Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO !"OT!S # COR$O%!, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-!"# filed before Branch "$, R%C Ro&as Cit', Ro(elio
Ba'otas ' Cordova )as char(ed )ith Rape and eventuall' convicted thereof on *une
"+, "++" in a decision penned b' *ud(e Manuel E. Auta,a'. Pendin( appeal of his
conviction, Ba'otas died on -ebruar' ., "++! at
the National Bilibid /ospital due to cardio respirator' arrest secondar' to hepatic
encephalopath' secondar' to hipato carcinoma (astric malin(erin(. Conse0uentl',
the 1upreme Court in its Resolution of Ma' !2, "++! dismissed the criminal aspect of
the appeal. /o)ever, it re0uired the 1olicitor 3eneral to file its comment )ith re(ard
to Ba'otas4 civil liabilit' arisin( from his commission of the offense char(ed.
In his comment, the 1olicitor 3eneral e&pressed his vie) that the death of accused-
appellant did not e&tin(uish his civil liabilit' as a result of his commission of the
offense char(ed. %he 1olicitor 3eneral, rel'in( on the case of People v.
Sendaydiego
1
insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of
revie)in( his conviction b' the lo)er court on )hich the civil liabilit' is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the vie) of the
1olicitor 3eneral ar(uin( that the death of the accused )hile ,ud(ment of conviction
is pendin( appeal e&tin(uishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his
position, said counsel invo5ed the rulin( of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia
2
)hich held that the civil obli(ation in a criminal case ta5es root in the
criminal liabilit' and, therefore, civil liabilit' is e&tin(uished if accused should die
before final ,ud(ment is rendered.
6e are thus confronted )ith a sin(le issue7 8oes death of the accused pendin(
appeal of his conviction e&tin(uish his civil liabilit'9
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue )as settled in the
affirmative. %his same issue posed therein )as phrased thus7 8oes the death of
Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibilit' and his civil liabilit' as a
conse0uence of the alle(ed crime9
It resolved this issue thru the follo)in( dis0uisition7
Article :+ of the Revised Penal Code is the controllin( statute. It reads, in part7
Art. :+. o! criminal liability is totally e"tinguished. ; Criminal liabilit' is totall'
e&tin(uished7
". B' the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties< and as to the pecuniar'
penalties liabilit' therefor is e&tin(uished onl' )hen the death of the offender occurs
before final ,ud(ment<
6ith reference to Castillo4s criminal liabilit', there is no 0uestion. %he la) is plain.
1tatutor' construction is unnecessar'. 1aid liabilit' is e&tin(uished.
%he civil liabilit', ho)ever, poses a problem. 1uch liabilit' is e&tin(uished onl' )hen
the death of the offender occurs before final ,ud(ment. 1addled upon us is the tas5 of
ascertainin( the le(al import of the term =final ,ud(ment.= Is it final ,ud(ment as
contradistin(uished from an interlocutor' order9 >r, is it a ,ud(ment )hich is final and
e&ecutor'9
6e (o to the (enesis of the la). %he le(al precept contained in Article :+ of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article "! of the 1panish El
Codi(o Penal de ":#2 )hich, in part, recites7
?a responsabilidad penal se e&tin(ue.
". Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, ' respecto a
las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia
firme.
&&& &&& &&&
1
%he code of ":#2 . . . it )ill be observed emplo's the term =sentencia firme.=
6hat is =sentencia firme= under the old statute9
@@AIII Enciclopedia *uridica EspaBola, p. .#, furnishes the read' ans)er7 It
sa's7
1EN%ENCIA -IRME. ?a sentencia 0ue ad0uiere la fuerCa de las definitivas por
no haberse utiliCado por las partes liti(antes recurso al(uno contra ella dentro de
los terminos ' plaCos le(ales concedidos al efecto.
=1entencia firme= reall' should be understood as one )hich is definite. Because,
it is onl' )hen ,ud(ment is such that, as Medina ' Maranon puts it, the crime is
confirmed ; =en condena determinada<= or, in the )ords of 3roiCard, the (uilt of
the accused becomes ; =una verdad le(al.= Prior thereto, should the accused
die, accordin( to Aiada, =no ha' le(almente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni
responsabilidad criminal de nin(una clase.= And, as *ud(e Dapunan )ell
e&plained, )hen a defendant dies before ,ud(ment becomes e&ecutor', =there
cannot be an' determination b' final ,ud(ment )hether or not the felon' upon
)hich the civil action mi(ht arise e&ists,= for the simple reason that =there is no
part' defendant.= EI Dapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. .!". 1enator
-rancisco holds the same vie). -rancisco, Revised Penal Code, Boo5 >ne, !nd
ed., pp. :F+-:$2G
%he le(al import of the term =final ,ud(ment= is similarl' reflected in
the Revised Penal Code. Articles #! and #: of that le(al bod'
mention the term =final ,ud(ment= in the sense that it is alread'
enforceable. %his also brin(s to mind 1ection #, Rule ""$ of the
Rules of Court )hich states that a ,ud(ment in a criminal case
becomes final =after the lapse of the period for perfectin( an
appeal or )hen the sentence has been partiall' or totall' satisfied
or served, or the defendant has e&pressl' )aived in )ritin( his
ri(ht to appeal.=
B' fair intendment, the le(al precepts and opinions here collected
funnel do)n to one positive conclusion7 %he term final ,ud(ment
emplo'ed in the Revised Penal Code means ,ud(ment be'ond
recall. Reall', as lon( as a ,ud(ment has not become e&ecutor', it
cannot be truthfull' said that defendant is definitel' (uilt' of the
felon' char(ed a(ainst him.
Not that the meanin( thus (iven to final ,ud(ment is )ithout
reason. -or )here, as in this case, the ri(ht to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessit', cover =both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case.= People vs. #usico ENovember +, "+.!G, ! >.3., No. "22, p.
+$.. 1ee also7 People vs. $oll, $: Phil., $!$, $.< %rancisco,
Criminal Procedure, "+F: ed., Aol. I, pp. !., !$. Correctl', *ud(e
Dapunan observed that as =the civil action is based solel' on the
felon' committed and of )hich the offender mi(ht be found (uilt',
the death of the offender e&tin(uishes the civil liabilit'.= I Dapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
/ere is the situation obtainin( in the present case7 Castillo4s
criminal liabilit' is out. /is civil liabilit' is sou(ht to be enforced b'
reason of that criminal liabilit'. But then, if )e dismiss, as )e must,
the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, )e )ill be faced
)ith the anomalous situation )hereb' )e )ill be called upon to
clamp civil liabilit' in a case )here the source thereof ; criminal
liabilit' ; does not e&ist. And, as )as )ell stated in &autista' et al.
vs. (strella' et al., CA-3.R.
No. "+!!$-R, 1eptember ", "+F:, =no part' can be found and held
criminall' liable in a civil suit,= )hich solel' )ould remain if )e are
to divorce it from the criminal proceedin(.=
%his rulin( of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case
&
)as adopted b' the 1upreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. &onifacio Alison' et al.,
4
People of
the Philippines v. )aime )ose' et al.
'
and People of the Philippines v. Satorre
(
b'
dismissin( the appeal in vie) of the death of the accused pendin( appeal of said
cases.
As held b' then 1upreme Court *ustice -ernando in the Alison case7
%he death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison havin( been
established, and considerin( that there is as 'et no final ,ud(ment
in vie) of the pendenc' of the appeal, the criminal and civil liabilit'
of the said accused-appellant Alison )as e&tin(uished b' his death
EArt. :+, Revised Penal Code< Re'es4 Criminal ?a), "+#" Rev. Ed.,
p. #"#, citin( People v. Castillo and >femia C.A., F$ >.3. .2.FG<
conse0uentl', the case a(ainst him should be dismissed.
>n the other hand, this Court in the subse0uent cases of &uenaventura &elamala v.
$arcelino Polinar
7
and *amberto Torri+os v. The onorable Court of Appeals
)
ruled
differentl'. In the former, the issue decided b' this court )as7 6hether the civil liabilit'
of one accused of ph'sical in,uries )ho died before final ,ud(ment is e&tin(uished b'
his demise to the e&tent of barrin( an' claim therefore a(ainst his estate. It )as the
contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior
to final ,ud(ment e&tin(uished all criminal and civil liabilities resultin( from the
offense, in vie) of Article :+, para(raph " of the Revised Penal Code. /o)ever, this
court ruled therein7
6e see no merit in the plea that the civil liabilit' has been
e&tin(uished, in vie) of the provisions of the Civil Code of the
2
Philippines of "+F2 ERep. Act No. :$G that became operative
ei(hteen 'ears after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out b' the
Court belo), Article of the Civil Code establishes a civil action
for dama(es on account of ph'sical in,uries, entirel' separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. . In cases of defamation, fraud, and
ph'sical in,uries, a civil action for dama(es,
entirel' separate and distinct from the criminal
action, ma' be brou(ht b' the in,ured part'. 1uch
civil action shall proceed independentl' of the
criminal prosecution, and shall re0uire onl' a
preponderance of evidence.
Assumin( that for lac5 of e&press reservation, Belamala4s civil
action for dama(es )as to be considered instituted to(ether )ith
the criminal action still, since both proceedin(s )ere terminated
)ithout final ad,udication, the civil action of the offended part'
under Article ma' 'et be enforced separatel'.
In Torri+os, the 1upreme Court held that7
&&& &&& &&&
It should be stressed that the e&tinction of civil liabilit' follo)s the
e&tinction of the criminal liabilit' under Article :+, onl' )hen the
civil liabilit' arises from the criminal act as its onl' basis. 1tated
differentl', )here the civil liabilit' does not e&ist independentl' of
the criminal responsibilit', the e&tinction of the latter b' death, ipso
facto e&tin(uishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final ,ud(ment. %he said principle does not
appl' in instant case )herein the civil liabilit' sprin(s neither solel'
nor ori(inall' from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. EEmphasis oursG
&&& &&& &&&
In the above case, the court )as convinced that the civil liabilit' of the
accused )ho )as char(ed )ith estafa could li5e)ise trace its (enesis to
Articles "+, !2 and !" of the Civil Code since said accused had s)indled
the first and second vendees of the propert' sub,ect matter of the contract
of sale. It therefore concluded7 =Conse0uentl', )hile the death of the
accused herein e&tin(uished his criminal liabilit' includin( fine, his civil
liabilit' based on the la)s of human relations remains.=
%hus it allo)ed the appeal to proceed )ith respect to the civil liabilit' of the accused,
not)ithstandin( the e&tinction of his criminal liabilit' due to his death pendin( appeal
of his conviction.
%o further ,ustif' its decision to allo) the civil liabilit' to survive, the court relied on the
follo)in( ratiocination7 1ince 1ection !", Rule of the Rules of Court
9
re0uires the
dismissal of all mone' claims a(ainst the defendant )hose death occurred prior to
the final ,ud(ment of the Court of -irst Instance EC-IG, then it can be inferred that
actions for recover' of mone' ma' continue to be heard on appeal, )hen the death
of the defendant supervenes after the C-I had rendered its ,ud(ment. In such case,
e&plained this tribunal, =the name of the offended part' shall be included in the title of
the case as plaintiff-appellee and the le(al representative or the heirs of the
deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants.=
It is, thus, evident that as ,urisprudence evolved from Castillo to %orri,os, the rule
established )as that the survival of the civil liabilit' depends on )hether the same
can be predicated on sources of obli(ations other than delict. 1tated differentl', the
claim for civil liabilit' is also e&tin(uished to(ether )ith the criminal action if it )ere
solel' based thereon, i.e., civil liabilit' e" delicto.
/o)ever, the 1upreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego' et al.
10
departed from this
lon(-established principle of la). In this case, accused 1enda'die(o )as char(ed
)ith and convicted b' the lo)er court of malversation thru falsification of public
documents. 1enda'die(o4s death supervened durin( the pendenc' of the appeal of
his conviction.
%his court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss 1enda'die(o4s appeal but
onl' to the e&tent of his criminal liabilit'. /is civil liabilit' )as allo)ed to survive
althou(h it )as clear that such claim thereon )as e&clusivel' dependent on the
criminal action alread' e&tin(uished. %he le(al import of such decision )as for the
court to continue e&ercisin( appellate ,urisdiction over the entire appeal, passin(
upon the correctness of 1enda'die(o4s conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determinin( if he is civill' liable. In doin( so, this Court
issued a Resolution of *ul' :, "+## statin( thus7
%he claim of complainant Province of Pan(asinan for the civil
liabilit' survived 1enda'die(o because his death occurred after
final ,ud(ment )as rendered b' the Court of -irst Instance of
Pan(asinan, )hich convicted him of three comple& crimes of
malversation throu(h falsification and ordered him to indemnif' the
Province in the total sum of P$",2.:.! Eshould be PF#,2.:.!G.
%he civil action for the civil liabilit' is deemed impliedl' instituted
)ith the criminal action in the absence of e&press )aiver or its
reservation in a separate action E1ec. ", Rule """ of the Rules of
CourtG. %he civil action for the civil liabilit' is separate and distinct
3
from the criminal action EPeople and Manuel vs. Coloma, "2F Phil.
"!:#< Roa vs. 8e la CruC, "2# Phil. :G.
6hen the action is for the recover' of mone' and the defendant
dies before final ,ud(ment in the Court of -irst Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especiall' provided in
Rule :# of the Rules of Court E1ec. !", Rule of the Rules of
CourtG.
%he implication is that, if the defendant dies after a mone'
,ud(ment had been rendered a(ainst him b' the Court of -irst
Instance, the action survives him. It ma' be continued on appeal
E%orri,os vs. Court of Appeals, ?-.2$, >ctober !., "+#F< $#
1CRA +.G.
%he accountable public officer ma' still be civill' liable for the funds
improperl' disbursed althou(h he has no criminal liabilit' EH.1. vs.
Elvina, !. Phil. !2< Philippine National Ban5 vs. %u(ab, $$ Phil.
F:G.
In vie) of the fore(oin(, not)ithstandin( the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased 1enda'die(o insofar as his criminal liabilit'
is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue e&ercisin( appellate
,urisdiction over his possible civil liabilit' for the mone' claims of
the Province of Pan(asinan arisin( from the alle(ed criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted a(ainst
him, thus ma5in( applicable, in determinin( his civil liabilit', Article
2 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is
directed to inform this Court )ithin ten E"2G da's of the names and
addresses of the decedent4s heirs or )hether or not his estate is
under administration and has a dul' appointed ,udicial
administrator. 1aid heirs or administrator )ill be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liabilit' is
concerned E1ecs. "$ and "#, Rule , Rules of CourtG.
1ucceedin( cases
11
raisin( the identical issue have maintained adherence to our
rulin( in Sendaydiego< in other )ords, the' )ere a reaffirmance of our abandonment
of the settled rule that a civil liabilit' solel' anchored on the criminal Ecivil liabilit' e"
delictoG is e&tin(uished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the
accused.
But )as it ,udicious to have abandoned this old rulin(9 A re-e&amination of our
decision in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old rulin(.
%o restate our resolution of *ul' :, "+## in Sendaydiego7 %he resolution of the civil
action impliedl' instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter4s
e&tinction due to death of the accused pendin( appeal of his conviction, pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code and 1ection !", Rule of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides7
6hen a separate civil action is brou(ht to demand civil liabilit'
arisin( from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedin(s are
instituted durin( the pendenc' of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall li5e)ise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearl', the te&t of Article 2 could not possibl' lend support to the rulin( in
Sendaydiego. No)here in its te&t is there a (rant of authorit' to continue e&ercisin(
appellate ,urisdiction over the accused4s civil liabilit' e" delicto )hen his death
supervenes durin( appeal. 6hat Article 2 reco(niCes is an alternative and separate
civil action )hich ma' be brou(ht to demand civil liabilit' arisin( from a criminal
offense independentl' of an' criminal action. In the event that no criminal
proceedin(s are instituted durin( the pendenc' of said civil case, the 0uantum of
evidence needed to prove the criminal act )ill have to be that )hich is compatible
)ith civil liabilit' and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of (uilt be'ond
reasonable doubt. Citin( or invo5in( Article 2 to ,ustif' the survival of the civil action
despite e&tinction of the criminal )ould in effect merel' be( the 0uestion of )hether
civil liabilit' e" delicto survives upon e&tinction of the criminal action due to death of
the accused durin( appeal of his conviction. %his is because )hether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liabilit' e" delicto is e&tin(uished
b' the death of the accused )hile his conviction is on appeal. Article :+ of the
Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter7
Art. :+. o! criminal liability is totally e"tinguished. ; Criminal
liabilit' is totall' e&tin(uished7
". B' the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties< and as
to pecuniar' penalties, liabilit' therefor is e&tin(uished onl' )hen
the death of the offender occurs before final ,ud(ment<
&&& &&& &&&
/o)ever, the rulin( in Sendaydiego deviated from the e&pressed intent of Article :+.
It allo)ed claims for civil liabilit' e" delicto to survive b' ipso facto treatin( the civil
action impliedl' instituted )ith the criminal, as one filed under Article 2, as thou(h
no criminal proceedin(s had been filed but merel' a separate civil action. %his had
the effect of convertin( such claims from one )hich is dependent on the outcome of
the criminal action to an entirel' ne) and separate one, the prosecution of )hich
does not even necessitate the filin( of criminal proceedin(s.
12
>ne )ould be hard
put to pinpoint the statutor' authorit' for such a transformation. It is to be borne in
mind that in recoverin( civil liabilit' e" delicto, the same has perforce to be
determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court4s pronouncement of the
4
(uilt or innocence of the accused. %his is but to render fealt' to the intendment of
Article "22 of the Revised Penal Code )hich provides that =ever' person criminall'
liable for a felon' is also civill' liable.= In such cases, e&tinction of the criminal action
due to death of the accused pendin( appeal inevitabl' si(nifies the concomitant
e&tinction of the civil liabilit'. $ors Omnia Solvi. 8eath dissolves all thin(s.
In sum, in pursuin( recover' of civil liabilit' arisin( from crime, the final determination
of the criminal liabilit' is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action,
such that )hen the criminal action is e&tin(uished b' the demise of accused-
appellant pendin( appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. %he claim for civil
liabilit' sprin(s out of and is dependent upon facts )hich, if true, )ould constitute a
crime. 1uch civil liabilit' is an inevitable conse0uence of the criminal liabilit' and is to
be declared and enforced in the criminal proceedin(. %his is to be distin(uished from
that )hich is contemplated under Article 2 of the Civil Code )hich refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not dra) its life from a criminal
proceedin(. %he 1enda'die(o resolution of *ul' :, "+##, ho)ever, failed to ta5e note
of this fundamental distinction )hen it allo)ed the survival of the civil action for the
recover' of civil liabilit' e" delicto b' treatin( the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 2. 1urel', it )ill ta5e more than ,ust a summar' ,udicial
pronouncement to authoriCe the conversion of said civil action to an independent one
such as that contemplated under Article 2.
Ironicall' ho)ever, the main decision in 1enda'die(o did not appl' Article 2, the
resolution of *ul' :, "+## not)ithstandin(. %hus, it )as held in the main decision7
1enda'die(o4s appeal )ill be resolved onl' for the purpose of
sho)in( his criminal liabilit' )hich is the basis of the civil liabilit'
for )hich his estate )ould be liable.
1&
In other )ords, the Court, in resolvin( the issue of his civil liabilit', concomitantl'
made a determination on )hether 1enda'die(o, on the basis of evidenced adduced,
)as indeed (uilt' be'ond reasonable doubt of committin( the offense char(ed. %hus,
it upheld 1enda'die(o4s conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his
civil liabilit'. Conse0uentl', althou(h Article 2 )as not applied in the final
determination of 1enda'die(o4s civil liabilit', there )as a reopenin( of the criminal
action alread' e&tin(uished )hich served as basis for 1enda'die(o4s civil liabilit'. 6e
reiterate7 Hpon death of the accused pendin( appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is e&tin(uished inasmuch as there is no lon(er a defendant to stand as the
accused< the civil action instituted therein for recover' of civil liabilit' e" delicto is
ipso facto e&tin(uished, (rounded as it is on the criminal.
1ection !", Rule of the Rules of Court )as also invo5ed to serve as another basis
for the Sendaydiego resolution of *ul' :, "+##. In citin( 1ec. !", Rule of the Rules
of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the t'pe involved in
Sendaydiego consist of mone' claims, the recover' of )hich ma' be continued on
appeal if defendant dies pendin( appeal of his conviction b' holdin( his estate liable
therefor. /ence, the Court4s conclusion7
=6hen the action is for the recover' of mone'= =and the defendant
dies before final ,ud(ment in the court of -irst Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especiall' provided= in
Rule :# of the Rules of Court E1ec. !", Rule of the Rules of
CourtG.
%he implication is that, if the defendant dies after a mone'
,ud(ment had been rendered a(ainst him b' the Court of -irst
Instance, the action survives him. It ma' be continued on appeal.
1adl', reliance on this provision of la) is misplaced. -rom the standpoint of
procedural la), this course ta5en in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctl'
observed b' *ustice Re(alado7
&&& &&& &&&
I do not, ho)ever, a(ree )ith the ,ustification advanced in both Torri+os and
Sendaydiego )hich, rel'in( on the provisions of 1ection !", Rule of the Rules
of Court, dre) the strained implication therefrom that )here the civil liabilit'
instituted to(ether )ith the criminal liabilities had alread' passed be'ond the
,ud(ment of the then Court of -irst Instance Eno) the Re(ional %rial CourtG, the
Court of Appeals can continue to e&ercise appellate ,urisdiction thereover despite
the e&tin(uishment of the component criminal liabilit' of the deceased. %his
pronouncement, )hich has been follo)ed in the Court4s ,ud(ments subse0uent
and consonant to Torri+os and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned
as bein( clearl' erroneous and un,ustifiable.
1aid 1ection !" of Rule is a rule of civil procedure in ordinar' civil actions.
%here is neither authorit' nor ,ustification for its application in criminal procedure
to civil actions instituted to(ether )ith and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there
an' authorit' in la) for the summar' conversion from the latter cate(or' of an
ordinar' civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedl' instituted in a criminal proceedin( for recover' of
civil liabilit' e" delicto can hardl' be cate(oriCed as an ordinar' mone' claim such as
that referred to in 1ec. !", Rule enforceable before the estate of the deceased
accused.
>rdinar' mone' claims referred to in 1ection !", Rule must be vie)ed in li(ht of
the provisions of 1ection F, Rule :$ involvin( claims a(ainst the estate, )hich in
Sendaydiego )as held liable for 1enda'die(o4s civil liabilit'. =6hat are contemplated
in 1ection !" of Rule , in relation to 1ection F of Rule :$,
14
are contractual mone'
claims )hile the claims involved in civil liabilit' e" delicto ma' include even the
restitution of personal or real propert'.=
1'
1ection F, Rule :$ provides an e&clusive
enumeration of )hat claims ma' be filed a(ainst the estate. %hese are7 funeral
e&penses, e&penses for the last illness, ,ud(ments for mone' and claim arisin( from
5
contracts, e&pressed or implied. It is clear that mone' claims arisin( from delict do
not form part of this e&clusive enumeration. /ence, there could be no le(al basis in
E"G treatin( a civil action e" delicto as an ordinar' contractual mone' claim referred to
in 1ection !", Rule of the Rules of Court and E!G allo)in( it to survive b' filin( a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
e&tin(uished upon e&tinction of the criminal action en(endered b' the death of the
accused pendin( finalit' of his conviction.
Accordin(l', )e rule7 if the private offended part', upon e&tinction of the civil liabilit'
e" delicto desires to recover dama(es from the same act or omission complained of'
he must sub,ect to 1ection ", Rule """
1(
E"+:F Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amendedG file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felon' previousl'
char(ed but on other sources of obli(ation. %he source of obli(ation upon )hich the
separate civil action is premised determines a(ainst )hom the same shall be
enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from ,uasi-delict or ma', b'
provision of la), result in an in,ur' to person or propert' Ereal or personalG, the
separate civil action must be filed a(ainst the e&ecutor or administrator
17
of the
estate of the accused pursuant to 1ec. ", Rule :# of the Rules of Court7
1ec. ". Actions !hich may and !hich may not be brought against e"ecutor or
administrator. ; No action upon a claim for the recover' of mone' or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced a(ainst the e&ecutor or administrator< but actions to
recover real or personal propert', or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an in+ury to person or property'
real or personal' ma' be commenced a(ainst him.
%his is in consonance )ith our rulin( in Belamala
1)
)here )e held that, in recoverin(
dama(es for in,ur' to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article of
the Civil Code, the same must be filed a(ainst the e&ecutor or administrator of the
estate of deceased accused and not a(ainst the estate under 1ec. F, Rule :$
because this rule e&plicitl' limits the claim to those for funeral e&penses, e&penses
for the last sic5ness of the decedent, ,ud(ment for mone' and claims arisin( from
contract, e&press or implied. Contractual mone' claims, )e stressed, refers onl' to
purely personal obligations other than those )hich have their source in delict or tort.
Conversel', if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed a(ainst the estate of the accused, pursuant to 1ec.
F, Rule :$ of the Rules of Court.
-rom this len(th' dis0uisition, )e summariCe our rulin( herein7
". 8eath of the accused pendin( appeal of his conviction e&tin(uishes his criminal
liabilit' as )ell as the civil liabilit' based solel' thereon. As opined b' *ustice
Re(alado, in this re(ard, =the death of the accused prior to final ,ud(ment terminates
his criminal liabilit' and only the civil liabilit' directly arisin( from and based solel' on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liabilit' e" delicto in senso strictiore.=
!. Corollaril', the claim for civil liabilit' survives not)ithstandin( the death of accused,
if the same ma' also be predicated on a source of obli(ation other than delict.
19

Article ""F# of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obli(ation from
)hich the civil liabilit' ma' arise as a result of the same act or omission7
aG ?a) 20
bG Contracts
cG Iuasi-contracts
dG . . .
eG Iuasi-delicts
. 6here the civil liabilit' survives, as e&plained in Number ! above, an action for
recover' therefor ma' be pursued but onl' b' )a' of filin( a separate civil action and
sub,ect to 1ection ", Rule """ of the "+:F Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.
%his separate civil action ma' be enforced either a(ainst the e&ecutorJadministrator
or the estate of the accused, dependin( on the source of obli(ation upon )hich the
same is based as e&plained above.
.. -inall', the private offended part' need not fear a forfeiture of his ri(ht to file this
separate civil action b' prescription, in cases )here durin( the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its e&tinction, the private-offended part' instituted to(ether
there)ith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liabilit' is
deemed interrupted durin( the pendenc' of the criminal case, conformabl' )ith
provisions of Article ""FF
21
of the Civil Code, that should thereb' avoid an'
apprehension on a possible privation of ri(ht b' prescription.
22
Appl'in( this set of rules to the case at bench, )e hold that the death of appellant
Ba'otas e&tin(uished his criminal liabilit' and the civil liabilit' based solel' on the act
complained of, i.e., rape. Conse0uentl', the appeal is hereb' dismissed )ithout
0ualification.
6/ERE->RE, the appeal of the late Ro(elio Ba'otas is 8I1MI11E8 )ith costs de
oficio. 1> >R8ERE8.
6