Robinson Policy-Media Interaction Model - Measuring Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis - 2000

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Journal of Peace Research
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343300037005006
2000 37: 613 Journal of Peace Research
Piers Robinson
Crisis
The Policy-Media Interaction Model: Measuring Media Power during Humanitarian
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Overview
In recent years, there has been considerable
discussion regarding the ability of news
media coverage to cause intervention during
humanitarian crisis. Operations Provide
Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991 and
Restore Hope in Somalia in 199293, where
emotive news coverage of suffering people
appeared to drive intervention, are the most
prominent examples to date of the so-called
CNN effect. Yet debate over the relationship
between media coverage and intervention
remains inconclusive. Leading studies by
journalists Gowing (1994) and Strobel
(1997) have questioned how inuential the
media really are, whilst academics such as
Shaw (1996) argue media impact is pro-
found. As Livingston (1997: 1) points out,
despite numerous symposia, books, articles,
and research fellowships devoted to unravel-
ling the CNN effect, success at clarifying it
. . . has been minimal. For humanitarians,
many of whom seek to harness the perceived
potential of the news media to facilitate
humanitarian action, this lack of progress is
signicant and the question of whether such
2000 Journal of PeaceResearch,
vol. 37, no. 5, 2000, pp. 613633
SagePublications(London, Thousand Oaks,
CA and New Delhi)
[0022-3433(200009)37:5; 613633; 014110]
The PolicyMedia Interaction Model: Measuring
Media Power During Humanitarian Crisis
PI ERS ROBI NSON
School of Politics and Communication Studies, University of Liverpool
This article details the results of a plausibility probe of a policymedia interaction model designed to
identify instances of media inuence. If sufcient evidence is found to support the model, it can be
used as part of a wider study examining the impact of media coverage on decisions to intervene during
humanitarian crisis, the so-called CNN effect. The model predicts media inuence when policy is uncer-
tain and media coverage is framed so as to be critical of government and empathizes with suffering
people. In order to test the model, it is applied to two cases: US intervention in Bosnia in 1995 in order
to defend the Gorazde safe area and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. In the rst case, the
model highlights the impact of critical, empathizing media coverage and policy uncertainty in effect-
ing the US decision to defend the Gorazde safe area. In the second case, the failure of critical news-
paper coverage to change the Clinton Administrations air-war policy highlights the limits of media
inuence when there exists policy certainty. Overall, it is argued that the plausibility probe supports the
prediction that media inuence occurs when policy is uncertain and media coverage is critically framed
and empathizes with suffering people. And that when policy is certain, media inuence is unlikely to
occur. As such, the policymedia interaction model should prove a useful tool in testing the claim that
media coverage causes intervention during humanitarian crisis.
* The Economic and Social Research Council funded the
research for thisarticle. For commentson earlier draftsthanks
to Eric Herring, Nils Petter Gleditsch, Scott Gates, Steven
Livingston, JamesGow, Clair McHugh, Adam Biscoe, Cecile
Dubernet and three anonymousreviewers. The data used for
the framing analysis in this article can be obtained from:
http://www.liv.ac.uk/~piersgr/index.html.htm.
Correspondence should be addressed to the author by
e-mail: piersgr@liv.ac.uk.
06robinson (ds) 25/7/00 7:35 am Page 613
interventions are media-driven or strategi-
cally motivated by cross-border refugee ows
remains unclear.
1
In order to examine the CNN effect, I
devised a policymedia interaction model.
This article presents the results of a plausibil-
ity probe of this model (Eckstein, 1975:
79137). If support for the model is suf-
ciently strong, it can be used as part of a
wider research project examining the claim
that media coverage causes intervention
during humanitarian crisis. Two cases have
been selected in order to test the model: US
intervention in Bosnia in 1995 to protect the
Gorazde safe area and US intervention in
Kosovo in 1999 (Operation Allied Force). In
the rst case, the model is applied in order to
try and explain why US policymakers decided
to defend Gorazde. In the second case, the
model is applied in order to help explain why,
despite criticisms of the NATO air war and
emotive coverage of suffering refugees, the
Clinton Administration did not deploy either
ground troops or close air support in order to
protect Albanian Kosovars.
I start by outlining the policymedia inter-
action model and the methodology employed
in this study. The application of the model to
the two cases is then detailed and the ndings
stated. In the case of Gorazde, it is found that
critical media coverage and policy uncertainty
following the fall of the Srebrenica safe area
helped cause the decision to defend Gorazde.
In the case of Operation Deliberate Force, it
is argued that policy certainty meant that
critical media coverage could not inuence
policy and as a result neither ground troops
nor close air support was used to provide
immediate protection to Albanian Kosovars.
The article concludes with an assessment of
how well the model worked. The hypotheses
that policy uncertainty and critical media
framing leads to media inuence on policy,
and that when there is policy certainty media
inuence is limited, are supported by the two
case-studies.
Methodology
Generally, research into the CNN effect has
tended to reach contradictory conclusions
regarding media inuence. In part, this has
been due to over reliance on interview data
(Robinson, 2000) and in part due to a failure
to employ a theoretical and systematic
approach to the examination of media inu-
ence (Robinson, 1999).
2
In order to over-
come these problems, the policymedia
interaction model was devised. The model
posits that media inuence on policy occurs
when there exists: (1) policy uncertainty
(Gowing, 1994: 38; Strobel, 1997: 219;
Minear et al., 1997: 73) and (2) critically
framed media coverage that empathizes with
suffering people. In this situation, policy-
makers, uncertain of what to do and without
a clearly dened policy line with which to
counter critical media coverage, can be forced
to intervene during a humanitarian crisis due
to media-driven public pressure or the fear of
potential negative public reaction to govern-
ment inaction.
Alternatively, if a decision has been taken
to intervene for non-media-related reasons,
we would expect to observe high levels of
policy certainty with the executive drawing
upon its substantial resources in order to try
and inuence the news agenda. In this scen-
ario, we would expect to observe media
coverage following decisions made by the
executive. Whilst press coverage might still
criticize government policy even when the
government is working hard to sell policy,
such criticism tends to surface only when
there exists elite dissensus over policy
journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume37 / number 5 / september 2000 614
1
For example, Adelman (1992: 74) argues that threats to
regional security generated by cross-border refugee ows
trigger intervention rather than media coverage.
2
Notable exceptions, which are both systematic and theor-
etically informed, include Jakobsen (1996) and Livingston
& Eachus (1997). For more general discussions on the
media and humanitarianism, see Rotberg & Weiss (1996).
(Bennett, 1990; Hallin, 1986; Mermin,
1999). However, with policymakers set on a
particular course of action, critical media
coverage is unlikely to inuence policy.
Instead, policymakers are more likely to work
harder to promote their chosen course of
action through press briengs and public
announcements. An outline of the model can
be found in Table I.
The policymedia interaction model ts
within the broader theoretical framework of
pressstate relations devised by Hallin (1986)
and Bennett (1990). The thesis advocated by
these writers is that US media content tends
to reect the agendas of elites (dened
broadly to include the executive, legislature
and foreign policy advisors). When a consen-
sus exists between elites, media coverage
tends to reect that consensus with the
content of media reports remaining relatively
uncritical. When there exists elite dissensus
over policy, however, media coverage will
reect this and contain a mix of critical and
supportive coverage. However, Hallin and
Bennett do not consider in detail the circum-
stances under which media coverage might
effect and change executive policy. This is
where the policymedia interaction model
contributes. By hypothesizing media inu-
ence on policy when media coverage becomes
critical of executive policy (rather than con-
taining a balanced mix of supportive and
critical reports) and executive policy is uncer-
tain, the possibility for media coverage
playing a key role in policy formulation
occurs. In other words, the model accounts
for the possibility that media coverage might
actually take sides during elite debates over
policy. By promoting a particular policy line
advocated either by elites outside the execu-
tive or particular members of the executive
itself, the media can play a key role in causing
policy change.
Used as a tool to assess the claim that
Pi ers Robi nson CNN AND HUMANI TARI AN I NTERVENTI ON 615
Table I. The PolicyMedia Interaction Model
Government Direction Newsmedia PolicyMedia Relationship
Policy Line of Inuence Coverage
Media inuence Uncertain Extensive In this scenario media inuence
and critical occurs. In the absence of a clear,
well-articulated policy line, the
government is vulnerable to critical
and extensive media attention. If
news reports are critically framed,
advocating a particular course of
action, the government is forced to
do something or face a public
relations disaster. Here, media can
signicantly inuence the policy
process.
No media Certain Indexed to When the government has clear and
inuence ofcial agenda well-articulated objectives it tends to
set the news agenda. Coverage might
become critical if there is elite
dissensus. With the executive
decided on a particular course of
action, media coverage is unlikely to
inuence policy.
media coverage causes intervention during
humanitarian crisis, if we nd policy uncer-
tainty and critical and empathizing media
coverage preceding intervention, our con-
dence in the assertion that media coverage
triggers intervention will be increased. The
more cases in which we identify this corre-
lation, the greater our condence in the
casual inference. In any given case, inferences
based on the model are cross-referenced with
other accounts of the policy decisionmaking
process. If indications provided by the
policymedia interaction model are consist-
ent with other accounts of the policy process,
then conclusions regarding media inuence
can be stated with greater condence.
Framing
The concept of framing refers to the
specific properties of . . . [a] narrative that
encourage those . . . thinking about events
to develop particular understandings of
them (Entman, 1991: 7). Media coverage
of war may be framed so as to empathize
with suffering people, for example identify-
ing them as victims (van der Gaag & Nash,
1987: 2830). This type of framing,
referred to here as empathy framing, con-
tains implicit or explicit criticism of a
government opposed to intervention.
3
Alternatively, coverage may be framed so as
to maintain an emotional distance; for
example, classifying suffering people as
members of warring tribes (van der Gaag &
Nash, 1987: 2830). This type of framing,
referred to here as distance framing, is
implicitly supportive of a government
opposed to intervention.
4
In order to reveal media frames, I employ
a combination of approaches. First, a sample
of news reports (including editorials) are read
in order to both identify their subject matter
and develop a sense of the overall tone of
reports. This aspect of the framing analysis is
unsystematic and interpretative, but does
possess a high degree of validity requiring the
researcher to read complete news texts and
develop a sense of the overall tone and
emphasis of media reports. The next method
employed, by contrast, is more systematic
and reliable, involving quantication of
descriptors used in reports. The approach
involves rst predicting a set of descriptors
one would expect to be associated both with
the frame the researcher is trying to reveal
and its opposite. For example, descriptors
associated with both an empathy frame and
the opposite distance frame are searched for.
This method avoids selection bias whereby
the researcher considers only the evidence
that supports the expected frame. By
quantifying the occurrence of descriptors
associated with the frame and its opposite, a
picture is built up of the relative prevalence of
each frame. This provides a systematic and
reliable check for any inferences made during
the interpretative element of the framing
analysis.
Policy Certainty
The conceptualization of policy certainty
builds upon the policy studies literature
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Smith &
Clarke, 1985; Schilling, 1962; George,
1980; Hilsman, 1987) in order to offer an
idea of what we might expect to observe
when there exists policy uncertainty.
Drawing upon this literature, the decision-
making process is conceptualized as the
outcome of a bargaining process between a
3
It is important to note here that in assessing overall cover-
age it is not useful to try and identify actual calls for inter-
vention. Journalistic norms regarding objectivity preclude
journalists from making explicit policy prescriptions (other
than in editorials). Rather, producing empathizing coverage
is one way journalists can construct news reports that pres-
sure for a particular policy outcome without explicitly
calling for a particular course of action.
4
For useful analyses of the frames adopted by Western
leaders, although not the news media, of the war in Bosnia,
see Kuusisto (1998) and Hansen (1998).
set of policy subsystems in the executive. If
an issue suddenly arises and no policy is in
place, or if there is disagreement, conict of
interest or uncertainty between the executive
subsystems, there can be said to be policy
uncertainty. Policy certainty results from
agreement on policy between the subsys-
tems.
The observable implications of policy
uncertainty are as follows: (1) no policy line,
when there is no ofcial policy in place
regarding an issue; (2) waveringpolicy line,
when a policy line changes frequently; and
(3) an inconsistent policy line, when the sub-
systems of the executive may be divided over
policy and pursue or advocate different poli-
cies. The rst step in assessing policy cer-
tainty is to analyse the press briengs of three
key US executive subsystems: the White
House, the State Department and the
Department of Defense. By searching these
press briengs for the observable impli-
cations of policy uncertainty, a picture can be
built up of the extent to which the executive
is feeding a certain policy line to the media.
Any inferences based upon the press brieng
analysis are then cross-referenced with other
available accounts of the policy process in
question. If accounts are consistent with the
ndings of the press brieng analysis then
inferences relating to levels of policy certainty
can be stated with condence.
The operationalization of policy certainty,
in particular the analysis of press briengs as
one indicator of policy certainty, is not
considered unproblematic. (This is why
inferences are cross-referenced with other
available accounts of the policy process.) But
press briengs are an arena in which the
executive attempts both to set news agendas
and sell policy. In particular, when govern-
ments are already intent on taking military
action, press briengs play a key role in both
justifying and promoting policy to both jour-
nalists and the broader public. In such
situations, it is expected that a certain policy
line would be fed to journalists. As such,
press briefings are a useful indication of the
presence, or absence, of policy certainty in
the run up to a military intervention. More-
over, without an attempt to define the
observable implications of policy certainty,
and precisely what we mean by it, it is diffi-
cult to effectively apply this insight vis--vis
the conditions for media influence. For
example, Gowing (1996: 86) understands
policy uncertainty occurring when the
media covers unexpected events and poli-
ticians literally do not know how to
respond. This narrow definition causes
Gowing (1996: 86) to argue media impact
is rare. Alternatively Shaw (1996: 181)
notes that the whole postCold War era is
characterized by uncertainty regarding the
foreign policies of Western governments.
Understanding policy certainty in these
broad terms allows Shaw to argue that
media impact is far more profound.
Without defining conceptualizing and then
specifying the observable implications of
policy certainty, it is difficult to even start to
determine levels of policy certainty and,
therefore, the scope of media influence on
policy.
The Cases
US intervention in Bosnia in 1995 to defend
the Gorazde safe area and Operation Allied
Force in Kosovo were selected for analysis.
5
These cases, respectively, can be considered a
hard and an easy case for the policymedia
interaction model. The US decision to
defend Gorazde was considered a hard case
because US policy toward the 199295 war
in Bosnia had for many years been set against
5
Whilst a case can be made that the two events are causally
connected, the focus of this study is on the impact of
immediatefactors on policymaking rather than the role of
underlying or permissive factors.
(i.e. there was policy certainty) direct
involvement (Gow, 1996). Yet, in the
summer of 1995, after the fall of the
Srebrenica safe area, the US took over mili-
tary leadership of the Western response to the
war in Bosnia. These events were followed by
a renewed USA diplomatic effort in August
and a sustained bombing campaign (Opera-
tion Deliberate Force) in late August/Sep-
tember. By the end of September, the war in
Bosnia had come to an end. The immediate
goal of the military lead in July was to prevent
the fall of the Gorazde safe area (Holbrooke,
1998: 72; Christopher, 1998: 348). Because
the factor policy uncertainty was not present
in this case, it was not expected that the US
decision to defend Gorazde could be
explained in terms of media pressure. Rather,
policy certainty would have been expected to
fend off media pressure and intervention
would not have occurred.
Operation Allied Force (MarchJune
1999) involved an air campaign against
Serbia, the aim of which was to force
Serbian President Milosevic to withdraw
troops from the Serbian province of Kosovo.
The case can be considered an easy one for
the policymedia interaction model. This is
because after the air campaign had started
critical media coverage came head to head
with policy certainty in the US executive.
Throughout April, a debate occurred in the
USA over whether airstrikes were sufficient
to force Milosevic to withdraw from Kosovo
territory, or whether a ground war would be
required. This debate was reflected in criti-
cal coverage in the media. At the same time,
the US executive maintained a policy cer-
tainty against escalation to a ground war
throughout most of the campaign.
6
Hence,
the case can be argued to support the
hypothesis that when policymakers are
decided on a particular course of action
critical media coverage is unlikely to influ-
ence policy.
It should be noted that whilst the focus of
inquiry is the same in both cases (i.e. the
question of media inuence), the nature of
each case is different. In the case of Gorazde,
the general aim is to explain why US policy
shifted from non-intervention to inter-
vention. In the case of Operation Allied
Force, the aim is to explain why US policy,
already at the stage of intervention in that an
air campaign was underway, was apparently
not forced to escalate to a ground war by
critical coverage (i.e. the dependent variable
is the apparent refusal to deploy ground
troops). As such, the events that we are
trying to explain in each case are slightly
different from each other, although both t
within the broad denition of forcible inter-
vention during humanitarian crisis. For the
purposes of a plausibility probe, this vari-
ation is not problematic because what we are
testing here is not the CNN effect claim that
media coverage causes intervention (in
which case selecting a case in which inter-
vention has already occurred might appear
odd). But rather we are testing the central
hypothesis of the model that policy uncer-
tainty and critical media framing lead to
media inuence on policy. As such, any case
containing media coverage and either policy
change or policy continuity, regardless of
what that policy might be, is useful for
testing the policymedia interaction model.
The Fall of Srebrenica and the
Defence of Gorazde
The fall of the UN safe area Srebrenica in
July 1995, the ensuing massacre of around
8,000 inhabitants and the displacement of its
remaining population marked a turning
point for the US response to the war in
Bosnia. Loza (1996: 38) argues that
Srebrenica was the nal act to unite the West
against the Bosnian Serb nationalists. US
6
The possibility that a ground war decision was taken in
late May/early June will be dealt with in the section on this
case.
special envoy Richard Holbrooke (1998: 70)
claims the fall of the safe area left no more
energy . . . in the international system, whilst
the then Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher argued (1998: 348): the massacre in
Srebrenica was devastating, and we realized
something had to be done. Finally, President
Clinton cited the collapse of Srebrenica as a
turning point for US policy:
When that happened, and the threat of
hostage-taking . . . caused Srebrenica to fall
without a terric response in terms of air
punishment. That collapsed the support for
the United Nations, and all of us, including
the United States and NATO, who had sup-
ported it, suffered in prestige, . . . not because
we didnt win, but because the UN didnt do
what it said it was going to do. You cant go
about the world saying youre going to do
something and then not do it. (White House
Press Conference, 27 July 1995)
7
By 23 July, the USA threatened any further
violation of safe areas with actions at
unprecedented levels (White House Press
Statement, 23 July 1995). According to an
interview by Blechman with Secretary of
Defense William Perry, the dening moment
with regard to the threat to use force came on
23 July when the chiefs of the US, British and
French armed forces visited Belgrade to
convey the new resoluteness of the NATO
nations in the aftermath of the Srebrenica
massacres (Blechman & Wittes, 1999: 21).
The immediate concern here was to deter any
attack on the remaining Gorazde safe area
(Holbrooke, 1998: 72; Christopher, 1998:
348) although the threat was extended to
include attacks on any safe areas, including
Sarajevo. With a robust policy in place, the
USA took the necessary measures to enable a
forceful military response to an attack on
Gorazde.
The question we turn to now is what effect
did media coverage have on this policy
change. If we observe critical media coverage
and policy uncertainty preceding the
decision to defend Gorazde, then the media
should have been a factor in causing the
policy outcome. Alternatively, if we observe
policy certainty and media coverage follow-
ing the decision to defend Gorazde then
media coverage is unlikely to have been a
factor in causing the policy outcome. In
order to assess these variables, the
policymedia interaction model was applied
to the period between the fall of Srebrenica
and the defence of Gorazde.
Media Framing, Empathizing with
Refugees and Criticizing Western Policy
8
The media treated the fall of Srebrenica as an
event of pre-eminent importance devoting
extensive coverage to the story. The Washing-
ton Post and the New York Times ran 70
reports on Bosnia between 11 and 18 July,
averaging over four reports each per day on
Bosnia. Every day, at least one of the reports
ran on the front page. CBS treated the fall as
the key news story between 11 and 14 July
allocating it to the leading headline slot.
Between 15 and 18 July, Bosnia slipped
slightly down the news agenda but at all
times was covered within the rst ten
minutes of the evening news. The extensive
coverage secured Srebrenica as an event of
7
All US government press briengs and conferences
(including White House, State Department and Pentagon)
are available on line; see for example http://www.
whitehouse.gov.
8
For the framing analysis, articles for the decision period
1118 July inclusive were selected from LexisNexis using
the search term Bosnia. The data sources were the Washing-
ton Post, the New York Times and CBS Evening News.
Seventy newspaper articles in total were retrieved relating to
Bosnia. Articles were listed chronologically and alternate
articles selected for analysis. This provided a non-biased
sample of 35 articles. The CBS news search provided eight
days worth of news segments devoted to Bosnia, all of
which were analysed. CBS is considered as broadly rep-
resentative of the other two major networks, and theNew
York Timesand the Washington Post as the most inuential
of the dailies (see Entman, 1991: 9). The data source is
therefore considered to be representative of news coverage
in general. Precise details concerning the descriptor count
are available with the dataset at http://www.
liv.ac.uk/~piersgr/index.htm/htm.
importance. To understand more fully the
potential political impact of the coverage, we
need to understand the framing of media
content.
The rst (interpretive) task of the framing
analysis involved reading selected news
reports in order to determine the subject
matter of media coverage. Out of 35 news-
paper reports selected for analysis, 12 con-
tained signicant reference to the refugees
from Srebrenica whilst 22 contained signi-
cant reference to Western policy. In terms of
news topics, news media coverage tended to
highlight the issue of refugees and Western
policy. Selected reports were then read in
order to: (1) identify the extent to which
reports referring to Western policy were
critically mixed or supportively framed and
(2) identify the extent to which reports refer-
ring to the refugees were empathy framed,
mixed or distancing framed. References to
Western policy tended to be critically
framed. A list of descriptors indicative of
failure framing can be found in Table II. The
following quote is an example of failure
framing:
With Srebrenica, one of the six safe havens
the United Nations had pledged to protect,
already fallen to the Serbs last week, and a
second, Zepa, heading to that end, the allies
and the Clinton administration displayed the
same division they have shown over the past
three years as the situation had worsened.
Clinton and his aides have been united in only
one thing: that unless the UN mission to
Table II. A Selection of Descriptors Used in Relation to the People of Srebrenica and Western Policy
Empathy Descriptors Critical Descriptors
Human tragedy Talking so nice and doing nothing
Bedraggled Sickly
Hungry Lack of authority
Scared Viability at issue
Little food, water or medicine Spinelessness
Rousted from their homes Presence at risk
Trail of tears/tears, sobbing Doing too little too late
Frantic Lacks the military means
Desperately Inaction
Prayed for their missing Absence of will
Dazed Muddle-through strategy
Weeping Doing nothing
Hysterical Caught by surprise
Carrying only the clothes on their backs Impotence
Trudged Feckless
Without shelter Collapsing
Huddling One humiliation after another
Driven out Ineffectual
Human suffering Reluctance to use force
Rape At an end
Mass killing Unless strengthened . . . it is doomed
Murder Feuding
Throats cut
About to give birth
Mass of wailing humanity
West includes US, UN, NATO, UNPROFOR, EU. Source: New York Timesand Washington Post. Washington Post
available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com. New York Timessearch available via Lexis-Nexis.
protect civilians can be strengthened, it is
doomed. (Devroy & Dobbs, 1995: A17)
Reports referring to refugees tended to be
empathy framed. A list of descriptors charac-
terizing the empathy frame can be found in
Table II. One notable CBS news bulletin was
headlined Bosnia Bleeding. The following
quote is an example of empathy-framed
coverage:
The air was lled with anguished cries as the
Bosnian Serbs loaded the rst 3,000 women,
children and elderly refugees onto buses at
Potocari, the United Nations base overrun
today outside Srebrenica, which was captured
on Tuesday. The refugees were dropped off
outside Kladanj, about 25 miles away, where
they were forced to walk the last six miles
across the front lines to the Government-held
town and aid. (Hedges, 1995: A1)
The next task involved checking the
validity of the interpretive inferences by
applying a systematic test of the empathy
and failure frames. Here, media texts were
analysed for descriptors predicted to be
associated with both the empathyand failure
frames and the opposite distance and
success/non-failureframes. Starting with the
empathy/distance frames, the number of
times the population of Srebrenica was
referred to as (1) refugees, (2) peopleand (3)
women and children, was quantied. These
empathizing descriptors encourage an audi-
ence to identify with the plight of refugees
by: (1) emphasizing their status as victims,
(2) reminding the reader of his or her essen-
tial similarity with the victims and (3) repre-
senting connotations of innocence and
vulnerability (womenare clearly problematic
here). Conversely, the number of times the
descriptors: (1) Muslim, (2) Bosnianand (3)
men and soldier were used to refer to the
population of Srebrenica was quantied.
These distancing descriptors encourage an
audience to maintain an emotional distance
by: (1) dening the population of Srebrenica
as an other and (2) representing connotations
of responsibility and power, therefore
tending to minimize sympathy from the
audience. Regarding the failure framing of
the West, the number of times the words fail,
withdrawand end were used in relation to
the West was counted. One would expect
these terms to dominate in news reports that
focused upon the failure of the West to
protect Srebrenica and the possibility of the
UN mission collapsing. Conversely, the
number of times the terms success, protectand
continuewere used in relation to the West
was counted. One would expect these
success/non-failure framing terms to domi-
nate in media reports that focused upon the
positive aspects of the safe area policy and
the continuance of the UN presence in
Bosnia.
The results of this analysis are shown in
Table III. Starting with the empathyverses
distanceframes we can see that overall the
humanizing, empathy encouraging descrip-
tors were used on 181 occasions, whereas
the distancing or neutral descriptors
occurred on only 100 occasions. The results
therefore support the inference of an
empathy frame predominating in news
coverage revealed during the interpretative
element of the framing analysis. Regarding
the failureversus success/non-failureframing
of the West, we can see that overall we have
75 occurrences of descriptors associated with
a failureframe against just 38 occurrences of
descriptors associated with a success/non-
failureframe. These results therefore support
the inference made during the interpretative
element of the framing analysis that a failure
frame regarding Western policy predomi-
nated in news coverage.
Summarizing, the ndings show that: (1)
an empathy frame prevailed in media reports
which encouraged empathy with the victims
of Srebrenica as opposed to emotional dis-
tance; and (2) a failureframe predominated
in reports that served to highlight the failure
of Western policy in Bosnia.
What Do WeDo Next?
9
The analysis of press briengs, in particular
those of the White House, reveals the
awkward situation the US executive was
placed in with regard to whether they would
act to defend or retake Srebrenica. For
example, on 11 July, a journalist asked
Anthony Lake for an assessment of the current
situation in Bosnia. Lake replies bluntly Let
me give you a very brief answer: No! (White
House Press Brieng, 11 July 1995). When
asked to elaborate, Lake says, Because this is a
uid situation, is one reason. Im leaving, and
as you know is our practice, when were in the
middle of a situation like that, for a variety of
reasons, we prefer not to comment (White
House Press Brieng, 11 July 1995). On the
same day, White House spokesperson Mike
McCurry is placed in a difcult position when
asked whether the US would intervene to save
Srebrenica. McCurry initially attempted to
deect these questions by stating that the
European led Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)
was set up to respond to crises such as the
assault on Srebrenica. When it is pointed out
that the US marines are available off shore and
the RRF is not yet fully deployed, McCurry
refuses to be drawn to comment. At this point
a frustrated journalist remarked:
Well Michael, what is the point of the Presi-
dent going to Denver and making a public
pledge to rescue peacekeepers in danger when
the rst and most prominent case of that
comes up and no one in this administration
can say whether or not this is what he was
talking about? (White House Press Brieng,
11 July 1995)
Specically, the policy certainty analysis indi-
cated a rm policy line in place that
UNPROFOR should remain in order to
perform its humanitarian mission. The
White House, the Department of Defense
and the State Department articulated this
policy line consistently. For example:
Table III. Media Coverage
FailureFrame Success/Non-FailureFrame
Descriptor Frequency Descriptor Frequency
(a) Of theWest
Fail 24 + 4 Succeed 5 + 0
Withdraw 44 + 1 Protect 25 + 4
End 1 + 1 Continue 4 + 0
Total 75 Total 38
Empathy Frame Distance/Neutrality Frame
(b) Of theExpelled Population of Srebrenica
Refugee 74 + 11 Muslim 42 + 4
People 35 + 8 Bosnian 13 + 3
Women 25 + 6 Men 19 + 10
Children 16 + 6 Soldier 4 + 5
Total 181 Total 100
Figures are the totals for the Washington Post +New York Timesand CBS (bold) Sources: Washington Post available on
line at http://www.washingtonpost.com; New York Timessearch available via Lexis-Nexis; and CBS EveningNews
segments available via TV News Archive, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee.
9
Clinton cited in Woodward (1996: 259).
United States and our allies reaffirmed the
importance of the North Atlantic Alliance
and the importance of a continued UN pres-
ence in Bosnia and a common position
toward the situation in the enclaves and
Bosnia generally. There will be follow-up
conversations at various levels as the United
States government works to minimize the
humanitarian suffering in Bosnia, and to
strengthen the UN mission in Bosnia
(UNPROFOR). (White House Press State-
ment, 13 July 1995)
However, the analysis also indicates the
executive failing to demonstrate policy cer-
tainty line regarding whether or not greater
force would be used to defend the threat-
ened Gorazde safe area. For example, on 13
July, a State Department spokesperson
states:
I think there are two factors at work. One is
that the United Nations and the troop-
contributing countries have got to make a
fundamental decision whether they will use
military force or military strategy to try to
either regain what has been lost or to protect
what may be lost. That is a very important
question, one that has not yet been fully
answered. (State Department Press Brieng,
13 July 1995)
Again, on 18 July, McCurry states Ill say
its not useful at this point for me to speculate
on any possible military action in connection
with strengthening UNPROFOR because
theres a lot of speculation out there that,
frankly, right now is inaccurate (White
House Press Brieng, 18 July 1995).
Hence, in terms of the observable impli-
cations of policy uncertainty, the analysis
here provides indications of there being a no
policy lineregarding the use of force. Accord-
ing to the denition and conceptualization of
policy certainty outlined earlier, the obser-
vations here indicate the presence of policy
uncertainty.
The next step in the policy certainty
analysis is to cross-reference the above
inferences with other available accounts.
The press briefings show that the executive
was (a) declaring that UNPROFOR would
not be withdrawn and (b) stating that there
was no decision yet (i.e. there existed policy
uncertainty) on whether force would be
used to either retake Srebrenica or protect
Gorazde. If we compare these statements
regarding the state of policy with other
sources, we find a high level of consistency.
Regarding the certain policy line that the
UN would remain in Bosnia, this is con-
sistent with the personal accounts of both
Holbrooke (1998: 38) and Christopher
(1998: 348), who state that a US-backed
withdrawal from Bosnia had been deemed
an unacceptable option. Available accounts
therefore support the indications of the
press briefings that the US had a firm policy
line not to allow a UN withdrawal from
Bosnia. With respect to the uncertain
policy regarding the use of force, this
finding is consistent with available
accounts which point to US policy being
discussed and changed after the fall of Sre-
brenica (e.g. Christopher, 1998: 348; Hol-
brooke, 1998: 6370; Loza, 1996: 38;
Woodward, 1996: 257). Indeed both Hol-
brooke (1998: 72) and Christopher (1998:
348) note that one of the key decisions
finally made during the days following Sre-
brenica was the decision to draw a line at
Gorazde. Clearly, this decision would have
been under discussion in the days leading
up to it. Again, the statements in the press
briefings between the fall of Srebrenica and
the decision match up with this infor-
mation stating that discussions were under-
way but that there was no final decision on
defending Gorazde.
We can conclude from the policy cer-
tainty analysis, with a high level of con-
dence, that US policy was uncertain during
the period in question in that deliberations
were taking place regarding the use of force
to both defend Gorazde and enforce UN
resolutions.
Assessing Causation and Alternative
Factors
The above ndings indicate that policy
uncertainty, critical media coverage and the
decision to defend Gorazde were correlated.
This supports the model in predicting that,
when there exists policy uncertainty, critical
media coverage can inuence the policy
process and cause intervention. However,
correlation is not synonymous with causa-
tion. If we nd the same correlation in sub-
sequent cases then our condence in the
hypothesis that critical media coverage and
policy uncertainty can inuence policymak-
ing and cause intervention will be increased.
In the context of this plausibility probe,
because we have a correlation in only one
case, there is a high level of uncertainty over
any causal inference. However, we can draw
upon additional information in order to
increase our condence in this nding.
An account by Woodward also indicates
media coverage being a factor during policy
deliberations in July. For example, in a
foreign policy meeting on 17 July, Clinton
stated, We have a war by CNN. Our
position is unsustainable, its killing the US
position of strength in the world (Wood-
ward, 1996: 261). Also, in the Oval ofce on
18 July Gore stated:
The worst solution would be to acquiesce to
genocide . . . and allow the rape of another city
[Gorazde] AND more refugees. At the same
time we cant be driven by images because
theres plenty of other places that arent being
photographed where terrible things are going
on. But we cant ignore the images either, . . .
My 21-year-old daughter asked about that
picture (in the Washington Post of a Muslim
woman who hung herself following the Serb
assault) . . . What am I supposed to tell her?
Why is this happening and were not doing
anything . . . Acquiescence is not an option.
(Woodward, 1996: 262263)
Also, Holbrooke emphasized the import-
ance of media coverage with regard to
Americas intervention in Bosnia 1995. He
has stated Lets be clear: the reason the West
nally, belatedly intervened was heavily
related to media coverage (Holbrooke 1998:
20).
10
The nding of media inuence is also
consistent with other available accounts
detailed earlier that all highlight the import-
ance of Srebrenica in moving US policy
toward a more forceful stance (Loza, 1996;
Holbrooke, 1998; Christopher, 1998). The
widespread and critical media coverage
detailed here inevitably played a part in ele-
vating the political signicance of the fall of
Srebrenica. The claim that policymakers
were affected by the horric footage coming
back from Srebrenica is supported by the
statements revealing Clinton and Gore dis-
cussing the damaging nature of media cover-
age during this period. Introducing media
coverage as a factor also helps makes sense of
Clintons own reference to both Western
prestige being damaged and the USA
looking weak during this period. The ideas
of prestige being damaged and the USA
lookingweak make little sense in the absence
of media coverage. In short, media coverage
is likely to have played a part in both com-
municating the horror of Srebrenica to
Western policymakers and raising the politi-
cal stakes.
If we compare the case-study here with a
broader pattern of Western and US responses
to the war, we nd an interesting similarity.
In his discussions with policymakers,
Gowing (1994) nds a pattern of policy reac-
tions to negative media coverage. Analysing
events surrounding the 5 February 1994
mortar bombing of Sarajevo, Gowing (1994:
70) argues that media coverage led to the
Clinton Administration issuing an ulti-
matum to Bosnian Serb nationalists to with-
10
It is important to note that Holbrooke does not specify
media coverage of any particular event. However, given that
the fall of Srebrenica was a turning point for US policy
regarding the use of force in Bosnia (see Blechman &
Wittes, 1999), it is reasonable to assume that the media
coverage of the safe area crisis was part of that media cover-
age Holbrooke referred to.
draw . . . weapons or . . . be the target of air
strikes (Gowing, 1994: 72). Again, analysing
events surrounding the initial designation of
Srebrenica as a safe area, Gowing (1994: 48)
details the impact of video footage on policy:
Tony Birtleys smuggled video images created
the impression of a death camp. They showed
squalor, desperation, hunger and humiliation.
They conrmed the reason for General Moril-
lons deance and had a profound impact
world-wide . . . Together they provided
governments with the stark reality that they
had to do something or be accused of being
accomplices to the slaughter of many thou-
sands of Moslems (Gowing, 1994: 48)
Both these examples are consistent with
the ndings here. In all cases, media coverage
of atrocities was followed by a policy response
from the West. In the case of the 1994 mortar
bombing, as with the decision to defend
Gorazde in July 1995, the response came in
the form of a threat to use force. In the case
of Srebrenica, a response came in the form of
a safe area policy. In all these cases, Western
policymakers seem to have been forced to
respond to media coverage.
At the same time, other factors have also
been cited as important in explaining US
military and diplomatic engagement in
Bosnia 1995. Christopher (1998) and Hol-
brooke (1998) both highlight the desire to
avoid having to deploy US ground troops in
support of an UNPROFOR withdrawal.
During Spring 1995, Bosnian Serb national-
ists had taken United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) personnel hostage in
order to prevent NATO airstrikes. Humili-
ated by these events, a debate broke out
within the Western alliance over whether or
not to stay in Bosnia (Holbrooke, 1998: 65;
Christopher, 1998: 348). Crucially, the US
had committed itself to the NATO extrac-
tion plan Determined Effort that required
the deployment of US ground troops to cover
any UNPROFOR withdrawal (Christopher
1998: 348; Holbrooke 1998: 6667). The
preferred option was to engage militarily
with the Bosnian Serb nationalists rather
than become involved in a humiliating with-
drawal from Bosnia (Christopher, 1998: 348;
Holbrooke, 1998: 66). Other factors cited as
important include pressure from Congress
and concerns over NATO and US credibility.
Congress had been debating a bill that could
force the lifting of the arms embargo on
Bosnia. Not only did this represent a serious
challenge to the Clinton Administrations
foreign policy, but also it might have led to
the collapse of the UN mission, therefore
drawing the USA into a humiliating with-
drawal from Bosnia. With respect to Western
credibility this had been damaged by the
hostage-taking crisis mentioned above.
All of these factors offer alternative expla-
nations for US policy toward Bosnia
throughout 1995, although the extent to
which they relate to the specic decision to
defend Gorazde as opposed to broader US
military (Operation Deliberate Force) and
diplomatic engagement is unclear. Two
points arise with regard to these alternative
factors. First, further research is necessary to
assess the explanatory weighting that should
be accorded each of these factors. In particu-
lar, a useful contribution could be made by
specifying the theory and method by which
we can measure the impact of factors such as
concern over US credibility on policy. A sys-
tematic and theoretically informed approach
to measuring these variables would enable us
to further clarify the importance of these
factors during the policy process in question.
Until this is done, the extent to which media
coverage was a minor as opposed to major
factor in the decision to defend Gorazde will
remain unclear. Second, as a guide for future
research, the consistency between the case-
study ndings here and earlier Western
policy responses highlighted by Gowing
(1994) suggests that a distinction can be
made between the immediate concern of
defending Gorazde and the underlying
concern of avoiding a humiliating retreat
from Bosnia. It might be that it was this
underlying concern coupled with worries
over NATO credibility that informed the
diplomatic effort in August 1995 and the sus-
tained bombing campaign Operation Delib-
erate Force of August/September. If this is the
case, the decision to defend Gorazde might
be most accurately explained as part of the
wider pattern of media-driven policy
responses to crisis situations identied by
Gowing (1994).
As the study stands, the correlation
between policy uncertainty, critical media
coverage and the decision to defend Gorazde
supports the thesis that media coverage can
cause intervention. But without further cases
and similar correlations we must accept a
high degree of uncertainty in this causal
inference. However, our condence is
increased by the consistency between the
inference derived from the model and other
accounts of the policy process in question,
including quotes attributed to Clinton and
Gore. The pattern observed in this case is
also consistent with earlier media-driven
policy responses to the war in Bosnia. At the
same time, further research needs to be con-
ducted into other factors cited as important
in order to delineate the causal signicance
of each.
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo
Operation Allied Force was initiated follow-
ing the peace talks at Rambouillet that had
sought a settlement between Serbian Presi-
dent Milosevic and Albanian Kosovars living
in the province of Kosovo. The aim of the air
campaign was to force Milosevic to comply
with US demands. However, as the air cam-
paign progressed, a massive refugee crisis
developed when Milosevic accelerated
sharply the expulsion of Albanian Kosovars
from the region. At this point, Western
governments justied the bombing as an
attempt to prevent ethnic cleansing and
ensure the safe return of the expelled Alban-
ian Kosovars. As increasingly desperate
images were transmitted back from refugee
camps, a substantial debate occurred in
Washington over whether the bombing cam-
paign was sufcient to reverse the expulsion
of Albanian Kosovars and, indeed, whether it
was only worsening their plight. This debate
was heightened by the involvement of politi-
cal actors such as Colin Powell (former
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ), who
emphasized the inadequacy of airpower
alone. NATO commander Wesley Clarkes
own scepticism with regard to the air cam-
paign was at best thinly veiled during this
period. For example, when asked by CBS
anchor Dan Rather if he believed airpower
was sufcient, Clarke replied, I have my own
military views and beliefs, as you might
imagine. Im looking very carefully at the
mission that had been assigned, what the
requirements are . . . and Dan I just have to
leave it that way (CBS EveningNews, 9 April
1999). The debate was brought to a head in
a failed attempt by Senator John McCain to
force an escalation to a ground war via a con-
gressional vote in late April. During May, the
air campaign was intensied alongside vigor-
ous diplomacy via Russia. The air campaign
ended in early June with the deployment of
over 40,000 NATO troops in Kosovo and the
complete withdrawal of Serbian forces from
the province.
Two questions arise with regard to media
coverage and US policy during this period.
First, did media coverage of the refugees force
a policy change by the Clinton Adminis-
tration? If we observe policy uncertainty,
critical media coverage and evidence of a shift
in policy, we would expect the media to have
been a factor in the policy change. Second,
did the Clinton Administration successfully
ght off pressure to escalate the war as
appeared to be the case?If we observe policy
certainty and nd no evidence of policy
change, we would not expect the media to
have been a factor in the policy process. In
order to evaluate these two possibilities, the
policymedia interaction model was applied
to the period between 1 April and 26 May.
News Media Empathy and Criticism
11
Media coverage of Operation Allied force was
vast. Between 1 April and 26 May (the
research period), over 1,000 articles in the
New York Times and the Washington Post
made reference to Kosovo. This equates to
over nine articles per day on Kosovo in each
paper. Coverage over the eight weeks rarely
left the front pages of the broad sheets and
topped CBS news bulletins almost every day.
By devoting substantial coverage, the media
identied Operation Allied Force as an event
of pre-eminent importance.
The interpretive aspect of the framing
analysis proceeded along broadly similar
lines to that conducted on the media cover-
age of the fall of Srebrenica. Over the period
1 April to 26 May, 429 reports made sig-
nificant reference to Western policy and the
refugees. As with the fall of Srebrenica,
media coverage highlighted the issues of
refugees and Western policy. Selected
reports were then read in order to: (1)
identify the extent to which reports refer-
ring to Western policy were critically
framed, mixed or supportively framed and
(2) identify the extent to which reports
referring to the refugees were empathy,
mixed or distancing framed.
Reference to Western policy in the
Washington Post and the New York Times
during April tended to be critical, with many
reports highlighting the failure of the
bombing campaign to prevent ethnic cleans-
ing. A list of critical descriptors can be found
in Table IV. An example of the critical
framing can be seen in the following New
York Timesreport:
NATO must now begin to assemble ground
troops, ready to enter Kosovo as a ghting
force if necessary or to be a protection force for
returning refugees if and when the Serbian
forces are gone. Ruling out ground forces at
the start was a grievous political mistake, con-
vincing Mr. Milosevic that we were not
serious. A majority of Americans, and a larger
majority of Britons, now favor the use of
ground troops. (Lewis, 1999: A15)
Interestingly, the vast bulk of critically
framed reports appeared in April. Through-
out May, coverage became far more mixed.
Coverage by CBS was far more mixed,
however, and no clear frame, either support-
ive or critical, could be discerned during the
interpretive analysis. Reference to refugees
was empathy framed throughout the eight-
week period. A list of empathy descriptors
can be found in Table IV. An example of
empathy framing can be seen in the follow-
ing extract:
The new wave of Serbian attacks, growing
food shortages and the latest Serbian policy of
allowing Albanians to freely cross the border
here has swollen the ood of refugees eeing
from Kosovo. More than 3,000 disheveled and
dispirited ethnic Albanians trudged across the
border here today clutching their life posses-
sions in tote bags and backpacks, triple the
number who entered the previous day.
(Rohde, 1999: A14)
The next step involved applying the
descriptor test to the interpretive inferences.
Regarding the empathy/distance frames, the
same descriptors as those used for the
11
The sample selection was slightly different from that for
the Srebrenica coverage. Due to the vast number of articles
relevant to Kosovo over the eight-week period, it was
decided to select articles making signicant reference to
Western policy and the refugees by a keyword search. The
descriptors Kosovo and (policy or refugee or Muslim) was
used and the search restricted to the rst paragraph of a
news story. Lexis-Nexis were used to search both the New
York Timesand the Washington Post. This was designed to
retrieve articles that made signicant reference to Western
policy and the Albanian Kosovars. This search returned 429
articles. This sample had to be cut to a more manageable
number for reading. The articles were listed chronologically
and every eighth article selected for analysis. This gave a
sample size of 53 articles. CBS coverage was selected by
analysing the rst ve minutes of every fourth day in order
to produce an affordable sample.
Srebrenica case were searched for (obviously
Bosnian was replaced with Albanian/
Kosovan). For the supportive/failure frames,
the descriptors success, winning and
working (support frame) and fail, losing and
not working (failure frame) were counted.
12
The results of the framing analysis are
shown in Table V and support the interpre-
tive inferences made. Descriptors associated
with the empathy frame outnumber those
associated with the distance frame 533 to
255, indicating that the interpretive infer-
ence that media coverage was framed so as
to empathize with the refugees was correct.
Regarding the critical/support framing,
descriptors associated with critical framing
outnumbered those associated with support
framing 9 to 4 in April, indicating a failure
framing in April. However, CBS coverage
(shown in bold in Table V) shows a more
mixed picture with two occurrences of
support descriptors and one occurrence of a
critical descriptor. This supports the
Table IV. Selected Descriptors Used in Relation to the Kosovar Albanians and Western Policy
Empathy Descriptors Critical Descriptors
Thousands of refugees What have his [Clintons] policies done
Charred bodies Created instability
Desperate people Bombing alone is not sufcient
Rape, torture and executions Instead of weakening Milosevic, he
Misery of the refugees [Clinton] has united the Serbian people
Three nights sleeping outside around Milosevic
Flood of refugees Minimize risks rather than maximize
Devoid of life results
Hundreds of people hunker down Sending mixed messages
Old and young . . . suffering from exposure Foreign policy is being driven by public
Mother died in child birth opinion
People . . . sleeping in the open Stop making vague pronouncements
Helpless men, women and children Kosovo policy jinx
Refugee limbo Shameful miscalculation
Refugee misery Totally unprepared
Hepatitis and pneumonia . . . raging No plan
Makeshift shelters Grievous political mistake
Smoke rises from smouldering homes Clinton badly needs bipartisanship to save
Devastated mosque his policy in Kosovo
Homes reduced to rubble Administration can be faulted on its
execution
Gamble so much on Milosevics caving as
soon as the bombs started falling,
we are unprepared
Failed to weaken Milosevic
Without the troops, there can be no victory
West includes US, UN, NATO, UNPROFOR, EU. Source: New York Timesand Washington Post. Search conducted
via Lexis-Nexis.
12
This descriptor is slightly different from that used for
the Srebrenica analysis because the terms of debate over
policy were different in each case. In Srebrenica, questions
revolved around whether the USA would withdraw/end the
UN mission or continue it and protect the safe areas. In
Kosovo, debate was over whether the air-war policy was
working and therefore the USA was winning, or whether
the policy was not working and therefore the USA was not
winning. Precise details concerning the descriptor count
are available with the dataset at http://www.
liv.ac.uk/~piersgr/htm/htm.
interpretive inference that CBS coverage
was mixed in April. The results therefore
indicate a split between TV news and the
broadsheets with the newspapers adopting a
critical line whilst TV news remained
neutral. In May, descriptors associated with
both the support and critical frames
occurred in equal numbers, supporting the
interpretive analysis that framing became
mixed in May.
Summarizing, the results show that: (1) an
empathy frame prevailed in media reports
that encourage empathy with the Albanian
Kosovars rather than emotional distance and
(2) a failure frame predominated in
newspaper reports during April that high-
lighted debate over the failure of Western
policy but that CBS coverage was neutral vis-
-vis this debate. In May, coverage across
newspapers and TV news became mixed.
No Intention To UseGround Troops
The policy line that there was no intention to
use ground troops in anything but a permis-
sive environment was consistently and clearly
articulated across all three bodies of the US
executive. This policy line was often articu-
lated alongside the assertion that the air cam-
paign was working. For example, on 10 April,
Major General Wald declared, Theres no
Table V. Media Coverage
Empathy Frame Distance/Neutrality Frame
(a) Of theExpelled Population of Kosovo, April and May
Refugee 310 + 30 Muslim 12 + 1
People 141 + 6 Albanian or Kosovar 198 + 12
Women 18 + 3 Men 30 + 2
Children 22 +3 Soldier 0
Total 533 Total 255
(b) Of theNATO Air War, April
Lose 0 + 1 Win 0 + 1
Not work 2 + 0 Work 0 + 1
Total 9 Total 4
(c) Of theNATO Air War, May
Lose 0 + 0 Win 0 + 0
Not work 0 + 0 Work 0 + 0
Total 1 Total 1
Figures are the totals for the Washington Post +New York Timesand CBS(bold) Sources: Washington Post available on line
at http://www.washingtonpost.com; New York Timessearch available via Lexis-Nexis; and CBS EveningNewssegments
available via TV News Archive, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee.
intention right now at all to employ ground
troops. The air campaign is going as planned
(Department of Defense Press Brieng, 10
April 1999). On 6 April White House briefer
Joseph Lockhart declared:
No, I think the President has made his, as he
told you yesterday, made the choice on the best
option available that remains the best option
available. He has no intention of introducing
ground troops, and hes made his decision with
the best advice he has from his military and
foreign policy advisors. (White House Press
Brieng, 6 April 1999)
On 13 April, James Foley of the State Depart-
ment declared We have condence in the air
campaign. What we have made clear is that
we dont have any intention now to introduce
ground forces in a combat situation (State
Department Press Brieng, 13 April 1999).
At times, a different emphasis was placed on
this no ground troops policy line. For
example, in late April, White House briefer
Lockhart dropped the no intention line. He
stated instead let me say that we have said all
along that we need to persist with this air
campaign, that is the option that we believe
as we are highly condent it will get us to our
military objectives (White House Press
Brieng, 21 April 1999). And, in late May,
there is a slight shift in emphasis when the
caveat no option is off the table was added
to policy statements. For example, Rubin
from the State Department stated:
We believe in the air campaign, therefore we
have condence it can achieve its objective of
getting President Milosevic to accept NATOs
ve conditions, and thus deploy a force with
NATO at its core, get the Serb forces out and
bring the refugees home. The other two are in
there, too. With respect to our view, the Presi-
dent reiterated it yesterday is that we have
condence in the air campaign, we havent
taken other options off the table, but we have
no intention of deploying ground troops in
anything but a permissive environment. (State
Department Press Brieng, 19 May 1999)
However, despite these subtle shifts,
policy never deviated signicantly from the
line that the air war was working and that
there were no plans to ght a ground war.
Overall, there were no indications of policy
uncertainty (i.e. wavering, inconsistentand no
policy line). Rather, the policy line that the
air war was working and that there was no
intention to launch a ground invasion was
consistently articulated. According to the cri-
teria for policy certainty, this indicates a high
level of policy certainty against escalating to
a ground war.
It is important to compare the policy cer-
tainty ndings with other available accounts.
Evidence that the Clinton Administration
moved towards adopting a ground-war
policy is mixed. Some commentators empha-
size the resistance of Clinton to any such
escalation (e.g. Luttwak, 1999; Nye, 1999;
Rogers, 1999). Also, throughout the air cam-
paign, the Clinton Administration repeat-
edly blocked the use of apache helicopters
and other close air support aircraft, much to
the dismay of NATO commander Wesley
Clarke. This would suggest that Clinton was
loath to take any further risks in terms of US
casualties. US Deputy Secretary of State,
Strobe Talbott, has also stated that if Milose-
vic had not agreed to the terms set out by
Russian and Finnish diplomats in late May,
the policy was simply to continue bombing
rather than escalate to a ground war.
13
At the
same time, there is evidence that Clinton
decided to authorize a ground invasion in late
May/early June (e.g. Wintour & Beaumont,
1999; Erlanger, 1999). For example, Erlanger
cites Ivo H. Daalder, a former National
Security Council ofcial, In the end, the
president concluded that he could not risk
losing the war, and he was therefore prepared
to send ground forces into Kosovo to assure a
NATO victory (Erlanger, 1999). The possi-
bility therefore exists that the Clinton
Administration, in late May/early June, had
13
NATOs War Against Milosevic: The Untold Story,
Panorama, BBC, 20 August 1999.
made the decision to launch a ground inva-
sion. This possibility, and its consequences
for the case-study, will be discussed next.
Overall, in view of the policy certainty
analysis and available accounts, we can con-
clude that US executive policy was certain
and set against escalation to a ground war at
least until late May or early June, when it is
possible that a decision to launch a ground
war was taken.
Explaining theLack of Media Inuence
on Policy
According to the policymedia interaction
model, if we observe policy uncertainty, criti-
cal media coverage and nd evidence of a
change in policy then we would expect media
coverage to have been a factor in the policy
outcome. If we observe policy certainty and
nd no evidence of a policy change then we
would not expect the media to have been a
factor in the policy outcome. What do the
ndings tell us? Policy certainty existed
throughout the air campaign and there was no
evidence that policy changed, at least not
until the end of May just prior to the cessa-
tion of hostilities. The theoretical insight of
the policymedia interaction model suggests
that policymakers, in the presence of policy
certainty, would have been resistant to media
inuence. As such, the ndings here support
the model which predicts that when there
exists policy certainty media coverage is
unlikely to inuence policy outcomes.
14
However, we must also consider the possi-
bility that policy changed in late May. If so,
the ndings might be perceived as problem-
atic for the model because it could be argued
that critical coverage was able to alter policy
despite policy certainty, a situation not pre-
dicted by the model. However, it seems
unlikely that any policy change in late
May/early June could have been due to criti-
cal media coverage. The research shows that
critical coverage occurred only in April, whilst
in May it became far more mixed. Hence, if
media coverage were to have changed policy,
we would expect this to have occurred in April
not late May. Moreover, any causal link
between media coverage and the possible
policy change is signicantly weakened by the
two-month delay between critical media
coverage starting and the policy changing.
In short, even if policy did change in late
May, this does not appear to challenge the
central nding here that critical media cover-
age was unable to change US policy through-
out the air campaign. If policy did change in
late May, this is more likely for reasons other
than media coverage.
The Utility of the PolicyMedia
Interaction Model
Overall, the ndings indicate the utility of
the policymedia interaction model for
identifying and explaining instances of media
inuence and non-inuence. The hypothesis
that policy uncertainty and critical media
coverage leads to media inuence on policy
was supported by the rst case-study in
which critical media coverage helped cause
policymakers, uncertain of whether or not to
intervene, to move to defend the threatened
Gorazde safe area. The hypothesis that when
there exists policy certainty, media inuence
is unlikely is supported by the case-study of
Operation Allied Force. Despite critical and
empathizing media coverage within the
newspapers, the USA did not intervene on
the ground to prevent the attacks on, and
expulsion of, the Albanian Kosovar popu-
lation. Instead, the Clinton Administration
stayed with an air campaign that was aimed
14
Because the framing analysisindicated TV newscoverage
remained mixed regarding the ground-war debate, the possi-
bility existsthat ifTV newscoverage had also been critically
framed, policymakers would have been forced to change
policy. Further research isnecessary to establish whether this
possibility has any support. As the research stands, the
nding that policymakerswere able to ride out critical news-
paper coverage issuggestive of policy certainty being able to
prevent critical media coverage inuencing policy.
at applying pressure on Milosevic rather than
offering immediate protection to suffering
people. With respect to the relationship
between media coverage and policy uncer-
tainty, an interesting area of future research
would be to assess the extent to which criti-
cal media coverage can itself generate policy
uncertainty. If it can be shown that the media
can create policy uncertainty then the causal
link between media coverage and inter-
vention would be strengthened.
As a part of a wider research project
investigating the CNN effect, the model
should prove a useful tool both for determin-
ing the extent to which media coverage drives
humanitarian intervention and explaining
the conditions under which this occurs. In
the case of the defence of Gorazde, the
nding that policy uncertainty, critical/
empathizing media coverage and inter-
vention were associated lends support to the
thesis that media coverage causes inter-
vention. More generally, as part of a case-
study comparison of further instances of
intervention and non-intervention, if policy
uncertainty and pro-intervention framing are
found to be associated with other cases of
intervention, then our condence in the
thesis that media coverage causes humani-
tarian intervention, will be increased. The
realization of this research programme would
offer more conclusive answers as to the scope
and signicance of the CNN effect than is
provided by current research.
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PIERS ROBINSON, b. 1970, MSc in Inter-
national Relations (University of Bristol,
1997), completing PhD thesis on News
Media and Intervention During Humani-
tarian Crisis (University of Bristol); Lecturer
in Political Communication, School of Politics
and Communication Studies, University of
Liverpool (1999 ). Current research interests:
the relationship between the news media and
global politics, postCold War intervention
and media coverage of humanitarian crisis.

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