Taada v. Court of Appeals, Oct.

23, 1985
Case Digest

G.R. No. L-40007 October 23, 1985

LORENZO TAADA, ROSARIO M. DELGADO and
CONCEPCION DELGADO, substituted heirs of the
deceased plaintiff Francisco A. Delgado, petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE H. TECSON,
respondents.
Arsenio S. Reyes for private respondent.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Facts :

Lorenzo Tanada and Francisco Delgado are former
partners of a law firm. They entered into a
compromise agreement with their client, Narcisa
Mendoza. Wherein if their client won civil cases
8246 and 8330, Lorenzo Tanada and Delgado will
receive half of the total amount won in the case as
payment for their services.

Upon winning the case, the court had given its
stamp of approval on the agreed lien. Narcisa
Mendoza then, without any objection to the court's
approval, gave the certificates of titles covering the
lands involved in the lien to the Register of Deeds.
While there is a pending physical division of the
lands, Narcisa Mendoza, upon agreement with
Tanada and Delgado, delivered the one-half share
of the produce from 1941 to 1958. By sometime in
1958, Narcisa Mendoza stopped the delivery of the
one-half of the share of the produce.

A complaint was then filed against Narcisa Mendoza
asking for the division of the lands, payment of their
respective shares along with its interest. In answer,
Narcisa Mendoza, stated that the petitioners did not
utilize their legal knowledge and professional skill to
win the case and that the claim for half of the
properties had become unconscionably
disproportionate. The trial court rendered judgement
in favor of the petitioners.

On an appeal made with the Court of Appeals, the
decision was reduced, rendering that the petitioners
claim to be only of what was agreed upon.
Petitions for reconsideration were denied, hence the
petition for review.

Issues :

Is the lien that was approved by the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija unconscionably
disproportionate, as the respondent is claiming,
rendering the Court of Appeals to reduce the
Petitioner's lien from 50% to just 25% of the total
winnings?

Held :

What has long become final and executory can no
longer be appealed from and such contentions of
unreasonableness will no longer be heard. The
motion is approved. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed and the decision of the Court of
First instance is maintained.

G.R. No. L-41607 August 21, 1990

MARIANO T. NASSER, MANUEL S. NASSER,
ROSARIO S. MATUTE, and FORTUNATA
ZAMBRANO VDA. DE MATUTE, petitioners,

vs.

HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, Judge, Court of First
Instance, Manila, Br. IV, PATERNO R. CANLAS,
and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO
ORIENTAL, respondents.

Facts:

In the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the late Amadeo Matute Molave, a document
embodying a supplemental compromise agreement
and partition of property was executed among the
heirs and interested parties. The supplemental
compromise included a payment of the attorney's
fees for Atty. Paterno Canlas. The attorney's fees
include Hacienda Cadiatan which amounted to
Php128,000 and cash in the amount of 412,000.
The total amount for both is Php600,000. It was
approved 8 months later.

After the approval of the fees, Atty. Canlas moved
for the execution of the Attorney's fees and this was
granted by the court. The heirs assailed this order
stating that there was no written agreement. The
court granted a Temporary Restraining Order. Not
long after an agreement between Mariano T.
Nasser, Manuel S. Nasser and Fortunata Zambrano
Vda. de Matute reached an agreement with
respondent Canlas over the payment of the latter's
fees. However, the Nassers are the only ones who
complied with the agreement to pay Atty. Canlas.

The heirs, who had yet to comply with the
agreement, maintain that the part of the agreement
stating "upon full-payment of the corresponding
liability of aparty the lien on his l her share is
extinguished mean that the payment can be done
at different times.

Issues:

The issue in this case is whether the remaining
heirs who had not yet complied with the agreement
be made to pay the remaining attorney's fees to
Atty. Canlas.

Held:

The legal principle, in any event, is that "the creditor
cannot be compelled partially to receive the
presentations in which the obligation consists"
unless "there is an express stipulation to that
effect," in much the same way that the debtor may
not "be required to make partial payments.

It is noteworthy that the agreement of compromise
and of partition in question was signed by the
obligors with the assistance of their respective
counsel, and was not approved by the Probate
Court until after eight months or so. At no time did
they then draw attention to the absence in the
agreement, or in the Court order approving it, of any
option on their part to pay their share in the
attorney's fees by parts or In installments. Equally
noteworthy, as reflective of the heirs' intention, or
lack of it, to comply with their obligation to pay
Canlas' fees, is that from the time of the execution
of the compromise agreement, up to date hereof,
sixteen years altogether, they have not paid a single
centavo to Mr. Canlas.
On nothing but what may be called semantic
sophistry, the petitioners have succeeded in
delaying payment of their valid debts for sixteen
(16) years. Their stratagem having been exposed
for what it is, they should not be allowed to delay
fulfillment of their obligation any longer.

G.R. No. 90983 September 27, 1991

LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, petitioner

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE GENARO C.
GINES, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVI, Regional
Trial Court, First Judicial Region, San Fernando, La
Union, and BENGSON COMMERCIAL
BUILDING, INC., Respondents.

Facts:

Atty. Raymundo Armovit is the counsel for Bengson
Commercial Building, Inc. in a complaint filed to
declare null and void the extrajudicial foreclosure of
certain properties by the GSIS. The agreement
between Atty. Armovit and Bengson Inc. for
Attorney's fees is Php15,000 for initial
compensation and 20% in contingent fees if there
was a favourable result.

The case was won and Atty. Armovit sought
execution with the court, but Romualdo Bengson
informed Armovit that they had retained Atty.
Pacifico Yadao but he will have a separate billings.
Atty. Armovit tried to ask for his payment over the
phone a couple of times but his calls are being
ignored. He then sought the entry of his attorney's
lien in the record of the case. The lower court,
however, refused to make the entry and issued PNB
to release to the custody of Mr. Bengson and Atty.
Yadao the sumof Php2,760,000. In light of an
amicable settlement, Atty. Armovit moved to
withdraw his pettion.

Once the money has been turned over to Mr.
Bengson, Mrs. Brenda Bengson (wife of Romualdo
Bengzon delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of
P300,000.00 only. Armovit protested and demanded
the amount of P552,000.0 twenty percent of
P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengzon made
assurances that he will be paid the balance.

On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit
received a order emanating from the trial court
which stated as compliance alleging that petition
(Atty. Armovit) has already received from the plaintiff
the sum P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and
by way of attorney's fees With the receipt by the
petitioner from the plaintiff of this amount, the latter
has faithfully complied with its obligation. Atty.
Armovit then filed for a motion for reconsideration
was denied. He then filed for a motion for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals but his
petition was dismissed.

Issues:

The issue is whether Atty. Armovit is entitled to the
sum of P252,000.00 more, in addition to the sum
P300,000.00 already paid him by the private
respondent

Held:

Bengson Commercial insists that the retainer
agreement was signed by only one of seven
directors, and it could no bind the corporation. Atty.
Armovit, in any event, had also been allegedly
more than sufficiently compensated. They also
alleged that Atty. Armovit had bee paid P300,000.00
- an amount approved by the court, and an amount
he accepted and for which he is allegedly estoppel
from claiming a higher amount. The order of the
court has the effect of res judicata, the private
respondent claimed, as well as a compromise
agreement which is immediately executory.
The Court is inclined to believe that Atty. Armovit
never agreed on the compromise sum of
P300,000.00. It is true that he did agree to withdraw
his motion to annotate attorney's lien, but because
the parties were "in the process of amicably settling
their differences" 9 and not because Atty. Armovit
had agreed to accept a lower amount as full
payment. There is nothing there that would indicate
Atty. Armovit's willingness to accept, in fact, a lower
figure in consideration of his withdrawal of his
request to enter attorney's lien. What the Court
takes his statement to mean is that he was
withdrawing his request on the certainty that the
private respondent would pay him the money,
presumably, under more becoming circumstances.

The fact that Atty. Armovit did not, after all, accept
the sum of P300,000.00 as final compensation is
indeed indicated by the behavior of the private
respondent, through Mrs. Romualdo Bengson,
when she assured Atty. Armovit that the balance
was forthcoming. 11 According to Mrs. Bengson,
she wished the rest of the Bengsons to witness the
final payment and when the occasion was present,
wished for a postponement on account of "All Saints
Day."

Premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The private respondent is ORDERED to pay the
petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against
the private respondent.

G.R. No. 92561 September 12, 1990

SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS,petitioner,

vs.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and NERIO
MADARANG, respondents. The Solicitor General
for petitioners. Jose C. Cimano for private
respondent.

GANCAYCO, J:

Facts:

In the course of the reorganization of the DOTC,
Grido C. Agon and Alfonso Magnayon were
appointed to the positions of Head
Telecommunications engineer (Range 74). Nerio
Madarang was appointed to the position of
Supervising Telecommunications Engineer (Range
12).

Madarang questioned the appointments of Agon
and Magnayon by filing an appeal with the
Reorganization Appeals Board of the DOTC. This
was dismissed due to lack of merit. Madarang then
filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission.

The Civil Service Commission revoked the
appointments of Agon and Magnayon and directed
the appointment of Madarang as Head
Telecommunications Engineer. DOTC Assistant
Secretary Sibal sought a reconsideration of the said
resolution of the CSC but this was denied.

On November 21, 1989, Assistant Secretary Sibal
filed a manifestation with the CSC stating:

The Telecommunications Office
through the undersigned, hereby
manifests that we received the CSC
resolution in CSC Case No. 393 on
November 12, 1989 and in compliance
thereto, we will convene our Selection
and Promotion Board to deliberate on
the position of Head
Telecommunications Engineer
(reclassified to Engineer IV pursuant to
National Compensation Circular No. 58
effective July 1, 1989) with qualified
candidates including appellant Nerio
Madarang.

Madarang requested the CSC to take appropriate
action by implementing its resolutions. An order
dated December 19, 1989, the CSC directed the
immediate implementation of its aforementioned
resolution insofar as it concerned the appointment
of Madarang. Agon and Magnayon filed their
separate motions for reconsideration of the
aforestated resolutions of the CSC but these were
denied by the said commission in a resolution dated
January 19, 1990.

This petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order which was
filed by the Solicitor General in behalf of petitioner.
On March 29, 1990, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice and issued a restraining order
enjoining the CSC from enforcing its questioned
resolutions until further orders.


Issues:

Whether or not the CSC acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested
position

Held:

While Oscar Orbos does not question the
aforestated resolutions of the CSC insofar as it
disapproved the appointments of Agon and
Magnayon to the positions of Head
Telecommunications Engineer, Orbos maintains that
as the appointing authority, he has the right of
choice and discretion to appoint the persons whom
he deems fit to the position to be filled.

On the other hand, the CSC contends that it was
properly exercising a constitutional and legal duty to
enforce the merit and fitness principle in the
appointment of civil servants and to uphold their
equally guaranteed right to be appointed to similar
or comparable positions in the reorganized agency
consistent with applicable law and issuances of
competent authorities.

Paragraph H, Section 9 of Presidential Decree No.
807, otherwise known as the 'Civil Service Decree
of the Philippines," provides:

Section 9. Powers and Function of the
Commission. The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service and shall
have the following powers and
functions:

(h) Approve all appointments, whether
original or promotional, to positions in
the civil service, except those of
presidential appointees, members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
police forces, firemen, and jailguards,
and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications. An appointment shall
take effect immediately upon issue by
the appointing authority if the
appointee assumes his duties
immediately and shall remain effective
until it is disapproved by the
Commission, if this should take place,
without prejudice to the liability of the
appointing authority for appointments
issued in violation of existing laws or
rules: Provided, finally, That the
Commission shall keep a record of
appointments of all officers and
employees in the civil service. All
appointments requiring the approval of
the Commission as herein provided,
shall be submitted to it by the
appointing authority within thirty days
from issuance, otherwise the
appointment becomes ineffective thirty
days thereafter. (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing provision it is clear that the CSC
has the power to approve or disapprove an
appointment and not the power to make the
appointment itself or to direct that such appointment
be made by the appointing authority. The CSC can
only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen
to fill a vacant position and it finds the person
qualified it must so attest. The duty of the CSC is to
attest appointments.

the petition is GRANTED and the questioned
resolutions of the respondent CSC dated August 29,
1989, November 2, 1989 and January 19, 1990 are
hereby annulled insofar as they direct the
appointment of Nerio Madarang to the contested
position. The petitioner is hereby authorized to
convene the DOTC Selection and Promotion Board
to determine who shall replace Guido Agon and
Alfonso Magnayon to the contested position by
considering all qualified candidates including Nerio
Madarang. The restraining order dated March 29,
1990 is hereby made permanent. No costs.


G.R. NO. 97351. March 17, 1992.

RAMON A. GONZALES vs. HON. FRANCISCO I.
CHAVEZ, etc., PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT and
COMMISSION ON AUDIT.

In its pleading captioned "Clarification/Compliance"
dated February 17, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor
General brings to light what it considers as
"misimpressions" alleged in the petition
and upon which the Court based its decision of
February 4, 1992. With its avowal to abide by
the said decision, the OSG manifests that it would
no longer file a motion for reconsideration but points
out that the decision "engenders 'impracticalities'
and 'impossibilities' in terms of successful
prosecution of the PCGG cases by lawyers who at
this stage must have `mastery of the cases,' and no
amount of motion may remove these realities."

G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996

TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION,
ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and
EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First
Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo
Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY
FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that
Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well
as other information regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge
its clients name?

Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should
not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is
flesh and blood.
2) the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established.
The attorney-client privilege does not attach until
there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject
matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know
who his opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope
in the dark against unknown forces.

Except:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong
probability exists that revealing the clients name
would implicate that client in the very activity for
which he sought the lawyers advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged.
3) Where the governments lawyers have no case
against an attorneys client unless, by revealing the
clients name, the said name would furnish the only
link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the
clients name is privileged.
That client identity is privileged in those instances
where a strong probability exists that the disclosure
of the client's identity would implicate the client in
the very criminal activity for which the lawyers legal
advice was obtained.


Luisa Y. Ortega v CA

Guevarra v Eala

Facts:

Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit
affair with the respondent. After leaving the conjugal
home, petitioner found out that Irene and
respondent was living together in a residential
house few blocks away from the church they were
married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to
a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent as
the father in the certificate of live birth.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage
to Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene.

Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment
before the IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath which was dismissed by the IBP Board of
Governors due to lack of merit.

Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:

Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and
a married woman constitute gross immoral
conduct?

Ruling:

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman
not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should
be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct'
depends on the surrounding circumstances." The
case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his
wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried
out discreetly.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by
our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal)

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and
indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and
privileges which his license confers upon
him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath
he took before admission to practice law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of
Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive
Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional
provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct,"
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent,
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of
office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Fernandez v Grecia

Facts:

Fernandez et al filed a disbarment case against Atty
Grecia for theft of documents pertaining tothe latters
case against the petitioners. A certain Fe Linda
Aves was admitted and diagnosed of having a mild
pre-eclampsia on December 20, 1990. Five days
later, he was discharged to celebrate Christmas
with her family, unfortunately on December 26,
1990, the said patient died with her unborn child,
prompting the Aves family to brought an actgion for
damages against the doctors and the hospital. (Fer-
nandez et al.)

During the litigation in the lower court, Atty Grecia,
allegedly asked the clerk of court the medical chart
of the aforementioned patient which was at that time
in the court's possesion, and thereafter tore two
pages identified as pages 72 and 73.

In view of Atty Grecia's unprofessional conduct, the
petitioners filed the case for disbarment.

Issue:
WON the disbarment case is meritorious.

Held:
To quoute the Supreme Courts decision, they say
that "by descending to the level of a common thief,
respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced
the legal profession. He has demonstrated his moral
unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable
fraternity of lawyers. He has forfeited his member-
ship in the BAR."

Atty Grecia was then ordered disbarred, his license
to practice law in the Philippines cancelled and his
name was ordered to be stricken out of the Roll of
Attorneys.

The Supreme Court cited Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 in
the Rules of Professional Responsibility being vio-
lated by Atty Grecia, notwitsanding that he was
once disbarred to practice law on November 12,
1987 for his 'unholy alliance' with a judge in Quezon
city to rip off banks and Chinese business firms.
And that 8 months after the Supreme Court heeding
his pleas for compassion and promise to mend his
ways, it was just eight months after that he is faced
with yet another disbarment case.

Cf Yuseco v DCa Bernad

Barrientos v Daarol

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrien-
tos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She
was a college student, single. Atty. Daarol went to
her house because he was a friend of her sister,
hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol
to be a single and as a General Manager of ZAN-
ECO (electic cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos
house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in
the Masons convention so the latter said he should
ask for the permission of her parents. They con-
sented and so she served as an usherette, Daarol
picking her up and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioners
house and invited her for a joy ride, with the permis-
sion of her mother (who was Daarols former class-
mate). They went to the beach and Daarol pro-
posed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she
would accept him, he would marry her within 6
months from her acceptance. After a few days of
courting, she accepted the offer of love. Visitations
continued and they agreed to get married in Dec
1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party
and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an
airport in Sicayab where there were no houses
around. There, he pressured her into having sexual
intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that he
would marry her and that December was very near
anyway they would marry soon. She gave in after
much hesitation because she loved him. She cried
after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter
during August to October 1973, where she con-
sented because she loved him. Eventually, she be-
came pregnant and informed Daarol. He however
suggested that she have the baby aborted. She re-
fused. He told her that she didnt have to worry be-
cause they were getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see
Barrientos and her mother and told them that he
could not marry her because he was already mar-
ried. He reassured them though that he has been
separated from his wife for 16 years and that he
would work for the annulment of his marriage and
subsequently marry her. So Barrientos waited and
delivered the baby but eventually wasnt able to
contact Daarol anymore (he went MIA).

ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct.

HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was
disclosed by respondent only after the complainant
became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepre-
sented himself as being eligible to re-marry for hav-
ing been estranged from his wife for 16 years and
dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that
he would work for the annulment of his first mar-
riage. It was a deception after all as it turned out
that respondent never bothered to annul said mar-
riage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satis-
faction of his sexual desires at the expense of the
gullible complainant. He is perverted. He says that:
"I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite
my being married." Worse, he even suggested
abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to
allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such,
could enter into multiple marriages and has inquired
into the possibility of marrying complainant. As rec-
ords indicate, however, his claim of having em-
braced the Islam religion is not supported by any
evidence save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tenden-
cies to appease his sexual desires, respondent
Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral delin-
quency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecom-
ing a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit
and grossly immoral conduct is in order.

Balaoing v Calderon

FACTS:
1. SEVERAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST
BALAOING.
a. BALAOING vs. JUDGE DOJILLO
i. Balaoing was re-
quired to show why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt for suppressing certain material facts of which
he was charged with knowledge and for having en-
gaged in forum-shopping.
ii. Balaoings motion for
reconsideration was denied, his explanation was
declared unsatisfactory and he was severely cen-
sured for having instituted a patently unfounded and
frivolous admin action and warned that the commis-
sion of same conduct will be dealt more severely.
b. BALAOING vs. JUDGE MALIWA-
NAG
i. Grave misconduct
for failure and regusal to issue corresponding write
of action (pending appeal) prayed for by complain-
ant in his motion in civil case, ZABALA vs. BUENO.
ii. Balaoings use of un-
savory, defamatory and offensive language against
Judge brought dismissal to the complaint, 1-year
suspension and P1000 fine for violation of canons.
c. 2 MORE COMPLAINTS: CALDE-
RON AND MALIWANAG.
i. BALAOING: filed
complaint against CALDERON for grave abuse of
authority and malicious delay in administration of
justice.
1. CALDERON does not follow the Circular and merely
treats it as directory; practice of Judge to automati-
cally grant postponements and deferment of hearing
of cases to a later hour whenever his OIC makes a
manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer or
party called up requesting that his case be post-
poned.
2. Judge drinks a lot and fraternizes openly.
3. Delayed cases:
a. Allowed defendants to keep postponing hearings
more than 1 year.
b. Cahoots with deputy sheriff, unlawfully prevented
implementation of writ of Possession.
4. Charged both CALDERON AND OIC, MANIAGO
with misconduct, grave abuse of authority and mali-
cious delay in admin of justice.
5. OIC MANIAGO alleges BALAOING calling her noto-
rious, swindler, insane.
ii. CALDERON:
Balaoing won a foreclosure case and became the
highest bidder in the public auction, Certificate of
Sale was issued and registered.
1. He prevented the writ of Possession dude to preju-
dice.
a. Gavilans widow (former owner), Alice and children
were residing in the properties; period to redeem
the properties had not yet expired.
2. When redemption period elapsed, he issued write of
possession but up to present time, Balaoing has not
yet taken possession and showed his disinterest.
iii. MALIWANAG denied
BALAOING allegation, judgment is based on equity
and justice against injustice by a lawyer on the un-
learned and poor couple from Baguio.

ISSUE:
WON Balaoings admin complaints hold merit? NO.
Is Balaoing guilty of gross misconduct? YES.

HELD:
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS DISMISSED.
BALAOING DISBARRED.
1. CANON 11: Lawyer shall observe and
maintain respect due to the courts and to ju-
dicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others.
a. Rule 11.03: Lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or men-
acing language or behavior before
Courts.
b. Rule 11.04: Lawyer shall not attrib-
ute to a Judge motives not sup-
ported by record or have no materi-
ality to the case.
2. Complaints are based on his personal inter-
pretation of the law and not on material alle-
gations of fact, substantiated by evidence.
Bautista v Gonzales

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, re-
spondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation
of lawyers oath. Required by this Court to answer
the charges against him, respondent filed a motion
for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his
charges more definite. In a resolution the Court
granted respondents motion and required com-
plainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, al-
leging that respondent committed the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his cli-
ents, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado
and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the
Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court
fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of
the value of the property in litigation.
x x x
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client,
to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971
for the development into a residential subdivision of
the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, cov-
ered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired
fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorneys
fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well
that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff
of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register
of Deeds of Iligan City;
x x x
Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1
above, reads:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent
fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales]
defray all expenses, for the suit, including court
fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious mis-
conduct involving a champertous contract.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of
law for six (6) months.
RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the re-
spondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides
that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to
pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also
Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject
to reimbursement. The agreement between re-
spondent and the Fortunados, however, does not
provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation
expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to
enforce the clients rights is champertous [citation
omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy
especially where, as in this case, the attorney has
agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the
thing in dispute [citation omitted]. The execution of
these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the for-
mer must incur administrative sanctions.
Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the prov-
ince of Antique, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibi-
tion and mandamus under Rule 65 before the Su-
preme Court, seeking to restrain the Sandi-
ganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from
proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of
criminal cases against him on the ground that said
cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal
and constitutional authority, since under the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987,
it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incum-
bent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file
cases with the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner also
prayed that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained
from conducting preliminary investigations with the
Sandiganbayan.

Issue:

Does the Tanodbayan (Special Prosecuter) have
the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan?

Held:

No. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman
(as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan)
is charged with the duty to:

Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any per-
son, any act or omission of any public official, em-
ployee, office or agency, when such act or commis-
sion appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or ineffi-
cient (Sec. 13, par. 1)

The Constitution likewise provides that:

The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known
as the office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall con-
tinue to function and exercise its powers as now or
hereafter may be provided by law, contempt except
those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7).

Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is
given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanod-
bayan (caged Special Prosecutor under the 1987
constitution and who is supposed to retain powers
and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is
clearly without authority to conduct preliminary in-
vestigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases
with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective
February 2, 1987. From that time, he has been di-
vested of such authority.

Under the present Constitution, the Special Prose-
cutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the
Tanodbayan Ombudsman) and can investigate and
prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or
orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the
prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same
if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his
original power to issue subpoena, which he still
claims under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is now
deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may,
however, retain it in the Spedal Prosecutor in con-
nection with the cases he is ordered to investigate.

It is not correct either to suppose that the Special
Prosecutor remains the Ombudsman as long as he
has not been replaced, for the fact is that he has
never been the Ombudsman. The Office of the Om-
budsman is a new creation under Article XI of the
Constitution different from the Office of the Tanod-
bayan created under PD 1607 although concededly
some of the powers of the two offices are Identical
or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that
he has a right to hold over the position of Ombuds-
man as he has never held it in the first place.

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by peti-
tioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal in-
formations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan;
and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease
and desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and function of the Ombuds-
man.

Narag v Narag

FACTS:
Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have aban-
doned his family for his paramour who was once his
student in tertiary level. The administrative com-
plaint of disbarment was filed by her wife, Mrs. Juli-
eta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss be-
cause allegedly the complainant fabricated the story
as well as the love letters while under extreme emo-
tional confusion arising from jealousy. The case
took an unexpected turn when another complaint
was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now
together with their seven children as co-signatories.
After several hearings, the facts became clear, that
the respondent indeed abandoned his family as
against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In
addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immo-
rality and for having violated and the Code of Ethics
for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.
HELD:
YES. Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:
The complainant was able to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the respondent breached
the high and exacting moral standards set for the
members of the law profession.
Good moral character is not only a condition prece-
dent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualifi-
cation for all members of the bar.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and sup-
port the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, be-
have in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were vio-
lated.
Bildner and Illustrio v Erlinda K Illustrio

FACTS:

A complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action
against respondent was filed by petitioners for al-
leged gross misconduct, among other offenses.
Said disbarment case arises from a case presided
by Judge Antonio Reyes where respondent at-
tempted to influence the outcome of the case as
can be inferred from his acts evidenced by the fol-
lowing documents, to wit: (1) the transcript of the
stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in
the sala of Judge Reyes when the judge made it of
record that respondent offered Atty.Oscar Sevilla
P500,000 to be given to Judge Reyes for a favora-
ble decision; (2) the affidavit of Judge Reyes al-
leged that respondent, as soon as the case started,
visited him about three times in his office, and made
more than a dozen calls to his Manila and Baguio
residences, some of which were even made late
evenings; and (3) the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla con-
firmed that he was approached by the respondent to
convince the judge, his close family friend, to rule in
Atty. Singsons favor.

ISSUE: WON respondent should be administratively
disciplined or disbarred from the practice of law for
the alleged misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge
Antonio Reyes.

RULING:
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer ap-
proaching a judgeor a judge evincing a willing-
nessto discuss, in private, a matter related to a
case pending in that judges sala cannot be over-
emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on
different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through
a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude
that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the
judge to rule in his clients favor. This conduct is not
acceptable in the legal profession. Canon 13 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins it:
Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his
cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence or gives the appearance of influencing
the court.
While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps
not be supported by evidence other than Judge
Reyes statements, there is nevertheless enough
proof to hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical be-
havior of attempting to influence a judge, itself a
transgression of considerable gravity.

In Re Integration of Philippine bar

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration

submitted its
Report with the earnest recommendation on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526

of the Court, and
consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants,
as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment
of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Hon-
orable (Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the
adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court
Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally
prays the Court to order the integration of the Philip-
pine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far
as possible and practicable to existing provincial
and other local Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitu-
tional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the
Bar at this time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the
Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Ar-
ticle VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to promulgate
rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice
of law.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the ex-
haustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integra-
tion, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is per-
fectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,
within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effec-
tively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, or-
dained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines
effective January 16, 1973.
In Re IBP Elections

A basic postulate of the IBP, heavily stressed at the
time of its organization and commencement of exist-
ence, is that the IBP shall be non-political in charac-
ter and that there shall be no lobbying nor cam-
paigning in the choice of members of the Board of
Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of
the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter

It is evident that the manner, in which the principal
candidates for the national positions in the IBP con-
ducted their campaign preparatory to the elections
on 9 June 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-
Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a strictly
non-political Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4
of the By-Laws

The candidates and many of the participants in that
election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but
also the ethics of the legal profession which im-
poses on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obliga-
tion to obey and uphold the constitution and the
laws, the duty to promote respect for law and legal
processes and to abstain from activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, CPR). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves,
who are supposed to be minions of the law, engage
in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the
very rules that the IBP formulated for their ob-
servance. The unseemingly ardor with which the
candidates pursued the presidency of the associa-
tion detracted from the dignity of the legal profes-
sion. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being
bribed to vote in one way or another certainly did
not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it
in the public esteem.

Rule 7.01 A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppress-
ing a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar.

A student aspiring to be a lawyer must, at that early
period, study and observe the duties and responsi-
bilities of a lawyer. He cannot claim that not being a
member of the bar, the CPR does not apply to him.
One who aspires to profess the law must show his
fitness for admission by adherence to, or ob-
servance of, the standards of conduct required of all
members of the bar. For failure to live up to them
may prevent him from being admitted to practice
and, if admitted without the SC acquiring knowledge
of his transgressions thereof, he may be disbarred
for such misconduct.

Every applicant for admission to the practice of law
must:

Be an RP citizen and resident (because an alien
cannot maintain allegiance to RP, which the law-
yers oath requires)
Be at least 21 years old
Be a person of good moral character
Show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude are filed or pending in court

SC decides WON an offense involves moral turpi-
tude. Applicant must disclose under oath in applica-
tion form any crime of which he is charged. Con-
cealment or withholding from court of fact that crime
charged is ground for disqualification of applicant to
take the bar exam, or for revocation of license to
practice. If what the applicant concealed is a crime
that doesnt involve moral turpitude, it is the fact of
concealment and not the commission of the crime it-
self that makes him morally unfit to become a law-
yer.

Possess the required educational qualifications

(four-year high school course + bachelors degree in
arts or sciences with PolSci/ Logic/ English/ Span-
ish/ History/ Economics as a major field of concen-
tration + 4 year bachelors degree in law with com-
pleted courses in civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international
law, political law, labor and social legislation, medi-
cal jurisprudence, taxation, legal ethics). Courses of
study must be completed in an authorized and rec-
ognized university, college, or school, and must be
taken progressively in the usual manner (e.g. appli-
cant who only completed pre-law after he began
studying law not qualified to take the bar)

Pass the bar exams.

The SC may likewise prescribe such other qualifica-
tions or requirements as it may deed necessary to
elevate the standards of the legal profession. The
additional qualifications may be apart from whatever
qualifications the legislature may provide.

By seeking admission to practice of law, applicant
assumes the burden of proof to establish all those
qualifications to the court. He must, accordingly,
produce sufficient evidence to clear any doubt as to
any of his qualifications. But after having presented
prima facie evidence of his qualifications, it is in-
cumbent upon anyone objecting to his admission to
offer contrary evidence to overcome the applicants
prima facie showing.

The fact that the bar exam committee has passed
upon, and is satisfied with, the applicants qualifica-
tions will not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry
on the same question in a disbarment proceeding
where that question is raised as an issue. The law-
yers name may not, however, be stricken from the
roll of attorneys by reason of alienage, non-comple-
tion of prescribed course, or bad moral character in
the presence of clearly preponderant evidence that
he did not, in fact possess the necessary qualifica-
tions at the time of his admission. The burden of
proof, in such a case, shifts to the complainant.

In Re Emil Jurado

Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspa-
per of general circulation, the Manila Standard. He
describes himself as a columnist, who incidentally
happens to be a lawyer,, had been writing about al-
leged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary
over several months (from about October, 1992 to
March, 1993). Other journalists had also been mak-
ing reports or comments on the same subject. At
the same time, anonymous communications were
being extensively circulated, by hand and through
the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the
courts. And all these were being repeatedly and in-
sistently adverted to by certain sectors of society.
Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at
Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the
decision promulgated by this Court on August 27,
1992, in the so-called controversial case of Philip-
pine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern
Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No,
94374. In that decision the Court was sharply di-
vided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner
PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the
opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other
newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a re-
port of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles
Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentle-
man, it appears, had been commissioned by one of
the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philip-
pines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the deci-
sion of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his
prior ponencias and the writings of one of the law-
yers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if
the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by
the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the
Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the
writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of
the Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to un-
disclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the
Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some
undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one;
the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified trial judges in Ma-
kati and three other cities. He adverts to an anony-
mous group of justices and judges for whom a bank
allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices
of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vaca-
tion in Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order
Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Re-
ports of Corruption in the Judiciary, to investigate
the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter
affidavit was also received from the public utility,
denying the allegations in Jurados column. The Su-
preme Court then issued a resolution ordering that
the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the
public utility company be docketed and acted upon
as an official Court proceeding for the determination
of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado
are true.
HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in which
they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility,
and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury
that he might cause to the name and reputation of
those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt
of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or
abase the administration of justice and the judges
engaged in that function. By doing them, he has
placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, de-
cent and responsible journalists who live by their
Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all
times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their
calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may
further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should
enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false state-
ment and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm
for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or
otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. The provision
is reflective of the universally accepted precept of
abuse of rights, one of the most dominant princi-
ples which must be deemed always implied in any
system of law.
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascer-
taining the truth of the statements when publishing
statements which are clearly defamatory to identifia-
ble judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as
voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of con-
duct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are com-
monly required from private persons. Nevertheless,
persons who seek or accept appointment to the Ju-
diciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having
forfeited any right to private honor and reputation.
For to so rule will be to discourage all save those
who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from
becoming judges. The public interest involved in
freedom of speech and the individual interest of
judges (and for that matter, all other public officials)
in the maintenance of private honor and reputation
need to be accommodated one to the other. And the
point of adjustment or accommodation between
these two legitimate interests is precisely found in
the norm which requires those who, invoking free-
dom of speech, publish statements which are
clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other
public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascer-
taining the truth of the statements they publish. The
norm does not require that a journalist guarantee
the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless disregard of private repu-
tation by publishing or circulating defamatory state-
ments without any bona fide effort to ascertain the
truth thereof.
In re Tulfo

Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspa-
per of general circulation, the Manila Standard. He
describes himself as a columnist, who incidentally
happens to be a lawyer,, had been writing about al-
leged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary
over several months (from about October, 1992 to
March, 1993). Other journalists had also been mak-
ing reports or comments on the same subject. At
the same time, anonymous communications were
being extensively circulated, by hand and through
the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the
courts. And all these were being repeatedly and in-
sistently adverted to by certain sectors of society.
Events Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at
Bar.
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the
decision promulgated by this Court on August 27,
1992, in the so-called controversial case of Philip-
pine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern
Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No,
94374. In that decision the Court was sharply di-
vided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner
PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the
opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other
newspapers published, on January 28, 1993, a re-
port of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles
Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentle-
man, it appears, had been commissioned by one of
the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philip-
pines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the deci-
sion of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his
prior ponencias and the writings of one of the law-
yers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain if
the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by
the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the
Gutierrez decision looks, reads and sounds like the
writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of
the Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to un-
disclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the
Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some
undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one;
the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified trial judges in Ma-
kati and three other cities. He adverts to an anony-
mous group of justices and judges for whom a bank
allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices
of this Court who reportedly spent a prepaid vaca-
tion in Hong Kong with their families.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order
Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Re-
ports of Corruption in the Judiciary, to investigate
the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter
affidavit was also received from the public utility,
denying the allegations in Jurados column. The Su-
preme Court then issued a resolution ordering that
the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the
public utility company be docketed and acted upon
as an official Court proceeding for the determination
of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado
are true.
HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in which
they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility,
and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury
that he might cause to the name and reputation of
those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt
of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or
abase the administration of justice and the judges
engaged in that function. By doing them, he has
placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, de-
cent and responsible journalists who live by their
Code or the Golden Rule and who strive at all
times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their
calling.
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may
further the fruitful exercise of the right of free
speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should
enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false state-
ment and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm
for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or
otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. The provision
is reflective of the universally accepted precept of
abuse of rights, one of the most dominant princi-
ples which must be deemed always implied in any
system of law.
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascer-
taining the truth of the statements when publishing
statements which are clearly defamatory to identifia-
ble judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as
voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of con-
duct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are com-
monly required from private persons. Nevertheless,
persons who seek or accept appointment to the Ju-
diciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having
forfeited any right to private honor and reputation.
For to so rule will be to discourage all save those
who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from
becoming judges. The public interest involved in
freedom of speech and the individual interest of
judges (and for that matter, all other public officials)
in the maintenance of private honor and reputation
need to be accommodated one to the other. And the
point of adjustment or accommodation between
these two legitimate interests is precisely found in
the norm which requires those who, invoking free-
dom of speech, publish statements which are
clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other
public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascer-
taining the truth of the statements they publish. The
norm does not require that a journalist guarantee
the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm
does prohibit the reckless disregard of private repu-
tation by publishing or circulating defamatory state-
ments without any bona fide effort to ascertain the
truth thereof.
Cayetano v Monsod

FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25,
1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity
of the confirmation by the Commission on Appoint-
ments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a pe-
tition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elec-
tions be declared null and void because Monsod did
not meet the requirement of having practiced law for
the last ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable con-
sideration engages in the business of advising per-
son, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, ref-
eree, board, body, committee, or commission con-
stituted by law or authorized to settle controversies.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative ca-
pacity, engages in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philip-
pine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philip-
pines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-man-
ager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor verily more than sat-
isfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Mauricio Ulep v Legal Clinic

Facts:
Mauricio C. Ulep, petitioner, prays this
Court "to order the respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., to cease and desist from issuing advertise-
ments similar to or of the same tenor as that of An-
nexes `A' and `B' (of said petition) and to perpetu-
ally prohibit persons or entities from making adver-
tisements pertaining to the exercise of the law pro-
fession other than those allowed by law. The ad-
vertisements complained of by herein petitioner are
as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THEPlease call: 521-0767,
LEGAL5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC.8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on
Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Spe-
cial Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remar-
riage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Chil-
dren. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
LEGALErmita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the ad-
vertisements above reproduced are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and de-
structive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the re-
liefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent ad-
mits the fact of publication of said advertisements at
its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the
practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services ad-
vertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the
light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen
vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Issue:
Whether or not the services offered by re-
spondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.

Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the ser-
vices offered by the respondent constitute practice
of law. The definition of practice of law is laid down
in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, as defined:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and as-
sisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident
to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and
the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces
all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law."

The contention of respondent that it merely
offers legal support services can neither be seri-
ously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is
belied by respondent's own description of the ser-
vices it has been offering. While some of the ser-
vices being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical know-how,
such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law of-
fices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an excep-
tion to the general rule. What is palpably clear is
that respondent corporation gives out legal infor-
mation to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that
such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, di-
vorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this
Court that all that respondent corporation will simply
do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the
client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called parale-
gals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertise-
ments represent and for which services it will conse-
quently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "prac-
tice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by
the fact that respondent corporation does not repre-
sent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to
court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

That fact that the corporation employs para-
legals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the prac-
tice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it
renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of
the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements
which it has caused to be published and are now
assailed in this proceeding. The standards of the le-
gal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement
of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertis-
ing his goods. The proscription against advertising
of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice
of law is a profession. The canons of the profession
tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer
is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and effi-
cient service to a client as well as to the community
has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of ef-
fective service which is right and proper. A good
and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily
sees the difference between a normal by-product of
able service and the unwholesome result of propa-
ganda.

Alawi v Alauya

Facts of the Case:

Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of EB
Villarosa & Partners, Co. Ltd. Of Davao City, while
Ashari Alauya is an incumbent executive clerk of
court of 4
th
Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City.

Alawi and Alauya were classmates and
friends. Through Alawis agency, a contract was ex-
ecuted for the purchase on instalments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the abovemen-
tioned firm. Thereafter, a housing loan was granted
to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC). On December 15, 1995,
Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Vil-
larosa and Co. advising the termination of contract
with the company, on the ground that Alauyas con-
sent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by sales
agent which makes the contract void ab initio.

Alauya also wrote to Vice President of Credit
and Collection Group of National Home Mortgage Fi-
nance Corp. (NHMFC) repudiating as fraudulent and
void his contract with Villarosa & Co. and asking for
a cancellation of his housing loan.

Alauya also wrote to Ms. Corazon Ordonez,
Head of Fiscal Management and Budget Office, and
to the Chief, Finance Division of Supreme Court to
stop deductions from his salary.

Alawi filed on SC a verified complaint dated
January 25, 1996, to which she appended a copy of
the letter and accused Alauya of:

Imputation of libellous charges with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith.
Causing undue injury.
Unauthorized enjoyment of free postage.
Usurpation of the title attorney which only
regular members of the Philippine Bar may
use.


Alauya thereafter claims that Alawi was only en-
vious of him for being an Executive Clerk of Court but
also a scion of a Royal Family. He also claimed that
Alawi falsified his signature.

As with the use of the title attorney, he justified it
by assertion that it is synonymous with Counsellors-
at-Law. He preferred to use attorney because coun-
sellor is often mistaken for councillor.


Issue:

Whether or not Alauya is guilty of libel-
lous charges without solid grounds through
bad faith.
Whether or not Alauya is entitled to use
the appellation attorney.



Court Ruling:

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713) enun-
ciates the State policy of promoting a high standard
of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public ser-
vice. Public officials and employees must at all times
respect the rights of others and refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest.

The conduct of behaviour of every official
and employee of an agency involved in administra-
tion of justice from presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with heavy burden of
responsibility.

He must act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

As to Alauyas usurpation of the title attor-
ney, the Court has declared that persons who
passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledge members
of the Philippine bar. His disinclination to use the title
counsellor does not warrant his use of the title at-
torney.


In In re Meling, the Court said that the title
attorney is reserved only to those, who, having ob-
tained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing, and it is
they who are authorized to practice law in this juris-
diction.