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1. I want to consider, in what follows, the relation between ethics and conceptions of the self.
The idea that our conceptions of the self, or self conceptions, might be important for ethics has
been initially met with resistance in the analytic tradition. To mention just two sources of
distrust: first, appeals to the naturalistic fallacy have made it hard to see how a description of
who we are might be relevant for an understanding of what we must do1; second, the idea
(which dates back at least to Sidgwick) that character is exclusively expressed in action has
promoted a picture of moral theory which makes action, and not character, the primary focus of
moral evaluation.2 These assumptions has been, as is well known, increasingly contested in
more recent developments of the tradition. In metaethics, for instance, metaphysical discussions
on the nature of self has been deemed relevant to the explanation of moral motivation and
moral responsibility; in normative ethics, instead, virtue theorists have revaluated the
significance of character for our understanding of moral assessment and practical reasoning.
What I want to consider, however, is a further way in which our conceptions of the self might
be important for ethical thought – a way which cannot be readily accommodated, I believe,
within metaethical or normative debates. The problem I have in mind has been famously stated
1 A version of this argument can be found already in Moore’s Principia Ethica; see Moore 1959: 113-114.
2 See for instance Sidgwick 1981: 391-394.
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by Nietzsche in The Genealogy of Morals, where, in speaking of our judgements of ethical
value, he invites us to ask «what value do they themselves possess».3 Nietzsche is asking, in
other words, why do we find morality on the whole valuable, or what are the sources of the
interest we take in it. An answer to such questions might involve, in various ways, an appeal to
our conceptions of ourselves, and in what follows I want to explore some of these ways. I will
consider, in particular, Cavell’s account of moral perfectionism: my claim will be that Cavell’s
use of this notion provides a peculiar way of understanding the relation between our self
conceptions and our commitment to morality in general. I will then compare Cavell’s ideas
with two other important accounts that are relevant in this connection: the neo-Aristotelian
position that Alasdair MacIntyre puts forward in After Virtue, and the neo-Kantian conception
articulated by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity. These authors link, like
Cavell, a certain description of what we are with our exposure to morality as such: still, as I will
argue, the connection they envisage seems to exclude (in different ways) the very dimension of
moral experience that Cavell’s notion of perfectionism emphasizes. The aim of the comparison
is then twofold: I want, on the one hand, to indicate a possible framework in which Cavell’s
work on perfectionism may be understood; and on the other, to spell out what Cavell’s specific
2. In Cavell’s understanding of perfectionism, questions about our conceptions of the self are
not simply seen as relevant for ethics, but as ethical questions themselves. This point is easy to
overlook, but as I will try to show it has a crucial significance for Cavell’s moral philosophy.
Cavell doesn’t start, in other words, with some philosophical account of what we are, and then
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moves to see how this philosophical anthropology might be important for ethics. Problems
about our conception of ourselves, rather, belong to a specific register of moral life – namely,
the perfectionist register. This register exists alongside the dimension of ethics that is usually
articulated by moral theories, and in which more canonical questions about the right action are
asked. Both registers are associated with specific moral difficulties and peculiar modes of moral
reasoning.4 In what follows, I won’t give a full description of these two registers of moral life: I
will provide, instead, an introductory sketch of their difference by focusing on the kind of
moral difficulty that, according to Cavell, characterizes each of them. Having outlined the
difference between perfectionism and the area of moral life articulated by moral theories, it will
be possible to raise the question of their relation: this will, in turn, enable us to see the
connection that Cavell envisages between our self conceptions and our engagement in morality.
Let’s begin from the following passage, from Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome:
A call for change will not be expressed as a particular imperative when what is problematic in your life
(as of now) is not the fact that between alternative courses of action the right has become hard to find,
but that in the course of your life you have lost your way. 5
Cavell here contrasts two kinds of moral difficulty: one has to do with choosing the right action
between alternative possibilities, while the other is expressed by Cavell as a matter of “losing
one’s way”. The first kind of difficulty is encountered when we don’t know what to do: we are
faced with two possible courses of action, and we wonder which one is recommended by
morality. When we envisage such a dilemma, we may want to recur to moral theories: by
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specifying general principles of conduct, moral theories can enable us to derive a particular
imperative about the action we ought to perform in the relevant situation. Moral theories may
It is important to note one point: our willingness to recur to some moral theory in order to solve
our difficulties about what to do presupposes that we are committed to the project of morality.
We must think of ourselves as moral agents, hence willing what morality wills, if the purpose of
understanding what morality commands in this particular case is to have some interest for us.
We may say, therefore, that our difficulty about what to do, when we are uncertain between
possibilities of action, presupposes that we are not in difficulty at another level: our conception
of ourselves as moral agents should not be problematic for us. In order to experience a
This leads us to the second type of moral difficulty: we may think, in fact, that a peculiar sort of
moral perplexity may arise about one’s conception of oneself. Cavell describes this sort of
difficulty through the idea of “losing one’s way”. In order to understand what Cavell means
here one must appreciate the force of the remark that a certain way may or may not be mine.
Assuming that the image of the way indicates a certain mode of life in general, the thought that
a given mode of life might be mine is meant to portray a peculiar relation between my identity
and such a mode of life: a certain way of life counts as “mine” in the relevant sense if not living
that life means to me that I cease to be myself, to be who I am. The idea of a way of life being
mine emphasizes, in other words, an internal relation between the mode of life at issue and my
identity.
Now, we can think of a difficulty related to this mode of conceiving ourselves by postulating a
distance between my present mode of life and the mode of life which counts as really mine.
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We may come to feel, in this sense, that our current mode of life is not really ours, that it
doesn’t express or represent who we are. This sort of perplexity, that Cavell names «crisis», is
the peculiar moral problematic that calls for a perfectionist assessment of our condition: the
Having sketched the difference between these two register of moral life, we might now
consider their relation: how the perfectionist questioning of one’s identity is related to the
sphere of moral theory? In this respect, I want to stress two points: first, the perfectionist
questioning is, in Cavell’s perspective, essential to moral theory; second, this mode of
questioning may nonetheless enter in conflict with the requirements of moral theory.
Let’s begin from the idea that a perfectionist register is essential to moral theory. We may
introduce the issue by bringing out a point that was implicit in what has been said so far. Our
present mode of life may involve a commitment to morality, a conception of ourselves as moral
agents. A perfectionist investigation of our present mode of life, therefore, may induce us to
question whether our current commitment to morality is really ours. What Cavell indicates
here is a particular way of raising the question of our interest in morality, of the value morality
has for us: for if my present commitment to morality doesn’t really represent me, then my
consent to morality is a matter of mere conformity; in this case, morality is valued as a way of
gaining social acceptance, or of avoiding responsibilities towards one’s life, etc. If a moral theory
doesn’t have a space for such perfectionist investigations of our relation with morality, then it
might leave the nature of our interest in morality in the dark: we might never know whether
our adoption of morality is merely «moralistic», whether we are enforcing morality on ourselves
6 On the idea of «crisis» see for instance Cavell 2004: 11; Cavell 2004: 446.
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by «immoral means».7 In this sense, Cavell claims that a perfectionist questioning of one’s
identity is essential to moral theory:8 without this mode of self examination, we would never
This brings us the possibility of a conflict between the perfectionist register and the sphere of
moral theories. What happens, indeed, if we discover that our present commitment to morality
is not really ours? We might be brought, in such a predicament, to withdraw our consent to
morality as such, because such consent, as it stands, is a sign of our dispossession of ourselves.
As Cavell puts the point in The Claim of Reason, we would find ourselves in the position of
seeking «the salvation of the self through the repudiation of morality».9 This is a peculiar case of
moral conflict: it is not a conflict of obligations within a moral code (for what is on trial is
morality itself), nor is it the usual challenge to morality from the point of view of egoism. We
may think of it as combining certain features of these two kinds of conflict. As in the case of a
conflict between morality and egoism, what is challenged is morality on the whole, and not a
specific obligation. As in the case of conflicts of obligations within a moral code, the conflict is
motivated morally. What brings me here to question morality in general is not an egoistic desire
to affirm my present interests as they stand: the kind of questioning that interests Cavell is
rather driven by one’s sense that one’s present interests should be different from what they
currently are. Cavell wishes to understand the force of this “should” as moral, although not in
the sense in which one should or must perform a particular action out of duty.
To sum up, in Cavell’s perspective, the question whether my present conception of myself is
really mine belongs to a specific register of morality. This register, which Cavell calls
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perfectionism, is essential to understand our adherence to morality as a whole: we couldn’t
clarify the nature of our interest in morality independently of it. Perfectionism can, on the
other hand, conflict with our commitment to morality: such a commitment might in fact be
part of a mode of life that I cannot recognize as mine anymore. Since perfectionism is itself a
dimension of our moral life, this kind of conflict may be seen as a moral conflict with morality.
3. Having completed this admittedly crude sketch of Cavell’s position, I will now proceed to
compare Cavell’s ideas with those of MacIntyre and Korsgaard. Let’s take MacIntyre first. There
is a sense in which we can say that, in MacIntyre’s account, the relation between self and
morality has a central place: according to his conception, indeed, the practice of morality allows
us to realize our true selves. Even if MacIntyre wishes to depart from certain features of the
Aristotelian framework, this much at least is retained: obedience to morality is the device
through which we get from our present state, our nature as it stands, to the full realization of
our telos, of what we really are10 (a departure from Aristotle lies surely in the way in which
MacIntyre conceives of the human telos). The idea of a device shouldn’t be understood in
instrumental terms: in the Aristotelian account MacIntyre endorses, in fact, while virtues are
seen as «[…] means to an end, the relation of means to end is internal and not external».11 It
wouldn’t make sense, in this perspective, to say that I might realize my telos by means other
than the virtues: the exercise of virtue belongs indeed to the very description of human
flourishing.
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MacIntyre shares then with Cavell the idea of a distance between my present mode of life and a
mode of life that realizes what I am. A crucial difference, however, lies in the role that
dimension of moral life alongside the perfectionist register, in which questions about our true
self are raised. These two registers may generate a specific kind of moral conflict: we can
question our commitment to morality from the point of view of the realization of our essence.
In MacIntyre, instead, morality is the means (the only one, indeed) to realize one’s self:
morality, therefore, cannot by definition be in conflict with the realization of the self. It seems,
then, that MacIntyre’s way of connecting self and ethics excludes the very possibility of
The exclusion is not accidental. The possibility of a conflict between morality and realization of
the self presupposes that these notions can be separated, as Cavell is indeed inviting us to do.
But in MacIntyre’s perspective, such a separation could only mean that we’ve lost the only
possible rational understanding of morality: if morality is not connected to the realization of our
telos, then we won’t be able anymore to make sense of our commitment to morality in general.
Our conceiving ourselves as moral, in such a predicament, is only a cover for the affirmation of
our arbitrary desires. From this point of view, then, the difference between MacIntyre and
Cavell is striking: while in MacIntyre the possibility of questioning the value of morality from
the point of view of the self is a symptom of the fact that morality is over, in Cavell this very
possibility opens up a specific dimension of moral experience – a dimension that is, in fact,
I want now to turn briefly to Korsgaard’s position in The Sources of Normativity. Korsgaard
doesn’t share MacIntyre’s pessimism about modern moral philosophy: for her, the burden of
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questioning our engagement in morality as such is not a sign of the degeneration of our moral
culture, but is precisely what distinguishes the modern outlook from ancient ethics of
excellence.12 She accordingly believes, like Cavell, that questions about the value of morality are
an essential feature of our ethical thinking: still, her treatment of such questions seems to
exclude, analogously to MacIntyre’s account, the very possibilities of criticism that Cavell
wishes to preserve.
Korsgaard as well gives pride of place to the connection between our conceptions of the self and
our obligations. Elaborating on the Kantian insight that our will must be determined by a law,
she argues that the laws that govern our actions must be expressive of what she defines our
«practical identity». By this she means a certain description under which we value ourselves,
and that gives sense to our conduct; examples of practical identities are for instance mother,
soldier, citizen, etc.13 In this perspective, it is because we conceive of ourselves in certain ways
that we have reasons to act or not to act, hence certain obligations. Now, the obligations
deriving from our practical identities are not ispo facto moral, but Korsgaard thinks that
reflection on our practical identities can lead us to recognize moral obligations. We need to
acknowledge that, while our particular practical identities are contingent, the fact that we must
have some practical identity to make sense of our conduct it is not: this gives us a reason for
adopting a practical identity that doesn’t spring from any practical identity in particular, but
from our conceiving ourselves as human. In conceiving ourselves as human beings, according to
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Korsgaard, we recognize the obligations we have towards humanity as such, namely our moral
obligations.14
The upshot of this transcendental argument is that, if we have a conception of ourselves at all,
then we must be conceiving ourselves as moral agents. Now this conclusion, if correct, would
spoil the possibility of raising the sort of questions about morality as a whole that Cavell
indicates. Korsgaard, not differently from MacIntyre, is indeed obliterating the space in which I
can ask whether my present way of conceiving myself – including my present commitment to
morality – is really mine. The point of her argument is to show that, if I have a conception of
myself at all, then I am by default conceiving myself as a moral agent. Moral identity, in this
perspective, must be mine, whatever the relation I may happen to have with my present mode
Korsgaard, for this reason, doesn’t have a space for the kind of moral conflict with morality that
Cavell stresses. She is in general careful to preserve the possibility of conflict: she endorses
Bernard Williams’ view that we cannot conceive ourselves only as moral agents, if we are to
make sense of the point morality has for us.15 But the conflicts Korsgaard recognizes are
typically conflicts of obligations generated by a clash between our moral identities and those
more local practical identities that are in general compatible with morality. There is no space,
here, for the sort of conflict that Cavell describes, in which a question about my identity draws
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whole, in Korsgaard’s perspective, I should be a complete normative sceptic16: I should, that is,
not value anything at all, and not have any reason to act in one way rather than another.
Korsgaard doesn’t see that I might have some values and commitments that don’t represent me,
and that also this acknowledgement may lead me to criticize my adherence to morality.
In spite of all their apparent differences, Korsgaard shares with MacIntyre a certain way of
connecting morality and conceptions of the self. What Korsgaard’s reasoning shows, in fact, is
that we already are the kind of animals that are exposed to morality. As she writes, the fact that
we are human beings, and that we must value something if we are to act at all, «is simply the
truth»:17 we must, therefore, value morality as well. Korsgaard’s transcendental arguments are
then reaching by a different route the same conclusion that MacIntyre achieves through
teleological arguments: for MacIntyre as well, indeed, our exposure to morality can be read off
from the very description of the kind of beings we are. This suggests a further way of
morality we must have a self that we can call our own: Cavell writes in this sense that moral
perfectionism is «the precondition of morality».18 In this perspective, we’re not simply are, but
we must become human beings, beings that are exposed to morality. The task of becoming
human, moreover, is seen by Cavell as a specifically moral task: constructing one’s self, or caring
for it, is a particular dimension of our moral life, associated with peculiar difficulties and
specific modes of reasoning. It is only through an engagement in these modes of reasoning that
we can hope make ourselves committed to morality. Our commitment to morality, in other
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words, is itself a moral problem: we cannot prove, by philosophical arguments, that our
References
Cavell, S. 1979 The Claim of Reason, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York
Cavell, S. 1990 Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, Chicago University Press, Chicago
MacIntyre, A. 2007 After Virtue, Third Edition, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
Moore, G.E. 1959 Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, London and New York
Nietzsche, F. 1967 On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, Vintage Books, New York
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