power regulation, the state restricts the use of
private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights,
which constitute ownership, is appropriated for use by or for the benefit
of the public. (-Bernas)
TAKINGMAYINCLUDETRESPASSWITHOUTACTUAL EVICTIONOF
THE OWNER, MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT OF THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY OR PREVENTION OF THE ORDINARY USES FOR
WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS INTENDED SUCH AS THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ANEASEMENT.
In Republic v. Castellvi, the Court had the occasion to spell out the
requisites of taking in eminent domain, to wit:
1. the expropriator must enter a private property;
2. the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
3. the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
5. the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive himof beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but
no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to
impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement right
of way.
THE ENTRY REFERRED TO IN SECTION 76 IS NOT JUST A SIMPLE
RIGHT-OF-WAY WHICH IS ORDINARILY ALLOWED UNDER THE
PROVISIONSOF THECIVIL CODE. Here, the holders of mining rights enter
private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration,
extraction and processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels, prepare tailing ponds,
storage areas and vehicle depots, install their machinery, equipment and sewer
systems. On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to
themwhere they may build warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission,
railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All these
will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial
ownership of their lands. WITHOUT A DOUBT, TAKING OCCURS ONCE
MININGOPERATIONSCOMMENCE.
1. On Section 76 of RANo. 7942 as a Taking Provision
Brief History of Mining Laws:
First found in Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 137
Asimilar one was found in a provision of Presidential Decree No. 463,
otherwise known as The Mineral Resources Development Decree of
1974
Hampered by the difficulties and delays in securing surface rights for
the entry into private lands for purposes of mining operations,
Presidential Decree No. 512 dated 19 July 1974 was passed into law
in order to achieve full and accelerated mineral resources
development. Thus, Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new
system of surface rights acquisition by mining prospectors and
claimants.
Whereas in Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No.
463 eminent domain may only be exercised in order that the mining
claimants can build, construct or install roads, railroads, mills,
warehouses and other facilities, this time, the power of eminent
domain may now be invoked by mining operators for the entry,
acquisition anduse of private lands.
Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified
mining operators the authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant
of authority is deemed incorporated in Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter provision is a taking provision.
o The taking to be valid must be for public use.
o Public use as a requirement for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain is now synonymous with public interest, public
benefit, public welfare and public convenience.
o It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
Public use as traditionally understood as actual use by the public
has already been abandoned.
Decision THEREFORE, the Mining Lawand the CAMCFTAA are not void
because Sec. 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Sec. 107 of DAO96-40 provide for
the payment of just compensation based on the agreement entered into by the
holder of mining rights and the surface owner, occupant or concessionaire in
accordance to PD512.
Reasoning and Held/s on the Second Substantive Issue:
3. On the Power of Courts to Determine Just Compensation
The question on the judicial determination of just compensation has been
settled in the case of Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay wherein the
Court declared that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is ajudicial function. Even as the executive department or the legislature
may make the initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the courts
findings. (NOTE: I think this is the ratio already.)
There is nothing in the provisions of the
assailed lawand its implementing rules and regulations that exclude
the courts from their jurisdiction to determine just compensation in
expropriation proceedings involving mining operations.
There is nothing wrong with the grant of
primary jurisdiction by the Panel of Arbitrators or the Mines
Adjudication Board to determine in a preliminary matter the
reasonable compensation due the affected landowners or occupants.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts is not any less original and exclusive because the question is
first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a
continuation of the administrative determination.
4. On the Sufficient Control by the State Over Mining Operations
Citing La Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos: The Court
held that RA 7942 provides for the states control and supervision
over mining operations.
o The gamut of requirements, regulations, restrictions and limitations
imposed upon the FTAA contractor by the statute and regulations
easily overturns petitioners contention that the setup under RA7942
and DAO96-40 relegates the State to the role of a passive regulator
dependent on submitted plans and reports.
On the contrary, the government agencies concerned are empowered
to approve or disapprove -- hence, to influence, direct and change --
the various work programs and the corresponding minimum
expenditure commitments for each of the exploration, development
and utilization phases of the mining enterprise.
- Considering the provisions of the statute and the regulations just discussed,
the Court believes that the State definitely possesses the means by which it
can have the ultimate word in the operation of the enterprise, set directions and
objectives, and detect deviations and noncompliance by the contractor;
likewise, it has the capability to enforce compliance and to impose sanctions,
should the occasion therefore arise.
In other words, the FTAA contractor is not free to do whatever it
pleases and get away with it; on the contrary, it will have to followthe
government line if it wants to stay in the enterprise. Ineluctably then,
RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 vest in the government more than a
sufficient degree of control and supervision over the conduct of
mining operations.
5. On the Proper Interpretation of the Constitutional Phrase "Agreements
Involving Either Technical or Financial Assistance"
CitingLa Bugal-BLaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos:
Par. 4 of Sec. 2 Art XII allows for the possibility that matters, other
thanthose explicitly mentioned, could be made part of the agreement.
o The use of the word involving implies that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The difference in sense becomes very apparent when we
juxtapose agreements for technical or financial assistance against
agreementsincludingtechnical or financial assistance. This much is
unalterably clear in averba legisapproach.
o The word involving as used in this context has three connotations
that can be differentiated thus: one, the sense of concerning,
having to do with, or affecting; two, entailing, requiring,
implying or necessitating; and three, including, containing or
comprising.
If the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations
to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language
would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as
to leave no doubt in anyones mind about their true intent.
o For example, they would have used the sentence foreign corporations
are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the management or
operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A
search for such stringent wording yields negative results.
- The meaning of the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance must not be construed in an exclusionary and limiting manner
since there was a conscious and deliberate decision by the drafters to avoid
the use of restrictive wording.
6. On Service Contracts Not Deconstitutionalized
The 1987 Constitution allows the
continued use of service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the State;
this time, however, safety measures were put in place to prevent
abuses of the past regime.
Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court
of Appeals:
a. "The phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts.
But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between
foreign corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on
the other, the government as principal or owner of the works."
b. "xxx..Fromthe foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the
phrase agreements involving either technical or financial assistance,
referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service contracts. But unlike
those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other,
the government as principal or owner of the works. "
- "As written by the framers and ratified and adopted by the people, the
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts with foreign
corporations -- as contractors who would invest in and operate and manage
extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and supervisionof the State --
sans the abuses of the past regime. The purpose is clear: to develop and
utilize our mineral, petroleum and other resources on a large scale for the
immediate and tangible benefit of the Filipino people." (id.)
Decision The petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED.
Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO96-40; Republic
Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO
96-40insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements
referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING V BALITE
PORTAL MINING
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 3, 2002
FACTS
- Diwalwal Gold Rush Arearich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-
Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve. It is located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities
of Monkayo and Cateek in Davao Del Norte. The land has been embroiled in
controversy since mid-80s due to the scramble over gold deposits found within
its bowels.
- March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted Exploration
Permit No. 133 (EPNo. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the
Diwalwal area.
- June 27, 1991, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7076 or the Peoples
Small-Scale Mining Act which established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Programto be implemented by the secretary of the DENR and created the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENRSecretarys direct
supervision and control. It also authorized the PMRBto declare and set aside
small-scale mining areas subject to reviewby the DENRSecretary and award
mining contracts to small-scale miners under certain conditions.
- December 21, 1991, then DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran issued
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 66 declaring 729 hectares of the
Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining. This was made
pursuant to the powers vested in the DENRSecretary by Proclamation No. 369
which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
- Petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the admission of a Mineral
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was filed
before the DENRRegional Executive Director (REDMines Case)
- February 16, 1994, whileREDmines case was pending, Marcopper assigned
its EPNo. 133 to Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation (SEM), which
in turn applied for an integrated MPSA over the land covered by the permit.
The Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. XI in Davao City
(MGB-XI) accepted and registered SEMs integrated MPSA application.
Several small-scale miners filed their opposition (MACcases).
- March 3, 1995, Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act was
enacted. Pursuant to this, the MACcases were referred to a Regional Panel of
Arbitrators (RPA) tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting mining rights.
RPAtook cognizance of the REDMines cases which was consolidated with the
MACcases.
- April 1, 1997 Provincial Mining Regulatory Boardof Davao passed Resolution
No. 26, Series of 1997 authorizing the issuance of ore transport permits
(OTPs) to small-scale miners operating in the Diwalwal mines.
- May 30, 1997, petitioner SEMfiled complaint for damages against DENR
Secretary and PMRB-Davao, alleging that the illegal issuance of the OTPs
allowed the extraction and hauling of P60,000 worth of gold ore per truckload
fromSEMs mining claim.
- Meanwhile, June 13, 1997, the RPAresolved the Consolidated Mines cases
and decreed in an Omnibus Resolution that the validity of EP No. 133 is
reiterated and all adverse claims against MPSAANo. 128 are dismissed.
- June 24, 1997 the DENRSecretary issued MemorandumOrder No. 97-03
which provided among others, that:
a. DENR shall studythe option of direct state utilization of the mineral
resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area
b. Study shall includestudying and weighing the feasibility of entering
into management agreements or operating agreements
c. Such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharingincluding
profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as well as the
payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities
- July 16, 1997 petitioner SEM filed a special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus before the CAfor the nullification of Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused
therein would effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133, among
others
- January 6, 1998, the MAB rendered a decision in the Consolidated Mines
cases, setting aside the judgment of the RPA. This decision was then elevated
to he Supreme Court by way of consolidated petition.
- March 19, 1998, the CAdismissed petition of SEMruling that:
a. DENR Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 since it was merely a directive to conduct studies on the
various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal
conflict.
b. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct state
utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a
manifestation of the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options,
after determining its feasibility through studies.
c. Petitioners rights under EP No. 133 are not inviolable, sacrosanct or
immutable and, being in the nature of a privilege granted by the State,
the permit can be revoked, amended or modified by the Chief Executive
when the national interest so requires.
- Motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in upholding the questioned acts of the DENR Secretary
which petitioner allege as violative of mining laws and in derogation of vested
rights of petitioner over the area as covered by EPNo. 133.
2. WON CA erred in holding that an action on the validity of ore transport
permit (OTP) is vested in the Regional Panel of Arbitrators (RPA).
HELD
1. SCagreed with CAthat the challenged MO97-03 did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms
of the memorandumclearly indicate that what was directed was merely astudy
of this option and nothing else. It did not grant any management/operating or
profit-sharing agreement to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter,
but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned to undertake studies to
determine its feasibility.
- Petition was premature. The MO did not impose any obligation on the
claimants or fix any legal relation whatsoever between and among the parties
to the dispute. Petitioner can showno more than a mere apprehension that the
State, through the DENR, would directly take over the mines, and until the
DENRactually does so and petitioners fears turn into reality, no valid objection
can be entertained against MO97-03 on grounds whichare purely speculative
and anticipatory.
2. Whether or not petitioner actually has a vested right over Diwalwal under EP
No. 133 is still an indefinite and unsettled matter, as the EPs validity is still
being disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases.
- Whether or not respondent Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
(BCPMC) and the other mining entities it represents are conducting illegal
mining activities is a factual matter that has yet to be finally determined in the
Consolidated Mines Cases.
- SCalso pointed out that under no circumstances may petitioners rights under
EP No. 133 be regarded as total and absolute, as EP No. 133 merely
evidences a privilege granted by the State, which may be amended, modified
or rescinded when the national interest so requires. This is necessarily so since
the exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral
resources are matters impresses with great public interest.
- Looking into Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 4,
Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, the SCsaid that the State may
pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral
resources, by either directly undertaking the same or by entering into
agreements with qualified entities. The State need be guided only by the
demands of public interest.
- In the absence of any concrete evidence that the DENRSecretary violated
the lawor abused his discretion, he is presumed to have regularly issued the
memorandumwith a lawful intent and pursuant to his official functions.
- With regard to the second issue, the Court did not rule on it as the grounds
invoked by petitioner for invalidating the OTPs are inextricably linked to the
issues raised in the Consolidated Mines cases.
Decision Petition was denied; CAruling affirmed.
CHAVEZ V PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY AND AMARI
COASTAL BAY
CARPIO; July 9, 2002
FACTS
- Nature original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Petition also seeks to compel the
Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to
reclaimportions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEAfrom
signing a newagreement with AMARI involving such recalamtion.
- 1973-The government through the Commission of Public Highways signed a
contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines
(CDCP) to reclaimcertain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay
- 1977-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating the
PEA. And was tasked to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged
areas and to develop, improve, acquire x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands. On the same date, President Marcos issued PD. 1085 transferring to
PEAthe lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay under
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road andReclamation Project (MCCRRP)
- 1981-Pres. Marcos issued a memorandum ordering PEA to amend its
contract with CDCPwhich stated that CDCPshall transfer in favor of PEAthe
areas reclaimed by CDCPin the MCCRRP
- 1988-President Aquino issued Special Patent granting and transferring to
PEA parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP. Subsequently she
transferred in the name of PEA the three reclaimed islands known as the
FreedomIslands
- 1995-PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
private corporation, to develop the FreedomIslands and this was done without
public bidding
- President Ramos through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres approved the
JVA
- 1996-Senate President Maceda delivered a privileged speech in the Senate
and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a result,
investigations were conducted by the Senate. Among the conclusions were: (1)
the reclaimed lands PEAseeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVAare lands
of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable
lands and therefore PEAcannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of the
title covering the FreedomIslands are thus void, and (3) the JVAitself is illegal
- 1997-President Ramos created the Legal Task Force to conduct a study on
the legality of the JVA in view of the Senate Committee report.1998-The
Philippine Daily Inquirer published reports on on-going renegotiations between
PEAand AMARI
- PEADirector Nestor Kalawand PEAChairman Arsenio Yulo and former navy
officer Sergio Cruz were members of the negotiating panel
- Frank Chavez filed petition for Mandamus stating that the government stands
to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEAof the reclaimed lands to AMARI
and prays that PEApublicly disclose the termsof the renegotiations of JVA. He
cited that the sale to AMARI is in violation of Article 12, Sec. 3 prohibiting sale
of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations and Article 2
Section 28 and Article 3 Sec. 7 of the Constitution on the right to information on
matters of public concern
- 1999-PEAand AMARI signed Amended JVAwhich Pres. Estrada approved
ISSUES
1. WONthe principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic
because subsequent events
2. WON the petition merits dismissal for failure to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts
3. WON the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative-
remedies
4. WONpetitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
5. WON the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement
6. WON the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the
transfer to amari of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate
the 1987 consitution; and
7. WON the court is the proper forumfor raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageuos to the
government.
o threshold issue: whether amari, a private corporation, can acquire and
own under the amended jva 367.5 hectares of reclaimed froeshore
and submerged area in manila bay in viewof sections 2 and 3, article
12 of the 1987 constitution
HELD
(1) The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional
grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the meantime
PEAand AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution and if already
implemented, to annul the effects of an unconstitutional contract
(2) The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions
Reasoning the instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public
(3) The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when
the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question
(4) Petitioner has standing if petition is of transcendental public importance and
as such, there is the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayers suit on these matters
of transcendental public importance
(5) The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract and must therefore constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order
Reasoning The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving
public interest reinforces the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern. PEAmust prepare all the data and disclose themto the public at the
start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of the contract.
While the evaluation or review is on-going, there are no official acts,
transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals but once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the
part of the government
(6) In a formof a summary:
o The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, nowcovered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEAmay lease these lands to
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
o The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain and outside the
commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service.
The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which
are the only natural resources the government can alienate.
o Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands,
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article 12 of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations fromacquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain
o Since the Amended JVAalso seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership
of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article 12 of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain. PEAmay reclaimthese
submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them
no longer needed for public services. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void
in view of Section 3, Article 12 which prohibits private corporations
fromacquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Reasoning Commonwealth Act 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
empowers the president to classify lands of the public domain into alienableor
disposable sec. 6. The President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall fromtime to time classify the lands of the
public domain into(a) Alienable of disposable, (b) timber, and (c) mineral
lands.-The President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable, and then declare themopen to disposition or concession.
-Sec. 59 states that the lands disposable under this title shall be classified as
follows: (a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other
means; (b) Foreshore; (c) Marshy lands (d) Lands not included in any of the
foregoing classes. -Sec. 61 states that the lands comprised in classes (a), (b)
and (c) of section 59 shall be disposed f to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise
-After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and
not sold to private parties. These lands remained suis generic as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not
sell to private parties. The only way that the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public
domain is for the legislature to pass alawauthorizing such sale.
-in case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain, a public
bidding is required
-1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. Article 12, Sec. 3 states that alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period
not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
-ration behind the ban on corporations fromacquiring except through lease is
not well understood. If the purpose is to equitably diffuse lands ownership then
the Consti could have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public
domain that corporations could acquire. If the intent was to encourage owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family-size farmand to prevent a recurrence of
cases like the instant case, then placing the land in the name of a corporation
would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the
farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided
parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of
farmlands into smaller and smaller plots fromone generation to the next. In
actual practice then, this ban strengthens the consti limitation on individuals
from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the ban, individuals who already acquired the maximumarea
of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allowhim. He could even hide his ownership
of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation.
J.G. SUMMIT HOLDINGS V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; September 24, 2003
FACTS
- January 27, 1977 The National Investment and Development Corporation
(NIDC), a government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
with Kawasaki Heavy Industry, Ltd of Kobe, Japan for the construction,
operation, management of the Subic National Shipyard, which became the
Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO) with 60-40%
capitalization.
- One of the features of the agreement is the grant to the parties the right of
first refusal should either of themdecide to sell, assign or transfer its interest in
the joint venture.
- November 25, 1986-- the NIDCtransferred all its rights, title and interest in
PHILSECO to the Philippine National Bank (PNB). And subsequently
transferred to the Natl Government pursuant to Administrative Order No. 14
- December 8, 1986-- Pres Aquino issued Proclamation No. 50 establishing the
Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to
take possession of, manage and dispose of non*performing assets of the
National Government.
- APT was named trustee in the National Govt share in PHILSECO.
- COP and APT decided to sell the govt shares to private entities (87.67%
equity share).
- APT and KAWASAKI agreed to exhange KAWASAKIs right of first refusal for
the right to top by 5%the highest bid, and be entitled to name the company
which could top. KAWASAKI named Philyard Holdings, Inc. (PHI)
- JGSummit Holdings Inc submitted a bid of 2,030,000,000.00php with an
acknowledgment of KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top. JGSHI was declared the
highest bidder.
- KAWASAKI/PHI exercised the option to top and the COPapproved. APT and
PHI executed a Stock Purchase Agreement.
- JGSHI filed a petition for mandamus to question the legality of the right to first
refusal and right to top exercised by KAWASAKI/PHI.
- CA held that petition for mandamus was not the proper remedy, and that
JGSHI was estopped fromquestioning the validity because it participated in the
public bidding with the full knowledge of KAWASAKI/PHIs right to top.
- SC held that a) the right to top granted to KAWASAKI/PHI was illegal.
Because it allows foreign corporations to own more than 40% equity in
PHILSECO, which is a public utility whose capitalization should be 60%
Filipino-owned. It also violates the rules of competitive bidding; b) JGSHI
cannot be estopped from questioning the unconstitutional, illegal and
inequitable provision; c) APT should accept the 2,030,000,000.00 bid of
JGSHI, execute Stock Purchase Agreement, return to PHI the amount of
2,131,500,000.00php, and cancel the stock certificates issued to PHI.
- Respondents filed MFRwith the ff. issues
ISSUES
1. WONPHILSECOis a public utility.
2. WON under 1977 Joint Venture Agreement, KAWASAKI can exercise its
right of first refusal only up to 40%of the total capitalization of PHILSECO
3. WON the right to top granted to KAWASAKI violates the principles of
competitive bidding.
HELD
1. No. PHILSECOis not a public utility. A shipyard is not a public utility by
nature, and there is no lawdeclaring it to be.
a) Public utility= a business or service engaged in regularly supplying the
public with some commodity or service of public consequence such as
electricity, water, transportation. The facility must be necessary for the
maintenance of life and occupation of residents.
b) Public utility implies public use and service to the public. Determinative
characteristic: service or readiness to serve an indefinite public (not a
privileged few), which has rights to demand and receive the services and
commodities.
c) Public use is not synonymous with public interest. The fact that a
business offers services and goods that promote public good and serve
the interest of the public does not make it a public utility.
d) True criterion to judge the character of the use: whether the public may
enjoy it by RIGHT or only by PERMISSION
e) Shipyard= a place or enclosure where ships are built or repaired. It has
a limited clientele whomit may choose to serve as its discretion. It is not
legally obliged to render its services to the public. Though the industry
may be imbued with public interest, its public service isonly incidental.
f) Shipyards in the past were declared as public utilities (by Act No 2307,
Commonwealth Act No 146). Then Marcos PDNo. 666 removed it from
the list of public utilities to free the industry fromthe 60%citizenship
requirement under the Constitution (he wanted to accelerate the growth
of the industry). Then BPBlg 391 repealed PDNo. 666 , reverting back
the status of shipyards as public utilities.
g) Pres Aquino repealed BP Blg 391 with EO No. 226. But this did not
revive PDNo 666 or the other repealed laws. The status of shipyards
reverts back to non-public utility prior to the Public Service Law.
2) No. There is nothingthat prevents KAWASAKI to acquire more then 40%
of PHILSECOs total capitalization, under the Joint Venture Agreement.
(or YES, it canown more than40%). They agreed that in the event that
one party sells its shares, the non-selling party have a preferential right
to buy or to refuse the selling. The partnership is based on delectus
personae. No one can become a member of the partnership association
w/o the consent of all other associates.
3) No. The right to topdid not violatethe rules of competitive bidding.
a) bidding = making an offer or an invitation to prospective
contractors whereby the govt manifests its intention to make
proposals for the purpose of supplies, materials and equipment for
official business or public use. Public bidding is the accepted
method in arriving at a fair and reasonable price, and ensures that
overpricing, favoritism, and other anomalous practices are
eliminated or minimized.
b) Principles of bidding: 1) the offer to the public; 2) an opportunity for
competition; 3) a basis for comparison of bids. As long as the three
are complied with, the bidding is valid and legal.
c) The highest bid may not be automatically accepted. Bidding rules
may specify other conditions or reservations.
d) In the case, 1) all interested bidders were welcomed; 2) basis for
comparing bids were laid down; 3) all bids were accepted sealed
and were opened and read in the presence of the COAs official
representative and before all other bidders.
e) The bidders were placed in equal footing. And they
were made aware of the rules that the govt reserved the right to
reject the highest bid should KAWASAKI/PHI decide to exercise its
right to top.
f) If the parties did not swap right to first refusal with
right to top, KAWASAKI would still have the right to buy the shares
(for the original amount, which was lesser), so there is no basis in
the submission that the right to top unfairly favored KAWASAKI.
Decision: MFRgranted. Decision &resolution of CAaffirmed.
Voting Concur: Davide, Ynares-Santiago, Corona, Tinga (w/ sep op)
SEPARATE OPINION
TINGA
Shipyard is not a public utility. Since the enactment of CANo. 454 shipyards
havenever been considered public utilities. PD666 merely removed any doubt
as to their non-public utility status.
BAGATSING V COMMITTEE ON PRIVITIZATION
QUAISON; July 14, 1995
FACTS
- this is a petition to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of
shares of Petron Corporation and the award made to Aramco Overseas
Company as the highest bidder and to stop the sale of said block of shares to
Aramco
- PETRON was originally registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1966 under the corporate name Esso Philippines, Inc.
- In 1973, the Philippine government acquired ESSOthrough the PNOCand
became a wholly-owned company of the government under the corporate
name PETRONand as a subsidiary of PNOC.
- On December 8, 1986, President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 50
entitled Proclaiming and Launching a Programfor the Expeditious Disposition
and Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the Assets
thereof and creating the Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization
Trust in the exercise of her legislative power under the FreedomConstitution.
- Implicit in the proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the government
and the ideal of leaving business to the private sector.
- December 2, 1991, President Ramos deemed the privatization programto be
successful and beneficial.
- September 9, 1992, the PNOCBoard of Directors approved Specific Thrust
No. 6 and moved to bring the attention of the administration to the need to
privatize Petron.
- October 21, 1992, Sec. Del Rosario, as Chairman of the Committee on
Privatization, endorsed to President Ramos the proposal of PNOC.
- January 4, 1993, a follow-up letter was sent by Secretary Del Rosario to
President Ramos.
- January 6, 1993, Secretary Lazaro of the Dept. of Energy endorsed for
approval
- January 12, 1993, the Cabinet approved the privatization of Petron as part of
the Energy Sector Action Plan.
- March 25, 1993, the Government Corporate Monitoring and Coordinating
Committee recommended a 100%privatization of Petron.
- March 31, 1883, the PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution
authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract with the
consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited and PCI Capital
Corporation for financial advisory services to be rendered to Petron.
- April 1, 1993, President Ramos approved the privatization of Petron up to a
maximumof 65%of its capital stock.
- August 10, 1993, President Ramos approved the 40%-40%-20%privatization
strategy of Petron.
- Invitation to bid was published.
- The floor price bid for the 40%block was fixed at US$400 million.
- The bids of Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), ARAMCO, and
WESTMONT were submitted while the floor price was being dicussed.
- ARAMCOwas declared the winning bidder at US$502 million
- December 16, 1993, Monino Jacob, President and Chief Executive Officer of
PNOC, endorsed to COPthe bid of ARAMCOfor approval. And was approved
on the same day. Also on the same day, WESTMONT filed a complaint
questioning the award of shares to ARAMCO.
- February 3, 1994, PNOC and ARAMCO signed the Stock Purchase
Agreement
- March 4, 1994, the two companies signed the Shareholders Agreement
ISSUES
1. WONthe petitioner have locus standi
2. WONthe inclusion of Petron in the privatization programcontravened the
declared policy of the State
3. WONthe bidding procedure was valid
4. WONPetron was a public utility
HELD
1. YES. Taxpayers may question contracts entered into by the national
government or government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in
contravention of the law.
2. YES. The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of the
COP of such privatization, being made in accordance with Proclamation No.
50, cannot be reviewed by the Court. Such acts are exercises of the executive
function as to which the Court will not pass judgment upon or inquire into their
wisdom.
3. YES. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more
weight than the interpretation by that agency of the lawit is merely tasked to
administer.
4. NO. Apublic utility under the Constitution and the Public Service Lawis one
organized for hire or compensation to serve the public, which is given the right
to demand its service. Petron is not engaged in oil refining for hire and
compensation to process the oil of other parties.
Decision Petitions dismissed
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V COURT OF APPEALS
YNARES-SANTIAGO; April 20, 2001
FACTS
- Petition for reviewon certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
- Pilipinas Shell PetroleumCorporation (Shell) is engaged in the business of
importing crude oil, refining the same and selling various petroleumproducts
through a network of service stations throughout the country
- PetroleumDistributors and Service Corporation (PDSC) owns and operates a
Caltex service station at the corner of the MIAand Domestic Roads in Pasay
City
- June 30, 1983: Shell filed with the quondamBureau of Energy Utilization
(BEU) an application for authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at
Tambo, Paranaque to Imelda Marcos Ave, Paranaque. The application was
initially rejected because the old site had been closed for five years such that
relocation of the same to a newsite would amount to a newconstruction of a
gasoline outlet, which construction was then the subject of a moratorium.
Subsequently, BEUrelaxed its position and gave due course to the application.
- PDSC filed opposition on the grounds that: (1) there are adequate service
stations attending to the motorists requirements in the trading area, (2) ruinous
competition will result, and (3) there is a decline not an increase in the volume
of sales in the area. Petrophil and Caltex also opposed on the ground that
Shell failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements.
- March 6, 1984: BEUdismissed application on jurisdictional grounds and for
lack of full title of the lessor over the proposed site
- May 7, 1984: BEUreinstated application and conducted a hearing thereon
- June 3, 1986: BEUrendered a decision denying application because there
was no necessity for an additional petroleumproducts retail outlet on the site.
Shell appealed to the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA)
- May 8, 1987: EO 172 was issued creating the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB) and transferring to it the regulatory and adjudicatory functions of the
BEU
- May 9, 1988: OEA denied Shells appeal. Shell moved for reconsideration
and prayed for new hearing or remand of the case for further proceedings.
Shell submitted a newfeasibility study to justify application.
- July 11, 1988: OEA remanded case to ERB noting the updated survey
conducted by Shell
- September 17, 1991: ERBallowed Shell to establish the service station
- PDSCfiled a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the ERB. It thus
elevated the case to the CA.
- November 8, 1993: CAreversed ERBjudgment
- CAdenied motion for reconsideration. Shell and ERBthus elevated matters
to theSupreme Court
- While case was pending in the CA, Caltex filed a similar application in the
same area. PDSC opposed on the same grounds but ERB also approved
application. PDSCagain filed a petition with the CA. Petition was dismissed in
May 14, 1993.
- ERBarguments: evidence used as basis for ERBs decision is neither stale
nor irrelevant and justifies establishment of retail outlet, evidence on vehicle
volume and fuel demand supports construction of outlet, new outlet will not
lead to ruinous competition
- Shell arguments: ERB findings based on substantial evidence, feasibility
study has not become irrelevant even if presented two years after preparation,
CAerred in passing judgment and making pronouncement of purely economic
and policy issues on petroleum business, proposed outlet will not result to
ruinous competition, CAshould have referred the newevidence to ERBunder
the doctrine of prior resort to primary jurisdiction
ISSUES
1. WONthe court should set aside the ERBdecision
2. WON there is substantial evidence to support ERBs finding of public
necessity to warrant approval of Shells application
3. WONthe Feasibility study has become stale because it was submitted in
evidence two years after it was prepared in 1988
4. WONthe establishment of the outlet would result to ruinous competition
HELD
Ratio The courts will not interfere with actions of an administrative agency,
except if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion.
General Rule: The courts will not interfere in matters, which are addressed to
the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies
- Executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the
considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have
formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion
- Exception An action by an administrative agency may be set aside if there
is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
- When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of
policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what
the lawmeans.
1. No cogent reason to depart from general rule since ERB findings
conformto the governing statutes and controlling case lawon the matter
Regulatory boards were empowered to entertain and act on applications
for the establishment of gasoline stations in the Philippines.
There is a worldwide trend towards economic deregulation. This
trend is reflected in our policy considerations, statutes and
jurisprudence.
- RA8479 was enacted to implement Art XII, Sec. 19 of the
Constitution
- Government believes deregulation will eventually prevent
monopoly
- Art XII, Sec. 19 is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses
competition. The objective is based upon the belief that
through competition producers will satisfy consumer wants
at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the fewest resources.
Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for
goods and services and thus, matches their desires with
societys opportunity costs.
Recent developments in the oil industry as well as legislative
enactments and jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken
and rendered stale the view espoused by the appellate court in
denying Shells petition
2. ERBDecision was based on hard economic data
Data includes: developmental projects, residential subdivision
listings, population count, public conveyances, commercial
establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth of private cars,
public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles increased
market potential which will benefit community and transient
motorists
ERB is in a better position to resolve Shells application being
primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the
matter
Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an
administrative finding of fact. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion
3. The pronouncement of Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division affirming
ERB Decision approving a similar application by Caltex is more in
keeping with the policy of the State and the rationale of the statutes
enacted to govern the industry
CA: no gasoline station along the entire stretch; need not
necessarily result in ruinous competition, absent adequate proof to
that effect; unless petitioner is able to prove by competent
evidence that significant changes have occurred sufficiently to
invalidate that afore-stated study, the presumption is that said
study remains valid
4. The mere possibility of reduction of earnings of a business is not
sufficient to prove ruinous competition
In determining the allowance or disallowance of an application for
the construction of a service station, the CA confined the factors
thereof within the rigid standards governing public utility regulation,
where exclusivity, upon satisfaction of certain requirements, is
allowed. However, exclusivity is more the exception rather than the
rule in the gasoline service station business
PDSC failed to show that its business would not have sufficient
profit to have a fair return on investment
Caltex, PDSCs principal, never filed any opposition to Shells
application
A climate of fear and pessimism generated by unsubstantiated
claims of ruinous competition already rejected in the past should
not be made to retard free competition, consistently with legislative
policy of deregulating and liberalizing the oil industry to ensure a
truly competitive market under a regime of fair prices, adequate
and continuous supply, environmentally clean and high quality
petroleumproducts
Decision
(1) Challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside
(2) ERB Order granting the amended application of Pilipinas Shell
Corporation to relocate its service station to Benigno Aquino Jr., Ave.,
Pque, Metro Manila reinstated
Voting3 Justices concurred, 1 on sick leave
ART XIII: AGRARIAN REFORM
FORTRICH V CORONA
MARTINEZ; November 17, 1998
FACTS
- Two separate motions for reconsideration seeking reversal of the SCs
decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated November 7, 1997 issued by
the Office of the President (OP)
- Decision struck down as void the act of the OPin reopening the case in OP
Case No. 96-C 6424 through the issuance of November 7, 1997 win-win
Resolution which substantially modified its March 29, 1996 OP Decision that
had long become final and executory
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final
and executory after the DARs motion for reconsideration of the said decision
was denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
- Movants:
o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous
ruling
o Proper remedy for petitioner is a petition for reviewand not certiorari
o Filing of motion for reconsideration is acondition sine qua non before
petition for certiorari may be filed
o Petitioners are guilty of forumshopping
- Intervenors:
o They have right to intervene
o The win-win resolution is valid as it seeks to correct an erroneous
ruling
o Win-win resolution properly addresses the substantial issues of the
case
- Both movants ask that their motions be resolved en banc since the issues are
novel and of transcendental significance Issue here according to themis
WON the power of the local government units (LGUs) to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the Dept of Agrarian Reform(DAR)
- Other issues raised by movants described as substantial (1) whether the
subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility; (2)
whether the landhas long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for
intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land
into industrial/institutional use
ISSUE
WON the SCs decision nullifying the win-win resolution dated November 7,
1997 issued by the Office of the President (OP) must be reversed.
HELD
- The issues presented are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the
attention of the Court en banc
o The issue is no longer novel as having been decided in Province of
Camarines Sur, et al. v. CAwherein it was held that LGUs need not
obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non agricultural use.
o Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous
vote of all five members of the 2
nd
Division.
- The order which denied the DARs motion for reconsideration of the March
29, 1996 OPDecision was not an erroneous ruling and it does not have to be
corrected by the November 7, 1997 win-win resolution
o In accordance with Administrative order No. 18 which mandates that
decisions, orders, resolutions of the OP shall become final after the
lapse of 15 days fromreceipt of copy thereofunless a motion for
reconsideration is filed within such period.
o Late filing of DARis not excusable because DARmust not disregard
the reglementary period fixed by lawin referring the decision to the
departments concerned for the preparation of the motion of
consideration
o Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard as they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival
claims in the administration of justice
- There is a grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the second motion for
reconsideration and on the basis thereof issued the win-win resolution was a
flagrant infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of
the law, rules and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical
nature.
o When the March 29, 1996 OPDecision was declared
final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners
- When the DARs order denying the petitioners first application for conversion
was first brought by petitioner to the OP, the appropriate administrative rules
were not complied with. But movants cannot now question the supposed
procedural lapse for the first time before the SC. It should have been raised
and resolved at the administrative level.
- Intervenors do not have certain right or legal interest in the subject matter.
o Being merely seasonal farmworkers without the right to own,
application for intervention must fail as they have no legal or actual
and substantial interest over the subject land
o even "win-win Resolution of November 7, 1997 did not recognize the
latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the
qualified farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined
as ordered in the said resolution.
- The March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of
the aforementioned substantial issues
o Factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court,
presuming the OPis the most competent in matters falling within its
domain
- Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OPDecision is precisely
pro-poor considering that more of the impoverised members of society will be
benefited by the agro-economic development of the disputed land which the
province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to
undertake.
o The OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of
the many, no just of the few. This is clearly shown from the
development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners
- WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998
Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for
intervention, are hereby DENIEDwith FINALITY.
SIGRE V COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; August 8, 2002
FACTS
- Private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of
Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition and
mandamus seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from
accepting the leasehold rentals fromErnesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner
Rolando Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals
previously remitted to it by Sigre.
- Ernesto Sigre was private respondents tenant in an irrigated rice land located
in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent
a lease rental of 16 cavans per crop or 32 cavans per agricultural year. In the
agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private
respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBPpursuant to the Department of
Agrarian Reforms MemorandumCircular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the
guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-
beneficiaries under the land transfer programof P.D. No. 27.
- The pertinent provision of the DARMemorandumCircular No. 6 reads:
"A. Where the value of the land has already been established.
The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary
or his authorized representative has finally approved the
average gross production data established by the BCLP or
upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and tenant
farmers concerned heretofore authorized.
Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall
terminate on the date the value of the land is established.
Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their lease
rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents:
provided that in case where the value of the land is established
during the month the crop is to be harvested, the cut-off period
shall take effect on the next harvest season. With respect to
cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of the
land, the tenant-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such
rental, but it shall be his duty to notify the landowner and the
DARTeamLeader concerned of such fact who shall ascertain
immediately the veracity of the information and thereafter
resolve the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner
shall insist after positive ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is
to pay rentals to him, the amount equivalent to the rental
insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer with
the LBPor its authorized agent in his name and for his account
to be withdrawn only upon proper written authorization of the
DAR District Officer based on the result of ascertainment or
investigation."
- According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DARhad already
fixed the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32
cavans per hectare, and the value of the land was pegged at P13,405.67.
Thus, the petition filed before the Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the
validity of MCNo. 6, but alsothe constitutionality of P.D. 27.
- The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and declared MCNo. 6
null and void. The LBPwas directed to return to private respondent the lease
rentals paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals directly to
private respondent. In declaring MCNo. 6 as null and void, the appellate court
ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which sanctions the contested provision of
the circular; that said circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which provides that
payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter, being
a statute, must prevail over the circular; that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in
laying down the formula for determining the cost of the land as it sets
limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation; and
that it is no longer applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES
1. WONMCNo. 6 is valid
2. WONMCNo. 6 can be reconciled with PD816
3. WONPD27 is unconstitutional
HELD
1. YES.
- PD 27, issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
proclaimed the entire country as a land reform area and decreed the
emancipation of tenants fromthe bondage of the soil, transferring to themthe
ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a
systemfor the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone
of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands
that exceeded the minimumretention area were bound to sell their lands to
qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. It was pursuant to
said decree that the DARissued MCNo. 6, series of 1978.
- The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction said Circular,
particularly, the provision stating that payment of lease rentals to landowners
shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established, after which the
tenant-farmer shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its
authorized agents.
- We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative
bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the
details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. One such
administrative regulation is DARMemorandumCircular No. 6. As emphasized
inDe Chavez v. Zobel, emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedomfrom
the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of
the land theyre tilling. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the
Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious implementation
of the land reformprogram, thus necessitating its promulgation.
- The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the
appellate court when it stated that (T)he main purpose of the circular is to
make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to
his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular was
meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to
landowner were not credited in his favor against the determinedpurchase price
of the land, thus making hima perpetual obligor for said purchase price. Since
the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of
P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being the case, it has the force of lawand is
entitled to great respect.
2. YES.
- The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816 and
DARMemorandumCircular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that
the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner
until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DARMemorandumCircular No. 6,
implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the
lease rental after the value of the land has been determined.
- InCurso v. Court of Appeals, involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was
categorically ruled that there is no incompatibility between these two.
- In other words, MCNo. 6 merely provides guidelines in thepayment of lease
rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and
MCNo. 6, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the
land is established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to
the Land Bank. The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial
payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers.
- Private respondent, however, splits hairs, so to speak, and contends that
the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circular implements
P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in
implementation of P.D. 27. Both MCNo. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant
to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but
rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall
be made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been
determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to
the LBP, as provided in DARCircular No. 6. Clearly, there is no inconsistency
between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement
each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on
the agricultural property.
3. NO.
- P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity. It is a judicial fact that has
been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as
1974, in De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and
upheld as part and parcel of the lawof the land, viz.:
"There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the
goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is nowpart and
parcel of the law of the land according to the revised
Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply
out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express
mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is
clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of
the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the
fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would
run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away
with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise
and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive
petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential
decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and
precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed
be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had
spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems
thereby created. There can be no justification for any other
decision then whether predicated on a juridical normor on the
traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not
thwarting fundamental policy goals."
- Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella, which incidentally involves private
respondent and counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared
that "Presidential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality."
- Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in
Association of Rice &Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National
Land ReformCouncil.
- Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. 6657, any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27
was ultimately foreclosed when it was declared therein that R.A. No. 6657,
P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED
against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petition.
- The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the
judicial prerogative of determining just compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27
provides:
"For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be
transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the
value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one half (2 )
times the average harvest of three normal crop years
immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;"
- E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:
"SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands
covered by P.D. 27 shall be based on the average gross
production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land
Production in accordance with Department Memorandum
Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuances and
regulation of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average
gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a
half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five
Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of
50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos
(P31.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50
kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at
shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may
be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and
compensation to the landowner."
- The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16
(d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive. This is evident
fromthe succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:
"x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the
amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the
Department of Agrarian Reformand the Barangay Committee
on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within
thirty (30) days fromits submission pursuant to Department of
Agrarian ReformMemorandumCircular No. 26, series of 1973,
and other pertinent issuances. In the event a party questions in
court the resolution of the dispute, the landowners
compensation shall still be processed for payment and the
proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the
Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5
hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court."
- Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept
the valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and
the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the
appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the
prerogative of the court.
- Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARPLaw
operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private
agricultural land including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229; while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which
provides for the mechanismof the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgram,
specifically states: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue
to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in
any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent
with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the
tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
Decision Petitions GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
NULLIFIEDand SET ASIDE.
ROXAS AND CO. V COURT OF APPEALS
PUNO; December 17, 1999
FACTS
- Petition for reviewon certiorari of a decision of the CA
- Three haciendas (Palico, Banilad, Caylaway) in Nasugbu, Bats is owned by
Roxas and Co., a domestic corp.
- President Aquino signed Proclamation No. 131 and EO 229 for a
Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgram.
- Congress passed RA6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian ReformLawor CARL).
This was signed by Pres. Aquino.
- Roxas and Co. filed w/ DARa voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition
by DARin accordance w/ CARL.
PALICOANDBANILAD
- For Haciendas Palico and Banilad, the Municipal Agrarian ReformOfficer
(MARO) sent notices Invitation to Parties to Roxas and Co. through Mr. Jaime
Pimentel, Hacienda Administrator. This was to discuss the results of DAR
investigation of Haciendas. The reports recommended that the haciendas be
subject to compulsory acquisition. DAR, through its Secretary, sent Notices of
Acquisition.
- Whether they accept or reject this offer, they must informBureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution. In case of rejection or failure to reply, DAR
conducts administrative proceedings to determine just compensation of the
land. In case of acceptance or if compensation has already been deposited,
DARtakes immediate possession of the land.
- Bec petitioner rejected, DAR sent to Landbank a Request to Open Trust
Account in favor of petitioner for its compensation.
- Petitioner applied w/ DARfor conversion of Palico and Banilad fr agricultural
to non-agri lands. Despite this application, DARproceeded w/ acquisition of
the haciendas.
- The Landbank trust accounts for compensation were replaced by DARwith
cash and Landbank bonds.
- DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
distributed themto farmer beneficiaries.
CAYLAWAY
- This hacienda was voluntarily offered for sale to the govt. DARaccepted the
petitioners voluntary offer and sent Notice of Acquisition.
- However, Roxas and Co. President sent letter to DARwithdrawing voluntary
offer for sale (VOS) bec Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu reclassified Caylaway
fr agri to non-agri land.
- DARsaid reclassification would not exempt the land fr agrarian reform. It
denied the withdrawal of the VOS.
- Petitioner instituted case w/ DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) for
cancellation of the CLOAs bec Nasugbu is a tourist zone and not suitable for
agri production. This petition for conversion was denied by the MARO.
- Petitioner filed w/ CA, but CAdismissed the petition. Hence, the recourse to
SC.
ISSUES
1. WON SC can take cognizance despite failure of petitioner to exhaust
administrative remedies
2. WONacquisition proceedings were valid
3. WONSCcan rule on reclassification of the haciendas
HELD
1. Yes.
- Administrative remedies must be exhausted first. But judicial action can be
resorted to immediately when
- question is purely legal
- the administrative body is in estoppel
- act is patently illegal
- theres urgent need for judicial intervention
- respondent disregarded dueprocess
- the respondent is a department secretary
- irreparable damage will be suffered
- theres no other speedy remedy
- strong public interest is involved
- subject of controversy is private land
- in quo warranto proceedings
- DAR issued CLOAs w/o just compensation. And the law provides that
deposit must be made only in cash or Landbank bonds. DARs initial action to
open trust account deposits does not constitute payment.
2. No.
- CARL provides for 2 modes of acquisition: compulsoryand voluntary.
- In compulsory acquisition, the farmer beneficiaries and the landowners must
first be identified. However, the law is silent on how identification must be
made. To address this, DAR issued Admin Order 12-1989. This was
amended by DAR AO9-1990 and DARAO1-1993. In these amendments,
Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to conference meeting were
expanded.
- The Notice of Coverage notifies landowner that his property is placed under
CARP, informs him that a public hearing will be conducted and a field
investigation of the land will be conducted.
- Notices and pleadings against a corp are served on the President, Manager,
Secretary, Cashier or agent or directors. This is to ensure prompt and proper
notice. Jaime Pimentel is not one of these parties.
- Petitioners principal place of business is in Makati. Pimentel is based in
Nasugbu.
- Assuming that Pimentel was an agent of the corp, there is no showing that
he was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting.
- Assuming petitioner was duly notified, the areas subject to CARPwere not
properly identified before they were taken over by DAR. The acquisition covers
only portions, not the entire haciendas. The haciendas are not entirely agri
lands. Petitioner had no idea which portion was subject to compulsory
acquisition. This is important bec petitioner can exercise right to retention
choose to retain not more than 5 hectares out of the total area subject to
CARP.
- With respect to Caylaway, notices were not deemed received by the
petitioner.
3. No.
- DARs failure to observe due process in acquisition does not ipso facto give
SCpower to adjudicate on application for conversion fromagri to non-agri land.
Its DARs job.
- Guiding principle in land use conversion is to preserve prime agri lands for
food production while recognizing need of other sectors for land. CARL
promotes social justice, industrialization, and optimumuse of land.
- Land usemanner of utilization of land incl. allocation, devt and mgmt.
- Land use conversion requires field investigation.
- Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant SCto arrogate authority to
resolve controversy jurisdiction over w/c is initially lodged w/ an administrative
body. Here, DARmust be given chance to correct its procedural lapses.
DecisionPetition is remanded to DARfor proper acquisition proceedings and
determination of petitioners application for conversion.
SEPARATE OPINION
MELO [concur and dissent]
- PP1520 which declared Nasugbu, Bats as tourist zone, has force and effect
of lawunless repealed. It cannot be disregarded by DAR.
YNARES-SANTIAGO [concurr and dissent]
- If acts of DARare patently illegal and rights of party are violated, the wrong
decisions of DARshould be reversed and set aside.
- CLOAs do not have nature of Torrens Title and administrative cancellation of
title is sufficient to invalidate them.
ART XIV: EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS
V COURT OF APPEALS AND ARIOKASWAMY WILLIAM
MARGARET CELINE
MENDOZA; August 31, 1999
FACTS
- Arokiaswamy WilliamMargaret Celine is an Indian citizen taking her doctoral
programin Anthropology at the University of the Philippines. To complete the
doctoral programshe was required to pass a dissertation and she created one
entitled, Tamil influences in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. She
defended her dissertation although prior to it Dr. Medina noted some lifted
material in the dissertation without proper acknowledgment. She got the nod of
four of the five panelist and thus was allowed to graduate because the letter
coming fromDean Paz that wanted her to be temporarily struck off the list of
candidates for graduation to clear the problems regarding her dissertation did
not reach the Board of Regentson time.
- Prior to the graduation, Dean Paz told Celine through a letter that she would
not be granted academic clearance without Celine substantiating her
accusation of Drs. Diokno and Medina maliciously working for the disapproval
of her dissertation. Celine answered by saying that the unfavorable attitude
was due to some failure to include Dr. Medina in the list of panel members and
that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. Dr. Medina answered back and wrote
that Celines dissertation contained plagiarized materials and that her doctorate
be withdrawn.
- An ad-hoc committee was formed to investigate the charges and that the
request for the withdrawal of the doctorate degree was asked of the Board of
Regents. In the investigation it was found out that in at least 90 instances the
dissertation included lifted materials without proper or due acknowledgment.
The College Assembly therefore unanimously approved and recommended the
withdrawal of the doctorate degree and forwarded it to the University Council.
The University Council approved, endorsed, and recommended the withdrawal
to the Board of Regents. UPDiliman Chancellor Roman summoned Celine to a
meeting and that she should submit her written explanation to the charges
against her. The Chancellor informed Celine of the charges and showed a
copy of the findings of the investigating committee. A second meeting was
done as well as a third one, however Celine did not attend the third meeting
alleging that the Board of Regents at that time already had decided her case
before she was fully heard. Celine asked for a re-investigation and that the
jurisdiction was placed on the student disciplinary tribunal in the case of
dishonesty and that the withdrawal of the doctorate degree is not an authorized
penalty.
- A special committee was create by Chancellor Roman that investigated the
case and they came out with the findings through all the documents and an
interviewof Celine. It was established that at least 22 counts of documented
lifting were identified that forms the 90 instances found by the College ad-hoc
committee. That Celine admits of being guilt of the allegation of plagiarism. The
Board of Regents decided to withdrawthe doctorate degree. Celine requested
an audience with the Board of Regents and a reinvestigation which was
denied.
- Thus this case, a petition for mandamus and a prayer for a writ of mandatory
injunction and damages was filed. Trial court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit while Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the restoration of the
degree.
ISSUES
1. WONthe writ of Mandamus is applicable in this situation
2. WONTHEwithdrawal of the doctoral degree can be done by the University
3. WONthere was a denial of due process
HELD
1. No, a writ of Mandamus is not available to restrain an institution of higher
learning fromthe exercise of its academic freedomthat is a constitutional right
2. Yes, because Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board or person to do the act required to be done when it or s/he unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the lawspecifically enjoins as a duty
resulting froman office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there
being no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of a law. It
could not be invoked against the academic freedomof the school as academic
freedomas a Constitutional right (Article XIVSection 5 (2)) gives a wide sphere
of authority over the choice of students. This entails as well that it can also
determine who would have the distinction of being a graduate of the school. If
the University discovers that the honor and distinction was obtained through
fraud it has the right to revoke or withdrawsuch distinction. The actions of the
University through the Board of Regents is to protect academic integrity by
withdrawing her academic degree that she obtained through fraud.
3. No, Due process was done as there were several investigations done by the
school starting fromthe college to the Board of Regents. She was also invited
in the investigation to clear up her name. However, the actual admission and
the clear plagiarism of her sources proved that indeed she committed the
offense. Her demand for the Student Tribunal to decide her case is untenable,
as it is obvious that such case is useless for the penalty it gives is suspension.
Celine in not in the ambit of disciplinary powers of the UPanymore.
MIRIAMCOLLEGE FOUNDATION V COURT OF APPEALS
KAPUNAN; December 15, 2000
FACTS
-PETITIONfor reviewon certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
-Vol. 41, No. 14, or the September-October 1994 issue of MiriamColleges
school paper Chi-Rho entitled Libog at Iba Pang Tula was odiously received
by the MCHS community, calling it obscene, indecent and devoid of all
moral values among other things.
-an excerpt written by Mr. Gomez, who wrote the foreword (Foreplay) reads:
may mga palangganang nakatiwangwang
mga putang bikay na sa gitna
di na puwedeng paglabhan
di na maaring pagbabaran
-several other poems and stories are contained w/ the theme sekswalidad at
ibat ibang karanasan nito
-ff the publication of the paper, Dr. Sevilla, Chair of the MC Discipline
Committee wrote a letter to the editorial board, informing them of the
complaints filed against their publication by the MiriamCommunity, along with
the alleged school regulations violated, and requiring the board to submit a
written statement in answer to the charges.
-the students requested to transfer the case to DECS, w/c under Rule 7 of
DECSorder no. 94, has jurisdiction
-the students atty., Ricardo Velmonte, contends that for actions committed w/in
their capacity as campus journalists, what applies is RA 7079 (The Campus
JournalismAct) and not committee regulations
-the committee proceeded w/ its investigationex parte, suspending 5 students,
expelling 3, dismissing 2 and withholding graduation privileges of 1 student
-these students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order before the RTC of QC,
questioning the Discipline Boards jurisdiction
-the RTCdenied the prayer for a TROand held that nothing in the DECSOrder
No. 94 excludes school Admin fromexercising jurisdiction and that it cannot
delimit the jurisdiction of schools over disciplinary cases
-the students then filed a Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Reconsideration after w/c the RTCgranted the writ for preliminary injunction
(against expulsion and dismissal) so as not to render the issues moot
-both parties moved for reconsideration after w/c the RTCrecalled the issues
and dismissed the case
-the RTCreferred the case to the CA for disposition w/c issued a resolution
requiring the respondents to showcause why no preliminary injunction should
be issued, and issued a TRO(against the dismissals/suspensions)
-the CA granted the students petition, declaring the RTC order and the
dismissals/suspensions as void
-hence this present petition by MiriamCollege
ISSUES
1. WONthe case has been rendered moot
2. WONthe TChas jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari by the
students
3. WONMiriamhad jurisdiction over the complaints against the students
HELD
1. NO. Petitioner asserts that the case is moot since more than 1 year had
passed since the court issued the TRO. Apreliminary injunction is granted at
any stage of a proceeding prior to the judgment of a final order to preserve the
status quoof things until the merits of the case can be heard and persists until
issuance of a final injunction.
A TROon the other hand preserves the status quo until the hearing of the
application of the preliminary injunction. In the instant case, no such
preliminary injunction was issued, hence the TROautomatically expired (BP
224, TRO expires after 20 days if judge takes no action on application of
preliminary injunction). The CAerred in assuming its order was complied w/ by
Miriam; it cant be said that the students had graduated w/in that short span of
time. Miriamalso allegedly refused the students readmission, and so actual
controversy still existed. Since the RTChad set aside all previous orders, it
allowed the dismissals and suspensions to remain in force.
2. YES. RA7079 includes a certain S4 which states that the editorial board of
a school publication is free to determine its editorial policies; S7 of the same
act provides that a ..a student shall not be expelled or suspended solely on the
basis of articles he/she has written orperformance of his/her duties. S9
mandates DECS to promulgate the rules and regulations for the act, as
embodied by DECS Order No. 94, series of 1992 which under Rule 12
provides that DECSregional office shall have original jurisdiction over cases
as a result of the decisions, actions and policies of the editorial board of a
school w/in its area of administrative responsibility.
When the Discipline Board imposed the sanctions on the students, they filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition raising the ff grounds: (1) the Discipline
Board had no jurisdiction over the case (2) the Board did not have the qualities
of an impartial and neutral arbiter, w/c would deny the students their right to
due process.
The issues thus raised were purely legal in nature and well within the
jurisdiction of the TCto determine. The TChad the duty to render a decision
for a case w/in its jurisdiction and should have settled the issues before
dismissing the case.
3. YES. A14 S5(2) of the Constitution guarantees all institution of higher
learning academic freedomw/c includes the right of the school to decide for
itself howbest to attain it:
(1) who may teach (2) what may be taught (3) howit shall be taught (4) who
may be admitted to study
-how it shall be taught certainly encompasses the right of the school to
discipline its students. what may be taught embodies the Constitutional
obligation to instill discipline in students, stated in A14 S3(2)
-who may be admitted to study clearly provides the school w/ the right to
determine whomtoexpel
A14 S4(1) merely recognizes the States power to regulate and supervise
educational institutions, not deprive themof their rights
-In several cases, the Court has upheld the rights of students to free speech in
school premises.
-As held in Tinker v. Des Moines School District: petitioners have the right to
peacable assembly and free speechthey do not shed these constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse gate. Astudents rights extend beyond class hours,
and he/she may express even controversial subjects on school grounds
-however, free speech is not absolute and students lose immunity when
conduct by the studentdisrupts class work or involvesinvasion of the rights
of others.
-provisions of RA 7079 should be construed alongside the provisions of the
Constitution. Consistent w/ jurisprudence, S7 of RA 7079 should be read to
mean that the school cant suspend/expel a student on the sole basis of
articles he/she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class
work orinvades the rights of others.
- Fromthe foregoing, it is evident that MiriamCollege has jurisdiction over the
complaints against the students, as the power to investigate is an adjunct of its
power to suspend or expel students. It is a necessary corollary to its
enforcement of rules and regulations, w/c is inherently granted by the
Constitution. The court therefore rules that MChas the authority to hear and
decide the cases filed against respondent students.
CAMACHO V CORESIS
QUISUMBING; August 22, 2002
FACTS
- The Case: Special civil action for certiorari against the graft investigator in the
Office of the Ombudsman, Atty. Jovito Coresis Jr., in dismissing the
administrative and criminal complaints against private respondents.
- In June 1995, Petitioner Manuel Camacho, the Dean of the College of
Education of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP) received
complaints from several doctoral students regarding a class held by
respondent Dr. Daleon during the 1st sem. of SY1994-1995. The complaints
were that there were ghost students in Dr. Daleons class, namely
respondents Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba and Norma Tecson, who were given
grades of 1.0, 1.5, and 1.25 respectively, despite their failure to attend regular
classes.
- June 13, 1995, petitioner requested respondent Daleon to furnish copies of
exams, termpapers, records of attendance, which respondent ignored. The
matter was raised in a university council meeting and a committee was created
to investigate the complaint. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special
arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without
petitioners approval.
- Petitioner recommended to Dr. Prantilla (the University Pres) that Agulo,
Alaba, and Tecson be required to attend regular classes and comply with the
course requirements. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendation; however, he
also entertained an appeal by Agulo to validate the grades given to them. The
BoR upheld the grades and consequently, petitioner filed an administrative
complaint against Dr. Daleon, as well as criminal complaints against Dr.
Daleon, Agulo, Alaba, Tecson, and members of the USP BoR including Dr.
Prantilla for violating R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws to the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao. Said office ordered respondents to desist from
further proceedings to consolidate the administrative complaint with the
criminal complaint.
- On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., the
graft investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, and approvedby
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. It dismissed both complaints upon finding
insufficient evidence to hold Dr. Daleon liable for the administrative charges as
well as finding no prima facie violation for the criminal complaint. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration and was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the case
was brought before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
WON public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction (in exonerating Dr. Daleon fromadministrative as well as
criminal liability arising fromhis giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson, and
Alaba without requiring themto attend classes).
HELD
- Absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Courts power of judicial review under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may not be invoked.
Reasoning
1. Fromthe records, there is no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold
respondent Office of grave abuse of discretion because the conclusions
in its assailed Resolution are based on substantial evidence easily
verifiable. Well established is the principle that factual findings of
administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality
by this Court, provided such findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
2. Public respondent anchored his decision on Art. 140 of the University
Code which provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be
enforced in all classes subject to the modification by the Dean in the
case of graduate students and other courses. It is undisputed that Dr.
Daleon had already been designated Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the
Graduate School by the President of USP and was even entitled to
emoluments inherent to the Dean of the Grad. School. Accordingly, as
OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Grad. School, Dr.
Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without
seeking permission of petitioner.
3. Dr. Daleons teaching style had support of the members of the Board of
Regents (BoR), the body with the authority to formulate university
policies, fully knowing the policy on attendance of students in the
graduate school. In passing its resolution, they not only validated the
grades given by Daleon, they also gave an imprimatur on the propriety,
regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleons instructional approach.
4. Dr. Daleons teaching style, validated by the USP BoR, is bolstered by
the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. Academic freedomis
two-tiered - that of the academic institution and the teachers. As was
held in MiriamCollege v. CA, Institutional freedomincludes the right of
the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives and the
methods on howbest to attain them, free frominterference or outside
coercion except whenoverriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It
includes the freedomto determine for itself: who may teach, what may
be taught, howit shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
5. It was said in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation that,
Academic freedomalso accords a faculty member the right to pursue
his studies in his particular specialty. Applied to the case at bar,
academic freedomclothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate
and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his
students, subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Consider
that the BoR, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies, has
validated his teaching, there can be no reason for petitioner to complain
before the Court simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the
matter.
Decision Petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Resolution of Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao is affirmed.
VotingConcurred with by JJs: Bellosillo, Mendoza, and Corona
GARCIA V LOYOLA THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL
FERNANDO; November 28, 1975
FACTS
- This is a mandamus proceeding to compel the Admission Committee of the
Loyola School of Theology to allowpetitioner to continue studying there.
- Petitioner alleged that she was admitted by respondent in the Summer of
1975 to pursue graduate studies leading to an MAin Theology, but was denied
re-admission in the following semester. She contended that the reason given
by respondent for such denial, namely: that "her frequent questions and
difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the
progress of the class," is not valid ground for expulsion
- Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner was admitted, not
to a degree program but merely to take some courses for credit, since
admission to a degree requires acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the
Graduate School of Ateneo de Manila University (as opposed to, the Loyola
School of Theology), and no such acceptance was given.
- Further, that respondent, being an "institute of higher learning" has the
"academic freedom" to discretion whether to admit or continue admitting any
particular student considering not only academic or intellectual standards but
also other factors.
- Finally that there is no "clear duty" to admit petitioner since the School of
Theology is a seminary for the priesthood and petitioner is admittedly and
obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.
ISSUES
Procedural
1. WONa mandamus proceeding is proper in the case at bar
Substantive
2. WONrespondent is deemed possessed of a right to continued admission to
the Loyola School of Theology.
3. WON her expulsion was based on reasonable grounds (therefore, not
aribtrary).
HELD
1. Mandamus shall not lie absent a showing that there is a clear legal right on
her part and a clear duty on respondents part to so admit her.
- What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot
therefore satisfy the prime an indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding.
2. Autonomy recognized by the Constitution: "All institutions of higher learning
shall enjoy academic freedom."
- Although "academic freedom" is more often identified with the right of a
faculty member to publish his findings and thoughts without fear of retribution,
the reference given by the constitution of "institutions of higher learning," show
that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right.
- J. Frankfurter: "four essential freedoms" - determine for itself who may teach,
what maytaught, how, and who may be admitted to study
- Universities, unlike public utitlities, have discretion as to whomto admit or
reject.
3. Denied not only on general principle, but also in viewof the character of the
particular educational institution involved. It is a seminary for the priesthood.
Therefore, at most, she can lay claimto a privilege, no duty being cast on
respondent school.
- Decision for her expulsion was deemed best considering the interest of the
school as well as of the other students and her own welfare. There was
nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant.
SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE [concur]
- Same points as Ponencia, plus:
- Apetition will be dismissed where petitioner has admittedly failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies.
- Questions of admission to the school are matters of technical and academic
judgment that the courts will not ordinarily interfere with. Only after exhaustion
of administrative remedies and when there is marked arbitrariness, will the
courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty.
MAKASIAR [dissent]
- 1935 Constitution: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic
freedom." VS. 1973 Constitution which broadened the scope into "All
institutions of higher learning." Thus guaranteed, it is not limited to the
members of the faculty nor to administrative authorities of the educational
institution. It must also be deemed granted in favor of the student body
because all three constitute the educational institution, without any one of
which the educational institution can neither exist nor operate.
- An individual has a natural and inherent right to learn and develop his
faculties. The Constitution provides for this in various provisions. The
happiness and full development of the curious intellect of the student are
protected by the narrowguarantee of academic freedomand more so by the
broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and press, and
academic freedom.
- No private person has the inherent right to establish and operate a school.
Education is a sovereign state function; therefore, not different in this respect
fromcommercial public utilities, whose right to exist and to operate depends
upon state authority. Constitutional rights must be respected by the State and
by enterprises authorized by the state to operate.
REYES V BOARD OF REGENTS OF UP
MEDIALDEA; February 25, 1991
FACTS
- NaturePetitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and
restraining order to reviewthe decision of the CA
- Respondent-students (students hereinafter) as then applicants to the
University of the Philippines College, of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores
higher than 70 percent in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which
was the cut-off score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM
Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University
Council (UC) on April 8,1986.
- However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score
prescribed by the UPCMFaculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for
academic year 1987-88.
- Upon appeal of some concerned PreMed students, the Board of Regents
(BOR) in its 996th resolution dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the NWAT
cut-off score of 70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its
997th resolution dated March 24, 1987.
- subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of
the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the students case and
recommended inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile I
rating ranging from70 to 90 "as a matter of right".
- The Dean of the UPCMand the Faculty did not heed the BORdirective for
themto admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for
mandamus with the RTC. On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction for their admission.
- Students filed with the RTCa motion to dismiss and attached thereto their
letter
51
to the UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC
dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM
Faculty held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where it denied the
appeal of the students on the ground that they were not qualified for admission
to the UPCM. As a result, the students filed with the RTC a motion to
reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the RTCissued an order
for the admission of the students to the college. Whereupon, the petitioners
moved to lift the ex-parte mandatory order.
- Meanwhile, the BORin its 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its
plenary power under the Charter of the University over matters affecting
university affairs, resolved to approve the admission of the students in the
interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.
- Consequently, the UPPresident issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct
against themand later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. So,
herein petitioners appealed to the CAbut their appeal was dismissed. Motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON the BOR violated the petitioners academic freedom, and thus could
validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine.
HELD
There is no violation of academic freedomwhen an order of BORin upholding
the admission requirement approved by the University Council (in 1986) is
supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission
requirements, against the UPCM Faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the University Council without following
the prescribed rules and procedures of the University.
ReasoningThe method deployed was simply referring to the UPCharter or to
the University Code, and then applying the relevant provisions or rules to the
case at bar. The ponencia cited the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee
52
, Loyola School of Theology, citing Justice Frankfurters
51
Studentsmanifestedthat theynever intendedtoquestiontheFacultysright toacademicfreedom; that
theybelievedtheissuewassimplyonthequestionof observanceof theproper procedurein
implementingadmissionrequirements; that theyfelt theynolonger haveanymoral right topursuethe
court action; that theywouldleavetotheFacultythedeterminationof humanitarianconsiderationof their
case; that theyapologizedfor offendingtheFacultyandthat theywouldliketoappeal for achanceto
remaininthecollege
52
Theindividual facultymember hasthefreedomtopursuehisstudiesinhisparticular specialtyand
thereafter tomakeknownor publishtheresult of hisendeavorswithout fear that retributionwouldbe
visitedonhimintheevent that Hisconclusionsarefounddistasteful or objectionabletothepowersthat
be, whether inthepolitical, economic, or academicestablishments
concurring opinion inSweezy v. NewHampshire
53
, though as obiter dicta only,
to strengthen the arguments in support of the ratio decidendi.
First. Under the UPCharter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to
any college of the university is vested in the University Council (See. 9). The
power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in the University Council
subject to the approval of the Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint
the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service and other
conditions is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate
the income among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the
Board of Regents
Second. Academic freedom
54
may be asserted by the University Council or by
the Board of Regents or bothin so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested
in themby lawwhich are essential to institutional academic freedom
The academic freedomclaimed by the faculty to have been violated by the
Board of Regents when it issued the questioned order is related to the right of
the University to fix admission requirements. This right and power to fix
admission requirements is clearly vested by lawin the University Council. The
College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of Regents under Article
324 of the University Code to initially determine the admission requirements,
subject to the approval of the University Council and the President of the
University.
Third. When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in the NMAT at
70th percentile (p, 161, Rollo) which was the cut off score approved by the
University Council on 8 April 1986, it did not exercise the power to prescribe
the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University Council
under the lawto fix the requirements for admission to the UPCMand rendered
ineffective the action of the UPCMFaculty, which attempted to exercise that
power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the
approval of the University Council and the President of the University in
violation of Section 324 of the University Code (supra) which is very explicit on
this matter.]
Fourth. The BORonly exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing
to it that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.
Fifth. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession
or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable and equitable admission and
academic requirements [Article XIV, Section 5(3)]. While it may be the UC
could ratify the acts of the College regarding admission requirements, the
same should be done within a reasonable time. It is to be recalled that the
controversy regarding the students admission started in 1987. It is surprising
that despite petitioners insistence on the UCs jurisdiction over admission
requirements, they did not seek recourse to it immediately. Fromthe records,
there appears to be no physical or legal hindrance to the calling for a UC
meeting on the students case. To validate these resolutions at this point in
time would not be fair and equitable to the students. In the span of three years,
they have proved their mettle by passing the academic requirements of the
college
Therefore No. There was no violation of the petitioners academic freedomby
the BORsince the BORonly exercised its power of governance and its duty in
seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulations.
Decision Petitions DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
Voting 3 concur, no dissent, 2 took no part.
53
Incontrast, theUniversityhastheacademicfreedomtodeterminefor itself onacademicgroundswho
mayteach, what maybetaught, howit shall betaught, andwhomaybeadmittedtostudy
54
Art. XIVSec.5(2) of the1987Constitutionsatesthat Academicfreedomshall beenjoyedinall
institutionsof higher learning.
MORALES V UP
CHICO-NAZARIO; December 13, 2004
FACTS
- According to Art. 410 of the UPCode, students who complete their courses
with the following minimumweighted average grade shall be graduated with
honors:
Summa cumlaude1.20
Magna cumlaude1.45
Cumlaude1.75
- Provided that all the grades in all subjects prescribed in the curriculum, as
well as subjects that qualify as electives, shall be included in the computation
of the weighted average grade; provided further that in cases where the
electives taken are more than those required in the program, the following
procedure will be used in selecting the electives to be included in the
computation of the weighted average grade:
1) For students who did not shift programs, consider the required
number of electives in chronological order.
2) For students who shifted from one program to another, the
electives to be considered shall be selected according to the
following order of priority:
a. Electives taken in the programwhere the student is graduating
will be selected in chronological order.
b. Electives taken in the previous program and acceptable as
electives in the second program will be selected in
chronological order.
c. Prescribed courses taken in the previous program, but qualify
as electives in the second program will be selected in
chronological order.
- Nadine Morales transferred fromUPManila (majored in Speech Pathology) to
UPDiliman and enrolled in the European Languages undergraduate program
in SY 1997-98. She was enrolled under the Plan A curriculumand chose
French as her major and German as her minor.
- Under Plan A, a student has to complete 141 units with 27 being electives.
- 1
st
semester of AY1997-98Morales enrolled in German 10 and German 11
where she obtained a grade of 1.0 in both subjects.
- 2
nd
semester of AY 1997-98 Morales changed minor to Spanish but
maintained French as her major.
- End of 1
st
semester of SY1990-2000Morales included in list of candidates
for graduation with probable honors based on the computation made by the
College of Arts and Letters of Morales GWAinclusive of her grades of 1.0 in
German 10 and 11. Her GWAthen was 1.725.
- 2
nd
semester of SY1999-2000 Morales GWAwas 1.729 after obtaining an
average of 1.708 in her final semester in UP, making her eligible for cumlaude
honors.
- During the assessment for graduation, she was not granted cumlaude honors
because her grades in German 10 and 11 were excluded in the computation,
bringing her GWAto 1.760.
- According to Prof. Bautista of the Dept. of European Languages, a Plan A
student is required to major in a European language other than Spanish and
minor in any other discipline allowed in the curriculum.
o In Morales case, her major is French and her minor is Spanish so
German does not fit into her curriculum.
o Plan Acurriculumalso does not allowfor free electives.
Electives must be major language electives taken from French
courses in either literature or translation.
German 10 and 11 are basic language courses and do not fall
under electives as contemplated in the Plan Acurriculum.
- Morales requested that her German 10 and 11 grades be included in the
computation of her GWA.
o Her letter was taken up on a no-name basis during the University
Council meeting upon the endorsement of the Registrar. By a vote of
207-4, the Council affirmed the decision of the CAL in not awarding
honors to Morales.
o Issue was then elevated by Morales to the UPBoard of Regents and
it was resolved that the appeal be returned to the University Council
for further consideration with full disclosure of petitioners identity.
o By a vote of 99 in favor-12 against-6 abstaining, the Council denied
the award of cumlaude honors to Morales.
o A subsequent appeal was made to the Board of Regents. This
appeal was denied 9-2.
- Morales filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC and
assailed the decision of the UP Board of Regents as erroneous. The RTC
ruled in her favor by saying that the UPBoard of Regents greatly abused its
discretion in the improper application of its academic discretion in interpreting
Art. 410 of the UP Code. The RTC ordered that UP recomputed Morales
grades by including German 10 and 11 and confer upon her cumlaude honors.
- In the Court of Appeals:
o In resolving the issue, the CA initially determined whether only
questions of law were involved and eventually decided that an
analysis of the facts of the cases was indispensable.
o The CA ruled that the lower court violated UPs constitutionally
protected right to academic freedom when it substituted its own
interpretation of the internal rules and regulations of the University for
that of the UPBoard of Regents and applied the same to the case at
bar.
ISSUES
1. WONthe CAhad no jurisdiction over the appeal of the RTCOrder because
the essential facts were never in dispute, the case involving only questions of
law
2. WON the RTCs interpretation of Art. 410 of the UP Code violated the
academic freedomgranted to UPas an institution of higher learning
HELD
1. Yes, the appeal raises questions of law.
- Aquestion of lawarises when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being
admitted and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is
no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefromis correct is aquestion of law.
- Both parties admitted to the facts. Any conclusion based on these facts
would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of
evidence, but would be limited to an inquiry of whether the lawwas properly
applied given the state of facts of the case. Since the appeal raises only
questions of law, the proper mode of appeal is through a certiorari. The CAdid
not have the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal.
2. Yes, the RTCviolated the academic freedomgrantedto UP.
Ratio decidendi: Unless there is a clear showing of arbitrary and
capricious exercise of judgment, courts may not interfere with the
Universitys exclusive right to decide for itself its aims and objectives
and howbest to attain them(in this case, to whomamong its graduates it
shall confer academic recognition based on its established standards).
- In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, it was said that the discretion
of schools of learning to formulate the rules and guidelines in the granting of
honors for purposes of graduation forms part of the academic freedom. Such
discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there
is a grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
- Grave abuse of discretion involves capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The power should be
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to performthe duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
- UPproceeded fairly in evaluating the situation of Morales and gave her and
her parents ample opportunity to present their side on different occasions.
There is no showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness.
o Deliberations were done in the University Council.
Amember asked whether German 10 and 11 could be counted as
electives for Morales and the Registrar responded the student was
enrolled in Foreign Languages with a major in French and a minor
in Spanish and German 10 and 11 are not required in the
checklist. These can neither be considered as electives because
electives should be non-language electives. German 10 and 11
are excess subjects.
Even if Morales completed all the required subjects under the
curriculum so that German 10 and 11 should be included, the
Dean of the CAL said that the same rule had applied in the past to
previous students. Applying the rules to Morales would be unfair
to the other students.
o Since the rule provides for an order of priority in the electives, there is
an implication that not all electives may be included in the GWA.
o The Advising Committee allows students to change their majors and
minors but these shifts are not counted as part of the course with
credit in the curriculum.
- The word program in Art. 410 must be interpreted in the context of a
particular curriculum. In computing the GWA, the grades of subjects
prescribed in the curriculumand the grades of subjects that qualify as electives
in the curriculumare included.
- The interpretation of the required subjects or allowable electives in the
curriculum should be taken in the context of the entire courses. Morales
decision to shift caused the exclusion of her grades in German 10 and 11.
Besides, German 10 and 11 were excess subjects, her total units taken up in
the University being 147, instead of the required 141.
- Well-settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and
expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact
in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the Courts.
Art. 14, Sec. 4 of the Constitution proves that academic freedomshall be
enjoyed in all institution