36 Public Administration Review December 2007 Special Issue
Te governmental response to Hurricane Katrina was not
the unalloyed failure that is often portrayed. Te response was a mixture of success and failure. Successes occurred when a foundation had been laid for intergovernmental cooperation, as with the largely successful pre-landfall evacuation of Greater New Orleans, the multistate mobilization of the National Guard, and the search and rescue operations of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Postmortems should draw lessons from such successes rather than concentrate entirely on the numerous failures. It is now clear that a challenge on this scale re- quires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moments notice. President George W. Bush, September 15, 2005 I can say with certainty that federalizing emer- gency response to catastrophic events would be a disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina. Te current system works when everyone understands, accepts, and is willing to fulll their responsibilities . the bottom-up approach yields the best results. Florida governor Jeb Bush, October 19, 2005 I n Spike Lees HBO documentary about Hurri- cane Katrina, After the Levees Broke, someone asks why, if the U.S. government could quickly deliver massive aid to Banda Aceh, Indonesia, after a tsunami struck there on December 26, 2004, it failed to do so in New Orleans eight months later. Te answer, which might seem perverse to the average American, is that quick action in Indonesia was possible precisely be- cause it is half a world away, within easy reach of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln. 1 As a superpower in international politics, the United States had been patrolling the Pacic, and its chief executive, who is in charge of conducting the nations foreign relations and serves as the commander-in-chief of its armed forces, could quickly deploy U.S. naval forces to the Indone- sian shore. Within a week, television broadcasts were showing navy helicopters dropping supplies to survi- vors in remote, isolated areas. From the perspective of the presidents o ce, con- ducting domestic aairs in an emergency is more di cult and his powers are more constrained. By constitutional tradition and by law, the responsibility for managing emergencies, including natural disasters such as Katrina, rests initially with state and local governments. Te federal government provides relief at their request. Even then, the president is restrained by the Posse Comitatus Act, which since 1878 has limited use of federal troops for domestic law enforcement. Since its creation in 1979 by an executive order of President Jimmy Carter, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has been charged with coordinating federal assistance to state and local gov- ernments during disasters. It is a small agency at the time of Katrina, it had only 2,500 full-time employees and a vacancy rate of 15 20 percent ( U.S. Senate 2006 , chap. 14). With some exceptions, of which more will be said later, the theory of FEMAs disaster func- tion has been that it receives requests for assistance from state and local governments and transmits them to the appropriate federal departments such as the Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, Transportation or to private organizations such as the American Red Cross, which has a quasi- governmental character. Te job of interagency coordination is a hard one at best, and FEMAs performance has never been judged very favorably. Tey were more concerned with scoring well on agency performance reviews than in meeting the needs of suering individuals, Repre- sentative Tom Ridge said in 1988 following a tornado that killed 65 Pennsylvanians ( CQ 1990 , 495). After Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina, a man not given to restrained speech, Martha Derthick University of Virginia Where Federalism Didnt Fail Martha Derthick is professor emeritus of government and foreign affairs at the University of Virginia and former director of the governmental studies program at the Brookings Institution. She is the author of numerous books on American political institutions and public policy, including Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism (Brookings, 2001). E-mail: mad2d@virginia.edu Part IThe Setting: Roots of Administrative Failure Where Federalism Didnt Fail 37 called FEMAs sta the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses [he had] ever known ( Roberts 2006 , 65). Te federal govern- ments poor performance during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 was thought to have contributed to the defeat of George H. W. Bush, the incumbent, in that years presidential election. During the 1990s, however, the agencys reputation rose. James Lee Witt, President Bill Clintons director, excelled at entrepreneurship and relations with Con- gress, and for his part Clinton declared a record num- ber of disasters 379 between 1993 and 2000 and 75 in the 1996 election year alone which enabled FEMA to send welcome post- disaster aid to local places ( Cooper and Block 2006, 59 62 ). Under Witt, the agency began giving mitigation grants money to help localities harden infrastructure in order to reduce vulnerability to disasters and this practice continued after he left. For example, Louisiana received $20.5 million in mitiga- tion grants in scal year 2003, of which $13.5 million was allo- cated to Terrebonne Parish for the elevation of private structures (U.S. House 2006 , 381). All of this activity enhanced FEMAs standing, and no major hurricane occurred between 1993 and 2000 to damage it. An East Coast blizzard in 1993 was the only major domestic natural disaster to occur during the Clinton years (White House 2006 , 6). On the basis of the historical record, one would not have been very condent that FEMA could respond eectively to destruction of the magnitude that struck New Orleans, which left 80 percent of the city under as much as 20 feet of water. Indeed, a student of the U.S. executive branch might have been especially apprehensive in 2004 because the federal govern- ments emergency management functions had just undergone a major redesign and reorganization fol- lowing the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Although FEMA survived the reorganization, it was incorpo- rated into the new federal department, which meant that it lost direct access to the White House. Te FEMA director now had to report to the secretary of homeland security, whose department was placing heavy emphasis on protection against terrorism. In the face of this change, President George W. Bushs rst FEMA director, Joseph Allbaugh, a tough, towering, and abrasive Texan who had headed Bushs successful guber- natorial and presidential cam- paigns, resigned. His successor, the less imposing Michael Brown, fought the changes in organization and disaster plan- ning that were under way and did not have a good relation with Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Cherto. During the Bush administration, FEMA lost sta, money, and morale and would come to Katrina in a weakened state ( Cooper and Block 2006 , chap. 4). Te o cial and uno cial postmortems on Katrina have emphasized the failures of government perfor- mance at all levels of the federal system. Undeniably, much went wrong, and much would have gone better if governments had met the elementary responsibili- ties that they knew in advance were theirs. I will argue, none- theless, that Katrina presents a complicated mixture of failure and success. More went well than most accounts acknowledge. In trying to sort out the successes and failures, I will argue, consis- tent with my task of analyzing lessons for federalism, that the successes of Katrina built on intergovernmental cooperation among the various parts of the complicated federal system by which the United States is governed. Where glaring failures occurred in ood control above all the performance of individual agencies was defective, and the basis for eective intergovernmental collabo- ration was correspondingly weak. I will focus exclusively on Louisiana and New Orleans, not because the damage occurred only there but because that is where governmental failure was judged to be greatest. Te American public, instead of seeing their governments rushing aid to the victims of disaster, saw on television desperate residents of the poorest sections of the city waving banners pleading for help, tearful husbands searching for lost wives, and bloated corpses in the lthy water, strewn with wreckage, downed power lines, and drowning dogs. My analysis will proceed in rough chronological order of the events that occurred during Katrinas rst week. Success Mixed with Failure: The Pre-Landfall Evacuation Except for the oldest part of the city, which rests on naturally high ground, New Orleans sits in a swamp. It straddles the Mississippi River, with the Gulf of Te federal governments poor performance during Hurricane Andrew in 1992 was thought to have contributed to the defeat of George H. W. Bush, the incumbent, in that years presidential election. Te o cial and uno cial postmortems on Katrina have emphasized the failures of government performance at all levels of the federal system. Undeniably, much went wrong, and much would have gone better if governments had met the elementary responsibilities that they knew in advance were theirs. 38 Public Administration Review December 2007 Special Issue Mexico to the south, Lake Borgne to the east, and Lake Pontchartrain to the north. Only three highways lead out of New Orleans, and one of these goes east- ward, to the adjacent state of Mississippi. In the two days before Hurricane Katrina struck, an estimated 1 1.2 million people out of a population of 1.4 million reached safety by leaving Greater New Orleans in motor vehicles ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 243; Cooper and Block 2006 , 122). Tis was an astonishing achievement, for which state and local governments deserve much credit. Tra c congestion plagues urban America, and to overcome it in a coastal city threatened with destruction required careful planning and a high degree of intergovernmen- tal cooperation. Because the southern parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines (called counties in most of the United States) were most exposed to danger, they needed to be evacuated rst. Ten they could be followed by the residents of Orleans and Jeerson parishes, situated farther to the north ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 242 45). A plan for doing this by turning the exit routes into one-way roads, called Contraow, and sequencing the departures emerged between 1998 and 2005. It was a result of hurricane experience and cooperation between the governors and state police forces of Loui- siana and Mississippi and the Louisiana governments successful brokering of an agreement among 13 par- ishes in the southeast part of the state. Te agreement was concluded, providentially, in April 2005. Once Louisiana governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco had approved the plan, the states O ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness initiated a public education campaign using media outlets, the Red Cross, and mass merchandisers such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Lowes to distribute more than 1.5 million copies of the Louisiana Citizen Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guide. It included a Contraow evacuation map showing the routes that would be available and how the entrances and exits would work. Study this map and CHOOSE YOUR ROUTE WISELY, it instructed, with the capital letters in red. Tere will be many restrictions on the Interstate System. Upon entering the Contraow area, it may not be possible to change routes. If you do not wish to evacuate under the Contraow restrictions, your best strategy is to LEAVE EARLY before Contraow is activated. As Katrina approached, the governor initiated the Contraow plan at 4:00 p.m. on Saturday, August 27. On Sunday morning, after some hesitation, New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin called for a mandatory evacuation, the rst in the citys history ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 68 69). Contraow ended at 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, August 28, half a day before Katrina came ashore, with no vehicles waiting in queues. It is im- possible to say how many people left before the Con- traow was initiated and how many departed in the 25 hours during which it was in place. Whatever the precise details, immense credit far more than they have received is due the state and local o cials who put this plan in place and broadcast it to the public, as well as to the citizens who acted on it. Immense credit for this early and life-saving success is due also the o cials of the National Hurricane Center in Miami, an agency of the federal government, who urgently warned state and local o cials of the danger. Max Mayeld, the centers director, began tracking the storm as early as August 11, 15 days before it became a named storm. Te center issued its rst advisory on August 24, but at rst the storm seemed not to be heading for New Orleans. Ten it shifted direction, and Mayeld placed personal calls on Satur- day to emergency directors and governors in both Louisiana and Mississippi. Governor Blanco needed no prodding. On Friday, even in the absence of a prediction that Katrina was headed for New Orleans, she cancelled a trip planned for Saturday and put the states National Guard on alert. When she heard on Saturday from Mayeld, she urged him to call Nagin, who had been reluctant to order a mandatory evacua- tion ( Cooper and Block 2006 , chap. 5). Governments might have received more credit for the evacuation that did take place if they had been more successful at completing the job. More than 70,000 people remained in the city, some of them unwilling to leave even though they were physically able, while others were unable to evacuate because of disability or lack of private transportation (U.S. House 2006 , 115). Using buses, the city government helped thou- sands of residents reach its designated refuge, the Superdome. Although o cials had considered provid- ing public transportation to those who lacked cars, none of the necessary arrangements had been com- pleted before Katrina struck ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 248 54). For this, they have been rightly criticized. Failure: The Collapse of Flood Protection New Orleans was a city at extreme risk, sitting in its swamp, mostly below sea level, gradually sinking, and failing to face up to these facts. In the space of a few hours, the storm stripped away the security blanket, two journalists wrote. Giant waves rising as high as 27 feet hit the city, and miles of massive earthen levees crumbled. Floodwalls were breached in dozens of places, their concrete and steel components bent, broken, and scattered into the backyards they had once protected. Floodgates were ripped from their hinges . In the aftermath, only a narrow rim along the natural high ground of the riverbank was still inhabited and functioning the approximate bound- aries of New Orleans in the mid-1800s. Te city was Where Federalism Didnt Fail 39 once again open to the sea ( McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 7 8, 246). Historically, governments might have limited the risk by restricting the citys growth. Instead, as popu- lation spread south and east, the risk increased. But limiting growth would have gone against the grain not only of the devil-may-care city but also of the rapacious capitalism that characterizes the whole coun- trys approach to land use. New Orleans was encouraged to sprawl, and ood protection projects were justied partly on the economic grounds that they would make swamp reclamation and development possible ( McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 64). At its peak in 1960, the city had a population of 627,525, ranking 15th among American cities, just behind Dallas. By 2003, the population had fallen to 469,000, and the citys rank dropped to 34th, just below Albuquerque. A critical moment came, tellingly, during the expan- sive administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Hurricane Betsy struck New Orleans in 1965, causing a ood that killed 81 people and left thousands home- less. Cajoled by Louisiana senator Russell B. Long, Johnson came to the city and was moved by what he saw. Six weeks after the storm, Congress passed the Flood Control Act of 1965, which authorized a U.S. Corps of Engineers project called the Lake Pontchar- train and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan (the Lake Pontchartrain project for short). Te new levee system was to be completed by 1978 at a cost of $85 million, making the city safe for many years to come. It was still under construction when Katrina struck, with a cost that had reached $750 million ( McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 63; U.S. Senate 2006 , 133 34). When congressional investigators set out to nd out what had gone wrong with the citys ood protection system and who was in charge of it, they encountered a virtual parody of American federalism. Te system was a hodgepodge of stone and earthen levees, con- crete and steel oodwalls, drainage canals, more than 200 oodgates, and huge pumps. Tese numerous parts were of varying origin, age, design, and quality. Some of the barriers fell short of design height in one case by as much as 3 feet or they had sunk below prescribed levels. One of the oodgates had been damaged in a railroad accident in 2004, causing a breach in a levee, and had yet to be repaired in 2005. It was hard to say who was to blame. Tere has been confusion about the basic question of who is in charge of the levees, Senator Susan Collins of Maine remarked as she opened a hearing of the Homeland Security and Governmental Aairs Committee. Key o cials at the Army Corps [of Engineers] and the Orleans Levee District have demon- strated this confusion by tell- ing Committee sta one thing during interviews and then another later ( U.S. Senate 2005 ). Te Corps of Engineers had a central but not exclusive role. Even for what it built, it did not retain responsibility after construction was done. It turned the operation and maintenance of completed projects over to local levee districts, the rst of which were authorized by state law in 1879. In metropolitan New Orleans, there was a levee district for each parish. In Orleans Parish, there was also a sewer and water district that was in charge of the pumps, whose purpose was to push rain and oodwater out of the city northward into Lake Pont- chartrain. Tat agency originally built the canals through which the pumped water owed, and it still, in the eyes of the Orleans Levee Districts chief engi- neer, had responsibility for inspecting the canal walls ( Carrns 2005 ). Te Louisiana Department of Trans- portation was also involved. By law, it was supposed to approve any activity that might compromise the levees and administer training sessions for levee dis- trict board members and inspectors ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 131). Even after one paints this familiar American picture of extremely fragmented public responsibility, two agen- cies stand out the Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee District. Tey were the major players, and there was confusion and tension between them. Some of the confusion occurred over when or whether a project had been turned over to the levee district. Did turnover occur piecemeal, with each section of the decades-long Lake Pontchartrain project, or did it await completion of the whole thing? ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 135). And there was also uncertainty over the scope of local responsibility once turnover occurred. Te levee district held to the view that major prob- lems remained the responsibility of the Corps, whereas minor problems belonged to its own jurisdiction, an informal distinction with no founda- tion in law and obviously subject to misunderstanding ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 137). What to do about the levee that was 3 feet below design height illustrates the confusion. Levee district o cials considered the x to be the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers. Te Corps said that it lacked money. Te levee district had sometimes paid for repairs itself and then sought reimbursement from the Historically, governments might have limited the risk by restricting the citys growth. But limiting growth would have gone against the grain not only of the devil-may-care city but also of the rapacious capitalism that characterizes the whole countrys approach to land use. 40 Public Administration Review December 2007 Special Issue Corps. In this case, it sent letters to its congressional delegation asking for federal funding. It is a nice ques- tion whether this represents tension between the two agencies, as the Senate committee report on Katrina implies, or is instead an example of implicit political collaboration between them. In any case, it did not achieve the repair of the levee ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 131). Te confusion over responsibility that was evi- dent prior to the hurricane extended into the actual emergency, during which it was not immediately clear who had what role in repairing the breaches. Underlying the aws in intergovernmental collabora- tion was a much deeper problem that was manifest in the performance of both the Corps of Engineers and the Orleans Levee District. Flood protection was not their only function. If both organizations had been dedicated to that purpose alone, cooperation would have come more easily and the function would, of course, have been better performed. For the Corps, ood control competes with naviga- tion projects, whose purpose is to promote the indus- trial economy. Te prosperity of New Orleans depends on its port. To aid the port, the Corps builds and dredges shipping channels. Navigation projects do not merely compete with ood control projects for funds. Te clash can also be physical and hydrologic, as illustrated by the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, which the Corps completed in the 1960s. Tis is a 76-mile canal built as a shortcut for ships and barges heading from the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico. Environmentalists have long claimed that by admitting salt water, it destroyed coastal marshes that helped protect the city from the Gulf. Scientic stu- dents of hurricanes argued as well that it would serve, quite destructively, as a path for storm surges heading north toward the city, increasing their velocity. Tis appears to have happened during Katrina, and early in 2007, a federal district judge ruled that residents of New Orleans whose neighborhoods were ooded could sue the Corps with claims that the government- built navigation channel was largely to blame ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 26 28; Schwartz 2007 ). Te Orleans Levee District also was far from single-minded in its pursuit of ood protection. It had more distractions than the Corps. A brochure issued by the district in 1995 boasted that We protect against hurricanes, oods and boredom ( Carrns 2005 ). Te origin of the claim to relieve boredom goes back to 1928, when Governor Huey Long got the legislature to give the board authority to ll portions of Lake Pontchartrain and use the land thus created for places of amusement and recreation. Te board, with a majority composed of the governors appointees, eventually morphed into a major developer. Tracts sold in the 1940s and 1950s became some of the citys most expensive real estate. Te board constructed parks, walking paths, marinas, an airport, a casino, and more. Tese activities often consumed more of the districts attention than ood control ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 34 38). As one proceeds with analyzing the failure of ood protection, the more federalism recedes and politics comes to the fore, as practiced by governments that recklessly encouraged residential development and then gambled residents safety on the national legisla- tures willingness to protect one low-lying city. Insofar as governments and human agency mattered, as op- posed to the forces of nature, New Orleans safety rested on the large but not unlimited inuence of the Louisiana congressional delegation and on the priori- ties that Louisianas politicians set. Tey determined the purposes of appropriations to the Corps of Engi- neers. No U.S. government agency is more subject to congressional inuence. If ood protection failed, one has to look to Congress as well as the self-confessed technical failures of the Corps that emerged after the ood ( CQ 2006; McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 341 44; Grunwald 2005 ). Beyond that, beginning with the fabled Huey Long, Louisianas politicians stood behind the evolution of the Orleans Levee Dis- trict into an entrepreneur that oversaw prot-making enterprises and tended rather casually to ood control. Its periodic levee inspections were conducted quickly and ended with a good meal. Success: Search and Rescue Search and rescue teams were needed to save from the oodwaters the large number of people who had not evacuated before Katrina struck. Tat nearly all of them survived is Katrinas second big success in public administration. Federal, state, and local agencies were all involved, not to mention a 47-man team of Canadian Mounties that came to the rescue of St. Bernard Parish, southeast of the city ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 181). Once again, inter- governmental collaboration was crucial to success. Te outstanding performers, accounting for most of the res- cues, were the U.S. Coast Guard and two Louisiana agencies, the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and the National Guard, which acted with out-of- state help. Te FEMA teams Te outstanding performers, accounting for most of the rescues, were the U.S. Coast Guard and two Louisiana agencies, the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and the National Guard, which acted with out-of-state help. Te FEMA teams brought from out of state have been credited with a smaller but still signicant number of rescues. Where Federalism Didnt Fail 41 brought from out of state have been credited with a smaller but still signicant number of rescues. An unknown but probably quite small number of people were rescued by local agencies, the New Orleans police and re departments, which were overwhelmed by the catastrophe and underequipped in any case. Te police department had only ve boats and the re department none. Many volunteers came to help, with what results it is impossible to say. Te city ooded on Monday, and the Coast Guard achieved its rst rescue at 2:50 that afternoon. To explain the Coast Guards outstanding performance, the Senate committee report mentioned the careful positioning of assets, near enough to be useful but far enough to be safe; training and equipment for water missions; an organizational culture of rapid, aggressive response to emergencies; and familiarity with the locality and its public agencies ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 332 33). Because New Orleans is a major port, the Coast Guard, which protects the nations waterways, is a major presence there. Te headquarters of its biggest single district is in New Orleans. It regularly conducts exercises with state and local agencies, and in particular it had worked closely with the boat forces of Louisianas Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Louisianas agencies were on alert as early as Friday, August 26, when Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency. Te Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, like the Coast Guard, deployed on Monday after- noon. Whereas the Coast Guard worked both from the air with helicopters and on water with cutters, the Wildlife and Fisheries teams worked only on the ood surface. Like the Coast Guard, W&F [Wildlife and Fisheries] o cers, trained for water-rescue missions, were adequately equipped, had pre-positioned search and rescue assets close enough to be useful on the day of landfall, and were composed of men and women familiar with the aected area and other federal, state, and local agencies involved ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 333). Te Louisiana National Guard made the mistake of not moving high-water vehicles from its headquarters, Jackson Barracks, which was under water, but it nonetheless had access to boats and helicopters, and even before landfall it had solicited assistance from other states under the Emergency Management Assis- tance Compact, through which state governments have collaborated since 1996 in responding to emer- gencies. National Guard helicopters from both Louisi- ana and out of state began search and rescue missions on Monday as soon as wind conditions permitted ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 340, 343). Te contributions of FEMA to the search and rescue eort also illustrate the uses of intergovernmental collaboration, but in a less eective form. FEMA has under contract search and rescue teams composed of state and local employees, mostly members of re departments, that it can mobilize in emergencies. It had pre-positioned three such teams in Shreveport, which is 340 miles from New Orleans. It activated 16 others on Tuesday and 10 more on Wednesday. Its teams began work later than others and, because they lacked their own equipment, had to join the boats of volunteers or other agencies ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 334). Tanks to the twin successes of pre-landfall evacuation and post-ood rescue, the loss of life in Katrina, though deeply shocking to Americans who saw corpses on their television screens, did not remotely approach in severity what had been anticipated. Hur- ricane Pam, a hypothetical exercise in hurricane plan- ning for New Orleans nanced by the federal government and conducted in 2004, had predicted that 60,000 would die (U.S. House 2006 , 81). An article in Scientic American in 2001 said that New Orleans is a disaster waiting to happen . A direct hit is inevitable . Scientists at Louisiana State University predict that more than 100,000 people could die ( Fischetti 2001 , 78). In 2002, the vice president for disaster services of the American Red Cross had pre- dicted a toll of 25,000 100,000 ( McQuaid and Schleifstein 2002 , 1). An article in National Geo- graphic in 2004, in many respects quite prescient, predicted 50,000 deaths ( Bourne 2004 ). Even during the ood and the week after, o cials continued to predict as many as 10,000 deaths. Te actual toll, based on bodies found, was around 1,100 for Louisi- ana, and for the whole Gulf Coast 1,300 1,500, although because these gures take no account of victims washed out to sea or otherwise irretrievably lost, they are pre- sumably low ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 223; U.S. Senate 2006 , 2; AP 2006 ). Perhaps the very high predictions were meant to be frightening and should not be taken literally. Presumably, the number for Louisiana could have been lower had the city government of New Orleans done a better job of pre- landfall evacuation. However all of that may be, the performance of governments in planning the pre- landfall evacuation and achieving the post-ood res- cue stands as a signal accomplishment and proof that the performance of governments in planning the pre-landfall evacuation and achieving the post-ood rescue stands as a signal accomplishment and proof that the fragmentation of federalism was not an insuperable handicap. 42 Public Administration Review December 2007 Special Issue the fragmentation of federalism was not an insuper- able handicap. A Compound Case: Evacuation after the Flood Saving lives by rescuing people from the oodwater was one thing. Caring for them afterward proved to be another. By midday on Tuesday, local, state, and federal o cials realized that they must evacuate the city, and Governor Blanco called Governor Rick Perry of Texas to ask whether he would open Houstons Astrodome for Louisiana evacuees, as all 113 of her own states shelters were full. Perry agreed, and by Wednesday, Texas had opened 47 shelters ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 172 73). But it took until Friday to put in place the necessary buses, air transportation, and acceptable destinations to achieve an evacuation. In the meantime, many displaced residents lacked adequate food, water, and sanitation. Te Superdome, with failed plumbing, became unin- habitable. Tousands gathered at an alternative refuge, the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center, which was on dry land but had not been stocked with food, water, and medical services or given National Guard protection, as had the Superdome. Other thousands milled around the dry parts of the city or were camped on interstate overpasses, exposed to the in- tense late summer heat. Te inability of governments to provide for these many thousands of homeless people has to be counted as an o cial failure. Emer- gency management, which presumed that local and state o cials would ask for help and that FEMA would be able to procure it from federal sources, broke down. On the other hand, after several days the evacuation was achieved. Tese victims of Katrina were bused or airlifted out of New Orleans to destina- tions in Texas, Utah, Arkansas, and elsewhere. Te post-ood week was a chaotic compound of failure and success. Te saga of the buses illustrates the point about aws in emergency management. On Tuesday morning, FEMA director Brown, Governor Blanco, and Louisi- anas two senators, Mary Landrieu and David Vitter, arrived by helicopter from Baton Rouge to view the drowning city. Te governor, seeing hundreds of peo- ple wading through the water to reach the Super- dome, declared, We have to get these people out of here. We need buses. Everyone agreed. And Brown said brightly, If theres one thing FEMAs got, its buses ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 162). Brown then made the rst of a series of calls to Washington saying that Louisiana needed 500 buses. As he looked over the paperwork that afternoon, the states director of emergency preparedness noticed that FEMA head- quarters had reduced the number to 455. Te reduced request went forward to the U.S. Department of Transportation at 1:45 a.m. Wednesday, and Louisi- ana o cials were told that buses would arrive at 7:00 a.m., whereupon they halted independent eorts to commandeer buses locally from schools, churches, and other sources. But the buses did not come. Tey had to be procured from contractors all over the coun- try, hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Some arrived in the city on Wednesday evening and began evacuation of the special needs population and those who were marooned on highway overpasses. A more general evacuation began on Tursday, but it was not until Friday that a sizable eet arrived hundreds of buses lined up on New Orleans remaining dry land and prepared to evacuate, escorted by the Louisiana State Police ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 70; Cooper and Block 2006 , 172, 184 87, 210). In the aftermath, local and state o cials would re- main frustrated that FEMA did not know what it could deliver or when and made promises that were unreliable. Tis was true not only for buses, which in the complicated world of American government were not directly under the control of either FEMA or the Department of Transportation, but also for supplies that FEMA supposedly did control, such as genera- tors, food, water, and ice, which had been positioned in large amounts in the region but were slow to reach the disaster site. Te agencys logistics were poor, and communications generally had been impaired by the hurricane. Te FEMA emergency communications center, a truck nicknamed Red October, had re- mained in Baton Rouge until Friday rather being placed near city hall, a delay that Brown, who was hunkered down in it, would later concede was a mis- take ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 185, 213). Recognizing that FEMA was unreliable, everyone groped for alternatives. Tis included FEMA itself, whose o cials began acknowledging that they were overwhelmed and hinting that maybe the Department of Defense should take over, although FEMA was slow to initiate formal requests for help from the department ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 161, 166 67; U.S. Senate 2006 , 482). Governor Blanco, who bri- dled at the suggestion that Louisiana was incapable of command, called the White House directly on Wednesday, failing on her rst attempt to reach the president or his chief of sta, Andrew Card. Instead, she talked to an aide to Karl Rove, the presidents chief political advisor, though later in the day, after the president had returned to Washington from his ranch in Crawford, Texas, Blanco did reach President Bush and pleaded for help with transportation ( McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 269, 276). O cials at the top of the federal government were slow to comprehend that a catastrophe had struck New Orleans. Tis may have been partly attributable to the fact that they were scattered around the country on vacation: the president in Texas (with a detour to Where Federalism Didnt Fail 43 Southern California to make a speech), the vice president in Wyoming, and the White House chief of sta in Maine. But com- munication with them did not fail, and the slowness seems to be traceable more to the reluctance of Matthew Broderick, head of the recently created Homeland Security Operations Center, to believe what he was being told by sources in New Orleans. He was skeptical of reports from the ground, a peculiarly inapt metaphor for a city that had given up its ground to a ood ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 131 33, 145 51). Washington lacked situ- ational awareness, according to the later congressio- nal assessments. In plain language, it was slow to grasp reality, but by late Tuesday, Secretary of Homeland Security Cherto was beginning to get a grasp. Erro- neously believing that he was following the National Response Plan, he declared Hurricane Katrina an incident of national signicance, a classication to be found there. Te National Response Plan was a 400-page document prepared by the RAND Corpora- tion under contract in the aftermath of 9/11, by which the federal governments actions supposedly would be guided during national emergencies. It had been released in January 2005 and nominally went into eect in mid-April, but as Vice President Cheneys o ce acidly observed, it was not easily accessible to the rst-time user ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 551 58). Katrina would be its rst serious test, and the test was not going well. Cherto, though in a rage at Brown, designated him to be the principal federal o cial, another category to be found in the National Response Plan, but in prac- tice began relying on his deputy secretary, Michael Jackson, who was a former deputy secretary of trans- portation. Cherto ordered Jackson to set up an airlift from New Orleans Louis Armstrong International Airport. Tough FEMA had been working on this, it had been unable to work out destinations and sched- ules. Now that was done, but the federal Transporta- tion Security Administration, created in the aftermath of 9/11 to ensure the security of passenger aircraft, insisted on screening all passengers and baggage before the planes could take o. And the Department of Homeland Security also decided that undercover air marshals would have to be present on the departing ights. Fighting terrorism was a federal goal of utmost priority in the Bush administration, and here it con- icted with the need to achieve a swift evacuation of New Orleans ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 202 3). As o cials tried to get an evacuation organized, it remained necessary to provision the citys displaced population. Here, too, people discovered ways to work around FEMA and the failing o cial plans for emer- gency management. One work- around was to loot Wal-Mart, which became de facto a substi- tute for FEMA. Te people of New Orleans did this on their own initiative, but they had help from the National Guard, which recognized the necessity of seeing that people were supplied with food and water. A homeland security o cial assured Wal-Mart that the federal government would reimburse it if it acceded to this urgent function rather than try to protect its stores and warehouses. Tis turned out to be a promise on which the o cial could deliver only the modest amount of $300,000 ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 260 62). A continuing question, arguably the most problematic for federalism, was what role the armed forces of the United States should play. As early as Tuesday morn- ing, the acting deputy secretary of defense, Gordon England, ordered the U.S. Northern Command, a unit of the armed forces created after 9/11 to protect the continental United States, to move forces and materiel to the Gulf Coast and authorized it to provide assistance in support of FEMA. Te U.S. Northern Command created a Katrina task force headed by Lieutenant General Russel Honor and based at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to coordinate the military response to the disaster. Honor turned up in Baton Rouge and New Orleans on Wednesday night to look the situation over ( U.S. Senate 2006 , 69, chap. 26; White House 2006 , 42; Cooper and Block 2006 , 192). In her phone conversation with President Bush, Gov- ernor Blanco had asked for 40,000 troops an ex- traordinary number to take control of logistics and to oversee the continuing search and rescue eort so that the National Guard could concentrate on law enforcement. No such number was promised, but it was nonetheless a great disappointment to Louisiana o cials when Honor appeared on Wednesday with about a half-dozen people and a CNN crew ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 192). Before long, though, the mili- tary was delivering large amounts of food and water to both Louisiana and Mississippi. Who should be in charge of law enforcement was a question that was much more urgent at the time than it seems in retrospect. Rumors of violence and crowds out of control were beginning to spread and intimi- dated o cials, inhibiting their response. At the Super- dome on Tursday morning, the head of FEMAs small task force ordered members to take o their FEMA t-shirts for fear of being attacked, and the O cials at the top of the federal government were slow to comprehend that a catastrophe had struck New Orleans. Tis may have been partly attributable to the fact that they were scattered around the country on vacation 44 Public Administration Review December 2007 Special Issue team departed New Orleans for Baton Rouge ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 196 97). We now know that the rumors were much exaggerated. Some indisputably criminal looting did occur early in the disaster, con- centrated downtown along Canal Street, and there were a few incidents of gunre during the search and rescue operations. But considering their dire situation, the impaired state of the New Orleans Police Depart- ment whose chief was hysterical and many of whose members were AWOL plus the citys reputation for lawlessness in the best of times, the crowds were re- markably well behaved. Situational awareness in government was no better on this point than it had been on Monday regarding the collapse of levees and oodwalls. Arguably it had grown worse because the media, which initially had underplayed the disaster, perceiving too slowly the dimensions of the ood, were now overplaying it, giving excessive credence to reports of violence. And federal o cials, including the military, were taking their cues from the media. Once back in Washington, President Bush was tempted to take charge, whether by sending in regular army troops or by federalizing the Louisiana National Guard, for which he needed the governors permission unless an insurrection was in progress. Governor Blanco declined to grant such permission. Her posi- tion, with support from her sta, was that Louisiana could manage law enforcement and need not hand the Guard over to federal control. Tis issue came to a head close to midnight on Friday, when the White House faxed for her signature a document that would have brought the Louisiana National Guard under the presidents command so that he could announce the next day that he had done so. She refused to sign ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 212 15; McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 319 20, 327 30). And she added insult to injury by engaging James Lee Witt, President Clintons cel- ebrated FEMA director, as a consultant. Te White House later professed to have treated the governor with deference and political sensitiv- ity, saying anonymously and rhetorically to the New York Times, Can you imagine how it would have been perceived if a president of the United States of one party had pre-emptively taken from the female governor of another party the command and control of her forces, unless the secu- rity situation made it completely clear that she was unable to eectively execute her command authority and that lawlessness was the inevitable result? ( McQuaid and Schleifstein 2006 , 276). Republican governor Haley Barbour of Mississippi had also refused a request from the White House to turn over his National Guard to the president ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 212; U.S. House 2006 , 221). Louisiana asked for and received a great deal of help from National Guard units in neighboring states, making its requests not just through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact but also through the National Guard Bureau in the Department of Defense. Here again, interstate cooperation was a bright spot in the Katrina crisis. When a National Guard task force secured the convention center on Friday, approaching the building warily for fear of violence, it included troops from Texas, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Arkansas, as well as Louisiana. Te Guard found a peaceful place, containing people who were exhausted, hungry, and thirsty but not riotous. In all, other states would send about 20,000 National Guard troops to help Louisiana ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 191, 210 11, 223; U.S. Senate 2006 , 70; EMAC 2006 , 2-15 2-16). Te Superdome evacuation was completed by 1:00 p.m. on Saturday and the convention center evacuation by 6:30 p.m. the same day. Ofcial Aftermath: The Centralizing Syndrome So far, the analysis has sought out the eects of the federal form of government on Katrina, arguing that the successes to be found in the government re- sponse I have insisted that there were successes, contrary to widespread impression depended criti- cally on intergovernmental coop- eration. In the space remaining, I will invert the analysis and in- quire into the eects of Katrina on federalism. Disasters typically have central- izing consequences. Historically, major hurricanes have left in their wake fresh congressional enactments that enlarged the federal role in disaster response. Nonetheless, the basic federal law, stemming from an enact- ment in 1974 (P.L. 93-288) and amendments in 1988 (P.L. 100- 707), has never abandoned the principle that initial responsibil- ity rests with state and local governments. Under the combined impacts of 9/11 and Katrina, this central assumption is for the rst time subject to serious challenge. National preparedness planning, as practiced by the administration of President Bush, the new Disasters typically have centralizing consequences. Historically, major hurricanes have left in their wake fresh congressional enactments that enlarged the federal role in disaster response. Nonetheless, the basic federal lawhas never abandoned the principle that initial responsibility rests with state and local governments. Where Federalism Didnt Fail 45 Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Northern Command, is radically centralizing, at least in its rhetoric. Characteristic of the post-9/11 Bush White House, it trumpets a promise of transforma- tion ( Brooks 2007 ). How it will turn out in practice is another matter. Katrina, which was a test of cen- trally planned preparedness, showed just how hollow and feckless it was on its rst try, but the reaction of the administration was not to acknowledge the diversity of both the country and the risks the country faces but to try harder to plan and execute from the top. Te Bush administrations centralizing reactions to Katrina have been manifest at three points: (1) in the conduct of the federal executive branch during subse- quent hurricanes in the 2005 season; (2) in the Les- sons Learned report of the presidents assistant for homeland security and counterterrorism, issued in February 2006; and (3) most seriously, in a rider attached to the Fiscal Year 2007 Defense Authoriza- tion Act that made it possible for the president to federalize the National Guard in a domestic disaster without the consent of a governor. Tough the White House may not have been willing to run the political risk of confronting Governor Blanco in 2005, a year later it succeeded in reducing the authority of every governor of every state. Two powerful hurricanes, Rita and Wilma, followed Katrina in the season of 2005, and during both the federal government acted very aggressively, seeking to take charge with military task forces and sending homeland security employees into the states without advice, consultation, or requests from state o cials. Rita hit a sparsely populated area of Louisiana and did relatively little damage, although about 60 people died in the evacuations, including 23 nursing home resi- dents whose bus burned when an oxygen tank ex- ploded. Others died from heat exhaustion and heart attacks after spending hours in cars without water or air conditioning. In contrast to Katrina in Louisiana, the Rita evacuation in Texas was a horror story, with highways clogged for 100 miles north of Houston ( Cooper and Block 2006 , 269 70). Wilma, which at its pre-landfall peak was a more powerful hurricane than Katrina, touched o a major confrontation between Floridas government and federal o cials. Te commander of the Fifth Army at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio told the head of Floridas National Guard, General Douglas Burnett, that he wanted to y in equipment to set up a joint task force command. Burnett protested to U.S. Northern Command headquarters in Colorado, and Governor Jeb Bush called Secretary Cherto to say that the federal governments actions were insulting to him personally, to Floridas well-regarded director of emergency management, Craig Fugate, and to all the citizens of Florida. Florida appeared to win this battle when Fugate, in a videoconference three days before landfall, announced the creation of Wilma Com- mand a unied incident command that met the paper requirements of homeland security and intro- duced Governor Bush as its commander. Florida o cials had ardent support from FEMA employees in both Washington and Florida, who had no love for the Department of Homeland Security. Te U.S. Northern Command did not call up the Fifth Army, no military task force was created, and Secretary Cherto did not appoint a principal federal o cial ( Cooper and Block 2006 , chap. 12; Block and Schatz 2005 ). Floridas government managed the emergency, though in the end, Bush and Fugate were not fully satised with their own performance. Shortly after Katrina, President Bush spoke to the nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans, promis- ing to rebuild the city and ordering a review of the federal response to Katrina. Te resulting report drew 17 lessons and produced 125 recommendations. Te tone of this rhetorically expansive document is strongly centralizing. With frequent use of italics, it calls for a transformation of our homeland security architecture, a unifying system that will ensure National Preparedness, and the development of op- erational capability within the federal government. Te unied system that it envisions includes not only other governments in the federal system but also the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, faith- based groups, and communities, including individual citizens. All are to be coordinated from the center, through planning by the Department of Homeland Security. Rather than waiting for the next disaster, DHS planners must develop detailed operational plans that anticipate the requirements of future re- sponses and what capabilities can be matched to them in what timeframe (White House 2006 , 65 68, 70). Of greatest consequence was a change in law achieved by the administration late in 2006 through a rider added to the Defense Authorization Act for 2007. Tis change amended the Insurrection Act of 1871 to broaden the presidents authority to use the armed forces for domestic purposes and to call the National Guard, which is normally under the command of the governors, into federal service. Formerly limited to cases of insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, this rarely invoked au- thority was extended to cases in which public order is disrupted because of a natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other condition ( Elsea 2006 ). Tat is very broad language indeed. As two congres- sional critics, Senators Patrick Leahy of Vermont and Christopher Bond of Missouri, observed, it under- mines the optimal, well-proven approach for handling 46 Public Administration Review December 2007 Special Issue domestic emergencies, which gives primacy to elected chief executives of state and local governments. More fundamentally, it makes a constitutional change by replacing a presumption against invoking federal martial law with a presumption for domestic use of the military ( Bond and Leahy 2006 , 1; Mahoney 1986 , 1429 30). Tis revision of law, which is a sharp blow to federalism and a signicant expansion of the power of the presidency, received no debate in Con- gress. Its merits were not argued, nor were they tested against the actual evidence of governmental perfor- mance produced from the experience of Katrina, which in New Orleans was an extreme case a cata- strophic event in an exceptionally vulnerable and poorly governed place. At least in public, no one in Congress argued, against senators Leahy and Bond, that this added grant of power to the chief executive of the federal government was warranted. Yet this change in law is likely to stand as the most constitu- tionally signicant and lasting legacy of Katrina unless Senators Leahy and Bond succeed in an eort, under way as of February 2007, to repeal it. Conclusion Newt Gingrich, the Republican former Speaker of the House, has pronounced a glib summary judgment on Katrina: Te simple fact is the city of New Orleans failed, the state of Louisiana failed, and the govern- ment of the United States failed (2006, xi). At greater length and with rather more nuance, the federal gov- ernment has issued three major reports on the govern- ments performance one from the O ce of the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, which I very briey summarized earlier, one from the House of Representatives, and one from the Senate. Te House report eschews rec- ommendations and concentrates on fact nding. Te Senate report ends conventionally with 88 recommen- dations that are addressed almost entirely to adminis- trative organization and processes. It recommends the abolition of FEMA and its replacement with a new agency, the National Preparedness and Response Au- thority, within the Department of Homeland Security. It calls for improved coordination among and within governments. It takes a more temperate and realistic approach to federalism than the White House report by acknowledging that states and localities will continue to provide the backbone of response the rst response for all disasters, catastrophic or not (2006, 612). All of the reports fail to confront the risk of allowing ever larger coastal settlements to develop in locations so exposed that they cannot be given adequate protec- tion at a reasonable cost. None dwells on just how vulnerable New Orleans was and is destined to re- main, given its location well below sea level, made steadily worse by subsidence ( Foster and Giegengack 2006 ). On instinct in the wake of Katrina, the presi- dent speaking at Jackson Square only days after the event, the Louisiana congressional delegation with a grandiose $250 billion proposal for rebuilding, and the Corps of Engineers, with quixotic plans for reengineering the Mississippi Gulf Coast, all have embraced political business as usual. With the experience of Katrina in the federal system as a guide, I suggest the following very general pre- cepts for federal emergency planning and management: First, do no harm to the rst responders. Depen- dence on them is inescapable. Indeed, they could become the countrys only functioning and legiti- mate governments in case of a successful terrorist attack on Washington, D.C. Continue to think of federalism in the traditional way, as a source of strength through cooperation. Enlarge and train the armed forces of the United States so as to reduce their combat and operational dependence on the National Guard, which is in poor repair and needed at home. Consider, in collaboration with state gov- ernments, the creation of a volunteer home guard, not subject to overseas deployment and available in addition to the National Guard during domes- tic emergencies ( Korb 2007 ). Amend the Posse Comitatus Act to remove the restriction on the use of the army for domestic law enforcement and leave the National Guard under the governors control in domestic emergencies. Second, tend to your own self-preservation. In this age of terrorism, citizens are entitled to ask how much has been done to ensure the continuity of major federal governing institutions and also what preparations have been made for the evacua- tion of the nations capital, which every day of every normal work week, absent acts of terrorism, chokes on its own commuter tra c. Finally, look with more discernment to the suc- cess stories that are buried within Katrina: to the orderly pre-landfall evacuation of a million or more residents of greater New Orleans; to the perfor- mance, both singly and together, of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries; to the institutions of interstate coop- eration, including the National Guard; and to the ability of the U.S. armed forces to deliver supplies once they were called upon. Te U.S. government excels at fault nding through commissions and congressional committees after a catastrophic event. Tese study groups typically proer recommenda- tions for administrative reorganization, with an ill-founded certitude that such xes will work. It is also important to take the measure of success and to locate the sources of it, which I have traced here to intergovernmental cooperation. Te leading dimen- sions of such cooperation in Katrina were interlocal and local state, in planning the Contraow; Where Federalism Didnt Fail 47 interstate, in planning the Contraow and mobiliz- ing the National Guard; and federal state, in the search and rescue work of the Coast Guard and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries. Tese intergovernmental relations had already been developed prior to the catastrophe, which would have been far worse and the loss of life much greater had they not existed. Note 1. Te factual premise of the question is subject to challenge. A response took roughly a week in each case. 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Randy M. Shilts 1952-1994 Author(s) : William W. Darrow Source: The Journal of Sex Research, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1994), Pp. 248-249 Published By: Stable URL: Accessed: 02/09/2014 13:37