93

G.R. No. 140992 March 25, 2004

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES, INC.NAFLU, RODOLFO ALINDATO,
ROQUE TAN, JESSIE LIM, SUSAN TOPACIO, LYDDA PASCUAL, BERNARDO ALCANTARA,
GELACIO DESQUITADO, RODRIGO AVELINO, LEONARDO ANDRADE, DANILO CHUA,
AMANDO EUGENIO, CALVIN LOPEZ, ANDRES BASCO, JR., and CIRILO ALON, petitioners,
vs.
SULPICIO LINES, INC., respondent.
A strike is a powerful weapon of the working class. But like a sensitive explosive, it must be
handled carefully, lest it blows up in the workers own hands.
1
Thus, the right to strike has to be
pursued within the bounds of law.
For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision
2
dated May 28, 1999 and the
Resolution
3
dated November 25, 1999 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51322, entitled "Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc. NAFLU vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and Sulpicio Lines, Inc."
The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records are:
On February 5, 1991, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (herein respondent) and the Samahang Manggagawa sa
Sulpicio Lines Inc. NAFLU (herein petitioner) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with a term of five (5) years (from October 17, 1990 to October 16, 1995).
After three (3) years or on December 15, 1993, petitioner union and respondent company started
their negotiation on the CBAs economic provisions.
4
But this negotiation remained at stalemate.
On March 1, 1994, petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
National Capital Region, a notice of strike due to collective bargaining deadlock, docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-03-118-94.
For its part, respondent, on March 21, 1994, filed with the Office of the Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment a petition praying that the Labor Secretary assume jurisdiction over the
controversy.
On March 23, 1994, former Labor Secretary Nieves R. Confesor issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, thus:
"WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office assumes jurisdiction over the
labor dispute at Sulpicio Lines, Inc. pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended.
"Accordingly, any strike or lockout whether actual or intended is hereby enjoined.
"Further, the parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts
that might exacerbate the situation.
"SO ORDERED."
Meanwhile, on May 20, 1994, petitioner filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike alleging that
respondent company committed acts
5
constituting unfair labor practice amounting to union busting,
docketed as NCMB NCR-05-261-94.
Provoked by respondents alleged unfair labor practice/s, petitioner union immediately conducted a
strike vote. Thus, on May 20, 1994, about 9:30 oclock in the morning, 167 rank-and-file
employees, officers and members of petitioner, did not report for work and instead gathered in
front of Pier 12, North Harbor at Manila.
As a remedial measure, former Labor Secretary Confesor issued an Order dated May 20, 1994
directing the striking employees to return to work; and certifying the labor dispute to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. This certified labor dispute was
docketed as NLRC Case No. CC-0083-94.
Meanwhile, respondent company filed with the NLRC a complaint for "illegal strike/clearance for
termination," docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-04705-94.
On September 29, 1995, the NLRC issued a Resolution
6
declaring the strike of petitioners officers
and members illegal, with notice to respondent of the option to terminate their (petitioners officers)
employment. In the same Resolution, the NLRC dismissed petitioners complaint against
respondent, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, after a careful and judicious consideration of the
facts, arguments and evidence thus adduced, it is the considered opinion of the
Commission that the union (Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.) had clearly
engaged in an illegal strike on May 20, 1994, when its officers and members actively
participated in a well concerted refusal, stoppage and cessation to render work at
Sulpicio Lines, Inc.. In clear violation not only of the procedural requirements of a valid
strike, but worse, in clear and blatant contravention of the assumption order of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. Consequently, the following union officers named
in the complaint, to wit:
1) Allan F. Aguhar 9) Rodrigo Avelino
2) Rodolfo Alindato 10) Leonardo Andrade
3) Roque Tan 11) Danilo Chua
4) Jessie Lim 12) Amando Eugenio
5) Susan Topacio 13) Calvin Lopez
6) Lydda Pascual 14) Andres Rasco, Jr.
7) Bernardo Alcantara 15) Cirilo Alon
8) Gelacio Dequitado

are declared to have lost their employment status with the company, and the latter
may now, if it so desires, terminate their employment with it. The unions complaint
against the company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."
94

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution
7
dated
January 15, 1996.
On March 19, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the NLRC
Resolutions. Pursuant to our ruling in St. Martins Funeral Home vs. NLRC,
8
we referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals for its appropriate action and disposition.
On May 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the NLRC Resolutions. The
Appellate Court held (1) that the NLRC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of legality of the strike;
(2) that the May 20, 1994 temporary work stoppage by the officers and members of petitioner
amounted to an illegal strike; (3) that even assuming that respondent committed unfair labor
practice/s, still, the strike is illegal because it failed to comply with the mandatory procedural
requirements of a valid strike under Article 263 (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, as amended; and (4)
that the dismissal of petitioners officers who knowingly participated in an illegal strike is in
accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
On October 20, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated November 25, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred (1) in holding that the one-day work stoppage of petitioners officers and members is an
illegal strike; (2) in sustaining the dismissal from the service of its officers; and (3) in ruling that the
NLRC has jurisdiction over a petition to declare the strike illegal.
The basic issue for our determination is whether the strike staged by petitioners officers
and members is illegal. Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, provide:
"ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCKOUTS.
x x x
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent
may file a notice of strike x x x with the Ministry (now Department) at least 30 days
before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of
notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining
agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of
its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly
elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute
union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-
off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
x x x
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in
meetings or referenda called for that purpose. x x x. The decision shall be valid for
the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when
the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry (now Department) may at its own
initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union x x x shall furnish the Ministry (now Department)
the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout,
subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
x x x.
ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.
(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first
having filed the notice required in the preceding article or without the necessary strike
or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry (now
Department).
x x x."
Following are the Implementing Guidelines of the above provisions issued by the Department of
Labor and Employment:
1. A strike shall be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment at least 15 days
if the issues raised are unfair labor practice or at least 30 days if the issue involved
bargaining deadlock. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers
duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute
union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off
period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately;
2. The strike shall be supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained
by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose; and
3. A strike vote shall be reported to the Department of Labor and Employment at least
seven (7) days before the intended strike.
There is no showing that the petitioner union observed the 7-day strike ban; and that the results of
the strike vote were submitted by petitioners to the Department of Labor and Employment at least
seven (7) days before the strike.
We thus hold that for failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 263 (c) and (f) of
the Labor Code, the strike mounted by petitioner union on May 20, 1994 is illegal.
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC,
9
we stressed that "the language of the law
leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the
strike-vote report were intended to be mandatory."
But petitioner insists that the strike can still be declared legal for it was done in good faith, being in
response to what its officers and members honestly perceived as unfair labor practice or union
busting committed by respondent.
Petitioners accusation of union busting is bereft of any proof. We scanned the records very
carefully and failed to discern any evidence to sustain such charge.
In Tiu vs. NLRC,
10
we held:
95

"x x x. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial
evidence to support its allegations (of unfair labor practices committed by
management).
"x x x.
"x x x, but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even at least a
rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on alleged unfair labor practices
it did not even bother to substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It is not
enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor
practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to
warrant such a belief."
We explained in National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC
11
that "with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, the rule now is that such requirements as the
filing of a notice of strike, strike vote, and notice given to the Department of Labor are
mandatory in nature. Thus, even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the
company was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote
were conducted, the said strike is illegal."
In a desperate attempt to justify its position, petitioner insists that what transpired on May 20, 1994
was not a strike but merely a "one-day work absence"
12
or a "simple act of absenteeism".
13

We are not convinced. A strike, as defined in Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code, as amended,
means "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute." The term "strike" shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages,
but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant
equipment and facilities, and similar activities.
14

The basic elements of a strike are present in the case at bar. First, petitioners officers and
members numbering 167, in a concerted manner, did not report for work on May 20, 1994;
second, they gathered in front of respondents office at Pier 12, North Harbor at Manila to
participate in a strike voting conducted by petitioner; and third, such union activity was an
aftermath of petitioners second notice of strike by reason of respondents unfair labor practice/s.
Clearly, what transpired then was a strike because the cessation of work by petitioners concerted
action resulted from a labor dispute.
Invoking compassion, petitioner pleads that its officers who participated in the one-day strike
should not be dismissed from the service, considering that respondents business activities were
not interrupted, much less paralyzed. While we sympathize with their plight, however, we must
take care that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in
conformity with the law.
15

Pertinent is Article 264 (a) of the same Code, thus:
"ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.
"x x x. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
x x x."
It is worth reiterating that the strike is illegal for failure of petitioner to submit the strike vote to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days prior thereto. Also, petitioner failed
to prove that respondent company committed any unfair labor practice. Amid this background,
the participation of the union officers in an illegal strike forfeits their employment status.
In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,
16
we explained
"The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor
Code, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein.
"A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union
officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may
be declared to have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking worker cannot
be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that
he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may
be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and
like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike."
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the Labor Arbiter, not the NLRC, should have taken
cognizance of the case at bar. We do not agree.
In International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,
17
we held:
x x x [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the
authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same
accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor
dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising
therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction (underscoring supplied).
"In the same manner, when the Secretary of Labor and Employment certifies the
labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration the latter is concomitantly
empowered to resolve all questions and controversies arising therefrom including
cases otherwise belonging originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
May 28, 1999 and November 25, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
96

G.R. No. 100158 June 2, 1992
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-
NAFTEU, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking union members terminated
for abandonment of work after failing to comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be reinstated.
On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica's College (COLLEGE, for brevity) and private
respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU (UNION,
for brevity) initiated negotiations for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the
negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October 1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department
of Labor and Employment (DEPARTMENT, for brevity), docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-826.
On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the
COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November
1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, instead of returning to work,
the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioninginter alia the
assumption of jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute.
On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees enjoining
them to return to work not later than 8:00 o'clock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same
time, giving notice to some twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without prejudice
to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In response, the UNION presented a list of (6)
demands to the COLLEGE in a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most important of
these demands was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But
these were flatly rejected.
Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his return-to-
work order and sternly warned the striking employees to comply with its terms. On 12 November
1990, the UNION received the Order.
Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held conciliation meetings before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to
three (3), viz.: that striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and conditions before
the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary action be taken against them; and, that CBA
negotiations be continued. However, these efforts proved futile as the COLLEGE remained
steadfast in its position that any return-to-work offer should be unconditional.
On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the UNION
continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so that "appropriate steps under
the said circumstances" may be undertaken by him.
1

On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination to the striking
employees, which were received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and
members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by the COLLEGE.
On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers and
several of its members before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as
NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90.
The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order before respondent
SECRETARY, citing "selective acceptance of returning strikers" by the COLLEGE. It also sought
dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further hearings were conducted.
Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their respective position papers. The
COLLEGE prayed that respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who
defied his return-to-work order.
On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which, inter alia, directed
the reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or otherwise
illegal act accompanied the conduct of the strike and that a fledgling UNION like private
respondent was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting
its existence".
2
Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION officers responsible for
the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and,
correspondingly, sustained their termination.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with petitioner COLLEGE questioning
the wisdom of the reinstatement of striking UNION members, and private respondent UNION, the
dismissal of its officers.
On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied both motions. Hence, this
Petition for Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his assailed Orders insofar as
they directed the reinstatement of the striking workers previously terminated.
Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on
termination disputes, maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter
pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code, thus
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after
the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, the
following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: .
. . 2. Termination disputes . . . 5. Cases arising from any violation of Article
264 of this Code, including questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs . .
.
97

In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment
3
where We held:
The labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from
taking disciplinary measures against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263
of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike
but not the company's right to take action against union officers who
participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts.
Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico
4
and Union
of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,
5
workers who refuse to obey a return-
to-work order are not entitled to be paid for work not done, or to reinstatement to the
positions they have abandoned of their refusal to return thereto as ordered.
Taking a contrary stand, private respondent UNION pleads for reinstatement of its dismissed
officers considering that the act of the UNION in continuing with its picket was never characterized
as a "brazen disregard of successive legal orders", which was readily apparent in Union Filipro
Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra, nor was it a willful refusal to return to work, which
was the basis of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra. The failure of UNION officers and
members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders was not because they wanted to
defy said orders; rather, they held the view that academic institutions were not industries
indispensable to the national interest. When respondent SECRETARY denied their motion for
reconsideration, however, the UNION intimated that efforts were immediately initiated to fashion
out a reasonable return-to-work agreement with the COLLEGE, albeit, if failed.
The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, was already settled in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment.
6
Therein, We ruled that:
. . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code
the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume
jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all
questions and include and extend to all questions and controversies arising
therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction.
And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of the Labor Code did contemplate
of exceptions thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. This is readily evident from its
opening proviso reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . .
Previously, We held that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broad enough to give the Secretary
of Labor and Employment the power to take jurisdiction over an issue involving unfair labor
practice.
7

At first glance, the rulings above stated seem to run counter to that of PAL v. Secretary of Labor
and Employment, supra, which was cited by petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real.
To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved in
the disputes or to those that are submitted to him for resolution. The seeming difference is,
however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never
submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal
strike.
Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely
incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor disputed itself, or
otherwise submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL v. Secretary or
Labor and Employment, supra, and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is
tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling inInternational Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply.
The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases,
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred
to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.
In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990, asked the
"Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said circumstances." It likewise prayed
in its position paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking employees.
Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the termination of its officers and members before
respondent SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There is no
dispute then that the issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly
submitted to respondent SECRETARY for resolution.
Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to provide
workers immediate access to their rights and benefits without being inconvenienced by the
arbitration and litigation process that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially
burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our
workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights
must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For, labor laws are meant to
promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity Children's Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of
Labor ). 8 After all, Art. 4 of the Labor Code does state that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its
provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
We now come to the more pivotal question of whether striking union members, terminated for
abandonment of work after failing to comply strictly with a return-to-work order, should be
reinstated.
We quote hereunder the pertinent provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-
work order:
1. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there
exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
98

order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification,
all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under
the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . .
(as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied).
2. Article 264, same Labor Code
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall
declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in
accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice
required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout
vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving
the same grounds for the strike or lockout
. . . (emphasis supplied).
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence of an
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any
union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided,
That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike . . . (emphasis supplied).
3. Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August
1990)
Sec. 6. Effects of Defiance. Non-compliance with the certification order of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a return to work order of the
Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of the
strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or
loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from the
locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or
affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties . . .
(emphasis supplied).
Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to immediately comply with the
return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the assumption of
jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an academic
institution, the school could not be considered an industry indispensable to national interest, and
that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to immediately return to work.
This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a
strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall
immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is
immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration
(University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).
9
It must be strictly complied with even during the
pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in
the exercise of respondent SECRETARY's compulsive power of arbitration and, until
set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.
The rationale for this rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citing Philippine
Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
10
thus
To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance in a
motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its
import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the
ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed
insofar as the time element is concerned.
Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over labor
disputes involving academic institutions was already upheld in Philippine School of Business
Administration v. Noriel
11
where We ruled thus:
There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely
affects the national interest. The school is a duly registered educational
institution of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going
work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students and will entail
great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all concerned. More important,
it is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the
physical, intellectual and emotional well-being of the country's youth.
Respondent UNION's failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November
1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply
with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any
declaration of a strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal. act. Any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, "be declared
to have lost his employment status."
Section 6 Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides the penalties for
defying a certification order of the Secretary of Labor or a return-to-work order of the Commission,
also reiterates the same penalty. It specifically states that non-compliance with the aforesaid
orders, which is considered an illegal act, "shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under pain of loss of employment status." Under the
Labor Code, assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated.
Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and
defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers
have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could be
validly replaced.
99

We recently reiterated this stance in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong,
12
wherein we
cited Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra, thus
A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended .
. . The union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
Despite knowledge of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, records of the case reveal that
private respondent UNION opted to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 but
also that of 9 November 1990.
While they claim that after receiving copy of the Order of 9 November 1990 initiatives were
immediately undertaken to fashion out a return-to-work agreement with management, still, the
unrebutted evidence remains that the striking union officers and members tried to return to work
only eleven (11) days after the conciliation meetings ended in failure, or twenty (20) days after they
received copy of the first return-to-work order on 5 November 1990.
The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC),
13
cannot be extended to the striking union officers and
members in the instant petition. There was willful disobedience not only to one but two
return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of teachers, who
are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain
arrogance and pride displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing
threats of disciplinary action against some union officers and members who actively
participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE
enjoining the union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990
presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the same terms and
conditions or prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same. The
COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the services of those who
chose to disregard the return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in
order to protect the interests of its students who form part of the youth of the land.
Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v.
Tuico, supra, and Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle, Philippines, Inc., supra, cannot be made
applicable to them because in the latter two cases, workers defied the return-to-work orders for
more than five (5) months. Their defiance of the return-to-work order, it is said, did not last more
than a month.
Again, this line of argument must be rejected. It is clear from the provisions above quoted that from
the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is
already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply
refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the
positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico,
supra). Suffice it to say, in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra, the workers were
terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for only nine (9) days. It is indeed
inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to
stand akimbo and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they
report back to work. This is absurd.
In fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reinstatement
of striking union members who refused to report back to work after he issued two (2) return-to-
work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in an illegal act. The Order in question is,
certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and the
Resolution 31 May 1991 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are SET
ASIDE insofar as they order the reinstatement of striking union members terminated by petitioner,
and the temporary restraining order We issued on June 26, 1991, is made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

100

G.R. No. 170830 August 11, 2010
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), and ERLINDA VAZQUEZ,
RICARDO SACRISTAN, LEONIDA CATALAN, MAXIMO PEDRO, NATHANIELA
DIMACULANGAN,
*
RODOLFO MOJICO, ROMEO CARAMANZA, REYNALDO
GANITANO, ALBERTO BASCONCILLO,
**
and RAMON FALCIS, in their capacity as
officers of PILA, and ANGELITA BALOSA,
***
DANILO BANAAG, ABRAHAM
CADAY, ALFONSO CLAUDIO, FRANCISCO DALISAY,
****
ANGELITO
DEJAN,
*****
PHILIP GARCES, NICANOR ILAGAN, FLORENCIO
LIBONGCOGON,
******
NEMESIO MAMONONG, TEOFILO MANALILI, ALFREDO
PEARSON,
********
MARIO PEREA,
********
RENATO RAMOS, MARIANO ROSALES,
PABLO SARMIENTO, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, FELIPE VILLAREAL, ARSENIO
ZAMORA, DANILO BALTAZAR, ROGER CABER,
*********
REYNALDO CAMARIN,
BERNARDO CUADRA,
**********
ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, GERARDO
FELICIANO,
***********
ALEX IBAEZ, BENJAMIN JUAN, SR., RAMON MACAALAY,
GONZALO MANALILI, RAUL MICIANO, HILARIO PEA, TERESA
PERMOCILLO,
************
ERNESTO RIO, RODOLFO SANIDAD, RAFAEL STA. ANA,
JULIAN TUGUIN and AMELIA ZAMORA, as members of PILA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
Before us is the petition for review on certiorari
1
filed by petitioner Phimco Industries, Inc.
(PHIMCO), seeking to reverse and set aside the decision,
2
dated February 10, 2004, and the
resolution,
3
dated December 12, 2005, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70336.
The assailed CA decision dismissed PHIMCOs petition for certiorari that challenged the
resolution, dated December 29, 1998, and the decision, dated February 20, 2002, of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); the assailed CA resolution denied PHIMCOs subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
PHIMCO is a corporation engaged in the production of matches, with principal address at Phimco
Compound, Felix Manalo St., Sta. Ana, Manila. Respondent Phimco Industries Labor Association
(PILA) is the duly authorized bargaining representative of PHIMCOs daily-paid workers. The 47
individually named respondents are PILA officers and members.
When the last collective bargaining agreement was about to expire on December 31, 1994,
PHIMCO and PILA negotiated for its renewal. The negotiation resulted in a deadlock on economic
issues, mainly due to disagreements on salary increases and benefits.
On March 9, 1995, PILA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice
of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock. Seven (7) days later, or on March 16, 1995, the
union conducted a strike vote; a majority of the union members voted for a strike as its response to
the bargaining impasse. On March 17, 1995, PILA filed the strike vote results with the NCMB.
Thirty-five (35) days later, or on April 21, 1995, PILA staged a strike.
On May 3, 1995, PHIMCO filed with the NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order (TRO), to enjoin the strikers from preventing through force, intimidation and
coercion the ingress and egress of non-striking employees into and from the company premises.
On May 15, 1995, the NLRC issued an ex-parte TRO, effective for a period of twenty (20) days, or
until June 5, 1995.
On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO sent a letter to thirty-six (36) union members, directing them to
explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal acts they
committed during the strike. Three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the thirty-six (36) union
members were informed of their dismissal.
On July 6, 1995, PILA filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal (illegal
dismissal case) with the NLRC. The case was docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-04705-95,
and raffled to Labor Arbiter (LA) Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.
On July 7, 1995, then Acting Labor Secretary Jose S. Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute, and ordered all the striking employees (except those who were handed termination
papers on June 26, 1995) to return to work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the order.
The Secretary ordered PHIMCO to accept the striking employees, under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
4
On the same day, PILA ended its strike.
On August 28, 1995, PHIMCO filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case) with
the NLRC, with a prayer for the dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly
participated in the illegal strike. PHIMCO claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress
from the PHIMCO compound, thereby paralyzing PHIMCOs operations. The case was docketed
as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06031-95, and raffled to LA Jovencio Ll. Mayor.
On March 14, 1996, the respondents filed their Position Paper in the illegal strike case. They
countered that they complied with all the legal requirements for the staging of the strike, they put
up no barricade, and conducted their strike peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner, without
incident.
LA Mayor decided the case on February 4, 1998,
5
and found the strike illegal; the respondents
committed prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from PHIMCOs
premises and preventing the non-striking employees from reporting for work. He observed that it
was not enough that the picket of the strikers was a moving picket, since the strikers should allow
the free passage to the entrance and exit points of the company premises. Thus, LA Mayor
declared that the respondent employees, PILA officers and members, have lost their employment
status.
On March 5, 1998, PILA and its officers and members appealed LA Mayors decision to the NLRC.
THE NLRC RULING
The NLRC decided the appeal on December 29, 1998, and set aside LA Mayors decision.
6
The
NLRC did not give weight to PHIMCOs evidence, and relied instead on the respondents evidence
showing that the union conducted a peaceful moving picket.
101

On January 28, 1999, PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case.
7

In a parallel development, LA Espiritu decided the unions illegal dismissal case on March 2, 1999.
He ruled the respondents dismissal as illegal, and ordered their reinstatement with payment of
backwages. PHIMCO appealed LA Espiritus decision to the NLRC.
Pending the resolution of PHIMCOs motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case and the
appeal of the illegal dismissal case, PHIMCO moved for the consolidation of the two (2) cases.
The NLRC acted favorably on the motion and consolidated the two (2) cases in its Order dated
August 5, 1999.
On February 20, 2002, the NLRC rendered its Decision in the consolidated cases, ruling totally in
the unions favor.
8
It dismissed the appeal of the illegal dismissal case, and denied PHIMCOs
motion for reconsideration in the illegal strike case. The NLRC found that the picket conducted by
the striking employees was not an illegal blockade and did not obstruct the points of entry to and
exit from the companys premises; the pictures submitted by the respondents revealed that the
picket was moving, not stationary. With respect to the illegal dismissal charge, the NLRC observed
that the striking employees were not given ample opportunity to explain their side after receipt of
the June 23, 1995 letter. Thus, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of LA Espiritu with respect to the
payment of backwages until the promulgation of the decision, plus separation pay at one (1) month
salary per year of service in lieu of reinstatement, and 10% of the monetary award as attorneys
fees. It ruled out reinstatement because of the damages sustained by the company brought about
by the strike.
On March 14, 2002, PHIMCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the consolidated decision.
On April 26, 2002, without waiting for the result of its motion for reconsideration, PHIMCO elevated
its case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
9

THE CA RULING
In a Decision
10
promulgated on February 10, 2004, the CA dismissed PHIMCOs petition for
certiorari. The CA noted that the NLRC findings, that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCOs
evidence failed to show that the picket constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the
points of entry to and exit from the company premises, were supported by substantial evidence.
PHIMCO came to us through the present petition after the CA denied
11
PHIMCOs motion for
reconsideration.
12

THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the strike was illegal because the respondents committed the prohibited
acts under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, such as blocking the ingress and egress of the
company premises, threat, coercion, and intimidation, as established by the evidence on record.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTS
The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the issues raised in this case are factual in nature
that we cannot generally touch in a petition for review, unless compelling reasons exist; the
company has not shown any such compelling reason as the picket was peaceful and uneventful,
and no human barricade blocked the company premises.
THE ISSUE
In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation,
13
we laid down the basic approach that should be
followed in the review of CA decisions in labor cases, thus:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the
review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to
the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal
correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it
ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it
correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision
before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In
other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on
appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is the approach that should be basic in a
Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA
correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?
In this light, the core issue in the present case is whether the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did
not act with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the unions strike was legal.
OUR RULING
We find the petition partly meritorious.
Requisites of a valid strike
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle with management in the course of
setting their terms and conditions of employment. Because it is premised on the concept of
economic war between labor and management, it is a weapon that can either breathe life to or
destroy the union and its members, and one that must also necessarily affect management and its
members.
14

In light of these effects, the decision to declare a strike must be exercised responsibly and must
always rest on rational basis, free from emotionalism, and unswayed by the tempers and tantrums
of hot heads; it must focus on legitimate union interests. To be legitimate, a strike should not be
antithetical to public welfare, and must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a
means of attaining social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy anyone, least of all, the
employer.
15

Since strikes affect not only the relationship between labor and management but also the general
peace and progress of the community, the law has provided limitations on the right to strike.
Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article 263
16
of the Labor Code, which
requires that: (a) a notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) a strike
vote be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned,
obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given to the
DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory, and the unions failure to comply renders the strike
illegal.
17
The 15 to 30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the parties the opportunity to
amicably resolve the dispute with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator, while the
102

seven-day strike ban is intended to give the DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected
strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members.
18

In the present case, the respondents fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements; a strike
notice was filed on March 9, 1995; a strike vote was reached on March 16, 1995; notification of the
strike vote was filed with the DOLE on March 17, 1995; and the actual strike was launched only on
April 25, 1995.
Strike may be illegal for commission of prohibited acts
Despite the validity of the purpose of a strike and compliance with the procedural requirements, a
strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal.
19
The means become illegal
when they come within the prohibitions under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides:
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct
public thoroughfares.
Based on our examination of the evidence which the LA viewed differently from the NLRC
and the CA, we find the PILA strike illegal. We intervene and rule even on the evidentiary and
factual issues of this case as both the NLRC and the CA grossly misread the evidence, leading
them to inordinately incorrect conclusions, both factual and legal. While the strike undisputably had
not been marred by actual violence and patent intimidation, the picketing that respondent PILA
officers and members undertook as part of their strike activities effectively blocked the free ingress
to and egress from PHIMCOs premises, thus preventing non-striking employees and company
vehicles from entering the PHIMCO compound. In this manner, the picketers violated Article
264(e) of the Labor Code.
The Evidence
We gather from the case record the following pieces of relevant evidence adduced in the
compulsory arbitration proceedings.
20

For the Company
1. Pictures taken during the strike, showing that the respondents prevented free ingress
to and egress from the company premises;
21

2. Affidavit of PHIMCO Human Resources Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco, stating
that he was one of the employees prevented by the strikers from entering the PHIMCO
premises;
22

3. Affidavit of Cinco, identifying Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan,
Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela R. Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza,
Reynaldo Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis as PILA officers;
23

4. Affidavit of Cinco identifying other members of PILA;
24

5. Folder 1, containing pictures taken during the strike identifying and showing Leonida
Catalan, Renato Ramos, Arsenio Zamora, Reynaldo Ganitano, Amelia Zamora, Angelito
Dejan, Teresa Permocillo, and Francisco Dalisay as the persons preventing Cinco and
his group from entering the company premises;
25

6. Folder 2, with pictures taken on May 30, 1995, showing Cinco, together with non-
striking PHIMCO employees, reporting for work but being refused entry by strikers
Teofilo Manalili, Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Bernando Cuadra, Maximo Pedro, Nicanor
Ilagan, Julian Tuguin, Nemesio Mamonong, Abraham Caday, Ernesto Rio, Benjamin
Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gerardo Feliciano, Alberto Basconcillo, Rodolfo Sanidad,
Mariano Rosales, Roger Caber, Angelito de Guzman, Angelito Balosa and Philip Garces
who blocked the company gate;
26

7. Folder 3, with pictures taken on May 30, 1995, showing the respondents denying free
ingress to and egress from the company premises;
27

8. Folder 4, with pictures taken during the strike, showing that non-striking employees
failed to enter the company premises as a result of the respondents refusal to let them
in;
28

9. Affidavit of Joaquin Aguilar stating that the pictures presented by Cinco were taken
during the strike;
29

10. Pictures taken by Aguilar during the strike, showing non-striking employees being
refused entry by the respondents;
30

11. Joint affidavit of Orlando Marfil and Rodolfo Digo, identifying the pictures they took
during the strike, showing that the respondents blocked ingress to and egress from the
company premises;
31
and,
12. Testimonies of PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva, Aguilar and Cinco, as well as
those of PILA officers Maximo Pedro and Leonida Catalan.
For the Respondents
1. Affidavit of Leonida Catalan, stating that the PILA strike complied with all the legal
requirements, and the strike/picket was conducted peacefully with no incident of any
illegality;
32

2. Affidavit of Maximo Pedro, stating that the strike/picket was conducted peacefully; the
picket was always moving with no acts of illegality having been committed during the
strike;
33

3. Certification of Police Station Commander Bienvenido de los Reyes that during the
strike there was no report of any untoward incident;
34

4. Certification of Rev. Father Erick Adeviso of Dambanang Bayan Parish Church that
the strike was peaceful and without any untoward incident;
35

5. Certification of Priest-In-Charge Angelito Fausto of the Philippine Independent Church
in Punta, Santa Ana, that the strike complied with all the requirements for a lawful strike,
and the strikers conducted themselves in a peaceful manner;
36

103

6. Clearance issued by Punong Barangay Mario O. dela Rosa and Barangay Secretary
Pascual Gesmundo, Jr. that the strike from April 21 to July 7, 1995 was conducted in an
orderly manner with no complaints filed;
37
and,
7. Testimonies at the compulsory arbitration proceedings.
In its resolution of December 29, 1998,
38
the NLRC declared that "the string of proofs" the
company presented was "overwhelmingly counterbalanced by the numerous pieces of evidence
adduced by respondents x x x all depicting a common story that respondents put up a peaceful
moving picket, and did not commit any illegal acts x x x specifically obstructing the ingress to and
egress from the company premises[.]"
39

We disagree with this finding as the purported "peaceful moving picket" upon which the NLRC
resolution was anchored was not an innocuous picket, contrary to what the NLRC said it was; the
picket, under the evidence presented, did effectively obstruct the entry and exit points of the
company premises on various occasions.
To strike is to withhold or to stop work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.
40
The work stoppage may be accompanied by picketing by the striking
employees outside of the company compound. While a strike focuses on stoppage of work,
picketing focuses on publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is
happening in the company struck against. A picket simply means to march to and from the
employers premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making
known the facts involved in a labor dispute.
41
It is a strike activity separate and different from the
actual stoppage of work.
grievances,
43
these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does not extend to
blocking ingress to and egress from the company premises.
44
That the picket was moving, was
peaceful and was not attended by actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the
picket effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.
In this regard, PHIMCO employees Rodolfo Eva and Joaquin Aguilar, and the companys Human
Resources Manager Francis Ferdinand Cinco testified during the compulsory arbitration hearings:
ATTY. REYES: this incident on May 22, 1995, when a coaster or bus attempted to enter PHIMCO
compound, you mentioned that it was refused entry. Why was this (sic) it refused entry?
WITNESS: Because at that time, there was a moving picket at the gate that is why the bus was not
able to enter.
45

x x x x
Q: Despite this TRO, which was issued by the NLRC, were you allowed entry by the
strikers?
A: We made several attempts to enter the compound, I remember on May 7, 1995, we
tried to enter the PHIMCO compound but we were not allowed entry.
Q: Aside from May 27, 1995, were there any other instances wherein you were not
allowed entry at PHIMCO compound?
A: On May 29, I recall I was riding with our Production Manager with the Pick-up. We
tried to enter but we were not allowed by the strikers.
46

x x x x
ARBITER MAYOR: How did the strikers block the ingress of the company?
A: They hold around, joining hands, moving picket.
47

x x x x
ARBITER MAYOR: Reform the question, and because of that moving picket conducted
by the strikers, no employees or vehicles can come in or go out of the premises?
A: None, sir.
48

These accounts were confirmed by the admissions of respondent PILA officers Maximo Pedro and
Leonida Catalan that the strikers prevented non-striking employees from entering the company
premises. According to these union officers:
ATTY. CHUA: Mr. witness, do you recall an incident when a group of managers of
PHIMCO, with several of the monthly paid employees who tried to enter the PHIMCO
compound during the strike?
MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA: Can you tell us if these (sic) group of managers headed by Francis Cinco
entered the compound of PHIMCO on that day, when they tried to enter?
MR. PEDRO: No, sir. They were not able to enter.
49

x x x x
ATTY. CHUA: Despite having been escorted by police Delos Reyes, you still did not
give way, and instead proceeded with your moving picket?
MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA: In short, these people were not able to enter the premises of PHIMCO,
Yes or No.
MR. PEDRO: Yes, sir.
50

x x x x
ATTY. CHUA: Madam witness, even if Major Delos Reyes instructed you to give way so
as to allow the employees and managers to enter the premises, you and your co-
employees did not give way?
MS. CATALAN: No sir.
ATTY. CHUA: the managers and the employees were not able to enter the premises?
MS. CATALAN: Yes, sir.
51


The NLRC resolution itself noted the above testimonial evidence, "all building up a scenario that
the moving picket put up by [the] respondents obstructed the ingress to and egress from the
company premises[,]"
52
yet it ignored the clear import of the testimonies as to the true nature of the
picket. Contrary to the NLRC characterization that it was a "peaceful moving picket," it stood, in
fact, as an obstruction to the companys points of ingress and egress.
Significantly, the testimonies adduced were validated by the photographs taken of the strike area,
capturing the strike in its various stages and showing how the strikers actually conducted the
picket. While the picket was moving, it was maintained so close to the company gates that it
virtually constituted an obstruction, especially when the strikers joined hands, as described by
Aguilar, or were moving in circles, hand-to-shoulder, as shown by the photographs, that, for all
intents and purposes, blocked the free ingress to and egress from the company premises. In fact,
on closer examination, it could be seen that the respondents were conducting the picket right at
the company gates.
53

The obstructive nature of the picket was aggravated by the placement of benches, with strikers
standing on top, directly in front of the open wing of the company gates, clearly obstructing the
entry and exit points of the company compound.
54

With a virtual human blockade and real physical obstructions (benches and makeshift structures
both outside and inside the gates),
55
it was pure conjecture on the part of the NLRC to say that
"[t]he non-strikers and their vehicles were x x x free to get in and out of the company compound
undisturbed by the picket line."
56
Notably, aside from non-strikers who wished to report for work,
company vehicles likewise could not enter and get out of the factory because of the picket and the
physical obstructions the respondents installed. The blockade went to the point of causing the
build up of traffic in the immediate vicinity of the strike area, as shown by photographs.
57
This, by
itself, renders the picket a prohibited activity. Pickets may not aggressively interfere with the right
of peaceful ingress to and egress from the employers shop or obstruct public thoroughfares;
104

picketing is not peaceful where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is obstructed by
picketers parading around in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.
58

What the records reveal belies the NLRC observation that "the evidence x x x tends to show that
what respondents actually did was walking or patrolling to and fro within the company vicinity and
by word of mouth, banner or placard, informing the public concerning the dispute."
59

The "peaceful moving picket" that the NLRC noted, influenced apparently by the certifications
(Mayor delos Reyes, Fr. Adeviso, Fr. Fausto and Barangay Secretary Gesmundo presented in
evidence by the respondents, was "peaceful" only because of the absence of violence during the
strike, but the obstruction of the entry and exit points of the company premises caused by the
respondents picket was by no means a "petty blocking act" or an "insignificant obstructive act."
60

As we have stated, while the picket was moving, the movement was in circles, very close to the
gates, with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder formation without a break in their ranks, thus
preventing non-striking workers and vehicles from coming in and getting out. Supported by actual
blocking benches and obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive and
quietly intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the operations of the company, not
solely by the work stoppage of the participating workers, but by excluding the company officials
and non-striking employees from access to and exit from the company premises. No doubt, the
strike caused the company operations considerable damage, as the NLRC itself recognized when
it ruled out the reinstatement of the dismissed strikers.
61

Intimidation
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence, coercion or
intimidation is unlawful.
62
According to American jurisprudence, what constitutes unlawful
intimidation depends on the totality of the circumstances.
63
Force threatened is the equivalent of
force exercised. There may be unlawful intimidation without direct threats or overt acts of violence.
Words or acts which are calculated and intended to cause an ordinary person to fear an injury to
his person, business or property are equivalent to threats.
64

The manner in which the respondent union officers and members conducted the picket in the
present case had created such an intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and even
company vehicles did not dare cross the picket line, even with police intervention. Those who
dared cross the picket line were stopped. The compulsory arbitration hearings bear this out.
Maximo Pedro, a PILA officer, testified, on July 30, 1997, that a group of PHIMCO managers led
by Cinco, together with several monthly-paid employees, tried to enter the company premises on
May 27, 1995 with police escort; even then, the picketers did not allow them to enter.
65
Leonida
Catalan, another union officer, testified that she and the other picketers did not give way despite
the instruction of Police Major de los Reyes to the picketers to allow the group to enter the
company premises.
66
(To be sure, police intervention and participation are, as a rule, prohibited
acts in a strike, but we note this intervention solely as indicators of how far the union and its
members have gone to block ingress to and egress from the company premises.)
Further, PHIMCO employee Rodolfo Eva testified that on May 22, 1995, a company coaster or bus
attempted to enter the PHIMCO compound but it was refused entry by the "moving
picket."
67
Cinco, the company personnel manager, also testified that on May 27, 1995, when the
NLRC TRO was in force, he and other employees tried to enter the PHIMCO compound, but they
were not allowed entry; on May 29, 1995, Cinco was with the PHIMCO production manager in a
pick-up and they tried to enter the company compound but, again, they were not allowed by the
strikers.
68
Another employee, Joaquin Aguilar, when asked how the strikers blocked the ingress of
the company, replied that the strikers "hold around, joining hands, moving picket" and, because of
the moving picket, no employee or vehicle could come in and go out of the premises.
69

The evidence adduced in the present case cannot be ignored. On balance, it supports the
companys submission that the respondent PILA officers and members committed acts during the
strike prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code. The testimonies of non-striking
employees, who were prevented from gaining entry into the company premises, and confirmed no
less by two officers of the union, are on record.
The photographs of the strike scene, also on record, depict the true character of the picket; while
moving, it, in fact, constituted a human blockade, obstructing free ingress to and egress from the
company premises, reinforced by benches planted directly in front of the company gates. The
photographs do not lie these photographs clearly show that the picketers were going in circles,
without any break in their ranks or closely bunched together, right in front of the gates. Thus,
company vehicles were unable to enter the company compound, and were backed up several
meters into the street leading to the company gates.
Despite all these clear pieces of evidence of illegal obstruction, the NLRC looked the other way
and chose not to see the unmistakable violations of the law on strikes by the union and its
respondent officers and members. Needless to say, while the law protects the rights of the laborer,
it authorizes neither the oppression nor the destruction of the employer.
70
For grossly ignoring the
evidence before it, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion; for supporting these gross
NLRC errors, the CA committed its own reversible error.
Liabilities of union officers and members
In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. (a) x x x
x x x x
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to
have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike
shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had
been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
We explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines,
Inc.
71
that the effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code, make a distinction
between participating workers and union officers. The services of an ordinary striking worker
cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing
that he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The services of a participating union officer,
on the other hand, may be terminated, not only when he actually commits an illegal act during a
strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal strike.
72

In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required;
substantial evidence, available under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition
of the penalty of dismissal on participating workers and union officers as above described.
73

105

In the present case, respondents Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida Catalan, Maximo
Pedro, Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo Ganitano,
Alberto Basconcillo, and Ramon Falcis stand to be dismissed as participating union officers,
pursuant to Article 264(a), paragraph 3, of the Labor Code. This provision imposes the penalty of
dismissal on "any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike." The law grants the
employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost
his employment.
74

PHIMCO was able to individually identify the participating union members thru the affidavits of
PHIMCO employees Martimer Panis
75
and Rodrigo A. Ortiz,
76
and Personnel Manager Francis
Ferdinand Cinco,
77
and the photographs
78
of Joaquin Aguilar. Identified were respondents Angelita
Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday, Alfonso Claudio, Francisco Dalisay, Angelito Dejan,
Philip Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio Libongcogon, Nemesio Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili,
Alfredo Pearson, Mario Perea, Renato Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento, Rodolfo
Tolentino, Felipe Villareal, Arsenio Zamora, Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin,
Bernardo Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman, Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez, Benjamin Juan, Sr.,
Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio,
Rodolfo Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian Tuguin and Amelia Zamora as the union members who
actively participated in the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from the company premises
and preventing the passage of non-striking employees. For participating in illegally blocking
ingress to and egress from company premises, these union members stand to be dismissed for
their illegal acts in the conduct of the unions strike.
PHIMCO failed to observe due process
We find, however, that PHIMCO violated the requirements of due process of the Labor Code when
it dismissed the respondents.
Under Article 277(b)
79
of the Labor Code, the employer must send the employee, who is about to
be terminated, a written notice stating the cause/s for termination and must give the employee the
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
We explained in Suico v. National Labor Relations Commission,
80
that Article 277(b), in relation to
Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code recognizes the right to due process of all workers, without
distinction as to the cause of their termination, even if the cause was their supposed involvement
in strike-related violence prohibited under Article 264(a) and (e) of the Labor Code.
To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must
furnish him or her with two (2) written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another
written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.
81

In the present case, PHIMCO sent a letter, on June 23, 1995, to thirty-six (36) union members,
generally directing them to explain within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed
for the illegal acts they committed during the strike; three days later, or on June 26, 1995, the
thirty-six (36) union members were informed of their dismissal from employment.1avvphi1
We do not find this company procedure to be sufficient compliance with the due process
requirements that the law guards zealously. It does not appear from the evidence that the union
officers were specifically informed of the charges against them and given the chance to explain
and present their side. Without the specifications they had to respond to, they were arbitrarily
separated from work in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure.
As to the union members, only thirty-six (36) of the thirty-seven (37) union members included in
this case were notified of the charges against them thru the letters dated June 23, 1995, but they
were not given an ample opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves; the notice of
termination came on June 26, 1995, only three (3) days from the first notice - a perfunctory and
superficial attempt to comply with the notice requirement under the Labor Code. The short interval
of time between the first and second notice speaks for itself under the circumstances of this case;
mere token recognition of the due process requirements was made, indicating the companys
intent to dismiss the union members involved, without any meaningful resort to the guarantees
accorded them by law.
Under the circumstances, where evidence sufficient to justify the penalty of dismissal has been
adduced but the workers concerned were not accorded their essential due process rights, our
ruling in Agabon v. NLRC
82
finds full application; the employer, despite the just cause for dismissal,
must pay the dismissed workers nominal damages as indemnity for the violation of the workers
right to statutory due process. Prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of nominal damages
at P30,000.00, which same amount we find sufficient and appropriate in the present case.
83

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
dated February 10, 2004 and the resolution dated December 12, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70336, upholding the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The Decision, dated February 4, 1998, of Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor should prevail and is
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that Erlinda Vazquez, Ricardo Sacristan, Leonida
Catalan, Maximo Pedro, Nathaniela Dimaculangan, Rodolfo Mojico, Romeo Caramanza, Reynaldo
Ganitano, Alberto Basconcillo, Ramon Falcis, Angelita Balosa, Danilo Banaag, Abraham Caday,
Alfonso Claudio, Francisco Dalisay, Angelito Dejan, Philip Garces, Nicanor Ilagan, Florencio
Libongcogon, Nemesio Mamonong, Teofilo Manalili, Alfredo Pearson, Mario Perea, Renato
Ramos, Mariano Rosales, Pablo Sarmiento, Rodolfo Tolentino, Felipe Villareal, Arsenio Zamora,
Danilo Baltazar, Roger Caber, Reynaldo Camarin, Bernardo Cuadra, Angelito de Guzman,
Gerardo Feliciano, Alex Ibaez, Benjamin Juan, Sr., Ramon Macaalay, Gonzalo Manalili, Raul
Miciano, Hilario Pea, Teresa Permocillo, Ernesto Rio, Rodolfo Sanidad, Rafael Sta. Ana, Julian
Tuguin, and Amelia Zamora are each awarded nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

106

G.R. No. 120505 March 25, 1999
ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (AIUP), JOEL DENSING,
HENEDINO MIRAFUENTES, CHRISTOPHER PATENTES, AND ANDRES TEJANA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), CENAPRO CHEMICAL
CORPORATION and/or GO SING CHAN in his capacity as Managing Director, respondents.

PURISMA, J .:
The Petition for review on Certiorari at bar seeks to reinstate the Decision
1
of the Labor Arbiter insofar
as it ordered the reinstatement and payment of backwages of the four petitioners herein. The said decision was
affirmed
2
in toto by the NLRC. On February 21, 1995, however, upon motion for reconsideration of the
respondent company, the NLRC came out with a Resolution
3
modifying its decision, by deleting therefrom the
award of backwages, ordering payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and declaring the loss of
employment status of petitioner Joel Densing.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, the petitioners
herein, were casual employees of respondent CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation. In the said
company, the collective bargaining representative of all rank and file employees was CENAPRO
Employees Association (CCEA), with which respondent company had a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). Their CBA excluded casual employees from membership in the incumbent
union. The casual employees who have rendered at least one to six years of service sought
regularization of their employment. When their demand was denied, they formed themselves into
an organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent unions in the Philippines (AIUP).
Thereafter, AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which petition was opposed by the
respondent company. The CCEA anchored its opposition on the contract bar rule.
On May 4 and July 3 1990, the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the needed
documentation, with the Department of Labor and Employment. The notice of strike cited as
grounds therefor the acts of respondent company constituting unfair labor practice, more
specifically coercion of employees and systematic union busting.
On July 23, 1992, the union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union
perpetrated illegal acts. The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the
gate of the company were barricaded and blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented
and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting for work. Because of such illegal
activities, the respondent company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC, which granted a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence,
coercion, or intimidation and from blocking fee ingress and egress to the company premises.
Subsequently, or on July 25, 1990, to be precise, the respondent company filed a complaint for
illegal strike. The day before, July 24, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
and illegal lockout against the respondent company.
In a consolidated Decision, dated September 10, 1993, the Labor Arbiter declares illegal the strike
staged by the petitioners, and dismissed the charge of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice. The
dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision was to the following effect:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
strike illegal and as a consequence thereto, the officers who participated in
the illegal strike namely: Oscar Enicio, Jaime dela Piedra, Lino Isidro, Ariel
Jorda, and Jose Catnubay are declared to have lost their employment status.
CENAPRO is directed however to reinstate the other workers, except Ireneo
Sagaral, Artemio Guinto, Ruben Tulod, Marcelo M. Matura, Gilbert Holdilla,
Cesar Buntol, Rey Siarot, Lucio Nuneza, Jose Basco, Gervacio Baldespinosa,
Jr., Cresecente Buntol, Dennis Pepito, Florencio Pepito, Edwin Ramayrat,
Daniel Canete, and Vivencio Sinadjan who executed quitclaims in favor of
CENAPRO and cenapro is being absolved from the charges of illegal lockout
and unfair labor practice.
SO ORDERED.
4

In short, five (5) union officers were declared to have lost their employment status, fifteen (15)
union members were not reinstated because they executed quit claims in favor of the respondent
company, and six (6) workers, Rosalito Bantulan, Edward Regner, Joel Densing, Henedino
Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, ordered to be reinstated.
On October 8, 1993, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order excluding Rosalito Bantulan and Edward
Regner from the list of those to be reinstated and to be paid backwages. The remaining four (4)
workers, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, are the
petitioners here.
On October 5, 1993, the respondent company appealed the aforesaid decision insofar as it
ordered the reinstatement of some of the strikers.
On October 7, 1993, the petitioners also appealed the same decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Pending resolution of the said appeals, petitioner AUIP filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for
Execution of the Labor Arbiter's Decision directing reinstatement of some of its members. The
motion was granted in the Order dated October 15, 1993.
On December 7, 1993, respondent company presented Manifestation/Motion praying that instead
of reinstatement. it be allowed to pay separation pay petitioners.
On December 16, 1993, petitioners presented a motion for payroll reinstatement, which motion
was opposed by the respondent company, alleging mainly that the circumstances of the case have
strained the relationship of the parties herein, rendering their reinstatement unwise and
inappropriate. But such opposition was overruled by the Labor Arbiter. In his Order of March 23,
1994, the same Labor Arbiter issued a second writ of execution directing actual, if not payroll
reinstatement of the strikers.
On April 6, 1994, respondent company appealed the second order for the reinstatement of the
strikers, placing reliance on the same grounds raised in support of its first appeal.
In its Decision dated August 15, 1994, the NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter's decision,
dismissed both the appeal of private respondent and that of petitioners, and reiterated the Labor
Arbiter's Order for the reinstatement of the herein petitioners, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes,
Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana. The said decision disposed and directed as follows:
107

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these appeals are DISMISSED, and the
decision of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
Appellant Cenapro Chemical Corporation is hereby ordered to immediately
comply with the Labor Arbiter's Order dated March 23, 1994 and to release
the salaries of four (4) appellant-workers namely Joel Densing, Henedino
Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana from October 15, 1993
and continue paying them up to the time this decision has become final and
executory, less earning earned elsewhere.
SO ORDERED.
5

Respondent company moved for reconsideration of that portion of the NLRC's decision ordering
the reinstatement of the said strikers.
Acting thereupon, the NLRC modified its Decision of August 15, 1994, by ordering the payment of
separation pay in lieu of the reinstatement of the petitioners, deleting the award of backwages, and
declaring the loss of employment status of Joel Densing. The dispositive portion of the
Amendatory Resolution, ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Commission promulgated on August 15,
1994 is hereby MODIFIED. In view of reinstatement to complainants
Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, appellant-
movant CENAPRO Chemicals corporation is directed to pay them amount
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service and without
backwages. As regards Joel Densing, he is declared to have lost his
employment status.
SO ORDERED.
6

Hence, the present petition, theorizing that respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in:
1) Entertaining the 6 April 1994 (the first appeal dated 5 October 1993) which was based on
similar grounds.
2) Reversing its earlier Resolution of the first appeal promulgated 15 August 1994 by way of
another contradictory and baseless ruling promulgated on 21 February 1995.
3) Depriving Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana of their right to
reinstatement and backwages; and
4) Depriving Joel Densing of his right to reinstatement or separation pay with backwages.
It is decisively clear that although the grounds invoked in the two appeals were the same, the said
appeals were the same, the said appeals were separate and distinct remedies. Filed on October 5,
1993, the first appeal was from the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicasio Aninon, dated September 10,
1993, seeking loss of employment status of all the union members who participated in the illegal
strike. The second appeal, dated April 6, 1994, was, in effect, an opposition to the second writ of
execution issued on March 23, 1994. The second writ pertained to the order to effect immediate
actual or payroll reinstatement of the four petitioners herein. The said appeals were acted upon
separately by the NLRC, which did not act with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining such
appeals.
When they filed the notice of strike, petitioners cited as their grounds therefor unfair labor practice,
specifically coercion of employees and systematic union busting. But the said grounds wee
adjudged as baseless by the Labor Arbiter. The court quotes with approval the following findings of
Labor Arbiter Aninon, to wit:
. . . In fact, in the undated Joint Affidavit of Oscar Enecio, Edgardo Regner,
Christopher Patentes, Edgar Sanchez, Ariel Jorda, Jaime dela Piedra, the
workers stated that what they considered as harassments and insults are
those when they were scolded for little mistakes and memoranda for
tardiness. These acts, if really committed cannot be considered as
harassment and insults but were ordinary acts which employers have to do as
part of their administrative supervision over their employees. Moreover, Oscar
Enecio's testimony that some of his fellow union members like vice-president
Jaime dela Piedra, Christopher Patentes and Henodino Mirafuentes, were
also harass when they were made to work another eight (8) hours after their
tour of duty deserves scant consideration not only because it is
uncorroborated but he could not even give the dates when these workers
were made to work for sixteen (16) hours, how many instances these
happened and whether or not the workers have actually worked.
7

The court discerns no basis for altering the aforesaid findings which have been affirmed by the
NLRC.
The court is not persuaded by petitioners' allegation of union busting. The NLRC correctly ruled
that the strike staged by petitioners was in the nature of a union-recognition-strike. A union-
recognition-strike, as its legal designation implies, is calculated to compel the employer to
recognize one's union, and not the other contending group, as the employees' bargaining
representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the striking union's doubtful
majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the exclusive
representative in the bargaining unit. It is undisputed that at the time the petition for certification
election was filed by AUIP, petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the respondent
company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining representative of all rank and file employees. The
petition should have not been entertained because of the contract bar rule. When a collective
bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code,
a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may be entertained only within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiry date of the said agreement.
8
Outside the said period, as in the present
case, the petition for certification election or motion for intervention cannot be allowed. Hence, the conclusion
that the respondent company did not commit the alleged union busting.
From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by the petitioner
union was illegal for reasons, that:
1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed human barricades to
block the road, prevented the passage of the respondent company's truck, padlocked the
company's gate, and prevented co-workers from entering the company premises.
9

2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
10
enjoining the union and/or its members from
obstructing the company premises, and ordering the removal therefrom of all the barricades.
108

A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence.
11
It is considered as the most
effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment.
12
But to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for
the attainment of social justice is never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its
exercise. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly
paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared
invalid where the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered illegal as
the "strikers formed a human cordon along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways
and approaches to the launches and vessels of Petitioners".
13

It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid.
Their dismissal as a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, pertinent portion of which provides: " . . Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any . . union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. . ."
Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the
officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their
dismissal from the service is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers'
responsibility is greater than that of the members.
14

The court finds merit in the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the respondent
company committed no illegal lockout. Lockout means temporary refusal of the employer to furnish
work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute.
15

As observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily stopped working
because of their strike. In fact the appellant workers admitted that non-striking workers who
wanted to return to work were allowed to do so. Their being without work could not therefore be
attributed to the employer's refusal to give them work but rather, to the voluntary withdrawal of
their services in order to compel the company to recognize their union.
16

The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners herein. Decisive on the
matter is the pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: ". . any worker . . who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status. . ." It can be gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in
point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can not be terminated for mere participation in
an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the strike
17
and the striker
who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of
the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR,
18
the court ruled "Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial". Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a
conclusion."
Respondent company contends that sufficient testimonial, documentary and real evidence,
including the photographs supposedly taken by a certain Mr. Ponce, were presented at the
arbitration level. It is argued that the said pictures best show the participation of the strikers in the
commission of illegal acts in the course of the strike. In connection therewith, it is worthy to point
out the sole basis of the NLRC for declaring the loss of employment status of petitioner Joel
Densing, to wit:
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q: Now, Mr. Ponce, on page 1 of your affidavit, paragraph 4 thereof, you alleged that:
"While in the gate, I saw several strikers of Cenapro blocked its gate and prevented the
truck from proceeding to its destination." Who were these several workers you referred
to, in this affidavit of yours?
WITNESS:
A. The strikers.
HON. LABOR ARBITER:
Q. Are you referring to the complainants in this case who are now present?
WITNESS:
A. Yes sir, I am referring to AIU members.
HON, LABOR ARBITER:
Make it of record that the witness is referring to the five persons inside the court namely:
Rosalito Bentulan, Ariel Jorda, Ranulfo Cabrestante, Jose Catnubay and Joel
Densing.
19
(emphasis supplied)
All things studiedly considered, the court is not convinced that the quantum of proof on record
hurdled the substantiality of evidence test
20
to support a decision, a basic requirement in administrative
adjudication. If the said pictures exhibited before the Labor Arbiter portrayed the herein petitioners performing
prohibited acts during the strike, why were these pictures not exhibited for identification of petitioners?
Petitioners could have been identified in such pictures, if they were reflected therein, in the same manner that
the lawyer who examined Mr. Ponce, asked witness Armamento to identify the Sheriff Mr. Leahmon Tolo, thus:
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q I refer your attention Mr. Armamento to Exhibit "16". There is a person here wearing a
short sleeve barong tagalog. Can you please tell the Honorable office if you will be able
to identify this person?
WITNESS:
A Yes, this is the Sheriff Mr. Leahmon Tolo.
21

109

The identification of the alleged pictures of the strikers, if properly made, could have been
categorized as substantial evidence, which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support
a conclusion that Joel Densing participated in blocking the gate of respondent company.
Verily, the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Ponce does not suffice to support a declaration of loss
of employment status of Joel Densing. This could be the reason why the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, in its decision dated August 15, 1994, upheld the reinstatement of Joel Densing.
The contention of petitioners that the factual findings by the Labor Arbiter, as trial officer in the
case, deserve much weight is tenable. The NLRC is bound by the factual findings of the Labor
Arbiter as the latter was in a better position to observe the demeanor and department of the
witnesses. "Absent any substantial proof that the trial court's decision was based on speculation,
the same must be accorded full consideration and should not be disturbed on appeal.
22

Premises studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and hold, that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in declaring the loss of employment status of Joel Densing.
As regards the other petitioners, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana,
their reinstatement is warranted. In its resolution, the NLRC adjudged petitioners as "not entirely
faultless" in light of the following revelation of Mr. Ponce, to wit:
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q. Mr. Ponce, I will refer you to a picture previously marked as our Annex "H". Showing
to you the said picture. In said picture, there are persons who are lying on the road. Can
you please identify who are these persons?
WITNESS:
A. They are the strikers.
ATTY. PINTOR:
Q. Are you referring to the AIU strikers the complainants in this case?
WITNESS:
A. Yes. Sir.
23

For the severest administrative penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring strikers must be duly
identified. Simply referring to them as "strikers", "AIU strikers" "complainants in this case" is not
enough to justify their dismissal.
On the issue of reinstatement and payment of salaries, the court also find for petitioners. Telling on
the monetary award is Article 223 of the Labor Code, the pertinent of which reads:
. . . In any event, the decision of the labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed
employee shall be immediately executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of bond shall not stay
the execution of the reinstatement provided therein. . . .
The NLRC Resolution of February 21, 1995 does not state any plausible ground or basis for
deleting the award for backwages. The mere fact that the petitioners were "not entirely faultless" is
of no moment. Such finding below does not adversely affect their entitlement to backwages. As
opined by the NLRC in its Decision of August 15, 1994, affirming in its entirety the conclusion
arrived at by the Labor Arbiter "the only option left to the appellant-company is whether to
physically reinstate appellant workers or to reinstate them on the payroll."
The unmeritorious appeal interposed by the respondent company, let alone the failure to execute
with dispatch the award of reinstatement delayed the payroll reinstatement of petitioners. But their
long waiting is not completely in vain, for the court holds that their (petitioners') salaries and
backwages must be computed from October 15, 1993 until full payment of their separation pay,
without any deduction. This is in consonance with the ruling in the case ofBustamante vs.
NLRC,
24
where payment of full backwages without deductions was ordered. The four petitioners herein are
entitled to reinstatement absent any just ground their dismissal. Considering, however, that more than eight (8)
years have passed since subject strike was staged, an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay
for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is deemed more practical and appropriate to all the parties
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Resolution of NLRC, dated February 21, 1995, is
SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Labor Arbiter of October 8, 1993 REINSTATED, with the
modification that the petitioners, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and
Andres Tejana, be paid full backwages computed from October 15, 1993 until full payment of their
separation pay. The payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, is hereby authorized. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

110

G.R. No. 128632 August 5, 1999
MSF TIRE AND RUBBER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILTREAD TIRE WORKERS' UNION, respondents.
MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner seeks a review of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated March 20, 1997, which set
aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, dated July 2, 1996, in Civil Case No. 95-770,
granting petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The facts are as follows:
A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Philtread) and private
respondent, Philtread Tire Workers' Union (Union), as a result of which the Union filed on May 27,
1994 a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board National Capital Region
charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging in union-busting for violation of
the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. This was followed by picketing and the
holding of assemblies by the Union outside the gate of Philtread's plant at Km. 21, East Service
Road, South Superhighway, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice
of lock-out on May 30, 1994 which it carried out on June 15, 1994.
In an order, dated September 4, 1994,
2
then Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. She enjoined the Union
from striking and Philtread from locking out members of the Union.
On December 9, 1994, during the pendency of the labor dispute, entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company Limited (Siam Tyre), a subsidiary of Siam Cement.
Under the Memorandum of Agreement, Philtread's plant and equipment would be sold to a new
company (petitioner MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc.), 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre and
20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located would be sold to another company
(Sucat Land Corporation), 60% of which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.
This was done and the Union was informed of the purchase of the plant by petitioner. Petitioner
then asked the Union to desist from picketing outside its plant and to remove the banners,
streamers, and tent which it had placed outside the plant's fence.
As the Union refused petitioner's request, petitioner filed on May 25, 1995 a complaint for
injunction with damages against the Union and the latter's officers and directors before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 59 where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-770.
On June 13, 1995, the Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court. It insisted that the parties were involved in a labor dispute and that petitioner,
being a mere "alter ego" of Philtread, was not an "innocent bystander."
After petitioner made its offer of evidence as well as the submission of the parties' respective
memoranda, the trial court, in an order, dated March 25, 1996, denied petitioner's application for
injunction and dismissed the complaint. However, on petitioner's motion, the trial court, on July 2,
1996, reconsidered its order, and granted an injunction. Its order read:
3

Considering all that has been stated, the motion for reconsideration is granted. The
Order dated March 25, 1996 is reconsideration and set aside. Plaintiff's complaint is
reinstated and defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
As regards plaintiff's application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the
Court finds that the plaintiff has established a clear and sustaining right to the injunctive
relief, hence, the same is GRANTED. Upon posting by the plaintiff and approval by the
Court of a bond in the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos which shall answer
for any damage that the defendants may suffer by reason of the injunction in the event
that the Court may finally adjudge that the plaintiff is not entitled thereto, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue ordering the defendants and any other persons acting with
them and/or on their behalf to desist immediately from conducting their assembly in the
area immediately outside the plaintiff's plant at Km. 21 East Service Road, South
Superhighway, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and from placing and/or constructing banners,
streamers, posters and placards, and/or tents/shanties or any other structure, on the
fence of, and/or along the sidewalk outside, the said plant premises until further from
this Court.
SO ORDERED.
4

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, the Union filed on August 5, 1996 a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
On March 20, 1997, the appellate court rendered a decision granting the Union's petition and
ordering the trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition for
review. Petitioner makes the following arguments in support of its petition:
a. The Court of Appeals erred in not summarily dismissing the Union's petition for its
false certification of non-forum shopping and the Union's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration before going up to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari.
b. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 95-770 for lack of
jurisdiction and merit on the alleged grounds that MSF did not have a clear and
unmistakable right to entitle it to a writ of preliminary injunction.
c. The Court of Appeals' pronouncement that it has not touched upon the issue of
whether or not private respondent is a mere innocent bystander to the labor dispute
between Philtread and the Union or upon the issue of whether or not private respondent
is a mere dummy or continuity of Philtread is contrary to its own conclusions in the body
of the decision, which conclusions are erroneous.
d. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it disallowed the injunction
based on Philtread's remaining operations in the country and allowed the Union to
exercise its right to communicate the facts of its labor dispute within MSF's premises,
given the percentage of interest Philtread has in both MSF and the corporation which
owns the land bearing said plant.
The issues are (1) whether the Union's failure to disclose the pendency of NCMB-NCR-NS-05-
167-96 in its certification of non-forum shopping and its failure to file a motion for reconsideration
of the order, dated July 2, 1996, of the trial court were fatal to its petition for review before the
Court of Appeals; and (2) whether petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance of a writ
of injunction under the "innocent bystander" rule.
111

First. Forum shopping is the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
5
It
is an act of malpractice and is prohibited and condemned as trifling with courts and abusing their
processes.
6
As held in Executive Secretary v.Gordon:
7

Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision one forum, a party seeks a favorable
decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before
the Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that
even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case
(offering a similar remedy) would still be open, or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing
to obtain the same from the original court.
In determining whether or not there is forum-shopping, what is important is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies
to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and
in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora
upon the same issues.
8

Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Union's petition for review
on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was false and perjurious as a result of
the Union's failure to mention the existence of NCMB-NCR-NS-05-167-96, a proceeding involving
the same parties and pending before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.
The argument is without merit. Petitioner was a party to the proceedings before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board in which an order, dated September 8, 1994, was issued by then
Secretary of Labor Nieves Confesor, enjoining any strike or lock-out by the parties.
9
It was
petitioner which initiated the action for injunction before the trial court. Aggrieved by the injunctive
order issued by the lower court, the Union was forced to file a petition for review before the Court
of Appeals. We cannot understand why petitioner should complain that no mention of the
pendency of the arbitration case before the labor department was made in the certificate of non-
forum shopping attached to the Union's petition in the Court of Appeals. The petition of the Union
in the Court of Appeals was provoked by petitioner's action in seeking injunction from the trial court
when it could have obtained the same relief from the Secretary of Labor.
Indeed, by focusing on the Union's certification before the appellate court, petitioner failed to
notice that its own certification before the lower court suffered from the same omission for which it
faults the Union. Although the body of petitioner's complaint mentions NCMB-NCR-NS-05-167-96,
its own certification is silent concerning this matter.
10
It is not in keeping with the requirements of
fairness for petitioner to demand strict application of the prohibition against forum-shopping, when
it, too, is guilty of the same omission.
Second. Petitioner asserts that its status as an "innocent bystander" with respect to the labor
dispute between Philtread and the Union entitles it to a writ of injunction from the civil courts and
that the appellate court erred in not upholding its corporate personality as independent of
Philtread's.
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel,
11
this Court, through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, stated the "innocent bystander" rule as follows:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phase
of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it can
not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to
protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the courts are not without power to
confine or localize the sphere of communication or the demonstration to the parties to
the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments or
persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of
the dispute. Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent
bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its is to create an impression that a
labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists between them and
the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this
Court, we upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the
entrance to a feed mill located within the compound of a flour mill with which the union
had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection was found
between the two mills owned by two different corporations other than their being situated
in the same premises. It is to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful picketing has
not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a
labor union in front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute
was enjoined by the court from being extended in front of the main entrance of the
building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third persons were
located.
12
(Emphasis added)
Thus, an "innocent bystander," who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside
from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is entirely different from, without any
connection whatsoever to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign
to the context thereof. For instance, in PAFLU v.Cloribel, supra, this Court held that Wellington and
Galang were entirely separate entities, different from, and without any connection whatsoever to,
the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, against whom the strike was directed, other than the
incidental fact that they are the bank's landlord and co-lessee housed in the same building,
respectively. Similarly, in Liwayway Publications, Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union,
13
this
Court ruled thatLiwayway was an "innocent bystander" and thus entitled to enjoin the union's strike
because Liwayway's only connection with the employer company was the fact that both were
situated in the same premises.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such on to the dispute. As correctly
observed by the appellate court:
Coming now to the case before us, we find that the "negotiation, contract of sale, and
the post transaction" between Philtread, as vendor, and Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals
a legal relation between them which, in the interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To
be sure, the transaction between Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale
whereby Philtread ceased to have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the
contrary, Philtread remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of
Sucat Land Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms
of the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land were
subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private respondent uses the
112

same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same working conditions; same
machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture the same products as Philtread, lead
us to safely conclude that private respondent's personality is so closely linked to
Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ. Stated differently, given its close
links with Philtread as to bar its entitlement to an injunctive writ. Stated differently, given
its close links with Philtread, we find no clear and unmistakable right on the part of
private respondent to entitle it to the writ of preliminary injunction it prayed for below.
x x x x x x x x x
We stress that in so ruling, we have not touched on the issue of . . . whether or not
private is a mere dummy or continuation of Philtread . . . .
14

Although, as petitioner contends, the corporate fiction may be disregarded where it is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, or where the corporation is
used as a mere alter-ego or business conduit,
15
it is not these standards but those of the "innocent
bystander" rule which govern whether or not petitioner is to an injunctive writ. Since petitioner is
not an "innocent bystander", the trial court's order, dated July 2, 1996, is a patent nullity, the trial
court having no jurisdiction to issue the writ of injunction. No motion for reconsideration need be
filed where the order is null and void.
16

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.