Whitley 1992

Prehistory and Post-Positivist Science: A Prolegomenon to Cognitive Archaeology
Author(s): David S. Whitley

Source: Archaeological Method and Theory, Vol. 4 (1992), pp. 57-100
Published by: Springer
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Prehistory
and
Post-Positivist Science
A
Prolegomenon
to
Cognitive Archaeology
DAVID S. WHITLEY
Science,
after all,
is a
branch
of
literature.
?Sir Karl
Popper,
Objective Knowledge, p.
185
Archaeology
sits at an
interface.
Having finally
evolved
through (some
had
hoped beyond)
the
growth pangs
of new
archaeol
ogy,
it is now
undergoing
a
second,
similar
period
of
debate,
with
issues of
epistemology, ontology,
and
metaphysics
once
again
in the
fore. That
is,
current theoretical discourse involves a
reconsideration
of the
"processualist" positivism
of new
archaeology
and the evalua
tion of
"post-processual," "symbolic,"
or
"radical"
approaches (cf.
Hodder
1986;
Leone
1982;
Binford
1987;
Earle and Preucel
1987;
Shanks and
Tilley 1987a;
Schiffer
1988). Following
Huffman
(1986a;
cf. Lewis-Williams
1989),
I
prefer
a
particular
brand of
post-proces
sual
archaeology
labeled
"cognitive archaeology,"
but the
appellative
is not so
important
as
the substance.
Cognitive archaeology specifically
and
post-processual
archaeol
ogy
more
generally
are,
admittedly,
much less than
universally
or
even
widely accepted
in our
discipline.
Some view
many
of the con
tentions raised
by
their advocates as
fundamentally inappropriate
to
science
(e.g.,
Binford
1987). Others, equally strongly,
see
them
as
central concerns in
archaeology's
heuristic
(e.g.,
Hodder
1986),
even
while certain critics seem to
question
the
ability
of
post-processual
approaches
to
contribute to our
understanding
of the
prehistoric past
(e.g.,
Earle and Preucel
1987).
Yet on
the
empirical
and
practical
levels,
at
least,
there are two substantive areas in which
cognitive
archaeology,
that
is,
the
post-processual approach practiced princi
2
57
58 David S.
Whitley
pally by archaeologists
associated with the
University
of the Wit
water
srand, specifically
is
making great
inroads: African
iron-age
studies
(e.g.,
Huffman
1981, 1982, 1984, 1986a, 1986b; Thorp 1984a,
1984b;
Loubser
1985, 1988;
Evers
1989)
and
hunter-gatherer
research
(e.g.,
Lewis-Williams
1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, etc.;
Lewis-Wil
liams and Dowson
1988, 1989;
Lewis-Williams and Loubser
1986;
Whitley 1982, 1988a, 1992;
Huffman
1983; Wadley 1986,1987; Camp
bell
1986, 1987;
Dowson
1988a, 1988b).
It is the
purpose
of this
essay
to review these
cognitive archaeological studies,
but not
principally
in terms of
empirical
substance. To do so
without
attending
first to
the theoretical bases of
cognitive archaeology
would be incautious.
Aside from the fact that
many processual archaeologists
are
simply
unfamiliar with this
literature,
it is
apparent
that those that have
considered it maintain certain misconstrued beliefs.
Further,
as
implied above,
it is also true that there is more than
one brand of
post-processual archaeology
and that distinctions be
tween various strains have been little
explored
in the literature.
Thus,
a
consideration of
cognitive archaeology's
substantive ad
vances can
only
be
predicated
on a
necessarily
antecedent review of
the
philosophical
and
methodological
issues these entail. I
begin
with
these,
before
turning briefly
to two case studies of the
approach
in
practice.
Intellectual Bases of
Critiques
of the
positivism (or,
more
correctly, logical
empiricism)
that
underpinned
new
archaeology
have been
presented
by
a
number of authors from various
viewpoints (e.g., Wylie 1981;
Flannery 1982;
Hodder
1986;
Shanks and
Tilley 1987b; Kelley
and
Hanen
1988)
and need not be reiterated here. Suffice it
simply
to
note that the
perception
of a scientific
archaeology
as
necessarily
part
of Otto Neurath's "unified
science," following
a
formalized
(principally Hempelian) positivist model,
is now
widely recognized
as an
overly
narrow
characterization,
even
by
some of the
original
proponents
of the new
archaeology program. Ironically, though,
even
as
processual archaeologists
are
reworking
their
philosophical
and
methodological
commitments to
bring
them in line with recent de
velopments
in the
philosophy
of
science,
scientific
archaeology
is
being
caricatured
by
certain
post-processualists (e.g.,
Hodder
1986;
Prehistory
and Post-Positivist Science 59
Shanks and
Tilley 1987b)
in
exactly
the old-fashioned
positivist
mode that
many
new
archaeologists
are
moving beyond.
That the
early
new
archaeological
treatises and some of the more
vocal
post-processualists
share
(or shared)
the same
flawed, positivist
perception
of science
is, however,
more
than
simply
anecdotal. For
with this
misperception
on the side of certain
post-processualists,
there is an
equally debilitating
and
parallel
misconstrual on the
part
of most
processual archaeologists,
which is that
any opposition
to
their
processualist goals is, somehow,
an
opposition
to science and
necessarily
a committment to relativism.
Just
as narrow
positivism
has become a
whipping post
for
segments
of the
post-processualist
persuasion,
in other
words,
so too has an extreme relativism been
taken as the hallmark of
post-processual archaeology.
But,
in
fact,
these
philosophical
and
methodological
commitments
do not
necessarily
follow.
Anti-positivism
does not
equate
with anti
science,
or at least need not
so,
and neither
necessarily
does an anti
processualism imply
relativism.
Instead,
when
"post-positivist"
developments
in the
philosophy
of science are
acknowledged,
an
archaeology
that is both scientific and
hermeneutic?cognitive
ar
chaeology?is
allowed.
Indeed,
it
suggests
that
archaeology
funda
mentally
is an
interpretive endeavor,
but one in which scientific
method and heuristic
play
their
part.
In order to understand this intellectual
position adopted by cogni
tive
archaeologists,
and
implicitly
how this differs from other
post
processualist
as well as
processualist positions,
I outline two
impor
tant intellectual
developments
that have been fundamental to its
appearance: changes
in culture
theory
in
anthropology,
and the rise
of
post-positivist philosophy
of science.
Archaeology,
Culture
Theory,
and the
Cognitive Paradigm
Although recently
there
appear
to have been some
dissenting voices,
for over
three decades North American
archaeologists
have
by
and
large adopted
the
catch-phrase "archaeology
as
anthropology"
as a
rallying
cry,
if not an
ideological precept.
This is ironic because
just
as
archaeologists
were
emphasizing
their intellectual ties and al
legiance
to their
"mother-discipline," they apparently
turned their
backs
on certain
major
intellectual transitions then
occurring
within
anthropology. Specifically, shortly
after
Phillip Phillips published
the
oft-quoted
remark
"archaeology
is
anthropology,
or it is
nothing"
60 David S.
Whitley
(1955:246-47),
and
following
earlier intellectual trends in
psychol
ogy
and
linguistics, anthropologists
such as Ward
Goodenough,
An
thony
F. C.
Wallace,
David Schneider and others
began
the move to
wards a
"cognitive revolution," resulting
in what is now
generally
referred to as
cognitive
or
symbolic anthropology (cf.
D'Andrade
1984:88).
Whether
or not this constituted an
anthropological "para
digm
shift"
(Kuhn 1962),
or an
alteration in the "theoretical hard
core"
(Lakatos 1969),
is
arguable,
but it
certainly changed
in funda
mental
ways
the manner in which most
anthropologists
viewed the
world,
and their intellectual task in
understanding
it.
This is
apparent
when it is
recognized that, prior
to the
mid-1950s,
anthropology
was
dominated
by
the belief that most
things human,
including personality, language,
and
culture,
could be best under
stood in terms of
stimulus-response relationships (D'Andrade 1984;
Le Vine
1984).
For the
anthropologist,
and
by
derivation the archaeol
ogist,
this "behaviorism" was most manifest in the
then-existing
defi
nition of culture.
Simply stated,
culture
was defined in reference to
patterns
of
behavior,
with
explanations
of culture
change
or cultural
differences most
frequently
framed in terms of human-environment
relationships. But, starting
about
1957,
the behaviorist
paradigm
was
rejected by many
in
anthropology (and
other human
sciences)
in
favor of
a
cognitive
formulation.1
Here,
rather than
emphasizing
nor
mative
patterns
of
action,
concern shifted to a definition of culture
as a
system
of values and beliefs
or,
in a
word,
a worldview.
Although
this
change
in culture
theory
has not been
adopted by
processualist archaeologists, including many
who consider them
selves
"anthropological archaeologists," cognitive
culture
theory
is
fundamental to
cognitive archaeology,
and a few
summary points
concerning
its ramifications need be made. The first of these is that
this
change
in culture
theory implies
a
shift in the
emphasis
of social
inquiry
from the
purely
behavioral realm to better include the
cogni
tive. I discuss this in more detail
below,
but here I wish to
emphasize
one
implication
and what it
suggests concerning
the
explanatory
capability
of
one strain of
processual archaeology,
"behavioral
ar
chaeology"
as
espoused specifically by
Earle and Preucel
(1987).
This
is that
archaeologists employ
remnants of
prehistoric behavior,
whether
expressed
in
artifacts, monuments, sites, associations,
or
contexts,
as their evidence. Since the results of behavior
are funda
mentally
our
evidence,
it is then a
logical
inversion to
argue
that our
goal
is to seek laws to
explain
our
evidence,
as Earle and Preucel
Prehistory
claim. "One uses human behavior as evidence for the
operation
of
the
mind," John
Searle
(1982:2)
noted in a
parallel vein,
"but to
sup
pose
that the laws must be laws of behavior is to
suppose
that the
evidence must be the
subject
matter."
Indeed,
it is
only if
the
subject
of
inquiry
is extended
beyond
the level of
behavior,
to what causes
behavior,
that
any
hope
can
be raised of
achieving explanatory
laws
(cf. Jarvie 1972:18;
Farr
1983:171).
For this
reason,
cognitive archaeologists
have
adopted
an
approach
roughly
akin to
Popper's (e.g., 1972, 1976)
"situational
analysis."
In
situational
analysis Popper distinguishes
what he calls "world-one"
physical objects (which
include
behavior)
from "world-two"
subjec
tive
experiences,
and both of these from "world-three"
objects.
These latter are the
product
of the human mind
[not
to be conflated
with human emotions or
psychological states,
which are
world
two)
and include
art, myths, institutions, statements, arguments, etc.;
that
is,
the
cognitive (but
not
psychological)
realm. "The innermost
nucleus of world
three,"
he
states,
"is the world of
problems,
theo
ries and criticism"
(1976:194).
For
Popper
and other
proponents
of
situational
analysis (e.g., Jarvie 1972;
Farr
1983)
it is situational
analysis,
which
explicitly
considers world-three
objects,
that under
lies law-like
generalizations
and makes
explanation possible
in so
cial
inquiry (cf.
Farr
1983:171;
see also Gibbon
1984:388-92).
Now while
Popper
allows the narrow
applicability
of microeco
nomic theories of
rationality
in situational
analysis (cf. Popper
1961
:
141),
he contends these are
oversimplified, overschematicized,
and
therefore
largely
false.
Correspondingly, they
are
inappropriate
to
the kinds of social contexts and
problems that,
for
example,
archaeol
ogists
confront
(cf.
Farr
1983:172).
In other
words,
the
application
of
problematic assumptions concerning industrialized,
Western eco
nomic behavior?economic
rationality, maximization, optimiza
tion, minimization,
etc.?to
non-Western,
nonindustrialized cul
tures amounts to
implicit analogical reasoning
founded
on
vague
notions of universalities in human nature.
Thus, although
I
recog
nize that
many
processualists
set their
sights
on the decision
making
behind
prehistoric behavior, my
contention is that the
way
they
con
ceptualize
decision
making
is
fundamentally faulty.
That
is,
while
their concern
with decision
making may
in certain cases
supersede
the world-one realm of
behavior,
at best it leads to the
psychologisms
of world-two
or,
in other cases
(e.g., optimal foraging theory),
reduces
explanation
to a
sociobiological
focus
on
the behavior of the
gene.
62 David S.
Whitley
Situational
analysis, by contrast,
is "not based on
any
psychological
assumptions concerning
the
rationality (or otherwise)
of 'human na
ture'"
(Popper 1966:97). Therefore, many
processualists'
recourse to
immanent
psychological
motives
(e.g., maximization)
as
explana
tions for behavior devolves
rapidly
to a kind of hermeneutics con
cerned with
psychologistic
world-two
objects.
And such
simply
can
not lead to
satisfactory explanation.
Second, many
anthropologists
have chosen to
ally
this
change
in
culture
theory
with the
humanistically based, generally
relativist in
tone,
idealist
critique.
Hodder
(e.g., 1986)
has
apparently adopted
a
similar relativist stance
(cf. 1984:30), although
without
any
explicit
consideration of culture
theory. But,
in
fact,
the
cognitive paradigm
does not
imply
or
require
such a
position.
That
is,
nowhere does
interest in
cognition, symbolism,
or
belief
necessarily imply
a
rela
tivist or
nonscientific
approach
or
method
(cf.
Rudner
1966:74;
Huff
1981, 1982;
Farr
1983;
see
below); instead,
such is
simply
a
debatable
metaphysical
commitment.
Perhaps
most
importantly,
the retention
of
a
scientific
approach
even within an
interpretive program,
such
as
is
suggested by cognitive
culture
theory,
is
implied by
a
number of
researchers
(cf.
Sch?lte
1986:8;
Alexander
1982:138).
Third,
it is also
important
to
emphasize
that new
archaeology
ef
fectively
enshrined the behaviorist definition of culture. This is
ironic on a number of
counts,
but
particularly
because one
of the
central tenets of new
archaeology
was a
rejection
of the "normative"
approach
of traditional
archaeology.
Yet the behaviorist
paradigm
and its
resulting
culture
theory
are
paramountly
normative.
By
con
trast,
as
David Schneider has demonstrated a number of times
(e.g.,
1972:38),
it is
only
with the
cognitive paradigm
that the "normative
problem"
is
finally
overcome. Here the distinction turns on
the
con
ceptual
difference between culture as "constitutive rules"
(i.e.,
guidelines)
in the
cognitive paradigm
and as
"regulative
rules"
(or
norms)
in behaviorism.
Post-processual archaeology
and the
cogni
tive
paradigm, therefore,
do not
necessarily imply
a concern with
"mental
templates,"
as both Binford
(1987)
and Earle and Preucel
(1987)
seem to believe. Mental
templates, instead, simply represent
an
aspect
of the normative and one-dimensional model of
cognition
inherent in behaviorism.
The normative contradiction of new
archaeology,
of
course,
has
not
gone unrecognized by processualists.
Culture has been
widely
Prehistory
perceived
as
problematic,
because the
concept
has not been viewed
as
"operational." But,
instead of
coming
to terms with the
concep
tual
contradiction,
new
archaeologists simply
eliminated the con
cept
of culture from their
vocabulary (e.g.,
Hill
1977:103; Trigger
1984:283-84). This,
of
course,
was no new
strategy.
British social
anthropologists
had taken the same tactic in
downplaying
culture
and
favoring
social structure
(cf.
Radcliffe-Brown
1952:192),
and
with the same result: "social
anthropologists
in fact had all the
theoretical
problems
created for cultural
anthropologists by
the cul
ture
concept,
and also the added
problem
of not
realizing
that
they
had the
problems" (Sapire n.d.).
For a
number of
reasons,
consequently,
the
appearance
of
cogni
tive/symbolic anthropology
is an
important
intellectual
develop
ment in
understanding
the
post-processual
debate.
Arguably
it
repre
sents a
larger "paradigmatic
shift" from a
behaviorist to a
cognitive
view of human culture and
society,
with
repre
senting
a manifestation of this
change.
It also obviates the normative
problem
which has
plagued archaeology
for
decades,
and does this
by
revitalizing
the central
concept
of
any
anthropological (and any
an
thropological archaeological)
research: culture.
Equally importantly,
however,
it
implies
no turn to an extreme
relativist,
anti-scientific
approach
to research.
Post-Positivist
Philosophy of
Science
In addition to an
explicit recognition
and
adoption
of
cognitive
cul
ture
theory
now current in
anthropology, specifically
of culture as
worldview, cognitive archaeologists
have
expressed
a commitment
to scientific method and heuristic
(e.g.,
Lewis-Williams
1983;
Lewis
Williams and Loubser
1986;
Lewis-Williams and Dowson
1988;
Huff
man
1986a). This, perhaps
more than
anything else,
sets the
cognitive
archaeologists apart
from other
post-processualist
strains.
However,
this reflects
no
adoption
of doctrinaire
positivist
scientific methodol
ogy,
toward which other
post-processualists
and even now some
pro
cessualists look with disfavor.2
Instead,
it
represents
a
recognition
of
post-positivist developments
in the
philosophy
of
science,
and it is
to these that I now turn.
Post-positivist philosophy
of science is an
intellectual movement
that has
appeared during
the last two
decades,-
that
is,
since the initial
64 David S.
Whitley
emergence
of new
archaeology.
This is not to
deny
that it has earlier
intellectual
origins
but
simply
to
emphasize
that it has
experienced
a
sophisticated development
in the recent
past. Among
its central
tenets is the
rejection
of
positivism's
narrow
emphasis
on science as
based
on sense-data: it is
recognized
that there are
many
phenomena
that are not
directly
observable
(e.g., neutrinos)
but
that,
nonethe
less,
have
a material existence that is
indirectly observable,
based
on
their influence
on
other
aspects
of the material realm. That
is, post
positivist
science has been marked
by
the rise of realism3 and its
linkage
with
a
rationalist method of science
(discussed below).
The fundamental
postulates
or
presuppositions
of
post-positivist
science have been summarized
by
Toulmin
( 1977:152)
and Alexander
(1982:18-33; 1987:17-18;
cf.
Taylor 1971)
and can be
fruitfully
con
sidered in contrast to those of
positivism:
1. The
relationship of theory
and
fact
and the nature
of scientific
discourse. Positivism
presupposed
a
radical break between fact and
theory,
with
empirical
observations held to be
specific
and concrete
and
nonempirical
statements
thought
to be
general
and abstract. In
contrast, post-positivist
science maintains that all data are theoreti
cally-informed.
That
is,
a distinction in kind between theoretical
and observational terms?what Nietzsche condemned
a
century ago
as the
"dogma
of immaculate
perception"?is
now
widely
consid
ered neither
ontologically
nor
epistemologically supportable.
In
stead,
as Lakatos
(1969:156)
has
argued,
to call some
things
"observa
tions" and others "statements" is
simply
an
analytical
convenience
based on a useful manner of
speech (cf.
Hesse
1974;
Toulmin 1977:
152;
Newton-Smith
1981:19-27; Kaplan 1984:34-35;
Giddens and
Turner
1987:2-3). However,
that
we
recognize
that these do not dif
fer in kind does not
imply
that
we cannot
identify
a distinction in
degree
between
them; simply put, they
are a useful
manner of
speech,
and
one which we should maintain. This allows rational
con
fidence
(including,
in some low-level
cases,
inter
subjective
invari
ance)
in scientific observations.
Further,
this
postulate implies
that scientific formulations have
implicit
or
explicit
commitments to
metaphysical
and
empirical
concerns;
therefore science is not
simply
an
activity
that can be con
ceptualized methodologically
or
empirically,
for it
necessarily
incor
porates
the
general
and
presuppositional.
This is in contradistinction
Prehistory
to hard-line
positivism,
which held that more
general
and abstract
concerns had little
significance
for
an
empirically
oriented disci
pline.
To
ignore
the
philosophical side, however,
runs the risk of
implicit
and
unrecognized
theoretical
problems
or
misconstruals. As
Alexander
notes,
"Reason can
only
be
preserved by making presup
positions explicit
and
subjecting
them to
disciplined
debate"
(1987:
52),
and Reed contends that
"attempts
to'remove all
philosophizing
from a domain are
likely
to remove
only explicit, potentially improv
able ideas at the
expense
of
embedding tacit, potentially damaging,
ideas into the fabric of a field"
(1981:477).
This fact
emphasizes
the
necessity
of
including general,
theoretical discourse in
archaeology,
without
awaiting
the final resolution of
archaeology's
observation
language,
for
example,
as some seem wont to do.
2. The nature
of scientific
method. Scientific commitments are no
longer
made
solely
on
empirical
evidence
or
crucial, singular
tests
(cf. Polanyi 1958:92),
as
positivism
maintained. That
is,
the search
for some final
falsifying
or
verifying
evidence is considered inconclu
sive,
if not somewhat
simplistic. Archaeology's regular
controversies
over
the
acceptance
or
rejection
of certain
key
radiocarbon dates il
lustrate this
point
in an inductivist
way. Further, according
to
Lakatos
(1969),
it is often not clear what even constitutes a
crucial
test for a
particular theory anyway,
save in
hindsight. Thus,
Salmon
(1982:37-38) states,
"there exists both
confirming
and disconfirm
ing
evidence for
many important hypotheses,"
while
Kelley
and
Hanen
(1988:241)
note that
"acceptance
in science is
always
tenta
tive. We
adopt
the
hypothesis
that has best survived
testing, always
ready
to abandon it if additional research shows that another is more
probable."
This
implicates
a scientific
method,
which is to
say
a
means of
validation,
not wedded to
singular criteria,
such as naive
falsification,
but instead more
concerned with "inference to the best
hypothesis,"
to
employ Kelley
and Hanen's
phrase.
3. Theoretical
change. Finally, "paradigm
shifts"
or
transitions in a
"theoretical hard-core"
only
occur
when
a match exists between
em
pirical
evidence and
convincing
theoretical alternatives.
But,
be
cause
theoretical
disputes
are often
implicit (cf.
Holton
1973:26),
they may go unrecognized
in debates
perceived
as
principally empir
ical and
methodological
in nature.
Just
such
a
failure to
recognize
66 David S.
Whitley
the fundamental theoretical
changes implied by post-processual
ar
chaeology
is illustrated
by
Earle and Preucel
(1987),
who concluded
that this
simply represents
a
"critique"
of new
archaeology.
These
postulates
are
important
for a
number of reasons.
First,
and
most
significantly, they effectively
undermine the foundation of
positivism.
As Alexander has shown in
great
detail
( 1982:18-33),
the
last two decades in the
philosophy
of science can be said to have
unsettled the
metaphysical, ontological,
and
epistemological posi
tions
upon
which
positivism
was based.
This,
of
course,
justifies
many
of the criticisms of new
archaeology
that have been raised
by
the
post-processualists,
but of course similar criticisms have been
raised
by
those more allied with
processual archaeology
as
well
(e.g.,
Kelley
and Hanen
1988).
Further, although
the above
points
constitute the framework of
post-positivist philosophy
of
science, they
do not
imply only
a
single
approach
to
research;
for the
archaeologist, they
do not entail a
specific
method for the
study
of the
past.
In
fact,
there is considerable
room
for variation in how these
postulates
are
interpreted, particu
larly
the
first,
and these
interpretations
have had a
great
influence
on the manifestation of
post-processual
and
cognitive archaeology.
That
is,
and
contrary
to what certain
post-processualists
would lead
us to
believe,
the
postulates
of
post-positivism
do not
only imply
a
relativist
position.
This is best understood if we consider the basis
for a realist rationalism.
Temperate
Rationalism
That scientific method and a rationalist
approach
are not antithetical
to an interest in
interpretation
and the
cognitive paradigm
is demon
strated
by
the
philosopher
of science William Newton-Smith
(1981),
who has outlined what he calls a
"temperate
rationalism" that illus
trates the realist
position adopted by
the
cognitive archaeologists.
It
consists of two
components that, together, specify
its
program:
a
goal
of
science,
and
a
principle
or set of
principles
for
comparing
rival
theories,-
that
is,
a scientific heuristic and method. In consider
ing
the scientific
goal,
the
temperate
rationalist
accepts
a
realist
view of science. This includes
an
ontological position
that holds that
theories
are true or false
by
virtue of how the world
actually is,
inde
pendent
of ourselves
(this,
of
course,
being
a
cleaned-up
version of
the
"correspondance theory
of
truth";
cf. Davidson
1969;
Elkana
Prehistory
1978:312-13).
It also includes
a thesis of
verisimilitude,
in which it
is held that the
point
of scientific
enterprise
is to discover
explana
tory
truths about the
world,
but that these truths are verisimilar and
inherently corrigible
in the sense of
only progressively approximat
ing
the real truth
per
se.
Indeed,
the
"pessimistic
induction"
sug
gests
that all scientific theories will be
disproven
within about 200
years' time,
but that
they
will be
replaced by
better
theories,
achiev
ing increasing proximity
to the real truth.
The second
component
of
rationalism,
the set of
principles by
which theories
are
evaluated,
has been elaborated
by
Newton-Smith
in
great
detail
(1981:226-30),
and similar
principles
have been
suggested by
many
other scholars
(e.g.,
Kuhn
1962; Hempel
1966:33
46; Popper 1966:268;
Lakatos
1969; Copi 1982:470-75;
Farr 1983:
165;
1986).
It
corresponds
in its com
mitments and essential elements to
Kelley
and Hanen's
(1988)
con
tention that the validation of
archaeological hypotheses
should be
based
on inference to the best
hypothesis.
In
summary form,
what
Newton-Smith calls the
"good-making
features of theories" are as
follows:
(1)
observational
nesting?the ability
to
preserve,
while increas
ing
and
improving
over,
the observational
success of
previous
theories,
(2) fertility?the provision
of a
scope
or
guidance
for future devel
opment;
(3)
track record?the record of
success that
an
existing theory
has
accumulated;
(4) inter-theory support?the ability
to account
for,
or
support,
other, accepted theories;
(5)
smoothness?the
ease with which
a
theory
accounts for obser
vational anomalies in terms of
auxiliary hypotheses;
(6)
internal
consistency-,
(7) compatability
with
well-grounded metaphyscial beliefs)
and
(8) simplicity.
These
qualities
allow for
an
adjudication
between
competing
theo
ries and
hypotheses.
Scientific
advancement, therefore,
need not
simply
be a
question
of new theories
triumphing only through
the
death of old
theoreticians,
as Max Planck
(1949)
once
argued,
nor is
there "no external
objective
basis for
saying
that
any
one
theory,
well
argued
and coherent
internally
and
'fitting'
the
data,
is
any
bet
ter than
any
other"
(Hodder 1984:30). Nor,
for that
matter,
need we
68 David S.
Whitley
naively
assume that confirmation or
falsification
through
a
singular
critical test can occur.
Instead,
there are
multiple
criteria
upon
which
scientific evaluation can
be
based,
and these allow for a
rational and
objective process
of
verification,
even if it is
ultimately
tentative
and
provisional
in nature.
There
is, correspondingly,
a
rational
approach
available to
us that can be called
upon
to obviate the
many
problems
of
positiv
ism.
However,
this leaves some unresolved issues. As
might
be clear
from the few illustrations I have cited
concerning post-positivist
philosophy
of
science,
it is
apparent
that
many processual
archaeolo
gists have,
on a
practical level, already adopted
certain of the
pos
tulates of this move
beyond positivism.
This
simply
underscores
Laudan's
(1981:2)
contention that the
philosophy
of science is more
closely
tied to what has
already happened
in the sciences than the
reverse. But
what, then,
are the distinctions between
cognitive
ar
chaeology
and the
archaeology practiced by many
processual
archae
ologists,
if these
archaeologists already
share some of the same
realist rationalist commitments? In
summarizing
these I
emphasize
a distinctive brand of
post-processual archaeology?cognitive
ar
chaeology?most
evident in the research of the
archaeologists
at the
University
of the Witwatersrand.
Fundamentally, cognitive archaeologists
take the
position
that
so
cial
inquiry
must
necessarily
consider the
cognitive
and
symbolic
aspects
of
past
societies. That
is, fully
aware of the shift from the
behavioral to the
cognitive doctrine, they
maintain that the remains
of
prehistoric
actions are
evidential,
and the
point
of
inquiry
is to
study
the
cognitive systems
behind the behavior
creating
the archae
ological
record. This does not
deny
that humans
adapt
to their envi
ronment,
or that man-land
relationships may impose
constraints on
cultures.
Further,
it does not
imply
that such
are
unworthy
of
analy
sis.
And, parting
company
with
post-processualists
such
as Hodder
and Shanks and
Tilly,
it does not insist that
archaeological
research
need be anti-scientific
or
that, somehow,
concern
with
cognition
im
plies
interest in emotions or
psychological
states
(contrary
to what
both Sabloff et al.
[1987]
and Hodder
[1986]
seem to
believe).
Prehistory
Instead,
while
maintaining
an
allegiance
to scientific method
per
se,
and to the inherent
rationality
this
implies, cognitive
archaeolo
gists
insist that
explanation
and
interpretation
of
prehistoric
human
societies and culture
must look
beyond
the evidential
level, past
the
behavior that created
our
archaeological record,
to the
cognitive sys
tems that underlie it. In this
avowedly anthropological approach
to
archaeology,
three related
issues, then, require
clarification: the
focus of social
inquiry;
the
inescapability
of
interpretation
in social
research;
and the
means
by
which the
cognitive systems
of the
past
may
be accessed. I discuss these in turn.
The Focus
of
Social
Inquiry
Adopting
a committment
loosely
related to
Popper's
"situational
analysis" (Popper 1961, 1966, 1972, 1976),4 cognitive archaeologists
maintain that the
prehistoric past
was
socially
and
culturally
consti
tuted, and, therefore,
that
prehistoric
societies and cultures cannot
simply
be reduced
to one-to-one
analogues
with
ecological
or
cyber
netic
metaphors. Nor,
for that
matter,
do
they
think that the
explana
tion of the
past
can
proceed simply
with a
consideration of the
overt,
behavioral realm or the
relationship
of humankind to the environ
ment.
Rather, they
take the
concept
of culture to be central to ar
chaeological analysis.
But "culture" here is not what is meant
by
the
term in traditional and
new
archaeology:
culture
as
regulative rules,
governed by
mental
templates,
evidenced in behavioral
patterns,
and
resulting
from
stimulus-response relationships
with the environ
ment.
Instead,
culture is defined as a
system
of
beliefs, symbols,
and
values
or,
in a
word,
as
worldview,
with these
"cognitive objects"
comprising
constitutive rules within which human action and be
havior unfold. In this
sense,
culture is determinative for human so
cial
behavior,
but this does not
imply
full
predictability (Sapire n.d.;
cf. Weber
1975:122-23);
culture
provides
a
system
of beliefs that
guides behavior, just
like the rules for
a
game
of
chess,
but culture
does not
fully prescribe behavior,
like the
algorithm
that
uniquely
specifies
the course of
a
computer program (cf. D'Agostino 1986).
At this
point
a few words are needed in reference to
Popper's
situa
tional
analysis.
In
summary form,
it has two
components:
a situa
tional
model,
which is a
description
of what
Popper
terms the social
environment within which human behavior
occurs;
and
a
rationality
70 David S.
Whitley
principle.
The latter
(which
is not to be taken as a
law;
while it is a
major premise
of the
thesis,
it is more
rightly
a
definition,
therefore
it is not
nomological;
cf. Farr
1983:169) points
to the need to recon
struct the context or situation within which action
occurs,
to make
the actions that result
rationally
understandable
or
appropriate
to
the context within which
they
unfold.
By
this is
implied
a
ideologi
cal
analysis
that
begins
with the definition of the situation and
pro
ceeds to the
rationality
of
subsequent action,
as
specified by
this
context. Here the situational environment in a
general way
is recon
cilable with the
cognitive
definition of
culture,
and
interpretation
therefore must consider the
cognitive
realm.
Culture, then,
is a
central
concern,
but it is not
simply
an
explana
tory metaphor
for the
cognitive archaeologist (such
as
"diffusion"
was for the traditional
archaeologist,
or
"evolution" is in certain
pro
cessual
studies).
That
is,
it is the
purpose
of
cognitive archaeological
research to elucidate the
system
of beliefs that constitute a
culture,
thereby defining
the cultural
logic
or
situational
rationality
within
which decisions were
made,
institutions were
constituted,
and ac
tions
performed.
In reference to
Popper's
situational
analysis, then,
aims to
identify
the realm of
"cognitive
ob
jects" and, through
the
exegesis
of
these, explain, interpret,
and un
derstand the
prehistoric past.
It is
important
to
emphasize
a
few issues here.
First,
as noted
above,
concern with
prehistoric cognition
does not
imply
interest in
mental states or other
psychologistic concepts.
It
is, therefore,
not
the realm of human
emotions,
which has constituted the focus of
"classical" hermeneutics and now seems the
point
of Hodder's con
textual
archaeology. Simply stated, understanding
the
past
cannot
be attained
by "getting
into" the
psyche
of
our
ancestors,
or
by
con
cern with the
subjective experiences
of
prehistoric actors,
or
by
re
course to a sensationalist
epistemology.
As Farr
(1983:161) notes,
"the limitations of this
subjective
method overwhelm its
utility
and
suggestiveness."
In this manner
cognitive archaeology parts ways
with idealism and its recent
post-processual
manifestations.
Second, explanation
of the
past (or
of
any
social
phenomena)
can
only
be achieved
by
recourse to the
cognitive
realm. It cannot be
attained
simply by
examination of behavior
(Popper's "world-one")
nor
through
consideration of human
psychological
motives and emo
tions
(Popper's "world-two"). Instead, explanation
of social
phenom
ena
requires
recourse to
understanding (cf.
Weber
1977:109) and,
Prehistory
unlike the doctrine
espoused by
more
traditional
positivists, causal,
nomological explanation
cannot be
facilely
substituted for this
con
cept, although
it is not
incompatible
with such
explanations (Farr
1983).
The
philosopher
David
Sapire
has made this same
argument
in
slightly
different terms:
If
anthropology
aims to render
intelligible
the
actions, activities,
and artifacts of
people,
culture can
scarcely
be viewed
differently
[than
defined in terms of beliefs and
values].
That's because of
what actions
are,
and
so,
what it is to
explain
them or
render
them
intelligible.
The standard view is that actions
depend
on
the beliefs and values of the
agents
who
perform
them. Divorce
actions from these and
you
end
up
with
something quite
differ
ent?bare
behavior, bodily
movement.
Any grasp
of actions
must therefore be in terms of beliefs and values.
. . .
An under
standing, Verstehen,
of
people's representations of,
or
models of
the world
or
reality
...
is
[therefore] indispensible
for an
under
standing
of their actions.
(Sapire n.d.)
It is
quite clear, consequently,
that to come to terms with the
past?
be this in reference to some form of
"explanation"
or
"interpreta
tion"?understanding
is
required, something
which
positivist
new
archaeology originally
denied
(cf. Taylor 1971:10;
more on
this
below).
But
understanding
can
only
be
predicated
on a
consideration
of the
cognitive realm,
if
archaeology
is to be
something
more
than
a
superficial prehistoric ethology.
So whether we
espouse
explana
tion and law-like
generalizations
or
not,
we are
only fooling
our
selves if we
think that the
cognitive
realm can
be avoided. It
is,
there
fore,
to this area?the
context-dependent
world of beliefs and values
or,
in a
word,
to culture?that research must turn.
Now this is bound to raise alarms
among
the
profession.
"We can't
study
the
cognitive systems
of the
past,"
most will no
doubt
say,
"because there are no
living
informants to tell us
about them." Cer
tainly,
I do not contest the
mortality
of our
subject
matter.
Instead,
I
rest the case for
on two
propositions. First,
that even
with
no
informants, aspects
of
prehistoric cognition
can
be resuscitated. This is an
empirical
and technical
issue,
which I
turn to
subsequently. Perhaps
more to the
point,
however: if we
deny
the
possibility
of
accessing prehistoric cognition,
we not
only deny
but also
fully negate
the
program
of
processual
72 David S.
Whitley
archaeology.
For
example,
as
Evans-Pritchard noted
long ago
in com
menting
on
Radcliffe-Brown's social
anthropology,
social structure
is
every
bit as
abstract
as
culture, or,
at
least,
one is no more concrete
than the other.
Kinship,
in other
words?just
like economic and sub
sistence
systems?is
as much in
people's
minds as are
beliefs and
values
(Sapire n.d.).
All of these are at least in
part cognitive
con
structs,- strictly,
none are observable on the
ground;
therefore there
is no
logic
to the
argument
that
one can
be accessed
by prehistorians
while the others cannot
(Lewis-Williams 1986a;
cf.
Wylie 1982a).
Nor,
for that
matter,
is there reason to assume that the
investigation
of one need
necessarily
be
methodologically
different from the
study
of the other.
Indeed,
to
presuppose
that some of these
phenomena
can
be identified and studied
archaeologically
while others cannot is sim
ply
to allow
perceived
inductive limits of the
archaeological
record
to determine our
research,
as
Wadley (1987)
has
rightly pointed
out.
But this is
only part
of the
problem
in
positing
a
distinction in
kind between culture and the
social, economic,
and subsistence
sys
tems of the
new
archaeologist.
As
Sapire (n.d.) contends,
the
analysis
of social structure
simply
cannot be
separated
from beliefs and
values: the
relationships
that constitute distinctions in social
organi
zation
(like
commoner and
elite)
lie
exactly
in
culturally-specific
values and beliefs. Therefore it cannot be
presumed
that one can be
considered without the other.
Sapire points
out that "the
prompts
for these social roles
[constituting
social
structure]
are not in the
genes; they
are in the
conceptions
distilled from
stories, theories,
jokes, lies, customs,
and other educative
experiences
since childhood
. . .
social structure
presupposes
culture"
(Sapire n.d.; emphasis
added). And,
as Max Weber has
argued
in a
frequently
cited
passage
(1977:109),
the same holds for
economy
as well.
Consequently,
con
tentions that the
processual archaeologists'
focus of social
inquiry
is
somehow
more
concrete,
less
abstract,
and not
part
of the
cognitive
realm
but,
in
fact, separable
from
it,
are
simply wrong-headed,
and
represent
a
logical fallacy
of the
gravest
order.
Archaeology
and
Interpretation
That social
structure, economy,
and subsistence
are as abstract
a
form of the
cognitive
realm
as beliefs and values is one
thing;
that
we need
understanding
to
study
them
may
be viewed
by
some as a
slightly
different matter. Traditional
positivist
natural science denied
Prehistory
the need for
Verstehen,
or
understanding,
based
on the
argument
that
the
objects
that the
physical
sciences
study ("stars,"
for
example)
have
an existence
independent
of
anything
we make of them. With
new
archaeology's original adoption
of
positivism
and its
metaphysi
cal belief in a unified
science, moreover,
it was
presumed
that archae
ology
could
fully
be a naturalistic science and that recourse to Verste
hen was
unnecessary. Further,
it
appears
that certain
archaeologists
continue to view
any
concern with
understanding
or
interpretation
with
suspicion.
Therefore the
interpretive
nature of
archaeology
re
quires
comment.
First,
to
allay
certain initial
fears,
it is
important
to
emphasize
that
there is
nothing
about
interpretation
that is
inherently
"less
objec
tive" or "more
subjective,"
or "more scientific" or
"less
scientific,"
than there is about
"explanation."
To
presume
such is to commit a
fallacy
of
equivocation
in which the
concepts "objective"
and "sub
jective"
are conflated
respectively
with "unbiased" and
"biased,"
"cognitive"
and
"noncognitive,"
"observational" and "nonobserva
tional,"
"rational" and
"irrational,"
and
ultimately,
"scientific" and
"nonscientific." But this is
simply
an
epistemological doctrine, yet
to be
supported.
Processual
archaeologists,
for
example,
have never
illustrated that their
explanations
are
somehow more
scientific
or more
objective
than
cognitive archaeologists' interpretations (cf.
Feleppa 1981:62-63;
Lewis-Williams
1983;
Lewis-Williams and
Loubser
1986).
In a
parallel vein, similarly,
Rudner has noted that
"no one has ever demonstrated that the
psychological, per se,
is iden
tical with the
biased;
nor is it
easy
to
imagine
how
a
cogent
demon
stration of this could
possibly proceed. (The
fact that
metaphysical
positions
have assumed this
position
without demonstration is
scarcely
recommendation for its
adoption)" (1966:74; emphasis
in
original). Indeed,
Max Weber
(1975:125)
has
argued
that it is
exactly
because
interpretations
of human actions can situate such actions
within their own frames of reference that such
interpretations
are
inherently
more rational than scientific
explanations
of individual
natural
events,
which
may simply
constitute statistical
predictions.
Thus,
at the outset it is clear that certain
archaeologists'
reactions
against interpretation
and
understanding
are emotional
reactions,
based on
embedded
metaphysical
and
epistemological
beliefs that
have been little
thought-through
or
critically
evaluated. Fundamen
tally,
there is little
justification
for the
argument
that
understanding
and
interpretation are, somehow,
less
objective
than
explanation.
74 David S.
Whitley
But this embedded
reactionary position aside,
there are
other sub
stantial
arguments against
the notion that
archaeology
can
ignore
understanding. According
to Max Weber
(1975),
for
example,
the dis
covery
of
"meaning"
and
"interpreting"
are
neither
logically
nor
epistemologically
different than the
discovery
of laws or causes in
the natural
world; fundamentally
both
rely
on
the use of
hypotheses
and "instruments of
concept
formation"
(Huff 1981:469).
For
Weber,
in
fact, interpretation
and
understanding
are
necessary
activities in
all domains of scientific
inquiry (Huff 1982:91). Similarly, Popper
argues
that all science is
performed
within a "horizon of
expecta
tions" and that this "confers
meaning
on our
experiences,
actions
and observations"
(1972:345). By this,
both contend that understand
ing
is a
necessary,
indeed
unavoidable, component
of research.
And,
on an
empirical
level at
least,
Knorr-Cetina
(1981)
has demonstrated
that the situational
logic
of the
physical
sciences results in natural
and
technological
scientists
employing understanding
and
interpre
tation as much
as,
and in the same manner
as,
social scientists. In
short,
not
only
is it
impossible
for the
archaeologist
to avoid under
standing
in
studying
the
past,
it is
highly unlikely
that the natural
scientist is
any
more
privileged
in this
regard
as well.
Again, however,
this is not to
imply
that
interpretation
or under
standing
can be reduced
epistemologically
to
"experiencing
some
thing" (Weber 1975:159).
Weber was careful to
emphasize
the need to
objectify interpretation (cf. Cooper 1981:82;
Huff
1981, 1982),
and
this concern has been considered in detail
by Popper.
In
fact, Popper's
"critical
rationality"
is
effectively
an
objective theory
of understand
ing (cf. Popper 1972).
With this
Popper
defines what he calls "scien
tific
understanding,"
which is a
"systematically
critical version of
the kind of
understanding
we have in
everyday
life"
(Farr 1983:159).
It is
through
situational
analysis,
in
fact,
that such
objective
under
standing
can be achieved. That
is,
for the
archaeologist
it can be
through
the related
approach
termed
that we
can understand and
interpret
the
past,
but in a manner that obviates
the relativism of other
post-processualist approaches.
But there is one final
subtlety
in the
interpretation
of "understand
ing"
itself that warrants mention. This
pertains directly
to
many
processual archaeologists' apparent
fear of the
interpretive,
and is
that,
since Verstehen is not a method of
acquiring knowledge (as
Binford
[1987]
seems to
imply),
it cannot be a
suspicious
method at
all.
Instead,
it is a
mode of
knowledge (Sapire n.d.),
and
exactly
that
Prehistory
mode of
knowledge appropriate
when concern lies with
values,
be
liefs, meanings,
and so on. And
this,
of
course,
is the
specific
kind of
knowledge required
to understand human actions and behavior.
Archaeology, consequently,
is
fundamentally
an
interpretive
exer
cise.
Simply put,
we
interpret
the
past, regardless
of whether
or not
we do so with
explanatory laws, symbolic interpretations,
or em
pathie understanding.
This does not
necessarily relegate
it to non
science,
nor does it
implicate
relativism.
Instead,
as Max
Weber,
Karl
Popper,
and others have taken
pains
to
show,
it can
include
rational,
scientific
study.
Accessing
the
Cognitive Systems of
the Past
"Well and
good,"
I'm sure some will
say,
"but how does he
figure
he
can
determine what
they
were
thinking
in the
past?" This, then,
is the next order of
business, and, although my
concern is not the
thought patterns
of
prehistory,
it
ultimately
reduces to
empirical
and technical
problems.
To
begin,
it is
necessary
to
identify
the ar
chaeological
locus of the
cognitive
realm.
Where,
in
short,
can we
look within the
archaeological
record to find evidence of
prehistoric
cognitive systems?
As
implied above, prehistoric culture,
which is to
say beliefs,
val
ues,
or
worldview,
is
inseparable
from other
cognitive abstractions,
such as
economy, subsistence,
and social
organization.
Huffman
(1981, 1984, 1986a),
for
example,
has shown how beliefs and world
view were
expressed symbolically
in the internal
arrangements
of
African Iron
Age settlements,
while Evers
(1989)
has illustrated the
expression
of
contrasting cognitive systems
in the material culture
of a
variety
of modern and
prehistoric
Bantu
groups.
It
follows, then,
that
cognitive systems
are
expressed
at some level in
effectively
all
aspects
of material culture.
Thus,
beliefs are visible
archaeologically,
and
they
are even
commonly
and
regularly expressed
in
everyday
material culture
(cf.
Welbourn
1984:23)
as
well
as in "ceremonial
objects."
That the
cognitive
side of the
archaeological
record has been
somewhat overlooked in favor of techno-environmental considera
tions,
and that
archaeologists
may
be unaccustomed to
looking
for
it, then,
is no
argument
in
support
of the
putative difficulty
of access
ing prehistoric cognitive systems
in the material record of the
past.
This
fact, however,
is bound to lead to other
objections.
For exam
ple,
on
many
occassions I have heard
incredulity expressed
over the
76 David S.
Whitley
idea that beliefs and values
can
be ascertained without
talking
to
informants. But this
simply represents misconceptions concerning
the nature of
anthropological research,
in a
specific
sense,
and,
more
generally, concerning
how
interpretations
are
made,
as
well as the
distinction between
"signs"
and
"symbols" (Whitley n.d.a).
As far
back as his
writings
on
the Andaman
Islanders,
Radcliffe-Brown
(1922) argued
that "native
explanations"
are not
explanations
at all
in the sense of final
exegesis
or
interpretation. Instead,
as has been
emphasized by
numerous
anthropologists (e.g., Sperber 1975; Hugh
Jones 1979),
such oral accounts themselves are
simply
the raw data
from which the
anthropologist develops
his own
interpretation
of
a
particular
culture. Ask
a "native"
why
a
particular
ritual is
per
formed,
or what
bearing
his worldview has
on
his
architecture,
and
chances
are
quite good
that the
response
will be
on
the order of "Be
cause we have
always
done it this
way,"
or "It is our
tradition,"
or
simply
"I don't know." For that
matter,
ask the man on the street
similar
questions
about the
symbols
and beliefs of
our own
culture
and the
average response
will
probably
be
equally unenlightening.
Beliefs and
values,
as
expressed
in
symbols, myths,
and
rituals,
often
not
only
are not
widely
understood within a culture but are fre
quently
misunderstood
(Jung 1949:601;
Grimes
1976:45;
Elster
1982).
In a
word, then,
oral informants are not the end-all and do-all
of
cognitive research,
be it in
anthropology
or
archaeology.
It is
exactly
for this reason that Clifford Geertz
argues
that
"whatever,
or
wherever, symbol systems
'in their
own terms'
may be,
we
gain
em
pirical
access to them
by inspecting events,
not
by arranging
abstracted entities into unified
patterns" (1973:17).
And the archaeo
logical record,
of
course,
provides
similar access to
prehistoric
be
havioral events.
The
point, then,
is that informants' comments constitute
only part
of the data in the
interpretive process
followed
by ethnographers.
While
they may
serve as the source of
interpretive hypotheses,
behav
ior and action can be as
important
in
explaining cognitive systems
as
are
commentaries,
and behavior and action are revealed
archaeologi
cally. This, however,
is not to
deny
the value of
ethnographic exege
sis. This can be
useful,
but it is most useful in
conjunction
with
behavioral evidence. It is for this reason that most
(but
not
all)
recent
cognitive
and
post-processual
studies have been tied to
ethnographic
records. Earle and Preucel
(1987)
note this and from it
question
whether such studies
can,
in
fact, actually
consider
truly prehistoric
Prehistory
cases. But in this
they
miss a
central
point.
This is that
cognitive
ar
chaeologists recognize
that sound
interpretations
are
fundamentally
based
on
ethnographic analogy,
and therefore
that,
in a substantive
sense,
the
cognitive archaeology program
is
predicated
on
initially
building
a series of
ethnographically
informed
analogical
models.
Thus,
as Max Weber has
noted,
"It is not the
exception,
but the
rule,
that
interpretation proceeds by analogy" (1975:162). And,
perhaps
closer to
home,
Alison
Wylie
has stated that "most archaeo
logical
inference remains
analogical" (1985:64;
cf.
Kelley
and Hanen
1988:261).
It follows that
one
appropriate
course in the
development
of
a
research
program
is to
begin by building
an
ethnographically
informed
analogical
base
and, only
once this is
well
established,
to
proceed
to less immediate areas of the
past.
But
it does not follow that such areas are
methodologically inaccessible,
as
Earle and Preucel seem to
imply. Instead, cognitive archaeology
has
begun
with what can be considered "source-side"
research, using
ethnographic interpretations and,
in an
effort to
develop
relations
of
relevance,
seeks to
identify
causal
relationships
or relations of
dependence
between
pertinent
variables. Once a
methodologically
sound
analogy
has been
constructed,
the
prehistoric past
can be
truly
accessed.
One other
point, emphasized by Wylie (cf. 1982b, 1985, 1988)
in
her detailed consideration of the
archaeological
use of
analogy,
is
critical here. This is that sound
analogical
inference is best based on
multiple
sources;
there is no
support
for the
presumption
that there
need be
a one-to-one
analogue
between source and
subject
(1985:106).
She states:
Analogical
inference should not lead
automatically
to "ethno
graphic despair"
when
no
single, complete analog
for the
subject
is available.
Sophisticated analogical argument
across the sci
ences
exploits
a
range
of
sources... and establishes the relevance
of these sources to the
subject by demonstrating
the existence
of
"determining
structures"
. . .
that
ensure,
with
some
specifia
ble
degree
of
reliability,
that the association of
compared
with
imputed
attributes is not
purely
accidental.
(Wylie 1988:231)
Correspondingly, prehistoric
cases which
may
have
no exact
equiva
lence in the
ethnographic
record
(such
as
early
hominid
behavior,
or
Upper
Pleistocene
societies) may,
in
fact,
be
approachable
and inter
pretable
in
light
of well-founded
analogical
inference.
78 David S.
Whitley
Are
prehistoric cognitive systems
accessible in this same
way?
I
will sketch an
example
below to show that
they
are,
but I would like
to first
gainsay
one other
(usually)
tacit
assumption,
held
by many
archaeologists,
that serves as a
presuppositional stumbling
block
whenever the issue of the
cognitive systems
of the
past
is raised.
This
assumption
has been
implicitly expressed
in reference to the
parietal
art of Mud
Glyph
Cave:
It cannot be
emphasized
too
strongly
that it would be
a serious
mistake to
attempt
to
"interpret"
these themes and motifs in
terms of Southeastern
myth
and
religion
as
they
were in the
Historic
period..
. .
The
glyphs
were drawn more than 200
years
earlier than
our
earliest, fragmentary
historic records on the re
gion.
. . .
The time and social
change
is
roughly
the same as the
time between the American Revolution and World War II!
(M?l
ler
1986:38)
My
contention here is with the
logic by
which it is assumed
that,
since 200
years
have
passed, change
has
necessarily occurred,
as
if
time
itself
was the cause
of change. This,
in other
words,
is a
gradual
ist doctrine that
mistakenly
confuses the fact that because
change
occurs over
time,
time is somehow
causally implicated
in
change.
Change, however,
is a
condition
to be demonstrated
empirically,
not
assumed
a
priori (Huffman 1986a:85;
cf. Lewis-Williams
1984).
In
the case of Mud
Glyph
Cave and southeastern North
America, per
haps
sufficient cultural
change
had unfolded to
negate
the value of
historical
records;
but this needs be shown rather than assumed.
This is
especially
true in
light
of the realization
by many anthropolo
gists that,
even in the face of acculturation and social
disruption,
cognitive systems
of
belief, values,
and ritual tend to be the most
conservative and the most resistant to alteration.
Indeed,
it is
exactly
because of such conservatism that the verbal
components
of cere
mony
and ritual are
widely expressed
in archaic forms of
language
(Bloch 1974:62).
in Practice
There
is, correspondingly,
a
philosophical, methodologi
cal,
and technical base
upon
which
we can
build
an
approach
to
studying prehistoric cognitive systems. Still,
the above discussion
Prehistory
does not exhaust the
potentialities ?or
resolve all the
problems)
that
confront the
cognitive archaeologist. Nonetheless, programmatics
without
practice
is thin stuff. Rather than continue the theoretical
discourse
here,
I conclude with brief
synopses
of two
cognitive
re
search
programs:
one
that demonstrates that the
cognitive systems
of the
very
distant
past
can be
analyzed;
and one
that shows that
understanding systems
of
cognition
can aid the
prehistorian
in un
derstanding
more "traditional"
archaeological domains,
such as set
tlement and subsistence.
Shamanism and the
Upper
Paleolithic Art
of
Western
Europe
The first
research
program
I
briefly synthe
size is that conducted
by
David Lewis-Williams and his students.
This
program
had its
beginnings
in an
ethnographically
informed
interpretation
of the
symbolic meaning
of southern San rock
paint
ings (see
Lewis-Williams
1980,1981,1982,1983, etc.;
Lewis-Williams
and Loubser
1986;
Lewis-Williams and
Dowson
1989).
More
recently,
it has been extended well
beyond
the confines of southern Africa
and the recent
past.
Lewis-Williams's research
began
with an
effort to
decipher
the
meanings
of
historic/protohistoric
San rock
paintings by combining
an
analysis
of available
ethnographic
information on
myth, ritual,
and
linguistics
with the
archaeological
record of
painted
art.
Roughly
following
Victor Turner's
(e.g., 1967) suggestions
for
symbolic analy
sis
(Lewis-Williams 1981),
he established that the
painted
motifs
re
ferred to the
supernatural
visions and
experiences
that medicine
men
received while in trance.
Importantly,
he also demonstrated the
scientific
reliability
of his
interpretation and,
in
fact,
its
superiority
over
competing hypotheses (Lewis-Williams 1982, 1983, 1985;
1986).
Recognizing
the
implications suggested by
the
origin
of the
painted
forms in shamans'
"hallucinatory" trance-states,
he then
began
an
investigation
of the
neuropsychological
effects of altered states of
consciousness
on
visual and
graphic imagery (Lewis-Williams
1986b).
This
investigation
was
based
on
the
major premise
that the
human
neurological system
is a
biophysiological universal;
that
is,
that the
neuropsychological
effects of altered states can be
presumed
equivalent cross-culturally
and
through
the
antiquity
of Homo sa
piens sapiens' occupation
of the earth. In
fact,
an
examination of
80 David S.
Whitley
published neuropsychology experiments
that have examined altered
states of consciousness in Western
laboratory subjects,
as
well
as
certain
ethnographic
studies of the same
phenomena (e.g.,
Reichel
Dolmatoff
1978), support
this contention
(Lewis-Williams
and Dow
son
1988).
Building
from these
analogical
sources,
Lewis-Williams and Dow
son
(1988)
then abstracted a series of
recurring,
fundamental visual
forms
("entoptic phenomena") experienced cross-culturally during
altered
states,
along
with
a set of
principles
of
perception by
which
these are
seen,
and the
stages through
which a trance
subject's
visual
hallucination
proceeds.
This
neuropsychological
model was then
tested
against
two
separate corpora
of rock
art,
both of which are
known to have been
painted by
shamans and to be related to their
altered states
experiences:
the San case
(Lewis-Williams 1980, 1981,
1982, etc.),
and the rock art of the Coso
Range
of the western Great
Basin of North America
(Whitley 1988b, 1992, n.d.a, n.d.b).
Based
on a
close
correspondence
between the
expectations
of the neuro
psychological
model and the San and Coso
arts,
confidence in the
inferential value of this
analogical
model in
interpreting prehistoric
corpora
of art was obtained.
Lewis-Williams and Dowson then
compared
the
expectations
of
their
analogically
based
neuropsychological
model with the rock art
of the
European Upper
Paleolithic. A close
correspondence
was found
between the so-called
geometric "signs"
of the
Upper
Paleolithic and
their seven
recurring entoptic
forms. In
addition, correspondence
be
tween the model and the Paleolithic art in terms of the
principles
of
perception
and the
compositional style
and
graphic logic by
which
the
geometric
forms were combined with iconic
images,
and the
iconic
images
themselves were
rendered,
was also revealed. From
this, they
inferred a shamanic
origin,
founded in altered states of
consciousness,
for this
corpora
of cave art. With this inference
they
opened
the door to the
cognitive/belief systems
of
Upper
Paleolithic
culture.
A few
points
are
important
to
emphasize
in reference to this
study.
First,
while it is true that others had earlier
suggested
a
shamanistic
hypothesis
to
explain
Franco-Cantabrian
art,
Lewis-Williams and
Dowson's
study
for the first time based this inference on a methodo
logically
sound
analysis.
This was
done, second, by
an
application
of
just
the sort of
analogical
model
building suggested by Wylie (e.g.,
1985);
that
is, through
the use of
multiple
sources
examined to iden
Prehistory
tify
relations of relevance
or
determining
structures and
applied
to a
case that has no known
parallel
in our
ethnographic
record.
Third,
of
course,
this demonstrates the
feasibility
of
cognitive analyses
of the
past entirely
divorced from written records and texts.
But, perhaps
equally importantly, they
undertook their
analysis
and
interpreta
tion of this art
corpus
in a manner
by
which their
hypothesis
and its
competitors
could be
rationally adjudicated. Specifically, hypotheses
such
as
"art-for-art's
sake," "hunting magic,"
and so
on,
can be com
pared
to it in terms of the criteria listed earlier
(cf.
Lewis-Williams
1983;
1986), allowing
for an inference
to the best
hypothesis.
It is
demonstrably clear, then,
that there are no
inductive limits
placed
on
studies
by
the nature of our
pre
historic data.
Further,
it is
important
to
emphasize
that Lewis-Wil
liams and Dowson's
study
is
simply
the first
step
into the examina
tion of the
cognitive
realm of the
European Upper
Paleolithic. In this
sense it is
important
to
recognize
that its
importance,
and its full
significance,
will
only
be realized after its
implications
are
drawn
out in
subsequent
research.
Thus,
the inference that the art was
pro
duced
by
shamans and was
painted
to
display images
seen in altered
states is not the conclusion for this line of
analysis,
but
simply
the
starting point
from which a whole series of other
problems
can
be
addressed
(cf.
Lewis-Williams and Dowson
1988:217).
Art and
Ideology
in the Western Great Basin
A second
program
of
study
that I wish to
quickly
summarize is
my
own research in the Coso
Range
of eastern California. This has in
volved about ten
years
of intermittent site
survey
and four
years
of
intensive and test excavations
(cf. Whitley
and Gumerman
1986;
Whitley
et al.
1986; Whitley
et al.
1988).
These have been combined
with Chronometrie
(Whitley
and Dorn
1987, 1988)
and
interpretive
analyses
of rock art
(Whitley 1982, 1987, 1988b, 1990, n.d.a, n.d.b)
as
well
as
secondary ethnographic
studies
(Whitley 1992).
The Coso
investigation,
I
believe,
demonstrates the
potential
articulation and
importance
of
cognitive
studies for
understanding
mainstream ar
chaeological
concerns,
such as
subsistence,
settlement
systems,
and
man-land
relationships.
Settlement
surveys, previously published
excavation
reports (e.g.,
Harrington 1957; Lanning 1963),
and
my
own
projects suggest
that a
82 David S.
Whitley
3,000
to
4,000 year
period
of
stability
existed in the Coso
Range,
with
only
minimal
change (if any)
in settlement
patterns
and subsis
tence
practices
in this
region.
That
is,
between
3,000
and
4,000
radiocarbon
years b.p.,
a
settlement and subsistence
pattern
had
been established in the Coso
Range
and
environs,
and this did not
appreciably change
until the arrival of Euro-Americans
during
the
middle of the last
century: village/aggregation sites, occupied during
the
winter,
were
placed
in the
valley
bottoms toward the western
side of the
range,
and a
variety
of smaller habitation and
exploitation
loci was established in
essentially
all the
surrounding upland
and
lowland environments
(cf.
Elston et al.
1983; Whitley
et al.
1988).
In
addition,
based
on
inferences
concerning
site/environment correla
tions as well as direct evidence of food remains
(Gumerman 1985;
Whitley
et al.
1988;
Moore
n.d.),
a
generalized foraging pattern
was
followed that
emphasized locally
available
plant
resources and small
game
and minimized the
importance
of
big game
hunting. Perhaps
most
importantly,
it has not been
possible
to infer that
any
conse
quential
shift in this
pattern,
either in terms of foods
exploited
or
food-getting strategies employed,
occurred over
this same
period.5
This
pattern
is in distinct contrast to circumstances in the imme
diately surrounding
areas of the western Great Basin
(cf. Bettinger
1977, 1989),
where
significant change
has been identified. Also nota
ble,
in reference to
external
comparisons,
are the
very
high density
and
quantity
of
petroglyphs
found in the Cosos. These
are
estimated
to number more than
100,000
individual
motifs,
and are found liter
ally
on
any
basalt
outcrop offering
a
homogeneous
lithic
panel
for
pecking. Engravings
of
bighorn sheep [Ovis canadensis) predominate
numerically
and
visually,
but
ornately rendered, "patterned-body"
anthropomorphic figures
are
also
common,
as are
"stick-figure"
hu
mans and
geometric
motifs of
myriad
forms.
Although slightly
over
stating
the
case,
Wellman
(1979:61)
notes that "the rock art in the
Coso
Range
. . .
appears
to have
developed
and flourished in almost
complete isolation";
that
is,
it differs in
scale,
in some
ways
in con
tent,
and in certain cases in
socio-religious setting,
from the rock art
of the
immediately surrounding regions (Whitley 1987).
This record of
stability implies
a series of
problems,
at least in
reference to techno-environmental
explanations
of cultural
stability
and
change. First,
there is evidence of environmental
change
in this
region
over the
period
in
question (Weide 1982:17;
Scuderi
1984).
This involved a
cyclical
series of
neo-glacial
events
which, among
Prehistory
other
things,
filled and
subsequently
drained
major surrounding
lake
systems,
with the last
significant
lake stand
having
occurred
approx
imately 1,000 years
b.p.
(Sutton 1990). Although
it is not
yet
clear
how
greatly
this affected the local
environment, certainly
some de
gree
of environmental
variability
was
experienced
over this three to
four thousand
year period, involving
mean
temperature fluctuations,
shifts in water
tables, evapo-transpiration rates,
mean annual
pre
cipitation,
and moisture
budgets,
and this
variability
can be
pre
sumed to have had
some effect on faunal and floral resources.
Second,
it is also clear that
(at
least
minor) technological change
was
experienced by
the inhabitants of the Coso
Range.
This involved
the introduction of the bow and arrow
(replacing
the atlatl and
spear),
sometime around
a.d. 600. With this
technological change
as
well,
certain shifts occurred in the
exploitation
of local obsidian
sources: obsidian
quarrying
moved from the use of
lag deposits
to
(literally)
the
mining
of
major rhyolitic-obsidian
flows. But even
with the
technological change
in
hunting equipment
and shift in
obsidian
procurement strategies,
there is no evidence of
any
transi
tion in
trading patterns (Allen 1986)
or,
for that
matter,
correlated
evidence of
changes
in settlement
or
subsistence.
Thus,
the
implication
that results is
that,
even in the face of some
environmental and
technological change,
the
archaeological
record
of the Coso
Range
is one marked
by stability.
Recourse
simply
to
environmental
adaptation
or
technological
and
evolutionary posi
tions to
explain
this
archaeological record, then,
falls short: the set
tlement
pattern,
subsistence
system, and,
for that
matter,
the
gen
eral artifact
inventory,
did not
change appreciably
even while other
variables altered
and, further,
did not
change
even
though
the imme
diately adjacent
Owens
Valley
area underwent substantial trans
formation
(cf. Bettinger 1977, 1989).
In this
circumstance, then,
the
record of
stability requires explanation (at
least in terms of
proces
sual
archaeology's presuppositions),
and this
apparently
can
only
be
sought
outside the bounds of techno-environmental considerations.
How, then,
do we
understand the
prehistory
of the Coso
Range?
My position
has rested
on a
number of
premises,
the first of which is
that,
while subsistence and settlement reflect
necessary
adaptations
to the
environment,
the environment
(and,
for that
matter,
relevant
technology)
is a
contingent
rather than causal
variable;
that
is, they
are
limiting
but in no
simple
sense
determinate factors.
Thus,
it is
to the social and cultural
systems
that
explanation
must turn if we
84 David S.
Whitley
are to understand the three to four thousand
years
of cultural stabil
ity
in this
region.
And
by culture,
of
course,
I
imply
the situational
context,
or
prehistoric system
of beliefs and
values,
that
gave
ration
ality
to the social and
technological systems
and that maintained
these
even
when confronted with
a
changing
environment and tech
nological
base.
Second,
I
emphasize
that
change
is a condition to be
demonstrated
empirically,
not to be
presupposed
in
gradualist
terms.
With
this,
I
accept
the
possibility
that the ethnohistoric record can
inform
an
interpretation?indeed,
be used to
develop
a model of the
cultural and social
systems
of the Coso
Range?fully applicable
to
this
lengthy period
of
prehistory.
That
is,
since I
argue
that there is
no
empirical
evidence of
significant change,
and historical
linguistic
studies
suggest ethnolinguistic continuity
in the
region (cf.
Fowler
1972),
I see no
logic
in the
assumption
that
there, somehow,
must
have then been
some
anyway,
and that
ethnographic interpretation
is
thereby
disallowed.
My argument
then
proceeds
on two fronts.
First, explicitly
consid
ering
the social
theory underlying
this
analysis,
I
employ existing
ethnohistoric and
ethnographic
records to
develop
a model of the
social relations of
production
that were
ethnographically (and
there
fore
presumably prehistorically) present
in the Great Basin. These
can be said to have been
comprised by
the
kinship system,
the sexual
division of
labor,
and the shamanistic
religious system. Following
Collier's
(1988) analysis
of
kinship among
the
closely
related Coman
ches,
I
argue
that a series of
inequalities
were,
in
fact, present among
the
putatively egalitarian
Coso Shoshone. These were
manifest in
male
:
female,
married male
:
unmarried
male,
and shaman
: non
shaman
groups
within
society,
and resulted in structural
inequali
ties in terms of the distribution of
obligations, opportunities,
and
prestige
as well as of the maintenance of
power
in
society (Whitley
1990, n.d.b).
In this instance
inequality
needs to be considered not
only
in terms of the
rights
and
privileges
maintained
by
different
members of
a
society,
but also in terms of the
obligations
that bur
dened them and the
opportunities they
were afforded
or
denied.
Even while Coso
society
was
kin-based, unranked,
and
lacking
in
leaders with the
right
to
give
orders to
others, gender, marriage,
and
the access to shamanistic
power
resulted in an
unequal
distribution
of
privileges,
powers,
and
obligations.
The best
example
of this con
cerns
gender-based
subsistence
practices:
men hunted
big game (deer
and mountain
sheep)
while
women and children were
principally
Prehistory
responsible
for
gathering plant
foods and
foraging
for small
game
(lagomorphs
and
rodents),
which
provided
the bulk of the
aborigi
nal diet.
However,
the
game
the men
brought
back was distributed
throughout
the
camp,
whereas the women's contributions were re
served for their families.
Everyone,
in other
words,
was
guaranteed
some share in
large game,
so in a strict sense it did not matter
whether
a man hunted
or
not;
he and his
family
would
get
meat
regardless,
but
they
would
only get
the
staples
of their
diet, plant
foods,
if the wife was
diligent
in
gathering.
Because of differences in
the
manner in which the
plant
foods
gathered by
women and the
game
hunted
by
men were
distributed, therefore,
women were effec
tively independent
in an economic
sense,
whereas men could
only
adequately get by
either
through incurring
debts to married
men,
or
by marriage
itself. As a
result,
once
married,
men were relieved of
obligations,
whereas
women were tied to them
(Whitley 1990).
Mar
riage,
in this
sense,
was the
key
to a male's economic
well-being,
but
the same did not
necessarily
hold for females.
Further,
it was
only
with
marriage
that men
could become
politi
cal actors and
acquire prestige. Women, regardless
of marital
status,
had little or no means of
acquiring prestige
and
(implicit
but none
theless
important) political power.
For even while no true chiefs
existed,
it would be
a
mistake to therefore
presume
that
leadership
was
lacking;
that
is,
influence and
authority certainly
were
present,
and were evident in
older,
married males.
Authority, prestige,
and
power, then,
were
effectively
restricted
to the males in Coso
society,
and were
acquired
in
part through
the economic status
acquired by
the male with
marriage.
In this sense women were not
necessarily
viewed as inferior to
men,
nor were
they
down-trodden
by them,
but
the fact remains that the women's
obligations
were
greater,
and their
opportunities fewer,
than those of the
men.
But rather than
recognizing
the
importance
of
marriage
in struc
turing relationships
between men and women and
especially
be
tween men
and other
men,
particularly
in
giving
men an economic
independence (from
other
men) they
otherwise would not achieve
and in
allowing
them to become
political actors,
cultural
logic
dis
torted
causality.
It was believed that marital success
resulted from
hunting success,
and
hunting
success was due to
shamanistic
super
natural
power.
A man was a
great hunter,
in other
words,
because of
his
supernatural power,
and he had
a
successful
marriage(s)
because
of his
hunting capabilities,
not because he had a
steady
hand with
86 David S.
Whitley
the bow or because he had a devoted and
hardworking
wife. Shaman
istic
power,
in this
sense,
held the
key
not
only
to
hunting
achieve
ments but in turn to marital success and
ultimately
to the
acquisi
tion of
privilege
and
prestige.
In
short,
it was this
complex system
of
social relations of
production
that
socially
constituted Coso
society.
Perhaps
more
importantly,
these social relations maintained Coso
society
even in the face of
changing
environment and modifications
in
technology,
and these social relations were
inherently nonegalita
rian. Yet one wonders how this
system
of
inequality
was maintained
and
supported, especially
in
light
of the
changing
environment noted
for this
region
and time
period.
Given the basic
inequalities
in this
hunter-gatherer society,
it is
necessary
to sketch the
system
of beliefs
supporting
these social rela
tions.
Following Keesing (1987),
I
argue
that
culture,
the
cognitive
system
of beliefs and
values,
is
expressed by
an
ideological system
that masks and
mystifies
true relations of
production
to make them
appear
"natural" and
"pre-ordained" (cf.
Elster
1982) and, through
this,
enables the
reproduction
of a
society
founded
on
fundamental
inequities.
This
ideological system
of beliefs and values is revealed
through
a
symbolic analysis
of
myths
and
ritual,
in
conjunction
with
a
consideration of the
archaeological
record of
petroglyphs
found in
the Coso
Range.
That
is,
the second thrust of
my argument
concerns
the nature of the belief
system present ethnographically
and
presum
ably prehistorically,
and its
archaeological
manifestation in the his
toric and
prehistoric (cf. Whitley
and Dorn
1987, 1988)
rock art of the
region (Whitley 1982, 1992, n.d.b).
Ethnographic
evidence indicates that this art was
made
by
sha
mans,
that it was related to their
acquisition
of
supernatural
power,
and that it
depicts
the hallucinations
they perceived
in the altered
states of consciousness
they
entered to access the
supernatural
world. The content of this art is notable on two accounts: it is exclu
sively
male in
referent,
and it
emphasizes, symbolically, "hunting."
Of
course,
it is
exactly
for these
reasons that
early,
inductive in
terpretations
of the art attributed it to a
vaguely
conceived
"hunting
cult,"
founded
on an even
vaguer
notion of
"hunting magic" (Whit
ley 1982, n.d.a). Still,
it is here that the clues to its
ideological
mean
ing
lie. That
is,
at an overt level the Coso
engravings glorify
the
importance
of males'
big game hunting,
even
though
such
was
appar
ently
of minimal subsistence
significance
in the
region (Whitley
and
Prehistory
Gumerman
1986),
and
they
do this
by emphasizing
the
importance
of the shamans'
symbolic
and ritual involvement in this
activity.
As a
manifestation of the
ideological system,
the Coso rock
engrav
ings, then,
were
intended to aid in the
misrepresentation
of the im
portance
of male
hunting
in Coso
society,
and of the shamans'
part
in
hunting,
in terms of the
supernatural
balance of the world. Hunt
ing
success was considered the
cause
of marital
success,
and it was
only through
successful
marriage
that males had access to
power
and
prestige.
But
hunting
success could
only
be achieved with
super
natural
power
and
balance,
facilitated
by
the ritual activities of the
shamans. Shamans' control of
supernatural power
correspondingly
gave
them control over
hunting
and therefore over
marriage.
And
with
this,
the
engravings helped
to
mystify
the
unequal
and
asymet
rical
relationships
both between the sexes and between shamans and
nonshamans
by valorizing
and
glorifying
the shamans' and the males'
contribution to material subsistence. This contribution was made to
appear important,
even when it was
inconsequential,
and its valori
zation
legitimized
an
unequal
order of
things,
as if this was the
only
way things
could be. Thus it was because of the
symbolic mystifica
tion
suggested by
the Coso
petroglyphs,
as
well
as
by
other
aspects
of
myth
and
ritual,
that the
potential
conflicts between male-female
and shaman-nonshaman
special
interest
groups
were obviated in
pre
historic Coso
society.
With
this,
of
course,
the
society
was able to
continue to exist and maintain the status
quo, perpetuating
an
adap
tation to the environment based
on
nonegalitarian
social relations
of
production,
even
when external
changes
and stimuli
may
have
made this
system
less than
optimal
or
(in
Western
terms)
rational
and
equitable.
It is
through
recourse to an
ethnographically
informed
interpreta
tion of Coso
society
and its rock
engravings, consequently,
that I
derive
my
understanding
of the last three to four thousand
years
of
prehistory
in the Coso
region.
In so
doing
I have not denied the im
portance
of
identifying
human-environment
relationships,
or of
the
significance
of
technology
in
prehistoric society. Instead,
I have
simply
shifted the
emphasis
of
understanding
away
from such con
cerns
toward the
cognitive
realm and have
emphasized ideological
beliefs and values?culture and its situational
logic?in interpreting
the
prehistoric past.
In
this, therefore,
I
argue
for an
anthropologi
cal
archaeology,
one
based on
prevalent
modern
interpretations
of
88 David S.
Whitley
what
anthropology
is and what it can and should
do,
and how its
central
concern, culture,
should be
defined,
instead of
a
reduction of
anthropology
to narrow concerns with
adaptation, technology,
and
environment.
The
Baby
and the Bathwater
In
concluding
this
essay
one
metaphor
comes to mind
that, perhaps,
best summarizes
my
central theme. It is a
familiar
one, and,
in its
terms,
it seems that both new
archaeologists
and
certain
post-processualists
are
guilty
of
ablutionary
excess. For al
though
new
archaeologists
were correct in their
quest
for scientific
method and
rigor,
this
quest
did not
fully justify
their
jettison
of the
cultural
bathwater,
within which
prehistoric
societies
adapted,
evolved,
and in some instances
changed. And,
while
right
in
recog
nizing archaeology's inherently
hermeneutic
side,
certain
post-pro
cessualists have
ejected
the scientific
baby,
which continues to
pro
vide the
only
basis for a
plausible interpretation
of the
past.
But
rejection
or
acceptance
of either of these commitments need
not be
globally based,
as
many
new
archaeologists
and
post-proces
sualists
suppose:
there is no contradiction in an
archaeology
that
incorporates
scientific method and heuristic
even while
maintaining
allegiance
to
interpretation
and
understanding. Cognitive
archaeol
ogy,
while
certainly
no
panacea
to all the theoretical and methodo
logical problems
our
discipline
continues to
face,
reconciles this
false distinction and revitalizes
a concern that should be central to
an
anthropological archaeology:
the
study
and
explanation
of
prehis
toric cultures.
Acknowledgments
Research in the Coso
Range
was conducted
principally
while I was at the UCLA Institute of
Archaeology.
I owe
many people
thanks for their assistance with
my investigations there;
unfortu
nately, space
allows
me to
single
out
only
Wolf
Gumerman, Joe
Simon,
Bob
Moore,
Rod
Kingry,
Gwen Harwood and the
Rodney
Lane
family.
The draft of this
essay
was
prepared
while I held
a
post
doctoral research
fellowship
with the Rock Art Research Unit in the
Prehistory
Archaeology Department
at the
University
of the Witwatersrand. I
am indebted to the
Unit,
the
Department
and the
University
for their
support.
I am also
greatly
indebted to the comments and
suggestions
of
my
colleague
in the
philosophy department,
David
Sapire, during
the
preparation
of this
paper.
I thank Tom
Huffman,
David Lewis
Williams, Lyn Wadley,
and
Tamy Whitley
for their
help
and com
ments.
Although
I have
attempted
to
develop
a normative characteri
zation of the research of various
cognitive archaeologists
I have had
the
pleasure
to work
alongside,
it is
important
to
emphasize
that the
opinions expressed
here
are,
of
course,
solely
my
own.
NOTES
1.
Obviously,
not all
anthropologists adopted
this
change (cf. Keesing
1974).
Those most concerned with cultural
ecology
and economic
anthropol
ogy?notably,
those closest to most new
archaeologists'
interests?often
maintain a
behaviorist
perspective,
even in
light
of
persuasive philosophical
attacks such as those offered
by
Harr? and Secord
( 1972;
cf.
Kelley
and Hanen
1988:202-4). But,
that a
very
large proportion,
if not the
majority
of the
discipline, accepted
this
change
in culture
theory
seems undeniable.
2.
Indeed,
it is
probably
true that
many processual archaeologists
have
implicitly adopted many
of the tenets of
post-positivism.
In
part
this results
because its intellectual roots lie in the
writings
of
philosophers
of science
working
in the 1950s and 1960s
(including
Kuhn and
Hempel)
who
were,
themselves, widely
read
by archaeologists.
3.
Kelley
and Hanen
(1988)
have
correctly pointed
out that
even
while
realism has
gained many
followers in recent
years
(e.g., Wylie 1981;
Gibbon
1984),
it is not the
only potentially
viable alternative to
positivism,
and I do
not mean to
imply
such
by my emphasis
on it.
Instead,
and at the risk of
oversimplifying
their
position, Kelley
and Hanen contend that a
sophisti
cated anti-realism
may
serve
archaeologists
better than
realism, especially
in that it
requires
no hard-line
metaphysical
commitment to a
belief in
truth,
or the
reality
of the unobservable. But the latter?the
reality
of unob
servable entities?seems no obstacle for the
cognitive paradigm.
And the
notion that observation is
theory-dependent,
which is tacit in anti-realism
(Kelley
and Hanen
1988:271),
seems a
significant stumbling
block. Be this as
it
may,
they
also note that an insistence on realism
may
be
a
red-herring
because "from the
point
of view of
accomplishing
the scientific tasks at
hand,
it makes
no difference whether one is a realist or
[an anti-realist]"
(Kelley
and Hanen
1988:216).
4. I stress here the
importance
of Karl
Popper's
hermeneu tics
(cf.
Farr
90 David S.
Whitley
1983)
and the
similarity
of his
perceptions
on this
topic
to
cognitive
archae
ology.
This will come as a
surprise
to
many
archaeologists,
who
apparently
have not read
beyond
some of his earlier works and
presume
him to be a
"positivist" (in
the
very general sense) par excellance,
and therefore to have
supported
a
position
antithetical to
hermeneutics, understanding,
and
interpretation.
A narrow
focus
on
Popper's positivism
and falsificationist
program,
in
fact,
has been a common characteristic of
contemporary
social
scientists
(Farr 1983:157). But,
as
Popper
himself
notes,
his concern with
situational
analysis
was the "much more
important aspect
of the
problem"
(1976:42, 117). And,
while I fear the
necessary brevity
here does not do it
justice,
a
reading
of his thesis of hermeneutics does much to
support
the
notion and
importance
of a
scientifically based, rational, interpretive
archae
ology:
in
short, cognitive archaeology.
In
this, Popper's position
is similar to
that
espoused by
Max Weber.
It is also
important
to note that
Popper's
hermeneutics
may
have been
given
short shrift
by
those who
might
benefit most from it because of his
perceived ideological
stance
(particularly
as
expressed
in The
Poverty of
His
toricism and The
Open Society
and its
Enemies). Certainly,
the
adoption
of
aspects
of his
philosophical
and
methodological positions
affirms no com
mitment to his
ideological
ones,
and it is unfortunate when
political
differ
ences serve to
preclude
intellectual discourse.
For,
as Alexander
(1981:281)
has
noted,
"social science is
inherently ideological,
but it is not
only
so."
5. In an interim
report (Whitley
et al.
1988),
it was
suggested
that a
change
may
have occurred at the break between the Late Prehistoric and Shosho
nean
periods,
or at about a.d. 1200-1300.
Subsequent
reconsideration of
the
evidence,
as well as additional data
(cf.
Hildebrandt and Gilreath
1988),
indicate that the contentions raised for
change
in this earlier
paper
were
overstated.
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1992 "To have died": Shamanism and Rock Art in Far Western North
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414.
Whitley,
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1986
Archaeological Investigations
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1988 The Late Prehistoric Period in the Coso
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Pacific
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Archaeological Society Quarterly
24
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Whitley,
D.
S., J.
M.
Simon,
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Archaeological Survey
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Proposed CLJV
28.5 Mile
Transmission Corridor in the Coso
KGRA, Inyo County,
California.
Manuscript
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file,
NWC China
Lake,
California.
Wylie,
A.
1981 Positivism and the New
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Ph.D.
diss.,
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York, Binghampton.
100 David S.
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1982a
Epistemological
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I.
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39-46.
Press.
1982b An
Analogy by Any
Other Name is
Just
as
Analogical:
A
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on the Gould-Watson Debate.
Journal of
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1:382-401.
1985 The Reaction
Against Analogy.
Advances in
Archaeological
Method and
Theory
8:63-111.
1988 Comment on "The
Signs
of All Times." Current
Anthropology
29:231-32.

Whitley 1992

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Prehistory and Post-Positivist Science: A Prolegomenon to Cognitive Archaeology

Author(s): David S. Whitley

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