PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

BPI vs. Fidelity & Surety Co.

Suit: recovery on a contract of guaranty Evidentiary issue: mistake in the contract of guaranty and promissory note
SC says: According to section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is presumed to contain all
the terms of the agreement. The Civil Code has articles to the same effect. However, the Code of Civil Procedure
permits evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing in the following case: Where
a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, is put in issue by the pleadings.
The bookkeeping entries of the bank are hardly competent against a stranger to the transaction, such as the
defendant in this case. Moreover, it will not escape notice that one entry at least in plaintiff's Exhibit E has been
changed by erasing the words "y Fidelity and Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands" and substituting "Philippine Vegetable
Oil Co. garatizado p. Fidelity & Surety Co. of the Phil. Islands." The book entries taken at their face value are not
conclusive.
The correspondence between the parties fails to disclose either an express or implied admission that the
defendant had executed the guaranty in question in favor of the plaintiff bank. There is nothing in these exhibits
from which any such admission can be inferred. An attempt to interpret the correspondence merely leads open
further into the field of speculation. Yet the rule is that an admission or declaration to be competent must have
been expressed in definite, certain, and unequivocal language. Here, the exhibits are couched in a language which
is neither definite, certain, nor unequivocal for nowhere do they contain an admission of a guaranty made by the
defendant company for the protection of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. To justify the reformation of a
written instrument upon the ground of mistake, the concurrence of three things are necessary: First, that the
mistake should be of a fact; second, that the mistake should be proved by clear and convincing evidence;
and, third, that the mistake should be common to both parties to the instrument. The rule is, as has been
above stated, that the mistake must be mutual. There may have been a mistake here. It would, however, seem to be
straining the natural course of events to hold the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine Islands a party to
that mistake.
It may be that the majority has not approached a decision in this case in a spirit of tolerant sympathy. The
plaintiff has filed three distinct and conflicting complaints. It has not remained loyal to any one theory of the case.



Lechugas vs. CA
Suit: forcible entry and recovery of possession
Evidentiary issue: Lechugas claims that Leoncia Lasangue was the vendor of the disputed land. She denies that
Lasangue sold Lot No. 5522 to her. She alleges that this lot was sold to her by one Leonora Lasangue, who,
however, was never presented as witness in any of the proceedings below by herein petitioner.
SC says: As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and
may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to
the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
Lechugas reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by
Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and
the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she
really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and
fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper
which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot
instead.




Salimbangon vs. Tan
Suit: easement of right of way
Evidentiary issue: The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected Eduardo Cenizas (one of the
heirs) testimony that the heirs had intended to establish the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the
interior Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition agreement also made Lot A, now owned
by the Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that easement. The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded
the parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.
SC says: The exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions, one of which is found under
Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the RoC. In this case, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to
the partition when they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 of the contract seems to
imply, the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. Consequently, with such averment, the Tans
were entitled to introduce evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may
depart from what the partition agreement literally provided. At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not
object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they
were concerned, with the partition agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be
deemed to have waived their right to now question such testimony on appeal.

Sps. Lequin vs. Sps. Vizconde
Suit: declaration of nullity of contract of sale
Evidentiary issue: the contract has no valuable consideration; the sale is simulated; alteration of the terms and
conditions of the contract on the ground that theres fraud
SC says: On its face, the contract of sale appears to be supported by a valuable consideration. However, the
contract is a simulated sale and unsupported by any consideration, for respondents never paid the PhP 15,000
purported purchase price. Section 9 of Rule 130 gives both the general rule and exception as regards written
agreements. The second exception under Sec. 9 applies to the instant case. Lack of consideration was proved by
petitioners evidence aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. As explained above, said sale contract was fraudulently entered into through the misrepresentations of
respondents causing petitioners vitiated consent.