Aram Abgaryan

The KGB, had one of the most encompassing organizational structures in modern
history. Though the KGB was extremely powerful in magnitude, it had one of the worst
track records of intelligence usage in the intelligence community. Firstly, the KGB often
kept their officers waiting on instructions, as they did not appreciate their agents thinking
on their own. Second, most agents struggled with the difficult and often dangerous
internal purges. Because they valued their lives, most agents did not depart from standard
operating procedures. The KGB remained a very politically motivated machine
throughout its history. Finally, when it came to intelligence gathering in the West, the
dual divisions of legal and non-legal, as well as military residencies, created great havoc
and internal friction. Because of this, the intelligence collection process was frequently
undermined.
The KGB was not a particularly rewarding agency to work for. Legal agents often
had to wait for instructions and were looked down upon in favor of the more highly
regarded illegal agents. Mitrokhin notes that, alongside the committed FCD officers who
maintained their cover and professional discipline throughout their postings, there were
others that could not cope. This occurred when they were confronted by the contrast
between the Soviet propaganda image of capitalist exploitation and the reality of life in
the West.
An even darker secret of the Directorate S records was that one of the principal
uses of the illegals during the last quarter of a century of the Soviet Union was to search
out and compromise dissidents in the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. The squalid
struggle against "ideological subversion" was as much a responsibility of Directorate S as
of the rest of the FCD. Politically correct FCD reports dwelt overwhelmingly on the
economic problems of the capitalist West rather than on those of the Socialist east.
Agents such as Vladimir Ippolitovich Vetrov (FAREWELL) who was stationed in Paris,
became extremely disillusioned with the Soviet system. He resented his treatment by
Directorate T, which moved him from operations to analysis. Because of his forced
transfer, he defected. Other Cold War illegals in the United States were psychologically
less well prepared for the stress of their double lives. All residents had to come to terms
with a society, which was completely different from the propaganda image of the Main
Adversary, which they were told to expect. Unlike legal KGB officers, illegals did not
work in a Soviet embassy, where they were constantly subject to the ideological
discipline imposed by the official hierarchy. They were on their own and had to cope
with a great deal of isolation, which they could diminish only by friendships and sexual
liaisons, which were liable to undermine their professionalism. Illegals like Rudenk had
affairs that they tried conceal from the Center while others, like Bitnov, found it hard to
live in an capitalist free market society.
The working environments in the KGB were very restrictive. There were a vast
number of purges of Soviet intelligence agents during Stalins era. Often, the Kremlin
failed to properly analyze the information gathered by agents in the field because the
information did not conform to existing party biases and assumptions. However, as
Mitrokhin points out, the Soviets capacity to understand the political and diplomatic
intelligence never approached their ability to collect that intelligence. The Center had a
natural tendency to substitute conspiracy theory for pragmatic analysis when assessing
the intentions of the encircling imperialist powers. These tendencies worsened during the
1930s by Stalins increasing tendency to act as his own intelligence analyst. Stalin indeed
actively discouraged intelligence analysis by others, which he condemned as dangerous
guesswork, dont tell me what you think, and give me the facts and the source. As a
result INO had no analytical department. Intelligence reports throughout, and even
beyond, the Stalin era characteristically consisted of compilations of relevant information
on a particular topic with little argument or analysis. Those who compiled these reports
increasingly feared for their life if they failed to tell Stalin what he expected to hear.
Thus, the main function of Soviet foreign intelligence was to reinforce rather than to
challenge Stalins misunderstanding of the west. In order to align the documents with
Stalins own theories that the British encouraged Hitler to attack Russia, the Center
created false documents between British and German meetings.
Illegals had also to face unrealistic, and most of the time impossible, expectations
from the Center. Until the end of the Cold War, no post-war Soviet leader, KGB
chairman, or foreign intelligence chief had any experience of living in the West or
understanding of Western thought. Highly acclimated to strong central control and
command of the economy, the Center found it difficult to grasp how the United States
could achieve such incredible levels of economic production and innovation with such
little government regulation.
KGB files did not report the feelings of illegals. Upon return from Directorate S
postings, many agents are said to have had incorrect attitudes in life. In some instances,
the leadership cut their careers because of these incorrect attitudes. Illegals were very
much scared to voice their opinions about the Center because of possible retaliation. In
many ways, illegals were slaves to the system with no way out other than a coffin.
Because of bureaucracy, constant threat of purges, and a threatening regime, great
amounts of valuable intelligence were thrown out, disregarded, and often forged.
Standing out is something residents, officers, and chairmen did not want to do. For
example, Roland Abbaite was sacked when KI came into existence. His records had no
explanation for his departure. However, the reason might have been related to his Jewish
ancestry, which was noted in his file. Many illegal residents especially those stationed in
Czechoslovakia turned to alcohol because of their experiences. Both BOGUN and his
wife became alcoholics and agent GROMOV died young at thirty-nine. This was a
common experiance for many agents who dealt with the dehumanizing treatment by the
Center.
Finally, when it came to operations in the West, the KGB would tangle itself up
with the many different residents operating at once. The era of the great illegal agents
began when the first Soviet was sent to the United States in the 1930s. These were
groups of very talented individuals who not only spied but also recruited agents. These
groups were much more free than regular agents and did not have to follow bureaucratic
routines. Many of the illegals were not even Russians. The illegals received support from
another KGB creation called Line N. Line N officers were tested to support the
operations of Directorate S. These tests included clandestine meetings with illegals, their
surveillance, financial support, checking their contacts, approaching potential agents, and
recruiting them. However, as successful as illegals were, their significance hurt official
KGB officers.
Legals, as they were called, were not used to their full extent. Where illegal
residencies usually had seven and sometimes up to nine officers, legal residencies
operating under diplomatic cover in Soviet embassies had three officers at the most, and
sometimes only one. Their main function was to provide communications with the Center
and support to the more respected illegals. In its early history, the KGB valued illegal
spies more than legal spies, as illegals penetrated their targets more easily. However,
creating illegals became a daunting task because fake identities needed to be formed.
Compared to legal KGB agents, more time and money was needed to create and train
illegals. The legals were not treated fairly and had not been used efficiently. Creating two
types of agents might have allowed the Soviets to pierce through other countries more
effectively; however, it created more internal turmoil and resulted in poor treatment of
agents. The GRU, which was responsible for military intelligence, was seen as a rival to
the KGB.
One of the most prominent examples of the KGB GRU rivalry was the story
Melita Norwood (HOLA). Norwood was an illegal agent recruited by the Soviets in the
mid 1930s. She operated out of Britain after the termination of the Magnificent Five.
She ended up in the middle of a NKGB and GRU rivalry for control. She started her post
war career under NKGB/MGB. When KI was established during the Cold War she had
two GRU controllers. After, was returned to the MGB in 1952. Over the next twenty
years Norwood had seven different controllers: six KGB and one illegal. Though the
Center gained control in both instances, Norwood demonstrates the intense rivalry
between the agencies.
Towards the end of the Second World War, the Centers intelligence gathering
fears were realized when relations between GRU and the NKGB personnel, under legal
cover, brought both agencies to a standstill. The GRU residency took a large blow when
one of their cipher clerks, Igor Gouzenko, in Ottawa, stuffed his shirt with classified
documents and defected. This not only affected the GRU, as the NKGB was also blamed
for incompetence. Soviet intelligence became even more entangled in the 1940s with the
introduction of KI. KI was the combination of the foreign intelligence directorates MGB
and GRU. Under this umbrella all operational plans had to be approved by the KI. The
appointing of Soviet ambassadors as chief legal residents with authority over both MGB
and GRU created mass confusion with residents. Since most diplomats did not have as
much experience as residents on intelligence work, the residents, who were professional
intelligence officers, resorted to extraordinary deceptions to avoid informing their bosses
about their work, Over the course of the Cold War, the illegals Directorate was changed
eight times and its role modified fourteen times.
The KGB and GRU also created overlapping plans. The Thirteenth Departments
preparations for wartime sabotage operations were unavoidably overlapped with those of
the GRU. The resulting duplications of effort was made worse between the traditional
rivalry and distrust between the two agencies. In April 1960 the CPSU Central
Committee issued Decision No. P-274-XIVI, calling a closer co-ordination between the
two agencies. However, in 1963 the Center complained that the leadership of the GRU
was not making an attempt to work together with the KGB. The KGB found that it had an
easier time working together with Soviet Bloc intelligence agencies, who were willing to
take a lesser role and help out with Line F or wet affairs.
Though the KGB was in charge of one of the most expansive organizational
structures in the intelligence community, they still experienced major intelligence
gathering problems. With complications to internal purges compromising solid
intelligence, the KGB remained a very politically driven machine. The many divisions of
legal and illegal agents, as well as military intelligence residents, further fragmented the
Centers gathering efforts. Internal politics further hampered its ability to see information
clearly. As many residents were afraid to even walk out of line, most of their intelligence
was often useless because it did not conform to the political atmosphere of the Center.