"The Defender" is a publication of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association, a local bar association serving criminal defense lawyers and their clients while educating the public and shaping the criminal justice system.
"The Defender" is a publication of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association, a local bar association serving criminal defense lawyers and their clients while educating the public and shaping the criminal justice system.
"The Defender" is a publication of the Harris County Criminal Lawyers Association, a local bar association serving criminal defense lawyers and their clients while educating the public and shaping the criminal justice system.
CITY BONDS COUNTY BONDS J.P. BONDS FELONIES MISDEMEANORS 1161 48031-10(KatyFwy)@ Shepherd AvoidtheDowntownHassels en 1- WinningWorriors TDCJ Then ond Now SpendTimeWithYour KidsNow, SoWe DontHaveTo Later The 30 MinuteVoirDire:ApplyingJuryResearch and Psychometrics HCCLA Annuol Bonquet MotionoftheMonth TheScienceondArtofJurySelection:PortOne FAll 2005 THEAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION OF TEXAS HONORING GREG GlADDEN'SSEVEN-YEARTENURE AS PRESIDENTOFTHETEXASACLU SEPTEMBER 24, 2005 MAGNOLIA HOTEL 1100 TEXAS AVENUE HOUSTON, TEXAS PLEASE CONTACT MAIOAASOFSKYAT nJ-942-8146 OR MASOFSKY@ACLUTX.ORG FOR DETAILS AND SPONSORSHIP INFORMATION PROCEEDS TO BENEFITTHE ACLU FOUNDATION OF TEXAS MARKYOUR CALENDARS FOR UPCOMING CLE BY HCCLA AND HRA CL & PS THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15,2005- ALR & LICENSING ISSUES - PRESENTED BY CHARLES STANFIELD 12:00 - 1:00 [ONE HOUR FREE CLE CREDIT] CJC -- ATTORNEY READY ROOM - 7TH FLOOR WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28,2005 - JACK ZIMMERMANN WILL DISCUSS HIS ROLE AS SPECIAL PROSECUTOR INVESTIGATING THE "FAKE DRUG" SCANDAL IN DALLAS COUNTY 12:00 - 2:00 LOCATION TO BE DETERMINED IFYOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR IDEAS FOR FUTURE ClE COURSES, PlEASE CONTACT NICOLE DEBORDE AT 713-528-8300 OR NDEBORDE@HOUSTON.RR.COM. HCCLA OFFICERS 200 5-2006 STAFF PRESIDENT PublisherHeClA WENDELL A.ODOM,JR. PRESIDENT ElECT ROBERT FICKMAN VICE PRESIDENT MARK BENNETT SECRETARY DAVID KIAnA TREASURER PATRICK MCCANN PAST PRESIDENT STANLEY G. SCHNEIDER BOARD OF DIRECTORS: TOM BERG SEAN BUCKLEY NEAL DAVIS NICOLE DEBORDE TODD DUPONT II ROSA ElIADES AMIMICHElLE FElTOVICH RICHARDFRANKOFF DAN GERSON RANDAll KALLINEN MEli SSA MARTIN MARJORIE MEYERS JOANNE MUSICK CHARLES STANFiElD JAMES STAFFORD JIM SULLIVAN PAST PRESIDENTS: 19712004 C. ANTHONYFRILOUX STUART KI NARD GEORGE LUQUETTE MARVIN O. TEAGUE DI CK DEGUERIN W.B. HOUSE, JR. DAVID R. BIRES WOODY DENSEN WILL GRAY EDWARD A.MALLETT CAROLYN GARCI A JACK B.ZIMMERMANN CLYDE WILLIAMS ROBERT PElTON CANDElARID ELIZONDO AllEN C. ISBEll DAVID MI TCHAM JI ME. LAVINE RICK BRASS MARY E. CONN KENTA. SCHAFFER DAN COGDEll JI MSKElTON GEORGE J. PARNHAM GARLAND O.MCINNIS ROBERT A. MOEN LLOYD OLI VER DANNY EASTERLING RICHARD fRANKOff WAYNE HILL W.TROY MCKINNEY CYNTHIA HENLEY Editorial StaPP: Showno LReagin Ads &Distribution Showno lReagin &ChristinoAppelt CI_ Design &loyoutlimbDesi]n 1012 westAlabama Houston, Texas 77006 7135291117 Distribution450 copies perlSSue. forarticlesand other contributions, contactShowna LReagin al7132241641 1- To place an ad, call Shawno LReaginat 7132241641 For those of you who don't know, in July I became the new Editor of The Defender. We all owe big thanks to Oaucie Shefman for her many years of hard work putting together this magazine; grudgingly, we'll allow her to retire and focus on her own wants and needs for awhi le. The Defender now will be published on aregular quarterly basis. Expect the Fall issue in Seplember, Winter in December. Spring in March and Summer in June. This should allow us to establish acertain degree of reliability wilh regard to limesensitive news and announcements, so please let us know about your upcoming, lawrelated events. This issue's articles emphasize various voir dire techniques and includes amotion in limine we hope you find useful. Part II of Kevin Fine's learned treatise will appear in the December magazine - his knowledge exceeds the scope of asingle issue. Steve Rubenzer, Ph.D" weighs in on voir dire from a psychological slandpoint. Joe Varela provides an interesting update on TOCJ statistics and DaVid Kialta warns parenls against steering their children into the criminal justice system. We not only welcome your contributions in the form of articles, advertising, letters and announcements, we DEMAND them. Everyone ofyou has some special knowledge or area of expertise that we would all like to share. This is your forum for teaching and learning - use ill We envi Sion aprovocative, intelligentand controversial publication. Not everyone will be happy with every issue, unless we are doing somethi ng wrong. But remember - if you believe your point of view is being overlooked, jump right in and offer it. [We may not print it. but feel free to submit it .] Ilook forward to hearing from you. Shawnal. Reagin slreagin@aol.com The stotementsond YH!wp{lIntselpresSI!d herem ore the IndlYlduol authors' and do notOet:fssol'lly reFlect the pOSition ofHCClA os DO -- WINNING WARRIORS WARRIORS WHO HAVE ACHIEVED SUCCESS ON B E H L ~ O ~ THEIR CLIENTS: Robb Fickman finally prevailed with a grand jury no-bill on an indecency with a child case he fought for about a year - intelligent tenacity pays off once again for Robb. Hats off to Tom Stickler, who got a lO-minute Not Guilty on a OWl habitual in Brazoria County on July 19,2005. Dan Cogdell was victorious in one of the first Enron cases to go to trial, achieving a two-word verdict in United States of America v. Sheila Kahanek. Shortly thereafter, he gained an acquittal from the Hon. Caprice Cosper in an Aggravated Assault/ deadly weapon and Official Oppression trial. Jim Lavine and Jack Zimmermann likewise bested the government in a 3-1/2 month-long Enron trial, United States v. Kevin Howard: The jury hung on all 15 counts of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud and related offenses, and Judge Gilmore of the Southern District of Texas declared a mistrial on all counts. Despite over 190 counts and four co-defendants, there were NO guilty verdicts. Jack Zimmermann and Kyle Sampson obtained Not Guilty jury verdicts in the court-martial of an Army surgeon [U.S. v. Granger] charged with distribution of controlled substances, obstruction of justice, false official statement, violating orders and general regulations, dereliction of duty and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. Kyle Sampson also won Not Guilty jury verdicts in a OWl case in CCCL #6 and a family violence/ assault in CCCL #9, involving a mother accused of assaulting her 16-year-old honor student child. In a very rare type of victory, Sean Buckley obtained habeas relief from the Court of Criminal Appeals on an "actual innocence" claim out of Tarrant County: Ex parte John Michael Harvey, No. Ar- 74,955, December 8, 2004 [unpublished, of course]. Mr. Harvey had served 13 years of a 40-year sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a child. Raise a glass to Mark Bennett for his Not Guilty on a 15 -years-to- life possession of cocaine with intent to deliver [2 kilos] in the 338th District Court. James Stafford and Sherra Miller obtained a pretrial life sentence on a death capital in the 183rd District Court, despite some bad priors, bad facts and no classic mitigation. Jim credits his great legal team, including Danalynn Recer and Aimee Solway from Gulf Coast Regional Advocacy Center [GRACE], mitigation expert Gina Vitale and investigator Waymon Allen. Congratulations on an excellent result. Continuing the family tradition, Deborah Keyser scored a Not Guilty on an aggravated robbery case by using experts to present a "confabulation" defense to rebut the complainant's claim that the person who robbed and beat him almost to death was a street kid he had befriended. Gulf Coast Regional Advocacy Center [GRACE] has been instrumental in obtaining favorable results in several death capital cases: State v. Kelvin Jackson and State v. Melvin Hughes, bOtll with Mack Arnold, Sherra Miller, JJ Gradoni , Gina Vitale and Aimee Solway and ending in pretrial life pleas; and State v. Ramon Gonzales, with James Stafford, Cynthia Henley and Aimee Solway - case dismissed less than mree months after it was ftled . Tremendous team work and great la\V) l ering! Congratulations to Scott Pawgan for pulling a manslaughter conviction out of a murder charge in Trinity County; rumor has it that his client is the first African-American in decades to be convicted of a lesser-included on a murder case in that county. The 20-year sentence also beat the State's offer of 40 years. Rick Detoto won a 5-minute Not Guilty on a OWl in CCCL #3 on July 26, 2005, even though his client had an open container in me car and refused SFSTs on video. Rick got the HGN and oral statements suppressed and received instructed verdicts on twO drug paragraphs. Way to go, Rick! Kudos to JJ Paull for his IS-minute Not Guilty on a D\VI in CCCL #6 - his wicked cross-examination carried the day. Steve Baxley has been on a roll in federal court, with three recent victories: Not Guilty on felon in possession of a weapon, Not Guilty on conspiracy to possess a controlled substance and Not Guilty on conspiracy totransport stolen articles . Jim Sullivan saved his client from a possible felony theft conviction on trial date by convincing the prosecution to reftle the case as a misdemeanor, to which his client pled "no contest" and received a one-year deferred adjudication, with no fine and greatly reduced restitution . One co-defendant had already pled to pen time, and another one was lined up to testifY against Jim's client, so good call. Danny Easterling topped off an impressive string of victories by winning two Not Guilty verdicts in the 174th District Court back in April, on a sexual assault of a child and indecency \vith a child. Danny also got a Not Guilty on a no-test OWl in CCCL #6 in January and a Not Guilty on a no-test OWl in CCCL #3 in March. Keep up the great work! The "Give Thanks She's on Our Side Now" award goes to Joanne Musick: Following about four months of work, she obtained a no- bill on an arson case by presenting the issue of a coerced confession to me grand jury; a OWl \vith accident/ FSGI and blood test results was dismissed on the day of trial in CCCL #8, manks to her diIigent pn::paration, despite her client's lengtlly criminal history; a juvenile Robbery case was dismissed after Joanne proved her client was only a mere presence; and she and Brett Ligon managed to have an aggravated assault/deadly weapon dismissed on a self-defense claim, two days before trial in the 17 6th. Mark Hochglaube and Joanne Musick won an indecency case in the 178th District Court back in January. The same month, Mark also got an acquittal on an aggravated sexual assault in the 338th. In a case with international attention, a winning team of HCCLA members gained a reversal in the Andrea Yates capital murder conviction by establishing that perjury by the State's expert impermissibly tainted the trial: Daucie Shefman wrote the appellate brief, Troy McKinney presented oral argument and George Parnham and Wendell Odom laid the necessary groundwork at trial, then continued on the case. The Amazing Silverman Brothers strike again: Jed Silvennan, along with co- counsel Steve Gonzalez, defeated an intoxicated manslaughter charge at the grand jury by engaging in immediate investigation, accident reconstruction and wi mess interviews; the grand jury returned a misdemeanor OWl, instead. On the same day, another grand jury no-bil led Nonn Silvennan's client in an aggravated assault case, based on wimesses Norm brought to the prosecu tor. Thomas Berg achieved amazing results for a client charged in federal court with Kidnapping [mandatory minimum of 20 years], violation of the Mann Act [mandatory minimum of 5 years] and enticing a minor to travel in interstate commerce for sexual purposes [57-71 months, per the guidelines], by convincing the government to agree to a plea for two years on just the "enticing" charge. Hooray for Todd Dupont, who got a IS-minute Not Guilty on a OWl in Judge Karahan's court on August 11, 2005. Todd reportedly delivered a stellar summation. David Breston provided at least temporary respite for a client with four prior felonies by hanging the jury in a habitual DWl felony trial in the 300th District Court of Brazoria County, Visiting Judge Ogden Bass presiding. David also won a Not Guilty on an assault/family violence in CCCL #14 two weeks earlier. Grant Scheiner triumphed in an aggravated sexual assault trial in the 230th District Court on August 11, 2005, thanks to excellent preparation and talented cross-examination. Rumor has it the jury was out only 40 minutes, making the Not Guilty verclict a real shocker [for the State, that is]. Masterful cross-examination also yielded Robert Scardino's client an acquittal on a breath test DWl in CCCL #12, August 11,2005 . Overlooked in the last issue was Bo Hopmann's Not Guilty on a felony injury to a child in the 262nd District Court in October, 2004. The client rejected 4 months deferred adjudication on a Class A with no fine and termination after 3 reports on a plea without a recommendation and endured a harrowing, uphill battle at trial, but his innocence was rewarded in the end. Good job, Bo. Winning Warriors salutes Terri Jacobs, who was recently promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel of the United States Maline Corps. Semper Fi, Terri! BANNED IN BOSTON! CITY COUNClfSWORST NIGHTMARE! DENOUNCED FROM PULPITS COASTTO COAST! Is it Deep Throat? Tropic of Cancer? Hustler? NO) irSEVEN BmER: REASONABLE DOUBT WITH ROBB FICKMAN TUNE IN TO THE CABLE ACCESS CHANNEL THAT HAS HOUSTOWS GUARDIANS OF PUBLIC DECENCYTOTALLY A-TWinER TO SEE ROBB) HIS CO-HOSTS AND HIS GUESTS SPIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE CONTROVERSY. BE INFORMED AND ENTERTAINED, CATCH IT WHILE YOU CAN THURSDAYS AT 8:00 P.M. CABLEACCESS CHANNEL17 SPONSORED BY HCCLA
THEN AND NOW BY JOSEPH W. VARELA In the May/ June 1992 issue of"Docket Call,"! this publication's precedessor, there appeared an article Iwrote based onTDCJ's 1992 Fiscal Year Statistical Report. Recently I unearthed my copy from a box of old files, quite by accident. I thought a comparison Witll the present situation at TDCJ might be illuminating, given the dramatic changes in the scale ofimprisonmentin Texas. So here are some basic facts aboutTDCJ's current status. All me recent figures come from the Fiscal Year 2004Statistical Reportavailable at TDCJ'swebsite. 2 INMATES ON HAND. The first thing we notice is that the total number ofprisoners has almostpreciselytrebled in twelve years. On August 31, 1992 tllere were 51,592 offenders 3 on hand, housed in 40units .On thatsame date m2004,mere were atotal of150,709,includingprison,4state jail, and substance abuse such as SAFPF, housed in 106 units, not including parole violator incarceration facilities. 132,366 (88%) of these were prison, 15,089 (10%) were state jail, and 3,254 (2%) were substance abuse .About 18,800were in any ofseven privately operated facilities. NEW RECEIVES. Whereas in 1992TDCJ received 35,720 new inmates, in 2004 it more than doubled the inmates it received, to 77,315. But the proportion of parole violators has changed. In 1992 19,896were admitted on new sentences, and 15,192 (43%) were parole ormandator ysupervisionviolators.Ofthe 45 ,060 new admissions toTDCJ-ID(prison,excludingstatejail, towhich parole does notapply),33,749(74.9%) were admitted on newcrimes,and only 11,311 (25 .1%) were parole or mandatory supervision violators. In other words, me number ofparole revocations as a proportion ofnewadmissions has declined drastically. RELEASES. Discharges, which occurwhen aprisonerserves all of his sentence, have increased substantially from nearly notlling in 1992. 1992 releases totaled 29,860, wim only 196 discharges. In 2004 there were 72,130 releases. Prison released 41,028, with 7,445 discharges (notcountingstate jail).So even backing state jail outofthe releases, a lot more inmates had to serve aLi theirtime in 2004(18%) compared with 1992(<l %). Notice thatin 2004TDCJ had a netgain of5,185 inmates, more thandouble the equivalent ofthe typical 2,200 bed prison unit. GENDER. Texas is perhaps moving towards gender equality. In 1992 only 4% ofall inmates were women. In 2004 the figure had risen to 7.8%. Almost twice as many women are imprisoned, as a proportion ofthe mmate population. Race or ethnicity. Race breaks down as Pollows: 1992 2004 Black 48% 38.8% Hispanic 24% 29.1% Whit:;e 28% 31.6% Ot:;her <1% < 1% Blacks still disproportionately fill TDCJ, their percentage ofthe state's population beingonly 11.5%,but have gonedown nearly ten percent, whereas whites and llispanics have both mcreased their shares, Hispanics more tlunwhites. Thepercentage ofHispanics in the Texas population is about 35.3%, similar to their share of inmates. COUNTY OF ORIGIN. Harris County lawyers often think of ourcourthouseas arelentlessassembly-line single-handedlypacking TDCJ. This turns out not to be the case. Back in 1992 Harris County accounted for 24% ofall TDCJ admissions. In 2004 that proportion had not changed significantly, at 26%. The US Census Bureau lists the Houston SMSA at 23.1% of the population of Texas. So much for the complaint that Harris County has become disproportionately efficient at incarcerating its population in recent years. The big change was recorded by Dallas County, which accounted for 22% in 1992 but only 12% in 2004. 5 AGE. The average age of inmates on hand rose from 32.4 years to 36.0, not surprisingly in a time of flat-one-half terms for 3G offenses 6 and fewer unscheduled releases due to overcrowding. Excluding state jail, where sentences are short and turnover is high, the average age of prison inmates is 36.5. This bodes ill for future imprisonment costs. As of August 31, 2004, 3,437 inmates were sixty years old or older. The oldest was 88 . A total of 13,413 were serving life, capital life, or 60+ . I have not seen a curve, but in ten or twenty years we may be operating the world's largest geriatric facility for aging, chronically ill inmates with long sentences. The cost of this will be enormous. CRIME OF RECORD. In case an inmate is serving several sentences, "crime of record" is defined by TDCJ as the case with the longest sentence. Of inmates on hand, drug cases lead the pack with 22,765, edging out robbery's 21,897 and sexual assault's 17,663, the nearest competitors. Drugs thus account for 19.8% of inmates on hand now. The length of sentences, of course, skews the on-hand statistic; "violent" crimes are more likely than drug or property crimes to garner long and/ or 3G sentences. But the "War on Drugs" is shO\ving up in the admission statistics; of new admissions in 2004, 35.1 % are for drugs. SENTENCE LENGTH. The average sentence length of inmates on hand is 19.5 years. I don't have the fIgure for average length of sentence for inmates on hand for 1992, but the average sentence of a person released in 1992 was 11.1 years. In 2004 the average sentence of a releasee was only 8.4 years (excluding state jail). PERCENTAGE OF SENTENCE SERVED. Now we come to a statistic where the difference is truly dramatic. In 1992 the average releasee served but 17% of the time assessed. In 2004 the average releasee had done 59.8% of his time (excluding state jail, where there is no early release ). These figures include 3G sentences. So whereas the average releasee in 1992 did about 2 months per year of sentence, 2004's releasees did about 7.2 months on a year. So the percentage of actual time served has more than trebled, reflecting the public's desire for "truth in sentencing.". 3G OFFENSES. In 1992 33% of all inmates were serving a 3G sentence. In 2004 the figure (excluding state jail) was 54,779, for 41.4%. But if we add in state jail inmates, the proportion of 3G inmates has held more-or-Iess steady at 36%. CUSTODY TYPE. There are four basic levels of custody: In order of onerousness, Administrative Segregation, Close, Medium and Minimum. In 1992, about 70% of inmates were classified as minimum security inmates. That hasn't changed, as in 2004 74% were so classified. The public might flOd this surprising given that TDCJ classifIed 48% of its inmates as imprisoned for a "violent offense" (down hardly at all from 51 % in 1992). Administrative continued on page 20 1 This was the issue with a vcry Dan Cogdell on dlC cover. 2 http://W\\w.tdcj.state.tx.us/ publications/publications-home.htm. This website gives the curious an eye-glazing series of table. but almost no graphic summaries. 3 There seems also to be an evolution in nomenclature associated wi.th incarceration in Texas. [n days of yore, the institution was caUed the: "'Texas Prison System" and its denizens were called "'convicts." Then it was renamed the "Texas Dcparonc:nt of Corrections'" and housed "'inmatcs," Now it is me "Texas Dcparollcnt of Criminal Justice Institutional Division" and contains " By "prison," both the TDCJ and I mean the TDC/ instinltionai Di,ision, as distinct from the State Jail Division. Because state jail sentences arc day-for-day without parole, they sometimes should be treated differendy. 5 Oddly enough, Harris acconnted for 6,187 new prison and 9,186 new state jail admissions in 2004. Dallas, in sharp contrast, sent 4,093 to prison and only 3,239 to state jail. Either Dalla.<i criminals commit rc:markably fewer S[3[e jail offenses, or Hilnis judges and prosecutors redu.ce more prison sentences to state jail. Harris Counry alone accounted for 60% of all state jail new admissions in 2004. The other 253 counties contributed 40%. 6 Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Art. 42.12, section 3g. Sec Tex. Govt. Code section 508.145, requiring perrons convicted of '3g" offenses to serve one-half of their sentence or two years, whichever is greater, before becoming eligible for parole. This was raised in 1993 up /Tom one-fourd1. Botor< 1987 it was one-dlird.
"SPEND 11 E WITH YOUR KIDS NOW, Open Letter to All Parents: I am writing this letter because some observations I have made, some involving my own children and some involving children I do not know. I feel compeUed to write not only the parents I know, but also those I don't know. Not long ago, one of my children was involved in a potentially dangerous situation. Fortunatel y, my child chose to call a parent for help rather than surrender to peer pressure. My child and I had previously discussed this possible scenario and I am proud of the deci sion my child made. I know that possible danger looms in every child's future and I'm uncertain how my child wiU react next time. However, we have discussed nearly every possible event. As parents, it is our duty to have open and honest communication with our children. It is extremely important that we discuss uncomfortable topics such as alcohol , drugs and sex. The consequences of not having these discussions and not giving our children the opportunity to make good decisions are too grave to ignore. Times have changed since we grew up. Houston now has a very aggressive DWl Task Force that actively seeks drivers who may be intoxicated. Drugs are cheaper, easier to obtain and more common then ever among today's youth. Not only are there natural consequences of taking drugs or drinking, such as an overdose or a car wreck, the criminal and/ or civil liabilities can be severe. As a criminal defense attorney, I can assure you that the criminal justice system will not educate your child or "teach them a lesson." It is our job as parents to educate and protect our children. I have represented children from the most prestigious schools in Houston and children from some of the poorest areas of town. GeneraUy, one of the things these children have in common is parents who are not engrossed in their children's Jives. Whether the parents are rich or poor, children who are not educated about dangerous situations or not close to their parents tend to get into trouble by making poor decisions. However, all children, including my own and no matter how well raised, are susceptible to making errors in judgment. As humans we will make mistakes. However, it is important that our children know that we will be with them if they get in trouble. The relationship between parent and child must be strong enough so that our children will not hesitate to summon our help when needed . Another reason for writing this letter is to remind people that the bond between parents and their children starts early and my experience as a father and an attorney has taught me that children need much more from their parents than a quick glimpse at bedtime. For example, as a parent who has coached my kids' sports for several years, too often there are parents who never attend a game or even go out and play catch with their kids. At other times, I see parents who only occasionally show up for a game, then criticize and berate their child's efforts, but you never see these parents come out to a practice to work constructively with their child . In these and so many other ways, parents miss important opportunities to bond with and educate their children. Whether it's your child's sports activities, recitals, school plays, or just being there at home to give them some one-on-one, undivided attention for a few minutes, I urge you to take an active role in your children's lives. It is one of the most important aspects of their emotional well-being. Recently, one of my children got in some trouble and my initial reaction was to protect my child from any consequences from his actions. It is a natural reaction for parents to protect their children. There is a fine line though between protection and overprotection. Children must also have consequences for their actions. I am not here to tell you what to do in any given situation but without clear, consistent consequences, children rarely learn from the poor decisions they make. Disciplining our children can be difficult but consequences are essential to learning. If you do not want tile criminal justice system to attempt to educate or discipline your child then you must do it now. We all wantto trustourchildren and have ourchildren feel theycan trustus. It is importantto realize thatfull trustis earned and comes with ademonstratedability tothinkand act responsibly. We canand should exercise acertain level of"healthymistrust." By this, I mean that partof ourresponsibilitytoourchildrenis tohold themaccountableto betruthful and takestepstoverifY theirtruthfulness.Thismayinclude driving by to see they are where they said they would be, spontaneouslyand unexpectedlyshowing up, being in close communication with otherparentsaboutourchildren'splans, activities, and aboutourexpectations regarclingsupervision, alcohol and drug use, age-appropriate mixed gender activities, to name just a few.The point, I believe, is that it is important for us to ask questions, verifY facts, and know the people involved in ourchildren's lives. The bestway to influenceourchildren is by example. The phrase "doas I say and notas I do" does notwork weU. Probablylike many ofyou, I have not always been the example I hoped to be for my children. But whether the issue is drinking and driving, excessive use of alcohol,use oftobaccoorotherdrugs,usingvulgarlanguage,prejudicedviews,tellingthetruth,ordrivingsafely, we can besureourchildren are watching, learning, remembering, and are much more likely to copy our behaviors than comply with ourlectures ordouble standards. We need to be aJoving authorityand asafe place to turn for honestanswers. We musttalktoourchildreninadvanceabouthowtohandleclifficultdecisionsand situations;to provideclear,consistentconsequences; tospend consistent quality time with them on a reguJar basis and be involved in theirinterests and activities; to exercise "healthy mistrust" so that they learn that trust is earned through responsible living; and that we provide them a livi.ng example ofthe values we hold and behaviors we expect. PLtASt TALK TO YOUR CHILORtN NOW SO THAT NO ONt ASSOCIATto WITH THt CRIMINAL JUSTICt SYSTtM HAS TO lATtR. Sincerely, David W. Kiatta AttorneyatLaw Parentof FourChildren EZINTERLOCK An Alcohol Specific Ignition Interlock Provider r ~ l John Bums, President Laura O'Brien, Public Relations LorenzoVega, Technician *" Mostaccurate and reliable ignition interlockavailable *' Patented fuel cell eliminates false readings "* Easy to read instructions *' Convenientschedulingfor installation and recalibration *' Locally owned and operated '* Superiorquality ata reasonable rate Request EZ Interlock through CourtServices,CLOorCoordinator. Freeinstallation with your business card. "Assl/ring a DesiRnalcd Oriva" Steve Rubenzer, Ph.D., Clinical and Forensic Psychologist APPLYING JURY RESEARCH AND PSYCHOMETRICS The primary purpose ofvoir dire is to gather case-relevant information about prospective jurors (Frederick, 1995). However, research shows that lawyers spend most of their time uying collecting demographic data and exhorting jurors on the ideals of the jurorsystem and the need to be fair. Even assuming that these pursuits are worthwhile, they are subordinate to identifying which jurors tosuike. Psychometrics is an applied area ofstatistics that analyses the qualities oftests and questionnaires (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Although questionnaires are not practical in the thirty-minute voir dire practiced in Harris County non-death penalty cases, a psychomeuicapproach can guide questiondevelopmentand choice ofanswer formats. Questionscan be open-endedorclosed. Open-endedquestions illow for an infinite variety ofanswers and can be much more informative than a yes-no answer-if the respondent is willing to respond and fully articulate his or her thinking. Open-ended questions are also useful in voir dire through "looping," which involves asking an open-ended question, getting a response, and asking what other jurors think. It encourages discussion and gets people talking. However, open-ended questions take time. Often, even asuccessful loopingmaneuverwill yield information from only afraction ofthejurypool. Potential jurorswho are shyortired may fail to speak up. Looping may also inadvertently identifY defense- friendly jurors who \.vill then be struck by the prosecution. Lastly, looping may expose the jury pool to strongsentiments contrary to the defendant'sinterests. An alternative approach, often used in civil tria.ls, is to administer questionnaires. Although impersonal, questionnaires have manyadvantages.Responses areprivate. Each potentialjuroris asked thesame questions and, ifthe answer format is standardized, can be compared on the same basis. Mostimportantly, information is obtained from ill potential jurors. Given ill these factors, I estimate aquestionnaire would yield five times the tOtal amount of information as atypicalloopingsession in thesame amountoftime. (Although a few jurors may reveal more information during a loopingsession, the vast majority would reveal much less.) Many ofthe advantages ofquestionnaires can be adapted to verbal groupquestioningformat. Thesimplestscenariowould be to askaquestionandaskforashowof handsfor thosethatagree. From what I have seen, lawyers seem to prefer "yes-no" answers. Al= thoughgettingaclearly interpretableansweris important,questions that must be answered yes -no or true-false yield the least possible information aboutthe potential jurors:Onlyonedistinction can be made,as the original groupcan only be divided once based on their answers. Allowing a "neutral" response produces twice as much information (two distinctions) by dividing the jury pool into three groups. Psychologists have researched response formats in depth, as many psychological tests ask the subject to indicate his or herwith an attitude statement or personality description. Generilly, three response options provide more reliable data than two options, five optionsgive more information than three options, and nine options produce more reliable data than five options. There are Limits ofthe benefits tobe gained,however,and thevoirdire settingposes some practical constraints..I recommend usingatleast four options(e.g. , strongly disagree, disagree, agree,suongly agree). Scores on many psychological variables, such as IQ, have no natural divisions-they are continuous. The normal curve illustrates thatmostpeoplewiJl fall nearthe average (forIQ,between90-110), and the moreextreme the score, the more rarely it wilJ be observed. The normal curve can be useful to illusuate the strategy advocated here. Assume for the moment that potential jurors can be ordered on a single dimension of being defense- vs. prosecution-friendly. Let's assume that these attitudes are distributed in a normal curve, with more moderates than exuemists at eitherend.The goal ofthe defense attorney is to identifY potential jurors in the upper third1 (shaded area) ofthe curve, and ifpossible, to rank order tllem in terms ofundesirability. There are two basic ways to do this. One could ask ayes ornoquestion,worded in suchaway as togetabout 33 percentofthejurypool toagree with it. Forexample, you could ask, "How many people here believe that defendants should prove their innocence?" (Surveys indicate substantial portions of tlle population agree with this position). Or one could ask the same question, butask jurorsto respond onaone to fIve scale, where fIve is strongly agree, four is agree, etc. ("How many people suongJ}r agree with this statement?: When someone is charged with a crime, he should take it on himselfto prove his innocence.") Ifusing tlle latterapproach, theattorneycan first ask how many peoplestrongly agree, which could be taken as grounds for challenge for cause. A follow-up question wouJd be "Howmany ofyou just "agree" (not "suongly agree") that a defendant shouJd prove he is innocent?" The attorney could ask tllese two questions in either order. Ifyour question gets just a few hands in the hair, modif)r it to get more. Conversely, ifyou get twenty hands, make it more suingent . But record the responses to both, giving one point to the more moderate response and two to the extreme response. Although one could ask how many potential jurors agree with your position, this will tend to identify which jurors are most desirable to you and lead your opponent to get rid of them. The defense attorney will want to mine the 20-30% of the population most favorable to the prosecution (see diagram). Conversely, the prosecutor wil.! want to focus on the 20-30% of the jury pool most favorable to the defense . Although the information in the entire upper 50% (and theoretical.!y the entire curve) is potentially useful, identifying the top fifty percent implicirly identifies the other fifty percent for your opponent. The fewer hands that are raised for your questions, the less information is revealed to the prosecution. Ten to fifteen hands will maximize the ratio of information you get to that revealed to other side. However, if you can sing.le out one or two hostile potential jurors on a challenge for cause, this is weU worth doing. CHART 1 THE NORMAL CURVE Because the data obtained depends on the cooperation of the potential jurors, it is essential to overcome reticence, resentment, or self-consciousness. Apologize for the impersonal approach. Emphasize the importance of knowing what everyone thinks or feels. Ask if anyone is uncomfortable raising their hand or making their opinions known publicly. Ask to accommodate them (perhaps by having them write down the question and their answer). Ask a sample question or two that will allow you to check that everyone is responding (" How many people here are under 30? Over 30? 30?") . Make note of anyone who didn't raise their hand and encourage them. The attorney should vary rl1e format and direction of the questions to prevent boredom, self-consciousness, and the onset of response styles (such as tendency to agree or disagree with everything) that interfere with getting good data. Begin with less sensitive topics .. Ask some questions which invite a large portion of the group to raise their hands. For example, "How many people think a person should be punished only for their current crime, not for what they have done in the past?" The defense attorney will be interested in the minority (hopefuUy) that do not raise their hands, and again, litrle useful information is leaked to one's opponent. Do not pose several questions in a row that elicit only a few hands. A psychometric approach assumes that you will have to ask multiple questions about a topic to get a reliable measure . However, the need to do so varies with how complex and multifaceted the attitude or trait is you are trying to measure . If a particular attitude or trait is important to you and not easily summed up in one question, try formulating four to ten questions. Do not make them too specific. Each should come close to the heart of the subject . AITITUDES AND TRAITS THAT PREDICT VERDICTS Studies in the 1970's explored many different personality and attitudes as possible predictors of criminal verdicts .. Only nvo variables have shown to have good predictive power in multiple studies and types of offenses. Authoritarianism is the tendency to value and respect power and traditional authority. Normally, these are potential jurors defense attorneys wil.! want to eliminate. However, there are some types of cases in which authoritarian jurors are desirable. Because they value order and respect authority, they are supportive of police officers and high public officials as defendants. They will tend to favor people similar to them (in terms of race, background, education, attitudes) at the expense of those who are not. However, they are relatively less likely to convict for rape than for murder or other felonies, apparenrly because of cynicism toward the victim. Legal authoritarianism is a more specific concept that grew out of the initial research as it was applied to the legal arena, and it is an even stronger predictor of verdicts than general authoritarianism. Legal authoritarianism consists of two correlated sets of beliefs: that a defendant that is brought to trial is probably guilty, and 2) "reasonable doubt" means something like "more likely than not. " (See Table 1 below for some sample items). Scores on legal authoritarianism have been demonstrated to predict jurors' verdicts in hypothetical criminal cases. The impact of legal authoritarianism can be appreciated by two sets of statistics. One study divided its subjects into low and high scorers (on a legal authoritarianism scale) and presented them with four sample criminal cases to judge. High scorers produced a 72% conviction rate, while low scorers returned a 44% conviction rate. Both groups were also asked to respond to this item: "A defendant should be found guilty if there is at least a _ _ % chance that he/ she committed the crime. " High scorers were wi.lling to return a guilty verdict on the basis of 83% certainty, while low scorers required a 91.5% certainty. Although these differences are sizable, they are conservative estimates of the differences between extreme groups. In this study, the entire group of subjects was divided in two, so both groups contained many people that scored near the average. If the top 20% of scorers were compared with the bottom 20% (which are the people that voir dire might eliminate), the differences would probably have been considerably larger. It is quite possible that most prosecution-friendly 20% of the jury pool would endorse convicting a defendant on a 60 or 70% level of certainty. Researchers have created voir dire questionnaires for several specific legal issues. A measure of attitudes toward the insanity defense was found to predict mock jurors' verdicts. A similar scale, developed by one of the same authors, failed to predict outcome in an eyewitness case. This failure may be because jurors do not have strong feelings on this issue and because there was no expert testimony to weigh in the decision. It is likely that an effective voir dire in an eye\vitness case would examine a potential juror's interest in hearing about the research in this area and willingness to accept a new viewpoint. continued on page 13 MARKYANIS Appel/ate Lawyer HCCLAAnnu(J1 B(Jnquet HeCLA's 200S allnual ballqlll:1 \\'J.S hdd in !VLl)' .H the Hotel. Craig was ,'oled l..J.\\Tcr of the \\:'lr J.nd Rob Iknncrr recein:d rill' Litl:rimc Achic\'l'Illl'In I\"'<Hd, The inimir.lbk Ridurd "llKdl!>rse" Haynes introduced keynote spe,lker lVlike Ramsey, "Unsung Hew" .l\\'ards went to K.nherine Snrdino, n.Hlcie ShdIll.lll alld RO!.l1ld Moure, Jo.1I11ll: ,\\lIsick .Khin'cd ofthe \\',11', A good lime was had lw all. firmerFederalPOOIic OePenderRoIlIId Dahlin withwiPe Evelyn SIn AlFano, MiIce RamseyIIId Riehli'd'Racehorse"HOIJleS HonIrees "The Reol" Bob Bennettand CrIigWoshington Les Coehron chatswithcolumnist Rick Cosey continued !Tom page 11 TABLE 1 Sample Authoritarianism and Legal Authoritarianism Items from Questionnaires CONCEPT Do you like bossing people around? Ienjoyand feel good wearinga military uniform. Presumption ofGuilt Defense lawyers don'tcare aboutguilt orinnocence, they are just in business to make money. Generally, police only make an arrest when they are sure about who committed the crime. Relaxed Standard ofProof Extenuatingcircumstances not be considered-ifaperson commits acrime thenthatperson should be punished. Too many people are wrongfullyimprisoned. (R) Once legal authoritarianism and case specific attitudes are gauged,the defenseattorneymaywanttoconsiderotherpersonality characteristics that wiU increase the probability a juror will resist grouppressure to vote guilty. Such people are likelyto be stubborn, independent thinkers who care more about being right than being popular. Some might just be contrary. Although leadership/assertiveness is desirable ifthe person subscribes to your position, it cutstheotherway ifhe does not .Therefore,thedefense attorney should identify people who are agreeable, conventional, concerned with consensus, and defer to others in making their decisions-and considerstriking them.. Since the law requires jurors make theirowndecisions,and someonewhois highlydependenton others is unlikely to be able to change their personality in the pressure cooker ofjury deliberations, a dismissal for cause might be pursued. SAMPLING The bestpredictorof aperson'sperformanceis to have themdo a sample test. In other words, a prospective typist will be given a typing test, a prospective pro football player a try-out. The best predictor ofjuror's voting tendencies will be verdicts for other similarcases. Invoirdire,onemightbrieflyposeseveral hypothetical cases and ask how many would vote for guilt. Research has shown that initial polls among jurors are highly predictive offinal verdict. Thecases should beas similarto theactualcase as will be permitted, but should also produce about a 1:2 split among jurors (as with otherquestions),always concealingthejurorsmostfavorable toyou within a larger group. Again, identify hard core prosecution jurors by asking who would be absolutelysure oftheir guilty verdict. One or more hypothetical cases might incorporate judge's instructions and constitutional principles. It might be possible to pose a challenge for cause if the juror repeatedly votes in a way that suggests he did not follow the law oroperate undera presumption ofinnocence. PERSUASION The above method allows for advocacy by the potential jurors that the prosecution has identified as least desirable for its case. These are the defense's temporary spokespeop\e-"temporary" because they are likely to be struck at the end ofthe voir dire.. Defense-friendly potential jurors can relate their experiences and explain why they are skeptical ofthe police, DA's office, etc. This allows moderate jurors, who have not had similar experiences, to hear fresh, first-person accounts of possible official misbehavior. Allow these jurors to justif)r their perceptions and sound reasonable so they will be credible and to prevent them from being struck for cause. Beforequestioningapotentialjuror\vith apassionatedistrust ofthe police,you mightacknowledge the emotion attached to their perception ("I can see thatthis issue createsstrongfeelings for you. Can you help me understand why?). Ifyou can't get the juror to agree to putaside his orherbias, then paraphrase the position using your most powerful rhetoric for the benefit ofthe other potential jurors. ("So you believe so strongly, based onyourexperiences \vith your uncle and brother, that the policewill plant evidence that you would tend to assume thatwas thecase in asimilarcase?"). If you're going to lose the juror, get his message out first. It is vital that you confine this sort ofquestioning to those jurors the prosecution has already identified as defense-friendly. Unlike looping, you do NOT want previously unidentified jurors withsimilarattitudestojumpin and make themselves known.Those that would do so are likely to be the best remaining jurors for the defense. However, you could ask ifanyone disagrees strongly with what the defense jurors say and again ask for a showofhands. CONCLUSION Athirty-minutevoirdireconstrainsthe type of questioningthat may be done, but should not discourage information gathering. A tremendous amount ofdata can be gathered from ten or fifteen thoughtful, well-constructed questions addressed to all members of the panel, butanswered by only a portion. REFERENCES Frederick, R. (1995) Mastering voir dire and jury selection. American BarAssociation. Nunnally, J. C. & Bernstein, 1. H. (1994). Psychometric theory. McGraw-Hill. STEVE RUBENZER, PH.D., ABPP BOARD CERTIFIED FORENSIC PSYCHOLOCIST Competency& sanityassessment; DWT (SFSTInstructor); eyewitness factors; risk! dangerousness; voirdire; malingering; personal injury; child custody [[914Astoria Blvd., Suite490, Houston, TX 77089 Ph: '28J-481- 5715 www.SteveRubenzerPhD.com Fax: '28J-9'2'2- 5903 steverubenzer@sbcglobal.net CAUSE NO. ____ STATE OFTEXAS }{ IN THE DISTRICTCOURT v. }{ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS JANE DOE }{ JUDICIALDISTRICT MOTION IN LIMINE: PROHIBITPROSECUTOR FROM ADVISING VENIRE SIHE REPRESENTSCOMPLAINANTANDIOR "VICTIM{S)" TOTHE HOI\JORABLEJUDGE OF SAID COURT: COMES NOW JANE DOE, Defendant in the above-styled and numbered cause, and files this Motion to Prohibit the Prosecutor from Advising Venire s/he Represents the Complainant and/or "Victim(s)", and in support thereof she would showthe following: I. Prosecutors'commentsthattheyrepresentedthe "StateofTexasandthe familyof[complainant]" in acapital murder trial constituted clear error, and the trial judge "clearly erred in overruling appellant's . ..objections to the statements." Rougeauv. State, 738S.W.2d 651, 656-657(Tex.Crim.App. 1987). Although the Courtfound that, on the facts of that particulardeath penaltycase, the remarks were not egregious enough errorto require a reversal ,it described the statements as "extremely improper," and commanded: "...remarks that the prosecuting attorney represents the family of the deceased in the prosecution of the accused should never again be uttered by any prosecuting attomeyofthis State in a court oflaw ofthis State . .. ". Id. at658. [Emphasisadded]. Even if thecase does not involve murder, the prohibition can be logically extended to includeall criminal prosecutions. II . Defendant further contends that the State's attorney should refrain from use of the word "victim" when referring to the complaining witness alleged in the indictment. The term "victim" is notproperlegal terminology, and itsprejudicialeffectiscomparableto use of the objectionablephrase "rape kit" in asexual assaultprosecution. Also, "victim" connotes one who has been criminally acted upon, which is a matter of proof at trial, and therefore not properlyassumed as amatteroffact during thevoirdire examination. Defendantassertsthatto permitthe State to utilize this term during voirdire will deprive him of due process and a fair trial as guaranteed underthe Texas and United States Constitutions. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays this Motion be GRANTED and that the Court issue its orderaccordingly. Respectfully submitted, SHAWNAL. REAGIN 1305 Prairie, Suite 300 Houston,Texas 77002 (713) 224-1641 TBN 16634900 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CERTIFICATE OFSERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was hand-delivered to an Assistant DistrictAttorneyassignedto thiscase on thisthe _ dayof ,20_. SHAWNAL. REAGIN CAUSE NO. _ _ _ STATE OFTEXAS }{ IN THE DISTRICTCOURT v. }{ HARRISCOUNTY, TEXAS JANE DOE }{ JUDICIALDISTRICT ORDER On thisthe__dayof _ _______,20_,came on to be heard Defendant's Motion in Limine to Prohibit the Prosecutor from Advising the Venire S/He Represents Complainant and/or "Victim(s)" , and having dulyconsidered same, thisCourtisof the opinion said Motion should be: __GRANTED __DENIED SIGNEDand ENTERED this___dayof_ ______,20_. JUDGE PRESIDING
A. VOIR DIRE IS ACONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT The Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel and a trial before an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. V1. Part of this constitutional guarantee is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U .S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); Raby v. State, 970 S.w.2d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). It is essential to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the right to counsel that the defendant have the right to question prospective jurors in order to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. Raby, 970 S.W.2d at 10; Linnell v. State, 935 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.w.2d 330,344- 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The Court in Raby stated that "the light to propound questions on voir dire, in order to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges, is of the greatest importance" in consideration of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. (quoting Hernandez v. State, 508 S.w.2d 853, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)) . B.IHE JURY SHUffiE The jury shuffle is designed to ensure randomness in the list of jurors. Jones v. State, 833 S.W2d 146, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); TEX. CODE CRlM. PROC. art. 35.11 (Vernon 1991). Either party can ask for a shuffle and only one shuffie is required, regardless of which party makes tl1e request. Id. at 149. Although a jury shuffle may sometimes be used as a strategic tool, the actual purpose of the statute is merely to ensure that the members of the venire are listed in random order. C. TIME LIMITATIONS The trial judge may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of voir dire examination. Boyd v. State, 811 S.W.2d 105, ll5 (Tex. Clim. App. 1991). However, the judge cannot restrict proper questions that seek to discover a juror's views on relevant issues. McCarter v. State, 837 S.W.2d 117, 121-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Rios v. State, 4 S.w.3d 400, 401 (Tex. App. -- Houston [1 Dist.],1999) pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 122 S.W.3d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (where defense counsel responded to the court's termination of voir dire as follows: ".. . I have to question on jobs that involve entry into homes . .... Also, I have to ask the following question: Anti-crime organizations .. . And I also need some more time so that I could touch on tile punishment issue. . . . And I would be asking people about punishment and individual jurors as to what they would consider for punishment, what tl1ey could, and then get their opinions, more specific opinions than they have expressed about punishment. For that reason I would request more time"); cf. Rios v. State, 122 S.w.3d 194, 195-202 (Tex. Crim. App . 2003) (Price, J., and Cochran, J., dissenting from denial of State's p.d.r. as improvidently granted, each finding error was nOt preserved because defense counsel's offer of proof was not sufficiently specific). Defense counsel would be wise to state for the record the specific questions he wishes to ask the venire, rather than simply stating tl1e general topics he wishes to discuss. D. PROPER AND IMPROPER COMMITMENT VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS The scope of voir dire is broad and an accused is generally entitled to question the panel on any matter that will be an issue at trial. Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 344. As discussed above, error in the denial of a proper question, which prevents the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges, is an abuse of discretion. Atkins v. State, 951 S.W2d 787, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The right to propound questions during voir dire is not unfettered, however. It is the propriety of tl1e question propounded that is determinative of the issue. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Permissible questions include, for example, tl10se that probe into bias and prejudice against the applicable law, Hogue v. State, 711 S.w.2d 9, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), bias and prejudice against the defendant, Hernandez v. State, 563 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), and opinions formed regarding the facts of the case, Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205,209 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 850, 121 S.Ct. 125, 148 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000) (citing Curry v. State, 910 S.W2d 490, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). A litigant cannot, however, commit tl1e panel to their view of some specified testimony or the conclusion they would reach under a given set of facts ... Standefer v. State, 59 S.W3d 177, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The test as to whether a certain question is proper was set forth in Standefer as follows: (1) does the question ask the prospective juror to commit to a resolution of an issue in the case?; and (2) does the question include only those facts necessary to lead to a valid challenge for cause? If the answer is no to either question, then the question is proper. Examples of improper commitment questions include asking the panel or a prospective juror: (1) whetller they would have an automatic predisposition to find a person guilty because he refused to take a breath test. Standefer supra. [A proper way to ask this question is to phrase in terms regarding the State's burden of proof. For example, could you foUow the law and hold the State to its burden if you the only evidence you heard was that the accused refused to take a breath test?] (2) whether, if the evidence showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, they could not convict a defendant. Standefer supra; Atkins v. State, 951 SW.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). (3) whether "assum[ing] ... some of the evidence ... shows that the victim's family was gready impacted and terribly grieved and gready harmed by the facts, .. would not prevent or substantiaUy impair [them] in considering a life sentence. Penry v. State, 903 SW.2d 715, 739-740 (Tex. Crim. App.) , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977, 116 S.Ct. 480, 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995). (4) whether they would give mitigating affect to evidence of youth in punishment. Moore v. State, 999 S.W2d 385, 406-407 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). (5) whether they would give mitigating affect to evidence of drug use in punishment. Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 122-123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)(pluralityopinion). (6) whether they wouId give mltlga ting affect to evidence of alcoholism, troubled family background, intoxication, and good jail record in punishment. Garcia v. State, 919 S.w.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) . (7) whether ~ c t i r n impact evidence would affect their resolution in punishment. Stadnefer supra; Penry, 903 S.W2d at 739-740. (8) whether evidence of potential rehabilitation would affect their resolution in punishment. Stadnefer supra. (9) whether they could find someone guilty on the testimony of one witness. Stadnefer supra; CastiUo v. State, 913 S.W2d 529 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). (10) whedler they could fmd someone guilty on circumstantial evidence alone ... Stadnefer supra; Garrett v. State, 851 S.w.2d 853, 859- 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (venireman not subject to chaUenge for cause merely because he would require more evidence than the legal minimum). (11) whether a given set of circumstances would warrant the imposition of the death penalty or what circumstances, in their opinion, would warrant the imposition of the deadl penalty. Stadnefer supra; Allridge v. State, 850 S.W2d 471,480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, 510 U .S. 831, 114 S.Ct. 101 , 126 L.Ed.2d 68 (1993) . (12) whedler they could consider probation in a case where the victim is a nun. Stadnefer supra. (13) whether they could be fair and impartial in a case in which the victim was nine years old. Barajas v. State, 93 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). (14) whether the fact the victim was a two week old child would affect their verd ict or what effect that might have on their verdict. Freeman v. State, 74 S.W3d 913 (Tex. App. -- Amarillo 2002, pet. rerd). Conversely, examples of proper questions include asking the panel or a prospective juror: (1) whether the victim's status as a nun would affect dleir ability to be fair. Stadnefer supra. (2) whether they believe a child, in a child molestation case, could or would lie about a sexual assault . Stadnefer supra. (3) whedler they would presume someone guilty if he or she refused to make a statement to the police. Stadnefer supra. (4) whether they "feel as though [they] could evaluate a witness and his testimony and decide if he's being trudlful \vithout automatically dismissing his testimony because of some criminal history." Lydia v. State, 117 SW.3d 902, 904 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2003, pet. rerd). (5) whether it would make a difference if the crime committed by the \vitness was against the defendant. Td. (6) whether they believe a police officer would ever lie on the witness stand. Hernandez v. State, 563 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (op. on reh'g). (7) whether they would automatically disbelieve the testimony of a \vitness who was shown to lie in the past. Edwards v. State, 882 S.W2d 493, 495 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.). (8) whether they would disbelieve a witness simply because there was a delay in the reporting of the crime. Harris v. State, 122 S.W3d 871 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth, 2003, no pet.) (defendant charged widl falsely reporting a sexual assault to police). (9) whether they would not be able to find somebody guilty of a criminal offense \vithout having medical evidence. Id .. (10) whether they could not find somebody guilty based upon the testimony of just one \vi tness , even if they believed that one \vitness beyond a reasonable doubt. Td. (11) whether they would disbelieve a defendant in a murder prosecution. Rivera v. State, 82 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App. -- San Antonio 2002, pet. rerd) . E. Absolute Disqualification is Not Absolute Absolute disqualification, under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.19, does not mean absolute reversal on appeal. Tn order to perfect the record, the defendant must object prior to verdict. If there is no objection, the defendant must demonstrate "significant harm." Nelson v. State, 129 S.W3d 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In Nelson the court conducted a bench conference on the parties ' strikes for calise. During the conference, the court and the lawyers discussed a theft conviction of one of the prospective jurors. The venireman was called up and he related that he paid a fine on a Class C misdemeanor theft years before. Although the cOllrt and the parties reviewed the law together and discussed whether the venireman was qualified to serve, it was ultimately determined that he would be allowed to serve. The defense counsel acquiesced and never lodged an objection to the disqualified juror. After raising the issue for the first time on appeal, the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed. On the State's petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals. First, dle Court addressed whedler the defendant waived the issue for appeal by failing to object to the venireman's service on the jury. It found that the conference at the bench evidenced the trial COllrt'S awareness of the disqualification and, thus, the issue was preserved. The Court then addressed whether, notwithstanding the mandatory language of Article 35.19, a harm analysis was required. The Court held that where there is no objection prior to the verdict, the defendant is required to show significant harm from the service of dle disqualified juror. On the other hand, if the defendant raises the issue before dle verdict is entered, no sho\ving significant harm is necessary. The Court reasoned that, although the trial court was aware of the issue and the venireman should have been excused, the defendant, by failing to object, failed to raise the issue before the verdict was rendered and, hence, had to demonstrate the requisite harm. F. Batson Challenges Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a litigant may not exercise a peremptory challenge based on the juror's gender (J.E.B ... v. Alabama ex. reI. T.B., 511 u.s. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994)), ethrUcity (Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.s. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991 )), or race (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ) See also Fritz v. Texas, 946 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (gender); Wamget v. State, 67 S.W3d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (ethrUcity); TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 35.261 (race). There are three prongs to a Batson challenge. First, defense counsel must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, the burden of production then shifts to the proponent of the strike to offer a neutral explanation for that strike. Third, if the proponent offers a neutral explanation, the trial court must then decide whether the opponent has proved purposeful discrimination. The burden of proof in a Batson challenge is by a preponderance-of-the-evidence. Williams v. State, 767 SW.2d 872, 874 (Tex. App. - - Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd) (en banc). When the motives behind the prosecutor's chaUenge is mixed, that is, the reasons for the strike are both permissible (neutral ) and impermissible (discriminatory), then the Equal Protection Clause is violated only when the prosecution is unable to satisfy the court that the juror would have been struck based solely on the neutral reason. Guzman v. State, 85 SW.3d 242 (Tex ... Crim. App. 2002) . As an aside, it is interesting to note that Guzman was a five (5) to four (4) decision and that Judge Womack wrote the dissent. His dissent is worth reading. Obviously, it is not difficult for a prosecutor to proffer a neutral reason for the strike. Defense counsel, therefore, must be prepared to rebut the neutral basis offered. For example, in Gibson v. State, 117 SW.3d 567 (Tex. App. -- Corpus Christi 2003), defense counsel pointed out that other (white) panelists gave the same answers to questions as did the (black) panelist who was struck. The court of appeals held that "where the prosecutor offers only one reason for a challenged peremptory strike, the accused may discharge the burden of persuasion on a claim of disparate treatment under Batson on the basis of race to rebut the state's facially neutral explanation by showing that the state struck a panelist of one race but did not strike a panelist of a different race who presented the same reason. Gibson, 117 S.W3d at 571. Counsel should also be leery even when the prosecutor accepts a juror who is of the same race as the panelist struck. Simply because the prosecutor allowed one black person on the jury, does not mean that his strike on another is not race-motivated . Defense counsel should also be able to point out to the court that allowing a minority on the juror is not alone sufficient to demonstrate the strike was not racially motivated. The standard of review on appeal is "clearly erroneous." Hill v. State, 827 S.W2d 860, 865- 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (plurality op.). A ruling is clearly erroneous when, after examining the record, the appellate court has the "defmite and firm convi ction that a mistake has been committed. " United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 564, 567 ( 5th Cir. 1989) (citing and quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985 )); Id. In reviewing the trial court ' s ruling, the appellate court does not determine whether the prosecutor's explanations were credible , but rather whether the trial court's ruling was supported by the record. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S. Ct . 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); Guzman, 85 S.W3d at 254. If supported by the record, the trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous. Id. G.IHE "ONE WITNESS" RULE A panelist who" categorically refuses to render a guilty verdict on the basis of only one wimess is not challengeable for cause on that basis so along as his refusal is predicated on his reasonable understanding of what constitutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Zinger v. State, 932 SW.2d 511,514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see also Castillo v. State, 913 S.W2d 529, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995 ). In other words, if the panelist relates that the State could not meet its burden with only one wimess, then he is not challengeable for cause . On the other hand , if the prospective juror refuses to return a guilty verdict, even if he found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then such a challenge would be valid. Note also that, altllough the State can make inquiry as to the latter, it is an improper commitment question to inquire into the former. H. SECURING STRIKES FOR CAUSE When a prospective juror is equivocal as to their ability to follow the law or set aside any bias or prejudi ce against one side or tile other, the appellate court is required to defer to the trial court's judgment. Brown v. State, 913 S.W2d 577, 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In Brown, Judge Maloney stated for the court: [NJoiliing is left to the discretion of the trial court when the venireperson is unequivocal as to their ability to follow the law. If they testif)1 unequivocally that tlley can follow the law despite personal prejudices, the trial court abuses its discretion in allo\ving a challenge for cause on that basis. Likewise, if they testify unequivocally that they cannot tallow the law due to their personal biases, the trial court abuses its discretion in fai.ling to grant a challenge for cause on that basis. However, when the venireperson vaci.llates or equivocates on their ability to foLlow the law, the reviewing court must defer to the trial court's judgment. Brown, 913 S.W2d at 580 (emphasis in original) . It is, therefore, imperative tllat defense counsel tie down those prospective jurors who are objectionable by forcing (politely) a "yes" or "no" answer to the question. Usually it is best to do so by using leading questions. Counsel's questions should accurately state the law, the prospective juror's bias and prejudice against the law, and the fact that the venireperson cannot tallow the law. If the prospective juror vacillates, a su bsequent motion to strike is subject to being overruled. I. PRESERVING VOIR DIRE ERROR Voir dire error can amount to constitutional error. When the error deprives an accused of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the error is of constitutional dimension. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEXAS CONST. Art . 1, 10; Rios, 4 S.W3d at 402-03 (Trial court's error in limiting defense counsel to 45 minutes to conduct voir dire at aggravated robbery trial was not harmless, but amounted to constitutional error requiring reversal, where counsel still had proper voir dire questions to ask venire after allotted 45 minutes had passed). Regarding strikes for cause, a trial court 's error amounts to constitutional error "[0 ]nly in very limited circumstances ." Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386,391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). InJones, the Courtidentified the following as errors ofconstitutional dimension: "when a juror is erroneously excused because ofgeneral oppositiontodle death penalty;" and when a juror is excluded for an "impermissible" reason "such as race, sex, orethnicity. " Id. To show error when a trial court erroneously grants the State' schallenge for cause, a defendant "must demonstrate one oftwo things:(1)the trial judgeapplied the wrong legal standard in sustaining the challenge,or(2)the trial judgeabused [his] discretion in applying the correct legal standard." Jonesat 388-89(citingVuongv. State, 830 SW.2d 929, 943 (Tex.Crim.App.), cw. denied, 506 U.S. 997, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992). The Courtalso adopted apre-rules harm analysis to the non-constitutional voir dire error ofgranting the State's improper challenge for cause. Id. at 392-94 (overruling Payton v. State, 572 S.W2d 677 (Tex. Crim. App.1978), which had held that an erroneous grant ofthe State's challenge for cause was tantamount to aUowing the State an extra peremptory strike). "The erroneous excusing of a veniremember will call for reversal only if the recordshows thattheerrordeprived the defendantofalawfullyconstituted jury."Id. To preserve error based on a trial court 'sdenial ofadefendant's challenge for cause, the defendantmust:(1)assertaclear and specific challenge for cause; (2) use a peremptory strike on the complained-of veniremember; (3) exhaust his peremptory strikes; (4) request additional peremptory strikes; (5) identify an objectionable juror; and (6) show thathewould have struck the objectionable juror. Nelson v. State, 848 S.W2d 126, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 830, 114S.Ct .100, 126 L.Ed .2d 66 (1993). This hoop- jumping must take place before the jury is sworn. Credille v. State, 925 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. refd). Although a defendant need not specify why a particular juror is objectionable, his must at least state which particular juror is objectionable. Allen v. State, 108S.W3d281,282-83(Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Fuller v. State, 827 SW.2d 919, 924-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). A mere statement that certain jurors, without designation, are objectionable is not enough.Moreno v.State, 587S.W.2d 405, 408 (Tex.Crim. App. 1979). Following all the steps discussed above will not preserve error in all cases. In Loredo v.State, _ SW.3d _ 2004 WL 743833 (Tex. Crim. App. April 7, 2004), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that failing tocorrectthetrial court'smemoryof a prospective juror's statement, regarding whether she could consider probation, waived error even though the defendant had followed all the necessarystepssetforth in Nelson. The trial courtgranted three out offour challenges made by the defense for the veniremembers' inability to consider probation. The court, however, denied a fifth challenge, without further discussion. After defense counsel requested an additional peremptory, naming the problematic juror, the court responded by stating:My recollectionofMrs.Bandis dlat while she did tell you at one time that probation would not be a possible punishment in her mind that when I asked her a question she recanted and said that she could. Does anybody disagree with that? Or have I screwed the numbers upagain? Loredo, 2004 WL 743833, slip op. at 2. The record on appeal clearly showed the venireperson in question was unequivocal about her inability to consider probation. However, the Court found that the defendant "did not express doubt or disagreement with dle court's statement of the facts on which the court was basing its decision to deny the additional peremptorystrike."Id. The Courtheld that "[p]reservation of error is not merely a technical procedural matter by which appellate courts seek to overrule points of error in a cursory manner. Fairness to all parties requires a party to advance his complaints at a time when there is an opportunity to respond or cure them." Loredo, 2004 WL 743833, slip op. at 3 (citing Young v. State, 826 SW.2d 141, 149(Tex.Crim. App. 1991) (Campbell, J., dissenting)). AI'PEi\lDIX TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Art. 35.01. Jurors called Art. 35.02. Sworn toanswerquestions Art. 35.03. Excuses Art. 35.05. Excused by consent Art. 35.10. Courtto tryqualifications Art. 35.11. Preparation oflisr Art. 35.12. Modeoftesting Art. 35.13. Passingjurorfor challenge Art. 35.14. Aperemptorychallenge Art. 35.15. Numberofchallenges Art .35.16.Reasons for challenge for cause Art. 35.17.Voir dire examination Art. 35.18. Otherevidence on challenge Art. 35.19. Absolute disqualification Art. 35.20. Names caIJed in order Art. 35.21. Judge to decide qualifications Art. 35.25. Making peremptory challenge Art. 35.26. Lists returned toclerk Art .35.261. Peremptorychallenges based on race prohibited KARIN SCALISE EOREN.8IC DNA CONSIlLIANI 9 YEARS EXPERIENCE AS A FORMER FORENSIC DNA ANALYST WITH THETEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AUSTIN CRIME LABORATORY Phone 512-302-4274 Fax 512-323-2855 E-mail karinscalise@shcglnbal,nej Austin, Texas available internationally I conrinued from page 7 THE DEFENDER segregation is single-cell lock-down incarceration for gang members and especially violent inmates. It has held steady at about 7%. DEATH ROW. There were 344 inmates on Death Row back in 1992. In 2004 there were 454, of whom eight were women This represents an increase of 30% in 12 years. Too much should not be read into this figure, however; more people going to Death Row are offset by more frequent executions of sentence (12 in 1992 vs. 23 in 2004), making this statistic misleading. EDUCATION. In 1992 TDCJ published a hard figure for the educationa.llevel of inmates on hand. The average grade completed was 10.1, and about 85% cLid not finish high school. This figur e is now replaced with an Average Educational Achievement figure, not defined. THE BOTTOM LINE. The ultimate figures for the Texas criminal justice system are truly astounding. TDC] spent, in flsca.l year 2004, $1,936,793,366 on incarceration of felons out of a total TDC] budget of almost $2.5 billion. Incarceration accounts for about 77% ofTDC],s budget. This works out to $12,851.21 per inmate. There were a.lmost 32,000 TDC] empl oyees working in incarceration in 2004. 7 There were in Texas, as of August 31, 2004, 235,975 persons on felony probation and 76,577 on parole supervision, in adcLition to the 150,709 incarcerated .s In alJ, 463,261 people in Texas alone are either on felony probation, parole, or serving time for a felony.9 And this figure does not include pretrial confmement, misdemeanor probation or county jail sentences. The Census Bureau estimates the population of Texas in 2003 at some 22 million. This means that about two percent, or one out of fifty, of aU Texans are on some kind of felony imprisonment or supervision. 7 I seem toremember that dus was about the total population ofTDC when I starred practicing in 1983 . 8 12,736 are as abswnders. 9 ComJY.lre this figure to the Qnsus Bureau's population for the City of El Paso, at 563,662. lillill JII iI
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