GREGORIO MACAPINLAC, petitioner-appellee, v. MARIANO ALIMURONG, opponent-appellant. FACTS: Simplicia de los Santos having died on June 19, 1907, her surviving husband, Gregorio Macapinlac, submitted her will to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for probate. Macario Alimurong, a nephew of the deceased, opposed the proceedings and requested that "the will of the deceased, Doa Simplicia de los Santos, be declared null and void for either of the two reasons" which he expresses, and which are (1) Because the will was not executed and signed by the witnesses in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure now in force. (2) Because it was executed under duress and undue and illegal influence on the part of the persons benefited thereby or of a person acting in their interests. ISSUE: Whether the will is valid RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The posterior insertion of the words 'For Simplicia de los Santos' cannot affect the validity of the will. It can be considered as non-existent, and the other as the only fore of signature by the testatrix, the authenticity of which has not been impugned or which the trial court admits as conclusive, and is only one taken into account in its findings of fact. Although the said words "For Simplicia de los Santos" be considered as inserted subsequently, for the testatrix as if she signed the will, and also the signature of the witness who, at her request, wrote the name of the testatrix and signed for her, affirming the truth of this fact, attested by the other witnesses then present. And this fully complies with the provisions of section 618 of the Act. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that there was no data showing that persons directly influence the provisions of the will; that such is the illegal and improper influence which the law condemns as overcoming that freedom by which the last will of a man must be expressed.
G.R. No. 2586 Notarial Wills January 19, 1906 Page 1 of 1
TOMAS GUISON, Petitioner-Appellant , v. MARIA CONCEPCION, Respondent-Appellee. FACTS: Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on January 3, 1904. The last part of the will are as follows: Asi lo otorgo ante los testigos Seores Ambrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, de Manila, Islas Filipinas, y por no yo poder firmar, firma a mi ruego el mismo Feliciano Maglaqui, en mi presencia y de los mencionados testigos, quienes tambien suscriben, cadauno de ellos en presencia de los otros y la mia. (Firmado) FELICIANO MAGLAQUI. (Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES. (Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON. (Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN. Nosotros Ambrosio Reyes, Mariano de Leon y Felix Polintan, atestiguamosque Feliciano Maglaqui, a ruego de la Sra. Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo y en presencia de la misma y la nuestra, firmo el testamentoque antecede; y que cada uno de nosotros lo firmo en presencia de los otros y de dicha testadora. Manila, tres de Enero de mil novecientos cuatro. (Firmado) AMBROSIO REYES. (Firmado) MARIANO DE LEON. (Firmado) FELIX POLINTAN. Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will. The witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court below on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not the will is valid. HELD: No. The will is not valid for failure of the person who was supposed to sign the will for the testator, to indicate the name of the testator on behalf of whom he was signing. The judgment of the court below refusing the probate of the will is affirmed and after the expiration of twenty days judgment should be entered in accordance herewith and the case remanded to the court below for execution. It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui, instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will, wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the court below on the ground that the name of the testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has appealed.
G.R. No. L-9150 Notarial Wills March 31, 1915 Page 1 of 1
MARIANO LEAO, petitioner-appellant, v. ARCADIO LEAO, objector-appellee. Vicente Llanes for appellant. Severo Hernando for appellee. CARSON, J.: Facts: Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed her costs against her name, attached by some other person to the instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last will and testament, in the presence of three witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting clause, and that they attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other. Issue: Whether or not the testator by placing the cross opposite her name at the construction of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements as provided by law. Held: The Supreme Court held that the placing of the cross opposite her name at the construction of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that except where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and from herein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed animo testandi has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the United States in construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language identical with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code 1 , which was taken from section 2349 of the Code of Vermont. Furthermore, the evidence of record satisfactorily establishes the execution of that instrument as and for her last will and testament in the manner and form prescribed by law. The judgment entered in by the lower court was reversed by the Supreme Court, without costs in this instance, and the record remanded to the lower court, where judgment will be entered admitting the instrument in question to probate in accordance with the prayer of the petitioner.
1 Old Civil Code of the Philippines G.R. No. 6845 Notarial Wills September 1, 1914 Page 1 of 4
YAP TUA v. YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN JOHNSON, J.: FACTS: On the 23d day of August, 1909, one Perfecto Gabriel, representing the petitioner, Yap Tua, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, asking that the will of TomasaElizaga Yap Caong be admitted to probate. TomasaElizaga Yap Caong died in the city of Manila on the 11th day of August, 1909. Accompanying said petition and attached thereto was the alleged will of the deceased. The will was signed by the deceased, as well as AnselmoZacarias, SeveroTabora, and TimoteoPaez. On the 29th day of September, 1909, ordered that the last will and testament of TomasaElizaga Yap Caong be allowed and admitted to probate. The court further ordered that one Yap Tua be appointed as executor of the will. From the record it appears that no further proceedings were had until the 28th of February, 1910, when Yap CaKuan and Yap CaLlu appeared and presented a petition, alleging that they were interested in the matters of the said will and desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them in the cause. On the 1st day of March, 1910, the court appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem of said parties. On the 2d day of March, 1910, the said Gabriel La O appeared in court and presented a motion in which he alleged, in substance: First. That the will dated the 11th day of August, 1909, and admitted to probate by order of the court on the 29th day of September, 1909, was null, for the following reasons: (a) Because the same had not been authorized nor signed by the witnesses as the law prescribes. (b) Because at the time of the execution of the will, the said TomasaElizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness. (c) Because her signature to the will had been obtained through fraud and illegal influence upon the part of persons who were to receive a benefit from the same, and because the said TomasaElizaga Yap Caong had no intention of executing the same. G.R. No. 6845 Notarial Wills September 1, 1914 Page 2 of 4
Second. That before the execution of the said will, which they alleged to be null, the said TomasaElizaga Yap Caong had executed another will, with all the formalities required by law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909. Third. That the said Yap CaKuan and Yap CaLlu were minors and that, even though they had been negligent in presenting their opposition to the legalization of the will, said negligence was excusable, on account of their age. ISSUES: I. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the will was executed by the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong, without the intervention of any external influence on the part of other persons. II. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the testator had clear knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of signing the will. III. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the signature of the deceased Tomasa Yap Caong is identical with that which appears in the second will, Exhibit A. IV. Whether or not the court erred in declaring that the will was executed in accordance with the law.
RULINGS: I. While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will, upon the other hand, there were several witnesses who testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of the execution of the will, to influence her mind in any way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see, to hear, and to note the witnesses during their examination reached the conclusion that a preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue influence had been used. The Court found no good reason in the record for reversing his conclusions upon that question. II. With reference to the second assignment of error to wit, that TomasaElizaga Yap Caong was not of sound mind and memory at the time of the execution of the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of the witnesses which we found with reference to the undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very strong relating to the mental condition of TomasaElizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in question (Exhibit A). Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink G.R. No. 6845 Notarial Wills September 1, 1914 Page 3 of 4
and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that TomasaElizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. III. With reference to the third assignment of error, to wit, that the lower court committed an error in declaring that the signature of TomasaElizaga Yap Caong, on her first will (August 6, 1909, Exhibit 1), is identical with that which appears in the second will (August 11, 1909, Exhibit A), it may be said: First. That whether or not TomasaElizaga Yap Caong executed the will of August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the question presented to the court. The question presented was whether or not she had duly executed the will of August 11, 1909 (Exhibit A). Second. There appears to be but little doubt that TomasaElizaga Yap Caong did execute the will of August 6, 1909. Several witnesses testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that she executed a former will is no proof that she did not execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make the new will. Third. In said third assignment of error there is involved in the statement that "The signature of TomasaElizaga Yap Caong, in her first will (Exhibit 1) was not identical with that which appears in her second will (Exhibit A)" the inference that she had not signed the second will and all the argument of the appellants relating to said third assignment of error is based upon the alleged fact that TomasaElizaga Yap Caong did not sign Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the witnesses testified that she had written her full name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law sustains our conclusion, that if TomasaElizaga Yap Caong signed any portion of her name to the will, with the intention to sign the same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been held time and time again that one who makes a will may sign the same by using a mark, the name having been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a clear indication of her intention to execute the will. IV. With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be said that the argument which was preceded is sufficient to answer it also. G.R. No. 6845 Notarial Wills September 1, 1914 Page 4 of 4
During the trial of the cause the protestants made a strong effort to show that TomasaElizaga Yap Caong did not sign her name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did not sign their names in their presence nor in the presence of each other. Upon that question there is considerable conflict of proof. An effort was made to show that the will was signed by the witnesses in one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan of the room or rooms in which the will was signed was presented as proof and it was shown that there was but one room; that one part of the room was one or two steps below the floor of the other; that the table on which the witnesses signed the will was located upon the lower floor of the room. It was also shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was lying, it was possible for her to see the table on which the witnesses signed the will. While the rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is possible for each of the necessary parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures placed upon the will. In cases like the present where there is so much conflict in the proof, it is very difficult for the courts to reach conclusions that are absolutely free from doubt. Great weight must be given by appellate courts who do not see or hear the witnesses, to the conclusions of the trial courts who had that opportunity. Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a preponderance of the proof shows that TomasaElizaga Yap Caong did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the right use of all her faculties, the will dated August 11, 1909.
G.R. No. L-30289 Notarial Wills March 26, 1929 Page 1 of 2
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant, v. APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants. FACTS: On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession. On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would simplify the proceedings. The lower court in an order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating the will. ISSUE: Whether or not the will in question was not executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645 RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages. The name of the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left hand margin of the first four pages and at the end of the will. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. The three witnesses likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of the will. The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it is essential for the validity of the will that the person writing the name of the maker of the will also sign. Under the law prior to the amendment that where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own or not. G.R. No. L-30289 Notarial Wills March 26, 1929 Page 2 of 2
The Supreme Court held that a will to be signed is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. The testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. The law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. Moreover, the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.
G.R. No. 103554 Notarial Wills May 28, 1993 Page 1 of 2
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA, JUAN CABALLERO, AUREA CABALLERO, OSCAR LAROSA, HELEN CABALLERO, SANTOS CABALLERO, PABLO CABALLERO, VICTOR RAGA, MAURICIA RAGA, QUIRICA RAGA, RUPERTO ABAPO, represented herein by his Attorney-in-Fact, ARMSTICIA * ABAPO VELANO, and CONSESO CANEDA, represented herein by his heirs, JESUS CANEDA, NATIVIDAD CANEDA and ARTURO CANEDA, petitioners, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents.
FACTS: Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and testament before three attesting witnesses, namely, Cipriano Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano Toregosa. It was declared therein, among other things, that the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to Presentacion Gaviola, Angel Abatayo, Rogelio Abatayo, Isabelito Abatayo, Benoni G. Cabrera and Marcosa Alcantara, all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
The petitioners contend that the attestation clause, in contravention of the express requirements of the third paragraph of Article 805 of the Civil Code for attestation clauses, fails to specifically state the fact that the testator signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the witnesses and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause contained in the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero complies with the requirements of Article 805, in relation to Article 809, of the Civil Code. HELD: YES. Article 805 provides that the attestation clause should state (1) the number of the pages used upon which the will is written; (2) that the testator signed, or expressly caused another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the presence of the attesting witnesses; and (3) that the attesting witnesses witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. Failure to state the said facts shall invalidate the will. In the present case, the attestation clause, while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. Under Article 809, the defects and imperfections of a will, with respect to the form of the attestation or the language employed therein, would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. G.R. No. 103554 Notarial Wills May 28, 1993 Page 2 of 2
The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.
In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will.
G.R. No. L-9089 Notarial Wills January 5, 1915 Page 1 of 2
In re: the state of the deceased SOTERA BARRIENTOS. SAMUEL PERRY, petitioner, respondent-appellant, v. VICENTE ELIO, petitioner, respondent-appellee. Wolfson and Wolfson and Isaac Adams for appellant. No appearance for appellee. ARAULLO, J.: Facts: Upon the deceased of Sotera Barrientos, a resident of the municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, 68 years of age, the wife of Samuel Perry in her third marriage, in the said municipality on August 31, 1912, two documents were presented in the Court of First Instance of the said province, each of which, according to those who respectively presented them, was the last will and testament of the said deceased. The first document was filed on September 4, 1912, that is, four days after the death of the testatrix, by Vicente Elio, son of her first husband, and her brother-in-law; and the second on December 20 of the same year, 1912, by Samuel Perry, her surviving husband. Vicente Elio opposed the probate of the second will and Perry opposed the first will. On February 1, 1913, the probate court ruled that both wills were true and authentic but the will that Samuel Perry presented was executed on September 21, 1910 and the will that Vicente Elio presented was executed on August 26, 1912. Therefore, the will that was in favour of the former was revoked by the will favouring the lattermust be probated. In the first will, it was provided that Samuel Perry would be testatrixs sole heir. In the second will, it was stated that she had no children with Perry and that he had forsaken her during her serious illness, that Vicente Elio would be testatrixs sole heir, that testatrix authorised and begged her clerk to sign the will for her as she was too ill and weak to sign her own will. The will that Vicente Elio presented was signed by four witnesses who certified that the signing was made in their presence, signed by the testatrixs clerk, and the attestation clause that stated the aforementioned facts. Samuel Perry appealed the decision of the probate court, hence the instant petition. Issue: Whether or not the second will is valid. Held: The Supreme Court held that the will in favour of Vicente Elio was not valid. The Court pointed out that in order that a will may be deemed valid, that is executed by one person and signed by another on account of the testator's inability to sign, the law requires (sec. 618, Code Civ. Proc.) that it shall have been signed under the G.R. No. L-9089 Notarial Wills January 5, 1915 Page 2 of 2
express direction or by the express order of the testator. In the present case, when Elio and his companions took the said document to the house of the testatrix, there to be executed as her will, it already contained a statement in the paragraph preceding the space reserved for the signatures of the testatrix and the witnesses, to the effect that, as the testatrix was unable to sign the will by reason of her advanced age and her debility, she authorised and begged her clerk to do so at her request. There is no proof whatever that Vicente Elio was instructed by testatrix to have the statement inserted in the said document, when, as he testified, the drafting and preparation of the instrument was commended to him. It is evident that it was all merely the idea and purpose of Elio himself. With respect to this feature of the case, although from the testimony given it is gathered that the testatrix indicated by means of signs, her desire that the latter should sign the document as she was unable to do so, yet two of the witnesses gave it to be understood that is was Elio himself who named the clerk as the person who should sign for testatrix. As in the document drawn up and prepared by Elio himself the was already designated to sign at the request of testatrix, before the latter was asked by Elio, as he stated, the question mentioned by him; as Elio himself was to be benefited by the will then attempted to be executed; and as Elio's intervention in that selection was direct and exclusive, for, as he testified, it was he alone who heard the name of the clerk a selection which after all was entirely useless, since the person chosen for the intended purpose was already designated in the document by Elio himself no other conclusions can be reached than that the clerk not only did not sign the said document under the express direction and order of the testatrix, but also did not even do so at her request or in obedience to her own will, because the will of Vicente Elio, who drew up and prepared the document, was already expressed therein and to his will it appears, was that of the testatrixs subordinated in all respects, not only with reference to the signing of the instrument, but also with regard to all else connected with the alleged execution of the so-called will of this testatrix. Therefore, the will favouring Vicente Elio is revoked and remanded to the lower court the probate of the will favouring Samuel Perry. C.A. No. 8075 Notarial Wills March 25, 1946 TRINIDAD NEYRA v. ENCARNACION NEYRA DE JOYA, J.: FACTS: On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the recovery of one-half () of the property mentioned and described therein, which had been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra. After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to one-half of the said property. Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals for Manila, alleging several errors, attacking the execution and validity of said agreement; and on November 10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed, pursuant to the to an agreement or compromise entered into by the parties, as shown by the corresponding document, dated November 3, 1942, which was filed in the case the following day, November 4, 1942. In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two years, unexpectedly died, on November 4, 1942 at the age of 48, allegedly from heart attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease from which, it was claimed, she had been suffering for some time. Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said will, in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter enemy. The authorities of said Congregation denied the bounty offered by Encarnacion twice. When Encarnacion requested that holy mass be celebrated in her hous, the Congregation granted her wish and after the mass, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the two sisters greeted each other in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they also talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, the instant C.A. No. 8075 Notarial Wills March 25, 1946 case being the second, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protg, as witnesses. ISSUE: Whether or not said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra RULING: In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts. The logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942. It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must have C.A. No. 8075 Notarial Wills March 25, 1946 evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family life. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought her happiness, and that she had always been just to her sister, who had been demanding insistently what was her due, Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation, as she did not want to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore, most logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the beneficiary of her generosity, under her last will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by executing said agreement, and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labours. It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been dead since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-affirmed.
G.R. No. L-13431 Notarial Wills November 12, 1919 Page 1 of 1
In re: will of Ana Abangan. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee, v. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants. FACTS: On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. Said document consists of two sheets, the first of which contains the entire disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. ISSUE: Whether the will may be accepted for probate RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court ruled that signing on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other evidently has for its object to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. However, when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. The signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin would be unnecessary. The Supreme Court held that the statute regards of such importance to place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security. Moreover, the signature of the testatrix is not necessary in the attestation clause because this appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will. The requirement of correlatively numbering each and every page of a will in letters to be placed on the upper part of the sheet for the purpose of determining whether any sheet of the will has been removed. Moreover, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. On the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
G.R. No. 15566 Notarial Wills September 14, 1921 Page 1 of 1
EUTIQUIA AVERA, petitioner-appellee, v. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar Garcia and Jose Garcia, objectors-appellants.
FACTS: When the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia was allowed by the court, an appeal was instituted contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia contesting the validity of the will by reason of the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for the marginal signature of the testator and the witnesses to be on the left margin in order for the will to be valid. HELD: While the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on the left margin of each and every page, so far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or on the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. The will in herein case contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By the signing of every page of the will, every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by being signed in the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other. It results that the legal errors assigned are not sustainable, and the judgment appealed from will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 Notarial Wills June 30, 1964 Page 1 of 1
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee, v. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Facts: Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon copy. The will was attested to by three witnesses, the lawyer was present during its execution and its duly notarised. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted two pages simultaneously instead when he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testatrix and other witnesses in his presence. Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will. Held: The testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will; and the lawyer, who actually prepared the documents. Also the will and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and the lawyer, together before they were actually signed. Moreover, the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the testatrix and the witnesses. The failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated. The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed. Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects. G.R. 122880 Notarial Wills 12 April 2006 Page 1 of 3
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents. Tinga, J. (Third Division) Facts: Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June 10, 1981 and notarised on the same day. The will consisted of two (2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their signatures on the left- hand margin of both pages of the will though. Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a forgery. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been executed in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate, calling to fore the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes. According to the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-title, Patunay Ng Mga Saksi, comprised the attestation clause and the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose of identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate. Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as the substantial compliance rule. Issue: Whether or not the requirements of the law with respect to notarial wills were complied with and the subject will should be admitted to probate. Held: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. Perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these G.R. 122880 Notarial Wills 12 April 2006 Page 2 of 3
defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection. Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the formal requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Extant therefrom is the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New Civil Code put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618. Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the substantial compliance rule. However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarised but the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. The Court suggested in Caeda v. Court of Appeals 1 the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus preventing any increase or decrease in the pages. Following Caeda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. In this case, however, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in. The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805 particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. An
1 G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993, 222 SCRA 781 G.R. 122880 Notarial Wills 12 April 2006 Page 3 of 3
unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal. The notary public who notarised the subject will wrote, Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. By no manner of contemplation can these words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not follow to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of acknowledgment is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be acknowledged, and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mind-set in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will. G.R. No. L-36033 Notarial Wills November 5, 1982 Page 1 of 1
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner, v. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin),respondent. FACTS: Dorotea Perez executed a last will and testament written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect and consisting of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The Lower Courts denied the will for probate for want of formality in its execution primarily with the requirement of subscription. ISSUE: Whether the will has been executed with the formalities prescribed by law RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court held that the will was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order In addition, the will in question failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. It is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page. The law is to be liberally construed, the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. G.R. No. L-40804 Notarial Wills January 31, 1978 Page 1 of 2
ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA, CONSOLACION SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA, DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA, petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA GUERRA, respondents. Facts: Eugenia Danila allegedly executed a will and testament dated March 9, 1963 and a codicil dated April 18, 1963. Adelaida Nista, one of the instituted heirs filed a petition for the probate of the two documents. Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition to the petition alleging among others that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and Eugenia Danila. The adopted children alleged that the will and codicil were procured through fraud and undue influence. They further contend that the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the testatrix. They also claim that Eugenia had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will and testament which was duly probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime. The will and codicil are valid since it complied with the formalities required by law for the execution of a will and codicil. Issue: Whether or not the last will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of the law, considering two of the attesting witnesses testified against their due execution while other non-subscribing witnesses testified to the contrary. Held: The last will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. There is no question that each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of Eugenia Danila and the three (3) attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation claim far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the time present during the execution. There is no showing that the lawyers had been remiss in their sworn duty. Consequently, respondent court failed to consider the presumption of regularity in the execution of the questioned documents. There were no incidents brought to the attention of the trial court to arouse suspicion of anomaly. While the opposition alleged fraud and undue influence, no evidence was presented to prove their occurrence. G.R. No. L-40804 Notarial Wills January 31, 1978 Page 2 of 2
With regard to the testimonies of the witnesses against the due execution of a will, it does not necessarily disallow its probate. Although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witnesses in connection with its due execution, to deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable, and unbiased; if otherwise, it may be overcome by any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by the law. It has been regarded that the function of the Notary Public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements in the execution of a will. In the absence of any showing of self-interest that might possibly have warped his judgment and twisted his declaration, the intervention of a Notary Public, in his professional capacity, in the execution of a will deserves grave consideration. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed insofar as it disallowed the probate of the will and codicil with costs against respondent. G.R. No. L-21151 Notarial Wills February 25, 1924 Page 1 of 3
In re: Will of Antonio Vergel de Dios, deceased. RAMON J. FERNANDEZ, petitioner-appellant, HERMELO VERGEL DE DIOS and SEVERINA JAVIER, legatees-appellants, v. FERNANDO VERGEL DE DIOS, Et. al. ROMUALDEZ, J.: FACTS: The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A as a will, which was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate, and contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and Virgilio Rustia, the court of First Instance of Manila having denied its probate. The applicant takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower court in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645 void. The defects attributed to the will by the contestants are as follows, to wit: (a) It was not sufficiently proven that the testator knew the contents of the will. (b) The testator did not sign all the pages of the will. (c) He did not request anybody to attest the document as his last will. (d) He did not sign it in the presence of any witness. (e) The witnesses did not sign it in the presence of the testator, or of each other, nor with knowledge on the part of the testator that they were signing his will. (f) The witnesses did not sign the attestation clause before the death of the testator. (g) This clause was written after the execution of the dispositive part of the will and was attached to the will after the death of the testator. (h) The signatures of the testator on page 3 of Exhibit A are not authentic. ISSUE: Whether or not the Will is valid. RULING: The evidence sufficiently shows that when Attorney Lopez Lizo read the will to the testator, the latter's mind was perfectly sane and he understood it: that he signed all the pages of the will proper, although he did not sign the page containing the attestation clause; that while he did not personally call the witnesses, yet the latter were invited by Attorney Lopez Lizo to act as such in his presence. The law does not require that the testator precisely be the person to request the witnesses to attest his will. It was also sufficiently established in the record, besides being stated in the G.R. No. L-21151 Notarial Wills February 25, 1924 Page 2 of 3
attestation clause, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the three witnesses and that the latter, in turn, signed it in the presence of the testator and of each other, the testator knowing that the witnesses were signing his will; that the witnesses signed the attestation clause before the death of the testator; that this clause, with the names of the witnesses in blank, was prepared before the testator signed the will, and that the sheet containing said clause, just as those of the will proper, was a loose sheet, and that all the four sheets of which the will was actually composed were kept together and are the very ones presented in this case; and finally, that the signatures of the testator on page 3 of said exhibit are authentic. It thus appearing from the record that there are no such defects as those mentioned by the opponents, and it having been proven that the testator executed said will in a language known by him and consciously, freely and spontaneously, it would be seen unnecessary to go further, and the matter might be brought to a close right here, by holding the will in question valid and allowable to probate, were it not for the fact that the trial court and the opponents questioned the sufficiency and validity of the attestation clause because the sheet on which it is written is not numbered, and it is not stated there that the testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will in the presence of the three witnesses, or that the latter signed it is the presence of the testator and of each other, and especially because said attestation clause is not signed by the testator either at the margin or the bottom thereof. As to the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause, it is true that it does not appeal on the upper part of the sheet, but it does not appear in its text, the pertinent part of which is copied hereinafter, with the words, having reference to the number of sheets of the will, underscored, including the page number of the attestation: * * * We certify that the foregoing document written in Spanish, a language known by the testator Antonino Vergel de Dios, consisting of three sheet actually used, correlatively enumerated, besides this sheet . . . . Turning now to the question whether or not in this clause it is stated that the testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will, in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other, let us see what is said in said clause on this point, and to this end its pertinent part is hereinafter transcribed and is as follows: * * * and he (the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence and we at his request did the same in his presence and in that of each other as witnesses to the will, and lastly, the testator, as well as we, as witnesses, signed in the same manner on the left margin of each sheet. (Emphasis ours) G.R. No. L-21151 Notarial Wills February 25, 1924 Page 3 of 3
The underscored phrase "in the same manner" cannot in the instant case mean, and it in fact means nothing, but that the testator and the witnesses signed on the left margin of each sheet of the will "in the same manner" in which they signed at the bottom thereof, that is, the testator in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other. This phrase in the same manner cannot, in view of the context of the pertinent part, refer to another thing, and was used here as a suppletory phrase to include everything and avoid the repetition of a long and difficult one, such as what is meant by it. The same section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to avoid the repetition of the same long phrase about the testator having signed in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other, resorts to a similar expression in the second paragraph and says, "as aforesaid." Concerning the absolute absence of the signature of the testator from the sheet containing the attestation clause, this point was already decided in the above cited case of Abangan v. Abangan, where this court held that: The testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator. The foregoing conclusions lead us to hold, as we do here by hold, that the documents, as the last will and testament of the deceased Antonio Vergel de Dios, meets all the requirements prescribed by the low now in force and therefore it must be allowed to probate as prayed for by the petitioner.
G.R. No. 174144 Notarial Wills April 17, 2007 BELLA A. GUERRERO, petitioner, v RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, respondent FACTS: Ars Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner and respondent, died at the Metropolitant Hospital in Tondo, Manila. Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the decedent. Petitioner alleged that petitioner was named as executrix in the decedents will and she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacity to dispose of her estate by will. Respondent opposed her elder sisters petition on the following grounds that the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and acknowledgement did not comply with the requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured the will through fraud and improper pressure and influence. ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed by the testator complies with the formalities prescribed by law RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The will executed failed to comply with Article 806 of the Civil Code because of the fact that it was acknowledged by the testatrix and the witness at the testatrixs residence in Quezon City before a notary public who was commissioned for and in Caloocan City. The formal requisite is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. Acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In a notarial will, the competent officer is the notary public. Notary public, however, is authorized only to perform notarial acts, including taking acknowledgements within that territorial jurisdiction only. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgement of the testatrix and the instrumental witness. The testatrix and her witness could not have validly acknowledged the will before him. The last will and testament was not acknowledged as required by law. G.R. L-32213 Notarial Wills November 26, 1973 Page 1 of 1
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents. Esguerra, J.:
Facts: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them. Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. HELD: The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time. To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd. Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. He would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimise fraud.
226 SCRA 347 Notarial Wills September 14, 1993 Page 1 of 2
Alvarado v. Gaviola, BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS: On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled Huling Habilin wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna. According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when the said notarial will was executed, together with three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma. Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Thereafter, a codicil entitled Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testators eye operation. Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the same manner as with the previously executed will. When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. ISSUES: Whether or not notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-reading requirement under Articles 808 of the New Civil Code was not complied with.
226 SCRA 347 Notarial Wills September 14, 1993 Page 2 of 2
RULING: YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will. Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art. 808. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his wishes. Rino read the testators will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place. There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testators will.