1

XIX. DISINHERITANCE
CHING VS. HON JANSSEN RODRIGUEZ
Ramon S Ching v Hon Jansen Rodriguez(with Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng,
Mercedes Igne, and Lucina Santos)
Facts:
Case is about a review under rule 45 of ROC wherein Petition for motion
of reconsideration of appeal were denied and RTC decision was affirmed
Sometime between Nov to Dec 2002, respondents filed a complain
against stronghold Insurance company and Global business bank and all
persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching and his successors in
interest.
In the complaint for disinheritance, respondents allege the following as
causes of action:
o 1
st
: They are the heirs of Lim San also known as Antonio Ching
o Joseph Ching an Jaime Ching, allegedly are the children of
Antonio from his common law wife, respondent, Mercedes Igne
and Lucina Ramon
o Ramon misrepresented himself as his son and when he was in
fact adopted and his birth certificate was simulated
o Ramon is a primary suspect for Antonios murder
o According to respondents: he may be disinherited under Art919
of CC:
o 2
nd
: Respondents allege that Ramon illegally transferred to his
names 6 real estate properties left by Antonio. Also, there are 2
lots, cash and Jewelries in Possession of Antonio
o 3
rd
: Mercedes was sweet talked by Ramon to surrender to him
Global Business bank, time deposit of PHP4,000,000 and condo
in Binondo
o 40000 shares in Po Wing were illegally transferred to Ramon to
his own name
o 5
th
: Ramon Executed an affidavit of Extra Judicial Settlement of
estate, adjudicating only to himself prejudicing the heirs
o 6
th
: Ramons selling of Navotas lots are void since he lacks
authority to dispose them
Ramons wife Belen Dy Tan Ching manages Antonios estate with no
intent to convey to the respondents
Defendants prayed that; Ramon Ching be disinherited since he murdered
his father, nullity of all transactions mentioned above since it was illegally
procured
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss: alleging forum shopping, and
respondents are not real parties in interest.
RTC: dismissed the petition of motion to dismiss
CA: affirmed RTC, action of private respondents should be threshed out
in a special proceeding, allegations were substantially for the
enforcement of their rights against fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching
Issue:
WON there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?
WON Ramon Ching can be disinherited from the estate of his father.
WON RTC should have granted the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners on the
ground that RTCs lack of jurisdiction
Held:
Petition denied since they failed to comply with a lawful order, prescribed
period has expired.
No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and CA
Under Art 916; disinheritance can be effected through the will wherein
the legal cause therefore shall be specified

XX. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
A. INTESTATE HEIRS
RODRIGUEZ ET AL VS. BORJA
Rodriguez v. De Borja
Facts:
1. Fr. Rodriguez died in the City of Manila. Both parties in this case stipulated
that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque, that he was a parish priest of the
Catholic Church in Hagonoy from 1930 to 1963 and that he left real properties in
Rizal, Cavite, QC and Bulacan
2. March 4, 1963 = Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to
Clerk of Court (Bulacan) a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez
3. March 8, 1963 = Maria and Angela Rodriguez (petitioners), filed a petition to
examine the alleged will however it was withdrawn
4. Petitioners filed a petition for the settlement of intestate estate of Fr.
Rodriguez alleging that the latter left no will. They also prayed that Maria
Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate
5. On the other hand, Apolonia and Adelaida filed a petition for the probation of
the will.
6. Maria and Angelas claim: that CFI Rizal has no jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for probate since the intestate proceedings was filed at 8 AM (March 12,
1963) while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI Bulacan at 11 AM
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7. Apolonia and Adelaidas claim: CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the
case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court and that the case in
this court has precedence over the case filed in Rizal
8. CFI denied the motion to dismiss filed by Maria and Angela saying that time
difference did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other. That they
are aware of the existence of the will of Fr. Rodriguez since they filed a petition to
examine the same, and that movants filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal for
no other purpose than to prevent the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings
Issue: Whether the CFI Bulacan has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for
probate filed by Apolinia and Adelaida despite there was an existing intestate
estate case that was filed by Maria and Angela.
Held: No.
1. The jurisdiction of CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the
will of late Fr. Rodriguez even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu propio have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of ROC.
2. In the aforementioned rule of Civil Procedure, the use of disjunctive words
when a will is delivered OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed indicates
that the court may act upon the mere deposit there of a decendents testament,
even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is
made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time
when the will was delivered.
o Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court
of Bulacan March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in CFI Rizal
only on March 12, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court
is incontenstable.
3. On the petitioners objection that Bulacan court has no jurisdiction since the
decedent was domiciled in the province of Rizal: the Court cannot disregard Fr.
Rodriguezs 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy and even if there is
an animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paranaque, that detail would not
imply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction (law: the power to settle decedents
estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile of
testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court)
o The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan court, that court is
entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a
case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73
4. Another reason that militate against the success of petitioners: in our
system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the
testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.
o Castro v. Martinez: only after final decision as to the nullity of testate
succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-
established action. So, the institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not
thus proceed while the probate of the will of Fr. Rodriguez is pending
5. Ruling: the Bulacan court was entitled to priority in the settlement of the
estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate proceedings, said
court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal
court that should be dismissed.

MADARCOS VS . DE LA MERCED
Madaracos v. Dela Merced
Facts
In this case, the issue is the construction of the phrase Legal Heirs in P.D.
119 which states:
o Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent homestead provisions
when proper shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs w/in a period of 5 years at the date of conveyance.
Madaracos was the Niece of the decedent.
o she is seeking the repurchase of the property she sold for 4,800 pesos of Lot
B. of the estate of the decedent under the same law.
Sta. Maria said that this is no longer possible because under the law, she is
not a legal heir as contemplated by 119.
Issue
W/N Madaracos is a legal heir as contemplated in 119.
Held
The SC first discussed legal heirs according to intestacy
1. Legitimate children and their descendants
2. Parents and Ascendants
3. Illegitimate children and their descendants
4. Spouse without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces.
5. Collateral Relatives within the 5
th
degree.
6. The state
In this case, there Is a right to repurchase by madacaros.
The law is to be interpreted in favor of liberal construction.
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ROSALES VS. ROSALES
Rosales v Rosales
Facts:
1. Mrs Petra Rosales died intestate
2. The survivors are:
a. Her husband
b. Two children Magna Acebes and Antonio
3. Carterio Rosales, married to Irenea Rosales, was also the child of the
deceased but predeceased his mother, Petra.
4. Macikequerox was the child of Carterio and Irenea
5. Magna instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decasesd.
6. The trial court issued an order declaring the shares as follows:
a. Husband Fortunato
b. Magna Acebes (daughter)
c. Macikequerox (grandson)
d. Antonio (son)
7. Irenea insists on getting a claim for the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio using Article 887 of the civil code and that his
husband had an inchoate right to the estate of Petra as compulsory heir
Issue: WON, the widow is an heir to her mother-in-law
Held:
A - No.
L - There is no law which gives a right to the widow to represent his
husband in the estate of his mother or father in law
- 887 in referring to the widow refer to the widow of the deceased spouse
whose heir is in question.
- 999 confirm that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the
deceased spouse.
- 970-971 Essence and nature of right of representation. The
representative does not succeed the person he represented but instead takes the
place of the one represented.
A - in the case at bar, the person being referred to in Article 970,971 and
982 is Macikequerox.
- Since Macikequerox already took the place of his deceased father, the
widow cannot take the place of his husband.
- in Fact as stated earlier, there is no provision which gives her right.
- The defense of the widow that she represents the inchoate right of her
husband is unmeritorious because such inchoate right has been extinguished by
death of the husband.

B. EXCLUSION AND CONCURRENCE
DELOS SANTOS VS. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ,
defendant-appellant.
Facts:
On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific
performance against Maximo de la Cruz alleging that:
August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant,
executed an extrajudicial partition
parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant on
condition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of the
estate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection
therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three
(3) lots;
the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had
already sold the aforesaid lots.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial
partition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no
cause of action against him
the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that the
plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, and was included in the extrajudicial
partition agreement by mistake;
although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless
the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the
subdivided estate.
The answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that
the plaintiff had likewise sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the
extrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he
was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial
partition agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his
counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of
facts:
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That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceased
Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor in
interest of the land which was the subject matter of the extra-judicial partition
agreement;
That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said Pelagia
de la Cruz;
That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16,
1962.
That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of the
said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on September
22, 1935.
TC Held that the extrajudicial partition is VALID and plaintiff can INHERIT by
representing the mother
ISSUE: Whether the plaintiff is an heir (NO)
Ruling:
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. ... .
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-
appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is
concerned? She was included in the partition.
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto
were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the
legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the
partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the
deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he
was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir
designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De
Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the
agreement the right to have its terms enforced.
side issue: can the defendant recover the said property by way of reversion?
No, pag wala pang buyer in good faith.
Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and took possession of
the property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and void
partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance (De Torres
vs. De Torres, et al., supra).
Of course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee to a bona fide
purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations of the
counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount to
defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such sale for
the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has not
been touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by
evidence which appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from
is hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any
ability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim,
appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding
share of the property she has received under the extrajudicial partition
hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been disposed of as alleged.
Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.

BAGUNU VS. PIEDAD
BAGUNU V. PIEDAD
FACTS:
Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings
No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
Augusto H. Piedad. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the late
Augusto H. Piedad, she assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding
the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings
were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the
notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity
in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the
estate.
Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants.
Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the
decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a
fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the
fifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of
Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the
estate of Augusto H. Piedad; that the notice of hearing was published for three
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consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no order
of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that the
intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate
of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.
ISSUE:
Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside
respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does
the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral
relatives?
HELD:
NO. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree
to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the
extent that the right of representation can apply. In fine, a maternal aunt can
inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit
equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-
degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree
of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree
relative.
Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes
place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of
article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal
lines."
By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by
operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a
closer blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into
the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from
the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.
"ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited."
"ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in
the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take
place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such
children survive with their uncles or aunts.
"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers
or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood."
"ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of
the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or
representatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent would
inherit, if he were living or could inherit."
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they
survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall
inherit in equal portions."
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the
fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are
sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the
illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly,the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the
brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral
relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article
962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of
relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code
gives direction.
"Article 966. x x x
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is
made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is
two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of
his father, four from his first cousin and so forth."
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.
Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab
intestato to the estate of the decedent.
The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code
"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
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"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood."
"Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth
degree of relationship in the collateral line." -
invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that
among the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no
preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the
whole blood."
URIARTE VS. CA
Uriarte v CA, GR No. 116775, January 22, 1998
FACTS:
Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death a 2.7 ha piece of land in
Surigao del Sur.
Private respondent, Benedicto Estrada, is the nephew of Justa by her
half-sister, Agatonica Arreza.
Petitioners are the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, son of Conrado Uriarte and
Primitiva Arnaldo whose father Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan
Arnaldo, Justas father.
Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of
consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.ch
The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her
brother Gregorio.
These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the
fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio and
Primitiva.
Benedicto brought the case in the RTC for the partition of the 2.7 ha land
left by Justa that the latter acquired 0.5 ha by inheritance from her
parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 ha by purchase after the
death of her parents.
Benedicto claimed to be the sole heir of Justa on the ground the latter
died without issue. He contended that Pascasio worked Justas land as
tenant and refused to give him his share of the harvest and that Pascasio
has no right to the entire land but only to one-half of the 0.5 ha.
Petitioners claimed that the land originally owned by their granduncle
Ambrocio was bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo in a
holographic will wherein 2/3 will go to Domingo and 1/3 to Juan.
The land left by Ambrocio is only 0.5481 ha, 2/3 or 3,654 sqm to
Domingo and 1/3 or 1,827 sqm to Juan.
Justa bought about 2 ha and increased the land to 2.7588 ha.
LC ruled in favor of herein petitioners. When she died intestate and
without issue, her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncle
Domingo.
CA reversed LC decision finding that the 0.5 ha were acquired by Justas
parents during their marriage so as Justas nephew by her half-sister
Agatonica, Benedicto is entitled to a share in Justas estate
ISSUE:
Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estate
as her nearest relative within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil code?
RULING:
Benedicto as the nearest relative of Justa is entitled to her estate.
Art. 962 states that in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the
provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half
blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
paternal and maternal lines.
Since Benedicto is the son of Agatonica, Justas half-sister, he is a third
degree relative of Justa.
Petitioners on the other hand are sons and daughters of Justas cousin,
thus fifth degree relative of Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, Benedicto is
the lawful heir of Justa, notwithstanding the fact that his mother is only
the half-sister of Justa.
Benedicto being only a half-blood relative is immaterial. The CA held that
"The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half-blood
is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors."
Petition is denied. CA decision is affirmed.

C. RELATIONSHIP
D. REPRESENTATION
DELA PUERTA VS. CA
De La Puerta vs. CA
FACTS:
The right of representation does not extend to the adopted children of the person
to be represented. This is because the fictional tie that binds the adopter and the
adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopter. Thus, the adopter may
adopt an heir for himself, but he cannot adopt one for his relatives.
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1) DomingaRevuelta died on July 3, 1966, with a will leaving her properties to her
three surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la
Puerta.
2) The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her
brothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of the
execution of the will.
3) On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta adopted Carmelita de la Puerta. Soon,
Vicente died.
4) Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed a
motion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural
child of Vicente de la Puerta.
5) The probate court granted the motion, and was affirmed by CA.
PETITIONERs main argument is that Carmelita was not the natural child of
Vicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 and
remained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are Juanita
Austrial and Gloria Jordan.
ISSUES and RULING:
1) WON Carmelita is an acknowledged child of Vicente. YES.
There was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria lived
together as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria was
herself the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.
Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did not
continuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, if
he was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugal
home and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhood
at that.
The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed,
it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that the
two were legally married. She did not.
And during the hearing of Carmelitas adoption case, Vicente de la Puerta
categorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with Gloria
Jordan and that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent for her
subsistence, support and
education.
2) May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the
estate of DomingaRevuelta? NO.
* The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and
the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
It is settled that In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take
place only in the following cases:
first, when the person represented dies before the testator;
second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator;
and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator.
In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the
children or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of
representation.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to
inherit from her directly or in his own right.
No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita upon
her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been
different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita
could then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente,
assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.
* As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga
because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the
legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:
- Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
The reason for this rule was (Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.
- They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family
there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
- The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of
sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than
recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment. Indeed, even as an
adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting from
DomingaRevuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties
between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed
out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:
8

- If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot
represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the
adopter. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because
the filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and the
adopted.
- By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they
cannot thus make one for their kindred.
- The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la
Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to the
estate of DomingaRevuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should
therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate
and cannot be considered in the probate of DomingaRevuelta's Will.

DIAZ VS. IAC
Diaz vs De Leon

DIAZ V. IAC
(1987)

FACTS:


Felipe
Pamuti
Petronila
Asuncion

Pascual Santero
(+1970) m
Simona
(+1976)

Juliana

m
Simon
Jardin
Pablo (+1973)

Felisa
another
child (+
infancy)

w/Anselma Diaz

w/
Felixberta
Pacursa


Victor Federico

Rodrigo
another
child


Anselmina

Miguel

Felisa was
declared as the
sole heir of
Simona Pamuti
vda. De Santero.


In sp.
Proceedings for
the intestate
estate of Pascual
and Pablo,
Felisa intervened
but was declared
not an

heir of Simona,
which decision
was reversed by
the IAC. Hence
this appeal of the
natural children
of Pablo.

Petitioner's
contention was
that Article 990
of the NCC
modified the rule
in Art. 941 (old
Civil Code) and

recognizes the
right of
representation
(Art. 970) to

9

descendants,
whether
legitimate or
illegitimate.
ISSUE:

Whether or not
the illegitimate
children of Pablo
can inherit from
Simona, by
rightof
representation.

HELD:

No. The
applicable law is
Article 992 of the
Civil Code:


"An illegitimate
child has no right
to inherit ab
intestato from
the legitimate
children and
relatives of his
father or mother;
nor shall such
children or
relatives inherit
in the same
manner from the
illegitimate child.
"

Thus, petitioners
cannot represent
their father Pablo
Santero in the
succession of
the latter to the
intestate
estate of his
legitimate mother
Simona Pamuti
vda. De Santero,
because of the
barrier or iron
curtain

provided for
under Art. 992 of
the New Civil
Code. Xxx The
word "relative"
includes all the
kindred of the

person spoken
of. Petition was
dismissed.


Reflections of JBL Reyes, which also finds support from other civilists: that in the
Spanish code, the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle in Art. 992. While Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate
child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, the
illegitimates of an illegitimate can now do so.

TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL
Teotico v. Del Val
Vda. De Balsalobra died on july 14, 1955, she left properties worth 600,000. She
left a will leaving properties to Dr. Teotico worth 20,000, the husband of the
deceaseds daughter. She left the usufruct of the Calvo Bldg. to the her daughter
and herein petitioner.
10

They filed a petition for the probate of the will.
Aba Del Val Chan, the adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera who is the sister of
the testatrix filed an opposition claiming the will to be executed: (1) Not in
accordance with the law; (2) with undue influence, improper pressure; (3) without
possession of her full mental faculties.
The court moved forward with the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the
will.
Issue
W/N a person who has no interest in the property may intervene
W/N the adopted child has an interest to the will
Held
No, the intervenor cannot derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to
the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
An interested party as defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, in this
case, as she has no right to actually Inherit, and that she is not a creditor of the
same, she clearly is not an appropriate intervenor as mentioned by Section 2 Rule
80 of the Rules of court.

SAYSON VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
(SAYSON VS CA)
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO, BASILISA, REMEDIOS and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela
on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife
died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to
be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the
defense, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to
inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
(focus dito)
Issue:
1. Whether Delia, Edmundo (adopted children) and Doribel (legitimate
daughter) are entitled to inherit Teodoros (father) share in his parents
(grandparents) estate by right of representation.
Held:
Yes Doribel
No Delia and Edmundo
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981 she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children.
13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by
the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
14


Sayson v CA
FACTS:
11

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Elena died in 1952 and Rafaela in 1976.
Teodoro married Isabel Bautista and died in 1972. Isabel died in 1981. They left
their properties to Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children.
Mauricio, Rosario and Basilisa with Isabel's mother, Juana, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel resisted this action and filed a complaint and partition
of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela.
Being legally adopted children and the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel,
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
The lower courts decided in favor of private respondents in both cases being
legally adopted children and legitimate daughter.
Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision but modified in respect of the
legally adopted children Delia and Edmundo not inheriting from from the estate of
Eleno and Rafaela.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel have a right to represent
their deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of their
grandchildren.
RULING:
YES as to Doribel. As legitimate daughter of Teodoro, she has a right to represent
her deceased dather and under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares
of her other grandparents' other children
No as to Delia and Edmundo who were total strangers to the grandparents. While
adopted children are deemed legitimate and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship create by
the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted children and does
not extend to blood relatives of either party.
Delia and Edmundo as adopted children and Doribel as legitimate daughter are
the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel. Only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate. Petition is
denied.
ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded.
ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and
the latter by right of representation.
BACAYO VS. BORROMEO
G.R. No. L-19382. August 31, 1965.]
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELOIDA FARRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GAUDENCIA
FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO
FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, Oppositors-Appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar A. Kintanar for Petitioner-Appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.

Facts:
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was
known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening
her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana
de Bacayo, an aunt, and half- sister of decedents father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of full blood, Arturo
Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim
to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said
Melodia Ferraris.

Issue:
1. Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when
he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit: an aunt and the
children of a brother who predeceased him or her?
2. Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedents
brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?
12


RTC Ruling:
the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the
decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent, reasoning
out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces
and nephew succeed by right of representation, while petitioner- appellant is three
degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded
by brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Ruling: SC
A decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews
and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

The absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. (Art. 1009 Civil Code.)

An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three
degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong,
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code Art. 966).

Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per
stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews
and nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other
collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of
the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces
and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred
position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

"Other Collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of
brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree.
Beyond this, we can safely say, there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, persons beyond the fifth
degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

"Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship." (Italics
supplied)

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedents
uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of
the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

CORPUZ VS. CORPUZ
Corpus vs. Corpus
FACTS:
1. RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed with 5
children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others.
2. When TOMAS CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and
had 4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedent
TEORORO YANGCO
3. TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939.
a. His will was dated August 29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of his
death, he had no forced heirs.
b. He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO), wife
of Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother Pablo
Corpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus
(JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944.
4. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November
26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will.
5. The said project was contested by the following, on the following grounds
(oppositors):
a. Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because the will does
not contain an institution of heir
13

b. JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE CASTO, through
ATTY. CRUZ: the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will as the
testator intended that the estate should be CONSERVED and not physically
parititoned.
6. Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved by the Probate court, in
essence holding that the testator did not really intend to a perpetual prohibition
against alienation when he stated that some of his estate be conserved
7. Oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and the
appellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the legatees agreed to
pay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO CORPUS, the heirs of ISABEL
CORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA CORPUS her son TOMAS CORPUS (same
name as that of their lola sa tuhods ex-husband).
a. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was entered.
b. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory
8. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt
acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as settlement in full
of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge
Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case.
9. The legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of
the Yangco estate which was approved by the probate court in 1949. 1945 project
of partition was pro-tanto modified.
10. TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITAs supposed share in
Yangcos intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangcos will sing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under A785, OCC
and that 1949 partition is invalid.
a. The decedents estate should have been distributed according to the rules on
intestacy.
11. TC: DISMISS: Res Judicata and laches. a. directly appealed to SC
12. Petitioners contention: trial court erred in holding
(1) TeodoroYangco was a natural child;
(2) TeodoroYangcos will had been duly legalized;
(3) Plaintiffs action is barred by res judicata and laches.
ISSUE: Whether JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS mom, was a legal heir of
TEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of action to recover a
supposed intestate share in the estate? No
HELD: No.
JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioners mother, was NOT A LEGAL HEIR of Yangco
because there is NO RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.
Article 992, NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child.
o based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child
* Law does not recognize blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of
resentment.
TEODORO YANGCO, and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILD and NOT A LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and
RAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE CORPUS (LOLO OF TOMAS CORPUS, FATHER
OF JUANITA CORPUS) was the presumed legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUS
and RAMONA ARGUELLES.
* Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause of action for the recovery
of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA CORPUS, as legal heir
in YANGCOs estate.
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
* The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent.
* The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother.
DECISION: WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

DELGADO VS. RUSTIA

Delgado v Rustia

FACTS:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of their
estates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,
consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado
14

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio
Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa
Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood
siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was
not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio
with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.
The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in
fact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.
Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.
The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into
their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These
children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo
Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent
Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
ISSUES:
1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?
2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can
inherit by right of representation?
3. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?
RULING:
1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado
It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon
Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,
Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado, were her natural children.
The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all
illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new
Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently,
it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only
collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate
estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the
time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate
in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the
trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article
1001 of the new Civil Code:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be
entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of
paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together with
Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces
and nephews.
15

Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full
and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any
of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also
surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to
determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
share in her estate.
Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate)
shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz
(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman
Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be
per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their
estates.

E. ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION
SAYSON VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
(SAYSON VS CA)
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO, BASILISA, REMEDIOS and JUANA C.
BAUTISTA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,
Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela
on May 15, 1976.
Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife
died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to
be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with
Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,
against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted the
defense, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to
inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
(focus dito)
Issue:
1. Whether Delia, Edmundo (adopted children) and Doribel (legitimate
daughter) are entitled to inherit Teodoros (father) share in his parents
(grandparents) estate by right of representation.
Held:
Yes Doribel
No Delia and Edmundo
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her
deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981 she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children.
13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to
whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by
the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does
not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
14


Sayson v CA
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios
and Teodoro. Elena died in 1952 and Rafaela in 1976.
Teodoro married Isabel Bautista and died in 1972. Isabel died in 1981. They left
their properties to Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children.
Mauricio, Rosario and Basilisa with Isabel's mother, Juana, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.
16

Delia, Edmundo and Doribel resisted this action and filed a complaint and partition
of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela.
Being legally adopted children and the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel,
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of
representation.
The lower courts decided in favor of private respondents in both cases being
legally adopted children and legitimate daughter.
Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision but modified in respect of the
legally adopted children Delia and Edmundo not inheriting from from the estate of
Eleno and Rafaela.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel have a right to represent
their deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of their
grandchildren.
RULING:
YES as to Doribel. As legitimate daughter of Teodoro, she has a right to represent
her deceased dather and under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares
of her other grandparents' other children
No as to Delia and Edmundo who were total strangers to the grandparents. While
adopted children are deemed legitimate and have the same right as the latter,
these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship create by
the adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted children and does
not extend to blood relatives of either party.
Delia and Edmundo as adopted children and Doribel as legitimate daughter are
the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel. Only Doribel has the right of
representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate. Petition is
denied.
ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited.
ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the
person represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded.
ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of
other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and
the latter by right of representation.
BANAWA VS. MIRANO
Banawa v. Mirano
Facts:
1. 1911 Maria Mirano (niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza), and was still 9
years of age, was taken in by Sps. Banawa (Doroteo and Juliana) in their house in
Taal.
2. Sps Banawa being childless, treated and reared her up like their own
daughter. They also hired a private tutor to teach her literacy.
3. A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise
in Quezon from which they derived considerable income. They also acquired
several parcels of land.
4. Maria Mirano died in Taal after an illness. At the time of her death she left
as her only nearest relatives (Primitiva Mirano her sister) and Gregoria, Juana
and Marciano (children of a deceased brother, Martin)
5. There are two properties involved in this case: Iba property and the
Carsuche property
6. Iba property: owned by Punzalan from whom it was acquired in 1921. A
DOS in question states that the Iba property consisted of two parcels of land and
that they were sold for the amount of 2k in favor of Maria Mirano. Defendant
Doroteo impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial document when he
declared that in the execution of the document concerning the purchase of the Iba
property from Punzalan the Notary Public charged him 20 pesos and another 5 for
stamps
On the other hand, defendants claim of ownership over the Iba property is
predicated upon their assertion that the money used in buying said land pertained
to the spouses Banawa. Defendants contend that since 1919, Punzalan borrowed
money from Sps Banawa on three different occasions. Upon the failure of
Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land to the
spouses for 3,700. Defendants also alleged that the sale was made to appear in
favor of Maria because said spouses being already old, they want to leave
something to Maria for her to lean upon when they would have been gone. Maria
was 19 years old when the deed of sale was executed.
7. Carsuche property: original owners of this property were Roman Biscocho,
Paula and Carmen Mendoza. Maria Mirano was mentioned by a public instrument
evidencing the sale. Defendants, on the other hand, assert that the sale was
evidence by a private handwriting prepared in the handwriting of Roman and that it
was in favor of Sps Banawa
In order to prove the due execution of the public instrument, the plaintiffs
presented Atty Ilagan and Roman Biscocho. The witnesses declared that in 1935,
17

Sps Banawa, Maria, Roman, Paula and Carmen went to office of Atty Ilagan. Atty
Aro asked Atty Ilagans permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared a
document in English and which he asked Atty Ilagan to ratify and that the latter
translated the document into Tagalog. The document involved the sale of the
Carsuce property in favor of Maria Mirano. Doroteo asked Atty Ilagan whether the
document that he ratified was Matibay to safeguard the rights of Maria to which
Atty Ilagan answered in the affirmative.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in law in ruling that the placing of the Iba property in
the name of Maria was in the nature of donation inter vivos.
Held:
1. Respondents are correct when they stated that neither CA nor the CFI
Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name of
Maria was in the nature of a donation inter vivos.
2. CA rejected the contention of petitioners that a donation mortis causa was
executed. CA said that the placing of Iba property in the name of Maria (if it was to
be called a donation at all) was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa but a
donation inter vivos.
3. Both courts found that what was donated by the spouses Banawa to Maria
was the money used in the purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion of
the CFI was supported by testimony of Aro, a nephew of Doroteo, that the money
was used by Maria in the purchased of the Iba and Carsuche properties was given
to her by Doroteo.
4. Note that if the money used by Maria in purchasing the properties was given
to her by the sps, then the money had belonged to her. Maria purchased and paid
such properties with her money.
5. From the record there is no showing of deception or fraud nor of
concealment of intent of the parties as to the sale of the IP by the vendors in favor
of Maria.
6. The intention of spouses to make Maria the owner of the said parcels of
land was shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the DOS which
influenced the vendors to believe that Maria was indeed the vendee in their
agreement.
7. The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code became
effective on Aug 30, 1950. Hence, 1448 is not applicable. Moreover, there is no
showing that Maria bought the lands in question in trust for the petitioners.
8. It is a fact that while Maria was alive she possessed the property in question
as the owner thereof. Hence, it is error for petitioners to claim ownership over the
IP by acquisitive prescription under Article 41 of Civ Pro for their possession of the
said property became adverse and exclusive only in 1949 after Marias death.
From 1949 up to the date of filing in 1957 of the present action by the respondents
only eight years had elapsed.
9. On petitioners contention that oral donation of personal property requires
simultaneous delivery of the gift: the court said that delivery may be actual or
constructive. In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre
existing obli of the vendor, Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the
constructive delivery to Maria when the sps consented to the execution of the
DOS of IP in favor of Maria. The execution of said DOS constituted payment by
the vendor Punzalan of his outstanding obli due to spouses. There was a
constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses over
the property in question to Maria.
10. On the petitioners contention that the donor spouses are entitled to land in
question by virtue of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court: In case of the death of
the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his
legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from
either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or
their legit relatives who shall participate in the order established by the CC for
intestate estates.
Petitioners contend that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit
of this rule of reversion adoptive. However, the rule involved specifically provides
for the case of the judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction
that when the language of th
TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL
Teotico v. Del Val
Vda. De Balsalobra died on july 14, 1955, she left properties worth 600,000. She
left a will leaving properties to Dr. Teotico worth 20,000, the husband of the
deceaseds daughter. She left the usufruct of the Calvo Bldg. to the her daughter
and herein petitioner.
They filed a petition for the probate of the will.
Aba Del Val Chan, the adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera who is the sister of
the testatrix filed an opposition claiming the will to be executed: (1) Not in
accordance with the law; (2) with undue influence, improper pressure; (3) without
possession of her full mental faculties.
The court moved forward with the dismissal of the petition for the probate of the
will.
Issue
W/N a person who has no interest in the property may intervene
W/N the adopted child has an interest to the will
Held
18

No, the intervenor cannot derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by
adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to
the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as
expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the
adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
An interested party as defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, in this
case, as she has no right to actually Inherit, and that she is not a creditor of the
same, she clearly is not an appropriate intervenor as mentioned by Section 2 Rule
80 of the Rules of court.

BOLANOS VS. ZUNIGA
Bolanos v Zuniga 180997
Facts:
1. Roman Zuniga had property in Albay.
2. He had children from two marriages.
3. Respondents Roscef et al are from the second marriage
4. Flavia and Crescencia are daugheters from the first marriage.
5. Such lot under such tax declaration was declared for taxation purposes for
the first time on 14 December 1948 in the name of Flavia A. Zuiga, brothers and
sisters (Exhibits "A," "1"). Flavia A. Zuiga sold such 238-square-meter lot situated
in Salazar St., Poblacion, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to her sister Cresencia Zuiga-
Echague on 20 June 2001 (Exhibits "D," "2"). On the same day Cresencia Zuiga-
Echague sold the same lot in favor of the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos
(Exhibit "E")
6. When Roman died, Flavia without authority from his co-owners sold the lot
to Crescencia.
7. Crescencia sold the lot without authority as well to the herein petitioners.
8. Flavias defense: Denied the sale and that whatever was sold was only the
portion of Crescencia.
9. Crescencias defense: Cresencia denied the material allegations of the
complaint, and alleged that Flavia was the sole owner of Lot No. 1-P, thus making
her a buyer and seller in good faith and for value.
10. Cresencia also averred that Roscef, et al., as children of Roman by his
second wife, do not have any share in the subject property since Roman had
already orally partitioned it during his lifetime
11. Petitioners defense: For their part, petitioner-spouses alleged that the
subject property was owned in common by Flavia, Cresencia, and their full-blood
brothers and sisters only, and that, later on, Flavia acquired the entire lot. Flavia
then sold it to Cresencia, who, in turn, sold it to petitioner-spouses. They asserted
that they had acquired Lot No. 1-P in good faith and for value, without any
knowledge of the adverse claim of Roscef, et al. or that the property did not fully
belong to Cresencia.
12. RTC ruled that petitioner only acquired that portion belonging to their seller.
13. CA denied the appeal.
14. Hence the petitioners brought this case to the SC contending that the
property belonged to Romans first marriage only.
Issue: WON, the respondents as half blood brothers also owned the property in
question.
Held:
A - Yes.
L - Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents
and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages. x x x.
- Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own
right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares
A - Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-P rightfully belongs to the
11 children of Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4)
from his second marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no partition
among Romans children, the lot was owned by them in common. And inasmuch
as Flavia did not successfully repudiate her sale of her aliquot share to Cresencia,
the transfer stands as valid and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to
petitioner spouses was her own share and Flavias share in the property that she
acquired by virtue of the notarized deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1-P.
- In the absence of whatever evidence that he executed a will his
legitimate children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot in equal
share[s] as intestate heirs (Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1-P
has to be divided among them into eleven equal shares.
C - Therefore, the restitution of the property in excess of that portion by
petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.

F. THE IRON CURTAIN
DEL PRADO VS. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-20946 September 23, 1966
EUGENIO C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. AUREA S. SANTOS,
legal guardian of the minor JESUS SANTOS DEL PRADO, defendant and
appellee.
19

MAKALINTAL, J.:
Euguenio Del Prado filed for annulment of deed executed by Aurea Santos in CFI
RIZAL in favor of Jesus del prado. (his nephew-son of Aurea to his brother
Deogracias Demetria)
Plaintiff alleged that he was thus deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his
brother.
Defendant alleged that her son Jesus Santos del Prado, being an acknowledged
natural child of the deceased, was entitled to the property left by the latter.
Parties stipulate that:
1. Anastacio C. del Prado, died intestate in the City of Manila on August 11, 1958;
at the time of his death, Anastacio C. del Prado was single;
2. Plaintiff Eugenio C. del Prado is a legitimate brother of the late Anastacio C. del
Prado;
3. Defendant Aurea S. Santos was legally married to Deogracias Demetria in
1945, but has been in fact separated from him;
4. The deceased Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos
cohabited with each other without the benefit of matrimony; had a son Jesus
(acknowledged)
5. After the death of Anastacio C. del Prado his estate consisting, among others,
of a parcel of land situated at Caloocan, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 471848 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the name of Anastacio C. del
Prado with an assessed value of P750.00, was adjudicated to the minor Jesus del
Prado.
TC dismissed the complaint
Hence this petition
Issue: whether the plaintiff was deprived of his legitime
(NO. because descendant exclude the collateral relative)
The facts stipulated by him and by appellee are clear: "the deceased Anastacio C.
del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos cohabited with each other without the
benefit of matrimony; as a result of that cohabitation, the late Anastacio C. del
Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos had one son the minor Jesus S. del
Prado who was born on December 19, 1957, and whom Anastacio C. del Prado
admitted to be his son in the latter's birth certificate."
Since Anastacio C. del Prado died in 1958 the new Civil Code applies (Article
2263). Illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to successional rights
(Article 287). Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without
legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to
his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateral
relative.
Judgment affirmed

CACHO VS. UDAN
Cacho vs Udan L-19996 April 30, 1965
Facts:
Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a
purported will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as
her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate
said Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on 14 January 1960. On 15
February 1960 Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an
opposition to the probate. Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and
Urgent Motion for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan,
the appointed heir in the Will. Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his
opposition to the probate of this will. On 15 September 1960 oppositor Rustico G.
Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition, dated 13
February 1960, due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in
the will and said opposition was ordered withdrawn. After one witness, the Notary
Public who made and notarize the will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco
G. Udan died on June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines.
After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both
legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required
by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured
by fraud or undue influence.
Issue:
Whether or not, the brothers John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs
intestate of their legitimate sister, Silvina?
Held:
No. It is clear from Article 988 and 1003 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in
force at the time of the death of the testatrix that the brothers may not claim to be
heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, Silvina. The collateral relatives of one who
died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and
illegitimate children. Having Francisco Udan as the illegitimate son of the late
Silvina which fact is not denied by the oppositor brothers. He is so acknowledged
to be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix.
Hence, the death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not
improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only
transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are
20

legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, the legitimate relatives of the
mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the
Civil Code. Francisco Udan did survive his mother, and acquired the rights to the
succession from the moment of her death. While there is no document or pleading
in the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan. The
latter's own opposition to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible with
the intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary coheir, and to claim
the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato

CUARTICO VS. CUARTICO
Cuartico v Cuartico, No. 11190-R, November 16, 1955
FACTS:
Patricia Clavecilla, died single and ab intestato leaving 6 parcels of land
and houses as inheritance.
The petitioners-appellants , Tranquilino, Cipriano, Luis, Demetrio and
Pancrasio, all surnamed Cuartico, are children of Macario Cuartico and
Maria Clavecilla.
The oppositors-appellees, Feliciana, Gregorio and Paula, are the siblings
of appellees' father, Macario, whose parents are Eleno Cuartico and
Susana Germodo, both deceased. Macario then deceased was
represented by a daughter named Generosa.
Maria's mother is Sinforosa Romano , who after Maria's birth married
Benigno Martinez. Patricia's mother is Susana Germodo, who after
Patricia's birth married Eleno Cuartico from which wedlock were born the
appellees.
The appellants claimed to be the natural nephews of Patricia Clavecilla
averring that their mother Maria is a natural sister of Patricia. Both were
recognized as natural daughters of Juan Clavecilla on the strength of a
private instrument supposedly executed by Juan.
The appellees contended that Juan Clavecilla was legally married to
Bonifacia Cardente as evidenced by church records and from such
marriage was born Romana.
Appellees also maintained that Patricia and Maria were both adulterous
children and could not have been recognized by Juan being legally
married to Bonifacia.
Appellees are legitimate children of Eleno and Susana and are the
natural half-brothers and half-sisters of Patricia while and they sought to
inherit from the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether appellees as legitimate children of Eleno and Susana can inherit from
Patricia who was a natural child of Susana.
RULING:
NO.
Art. 943 of the Old Civil Code (now substantially reproduced as Art. 992)
states
"A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor such children or
relatives so inherit from the natural child."
The reason for this prohibition on intestate succession is the intervening
antagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural family
and those of the legitimate family.
The appellants cannot similarly inherit from Patricia by reason of their
alleged status as natural nephews of the latter.
Neither the appellants nor the appellees are entitled to succeed ab
intestato to the inheritance left by Patricia.
The State became the successor of Patricia.

CORPUS VS. CORPUS
Corpus vs. Corpus
FACTS:
1. RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed with 5
children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others.
2. When TOMAS CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and
had 4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedent
TEORORO YANGCO
3. TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939.
a. His will was dated August 29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of his
death, he had no forced heirs.
b. He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO), wife
of Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother Pablo
Corpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus
(JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944.
4. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November
26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will.
5. The said project was contested by the following, on the following grounds
(oppositors):
21

a. Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because the will does
not contain an institution of heir
b. JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE CASTO, through
ATTY. CRUZ: the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will as the
testator intended that the estate should be CONSERVED and not physically
parititoned.
6. Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved by the Probate court, in
essence holding that the testator did not really intend to a perpetual prohibition
against alienation when he stated that some of his estate be conserved
7. Oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and the
appellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the legatees agreed to
pay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO CORPUS, the heirs of ISABEL
CORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA CORPUS her son TOMAS CORPUS (same
name as that of their lola sa tuhods ex-husband).
a. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was entered.
b. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory
8. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt
acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as settlement in full
of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge
Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case.
9. The legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of
the Yangco estate which was approved by the probate court in 1949. 1945 project
of partition was pro-tanto modified.
10. TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITAs supposed share in
Yangcos intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangcos will sing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under A785, OCC
and that 1949 partition is invalid.
a. The decedents estate should have been distributed according to the rules on
intestacy.
11. TC: DISMISS: Res Judicata and laches. a. directly appealed to SC
12. Petitioners contention: trial court erred in holding
(1) TeodoroYangco was a natural child;
(2) TeodoroYangcos will had been duly legalized;
(3) Plaintiffs action is barred by res judicata and laches.
ISSUE: Whether JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS mom, was a legal heir of
TEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of action to recover a
supposed intestate share in the estate? No
HELD: No.
JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioners mother, was NOT A LEGAL HEIR of Yangco
because there is NO RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.
Article 992, NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or
relatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child.
o based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child
* Law does not recognize blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of
resentment.
TEODORO YANGCO, and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILD and NOT A LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO and
RAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE CORPUS (LOLO OF TOMAS CORPUS, FATHER
OF JUANITA CORPUS) was the presumed legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUS
and RAMONA ARGUELLES.
* Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause of action for the recovery
of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA CORPUS, as legal heir
in YANGCOs estate.
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
* The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent.
* The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother.
DECISION: WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

LEONARDO VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo claims to be the son of Sotero and
greatgrandson of Francisca Reyes. Reyes died intestate and was survived by
daughters Maria and Silvestra Cailles. Sotero's mother was Pascuala who
predeceased Francisca. To prove his filiation, Leonardo presented his alleged
birth certificate showing the name "Alfredo Leonardo," born on Sept. 13, 1935 to
Sotero and Socorro Timbol. He argued that being the son of Sotero he was
entitled to a right of representation of his father for the share in the estate of
Francisca. The trial court ruled in favor of Cresenciano; however, decision was
reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:
22

Whether or not Cresenciano may represent Sotero

HELD:
No. Even if it is true that Cresenciano is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still he
cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased
Francisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was
born outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September
13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is
more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.
(Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

MANUEL VS. FERRER
MANUEL vs. FERRER
Doctrine: When the law speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces as
legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as
well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and
sisters.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling, initiated this suit.
2. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one
Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years
passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally
crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04
November 1976.
3. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land,
was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels
of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer
Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in
his name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to
have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-
Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter".
4. On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuelexecuted in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed
of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half
(1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
5. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
6. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed
an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land (all
still in the name of Juan Manuel).
7. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed
one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold
to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
8. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
9. The trial court, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirs
abintestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-
interest to institute the suit.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct? Yes, except insofar as it has awarded
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses,
in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED.
HELD:
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate
estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the
provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code Respondents, in
turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession
abintestato in the collateral line between
legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand,
although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the
rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application,
however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in
intestacy is explained by a noted civilist.
His thesis:
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that
under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate
family from members of the legitimate family.
23

It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as
the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot
inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of"brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to
illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. xxxx. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers
the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees
in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.
Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were
legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; that the legitimate
collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a
natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter
cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of
her natural father;that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from
the
legitimate children and relatives of his father.
Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus
no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed in
relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.
Collate the order of preference and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article
978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
ORDER OF PREFERENCE
(a) Legitimate children and descendants
(b) Legitimate parents and ascendants
(c) Illegitimate children and descendants (in the absence of ICDs and LPAs, the
illegitimate parents)
(d) Surviving spouse
(e) Brothers and sisters /nephews and nieces
(f) Other collateral relatives (w/in the 5th civil degree)
(g) State
ORDER OF CONCURRENCE
(a) Legitimate children and descendants, illegitimate children and descendants,
and surviving spouse
(b) Legitimate parents and ascendants, illegitimate children and descendants, and
surviving spouse
(c) Illegitimate children and descendants and surviving spouse
(d) Surviving spouse and illegitimate spouse
(e) Brothers and sisters / nephews and nieces and surviving spouse
(f) Alone
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not
an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit
of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. We must
hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to
her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court.
Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" in the case, had neither the
standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint. The Court, however,
sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left
by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or
ascendant.
Facts:
1. Petitioners are the legitimate chikldrens of SPS Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling.
2. During his marriage, Antonio had an affair with one Ursula Bautista.
3. Juan Manuelson of Antonio and Ursula. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
4. Juan married Esperanza Gamba.
24

a. Executed DPN over a parcel of land in favour of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel.
5. Juan then bought two more parcels of land and registered in his name.
6. Juan and esperanza- no childtook in private respondent Modesta
Manuel- Baltazar and raised her as their own daughter.
7. June 3 1980, Juan Manuel Executed in favour of Estanislaoa Manuel a
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a
one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
8. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
9. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of
land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the
name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication
with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel
were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No.
184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
10. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed
one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold
to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
11. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's
intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse)
under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing
thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded
by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction
with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Held:
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab
intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and
illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such
succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of
the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference
and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces
Nieces and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
25

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not
an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit
of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.
13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued
to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not
being the real "parties-in-interest"
14
in the case, had neither the standing nor the
cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so
wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor.
15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private
respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Anselma Diaz v. IAC and Felisa Pamuti Jardin
Nature:
Petition for Review
Doctrine:
Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate family
Facts:
Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the
only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla;
Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and another child
who died during infancy;
Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo;
Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona;
Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976;
Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and six minor
natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with Felixberta.
1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor children file for
opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in
the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further taking part or
intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona
Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate
Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona
Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren(the
natural children of Pablo)
Ruling:
The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the succession of the
latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil Code
oArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestatofrom the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother;nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner fromthe illegitimate child.
Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.
Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other civilists:
O In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family.
O An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimatechildren and
relatives of his father and mother

DIAZ VS. IAC (1987)
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left
by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or
ascendant.
Facts:
26

1. Petitioners are the legitimate chikldrens of SPS Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling.
2. During his marriage, Antonio had an affair with one Ursula Bautista.
3. Juan Manuelson of Antonio and Ursula. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
4. Juan married Esperanza Gamba.
a. Executed DPN over a parcel of land in favour of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel.
5. Juan then bought two more parcels of land and registered in his name.
6. Juan and esperanza- no childtook in private respondent Modesta
Manuel- Baltazar and raised her as their own daughter.
7. June 3 1980, Juan Manuel Executed in favour of Estanislaoa Manuel a
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a
one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
8. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
9. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of
land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the
name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication
with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel
were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No.
184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
10. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed
one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold
to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
11. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's
intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse)
under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing
thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded
by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction
with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Held:
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in
the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it
has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference
and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces
Nieces and Surviving Spouse
27

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not
an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit
of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.
13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued
to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not
being the real "parties-in-interest"
14
in the case, had neither the standing nor the
cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so
wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor.
15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private
respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Anselma Diaz v. IAC and Felisa Pamuti Jardin
Nature:
Petition for Review
Doctrine:
Right of Representation is admitted only within the legitimate family
Facts:
Felisa is a niece of Simona who together with Felisas mother Juliana were the
only legitimate children of spouses Felipe and Petronilla;
Juliana married Simon and out of their union were born Felisa and another child
who died during infancy;
Simona is the widow of Pascual and mother of Pablo;
Pablo was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual and Simona;
Pascual died in 1970; Pablo in 1973 and Simona in 1976;
Pablo at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona and six minor
natural children: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta.
1976 Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa as the sole legitimate heir of Simona
Petitioners Anselma and Felixberta as guardians of their minor children file for
opposition and motion to exclude Felisa from further taking part or intervening in
the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona
1980 Judge Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa from further taking part or
intervening and declared her to be not an heir of Simona
Felisas motion for recon was denied, and she filed her appeal to theIntermediate
Appellate Court declaring her as the sole heir of Simona
Issue:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona, her niece Felisa or her grandchildren(the
natural children of Pablo)
Ruling:
The 6 minor children cannot represent their father Pablo in the succession of the
latter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the Civil Code
oArt 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestatofrom the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother;nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner fromthe illegitimate child.
Pablo is a legitimate child. However, his 6 minor children are illegitimate.
Art 992 provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.
JBL Reyes reflections on this which also finds full support from other civilists:
O In the Spanish Civil Code of 1989, the right of representation was admitted only
within the legitimate family.
O An illegitimate child cannot inherit ab intestate from the legitimatechildren and
relatives of his father and mother
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left
by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or
ascendant.
28

Facts:
1. Petitioners are the legitimate chikldrens of SPS Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling.
2. During his marriage, Antonio had an affair with one Ursula Bautista.
3. Juan Manuelson of Antonio and Ursula. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
4. Juan married Esperanza Gamba.
a. Executed DPN over a parcel of land in favour of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel.
5. Juan then bought two more parcels of land and registered in his name.
6. Juan and esperanza- no childtook in private respondent Modesta
Manuel- Baltazar and raised her as their own daughter.
7. June 3 1980, Juan Manuel Executed in favour of Estanislaoa Manuel a
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a
one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
8. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
9. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of
land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the
name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication
with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel
were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No.
184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
10. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed
one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold
to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
11. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's
intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse)
under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing
thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded
by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction
with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Held:
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in
the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it
has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference
and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
29

(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces
Nieces and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not
an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit
of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.
13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued
to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not
being the real "parties-in-interest"
14
in the case, had neither the standing nor the
cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so
wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor.
15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private
respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on
costs.
SO ORDERED.

DIAZ VS. IAC (1990)
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA
MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL,
BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left
by an illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or
ascendant.
Facts:
1. Petitioners are the legitimate chikldrens of SPS Antonio Manuel and Beatriz
Guiling.
2. During his marriage, Antonio had an affair with one Ursula Bautista.
3. Juan Manuelson of Antonio and Ursula. ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
4. Juan married Esperanza Gamba.
a. Executed DPN over a parcel of land in favour of Juan Manuel by
Laurenciana Manuel.
5. Juan then bought two more parcels of land and registered in his name.
6. Juan and esperanza- no childtook in private respondent Modesta
Manuel- Baltazar and raised her as their own daughter.
7. June 3 1980, Juan Manuel Executed in favour of Estanislaoa Manuel a
Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a
one-half (1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.
8. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04
February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.
9. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta
executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of
land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the
name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the document of adjudication
with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel
were canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No.
184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar.
10. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent
Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed
one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold
to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.
These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
11. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's
intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse)
under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing
thusly:
30

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded
by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half.
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction
with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis supplied)
Held:
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the
rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate
relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in
the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it
has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference
and concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and
Illegitimate Parents
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces
Nieces and Surviving Spouse
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone
(within the fifth civil degree)
(g) State (g) Alone
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not
an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit
of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.
13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued
to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of
Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not
being the real "parties-in-interest"
14
in the case, had neither the standing nor the
cause of action to initiate the complaint.
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so
wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor.
15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private
respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special pronouncement on
costs.
SO ORDERED.

VDA. DE CRISOLOGO VS. CA
G.R. No. L-13876 February 28, 1962
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs. DR. MANUEL SINGSON, defendant-appellant.
Sps Consolacion and Francisco filed for partition against Manuel Singson covering
a parcel of lot in Ilocos sur.
Petitioner alleged that They are co-owners by virtue of last will of Dna Leona
Singson which was approved by RTC but Singson failed to accede.
31

Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of,
and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in question, and that,
therefore, she was not entitled to demand partition thereof.
RTC held in favor of co-ownership.
From the above judgment, defendant Singson appealed.
It is admitted that Da. Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was
the owner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951
she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding
No. 453 of the lower court whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in
G.R. No. 3605-R.
At the time of the execution of the will, her nearest living relatives were her
brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and
Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.
Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .
Xxx_Spanish_xxx
Issue: Whether such clause is a valid substitution clause.
Held: YES
Ruling:
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for
a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner:
that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino whether this occurs before or
after that of the testatrix the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se
dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo,
Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of
Consolacion Florentino.
If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result
would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the
owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution
fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights
over the same half.
In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the
latter.
As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property
bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for
him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude
ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix, passed to and was
acquired by another person, and the person cannot be other than the
fideicomisario (6 Manresa p. 145).
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an obligation
be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit to another the
whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the
happening of a particular event.
For this reason, Art. 785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary
substitution shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera
expresa") either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir the
absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver the inheritance to a
substitute or second heir.
A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the
substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that
appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property
bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the
testatrix. As already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death
whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix her share shall belong
to the brothers of the testatrix.
In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the
deceased Da. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the
substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective
or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after
that of the testatrix.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs.
SUNTAY III VS. CONJUANGCO-SUNTAY

[G.R. No. 183053 : June 15, 2010]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, PETITIONER, VS. ISABEL COJUANGCO-
SUNTAY, RESPONDENT.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J.
Doctrine: The law [of intestacy] is founded... on the presumed will of
the deceased... Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways.
Facts:
1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to
Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate.
~ In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both
Cristina and Federico.
32

~ At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III)
and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
2. Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II
3. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter,
Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo
(Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
4. Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with
their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and
paternal grandparents.
5. Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation
rights over his grandchildren. It was altogether stopped because of a manifestation
filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her
grandparents.
6. After her spouses death, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on
September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita
7. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor. Federico filed his opposition. Being the surviving
spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator;
that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be
accorded legal preference in the administration
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico
filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III,
as administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf. Subsequently, the trial
court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave
to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
9. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
10. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein
petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate.What
matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in the light of
such unfortunate and bitter estrangement. The Court honestly believes that to
appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes of the decedent who raised
[Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it
would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who nominated [Emilio
III] for appointment as administrator.
11. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to
Emilio III. In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an
illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing his deceased
father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother, the decedent. That he cannot
be appointed for the ff reasons:
i. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition,
i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the estate
ii. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate
offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is
preferred, being the "next of kin" referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court
iii. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 of the Civil Code
bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother.
ISSUE :
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER
WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY,
WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO
BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
DECEDENT'S ESTATE
The pivotal issue:
Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent's estate.
Ruling:
The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,
is quite the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the
other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in
the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out
the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates, a situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative
heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
33

Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of
respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims
of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and
Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in
only one direction,i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the
Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives
of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate
the contrary - Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually
treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy,
educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by
decedent's husband, the original oppositor to respondent's petition for letters of
administration.
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of
intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not
distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her
husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of
this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal
presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and
antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both
petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon
payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination
and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal
interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Perez,
*
JJ., concur.
VERDAD VS. CA
Verdad vs CA
FACTS:
Respondent Socorro Vda. De Rosales, seeks to exercise her right of
redemption over the subject property sold to Verdad.
Socorro is the daughter in law of Macaria, the original owner of the property.
Upon the death of Macaria intestate, she was survived by all her children,
including David Rosales, the husband of Socorro.
o Later, David Rosales also died intestate without issue. David was survived by
his wife, Socorro, the respondent.
Later the heirs of Macaria from the first marriage, sold the subject property
to Verdad.
Soccorro discovered the sale and sought intervention for the redemption.
This was rejected by Verdad.
Socorro initiated a suit.
ISSUE: Whether Socorro can exercise her right of redemption over the subject
property, given the fact that she was not an heir of Macaria, the original owner?
RULING:
YES! Socorro is the daughter in law of Macaria. Although she is not an intestate
heir of Macaria, her right to redemption is stemmed from being a Legal Heir of her
husband David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in Macarias Estate.
When Macaria died, her estate passed on to her children, hence David became a
co-owner of the subject property. So when David died without an issue, his own
estate, which included his undivided share in the subject property inherited from
MAcaria, passed on to his widow Socorro. Hence, they all became co-owners. So
may right of redemption nga si Madame Socorro.

SANTILLON VS. MIRANDA
Santillon v Miranda

FACTS:
Pedro Santillon died without testament leaving his wife, Perfecta Miranda and
one son, Claro. Four years after Pedros death, Claro filed a petition for letters of
administration which was opposed by his mother and spouses Benito Miranda
and Rosario Corrales. The court appointed commissioners to draft a project of
partition and distribution of all properties of Pedro. Claro then filed a motion to
declare share of heirs and to resolve conflicting claims of the parties invoking Art.
892 of the New Civil Code insisting that after deducting from the conjugal
properties (conjugal share of Perfecta), the remaining must be divided as
follows: for her and for him. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed besides her
34

conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the NCC to another of the
remaining half. After due notice and hearing, the court held that Perfecta is
entitled to share and the remaining share for Claro after deducting the share
of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
The manner of division of share of the estate of an intestate decedent when the
only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child.
RULING:
Intestate proceedings in the New Civil Codes chapter on legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996.
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance
that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code form which Art. 996 was
taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where
the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the
second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art.
996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislators
desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

BICOMONG VS. ALMANZA
BICOMONG V ALMANZA

FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8 1859
Their 3 children were : Perpetua, Igmedia, Ignacio
Sisemanda Barcenas died ahead of Simeon
Simeon remarried Silvestra, theor children were Felipa and Maura
Simeon died before Silvestra
Ignacio died survived by Plaintiff Francisca as only heir
Igmedia died survived by Dionisio, Maria and Petra
Perpatua died survived by heirs Gaudencio, Felicidad and Gervacio
ON THE CHILDREN OF 2
ND
MARRIAGE:
v Maura died with no husband
Subject matter of case : of undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the ff 5
parcels of land which she inherited from her mother
Plaintiffs: Bicomongs, children of Perpetua, Tolentinos, children of Imelda
and Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic
Upon death of Maura, Cristela became owner and administrator of
properties
Cristela refused on the ground that payment for burial and etc has to be
paid yet
Cristela died without division of properties being effected
RTC: in favor of plaintiffs : divided the land into 10/24
CA: affirmed ruling of RTC

ISSUE: WON surviving nephews and nieces either full or half blood shall inherit

RULING:

In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died
intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had died
ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the
daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two
(2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New
Civil Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo v. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382,
August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone
do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether
the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference
as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole
niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and
nieces of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in
Art. 1008, N.C.C., in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which
provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share double that of the
nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction between whole and half blood
35

relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, Et. Al. v.
Melania Baldovino, Et Al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065
(unreported) and in Alviar v. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
610).chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half
blood citing Art. 1004, N.C.C., is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an
erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as
indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she
predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and
jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ.,
concur.

BACAYO VS. BORROMEO
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS,
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant v. GAUDENCIA
FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO
FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, opposiors-appellees

Facts:

1. Melodia Ferraris a resident of Cebu until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros
2. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944
3. Until the filing of petition for summary settlement of her estate in 1960,
her whereabouts are still unknown.
4. Because of this, she was declared presumptively dead (after 10 years
having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive) in order to open her
succession and distributing her estate among her heirs
5. Melodia left properties in Cebu (i.e. 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt
valued at 6k)
6. Melodia left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant or spouse but was
survived only by collateral relatives (Filomena aunt and half sister of Melodias
father, and her nieces and nephew children of Melodias only brother of full
blood Arturo)
7. Filomena and the nephews & nieces of Melodia claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of the latter

Issue: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or
she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a
brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the
children of the decedents brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded
by the latter?

Held: Filomena is of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositor-
appellees

1. SC held that Filomena is as far distant as the nephews from the
decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of
relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and then descending to the heir. Filomena is also right in her contention that
nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless
concurring with bros or sisters of the deceased
2. The trial court is correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (i.e. aunts, uncles, first
cousins) from the succession.
3. Under 1009, the absence of bros, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins) being called to
the succession.
4. The present Civil Code merely placed the spouse on a par with the
nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering
the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals
5. Under the laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and
are willing and qualified to succeed.

G. PARTIAL INTESTACY
XXI. PROVISIONS COMMON TO TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
A. RIGHT OF ACCRETION
1. DEFINITION
2. ELEMENTS OF ACCRETION
3. HOW ACCRETION OPERATES