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On the Audience of Aristotles Ethics

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Walter J. Thompson
University of Notre Dame

Surveying the field of Aristotelian studies, a recent commentator has remarked:

Probably the greatest weakness in virtually all current work on Aristotles
practical writings is a lack of attention to the fundamental issue of interpretation.
That the very real problems relating to the composition and transmission of the
Aristotelian corpus have long overshadowed other hermeneutic questions is
certainly not surprising, but the effect has been an unjustifiable neglect of what is
arguably a more basic matterthe question of the literary character and purpose
of Aristotles extant writings.
2


I propose in this essay to remedy the neglect of this fundametal issue of interpretation, by
exploring the peculiar character and purpose of Aristotles ethical and political writings.

I.

At several points early in the Nicomachean Ethics,
3
Aristotle pauses to reflect on the
distinctive character of the inquiry at hand. Unlike those recorded in his treatises on natural
philosophy, on first philosophy, on biology and psychology, the inquiry undertaken in his ethical
and political writings is said to be practical. Indeed, Aristotle identifies his inquiry as something
political, as a sort of political science ( NE I.2 1094b2). By this he intends to
differentiate it from the other sciences
4
in at least two ways: first, according to its subject matter;
and second, according to its end. Political science, Aristotle says, concerns matters of action; its
subject matter is things-to-be-done ( ). Such things, he continues, have nothing fixed
about them, they are naturally both variable and contingentindeed, so much so that they seem

1
Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, NY, September
1994.
2
Carnes Lord, Introduction, in Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science, ed. Carnes Lord and
David K. OConnor (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 45.

3
I will adopt the following abbreviations of Aristotles works: Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Politics (Pol), Rhetoric
(Rhet), Topics (Top), Posterior Analytics (PA). References to these will hereafter be intertextual, citing the standard
Bekker pages. All translations will be my own, from the Oxford Classical Text editions of NE, Pol, and Rhet and the
Loeb Classical Library editions of Top and PA.

4
The other sciences Aristotle identifies at NE VI.1 as those that belong to that element in the reason-having part of
the soul by which we study () the sorts of beings whose principles () cannot be otherwise. These
are then differentiated from those that belong to the element by which [we study the sorts of beings whose
principles] can be otherwise (NE VI.1 1139a3-17). It is characteristic of Aristotles mode of inquiry that he begins
not from this technical psychological differentiation but from the first appearances of the distinctive character of
practical things. It is equally characteristic of his approach, however, that he does introduce this more precise
differentiation at that point in his argument where it becomes pedagogically appropriate.



2
or are held to be by convention alone and not by nature (NE I.3 1094b14-16). Any account of
practicable things, therefore, can attain only such precision as the subject matter itself allows:
We must be content, Aristotle says, when speaking about such things and from such things to
present the truth roughly and in outline, and when speaking about things that are for the most
part and from such things, to make conclusions of this sort as well (NE I.3 1094b19-22).
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Matters of action, however, are a peculiar sort of subject matter, for an action is not a
thing-to-be-studied alone, but a thing-to-be-done. Because of this difference in subject matter,
political science must also differ from the other sciences in the end for the sake of which it is
pursued. Aristotle remarks, Since the present matters are not for the sake of study as the others
arefor we are inquiring not in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become good,
since otherwise there would be no benefit in itit is necessary to investigate the things which
concern actions, and how these must be done (NE II.2 1103b26-31). Note that according to
Aristotle political science investigates not only the things which concern action, but alsoand
more importantlyhow these must be done. Because its subject matter is practicable things, and
these are things-to-be-done, the end of political science is practical, it is doing them. As things-
to-be-done, however, actions are radically particular. What is done is always some particular
action done by some particular agent in some particular context. And in each case, Aristotle says,
those who act must always look toward what is opportune (NE II.2 1104a9-10). One can
therefore give no account that can reduce acting to an art or a science. Political science can yield
no rules determinative of action in particular cases. There would seem to be no benefit from a
theoretical consideration of action, then, because of the contingency and particularity of things-
to-be-done. Because its subject matter displays neither the regularity nor the generality which
admits of scientific treatment, political science is not a fertile field for knowledge of a theoretical
sort.
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5
It should be noted that it is not action itself, but speech about matters of action that must in the nature of things
be imprecise. Because possible situations of action are in principle limitless, a precise determination of what is to be
done must rest in the particular case. It is, then, Aristotles concern to safeguard the precision of action that leads
him to issue his caveat concerning the imprecision of general accounts of action. Cf. Aristide Tessitore, Aristotles
Ambiguous Account of the Best Life, Polity 25 (1992): 203.

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Carnes Lord has argued that Aristotelian political science is a practical science. . . not from necessity but from
choice. He reasons as follows: While it is true that Aristotle distinguishes the human things from the natural
things, he does not pretend that this distinction is itself theoretically precise. Aristotle cannot wholly separate the
study of man from the study of nature because he regards man as a part of nature. If man is not a being whose
characteristics are wholly determined by his instincts or physical nature, neither is he simply a conventional being.
Man himself possesses a `nature that forms the permanent ground and sets limits to the fluctuating uncertainties of
human affairs. In fact, then, the teaching elaborated in the Politics and in Aristotles ethical writings must
presuppose a certain kind of theoretical knowledge. Aristotelian political science appears to renounce the search for
the `causes of moral and political phenomena and to avoid depending directly on a theoretical psychology or
anthropology. Yet the possibility of a theoretical account of these causes is never denied, and occasionally appears
to be taken for granted. Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1982), 31-32. But Lord here makes an illicit transition from human nature, which is indeed
susceptible of theoretical treatment, to human action, which is not. The human things in Lords sense are the
subject matter not of political science, but of psychology and biology, treatments of which are found in the
Aristotelian corpus. Aristotle nowhere suggests, however, that from such theoretical treatments of the human
things one can deduce a theoretical science of action. To do so would be to deny the practicality of action. For the
reasons mentioned above, the distinctive subject matter of political science resists theoretical treatment. For an
account which follows Lord, see Tessitore, Aristotles Ambiguous Account, 207; to the contrary, see Stephen G.
Salkever, Finding the Mean: Theory and Practice in Aristotelian Political Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton


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But if action cannot be reduced to a science, what is the use of studying political science?
At this point in his argument Aristotle suggests that its utility lies not in direct application to
action but in giving reflective shape and direction to a life as a whole (NE I.2 1094a22-24). If
political science cannot yield decision-rules determinative of action in particular cases, still it can
articulate some general account of the human good, an account in reference to which one can
discriminate the worth of those goods or activities at stake in any particular case. Aristotle seems
to envision here a complex dialectic between a general account of the human good or human
happiness and particular situational judgments of what is to be done in some here and now.
While the former cannot determine the latter, still it can function as a critical tool by which to
identify what is at issue in any particular thing-to-be-done. Conversely, what is learned in acting
in particular situations about the worth of various activities and goods shapes ones general
account of the human good, of the things worthy of pursuit, and thus gives form and direction to
ones life as a whole.
7

Because it provides a general account of the human good, but actions are always ultimate
particulars, the findings of political science cannot simply be enacted. What is to be done in any
particular situation can only be determined by a particular practical judgment of what is fitting or
appropriate to the circumstances in which one acts. The one who acts, Aristotle says, must
always look to what is opportune.
8
In this sense, doing-well is a matter of responding
appropriately to the demands of the particular situation in which one must act. But ones
judgment of what is appropriate will be guided by ones understanding of the worth of the goods
at stake in any particular action. One will discriminate what is appropriate in particular actions
by reference to some account, however explicit, of the things worthy of pursuit in general. To put
this point another way, while Aristotle takes the end of life as a whole to be happiness, he takes
the end of the one who acts to be doing-well (see NE I.8 1098b20-22, VI.2 1139b2-4, VI.5
1140b8). Doing-well () is happiness () concretized, rendered practical. To do
well in the particular situation in which one must act is to seize that possibility for happiness
which a particular situation in fact offers. The determination of action in particular cases rests not
with political science, but with the judgment of practical wisdom. Still, if political science is at a
remove from particular actions, its influence is felt in informing practical wisdoms particular
situational judgment of appropriateness. Aristotle explains this difference by saying that while
political science and practical wisdom are the same disposition, their being is not the same (NE
VI.8 1141b23-24). This difference in being would seem to arise from a difference in perspective.
While both are concerned with action, practical wisdom looks toward what must be done here
and now, while political science looks toward human happiness or the human good and the form
of ones life as a whole.
From the distinctive character of its subject matter and end follows a distinctive mode of
inquiry appropriate to political science. In general, Aristotle argues, one learns by moving from
what is known to what is as yet unknown (see PA 71a1-3). But what is known is itself dual: there

University Press, 1990), 100101.

7
For an elaboration of this dialectic, see Salkever, Finding the Mean, 99102; and Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of
Character: Aristotles Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 1011.

8
Aristotles treatment in NE I is largely confined to this remark on the aim of the one who acts, in contrast to the
aim of the one who studies political science. A fuller account is given in the treatment of practical wisdom in NE
VI.8-11 from which I have found it necessary to draw in what follows.



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is the known to or for us () and the known simply (). For us, Aristotle remarks, we
must begin from what is known to us (NE I.4 1095b2-4). Political science, then, must proceed
from what is first for uswhat is most familiar or apparent to usto what is first simply or
first by naturewhich though less apparent to us is more true in itself. The subject matter of
political science, we have said, is things-to-be-done. But in speaking in this way we have already
abstracted from what is first for us about things-to-be-done. Speaking more precisely, Aristotle
will say that [t]he noble and the just things ( ) are those about which
political science inquires (NE I.3 1094b14-15). What is first for us concerning things-to-be-
done is their character as either noble and just or their opposites. Things-to-be-done appear to us
not as a neutral subject matter, but as deeds either well-done and worthy of praise or badly-done
and worthy of blame. This character of things-to-be-done as either praiseworthy or blameworthy
is revealed to us in speech, in the opinions we hold and express about them. In political science,
then, what is first for us are the things said ( ) about the noble and the just things.
9

Political science must begin here, with the first appearances of the noble and just things
as expressed in our opinions about them. It cannot rest here, however, because the common
opinions themselves conflictboth in themselves and with one another. Each, however, is
forwarded not only as an opinion, but as true. Every opinion claims to be not mere opinion but
knowledge. Internal to the practice of our holding and giving opinions, then, is the desire to hold
true opinions and the demand for a true account. Because we must begin with what is first for us,
but on reflection what is first for us does not satisfy, the mode of inquiry proper to political
science is dialectic. Dialectic is the engagement in speech of our common opinions ( ),
with a view to moving from opinion to knowledge (see Top 101a25-28, 104b1-15). Beginning
with what is first for us, dialectic attempts, through the critical clarification of opinion, to ascend
to what is first simply.
Dialectic is, then, at once both political and philosophic.
10
In engaging the things said,
the dialectician joins in the distinctive activity of citizens: articulating and arguing for rival
conceptions of the noble and just things. Unlike the citizen, howeverthough in fidelity to his
ultimate intentionthe dialectician refuses to play the partisan, he does not rest content with
what is first for us, but presses his inquiry toward what is first simply. While he remains faithful
to the political beginnings of his subject matter, he pushes his investigation to its philosophic
extreme.
Our opinions about the noble and the just things are the phenomena of which political
science gives account. But these are phenomena in the literal sense: they are appearances. And
appearances appear to, are relative to, persons of distinct character. What appears is what is
perceived by the character looking; and what is perceived is in part a function of that lookers
characterof his desires, experience, and expertise (see NE 1113a23-1113b2, 1114a31-1114b2;
Top 141b37-38; Rhet 1363b1-3). Dialectic is the mode of inquiry proper to political science
because the subject matter of political science is known to us through perception.

9
See Leo Strauss, What is Political Philosophy?: And Other Studies (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959; reprint,
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 12; Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study
of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952),
2122; and Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 243244.

10
See again, Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, 10; and Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness, 250.



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Unlike that of the simple senses, however, such perception is neither immediate nor simple. It
always entails the subsumption of some particular thing under some guiding conception of its
kind. The starting point of action, Aristotle says, is the perception that a possible thing-to-be-
done is either noble and just, and therefore to be done, or base and unjust, and therefore to be
avoided (NE 1095b4-8, 1143a35-1143b5). Because the practically decisive character of things-
to-be-done as either noble and just or their opposites is a matter for perception, the starting points
of action cannot be demonstrated.
11
One cannot conclude to a perception. At best, one can foster
the conditions for fuller perception through a critical unmasking of false or partial perceptions. In
engaging those opinions which express our common perceptions of the noble and just things,
dialectic works toward liberating us from the partiality of our perspectives. In a way analogous to
that in the other sciences, it leads us toward those starting points which are a matter not for
demonstration but for perception. In the case of things-to-be-done, as we have said, these starting
points lie in the perception of possible things-to-be-done as either noble and just or their
opposites. Insofar as dialectic questions our guiding conceptions of the noble and just, it can
transform the way in which things-to-be-done appear.
In engaging those opinions that express the appearances of the noble and the just things,
dialectic thereby engages those perspectives within which the appearances appear. In involving a
relation to opinion, Aristotle says, dialectic involves a relation to an audience (Top 155b7-16).
12

It is, then, inherently dialogical: it is the engagement in speech of some set of interlocutors. It is
so, moreover, not only on account of its subject matter, but equally on account of its end.
13

Because our opinions concerning the noble and just things are the reasons by which we account
for what we do, the critical engagement of those opinions must bear on the way in which we act.
If political science is pursued for the sake not of knowledge alone but of action, it must proceed
with a view to engaging and transforming the opinions of its audience so as to influence action.
14

In a word, it must proceed practically and pedagogically. Insofar as its mode of inquiry is
dialectical, Aristotles political science can be said to be have a pedagogical structure. In
interpreting it, then, we must ourselves read dialectically, interpreting particular passages in light
of their broader dialectical context and pedagogical intent.

II.

Contemporary commentators, however, are divided on precisely this point. There is

11
If this is so, then political science must be dialectical by necessity and not only by choice. If the starting points of
action are known to us only through perception, there can be no demonstration of moral phenomena, but only the
dialectical engagement of the appearances. Cf. Lord, Education and Culture, 31-32.

12
The philosopher does not consider the bearing of his argument on an audience. The dialecticians goal, however,
is not only truth, but persuasion. He intends not only to give a true account, but to secure his interlocutors assent to
it. See Top 155b716.

13
Because he denies that the peculiar subject matter of political science requires dialectical treatment, Lord is
compelled to reduce dialectic to a means of persuasion alone. See Lord, Education and Culture, 32.

14
See Paul A. Vander Waerdt, The Plan and Intention of Aristotles Ethical and Political Writings. Illinois
Classical Studies 16 (Spring/Fall 1991): 234; and Lord, Aristotle, in History of Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., ed.
Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 120.



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disagreement over the interpretive conclusions to be drawn from the distinctive character of
Aristotles political science. One broad class of commentators, typically those trained in the
tradition of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, are unwilling to allow the dialectical character
of the ethical and political writings to influence their own mode of interpretation. They continue
to treat Aristotles ethical and political writings as treatises of a more or less scientific sort.
They assume, first, that it is the intention of these writings to set forth a straightforward,
systematic, and comprehensive account of a determinate subject matter;
15
second, that that
subject matter is composed of a series of interrelated problems or topics;
16
and third, that a
satisfactory account of that subject matter is one that, in principle, is available to all, that is
universal in the sense that it is capable of securing universal assent.
17
Such presuppositions lead
these commentators to deny the integrity of Aristotles ethical and political writings.
18
The goal
of the exegete is not to render a given text intelligible as a whole, but to be as systematic as
possibleand if necessary, more so than Aristotle himselfin the exposition of a given topic.
Such an approach encourages proof-texting in the construction of systematic accounts, and a
focus on the explicit arguments of the texts to the neglect of their broader dialectical context. But
if Aristotles political science is, by virtue of its distinctive subject matter, end, and mode of
inquiry, not a theoretical but a practical science, such foreign hermeneutic premises can only
obscure Aristotles own manner of treatment. In ignoring its dialectical character, these
interpreters risk missing significant aspects of Aristotles teaching. They wish to plumb the
depths of Aristotelian political science, but are unwilling to begin at the surface.
A second class of commentators does recognize the practical character of Aristotles
political science. For these, a proper interpretation must take into account Aristotles dialectical
method and its practical intent. But here too there is disagreement on the precise implications of
adopting the dialectical method. Some maintain that in proceeding dialectically Aristotle
commits himself not only to beginning with but to remaining within the horizon of conventional
political opinion. The dialectical method, they argue, is inherently conservative. In adopting it,
Aristotle commits himself to acceptingat least in broad outlinethe common opinions of his
audience. While he may refine these opinions, he never fundamentally challenges or transcends
them. Aristotles political science, then, never ascends beyond opinion to knowledge. It remains

15
See W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotles Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 14; and John M.
Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975; reprint, Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1986), xixii.

16
A tell-tale sign of this assumption is the practice of expositing Aristotles theory of this or that moral
phenomenon. See n. 15 above.

17
See T. H. Irwin, The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotles Ethics, in Essays on Aristotles
Ethics, ed. Amlie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 36, 5051. For
complementary characterizations of the interpretive presuppositions of such commentators, see Lord,
Introduction, in Essays on the Foundations of Aristotelian Political Science, 2-5; and Tessitore, Aristotles
Ambiguous Account, 201.

18
Even Martha Nussbaum, who emphatically underlines the dialectical character of Aristotles ethics, denies the
integrity of his texts. In practice, then, she rarely interprets the texts as dialectical. See Nussbaum, Fragility of
Goodness, 237.



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rooted in the conventional opinions from which it begins. And it does so, moreover, because
Aristotle himself shares these opinions, because he himself is a member of the audience he
addresses.
19

But that Aristotle repeats the presuppositions of his contemporaries is a conclusion to be
shown; it cannot be a premise. Only a careful and complete interpretation of his own texts (and
those of his contemporaries) can disclose the extent of his conventionality. We have no reason to
suppose that Aristotle is more likely to reproduce than to challenge the prejudices of his culture.
Indeed, there can be no a priori reason to suppose either prior to interpretation. We cannot say in
advance how far Aristotle can succeed in moving beyond the common opinions that are his
starting point, we can only follow him in the attempt.
20
We will know where we arrive only
when we get there.
A final group of scholars, while they agree that the dialectical method is quasi-
conventional,
21
deny that Aristotle himself shares the opinions that he engages or is himself a
member of the audience he addresses. Rather, his mode of inquiry is a consequence of Aristotle
the philosophers engaging a determinate non-philosophic audience, and with practical intent.
The audience here is the class of gentlemen, and the intent, on the one hand, to foster moral or
political virtue, and on the other, to earn the respect of gentlemen for the philosophic
enterprise.
22
The gentlemen on this account are the well-bred men of leisure, those trained in the
habits of moral virtue, who devote themselves to the life in which such virtue is at home, the
political life. If Aristotle is to engage this audience, the argument goes, he must adopt that
audiences perspective, the perspective of moral and political men. Such men take for granted
that moral or political virtue is choiceworthy for its own sake. So, then, must Aristotle.
Because his political science is addressed to gentlemen and not to philosophers, it must forego
radical or philosophic questioning of the basis of gentlemanly virtue. The primary horizon of
Aristotles political science, then, is the gentlemans horizonthe horizon of politics or practice
or moral virtue. Aristotles horizon, says one interpreter, is common sense or, more
precisely, the common sense of the educated gentleman; his principal task is to articulate or
clarify what is within that horizon.
23
Still, if Aristotle refrains from radically challenging the

19
See A. W. H. Adkins, The Connection Between Aristotles Ethics and Politics. Political Theory 12 (February
1984): 29-49; R. G. Mulgan, Aristotles Political Theory. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 4-11; and Peter
Simpson, Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle. Review of Metaphysics 45 (March 1992): 508-10.

20
Martha Nussbaum is exceptional in the attention she pays to the dialectical character of Aristotles political
science. Still, her polemical intentionto put in question the philosophic quest for foundations external to human
speech and practiceleads her to underestimate the distance Aristotles dialectic can traverse from its starting points
in what is first for us. It remains unclear whether this underestimation is merely rhetorical. See Nussbaum,
Fragility of Goodness, 24044; cf. 258 and n. 38. For a corrective, see Larry Arnhart, The Rationality of Political
Speech: An Interpretation of Aristotles Rhetoric, Interpretation 9 (1981): 151152.

21
Lord, Aristotle, 119-20.

22
Lord, Education and Culture, 31-32; Lord, Aristotle, 123; Tessitore, Aristotles Ambiguous Account, 204,
21314; and Tessitore, Making the City Safe for Philosophy: Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10. American Political
Science Review 84 (December 1990): 1260 and n. 2.

23
Lord, Education and Culture, 32. The ultimate sources of this view would seem to be Jaffa, Thomism and
Aristotelianism, 14044; and Leo Strauss, The City and Man. (University Press of Virginia, 1964; reprint Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 25-26.


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gentlemens perspective from within, he does finallyif only brieflytranscend it. Aristotles
political science ascends from the perspective of ordinary political or practical men to a
perspective informed by philosophy, which is presented. . . as a pursuit decisively superior to the
pursuits of the practical life.
24
Even this teaching, however, is presented in a manner intended to
be intelligible to non-philosophic gentlemen, and with a prudential care that avoids undermining
the fragile but necessary supports for gentlemanly virtue.
25
On this account, then, the dramatic
structure of Aristotles political science consists in the ascent from the political or practical or
moral horizon to the philosophic horizon. These horizons, furthermore, are understood to be
discontinuous: in ascending to the philosophic horizon, Aristotle leaves behind the political or
practical or moral. Philosophy transcends or supercedes morality; it is, in some sense, beyond
good and evil.
26

I would like to offer here an alternative interpretation of the dramatic structure of
Aristotles political science. I will distinguish two sorts of audience for Aristotles teaching: an
audience of interlocutors in dialectical engagement with which Aristotle develops his teaching
and an audience of auditors to which that teaching is addressed. The last-mentioned group of
interpreters draw no such distinction, collapsing auditors into interlocutors. If his political
science is to benefit practice, they argue, it must be addressed primarily to to those who devote
themselves to the practical or political life and its virtuesnamely, the gentlemen. These
interpreters, then, collapse the horizon of politics into the practical or moral horizon simply.
27

Aristotle, I will argue, does notor does not simply. He does not because the conception of
politics that is first for us is not one in which politics is for the sake of or in the service of
moral or practical virtue. First for us, rather, is a conception of politics as a means to and an
arena for the pursuit of honor. Because he begins with what is first for us, Aristotle begins from
that conception of politics that is held by those who typically devote themselves to political life,
by those who consider themselves political men. It is the mark of such men, Aristotle tells us, to
reduce the realm of practice into that of politics narrowly conceived. For the political men, the
only life worthy of a man is that devoted to tending the affairs of the polis. Any life not so
devoted appears to them impracticalindeed non-practicalbecause it neglects the things they
find truly worthy of pursuit (Pol VII.2 1324b3233).
28
Aristotles primary interlocutors, then, are
not gentlemen if we take that termas Aristotle himself seems to
29
to connote men of moral


24
Lord, Aristotle, 123.

25
See Tessitore, Making the City Safe for Philosophy, 1256-7, 1260.

26
Jaffa equivocates on this point. See Thomism and Aristoteliansim, 14546.

27
I have argued elsewhere that this interpretation rests on a mistinterpretation of Aristotles distinction between
theory and practice. These commentators fail to see that, on Aristotles account, the horizon of practice is
comprehensive: it encompasses all human pursuitsincluding the pursuit of theory. See Walter J. Thompson,
Aristotle: Philosophy and Politics, Theory and Practice, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical
Association 68 (1994), forthcoming.

28
See again, Thompson, Aristotle: Philosophy and Politics, Theory and Practice.

29
Consider NE IV.3 1123b26-1124a4: The great-souled, since he merits the greatest things, would be best, for the
better always merit the better things, and the best [merits] the greatest. Thus the truly great-souled person must be


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or practical excellence. Rather, his interlocutors are the class of political men whose conception
of politics, because politically preponderant, is first for us. Aristotles political science begins as
the dialectical engagement of the perspective of the political men. In equating this perspective
with the practical or moral perspective simply, our final group of commentators grant too
much to the political men, uncritically accepting their own self-interpretation. They adopt the
political mens, and not Aristotles own perspective. Far from being first for us, the horizon of
moral or practical excellence is that toward which Aristotles dialectic must work.
If these are Aristotles primary interlocutors, who then are his auditors? At NE I.3-4,
Aristotle remarks that one must be both experienced in matters of action and finely habituated to
be an adequate student of political science (NE 1095a2-6, 1095b4-8).
30
This would seem to
imply that Aristotles auditors must be precisely those mature men of moral or political virtue
whom the last-mentioned commentators call gentlemen. Indeed, these are the passages typically
cited in defense of that interpretation. On reflection, however, the import of these passages is far
from clear. The young, Aristotle says, are no proper hearers of political science, for they are
without experience of the actions in accordance with life ( ), and the
arguments [of political science] are from these and about these. Further, as they are obedient to
the passions, they will listen in vain and without advantage, since the end is not knowledge but
action. And it makes no difference whether they are young in years or young in character (
), since the difference comes not from time, but from living and pursuing each thing
in accordance with passion. For such a person, knowledge is unprofitable, just as with the
incontinent person. But for those who form their appetites and act in accordance with reason
( ), to know about these things may be
of great benefit (NE 1095a211).
The youth that disqualifies one from being a student of political science is here defined
not in opposition to complete excellence, but to a minimal level of moral maturity. Youth are
those who are inexperienced in the actions in accordance with lifei.e., who have neither
adequate experience with the great range of possible occasions for action nor a sense for the form
of their lives as a whole; and who live and pursue each thing according to passioni.e., who
are unreflective, indeliberate, and live from moment to moment following whatever longing
happens to possess them. Those, on the other hand, are fit students of political science who
desire to give reflective order to their lives and deeds. Such students will not likely be already

good. And it would seem that greatness in each excellence should belong to greatness of soul. . . . Greatness of soul,
then, seems to be a sort of crown of the excellences, for it makes them greater, and cannot come to be without them.
On account of this, it is difficult to be great-souled in truth, for it is not possible without gentlemanliness
().
If the great-souled person is to be best, as all agree, then he must be good. But this is difficult, says
Aristotle, forcontrary, it seems, to the belief of manyit is hard to be good, it is hard to be excellent, it is hard to
be a gentleman. Gentlemanliness belongs only to those who are great-souled in truth. Gentlemanliness distinguishes
its bearer as truly, versus apparently, good and excellent. Surely, then, the gentleman cannot simply be the
conventionally reputable, nor one who observes the conventional moral orthodoxy, for there is little difficult in this.
In introducing gentlemanliness, Aristotle introduces a distinction between goodness or excellence in truth and
goodness or excellence in appearance. The gentlemanliness of the good and excellent is juxtaposed to that of the
reputable. Or rather, it is argued that repute properly belongs to goodness and excellence in truth.

30
His reason for saying the latter is that the starting points of action are a matter for perception. One must see the
fact that ( ) an action is noble and just; if this is apparent, there is no further reason for the reason why (to;
diovti).



10
settled into a determinate way of life, for entrenched habits, Aristotle says, are difficult to
overcomethey become a second nature. If the study of political science is to benefit practice it
must engage those who are not yet set in their ways. Perhaps, then, Aristotle means to say here
only that his auditors must be sufficiently well-disposed toward the development of complete
excellence, that they must be so habituated as to be receptive to the influence of his teaching.
31

The conditions Aristotle specifies for his students are the necessary prerequisites of moral
development. They are a beginning and not an end.
Indeed, it would be puzzling if only the already excellent were to be students of political
science, for these would have least to gain by their study, and least in the way of a motive to
become Aristotles students. And it would be surprising too if Aristotles auditors were only
experienced men of politics, because such men, being devoted to the practice of politics, have in
fact little leisure to devote to the reflective study of politics. Political practitioners, it seems, are
often the last to seek instruction in political science. They are likely to see themselves as experts
in rather than students of political science. On reflection, then, the safest conclusion to draw from
these passages is that the likely auditors of Aristotles political science will be those on the way
toward excellence, but for whom the question of an ultimate form or direction to life has not as
yet been definitively settled.
The audience of auditors for Aristotles political science, thereofore, is in principle a
good deal wider than that of interlocutors. Though it would include those attracted to a life
devoted to politics as conventionally conceived, it need not be exhausted by these. Indeed,
Aristotle himself suggests that political science will be useful for more than political
practitioners. Insofar as man is by nature a political animal, some political community will
typically form the architectonic context within which each individual lives his life. But every
particular political community is given form by a regime, and therefore by those authoritative
conceptions of the noble and just things held by its preponderant part (NE 1130b22-29; Pol
1273a39-41, 1276b24-28, 1294a11-12; Rhet 1365b22-29). Every regime, that is, embodies a
certain conception of what it is to be a good man, of what it is to lead a worthy life. Each,
moreover, forwards its conception as the true conception. Every regime claims to be the best
regime.
32
Every regime, therefore, obscures or denies the difference between a good citizen and a
good man. But if, as Aristotle suggests, there can be a difference between any actual regime and
the best regime (Pol 1276b241277a5), then the regime will be not only an encompassing
context, but a limiting one. Insofar as there can be a difference between a good citizen and a
good man, a knowledge of political scienceand more particularly of that architectonic branch
of political science which concerns the forms of regime, the branch that Aristotle calls legislative
science ()will be indispensable for anyone who intimates that difference and
wishes rather to be the latter. If man is by nature a political animal, and a political animal is
always a creature of some regime, then the good for oneself will not be possible without political
science (NE 1142a9-10). Thus while Aristotle speaks early in NE as though his teaching were
directed only to those who will actively tend the affairs of the polis (NE 1094b7-11, 1099a32-
b2), he concludes by suggesting that political science will be indispensable for anyone who

31
See M. F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Learning to Be Good, in Essays on Aristotles Ethics, ed. Amlie Oksenberg
Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 7174; but cf. Richard Bods, The Political Dimensions of
Aristotles Ethics, trans. Jan Edward Garrett (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 51.

32
See Strauss, City and Man, 48-49.



11
wishes to make himself and those close to him good, and especially for those in regimes that tend
to the formation of their citizens either haphazardly or badly (NE 1180a29-35).
33

Insofar as every actual regime falls more or less short of the best, the class of potential
beneficiaries of Aristotles political science is in principle universal. Such a class would include
not only political practitioners who desire to improve the politics of some existing regime, but
also those who must choose to refrain from explicit participation in the politics of a defective
regime because their own ends or goals differ. These latter will require political science in order
to understand the limits of their regime and their formation by it, and to understand the
possibilities available to them for giving alternative form to their own lives and the lives of those
close to them. The practical intent of Aristotles teaching, then, cannot be reduced to a narrowly
or conventionally political one. Finally, insofar as Aristotles teaching has been propagated,
insofar as it has been made public, the class of potential auditors for that teaching is as wide as
the class of those who have both the occasion and the interest to turn to it in the expectation of
some advantage. That interest might be, in addition to those discussed above, a philosophic
interest in understanding the place of politics itself and ones place as a political animal within
the whole.
34

Aristotles political science, I have said, begins as the dialectical engagement of the
perspective of those who consider themselves political men and who devote themselves to the
life of politics. The goal of that engagement, I will argue, is to wean the political men away from
the love of honor which constitutes the horizon of politics narrowly and conventionally
conceived, and toward the love of the noble which constitutes the comprehensive horizon of
practice.
I would like now to sketch the beginnings of that engagement. I will begin, as Aristotle
does, with what is first for us.

III.

At NE I.4-5, Aristotle begins his inquiry into the human good, that comprehensive good
that he has said is the end of political science. There is agreement among most concerning the
name, he says, for both the many and the refined ( ) call it happiness,
and suppose living well and doing well to be the same as being happy. But concerning what
happiness is ( ), they disagree, and the many and wise do not give a similar answer (NE
I.4 1095a18-22). The nominal agreement between the many and the refined gives way to a
disagreement between the many and the wise concerning the what is of happiness. The many,
Aristotle continues, [think] it is something obvious and apparent, such as pleasure or wealth or
honor, some thinking one thing, others another; the answer of the wise is not clearly indicated
(NE I.4 1095a22-23), though there is a reference to the teaching of the Platonists on the Good.
Aristotle turns to an examination of the common opinions, or rather, of those that are
most prominent or are held to have some reason for them (NE I.4 1095a29-30). It seems not

33
For an elaboration, see Salkever, Finding the Mean, 101; and Vander Waerdt, Plan and Intention, 23437.

34
See Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotles Politics. (Savage, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1992), 6-8. Cf. Strauss, What is Political Philosophy, 94. I say in addition to because,
insofar as he too is a political animal, the philosopher will have an eminently practical interest in understanding
political science.



12
unreasonable, he remarks, that people take up [a conception of] the good and happiness on the
basis of their ways of life (NE I.5 1095b14-15). From the lives men lead Aristotle identifies
three prominent candidates: the many and most vulgar hold [happiness and the good to be]
pleasure, and on account of this they prefer the life of enjoyment ( )
(NE I.5 1095b16-17). This life Aristotle summarily dismisses as utterly slavish, a life fit for
cattle. Still, the fact that many men in high places are seen to favor such a life gives it a hearing.
Aristotle seems to expect his interlocutors to share his judgment on this life. Or perhaps he
intends, by branding it as slavish, to dissuade from its pursuit those who would otherwise find
such a life of unrestricted power attractive. The tyrants life, after all, has never been without its
partisans. In either case, he passes on quickly to the next candidate: Refined and practical men
( ), Aristotle says, [hold happiness and the good to be] honor (),
for this is just about the end of the political life (NE I.5 1095b22-23). Recalling his earlier
differentiation of the opinions of the many, the refined and the wise, it now seems that while
Aristotle distinguishes the refined and practical from the many and most vulgar who find
happiness in the life of enjoyment, in contradistinction to the wise he counts them among the
many who find happiness in some good obvious and apparent.
This view of the refined and practical, however, Aristotle proceeds to engage
dialectically. Honor cannot be the good we seek, he argues, because it is too superficial. Honor
rests more with the one who honors than with the one who is honored, while we suspect that the
good must be something that is ones own. It appears, moreover, that the refined and practical
pursue honor in order to persuade themselves that they are good; for they desire to be honored
only by men of practical wisdom, who know them, and who honor them for their excellence.
There is, then, an unrecognized tension in the lives of those who call themselves refined and
practical between the pursuit of honor on the one hand, and the pursuit of excellence on the
other. This tension, however, comes to sight only through Aristotles dialectical refinement of
the opinion of the refined and practical. In their own self-understanding, the two remain
confused. Honor, because it is the more immediate and tangible of the two ends, seems to be the
end simply. And the life devoted to the pursuit of thisalbeit qualifiedhonor they take to be
the political life.
35

The connection between excellence and honor would seem to lie in praise. Excellence,
Aristotle says, is something praiseworthy. But the common index of what is praiseworthy is what
is in fact praised. Excellence first appears to us as that which is praised. Praise is, as it were, the
public face of excellence (NE I.12 1101b31-32, I.13 1103a9-10; Rhet I 1362b12-13, 1367b8-10).
The difficulty lies in the fact that there is no necessary connection between what is praiseworthy
and what is in fact praised.
36
If praise is the common index of excellence, still it may be an

35
It is important to emphasize that this is not Aristotles own conception of the political life, but his portrayal of
those who are called refined and practical and who devote themselves to the affairs of the polis. There is a
tendency among commentators to collapse practical into political, to grant to the political practitioner the
practical excellences, and so to read Aristotles commendation of excellent practical activity as a valorization of
politics. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1984), 14748. The danger in such a reading is that it threatens greatly to overestimate the virtue of
those who devote themselves to politics, and greatly to underestimate Aristotles criticism of politics as practiced in
most, if not all, actual regimes, on the grounds precisely of its deficiency as practice. When Aristotle allows the
practical or political men to speak in their own name, they reveal themselves as above all those who pursue a
qualified honor.

36
See Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism, 78.


13
unreliable index. Praise, Aristotle remarks, is only as valuable as the perceptiveness of the
praiser; it is always relative to the one who praises, who measures by his standards (NE I.12
1101b12-16). In calling honor superficial, Aristotle draws attention to the fact that the deep
motive behind the love of praise is the desire to know oneself as good. In exposing the tenuous
connection between what is praised and what is praiseworthy, he raises the question whether
there cannot be a knowledge of ones goodness that is more self-sufficient, that is more ones
own and less a submission to the possibly unreliable opinions of others.
37

On the basis of his dialectical refinement of the opinion of the refined and practical,
Aristotle suggests that perhaps it is excellence and not honor that is the true end of the political
life. But even this, he says, appears incomplete; for one might possess excellence while being
asleep or inactive () throughout life (NE I.5 1095b29-33). On first hearing, this
argument sounds quite odd. But perhaps Aristotle means to suggest that the refined and
practical, those who devote themselves to the pursuit of a qualified honor, typically
misunderstand the nature of excellence. For these, excellence is sought as a possession or an
adornment. They wish more to wear than to exercise their excellence. They are likely, then, to
subordinate the activity of excellence to the repute that its possession (or its reputed possession)
brings. In arguing as he does, Aristotle points the refined and practical beyond a conception of
excellence as a possession and toward a conception of excellence as a disposition to act, and to
act well. He points them from the love of honor to the love of excellent activity itself.
The last of the three candidates, the theoretical life ( ) Aristotle identifies,
but then quickly drops, with the promise of a later treatment. He remains silent on the identity of
its proponents, and on their view of happiness and the good. By his silence we are led to wonder
whether this life, if indeed it may have some reason for it, is in fact prominent as Aristotle had
earlier suggested. It would appear that the character of theory or theorizing, its difference from
other sorts of activity or pursuit, is in fact elusive, hidden from public view.
The prominent views of happiness and the good, Aristotle tells us, locate it in some one
of the external goods. Of these views, that which is politically preponderantthe view of those
who typically devote themselves to political lifetakes the greatest of the external goods to be
honor. And because politics offers the most and the grandest opportunities for the pursuit of
honor, it takes the political life to be the best life. Within the horizon of politics as conceived by
its typical practitioners, honor is the primary political good.
As Aristotle presents it, honor is the very currency of political life, the measure of public
worth (NE IV.3 1123b17-21; Rhet I 1365a8-9). It is considered the prize of excellence and
noble deeds (NE IV.3 1123b17-21). It is the means used by legislators to reward and punish, to
exhort and dissuade (NE III.1 1109b30-35; III.5 1113b21-26). It is the compensation given to
those who rule (NE V.6 1134b6-8) and the reward returned to benefactors and to contributors to
the common stock (NE VIII.14 1163b3-8; Rhet I 1361a28-31). Even those who pursue other of
the external goodswealth and power, for exampledo so wishing to be honored for their
possession. All the external goods are in fact pursued as honorable goods (NE IV.3 1124a17-18,
1124a20-24). Regimes, moreover, are differentiated according to whom they honor and for what


37
Aristotles addresses the problems raised in his examination of the love of honor in his treatment of friendship in
NE VIII-IX. That this later treatment is intended as an explicit response to the former is indicated by the fact that
Aristotle there identifies friends and not honor as the greatest of the external goods (NE IX.9 1169b9). Friendship, or
more precisely the best sort of friendship, would appear to offer more of what one seeks honor for.



14
qualities. And superiority in honor is a mark of superiority in the regime (Pol II.11 1273a39-41;
IV.3 1290a11-12; V.2 1302a24-32).
Honor, however, is a problematically political good. Because it is both scarce and
essentially comparative, its pursuit is a zero-sum game: what honor accrues to one is both lost to
and reduces the prominence of others. The pursuit of honor, then, whether by individual or
polisand latter is often the occasion for the former, while the former is often put in the service
of the latterproduces an unstable, agonistic politics. A politics centered on the pursuit of honor
becomes a politics of grasping for superiority: a politics of factious strife at home and of
domination abroad (see NE IX.6 1167a32-34, IX.8 1168b15-22; Pol II.7 1266b38-1267a14,
IV.11 1296a30-b2, V.2 1302a25-32). The many, Aristotle says, seem to think that politics
() is [the same as] mastery (), and seek to exercise such rule, if not among
themselves, then toward their neighbors (Pol VII.2 1324b32-33). They do so because they think
that the political life, conceived as the quest for honor or superiority, is the only life for a man
() (Pol VII.2 1324a40-41).
38
Aristotles dialectical pedagogy throughout his political
science seems directed precisely against this most common conception of politics. His practical
intent seems to be to moderate the politics of honor by redirecting desire away from those goods
the pursuit of which provokes contention and strife and toward goods whose pursuit can be
common (see NE IX.9, 1170b10-13; Pol II.7, 1267a8-13).
Corresponding to this movement is a recurrent refrain in Aristotles treatment of the
excellences of character in NE III-IV: that action in accordance with excellence is itself noble or
beautiful () and is done for the sake of the noble or beautiful ( ) (see NE
III.7 1115b12-13, 1115b21-24, III.12 1119b15-18, IV.1 1120a23-26, IV.2 1122b6-7).
39
The
excellences dispose one to act in each thing in the way that one should, in the manner that is
fitting. An action in accordance with excellence is one that responds appropriately to the
demands of the particular situation in which one must act. There is a beauty to an act that is
fittingly done that is simply attractive. And the person of excellence takes pleasure in so doing.
Thus noble action, and the pleasure that one takes in it, is choiceworthy for its own sake; it is its
own reward. The end of excellent action is acting finely and the motive for excellent action is the
attraction of the noble act itself. Unlike the lover of honor, then, the lover of the noble acts
primarily for the sake of the nobility of his deeds. While noble action may indeed be
praiseworthy, he who acts for the sake of the noble has his eyes more on the fitness of the deed
than on the praise that may or may not follow it.
40


38
On Aristotles critique of the politics of virility, see Salkever Finding the Mean, 191-99; and Nichols, Citizens
and Statesman, 128-30.

39
A second refrain is that because acting well in any particular situation requires perceiving that response that is
fitting or appropriate for the situationrequires hitting the mean as Aristotle saysit is a difficult task to do well,
it is hard to be good. The frequency with which Aristotle notes the difficulty of excellent action leads one to suspect
that this difficulty is typically underestimated. Most, it would seem, think that being good is easyor at least a good
deal easier than on Aristotles account it is. At NE V.9 1137a917, Aristotle suggests a reason: most think that doing
well is easy because they think it is easy to put together what the law requires. For most, that is, the form of
excellent action is obedience to a rule; and the most common source of such rules is law or convention.

40
Eric Petrie has argued that it is the distinguishing mark of moral as opposed to political virtue to be for the sake of
personal glory. While the man of political virtue acts for the sake of the polis, the man of moral virtue is more self-
regarding. He performs noble deeds for the sake of the honor that follows on the public display of his excellence.


15
Indeed, Aristotle repeatedly distinguishes the desire for the noble from the desire for
honor. In his treatment of courage, for example, he differentiates courage proper from five forms
of seeming courage. First among these, and the one that is thought most similar to courage,
Aristotle calls political courage ( ). The two forms differ in that the courageous man
endures fearful things because it is noble to do so, while the political man endures on account of
the penalties and reproaches of the laws and on account of honors (NE III.8 1116a18-19).
41
This
sort of seeming courage is thought most similar to true courage, Aristotle remarks, because it
happens on account of excellence, that is, on account of shame, and on account of longing for the
noble, for it longs for honor (NE III.8 1116a27-29). Aristotle, however, has already suggested
that shame, although it is praised as an excellence, is not in fact an excellence. Shame, he later
argues, is rather a passionthe fear of ill repute (NE IV.9 1128b10-12). For the young, and those
who live according to the passions, shame can be a useful countervailing force.
42
But for the
good it is inappropriate, insofar as they should not desire to act in ways that provoke shame. As
shame is commonly confused with excellence, Aristotle seems to say, so honor is commonly
confused with the noble. To those who are not yet excellent, and so do not feel the attraction of
acting nobly, acting on account of shame appears to be the same as acting on account of
excellence. For these, the fear of ill repute takes the place of the love of the noble. Honor
becomes, as it were, the seeming noble.
This confusion between honor and the noble runs deep. First among the fearful things
Aristotle lists in his search for the proper subject matter of courage is ill repute. The fear of ill
repute, he remarks, is fitting and noble, and the one who fears this is decent and modest, while
the one who does not is shameless. Still, he adds, in general one should not fear those things that
are neither from vice nor caused by oneself (NE III.6 1115a10-17). Recalling the essential
relativity of praise and the tenuous connection between praise and excellence, we are led to
wonder whether ill repute may not sometimes be among the things one ought not fear. In any
case, on this account concern for reputation would be subordinated to concern for excellence, the
love of honor to the love of the noble.

IV.

Aristotles political science, I have argued, begins as the dialectical engagement of an
audience of political men whose conception of politics, because coventionally authoritative, is
first for us. His primary interlocutors, then, are not gentlemen if we take that term to mean men
of practical or moral virtue; rather, they are those who consider themselves refined and

But this is to obscure the difference between motives that Aristotle himself keeps distinctthe love of the noble and
the love of honor. Petries error lies in assuming that for Aristotle political virtue is equivalent to patriotism or
devotion to the city. On the contrary, Aristotle clearly identifies as the distinctive mark of those who typically
devote themselves to politics not public-spiritedness but the love of honor. See Eric S. Petrie, Moral and Political
Virtue in Aristotles Ethics, in Politikos II: Educating the Ambitious, ed. Leslie G. Rubin. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1992), 170-75.

41
There is an etymological connection here between the penalties of the law ( ) and honors
( ) that is lost in English. The penalties of the laws are deprivations of public honor, of political privilege.

42
See Burnyeat, Learning to Be Good, 78 and n. 13; and Salkever, Finding the Mean, 19294.



16
practical and who devote themselves to the political life. For this audience, politics or practice
is not primarily for the sake of virtue, but of a qualified honor. Far from being first for us, then,
the horizon of practical excellence is that toward which Aristotles dialectic must work. The goal
of his dialectical engagement is to turn his auditors away from the love of honor which
constitutes the horizon of politics narrowly and conventionally conceivedpolitics as equivalent
to masteryand toward the love of the noble which constitutes the comprehensive horizon of
practice. I have attempted to sketch the beginnings of that engagement. Its completion remains to
be considered.

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