I

Addressing the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo: what is the role of the
international instruments put into place to deal with this
issue?


Bachelor thesis














II
Contents
Cover page .I
Table of contents .II
List of Abbreviations .III
Section 1. Introduction to the subject1
1.1 The issues that will be discussed in this thesis .1
1.2 The themes discussed in the thesis 1
1.3 The significance of the research conducted in this area ...2
Section 2. The legal framework..2
2.1 The United Nations convention on the rights of the child .. 3
2.2 The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol ..... 3
2.3 The International Labour Organization . 5
2.4 The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court . 7
2.5 The Paris Principles and Commitments ... 8
Section 3. The use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo9
3.1 the global issue of using child soldiers in armed conflicts .. 9
3.2 pinpointing the cause of the ongoing conflict in the Congo ... 10
3.3 Child soldiers and the Democratic Republic of the Congo ... 11
Section 4. Tackling the issue of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo ..12
4.1 Practical difficulties . 12
4.2 The role of the committee on the rights of the child .. 14
4.3 the role of NGOs in monitoring the optional protocol .. 15
4.4 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) ... 17
Section 5. Conclusion .18
Figures . 20
Bibliography .22
Internet sources 25
III
List of abbreviations
AFDL Alliance des Forces Dmocratiques pour la Libration du Congo-Zare
AP- I Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
AP - II Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
CNDP Congrs national pour la dfense du peuple
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARDC Forces Armes de la Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo
FLDR Forces dmocratiques de libration du Rwanda
ICC International Criminal Court
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ILO International Labor Organization
M23 Mouvement du 23 Mars
MONUC lOrganisation des Nations Unies en Rpublique Dmocratique du Congo

MONUSCO Mission de lOrganisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Rpublique
Dmocratique du Congo

NGO Non Governmental Organization

OP-AC Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in
Armed Conflict
RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dmocratie
TRIAL Swiss Association Against Impunity
UN United Nations
UNICEF United Nations Childrens Emergency Fund


1
Section 1. Introduction to the subject
1.1 the issue that will be dealt with in the thesis
The recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts is a human rights infringement which is
recognized worldwide as one of the worst forms of child labor
1
and has even been classified as a war
crime
2
because of the psychological strain
3
and obvious physical risk involved. The concentration of this
problem is in the African continent as most of these countries have limited resources for countering
this problem along with severe political instability.
4
A big milestone in tackling this issue was adopting
the United Nations optional protocol to the convention of the child on the involvement of children in
armed conflict which entered into force on February 12th 2002.
5
The ratification of this protocol has
been widespread and there are 156 parties to the convention as of June 2014.
6
Considering the limited
scale of this thesis, its focus is exclusively on the way this problem is tackled in one particular
geographic area: the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The issue of using child soldiers has been
particularly widespread in this country as they are recruited by rebel groups like the M23 offensive
7

which have become active in awakening the conflict in the area since 2009.
8

1.2 the themes discussed in the thesis
The main question that will be answered in this thesis is: What is the role of the various international
instruments protecting childrens rights in combating the issue of child soldiering in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo?
Other questions that will be focused on in this thesis are:
1. What are the different judicial instruments which govern the issue of child soldiers?

2. What are the practical difficulties that arise when attempting to solve the issue of child
soldiers?

3. How has the legal protection of children involved in armed conflicts evolved througout the
years?

4. How does the Committee on the Rights of the Child practice its monitoring duties when it
comes to the implementation of the Optional Protocol in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo?

5. What is the role of NGOs in addressing the issue of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo?



1
Art. 3(a) ILO convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour
2
Article 5 and 8 (2)(b) XXVI Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
3
See 4.1
4
Hartjen, 2012
5
Coomaraswamy, 2010, p. 537
6
United Nations, 2014
7
The group takes its name (Mouvement du 23- Mars) from the date of peace accords between the United Nations and the
DRC government.
8
Nangine, et al., 2014, p. 3
2
To get to the bottom of these questions Ill be focusing on the following themes:
The first theme to be explored is that of international human rights rules which aim to protect the
rights of the children and their added value to the protection of children in armed conflict. The most
prominent of these instruments is the optional protocol to the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OP-AC). This protocol is monitored
by the committee on the Rights of the Child which is made up of 18 independent experts on the
subject of childs rights.
9

The theme that the thesis will next focus on is that of the main issue: the use of child soldiers in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. This use has a long history starting with the first Congo war
10
and
has remained an issue ever since. The ongoing conflict which has been at the root of the problem is
caused by a complex of reasons which are hard to comprehend and therefore often unjustly simplified
by the international community and the academic world.
There will consequently be an overview of what the various legal instruments have contributed to the
attempt to mitigate the problem of recruitment and use of child soldiers. The latest report of the DRC
to the committee of the Rights of the Child on its implementation of the optional protocol which
provides a deeper understanding into the complexity of the issue and the different factors in play will
be discussed along with the supporting role NGOs provide in monitoring the issue. Lastly the UN
mission in the DRC which has a specific mandate to prevent recruitment of children and to provide
reintegration programmes will be shortly elaborated.
1.3 The significance of the research into this topic
The topic discussed in this topic is very relevant; the military groups in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, particularly those which are active in the South Kivu province are tremendously destructive.
11
A
strict compliance of the optional protocol and other human rights instruments governing this issue
would not only stop horrendous infringements of the human rights of these children, it would also help
in diminishing the capacity of these military rebel groups, thereby weakening them. The challenge lies
in solving such a problem in a third world country with such a hostile political climate.
12
Evaluating the
effectiveness of the legal framework dealing with this problem might be instrumental in finding out
what it would take to solve not only the problem of child soldiers in the region but also the underlying
conflicts.
Section 2. The legal framework
The protection of children involved in armed conflict has had a long history; it started with the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977.
13
The protocols included provisions such as
the obligation of the states to take all feasible measures to prevent children under the age of fifteen
from taking direct part in hostilities,
14
and prohibiting the recruitment and the participation of
children under the age of fifteen in hostilities.
15



9
UNICEF, 2009
10
See 3.2.1
11
ASADHO et al., 2012, p. 7
12
Further discussed in 3.2.2
13
Williams, 2011, p. 1075
14
Additional Protocol I Article 77
15
Additional Protocol II Article 4 Para. 3c
3
It took a long time after these initial protection mechanisms were put in place for humanitarian law to
catch up to this issue and provide further protection. The convention on the rights of the rights of the
child (CRC) which came into force in 1989 had only a limited role in strengthening the position of child
soldiers and tackling this issue.
16
The biggest development that has occurred since the CRC is the
adoption of the optional protocol to this convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict.
The optional protocol which has been put in to force in 2002 has gained worldwide support and
ratification from states. The aim of this section of the thesis is to provide clarification as to how the
treaty, optional protocol, the treaty body and other childrens rights instruments work together to
address the issue.
2.1 The United Nations convention on the rights of the child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is the most widely ratified childrens rights instrument.
17
The
main article of the convention which deals with the issue of children involved in armed conflict is
Article 38. The inclusion of this article was a reaction to a report by Graa Machel
18
on the effects of
armed conflict on children. In this report Machel advocates that children involved in armed conflicts
are a vulnerable group in need of adequate legal protection.
19
The article lays down the same
obligation
20
and prohibition
21
as the additional protocol to the Geneva Convention. It also adopts the
same age limit of fifteen years as article 38 CRC. A considerable strength of article 38 is that it applies
to all armed conflicts
22
and is therefore devoid of needlessly discerned categories like the ones that the
Geneva Convention and its protocols use.
23

Article 38s first paragraph compels the state parties to respect rules of international humanitarian law
applicable to the field of children in armed conflict which the State is has ratified.
24
This inducement
applies to both universal provisions like those mentioned in the optional protocol and the ILO
convention on the Worst Kinds of Child Labor and regional instruments like the African charter on the
rights and welfare of the child
25
. A third category which falls under the statutes obligation are soft law
provisions such as Security Council resolutions and the Paris Commitments.
26

2.2 The Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol
Art. 38 CRC has been under considerable scrutiny for not raising the maximum age of protection from
fifteen to eighteen. The article was also criticized for the fact that it only prohibited direct
participation.


16
It devoted only two articles: 38 and 39 to the matter
17
Kimmel & Roby, 2007, p. 746
18
UN expert on the issue of children involved with armed conflict (Kimmel & Roby, 2007)
19
Ang, 2005, p. 1
20
Art. 38 CRC Para.2
21
Art. 38 CRC Para.3
22
Ang, 2005, p.23
23
The protection of the Geneva Convention and its protocols is limited to cases of international conflict high intensity non
international conflict and low intensity international conflict (Ang 2005, p.23)
24
All rules that have customary law status and rules made by legally binding instruments which the state is a party to, the
instrument providing the most substantial protection is to be followed. (Ang, 2005, p. 25)
25
The DRC is not a party to this particular convention and it therefore will not be discussed further in this thesis.
26
Ang, 2005
4
Drafting the optional protocol was the UNs way of appeasing the international community and
reacting to the criticism.
27
The first article of the optional protocol is a repetition of the obligation to
take all feasible measures that weve already come across.
Where the optional protocol differs however is the establishment of a new minimum age of protection
at eighteen years. The Optional Protocol has suffered however under international negotiations and
couldnt find enough support for a provision which would include indirect participation.
28

The article provides a wider scope of protection for victims of child recruitment by specifying the
obligation in Article 1 to apply to hostilities instead of to armed conflict. This expansion is the result
of the definition of hostilities
29
being more inclusive than that of armed conflict.
30
Article 2 of the
Optional Protocol provides a prohibition on the compulsory recruitment of children under the age of
eighteen while allowing voluntary enlistment below that age. Voluntary recruitment still has a lower
limit of fifteen years of age in place but there have to be enough safeguards in place to ascertain that
the inscription is voluntary; children between the ages of fifteen and eighteen who are involved in
armed conflicts more often than not face problems such as limited economic resources and substantial
poverty.
31

The reality of these hardships causes the international community to doubt the voluntary nature of the
choice to be involved with armed conflict. It has therefore been suspicious of the necessity of the
division between voluntary and compulsive recruitment.
32
Article 4 of the Optional Protocol has
responded to this criticism by eliminating this distinction for armed groups which are distinct from the
armed forces of a State.
33
These groups are prohibited from recruiting anyone under the age of
eighteen. This article has great relevance for the situation in the DRC as the vast majority of child
soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is affiliated with rebel groups.
34

Art. 6 and 7 of the Optional Protocol urge the party states to cooperate in order to demobilize,
rehabilitate and reintegrate persons who have been a victim of child recruitment and have been used
in hostilities by armed forces and groups. This has led to the widespread practice of DDR-
processes
35
which are used to comply with this provision.
36

The Optional Protocol is monitored by the Committee on the Rights of the Child which is a body made
up of 18 independent experts.
37
It was formed on the basis of Art.43 CRC which describes it as a
monitory body who would review reports which the state parties would send the committee regularly.

27
Coomaraswamy, 2010, p. 538
28
Ibid, p.539
29
Described at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1974 1977 as acts of war that by their nature or purpose [strike] at
the personal and material of enemy armed forces. (Poulatova, 2013, p. 74)
30
In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross an armed conflict is a situation during which there are
periods of hostilities, interspersed with periods of truce. (International Committee of the Red Cross , 1998)
31
Article 3 OP-AC
32
Coomaraswamy, 2010, p.540
33
Also called non-state actors
34
See figure 3 en 4
35
Acronym for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
36
Pauletto & Patel, 2010
37
UNICEF, 2009
5
The Committee would go through each of these reviews in order to provide recommendations and
improve the implementation of the convention. After the implementation of OP-AC, the duties of the
committee were expanded to include monitoring this Optional Protocol in the same way.
38

Every state that is a party to the Optional Protocol has to submit an initial report two years after
acceding to it and then subsequent periodic reports every five years. The Committee is in charge of
reviewing and evaluating each of these reports
39
and making recommendations to the state called
concluding observations.
40

In addition to the reports given to it by the States themselves the Committee uses information sent to
it by Civil Society Organizations when evaluating the implementation of the Optional Protocol in the
State.
41
These shadow reports or alternative reports allow for agencies assigned to the protection
of children to express their own views of the reality and thereby provide a different perspective on the
problem from the states own report.
42

The committee has supplementary projects in addition to its tasks under Art. 43 CRC. It works with a
range of actors
43
in an effort to maintain international collaboration. The results of these efforts are
shared biennially with the UN General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council.
44

2.3 International Labour Organization
The Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour
45
, adopted in 1999 was the first convention in
which the ILO specifically addressed the problem of child soldiering. It has an important part within the
ILO framework for its considered one of the core conventions.
46


The reason for this inclusion was consensus between the member states that the recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict was grave enough to elicit being addressed as one of the worst forms
of child labour. It was however not regarded as a standalone category but as a form of slavery.
47


The body that monitors the convention is the Committee of Experts. This is carried out through a
process of state reporting. The ILO constitution requires member states to provide an annual report of
the conventions it has ratified.
48
This has been further elaborated by the committee; every country
must submit its first report on the implementation of a convention within a year after ratification.
This obligation is reduced to once every two years after the first report in the case of core
conventions.
49


38
Poulatova, 2013, p. 77
39
See 4.1.2 for a consideration of the first reporting cycle of the DRC
40
CRC Guidelines Regarding Initial Reports to be submitted by State Parties under Article 8 Paragraph 1 of OP-AC.
41
45(a) CRC
42
Poulatova, 2013, p. 80
43
multilateral agencies, donor countries and developing countries (UNICEF, 2009)
44
UNICEF, 2009
45
Full title: The Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labour
46
Cullen, 2011, p.67
47
Art. 3(a) ILO convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour: all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery including
forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict
48
Art. 22 ILO Constitution
49
Cullen, 2011, p.69
6
In analyzing the countrys obligation under the convention, the committee relies on supplemental
information from childrens rights authorities such as IPEC, the UN Security Council and UNICEF.
50


Since the implementation of the convention the issue of child soldiers has become of significant
interest to the ILO. This has resulted in different projects aimed at assisting the elimination of the
problem. One of these programs: the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC)
has been instrumental in preventing the recruitment of children and in furthering the reintegration of
former child soldiers.
51
One of these projects is the ILO Inter-regional Programme on the Prevention
and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict. The reintegration is heavily focused on
improving the socio-economic circumstances of former child soldiers.
52
This is achieved using forms of
informal apprenticeships to teach jobs to former child soldiers. This technique has proved effective
considering the lack of educational resources in the area
53
and the fact that former child soldiers often
lack professional skills.
54
IPEC is also active in carrying out a number of measures aimed at the
prevention of further recruitment of children by armed forces.
55


The convention and its elaboration by the committee of experts provide children involved with armed
conflict with an extensive set of rights. The convention defines the word child as all persons under the
age of 18
56
and therefore raises the bar from the age of fifteen provided in the additional protocols to
the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, the convention is not solely concerned with child combatants
but it applies a broader definition of the term child soldier, similar to the one expressed in the Paris
Principles.
57
Moreover, the committee has extended the scope of protection from mere recruitment of
children to include using them in conflict.
58


Lastly, the committee expects states to criminalize both forced and compulsory recruitment of children
and engage in preventive measures to counter recruitment by armed forces.
59


In the final report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
60
the committee of experts stresses the
amount of recruitment and use of child soldiers taking place by not only rebel groups but also by the
FARDC.
61
It also urges the country to abide by the Security Council resolution 1998 which asks the
member states to take criminal steps to prosecute those who commit war crimes, in this case the
perpetrators of child recruitment.
62



50
Ibid, p.71
51
Ibid, p.64
52
International Labour Organization, 2007
53
The report is evaluating the situation in the DRC (Bunia region) as well as that of the Ivory Coast but it uses the same
techniques in both circumstances for they are similar regions in the socio-economic and political sense.
54
International Labour Organization, 2010
55
International Labour Organization, 2007
56
Article 2 ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.
57
The ILOs concern is not limited to the cases where children are used as combatants, but extends to the use of children for
auxiliary activities for armed groups (e.g. cooks, porters, or sexual services). (Cullen , 2011 p.72)
58
Committee of Experts, Individual Observation concerning Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182) Burundi
(ratification: 2002), published: 2005
59
Cullen 2011, p. 74
60
Committee of Experts, Individual Observation concerning Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.182)
Democratic Republic of Congo (ratification: 2001), published: 2006
61
The national army of the DRC
62
Article 5 and 8 (2)(b) XXVI Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, addressed in 2.5
7
2.4 The Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute is the treaty that established the International Criminal Court. It was a result
of a conference
63
attended by 160 states, 33 intergovernmental organizations and 236
NGOs.
64
Article 5 of the statute assigns the competence of the International Criminal Court in
the event of the execution of a war crime
65
by an individual
66
. Article 8 provides an inventory
of different crimes that constitute war crimes. The provision lists the use, conscription and
enlistment of children to participate actively in hostility as a war crime. The ICCs protection
is limited however for it uses the age limit of fifteen years.
67


The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a party to the Rome Statute
68
and therefore the court
may bring crimes that have taken place on the territory of the DRC provided that it has the
permission of the DRC government or that of the state of which the individual bares the
nationality.
69
The first instance of a person being convicted for the war crime of conscripting
and using child soldiers
70
was the rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
71
who enlisted
72
and
used children under the age of fifteen for the purpose of participation in hostilities from
September 2002 to August 2003.
73


The International Criminal Court followed this decision up by prosecuting two more citizens
74

of the DRC for the war crime of enlisting and using children in hostilities.
75


In its Lubanga judgment the ICC elaborates that the conscription and enlisting of children is a
separate violation from using them in hostilities.
76
It further implicitly stresses that the
voluntary nature of the conscription for military services cannot be considered an exculpatory
fact.
77
This point of view is illustrated in the courts reiteration of the expert witness Elizabeth
Schauers views in which she states that children are unable to express consent to join an
armed group because of their limited understanding of the consequences of their choices.
78


63
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(ICC) which took place in Rome from June 15 -17 1998.
64
Arsanjani, 1999 , p.22
65
Article 5 (1)(c) Rome Statute
66
Article 1 Rome Statute: shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
67
Article 8 (b) (xxvi) Rome Statute: Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed
forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
68
Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 2011
69
Article 12 Rome Statute
70
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012
71
Wagner, 2013 , p.145
72
Into the Force Patriotique pour la Libration du Congo (FLPC)
73
Drumbl, 2014 , p.87
74
Germain Katanga, commander of the Force de Rsistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI), and Mathieu Ngudjolo, former leader
of the Front des Nationalistes et des Intgrationnistes (FNI) (Waddell, et al., 2008 , p.39)
75
Waddell, et al., 2008 , p.39
76
Lubanga trial judgment par. 609
77
Insofar as much of the evidence adduced in the trial related to enlistment of volunteers, the legal irrelevance of this fact
was clearly pertinent. At times, the Trial Judgment refers to the voluntary nature of the recruitment. It explicitly uses
quotation marks around the term, ostensibly to denote skepticism at the possibility that the recruitment could actually be
voluntary. (Drumbl, 2014 , p. 103)
78
Lubanga trial judgment par. 610
8
The court modified the aforementioned statements by allowing the manner of conscription to
be considered in the court decision on sentencing and reparations.
79


In the same judgment the court defines the sentence using a child to participate actively in
hostilities as a situation in which the support provided by the child to the combatants
exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target.
80


2.5 The Paris Principles and Commitments
The Cape Town Principles and Best Practices were constructed during a meeting of child protection
experts who were gathered in Cape Town, South Africa in 1997. In the course of the meeting these
experts came up with a number of standards, guidelines and good practice on both preventive
measures to keep children from being recruited as well as ways to integrate children back into their
communities once theyre affiliated with armed forces.
81

In celebrating the ten-year anniversary of these principles, a couple of organizations involved in the
protection of children examined what theyve learned from the past ten years and hereby created a
new set of principles called The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed
Forces and Armed Groups. In the same deliberations the organizations conceived a set of
commitments
82
which ended up being enforced by 58 countries who agreed to abide by them.
83

The Paris Principles advocate for the integration of the types of recruitment that are currently being
seen as distinguishable in the international law context. The principles therefore prohibit all three
forms
84
. The Paris Commitments urge the state parties that have agreed to them to abide by the
existing rules of international law which address the issue of protecting children involved with armed
forces. The Commitments are at the same time striving to change the direction of International law
and policy and afford more protection to the victims of child recruitment.
85

One of the documents aspirations is to eliminate the ability of children to volunteer their services to
state actors from the age of 15.
86
The Commitments furthermore advocate active investigation and
persecution of the perpetrators of child recruitment
87
and call for full cooperation with actions called
upon by the Security Council against parties to an armed conflict which use or recruit children.
88




79
Lubanga trial judgment par. 610
80
Ibid, par. 628
81
Stark, et al., 2009, p. 523
82
Conveniently called the Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or
Groups.
83
Stark, et al., 2009, p. 523
84
Compulsory, voluntary and forced recruitment (Principle 2.4)
85
Drumbl, 2012
86
Drumbl, 2012, p.244
87
Commitment 6
88
Commitment 8
9
Section 3. The use of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo
The problem of child soldiers is widespread and global, in 2005 Save the Children the total amount of
child soldiers as 250 000.
89
UNICEF had a slightly higher estimate at 300 000 in 2002.
90
A study by the
Brookings Institution claims that 80% of these children are under the age of fifteen.
91
The amount of
child soldiers in the eastern part of the Congo has been estimated at 8000 in 2009.
92
Academic scholars
believe that these figures will continue to increase.
93
Children are targeted specifically by armed
groups because of their undemanding nature, the low cost of sustaining them and their inane
impressionability among other factors.
94
The UN Secretary - General reported in his annual report on
children and armed conflict that 19 countries were involved with child recruitment between 2011 and
2012. Most of the victims of this human rights violation are concentrated in the African continent.
95

The African continent has experienced the fastest growth in the amount of child soldiers and the
average age of these children is declining at the same time. These numbers might suggest that the
international instruments in place to counter the issue are not effective.
96
This section will discuss the
issue of child soldiers in more depth and will subsequently go into the social and economic structures
responsible for the armed conflict in the DRC and will finally discuss the specifics of child soldiers in the
DRC.
3.1 the global issue of using children in armed conflicts
The way child soldiers are usually depicted in mass media images are as teenage boys carrying arms
portrayed as helpless, passive victims. This image however accurate it might be in certain
circumstances ignores any kind of nuance and generalizes the diverse group of children.
97

The term child soldier is most clearly described in the Paris Principles which defines A child
associated with an armed force or an armed group as:

any person below 18 years of age who is who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed
group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks,
porters, messengers or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a
direct part in hostilities.
98


Other tasks children are asked to perform are extremely hazardous and perilous such as laying
landlines
99
and to function as human shields.
100
This definition clearly shows that the phenomenon of
the child soldier is more complicated and multifaceted than what is depicted in the media and in the
minds of the global community.


89
Conradi, 2013, p. 1212
90
Breen, 2007, p. 71
91
Human Security Center , 2005
92
Pauletto & Patel, 2010
93
Rakisits, 2008; Achvarina & Reich, 2006
94
Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012, p.5
95
Rakisits, 2008
96
Ibid.
97
Drumbl, 2012, p. 38
98
2.1 of The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated With Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles)
99
Stark, et al., 2009, p. 524
100
Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012, p. 5
10
The substantial percentage of girls who are child soldiers is another illustration of the imbalance
between the reality and the depiction of child soldiers. The Save the Children report
101
reported that
girls accounted for 40 per cent of the total number of child soldiers worldwide.
102
The reason for such
a substantive percentage of female child soldiers lies in their ability to fulfill a multitude of roles within
the armed group: they are just as readily put to use as combatants as male soldiers but they can also
be used as sex slaves, caregivers to infants and spies among other tasks.
103

The main reason that so many children are successfully recruited lies in their impressionable nature.
Children are moldable and can therefore be manipulated in to becoming deadly warriors. After being
drafted children become dependent on the armed force their involved with and rely on them for
support and psychological identification.
104
The way children are treated by the armed forces they rely
on is often disruptive. Those who are unluckiest are often stripped of food and rest, viciously beaten
when they do something wrong and forced to perform horrendous acts such as kill and rape under the
influence of addictive substances.
105

Child soldiers have a variety of ways to get involved with armed forces. Sometimes theyre forced or
coerced into the armed forces. There are also some instances of children being born into armed
groups. The last and most prominent group is that of children who volunteer their services to the
armed forces.
106
The international community often underestimates the amount of children who
volunteer their services. There is often not enough attention being paid that children may volunteer
their services out of their inane impulsivity.
107

3.2 pinpointing the cause of the ongoing conflict in the Congo
The prominent contributing factor to the recruitment and use of child soldiers is the ongoing conflict in
the country. The presence of a variety of armed groups causing destruction is not a new thing in the
DRC. The country has been through two wars: the first (1996-1997) and second (1998-2002) Congo
wars. And the country has remained unstable even more than a decade after the latest war has come
to an end.
108
These conflicts arent concentrated in one region for guerilla groups can be found
wreaking havoc in the Kivu provinces,
109
the Ituri region where Ugandan troops attempt to hold on to
their power and the southern province of Katanga which has seen so much violence in recent times
that it has been renamed the triangle of death.
110
The situation seemed to improve with the defeat
of the M23 movement in November 23 but that defeat was only illusionary for the group has rapidly
recouped and has been active since the beginning of 2014.
111




101
Published in 2005
102
Conradi, 2013, p. 1212
103
Ibid.
104
Kimmel & Roby, 2007, p. 745
105
Ibid, p.746
106
Drumbl, 2012, p. 42
107
Ibid
108
Stearns, 2013
109
Jourdan, 2011 , p.90
110
Keulers, 2013
111
Ibid.
11
There have been several instances where tunnel vision by the international community as well as
academic scholars which have harmed solving the conflict and with it the use and recruitment by the
groups causing the conflict. The most obvious example is the trend to attribute the continuing nature
of the conflict to lack of political will of the government. This criticism is supported by the
governments tendency to reintegrate military groups into the FARDC
112
, but theres not enough
attention being paid to alternative (genuine) motives that the government might be pursuing.
113
The
same focus on a single theme is also seen when international actors see the conflict in the area as an
effect of the trade of mineral resources and the selectivity in focusing disproportionately on victims of
sexual abuse at the expense of others.
114

The DRC would best be served with foreign aid which understands the entire picture of the conflict in
the area and will invest in a future of growth and stability.
115
This will likely only happen when
humanitarian aid is carried out by more experience troops than is now the case with the UN peace
mission. The extent of the conflict in the DRC is too immense to be solved with a quick fix of donor aid
and small-scale humanitarian intervention.
116

3.3 Child soldiers and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Various scholars have argued the presence of a strong correlation between the social and economic
marginalization of young people in Africa and war in the same region.
117
The reasons for this
marginalization lie in a complex web of dynamics which has evolved over time. The disintegration of
the land distribution structure and state institutions such as the school system has contributed to this
marginalization.
118


In the eastern Congo, the enrollment into military groups is a rare chance to achieve social mobility
and to escape social marginalization.

When theres an existing conflict in an area, the intensification of
violence often means that enrollment is the only alternative to dying.
119
Armed groups often capitalize
on this development. An example of this is the armed group Mai Mai
120
which has used ritualistic
symbols such as the use of magic water
121
to shield bullets, to appeal to new, young recruits. This use
of ritualistic symbols which are culturally defined
122
promotes mobilization.
123
Recruits are further
enticed by the allure of asserting their self worth and gaining an entrance to new sources of power.
124

These observations are supported by empirical data gathered by UNICEF in 1997
125
and the ILO in
2007
126
which were centered on the motivations of children to join military groups.


112
The National army of the DRC
113
Baaz & Verweijen, 2013, p. 577-578
114
Autesserre, 2012
115
Stearns, 2012
116
Ibid.
117
Jourdan, 2011, p. 95
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid, p.97
120
Also often stylized as Mayi-Mayi
121
Known as Mayi , hence the name Mayi-Mayi
122
This use of magic water is a concept known throughout Africa and has been used to great effect to initiate the new
generations into armed forces and to entice them to fight.
123
Jourdan, 2011 , p.91
124
Ibid, p.90
125
See figure 1
126
see figure 2
12
Other prolific military group recruiting children in the area are the M23 rebellion, the Nyatura and the
FDLR
127
. According to MONUSCO which has a report on armed group recruitment in the region
between may 2012 and September 2013 the child recruitments by these three groups account for 45%
of the total figure of recruited children.
128

Section 4. Tackling the issue of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
4.1 Practical difficulties
The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict provides a clear mandate to
the member states to demobilize children involved with armed groups.
129
Fulfilling this commitment is
however not always without difficulty. Reintegration is often achieved through various DDR
programmes which are carried out by institutions such as MONUSCO
130
, IPEC
131
and a number of
NGOs.
132
The DDR programmes which currently take place in the DRC are structured through different
phases. The first phase is the removal of the child from the armed group their involved with, this is
followed by a replacement and structuring the childs life through school and ordinary life. This second
phase might be accompanied by psychological assistance provided that the child is observed as
requiring this assistance. Finally the child is put into the care of relatives or other responsible guardians
to care for them. In this final stage the child also is put into educational and vocational programmes to
provide a legitimate alternative to conscription into armed forces.
133

One of the difficulties faced when trying to get children away from armed forces is the reluctance of
the victims themselves to be extracted from an environment theyve acclimated to. As mentioned
earlier in the paper, girls are often given a number of different jobs within the armed group. Because of
this multitude of roles, the girls feel like a substantial part of the group which makes it hard to extract
them from that environment.
134
Among children who were used as combatants there is the danger
that they will eventually begin to see committing violent acts as rewarding. This psychological effect
called appetitive aggression is exacerbated when the combatants start at a younger age.
This results in more aggression former child combatants as opposed to their counterparts who have
started at a lower age.
135
This will complicate the removal of former combatants as well as the
prevention of rerecruitment.





127
Forces dmocratiques de libration du Rwanda
128
MONUSCO, 2013 , see figure 4
129
Article 6 (3) OP-AC: States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited
or used in hostilities contrary to this Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service.
130
See 4.4
131
Discussed in 2.3
132
e.g. Child Soldier International and Caritas
133
Pauletto & Patel, 2010 , p. 43
134
Conradi, 2013, p. 1212
135
Weierstall, et al., 2013, p. 505
13
Moreover, the Optional Protocol provides that member states are bound by the obligation to assist in
the social reintegration of these former child soldiers and to provide support for their physical and
psychological needs.
136
This is an arduous task for victims of child recruitment often return to the
communities where they were once recruited and at other times where they had committed horrible
acts. The psychological scarring that many child recruits suffer is also substantial and hard to treat.
137

The trauma of being separated from the armed forces mixed with the experiences of being in combat
can make former child combatants an easy target for post-traumatic stress disorder. This disorder
involves symptoms like severe panic attacks and feeling detached from ones environment.
138

Reintegration requires several years to be effective; therefore it has to be grounded in a long term
funding scheme to succeed.
139
Suboptimal reintegration could lead to former combatants going back
to the armed forces and becoming permanent members as well as a lasting impression on social
interaction.
140

Birth registration is the official way of recording a childs date of birth, and allows for the child to
receive a birth certificate. The CRC protects this right
141
as registration establishes the foundation of a
childs legal protection. It provides an important function in carrying out the Optional Protocol for it
provides the evidence of a person being either underage or an adult.
142
The social disorganization in
the DRC is demonstrated by its inadequate public administration which fails to keep decent birth
registration records. The low birth registration rates in the country
143
are a significant obstacle in
preventing inadvertent underage recruitment.
144
This is also problematic in the context of the
countrys obligation under ILO Convention no. 182 as the Committee of experts has stressed the
importance of engaging in preventive measures to counter recruitment by armed forces.
145

The Committee on the Rights of the Child has put the responsibility of determining the age of a recruit
on the recruiting authorities.
146
The use of alternative methods to documentary proof of age is
allowable. The most used methods to establish age are medical or physical methodologies but the
accuracy of these methods is questioned by medical professionals.
147

Both national Congolese law
148
and international treaties
149
urge the DRCs to uphold its obligation to
prohibit anyone under the age of 18 from being recruited into the armed forces. The difficulty in
ensuring that the DRC upholds it international obligations is that the greatest perpetrators of the crime
of child recruitment are non-state actors which are not bound by treaty law directly domestic law
which is often not and therefore must be tried by domestic law which are often not enforced.
150


136
Article 6 (3) OP-AC: States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to these persons all appropriate assistance for their
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.
137
Drumbl, 2012, p. 22
138
Kimmel & Roby, 2007, p. 747
139
zerdem & Podder, 2011, pp. 312-313
140
Kimmel & Roby, 2007
141
Art. 7 (1) CRC: The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right
to acquire a nationality
142
Child Soldiers International, 2012
143
28% according to (UNICEF, 2013)
144
Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012
145
Cullen 2011, p. 74
146
CRC/C/OPAC/EGY/CO/1 18
147
Child Soldiers International, 2012
148
Art.7 Congolese Military Law and Arts. 190 and 41 of the DRC constitution adopted in 2005
149
Most notably the discussed Optional Protocol and the ILO Convention No.182
150
Discussed in the next section
14
A related problem is the added hassle of dealing with multiple jurisdictions in the case of recruitments
which occur across borders or involve refugees from neighboring countries.
151


4.2 The role of the committee on the rights of the child
The Democratic Republic of the Congo delivered its first report to the committee in 2011.
152
The
Committee relied on information from different sources; the information provided in the report by
representatives of DRC, extensive reporting by the MONUSCO team
153
and reports from Civil Society
Organizations.
154
In this report the Committee sat down with representatives of the country and
addressed the problems it saw in upholding the Optional Protocol.
One of the first observations made by the Committee was that the legal framework which allows
criminal sanctions for recruitment and use of children in armed conflict hasnt greatly contributed to
persecutions or convictions of perpetrators of the crimes.
155
The Committee underscores the fact that
the State is providing the perpetrators another way to get away with their crimes by refusing to hand
known recruiters over to the International Criminal Court to be tried there.
156
The committee
consequently asked for information as to the steps the country has taken to integrate the provisions
given in the statute of Rome
157
in domestic law.
158
The committee was also critical of the continuous
employment of certain members of the FARDC which were known to disregard the Optional
Protocol.
159

The priorities of the country were also put into question. The vast investment of the country in
defense
160
and relatively little into health and education, this seems to misrepresent the causes of the
conflict in the area; namely economic misfortune and distribution and ownership of natural resources.
The budget would be better spend by a more substantial investment in stabilizing and reconstructing
the Eastern provinces.
161

This miscalculating is also seen in the budget for the judiciary; which is extremely low,
162
and might
partly be to blame for the corruption within the justice system.
163
The committee suggested that a
commensurate salary would mitigate the incentive to take bribes.
164

Another point that the committee continuously repeats is that the country is responsible for ending
the recruitment of children by all armed forces in its territory and that by ratifying the Optional
Protocol it has accepted this responsibility.
165


151
Bosch & Easthorpe, 2012
152
CRC/C/SR.1674
153
MONUSCO, 2013
154
TRIAL, 2011; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011
155
CRC/C/SR.1674, Para. 11
156
Ibid. Para. 21
157
Elaborated in 2.5
158
Ibid Para. 16
159
Ibid. Para. 11
160
30% of the state budget (Ibid. Para. 8)
161
Ibid. Para. 28-29
162
Less than 1% of the state budget
163
Ibid. Para. 51
164
Ibid Para. 54
165
Ibid. Para. 40
15
This opinion is most eloquently expressed in the following statement by one of the members of the
Committee:
The State party must honor its commitments. The Optional Protocol was being violated in every
possible way, and the State party bore responsibility for that even when the enlistment and use of
children was the work of other actors.
166

The Committee moreover points to the reluctance of the FARDC to check their militants in order to
eliminate the risk that any children were amongst them.
167
This is problematic because verified reports
by the United Nations show the occurrence of child recruitment within both the FARDC and the
Republican Guard.
168
Another concern raised was the steps taken to ensure that formed recruits
could benefit from DDR-programmes.
169
Training programmes which are provided for former child
soldiers by professionals should be provided as a part of the public education system and be separate
from efforts made by NGOs.
170

The committee wanted to be informed as to the specific mechanisms used for inter-regional
coordination as well as the method of raising awareness to this issue throughout the country, for this is
required under Article 6 par. 2 of the protocol.
171
The Committee furthermore urged the DRC to ensure
that children were not detained or arrested
172
since it had been informed that children were being
incarcerated in a military intelligence prison during the first six months of 2008.
173
Lastly, The
Committee also raised its concern on the problem of the low birth registration
174
in the country.
175


4.3 the role of NGOs in monitoring the optional protocol
NGOs (or non governmental organizations) are organizations that dont have any ties to a
government; they usually consist of activists who are devoted to working on specific issues and share
ideas and values. The tasks that NGOs carry out are essential, such as spreading information to raise
public awareness to an issue and remain in contact with more powerful organizations and
governments.
176
The role of NGOs within the UN is laid down in the UN charter.
177
NGOs have had a
considerable influence in the protection of childrens right in the drafting of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
178



166
Ibid. Para. 18
167
Ibid. Para. 15
168
Ibid. Para. 37
169
CRC/C/SR.1674, para. 17
170
Ibid Para. 23
171
Ibid. Para. 22
172
Ibid. para. 17
173
Ibid. Para. 31
174
See the previous section
175
Ibid. Para. 17
176
Breen, 2003
177
Art. 71 of the UN Charter: The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations, which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements shall be made with
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultations with the Member of the
United Nations concerned.
178
Breen, 2003
16
In 1983 the Ad Hoc NGO Group on the Drafting on the Convention on the Rights of the Child was
formed to play a role in drafting the CRC. The NGO ended up being of constructive influence on the
eventual text of the convention. A result of this positive cooperation has been the Conventions
mandate that it gives to NGOs in monitoring its implementation.
179
This feature is unique to the CRC as
there are no other international human rights treaties which give such powers to NGOs.
180

One of the privileges that NGOs enjoy is that they may express their opinions by attending public and
private meeting of the committee when they are invited by the monitoring body itself.
181
NGOs may
also submit reports to the committee pertaining to subjects they cover in their activities.
182
The
committee has encouraged NGOs to submit reports as to how they perceive the implementation of the
Convention in a particular country has been carried out.
183
The committee has come to use NGOs as
an additional source of information provided from a different perspective than that of the states.
184
In
addition to providing valuable regional information to the committee, NGOs such as Save the Children
have been instrumental in facilitating DDR processes.
185

The Committee on the Rights of the Child has used different shadow reports in its assessment of its
monitory capacities. In evaluating the first submitted report by the DRC on the optional protocol the
Committee received these reports from two different NGOs: one by the Swiss Association against
Impunity (TRIAL)
186
and one by the Coalition to stop the Use of Child Soldiers.
187

TRIAL has provided the Committee with a variety of criticisms of the DRCs failure to prosecute its
citizens for the recruitment and use of child soldiers which constitutes as undermining its obligation
under the optional protocol. The first remark the NGO makes is regarding a fundamental error in the
Congolese domestic law which governs the prosecution of human rights violations: the DRC is unable
to prosecute cases which dont have a direct link to the DRC.
188
By using appropriate criminal
sanctions the country would be fulfilling its obligation to take all feasible measures under article 4 of
the optional protocol. The use of criminal sanctions has been advocated by the Committee.
189
The
domestic criminal law undermines the principle of universal jurisdiction via the direct link
condition.
190
Another lacuna in the domestic law is the Congolese Military Code
191
which only applies
to those whove carried out war crimes while belonging to the enemy. Moreover the military
criminal court only mentions the jurisdiction over war crimes but doesnt further define whats
meant by the term.
192


179
Art. 45 (a) CRC: The committee may invite the specialized agencies, the United Nations Childrens Fund and other
competent bodies as it may consider appropriate to provide expert advice on the implementation of the Convention in areas
falling within the scope of their respective mandates.
180
Breen, 2003
181
Rule 34(2) of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
182
Rule 70 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
183
Breen, 2003
184
Ibid.
185
Pauletto & Patel, 2010
186
TRIAL, 2011
187
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011
188
TRIAL, 2011 , p.2
189
CRC, Concluding Observations Solomon Islands, 2 July 2003, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.208
190
TRIAL, 2011 , p.8
191
Article 174
192
TRIAL, 2011 , p.9
17
Lastly, TRIAL expresses concern over the new draft of the criminal code which if implemented would
cause the jurisdiction with regard to war crimes to be supplemental to that of the ICC instead of the
other way around.
193

The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has provided its own analysis of the situation in the DRC.
It raises awareness to the already discussed issue of child recruitment by the FARDC and the
Republican Guard. It is concerns about the treatment of children within these organizations.
194
Children
are also assimilated into these groups through assimilation facilitated by the government.
195

The coalition expressed severe dissatisfaction with the passivity in which the crime of child recruitment
and use has been prosecuted and the ineffectiveness of the verdicts of those who have faced
prosecution.
196
The NGO cites the impunity given to Bosco Ntaganda, former leader of the CNDP
among others. The president Kabila of the DRC has stated
197
that the decision to not prosecute
Ntaganda was a sacrifice for stability and peace in the Kivu provinces.
198
The Coalition attributes this
passiveness to lack of political will by authorities to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes.
199

The NGO clarifies a number of practical difficulties in trying perpetrators of child recruitment. One such
difficulty lies in the fact that the judge trying the case must carry a higher rank than the defendant.
Trials are often subpar and dont live up to international standards. Victims are often scared to accuse
military officers that have committed a breach of their human rights. The Coalition raises awareness to
the incarceration of 28 children in a military detention center for three months.
200

Lastly the coalition points to the limited success of social reintegration techniques due to the
governments lack of political leadership.
201

4.4 the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)
The United Nations effort in the Congo has started under the acronym MONUC in 1999. It has been the
United Nations most expensive
202
and wide-ranging peacekeeping operation has ventured since its
outset in 1945. The UN mission was to enforce the peace using a variety of approaches such as
apprehending armed groups in the DRC and in neighboring countries and screening for perpetrators of
war crimes.
203
MONUCs shortcomings caused a compromise between the DRC governments
eagerness of the withdrawal of MONUC from the country and the UNs aspirations of pursuing its
peacekeeping effort in the country.
204
MONUSCO was initiated on 1 July 2010 and its main objectives
were; safeguarding and protecting civilians and to stabilize and support peace consolidation.
205



193
Ibid. p, 10
194
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2011 , p. 11
195
Ibid. p.10
196
Ibid. p.20
197
In 2009
198
Ibid. p.19
199
Ibid. p.22
200
Ibid. p.24
201
Ibid. p.26
202
$ 1.3 billion for the year 2010 2011 alone (ASADHO et al., 2012)
203
Koko, 2011
204
Ibid.
205
MONUSCO, 2013
18
MONUSCO has been tasked with child protection by the Security Council. MONUSCO employs a Child
Protection Section who monitor and report on the status of children involved in the conflict. The
mandate includes deliberation with perpetrators in order to put a stop to child recruitment and other
forms of violations to childrens human rights.
206
The Child Protection Section of the mission is also
working together with UNICEF, ICRC and NGOs in repatriating children who might be involved with
foreign armed forces and wish to return to their country.
207
The Child Protection Section of MONUSCO
has been active
208
in DDR programs which are aimed at rehabilitating children who were previously
part of armed forces and reintegrating them back to their old communities.
209

Section 5. Conclusion
The main question asked in the beginning of the thesis was: What is the role of the various
international instruments protecting childrens rights in combating the issue of child soldiering in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo?
When looking at the entire range of instruments dedicated to the issue, it would be improbable
for anyone to say that the protection they afford the victims of child recruitment isnt substantive.
There has been a lot of progress in the field of protecting victims of child recruitment from its
infancy in the times of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.

Both the Optional Protocol to the CRC and ILO Convention no. 182 have furthermore provided the
international community with a way to monitor the issue on a regular basis. Articles 6 and 7 of the
Optional Protocol have developed a legally binding right for former child recruits to be given a
second chance through reintegration projects. NGOs fulfill an instrumental role in carrying out a
large number of these projects concentrated in the area which have already resulted in the
demobilization of thousands of child soldiers. The ILOs ILO Inter-regional Programme on the
Prevention and Reintegration of Children Involved in Armed Conflict is a great example of assisting
former child soldiers through social reintegration. Further research into the best strategies to
provide psychological assistance as well as research into the effectiveness of the various DDR-
processes could go a long way in preventing long term problems in child soldiers and mitigate the
incentive to be allured back into armed forces.

The ICC which is governed by the Rome Statute has established universal jurisdiction by including
both the recruitment and the use of child soldiers as war crimes. It has also made some headway
in actual prosecution of the perpetrators of these crimes; a feat which the Congolese government
hasnt carried through on yet. The actual substance of the court cases can be considered as
authoritative interpretations of how far the protection of children involved with armed groups
extends.




206
Ibid.
207
United Nations, 2012
208
United Nations, 2013
209
Pauletto & Patel, 2010
19
The Paris Principles provide an instrumental overview of all the knowledge and experience gained
on combating the issue of child recruitment and use in armed conflict. The Paris Commitments
asserts the states dedication to solving the problem, regardless of its non-binding nature.

Because of the extensive legal protection; the problem of child soldiers is no longer that of a lack
of legal resources but one of the inactivity to implement it. The results of the reports submitted to
both the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee of experts illustrate this fact.
This might suggest that the area in which there is the most to gain is the monitoring by supervising
bodies. Being in more constant communication with the country about the implementation of a
particular instrument could both expand public knowledge of the problem of child soldiering and
provide consistent pressure to perform.





















20


Figure 1



Figure 2


25%
28%
15%
7%
25%
Figure 1: Motivations of Children to become involved with armed
groups in Bukavu, the DRC (UNICEF, 1997)
Material benefits
Absence of job oportunities
Revenge against Mobuto army
Ending the conflict
Other
9%
11%
10%
15%
21%
34%
Figure 2: Children's motivation for joining armed forces and groups in
Congo, DRC and Rwanda (ILO, 2007)
Fear
Desire to leave family
Desire for vengeance
Fascination
Ideology
Material Needs
21

Figure 3 N=5,505



Figure 4 N=1,656

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Figure 3: Children who escaped or were released from armed forces
and group in 2010 (UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict , 2011)

Children who escaped or were
released from armed forces and
group in 2010
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Figure 4: Recruitment of children in the period from january 2012
untill september 2013 (MONUSCO, 2012)
children recruited from january
2012 untill september 2013
22
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