National Housing Corp. v.

Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)

F: Juco was an employee of the NHA. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ MOLE but his case
was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHA is a govt-owned corp. and jurisdiction over
its employees is vested in the CSC. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to
the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHA in turn appealed to the SC

ISSUE: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation, a GOCC without original charter, covered
by the Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?

HELD: Sec. 11, Art XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: "The Civil Service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the Government, including every government owned
and controlled corporation.
The inclusion of GOCC within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort at the framers
to plug an earlier loophole which allowed GOCC to avoid the full consequences of the civil service
system. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
This consti provision has been implemented by statute PD 807 is unequivocal that personnel of GOCC
belong to the civil service and subject to civil service requirements.
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception. This case refers to a GOCC. It does not cover
cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings.

xxx
For purposes of coverage in the Civil Service, employees of govt- owned or controlled corps. whether
created by special law or formed as subsidiaries are covered by the Civil Service Law, not the Labor
Code, and the fact that pvt. corps. owned or controlled by the govt may be created by special charter does
not mean that such corps. not created by special law are not covered by the Civil Service.
xxx
The infirmity of the resp's position lies in its permitting the circumvention or emasculation of Sec. 1, Art.
XII-B [now Art IX, B, Sec. 2 (1)] of the Consti. It would be possible for a regular ministry of govt to
create a host of subsidiary corps. under the Corp. Code funded by a willing legislature. A govt-owned
corp. could create several subsidiary corps. These subsidiary corps. would enjoy the best of two worlds.
Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required
by the Civil Service Dec. and the regulations of the COA. Their incomes would not be subject to the
competitive restraint in the open market nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment.
Conceivably, all govt-owned or controlled corps. could be created, no longer by special charters, but
through incorp. under the general law. The Constitutional amendment including such corps. in the
embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed

Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 -- Tanodbayan Has Jurisdiction over all Government Owned
Firms Regardless of How Organized.

F: F. Quimpo filed a complaint w/ the Tanodbayan (TB) charging G. Dimaano and D. Remo, manager
and analyst of Petrophil, w/ viol. of RA 3019 for their refusal to pay Quimpo's fees as surveyor. The TB
dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that his jurisdiction extended only to govt owned corps.
organized under a special law. Petrophil is a corp. organized under the Gen. Corp. Code; it was acquired
by the govt to carry out its oil and gasoline programs. Quimpo filed a petition for certiorari, questioning
the decision of the TB. The new TB confessed judgment.

ISSUE: WON PETROPHIL is a government owned or controlled corporation whose employees fall
within the jurisdictional purview of the Tanodbayan for purposes of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices
Act?

HELD: YES. Uphold the Tanodbayan jurisdiction. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally
"created" as a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its private status. It
is now funded and owned by the government as in fact, it was acquired to perform functions related to
governmental programs and policies on oil. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to
perform essential government related functions. For more case digests and law school notes visit
lizajamarga.com.

MAROHOMBASAR VS. ALONTO (1991)
Petitioner was designated as OIC of the Office of the Vice-Chancellor for AcademicAffairs (OVCAA) if
MSU in a concurrent capacity with her position then as Vice-President for External studies. The Office of
the VP for Externals was merged withthe OVCAA and, as such, the functions of the former were to be
exercised by thelatter. The petitioner was appointed as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairson
the same day. The Board of Regents of MSU approved her appointment as such.Afterwards, the President
of MSU decided that he wants to tap the petitioners talentfor the MSU system as VP for Academic
Affairs which is under the administrativestaff of the President. Petitioner declined because she has already
started severalprojects as OVCAA which she wants to see through. The President designatedanother
person for the position of OVCAA. Petitioner assails her removal as OVCAA.
Held:
It may be noted that the special order confirmed by the Board of Regentsspecifically designated the
petitioner as Acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs.A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity
is essentially temporary andrevocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be
removedanytime even without hearing or cause.A person who accepts an appointment in an acting
capacity extended and receivedwithout any protest or reservation and who acts thereunder for a
considerable timecannot later be heard to say that the appointment was, in reality, permanent andtherefore
there can be no removal except for cause. There are circumstances, however, which rule against the
routine or blindapplication of the principle which governs acting appointments to this case. The essence
of an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gapmeasure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until a permanent appointment isextended or a new appointee is chosen.
The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the claims of the appointee to alengthy tenure but also
defines the authority of the appointing power. A publicofficer appointed in an acting capacity cannot
claim that the appointment shall intime ripen into a permanent one. However, neither can the appointing
power usethe principle of temporary appointments to evade or avoid the security of tenure principle in the
Constitution and the Civil Service Law. This is similar to the rule that the head of an office cannot
arbitrarily convert permanent positions to primarily confidential items so that he can more freely fire and
hire or rehire subordinates at his personal discretion. It is the nature of the functions attached to a position,
not the nomenclature or title given by the appointing authority which determines its primarily confidential
nature. (Piero v. Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417 [1966]) For thesame reason, the Court may inquire into the
true nature of an "acting" appointment to determine whether or not it is used as a device to circumvent the
security of tenure principle.
In this case, the intent to make petitioner serve at the pleasure of the MSU Presidentis obvious. The VP
External Studies was merge with the OVCAA, and petitioner wasappointed OVCAA. The effect,
therefore, was to abolish the petitioners permanentoffice and give her a temporary appointment in the
supposedly new office whichreplaced or absorbed the former office. Another result was the loss of
herpermanent status. The power to designate is vested in the MSU President. The designation must be
lessthan one year. It must be reported to the Board of Regents at the next regularmeeting. After the
meeting, another designation must be issued if no permanentappointment was made. The earlier
designation becomes void as the Board isexpected to fill the item permanently, not merely leaving it
temporarily occupied.On the other hand, the power to appoint is vested in the Board of Regents
asfollows:If the President merely designates, the Board of Regents does not confirm thedesignation. Since
it is only for theinformationof the Board, the President's actionshould be merely "noted."When the Board
of Regentsconfirmed the appointment of the petitioner on May 16,1989, it was acting on anad interim
appointment effected by the President. Noother interpretation can be validly made. If it was a mere
designation, it needs noconfirmation. The fact that confirmation was needed shows that it is an
ad interimone. Anad interimappointment is one made during the time when theappointing or confirming
body is not in session and there is an existing clear andpresent urgency caused by an impending
obstruction or paralyzation of thefunctions assigned to the office if no immediate appointment is made.
(Rodriguez, Jr.v. Quirino, 9 SCRA 284 [1963]) When the Vice-Presidency for External Studies
wasabolished and its functions were merged with the Vice-Chancellorship for AcademicAffairs, both the
security of tenure of the occupant and the needs of the new officecalled for the
ad interimappointment. The respondent cannot use the device of an ambiguous designation to go
aroundthe security of tenure principle. Under the MSU Code, a designation requires a fixedperiod of not
less than one year. The appointment given to the petitioner wasindefinite. She would serve at the pleasure
of the MSU President who is not even thehead of the institution because the head is the Board of
Regents. The intent to convert permanent items into temporary ones is apparent. Thepetitioner states that
the purpose "is to hold the sword of Damocles hanging overthe head of all MSU employees and officers."
(Rollo, p. 75) The Board of Regentscooperated in the plan. Practically, all top officers below the President
wereconverted into positions where the occupants serve at the pleasure of the Presidentand presumably,
the Board of Regents. Thus, at the May 16, 1989 Board of Regents'meeting at the Army and Navy Club
alongside the Luneta in Manila, several actingappointments were submitted for approval or confirmation.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
2. C, Section 1..any appointment for any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired termIn no
case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Section 2. Powers.enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by courts of
general jurisdiction and elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
a. Deputize law enforcement agencies, including the ASFP..
b. Register political parties, except religious groups
c. File complaints for violation of election laws
d. Regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication..


Case Digest: Republic vs. Imperial
Law on Natural Resources, Constitutional Law

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR., FELIZA SREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR., FELIZA S.
IMPERIAL, ELIAS S. IMPERIAL, MIRIAM S. IMPERIAL, LOLITA ALCAZAR, SALVADOR
ALCAZAR, EANCRA CORPORATION, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of LEGASPI CITY
G.R. No. 130906, February 11, 1999

FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500)
pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided
and further subdivided resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein
petition in the name of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the
trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private
respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on which the OCT was based, has the
features of a foreshore land based on an investigation conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City.
Respondents, on the other hand contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT
No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."

Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador
Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial,
Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication
by the cadastral court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral
proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings
and was a direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed an objection to the motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec. No. 88
and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the
appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner.

Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore
land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be disposed of only by lease and not
otherwise. It was defined as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by
the flux and reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide."

The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of government, specifically the
director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau). The decision of the director of
lands when approved by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this ruling is that the
subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must therefore be given credit. This doctrine
finds no application, however, when the decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with
that of, the DENR Secretary.

There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in
the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by
TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City,
disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the
features of a foreshore land." The contradictory views of the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V,
Legazpi City, on the true nature of the land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by
the RTC, cannot be the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved.

The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of petitioner's reversion
efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting
the third and fourth motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an
exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course.

Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds. Petitioner also alleged
that it has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to be laid down before the proper Court, will
result to the prejudice of, and irreparable injury to, public interest, as the Government would lose its
opportunity to recover what it believes to be non-registerable lands of the public domain.

The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what constitutes good and
sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court. It has the power to
relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrants or
when the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all whether
the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause
for relaxing the procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants
brief. Petitioner Republics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public interest
which in the Courts discretion must be given due course.


Ramon Labo, Jr. vs Commission on Elections
176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual
Citizenship Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition
for quo warranto against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with
an Australian did not make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino;
that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was
lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being bigamous. Labo further
asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality
which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace
Labo in the event Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was
naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian.
It was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He
did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was
listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he
swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he
became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be
declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not
overcome the will of the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even
unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by
electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The
electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at
least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be
declared the mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest
number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively
declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective
offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal
votes cast in the election.
G.R. No. 170365 February 2, 2010
ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR

Facts:
The Comelec en banc ruled a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7a, Lanao del Sur
on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any
polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of
force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was
disrupted by a commotion, was untimely suspended and never resumed. The Comelec decision,
consequently nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner dibaratun as winner.

Petitioner Dibaratun contended that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for acting on herein respondents petition even if
such petition was filed out of time.

Issue:
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in declaring a failure of elections

Ruling:
The Court found the petition for declaration of failure of elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code to be in order, and it was properly disposed of by the COMELEC en banc.

The Court noted that the provisions on failure of elections in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and
Sec. 2, Rule 26 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not provide for a prescriptive period for the
filing of a petition for declaration of failure of elections. It appears that the COMELEC en banc had the
discretion whether or not to take cognizance of such petition. In this case, the petition was filed 11 days
after the scheduled election. The Court held that the findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are
binding on this Court.

There was no grave abuse of discretion imputable to Comelec in the exercise of its functions and duties.
Article IX-A, Section 7Cua v. Commission on Elections (& Priv.Respondent Puzon) (1987)
Facts:1. The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the petitioner but
neverthelesssuspended his proclamation as winner in the lonecongressional district of Quirino due to the
lack of the unanimous vote required by the proceduralrules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669.2. Section 5
of the said resolution states that, A case being heard by it shall be decided with theunanimous
concurrence of all three Comissionersand its decision shall be considered a decision of the Comission. If
this required number is notobtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion,the case may be appealed to the
Commission EnBanc, in which case the vote of the majoritythereof shall be the decision of the
Commission.3. Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of thefirst division was a valid decision despite
theresolution stated above because of Art. IX-A,Section 7 of the Constitution.
He argues thatthis applies to the votings of the Comelecboth in division and En Banc.
4. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that nodecision was reached by the first divisionbecause the
required unanimous vote was notobtained.
It was also argued that no validdecision was reached by the Comelec EnBanc because only three votes
were cast infavor of the petitioner and these did notconstitute the majority of the body.
Issue:W/N the 2-1 decision of the first division wasvalid.Held:The 2-1 decision by the first division was a
validdecision under Art. IX-A, Section 7 of theConstitution.Ratio:The three members who voted to affirm
the firstdivision constituted a majority of the fivemembers
who voted and deliberated thereon
(Note: This is the part of the decision which Fr. Bcriticized in the Reviewer. See second column.)En Banc
and their decision is also valid under theaforecited constitutional provision. Hence, theproclamation of
Cua on the basis of the twoaforecited decisions was a valid act that entitleshim to assume his seat in the
House of Representatives.

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