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Ethnic and Racial Studies
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Canadian multiculturalism as Ideology
Kogila Moodley
a
a
University of British Columbia
Published online: 13 Sep 2010.
To cite this article: Kogila Moodley (1983) Canadian multiculturalism as Ideology, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 6:3, 320-331
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1983.9993416
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C a n a d ia n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a s
I d e o l o g y *
Kogila Moodley
U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h C ol u m b i a
I
Nowhere is the confusion of myth and reality more evident than in the
meaning of the Canadian policy of multiculturalism. It encompasses a range
of notions of heritage, cultural diversity, recreation and entertainment
activities, cultural centres, and an entire way of life with fundamental in-
stitutional structures. Cultural differences are at once extolled and con-
sidered a hindrance to be removed in the interests of equal opportunity.
1
On the one hand, there is frequent reference to the 'multicultural movement,'
2
while on the other, surveys show that only a fifth of the Canadian public
has ever heard about multiculturalism,
3
let alone being moved by it.
With the stroke of a multicultural brush, the policy neutralized the special
claims of French and Native Canadians. Both of these historical groups
with charter rights are now equalized among numerous others. Although
the French language is recognized as one of the two official languages, the
French complain about a loss of cultural hegemony. At the same time,
other European ethnics complain that cultural preservation without linguistic
protection is bound to fail, while Native groups point out that multiculturalism
achieves nothing for the recognition of their controversial land claims and
forgotten treaty rights.
Yet with a festive aura of imaginary consensus, multiculturalism implies
that Canadian society offers equality of opportunity in the public sphere,
regardless of private ethnic classification. Hence the usage of 'ethnic' to refer
to all cultural sub-groups including 'dominant ethnics' thereby obfuscating
the cultural hierarchy and redefining ethnicity until it is meaningless. All
are exhorted to draw on some subliminal cultural allegiances, nostalgia,
customs and traditions as part of their hereditary insignia, even though
officially given the right to choose whether to identify or not. The fear
that ethnic groups in sustaining their respective cultures will undermine
national unity is mitigated by a meek plea to share these cultures with the
rest of Canadian society, thereby enriching the whole.
4
All who so desire,
are subsidised to bring cultural identities out of the private closet into the
public sphere, presumably elevating all to equally important pieces of a
diverse Canadian cultural mosaic .
s
Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 6 Number 3 July 1983
R.K.P. 1983 0141-9870/83/0603-0320 $1.50/1
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Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 321
Official policy defines culture as 'a way of being, thinking and feeling"*
undisturbed that such cultural existentialism may profoundly change under
altered circumstances. This somewhat primordialist emphasis, as opposed
to an instrumental notion of culture, is also true for most studies of Canadian
ethnicity. Ethnicity is seen as having an intrinsic vitality regardless of the
context.
This analysis, however, will argue against such a depoliticized and static
definition of ethnicity. Instead, ethnic mobilization is viewed as situational,
always in response to specific socio-structural contexts, arising in unique
historical constellations which in turn mediate ethnic expression dialectically.
The waxing and waning of ethnicity, it is argued, can hardly be understood
without reference to the motivational factors and underlying interests. These
are differently perceived according to constantly changing needs and their
ideological interpretations.
Both at the level of political and social reality, Canadian multiculturalism
greatly resembles the emperor's new clothes. Only unlike the emperor's
audience, Canadian professional ethnics, cultural entrepreneurs and a coterie
of academics are more directly and amply rewarded for their fantasies. It is
they who benefit most from multiculturalism and the big business of culture.
Their activities are largely the outcome, rather than the cause of official
policy. As Trudeau promised in his announcement of the policy, 'the whole
question of cultural and ethnic pluralism in this country . . . i s . . . an area
of study given all too little attention in the past by scholars.'
7
Judging by
the sheer volume of Canadian Ethnic Studies today, this can hardly be said
to be the case. It would still, however, seem to apply to the somewhat limited
focus of research. Modelled largely along U.S. examples of a positivistic
methodology and functionalist tradition, the numerous descriptive and
classificatory studies fall all too frequently short of what an historically
informed, interpretive sociology can achieve.
8
Official multiculturalism and
its academic reception in Canada provides a useful demonstration of the
potential for better insights which alternative critical perspectives can yield.
This would involve an eschewing of the reified numbers game and instead,
reasoning with structural changes that account for the alternating demand
for traditional cultural expressions in Canada. Historical evidence is presented
to show that the professional ethnic has a waning constituency in Canada,
despite increased subsidization, that ought to be directed, it is argued, towards
the largely neglected needs of a new ethnicity.
II
The rise of the welfare state eroded the significance of immigrant associations
for individual adjustment and advancement in the new environment. In
contrast, the pre-war generations of immigrants relied heavily on cultural
self-help organizations for initial survival. Their function has been largely
assumed by a host of state-directed social agencies. Claims for financial
and moral support in all situations exist from the day landed immigrant
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322 KogilaMoodley
status is granted. Hence, an. atomized, autonomous life outside cultural
bonds has become objectively possible where earlier cultural ties constituted
a lifeline for survival. Post 1960 associations appeal mainly to lower income
and older individuals. Noticeably absent from membership are youth, pro-
fessionals and unionized workers, whose occupational reference groups lie
outside the ethnic associations.
9
The improved legal status of immigrants allows for an early identification
with the host society. Previously, the immigrant frequently remained a
sojourner. Subject to political exclusion as newcomer and open economic
discrimination in a harsh competition, large numbers of immigrants in the
case of Italians in North America, before 1919, more than three quarters
actually returned to their country of origin after a period in the new
country. Despite the easing of travel nowadays, the proportion of those
who return permanently is relatively small. With the possibility of acquiring
citizenship after two years' residence often a double citizenship the
newcomer is free to oscillate, to probe and compare.
Despite the change of lifestyle and instrumental human relationships
in the country of adoption, few immigrants choose to exchange attractive
individualism, North American style, for the sake of cultural sentimentalities.
This is all the more so since economic opportunities in the new country
are still less bleak than those in the home country. On the contrary, with
the widening of the North-South gap, the pressure to emigrate has increased
in the less developed parts and all industrialized societies are faced with a
ready migrant labour force in search of a better life.
Another function of the improved legal status of newcomers was the
simultaneous immigration of entire families. Earlier immigration on the
other hand, was mainly characterized by the initial migration of single males
who were only joined by relatives, if at all, after a lengthy period of separation.
This phase not only made the single individuals rely more on cultural support-
groups in the new immigrant colonies but also retained strong emotional
links to the residence of their kin. Once kin have resettled as well, much
of what remains is nostalgia. With the family together in the new country,
the drive for material success and security assumes priority. Furthermore,
the maintenance of original cultures in a new society without the requisite
structural support institutions (schools, extended families) shifts from a way
of life to the realm of symbolic life embellishment. Traditional culture is
further undermined by peer socialization, media, and the 'hidden curriculum'
of a public school system, where the mainstream culture predominates as
the culture of success.
Canada's changed immigration policy in the form of the point system
led to a restructuring of the ethnic and occupational composition of new
immigrants. While in previous periods, almost all immigrants were unskilled
labourers or started as farmers, the point system favoured professionals and
wealthier members of middle groups with special skills or academic training.
These skilled newcomers soon established themselves interspersed throughout
Canadian society instead of starting in the cultural ghettos of New Italy,
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Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 323
New Greece or New Ireland as in earlier periods. These skilled migrants did
not need the initial linguistic familiarity of home became most of them
already arrived with bilingual faculties that were a precondition of their
jobs. With the exception of those who came as sponsored family members
the new wave, particularly from Third World countries, were geographically
mobile to seek opportunities outside ethnic conglomerates. In fact, many
newcomers belonged to new ethnic groups who did not yet have a sufficiently
large presence in the country to form cultural support organizations let
alone residential ghettos which they did not need in the first place. At the
most, neighbourhoods of new arrivals evolved around religious activities
or restaurants but hardly constituted centers of 'psychic shelter' and trans-
planted bases of home.
Due to their greater heterogeneity of ethnic background as well as social
stratification, the newcomers from the same country, share less with their
cultural peers and more with their counterparts across ethnic boundaries
than earlier, more homogeneous immigrant populations. This increased
class stratification of recent Canadian immigrants compared with the largely
unskilled arrivals previously, further eroded the cultural ties and social
lives the new ethnics might otherwise have shared.
To this heterogeneous ethno-class composition must be added the greater
degree of secularization of the newcomers. Two tendencies are noticeable.
Firstly, there is the loss of membership experienced by immigrant churches
through dwindling fluency in native languages, exogamy and the desire to
shed ethnic stigma. With upward mobility, the trend among church goers
has been away from 'ethnic' churches to 'Canadian' ones.
10
Overall, the
ethnic church as the core of the cultural life of the earlier immigrant community
has lost its appeal to large sections of nominal believers who prefer to pursue
non-religious leisure activities rather than have their hedonistic life styles
constricted by the conformity pressure of church groups.
The degree of secularization correlates with another important difference
in the origin of newcomers. The vast majority of earlier immigrants, be they
from Ireland, Italy or Eastern Europe emigrated from underdeveloped rural
areas. With the exception of Jews, they constituted the surplus population
of displaced peasants, rural laborers or craftsmen, who were essentially
conservative, religious and tradition-bound in outlook. The new ethnics,
on the other hand, derived mostly from urban centers where they had already
become acculturated long ago, if not to an industrial way of life, at least
to a cosmopolitan style, not too different to the skills needed in Canadian
urban conglomerates. In fact, newcomers from Delhi, Hongkong, Nairobi
or Beirut could teach Canadians valuable lessons in urban survival without
relying on artifical crutches of cultural identity maintenance. For this group,
expressions of cultural identity are far less meaningful relics of a distant
past.
The spatial dispersal of immigrants has also undermined the previous
importance of the ethnic school. With a few exceptions, such as the schools
in Vancouver's Chinatown district, almost all Canadian schools are now
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324 Kogila Moodley
truly integrated ethnically. Indeed, the proportion of children from Non-
English speaking homes sometimes exceeds 50 per cent in metropolitan
areas, although they do come from a vast variety of countries and cultures.
While the former ethnic school in the cultural ghetto could frequently
cultivate mother tongue instruction albeit after school hours, the new multi-
cultural school environment puts a premium on the shedding of the original
language in favour of the quick grasp of English language and culture. Deprived
of language, however, retention of culture becomes increasingly ephemeral
and artificial. The official language of school, business and career opportunities
determines a cultural hierarchy in which non-mainstream socialization is
relegated to the private realm at the most and to forgotten memory at the
worst. As has often been noted, true multiculturalism also presupposes
official multilingualism.
The superficial nature of current multicultural policy is highlighted by
this separation of culture and language. The explicit rejection of the relation-
ship between multiculturalism and multflinguaUsm in the official policy
announcement confirms this view. That a cultural as well as a linguistic
hierarchy exists is evident. The C.B.C., contrary to the recommendation of
the Royal Commission on Bflingualism and Biculturalism, has not removed
its proscription on the use of languages other than French and English in
broadcasting.
11
Given the role of mass communication and languages of
instruction in cultural development, privatized multiculturalism without a
publicly recognized linguistic base is the only option left for non-English
and French-speaking Canadians. Genuine cultural pluralism, however, is
still all too easily considered as undermining the cohesion of Canadian society.
The structural changes sketched resulted in what may be called the
depoliticization of multiculturalism. This refers to the loss of political in-
fluence of immigrants despite their numbers and improved legal status.
The common assertion that through increased purchasing, bargaining, and
electoral power, ethnic minorities acquire competitive advantages and develop
a politicised ethnic identification,
12
is indeed arguable. Except in the case
of immigrants who enter at the lowest occupational levels, and are handi-
capped through language, the incentives to escape the stigma of ethnicity
are considerable. If there is a dominant attitude among recent Canadian
immigrants, regardless of ethnic origin, it is to seek upward mobility through
.individual qualifications rather than through collective efforts. With the
opening of new economic opportunities outside the extractive and manu-
facturing sectors, many newcomers also developed the well-known white
collar mentality of an individual achievement orientation.
In the earlier phases, ethnic voting constituted a well-known fact. The
immigrant vote, on the whole went to left of centre parties (in the West to
the Socialists, in Ontario to the liberals), that were seen to represent the
interest of the newcomers against the conservative establishment. This ethnic
block vote has now, for the most part, dissipated, although the NDP and the
federal liberals still receive a disproportionally large share. But the community
leader who could deliver *his' vote in return for other favors is rare. Many of
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Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 325
his more successful 'members' would be more inclined to confirm their new
status by supporting the conservative establishment, including the federal
Liberals. This swing of a much more free-floating ethnic vote has made all
three parties embrace multiculturalism without, paradoxically, giving the
new heterogeneous lobby within their ranks any more power in their ma-
chinery. Apart from the one or two occasional token ethnics in the Ottawa
parliament, the so-called third force which comprises almost a third of the
total population, is not decisively represented as a political force. The dis-
sipation of ethnic voting paralleled by a decline of the ethnic press, has
weakened the immigrants who now prefer to pursue their special concerns
individually rather than collectively. Cultural interests became privatized
at the same time as they disappeared from the political arena under the
non-controversial and depoliticized formula of multiculturalism.
It is, therefore, misleading when Canadian academics frequently pose
the pseudo problem of political integration of the immigrants. In this vein,
a recent study begins with the remarkable question: *How is the cohesion of
Canadian society affected by the fact that over a quarter of its population
consists of immigrants and their descendants?'
13
Not only is the question
superfluous, but it makes the false and controversial assumption that Canadian
'mainstream' culture does not constitute an immigrant society. Only non-
charter members are seen as a threat to Canadian cohesion. Such questions
represent a typical example of unquestioned ethnocentric perceptions and
merely reflects the real inequality of power, hidden by the multicultural
cloak.
in
However, the erosion of traditional ethnicity does not imply that there
are no cultural needs left for Canadian immigrants. It is argued here as the
central critique of multicultural policy that new ethnic needs demand a
different emphasis that is ignored or not sufficiently addressed by the present
policy.
What then is the subjective basis of the new ethnicity? It is one based
on the feeling of being a constant outsider, of being non-English, of having
to do all the adapting and yet never enough. When these feelings are combined
with shared inequalities of opportunity in the market place, and of being
relegated to a lower caste status despite efforts, they foster networks which
span across the non-controversial specifics of particular cultural heritages.
For immigrants in poorly paid, exacting occupations, the advantages of
organizing as an occupational group, transcending ethnicity, are far greater
than their use of ethnicity as an organizing principle. These interest-based
alliances,
14
loosely bound by a cultural basis of not-belonging, which cross-
cut ethnic affiliation, are likely to be a far more potent force than particu-
laristic ethnic groups in the pursuit of culture maintenance. If the uplifting
of immigrants and their easier adjustment to Canadian society is the main
goal of multiculturalism, official policy would have to start supporting
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326 Kogila Moodley
such non-cultural interest groups as well. The outdated ethnic division of
labour is frequently still reflected in some regions and in certain occupations
despite the trend towards increased intra-ethnic stratification.
In the ideological realm, the new cultural needs do not derive from problems
of psychological adaptation or demands from conflicting cultures which would
have to be reconciled, as multiculturalism pretends. The problem is not
'cultural jealousies'
ls
of which Trudeau speaks, but the ethnocentrism of
entrenched Anglo-Canada. The new ethnicity needs to be structurally in-
tegrated. It therefore requires support in its continuous battle for equal
access to the power and status positions occupied by the charter groups.
In addition to ensuring equality, the new ethnics, particularly from Third
World countries, need multifaceted support and protection from implicit
and increasingly explicit racism.
The ideological aspect of multiculturalism is best illustrated by its focus
on the non-controversial, expressive aspects of culture. As long as cultural
persistence is confined to food, clothes, dance, and music, then cultural
diversity provides colour to an otherwise mundane monotonous technological
society. It even enhances tourism, if one considers how much Indians and
'ethnic' restaurants add to the magnificence of Canadian landscape. As such
it proves to be no threat, but on the contrary trivialises, neutralizes and absorbs
social and economic inequalities. However, if this should shift from an
expressive to an instrumental orientation, whereby cultural adherence becomes
a vehicle for mobilization and a voice for expressing grievances, then the
relationship between private identity and public policy has more controversial
consequences for Canadian society.
Typical of the futile distinctions with which some Canadian research has
been preoccupied, is the question whether differences in occupational place-
ment between ethnics and others can be attributed to levels of schooling or
differences in opportunity. As if these are separable, the Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism 1969 cited empirical evidence that dif-
ferences in occupational status among ethnics is attributable to lower levels
of schooling rather than lesser opportunities. A subsequent study in Toronto
by Goldlust and Richmond, however, provides quite a contrary picture.
Among a sample of immigrant men sharing similar characteristics, the earning
capacity ranged hierarchically from English and Jewish origin at the top,
followed by West-European, Slavic, Greek, Portuguese-origin and finally
Asians and Blacks at the bottom.
16
These unequal ethnic life chances call for the politicization of multi-
culturalism beyond the apolitical celebration of nostalgia. Politicized multi-
culturalism could ensure that the financial support for schools with large
proportions of immigrants is adequate, that special teacher training programs
in intercultural education
17
are offered and that optimal methods in language
training are used. The schools, vocational institutes and institutions of higher
education still remain one of the crucial battlegrounds where the success or
failure of the new multicultural Canada is to be decided.
Not the least, the target of multiculturalism would have to be the dominant
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Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 327
culture. Anglo-conformity standards would have to be 'multi-culturalized.'
This would jettison the very notion of a mainstream culture, in which the
others would have to fit. On the contrary, English Canada would genuinely
have to learn from other traditions and also internalize valuable habits of
other ways of life. At present, not even a different face for a C.B.C. television
announcer is tolerable, let alone a Punjabi accent. To be authentic, genuine
multiculturalism would have to preclude a cultural hierarchy as-well as mere
parallelism of cultural traditions in isolated compartments and represent a
mutual learning process, in contrast to the one-sided effort at present.
IV
Finally, Canadian multiculturalism has to be viewed against the background
of Quebec nationalism. This is, of course, a complex subject in itself. Only
a few crucial trends in the rise and decline of the movement with regard to
specific state policies will be highlighted here.
In the vast literature on ethnicity, a perspective which has gained support
holds that ethnic nationalism should be explained as a response to bureaucratic
intrusion into the lives of people. The increased control, associated with the
welfare state, is said to be rejected by regional elites who mobilize dif-
ferentiated populations 'into political constituencies seeking redress from
bureaucratic government.'
18
This explanation suggests a populist backdrop
to the ethnic revival, the protest of the periphery against the domination of
the centre. In the words of its proponents: 'The developmental phases of
these movements show their creation and manipulation by self-conscious
counter elites, or ethnic elites, who use them to carve out, reinforce, or
protect their access to power, wealth, and other prerequisites at first as
local influentials and then later as brokers between an increasingly bureau-
cratized state government and the ethnic collectivity.'
19
This intriguing perspective seems apt, insofar as it focuses on the situational
manipulation of symbols of descent by certain beneficiaries. However, even
more than bureaucratic intrusion by the welfare state, it is neglect or ex-
ploitation by the centre that causes regional resistance. Moreover, when
applied to Canada, it is obvious that the stress itself has set out to manage
ethnicity. By rhetorically supporting ethnic revival and diversity, the state
has not only co-opted what is left of an unassimilated ethnic leadership,
but diffused the very basis of ethnic resistance to its policies. Incorporated
and deprived of its antagonist, ethnic nationalism falters on the very oppor-
tunities it has grasped.
Quebec nationalism offers the best example of a thwarted ethnic movement
by a petty-bourgeoisie that set out -to redress Anglo-domination by the
much more powerful economic centre. The separatists were first appeased
by nation-wide official bilingualism as well as improved career opportunities
in the federal civil service. The Parti Quebecois nevertheless managed to
capture provincial state power by pandering to its main public service con-
stituency. It was not a resented welfare state intrusion but a desired bureau-
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328 KogilaMoodley
cratic expansion that propelled Quebec nationalism. A sovereign Quebec
promised unlimited career opportunities and higher status to a technocratic
elite that had assumed the dominant role once played by the church, as one
observer aptly noted.
20
However, the price for this mobilization of public support was high and
soon unaffordable. With one of the highest civil service wage rates in the
world and ambitious public projects of an 'ethnic social democracy', the
province was soon heavily in debt. Indirect taxes in Quebec are substantially
higher than in the rest of Canada. Salaries alone now account for 55 per cent
of the provincial budget. The credit rating of Quebec at the New York
bond market sank dramatically. The time arrived when the ruling party had
to demand back that which brought it into power in the first instance.
When the recession hit, accelerated by adverse demographic trends (exodus
and low birth rates) the Levesque government had no choice but to turn
against the exalted expectations of its own constituency. An unprecedented
20 per cent roll-back of civil service salaries and other severe austerity measures
produced bitter strikes that could only be ended by tough legislation. This
alienated the ethnic grassroot sentiment beyond repair from the separatist
movement. Ultimately, the demise of Quebec nationalism was brought about
by market forces that made the balkanization of an interdependent economy
unfeasible. Likewise, separatist fringe movements in Western Canada rapidly
faltered with the decline of the resource-dependent regional economy in
depressed export markets.
With economic crisis management in the forefront of governmental concern,
Canadian cultural policy also underwent a significant twist in the early
1980s. The rationale for multiculturalism changed from preserving heritage
as an end itself to an instrumental and pragmatic justification of diversity.
The minister in charge now talks about the "benefits of difference'.
21
The
instrumental value of multiculturalism is seen in better serving external
markets and improving the country's sales image. The competition is fierce;
we need every edge we can get, and one is knowledge of foreign languages.'
The study of 'heritage languages' was discovered as an asset in talking to
potential customers. At the same time, multicultural socialization is supposed
to bring about a new type of corporate employee who is able to function
in a global economy. In place of the somewhat parochial outlook of an
agricultural and extractive economy, 'the new mercantilism calls for a new
type of corporate manager, a flexible cosmopolitan aware of cultural sen-
sitivities . . . , who can cut costs and waste by knowing how culture affects
behavior, who can motivate workers with differing standards, read between
lines of reports from abroad, and pinpoint the pitfalls of overseas selling,
what is or is not acceptable.' Moreover, the government now discovered its
immigrants from some seventy-odd backgrounds as a potential reservoir
of new ideas and skills. With the Japanese booming post-war economy in
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Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 329
mind, the new ethnics are encouraged to import know-how more than labour.
Multiculturalism almost assumes the role of commercial spying: The cultural
tentacles of our ethnic groups can reach into the world's knowledge centres,
keeping tabs on new discoveries and innovations, a communication network
that could funnel commercial intelligence into Canadian companies from
every centre on earth.' Difference as a resource is now expected to give
Canada's bidding on overseas projects an edge over its culturally homo-
geneous competitors, such as Japan or Germany.
In this competition, the imagery of a sophisticated middle-power with
no domestic problems of interracial antagonism is considered a decided asset
as 'a message of .hope in a world of conflict.' The government has not yet
set out to sell multiculturalism itself as a recipe of conflict resolution but
thus far merely aims at projecting 'a strong multicultural image of equality,
tolerance and fairness.' The minister in charge now approvingly talks about
art and culture as t he handmaiden of the economy, preparing the ground for
trade by instilling respect and esteem.' While many governments, particularly
France, have always supported artistic endeavors for ulterior motives as
well, Canada seems unique at least in being so unashamedly instrumental
in its views of culture as a commodity. Culture has little intrinsic value,
other than as a saleable commodity.
The image of multicultural harmony that the Canadian state tries to
project, however, must not clash too conspicuously with a contrary domestic
reality. It is for this reason that the federal bureaucracy has recently become
genuinely concerned with issues of racism and discrimination. Closed shop
policies are officially condemned as adding to everyone's tax bill. 'Manpower
and Immigration noted that about two-fifths of new immigrants, even after
a year in Canada, were unable to find work they'd been trained for, and one
in five said the reason was that professional and trade associations refused
to accept or recognize their qualifications.' What comes increasingly under
attack, is the hidden costs of discrimination that 'lowers productivity, breeds
labour and social unrest, chronic conflict and disunity.'
The latter aspect constitutes the most important function of the new
version of multiculturalism: it is promoted as an ideological formula for
unity. In a society with bitter labor strife, ethnicity is expected to erode
the adversary principle. The ethnic bond is a positive force that cuts across
all lines of conflict, including those of region and class.' Ethnic revival is
meant to forge traditional ties, 'communal feelings that counter negativism.'
The state contrasts the loyalty of the newcomers "who take out citizenship
faster than the Anglo-Celts', with the "unconstructive dissent' of the Canadian-
born. In a country with a vague identity, in a society rich in geography and
short of history, multiculturalism is propagated as the lowest common
denominator on which all segments may agree. After all, the magic formula
merely asks that *we accept and try to understand the people next door,
regardless of their skin color and customs.'
As a foundation for the cultural hegemony of a ruling class, however,
such pleas 'to see ourselves in positive terms as a cultural mosaic'undoubtedly
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330 Kogila Moodley
fall short of affective appeal. If the desired harmony and partnership under
state guidance should work, all segments must find their everyday life would
be reflected and made intelligible in a dominant ideology. Multiculturalism,
in its present state, lacks this quality. Treating those who seem different
as equals is good business* is advice that appeals to the profit-minded. It
hardly engenders affectionate support from others. Thus the state cannot
manufacture meaning with a fading ethnic reality. Does the Canadian state
then really need the multicultural ideology? Beyond the liberal image, the
dominant section still can fall back on a hegemonic charter cultural tradition
that is being merely mystified by the symbolism of diversity. Multiculturalism
affords external legitimacy to a heterogeneous state. In fact, however, the
system really emphasizes other criteria than the equality of relative newcomers
as a priority.
Both the rise and decline of Quebec nationalism as well as the federal
counter ideology of multiculturalism highlight how much ethnic expressions
in Canada depend on specific state policies. The manipulation of ethnicity
in the pursuit of objective interests can be clearly traced and ethnicity as a
primordial aspect of identity withers away as a vehicle for political mobil-
ization under given circumstances. At the same time, the Canadian case
demonstrates not only the wide scope but also the limits of ethnic ma-
nipulation from above, mainly circumscribed by economic conditions that
activated and inspired official ethnic policies in the first place.
Notes
*This is a revised and expanded paper presented at the World Congress of the International
Sociological Association, Committee on Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations, Mexico
City, August 1 6 - 2 1 , 1982. I am grateful to Heribert Adam for many critical discussions
of the issues.
1. Trudeau, in introducing the policy, speaks of providing assistance to 'all cultural
groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society,' and in
the same breath, speaks of the value of cultural heritage retention (House of Commons
Debates, October 8, 1971, p. 8545.
2. There is even reference to a flourishing 'multicultural movement' (E. Kallen,
Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada, Toronto, Gage Publishing Limited, 1982,
p. 204).
3. John W. Berry, R. Kalin and Donald M. Taylor, Multiculturalism and Ethnic
Attitudes in Canada, Ottawa, 1977, p. 241.
4. However, for those groups who are committed to cultural retention, an important
prerequisite has been isolation from the mainstream as well as a clear separation, as
illustrated in the somewhat extreme case of the Hutterites.
5. The superficiality of multiculturalism in reality is revealed by the 'improvements'
experienced by non-visible immigrants who have changed their names. In an early
study by the 'Canadian Institute of Cultural Research,' name changers reported that
although they had weighed considerations of loyalty and pride, 'practicality and reality'
had won out (Canadian Institute of Cultural Research, Toronto, 1965, pp. 3 3 - 5) .
6. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Book 1) Ottawa,
Queen's Printer, 1967.
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Canadian multiculturalism as ideology 331
7. House of Commons Debates, October 8, 1971, pp. 8545-8.
8. For further elaboration of this approach, see Kogila Moodley, 'Canadian Ethnicity
in Comparative Perspective: Issues in the Literature,' in Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando
(eds), Ethnicity, Power and Politics in Canada, Toronto, Methuen, 1981, pp. 6-21.
9. John Norris, Strangers Entertained: A History of the Ethnic Groups of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Evergreen Press, 1971.
10. A favoured church is the United Church. In 1961, the United Church in Alberta
cited among those who claimed affiliation '50 per cent of those of Chinese and Japanese-
origin (combined), 26 per cent of Dutch, 20 per cent of Germans, 32.6 per cent of
Scandinavians, 14.5 per cent of Ukrainians and 10 per cent of Poles and Italians' (H.
Palmer, Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism, Toronto, Copp-Clark Publishing,
1975, p. 181.)
11. In a similar vein, a Vancouver school superintendent maintained that Chinese
language and culture ought not to be incorporated into Vancouver schools since they
were not the language and culture of success in the business world (Vancouver Sun,
April 8, 1975).
12. Sce. E. Kallen, Ethnicity and Human Rights in Canada, Toronto, Gage Publishing,
1982, and also John Wood, 'A Visible Minority Vote: East Indian Electoral Behaviour
in the Vancouver South Provincial and Federal Elections of 1979,' in Jorgen Dahlie
and Tissa Fernando (eds), op.cit., pp. 177-201.
13. In this vein, a recent study by Jeffrey G. Reitz in R. Breton, J.G. Reitz, V.F.
Valentine (eds), Cultural Boundaries and the Cohesion of Canada, Montreal, Institute
for Research on Public Policy, 1980, p. 331.
14. The advantages of organizing as an occupational group, as in the case of the
Farmworkers of B.C., despite their predominantly, though not exclusively, East Indian
composition, outweigh their use of ethnicity as an organizing principle. The very fact
that many of the farmowners are East Indian also militates strongly against the ethnicjza-
tion of the conflict.
15. Prime Minister's statement, House of Commons, October 1971, p. 2.
16. J. Goldlust and A. Richmond, 'A Multi-variate Analysis of the Economic Ad-
aptation of Immigrants in Toronto' mimeo. Downsview, Ontario: Institute for Behavioural
Research, 1973, as cited in R. Breton et al. (eds), op.cit., p. 367.
17. For an excellent, well researched view of what such an education might entail,
see C. Bagley and G.J. Verma (eds), Self Concept, Achievement and Multicultural
Education, London, Macmillan, 1982.
18. Charles F. Keyes (ed.), Ethnic Change, Seattle, University of Washington Press,
1981, p. 198.
19. Richard G. Fox, Charlotte H. Aull and Louis F. Cimino, 'Ethnic Nationalism and
the Welfare State", in C. Keyes (ed.), op.cit., p. 202.
20. Dominique Clift, 'Quebec public service losing its exalted role', Globe and Mail,
February 17, 1983.
21. The Honourable James Fleming, 'Multiculturalism: Who's it for?' Speech to the
Fourth Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism, Ottawa, October 23, 1981. All sub-
sequent quotes are from this keynote address by the Minister of StateforMulticulturalism.
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