The More Things Change The More They Stay the Same: Why the 2012 Transitions in

the US, France, China and Russia will lead to Inertia Plaguing Global Governance

By Dr. John C. Hulsman

Most grown-up foreign affairs analysts (that is those who do not think the UN
runs the world) accept that global governance only works when a majority of the
planets great powersbased on specific shared interestscome together to right the
worlds ills. As most problems are transnational in character and as power remains
firmly ensconced at the nation-state level, it is only when these powers decide to work
together that we truly get anywhere.

As such, the coming year of leadership transitions, where power will or may shift
hands in four of the five Security Councils permanent membership, is a year where
stasis is about the best thing one can hope for. Given we live in a world of daunting and
intractable problems, where the Iran nuclear crisis, euro-zone crisis, and future of the
Arab Spring will all come to a head, this is not saying much. But given these transitions,
looking for bold new policy initiatives out of the worlds great powers will be like
waiting for Godot.

The general reasons for the malaise

Generic countries in transitionwhatever the political nature of the systemare
unlikely to unveil bold and risky new foreign policy initiatives; by definition times of
transition are times of inward looking. In democratic (or quasi-democratic) states like
the US, France, and Russia, domestic facts on the ground make staying the course
prudent. If the incumbent wins (in these cases Presidents Obama, Sarkozy, and Prime
Minister Putin), he wishes to leave no hostages to fortune, making as few bold foreign
policy promises as possible, to maximize his room for maneuver once re-election is
assured.

If the incumbent is democratically unseatedas domestic issues almost always
determine political outcomes rather than foreign affairsthe new leader is unlikely to
have concocted a fully-formed foreign policy, and will proceed along the lines of his
vanquished foe, at least until he finds his own feet, installs his own team in the relevant
foreign affairs ministries, and allows them time to learn their briefs. This is also true in
the case of authoritarian China, where a new government (probably led by Xi Jinping)
will be nervously looking over its shoulder at the legion of eminence grises who used to
run the place. This universal truth means that for most of 2012, the four great powers
(the US, Russia, China, and France) will be on autopilot. The problem with this is that
the world and its crises wait for no man, and no country.

Specific Political Cultures Dont Help Here, Either

Looking at the specifics of the great power four does not give one room for
optimism, either. In the case of a US just beginning to pull itself out of the greatest
threat to the global economy since the Great Depression, President Obama has operated
his foreign policy like a Bad Bank; he has been winding up the costly calamities of the
Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan, while making no new risky commitments
of his own. From the administrations refusal to countenance new IMF funds to help a
stricken Europe, through its largely passive role in watching the Arab Spring develop
(think Syria), this is a White House whose mantra is the ancient Hippocratic Oath:
First, do no harm.

An economically besieged France is unable to play a grandiose Gaullist role, even
if it wished to. Polls suggest that Socialist Party challenger Francois Hollande remains
ahead of President Sarkozy if the two emerge as the second-round candidates for the
Elysee Palace. Over the euro crisis such an outcome could prove tumultuous, as
Hollande has made it clear he wishes to revisit the just-agreed-upon austerity treaty
Sarkozy (as the increasingly junior partner) made in tandem with Chancellor Merkel; it
is certainly true that a growth strategy has been crucially neglected. But beyond this
domestic issue, while France is hawkish over increased Iranian sanctions, it has little else
to offer, whoever wins the presidency. As for the Arab Spring, beyond the usual
impotent declarations that the Syrian government should stop murdering its people, do
not look for a downgraded France to lead the charge here.

A Putin government trying to change the subject to the creation of middle class
jobs (from that of stealing elections) interest-wise wants the Iran crisis to go on and on;
as a major oil and gas exporter this can greatly help jumpstart Russias one-note
petroleum economy. It will not in practice go along with the west squeezing Iran. The
Kremlin will also show continuing support for old ally Syria (its last real friend in the
Middle East) whatever the butchery, gumming up efforts for a joint international
response to the near-civil war there.

Chinas entire strategic culture is based on Deng Xiaopings dictum to make as
little noise as possible internationally as the country continues on its meteoric economic
rise. The largest consumer of Iranian oil and gas (and a major direct investor in Irans
oil fields) shows no sign of wanting to write off this tie as a significant strategic and
economic loss. The Arab Spring is viewed with alarm, as are all quasi-democratic
revolts, as they cut a little too close to the bone. Over bailing out Europe, Beijing
sensibly enough wonders why if relatively rich countries cannot help themselves, the
insist on asking a relatively poor (in per capita terms) country such as China to save
them.

While this mountain of factors will not cause blanket foreign policy paralysis at
the great power level, they do constitute the general drag that makes effective global
governance over the game changing issues of 2012 highly unlikely. Put it this way; as
head of a foreign policy political risk firm, I expect to have plenty of work in the year
ahead!

--Dr. John C. Hulsman is the President and Co-Founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises
(info@john-hulsman.com), a successful political risk consulting firm, specializing in
assessing the game changing foreign policy events that will determine the coming shape of
the western world. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he is the author of
all or part of 10 books, including The Godfather Doctrine and a biography of Lawrence of
Arabia, To Begin the World Over Again.