Complex Crimes

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent
of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND
EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs.
Hernandez
1
once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-
examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the
intervening period saw a number of similar cases
2
that took issue with the ruling-all with a
marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more
effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even
among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are
now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor
Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim
of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime
Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period
of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken
to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none
having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The
following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District,
Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2,
1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge
who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable
cause.
4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on
March 6, 1990.
5
On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return
6
for the
respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164
7
Which had been contemporaneously but
separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall
within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it very simply-the information
in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for
the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder
and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated
otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is
referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of
theHernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same
paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not
apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the
Court issued its Resolution of the same date
8
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety
bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The
Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the
matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon
the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court
9
voted against granting bail
to Senator Enrile, and two
10
against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator
Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main
dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may
properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in
his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in
the course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less
grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in
furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez.
Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined.
10
-A In the view of the
majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all
subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent
President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal,
among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to
nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal
Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in
this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most
serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."'
11
In thus acting,
the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or
should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the
complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in
furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments
were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to
overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses
of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our
Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed
with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this
could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances
present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of
murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the
movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the
words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que
hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de
que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito
mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran
los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said
amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its
maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the
penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence
of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the
spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there
can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that prescribed for each one
of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense
be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no
other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the
penalties for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent
spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes are the result
of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the
more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the
separate penalties for each offense.
12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here
inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The
Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant
to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the
recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner
does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of
rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for
the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the
aforementioned amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years
of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of
this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail.
13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for
simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on
the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.
14
There is nothing
inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an
offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the
evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest
without first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath
or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution.
15
This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of
the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established
procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor.
16
Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and
twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the
latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation.
17
Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a
relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that
he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right
to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy
was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked,
and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information
charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more
than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent Judge.
18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded
the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the
information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the
respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the
criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to
this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was
beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would
be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such
complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from
deciding them; none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this
is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to
petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to
correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of
arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged.
19
It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the
right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence
against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other
parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or
contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The
proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have
hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but
also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound
the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But
in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the
ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court
and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a
proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give
short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden
it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts.
What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the
Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in
factualmilieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said
spouses have uncontestedly pleaded
20
that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-
accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before
NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and
detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their
constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and
punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for
power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the
sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so
underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings
and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent
civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called
rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded
streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the
public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent
need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly
define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot
be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its
name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it
stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress
will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is properly within
its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in
both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139610. August 12, 2002]
AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and
corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders
punished. However, this objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the
prosecution passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court
is mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the
accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April
29, 1999 Decision
[1]
and February 3, 2000 Resolution
[2]
of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
in Criminal Case No. 18768. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused AUREA
MONTEVERDE y RASUELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and in default of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is
hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties of
the law, and to pay the cost.
She shall be credited with the full period of any preventive imprisonment suffered, pursuant
to and as mandated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.
The facts from which the civil liability may arise not being indubitable, there is no
pronouncement as to the same.
The bailbond of herein accused is hereby ordered cancelled.
[3]

The assailed resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from the Information dated February 4, 1993, signed by Special
Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. dela Llana with the approval of then Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez. Charging petitioner with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the
accusatory portion reads thus:
That on or about January 17, 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being the Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut,
Tondo, Manila with intent to defraud, and by taking advantage of [her] official position and to
liquidate the funds donated/granted by the Philippine Games and Amusement Corporation
submitted Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of P13,565.00
allegedly issued by Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said sales invoice is falsified
and later did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same to her personal use and benefit, to the damage of the Government and
which crime was committed in relation to her office.
[4]

During her arraignment on April 5, 1993, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de
parte,
[5]
pleaded not guilty.
[6]
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner
of the crime of estafa, but convicted her of falsification of a commercial document under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the facts is curtly summarized by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP) as follows:
Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay
124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the
amount of P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR).
The amount was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay.
To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A-3) with copies
of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.
Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso
Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay
Treasurer, with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay
General Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito
Galinda for the period July 16, to December 1990. The complaints were docketed as OMB-0-
91-12694 and OMB-0-92-0643 (Exhs. A, B and C).
[7]

Version of the Defense
The foregoing account is reiterated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Memorandum.
[8]
The petitioner did not submit her own Memorandum, but merely adopted
the position of the OSG which recommended her acquittal.
Version of the Sandiganbayan
The foregoing narration does not adequately explain the evidence. In fairness to the
Sandiganbayan (SBN hereafter) which is being faulted with reversible errors by petitioner
and the OSG, we deem it prudent to quote the facts and the evidence it relied upon in its
assailed Decision, as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the People presented
the following documentary evidence:
1. Exhibit A which is a letter complaint addressed to the Ombudsman dated
September 2, 1991 signed by Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz, Antonio Araza and Jose
Salvatierra;
2. Exhibit B which is a Joint-Affidavit of the said four (4) complainants subscribed and
sworn to before a Notary Public on September 8, 1991;
3. Exhibit C which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed by complainants Jose
Salvatierra and Antonio Araza addressed to Mr. Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief
Barangay Bureau, City of Manila;
4. Exhibit D which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford
Hardware.
5. Exhibit D-1 which is the duplicate original copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July
20, 1981 listing only three (3) items;
6. Exhibit D-1-A which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit D-1;
7. Exhibit E which is a machine copy of an official receipt with Aurea Monteverde
appearing as buyer and listing eleven items as articles purchased;
8. Exhibit E-1 which is a certification of Luz Co, Manager of Sanford Hardware stating
that Exhibit E is not a genuine reproduction of the duplicate original;
9. Exhibit F (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17,
1991;
10. Exhibit G is a machine copy of an undated letter signed by Bella Evangelista
authorizing Antonio Araza to verify the authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated
January 17, 1991 in the sum of P13,565.00
as well as witnesses Luz Co y Tan and Antonio Araza y Reposo.
LUZ CO y TAN declared that she is the manager of Sanford Hardware since 1976, that Exhibit
D-1 which is [a] duplicate copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated July 2, 1981 where the amount of
purchase is only P157.00 is the invoice used by her firm in the conduct of its business; that
Exhibit E was not her receipt and that she executed a certification to that effect (Exhibit E-1)
when required by a male person; that she does not know the entries appearing in Exhibit E but
the entries in Exhibit D-1 are of her business; that Sanford Hardware is owned by [her] sister-
in-law Delia Co; that there are three copies of the sales invoice her business is issuing, and the
third copy or last copy is the one left in the store, and that the one who approached her and
asked about Exhibit E is one Narciso Cruz and when she answered that she did not issue
Exhibit E she was requested to execute an affidavit; that she does not know accused Aurea
Monteverde and that she had no delivery of hardware materials to the Barangay on January
17, 1991 (TSN May 14, 1993).
It was the testimony of ANTONIO ARAZA that he is a resident of 2256 Malaya St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila and that he secured a copy of Exhibits E and F from the Barangay Treasurer;
that he brought the same to the owner of the Sanford Hardware for verification; that Luz Co to
whom he talked x x x in said store manifested that said Exhibits E and F are not issued by the
firm; and for which he requested Luz Co to issue a certification (Exhibit E-1); that after realizing
that the receipts used by the accused are falsified receipts, he signed letter complaints and [a]
Joint-Affidavit together with Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz and Jose Salvatierra, and charged the
accused before the Ombudsman; that the money involved in this case are barangay funds
because it was donated by the PAGCOR to the Barangay and he was able to secure a copy
from the PAGCOR evidencing that it was donated to the Barangay but the copy was submitted
to the Ombudsman; that the Barangay Treasurer lent to him the receipts with the advice to
verify it from the proprietor of [the] Hardware and she even gave a letter of authorization to
him (Exhibit G); that the P13,565.00 appearing in Exhibits E and F was not used to buy
electrical materials or lightings, and the bulbs in the Meralco post were donated by Councilor
Rene Jose (TSN March 18, 1994).
EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED
The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with Exhibits 35 to 80 dealing with certificates
of commendation in favor of the accused during her stint as Barangay Chairman from 1991 to
1993 and even prior to her being a Barangay Chairman. Exhibits 1 with its submarkings
(Exhibits 1-A to Exhibits 1-A-3) is a letter of the accused addressed to Alice LI Reyes of the
PAGCOR with attachment she captioned Financial Statement; Exhibits 2 to 15 are Sales
Invoices/Receipts from different hardware stores and individuals while Exhibits 16 and 17 are
pictures depicting a basketball court portion thereof being sub-marked, and Exhibits 18 to 32
are fifteen (15) pictures depicting different alleys at Barangay 124. Exhibit 33 is a turn-over
certificate/record of the Barangay properties signed by the incoming Barangay Chairman with
the third page submarked as Exhibits 33-A to 33-b-2; and Exhibit 34 is the counter-affidavit of
the accused sworn to before a Notary Public on September 5, 1991. Exhibit 81 is a Joint-
Affidavit of Alfonso Cua Jr. and Joel Magbanua.
Aside from her, the accused presented ALFONSO CUA, JR. whose testimony is as follows: that
he knows the accused to be the Chairman of Barangay 124 from 1991 up to 1992 while he was
a Barangay Tanod in the said Barangay; that one project of the accused was the installation of
lights or lighting the streets and playgrounds in the Barangay; that in January 1991 materials
were delivered to the house of the Barangay Chairman (accused) and around three (3) days
thereafter, he helped in the installation of the electrical materials consisting of electrical
wirings, electrical tapes, bulbs, lamps and lamp covers, and it took them (he and the husband
of the accused) about three Sundays in doing so; that he executed a Joint-Affidavit together
with one Joel Magbanua in connection with the incident (Exhibit 81) (TSN April 2, 1997).
Testifying in her behalf accused took the witness stand and declared:
That she was the Barangay Chairman in Brgy. 124 since 1989 to 1994; that in January 1991 she
received donation or cash money in the amount of P44,800.00 from PAGCOR which she used
in Barangay projects like lighting, and cleanliness and beautification; that she reported the
matter to PAGCOR and submitted [a] financial statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A, 1-A-1); that when
she purchased electrical and hardware items from Sanford Hardware she was issued a receipt
(Exhibit 9) and considering Exhibit D-1 and D-1-A, it would appear that Sanford Hardware
issued two (2) receipts; she denied the charge of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents, and claimed that with the meager amount involved, she is not going to sacrifice
her good name and reputation; she then identified x x x several awards she received (Exhibits
35 to 79); that she was the one who personally purchased the items in Exhibit F, and she
actually paid the same in cash for which she was issued Exhibit 9 (Exhibit F and 9 contain the
same items); that the receipt was issued in her name and the money was in her possession
that was why it was she and not the Barangay Treasurer who personally made the purchase;
that the PAGCOR check was issued in her name and was directly given to her and so she was
the one who encashed the check accompanied by one of the councilors but she did not turn
over the cash to the treasurer; that even after she came to know of the existence of Exhibit E,
she did not go to Sanford Hardware to inquire about the said document; that the original of
the said exhibit was given to her but she submitted it to PAGCOR. (TSN September 3,
November 5, 1996 and April 1, 1997).
[9]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The assailed Decision noted that petitioner was supposed to have been charged with the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. However, there was
no clear allegation in the Information that the falsification was a necessary means to commit
the estafa.
[10]
Nevertheless, going along with the supposition that a complex crime had been
charged, the SBN held:
Despite the ambiguity and disquietude, however, the court is constrained to go with the
supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical
consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes - that of Estafa and that of
Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her.
[11]

The anti-graft court acquitted petitioner of estafa, because there was no evidence that
funds had been misappropriated or converted.
[12]
Neither was there proof that petitioner had
been required to account for the money received.
[13]
Without these proofs, no conviction for
estafa was possible.
[14]

However, the court a quo convicted her for allegedly falsifying the document she had
submitted to show that the P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting
materials for her barangay. According to the SBN, the falsification became very clear when the
document was compared with another one purporting to be a duplicate original presented by
the prosecution.
[15]
While the prosecution did not present any proof evidencing that it was
petitioner who had caused the falsification, the SBN relied on the presumption that in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, a person who is found in possession of a forged
document, and who uses it, is the forger.
[16]

Nevertheless, petitioner was not convicted of falsification as defined by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, because there was no proof that she had taken advantage of her position
in committing the crime.
[17]
Instead, she was convicted of falsification under Article 172.
[18]

Hence, this Petition.
[19]

Issues
The OSGs Memorandum which recommended acquittal, and which petitioner adopted,
raised the following issues:
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:
[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was
committed[;]
[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public document[;
and]
[3.] applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of falsification in
the absence of any proof that she benefited from it.
[20]

This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Nature of Complex Crimes
Appellant was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of a commercial document. However, even if the SBN itself doubted whether the Information
had properly charged a complex crime, it was, as quoted earlier, constrained to go along with
the supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex crime, otherwise the logical
consequence is that the accused has been indicted with two crimes -- that of Estafa and that of
Falsification of Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her.
[21]

We clarify. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
[22]
a complex crime refers to (1) the
commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a
single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or
others).
[23]
Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are
committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for
committing the other (or others) .
[24]

Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot
constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public
and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the two
crimes the result of a single act. The OSG correctly observed:
x x x. The alleged falsification happened after the money was spent and to explain how it was
expended. Thus there is no complex crime since the falsification is not a necessary means for
committing the estafa (as charged) or malversation (as suggested by Sandiganbayan in its
Order dated February 1, 2000). If at all, it was intended to conceal the estafa or
malversation.
[25]

Well-known is the principle that an information must charge only one offense, except
when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
[26]
When more than one
offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information.
[27]

In the present case, the accused should have objected to the Information on the ground
that more than one offense was charged therein. For her failure to move to quash the
indictments, she is deemed to have waived her right to be tried for only one
crime.
[28]
Furthermore, she did not object to the submission of evidence that tended to prove
the offenses charged in the Information -- estafa and falsification. Verily, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, but the accused fail to object to the
defect before trial, the trial court may convict them of as many offenses as are charged and
proven, and impose on them the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings
of fact and law in each.
[29]

On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the argument of petitioner that since she was
acquitted of estafa, she could no longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial
document. Having, in effect, been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not
necessarily lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based on its own merits,
and conviction will depend on the proof of the elements of each particular offense.
Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN
supposed. Still, acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal
from the other (or others).
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is
axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the information and prove during the trial all the
elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and
the acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the
other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so
long as they are proved.
[30]

Second Issue:
Nature of Sales Invoice
The OSG agrees that the subject Sales Invoice is a public and/or a commercial document
within the meaning of falsification as defined under the Revised Penal Code.
Both the OSG and the OSP agree that a private document acquires the character of a
public document when it becomes part of an official record and is certified by a public officer
duly authorized by law.
[31]
The OSP aptly explained this point as follows:
x x x, *I+f the document is intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the
preparation of which being in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the
government, the falsification of that document, although it was a private document at the
time of its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or official document.
Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was
submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Thus this Sales Invoice is intended to be
part of the public records and the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and regulations.
Moreover, Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed part of the official records of PAGCOR when it was
submitted by petitioner as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation of her
accountability to PAGCOR.
[32]

Neither can it be denied that the Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. Commercial
documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate
trade or credit transactions.
[33]
This Court has previously characterized such documents in this
wise:
x x x. In most cases, these commercial forms *receipts, order slips and invoices] are not
always fully accomplished to contain all the necessary information describing the whole
business transaction. The sales clerks merely indicate a description and the price of each item
sold without bothering to fill up all the available spaces in the particular receipt or invoice, and
without proper regard for any legal repercussion for such neglect. Certainly, it would not hurt
if businessmen and traders would strive to make the receipts and invoices they issue
complete, as far as practicable, in material particulars. These documents are not mere scraps of
paper bereft of probative value but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They
are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.
[34]
(Italics supplied)
Third Issue:
Proof of Guilt
The gut issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of petitioner with regard to the crime of falsification. A determination of this
question will necessarily require an examination of the facts as presented before the
Sandiganbayan.
As a rule, an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises only questions
of law.
[35]
However, this Court, in exceptional cases, has taken cognizance of questions of fact
in order to resolve legal issues. This is especially true in cases in which a palpable error or a
grave misapprehension of facts was committed by the lower court.
[36]
Criminal cases elevated
by public officials from the SBN deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal
cases brought up by ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional presumption of
innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt in both instances. Indeed, in
a criminal case, a persons life or liberty is at stake.
[37]

Petitioner asserts that the SBN erroneously applied the presumption that the possessor of
a forged or falsified document who uses it is the author of the forgery or falsification. The OSG
concurs with her on this point. That is why it recommended that she be acquitted.
We agree. To our mind, the prosecutions evidence is not sufficient to convict. As correctly
observed by the OSG, the Decision of the SBN is based on the assumption that there was only
one set of sales invoices issued by Sanford Hardware. On such a premise, petitioners Exhibit 9
thus becomes obviously falsified when compared with respondents Exhibit D-1. But on the
premise that the two Exhibits are two different Sales Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful.
The OSG is correct in observing as follows:
x x x. For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify the customers copy of Sales
Invoice No. 21568, she/he would have to erase or cover with correction fluid the spaces
pertaining to the name of the customer, date, quantity, unit, description of articles, unit price
and amount, before the insertions could be written. Neither the appealed decision nor the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) point out various tell-tale signs of falsification despite
opportunity of the prosecution to see the original of Exh. 9. The only observation the
respondent Court mentioned was with respect to the date: *t+he superimposition of January
17, 1991 is too apparent to be disregarded, and the alteration of the date has affected both
the veracity and the effects of the said document. But the changing of the date was the
easiest to accomplish. The more cumbersome, as they affect wider space, would [have been]
the name of the customer and the purchases. The total absence of any hint or sign of
alteration on these areas is revealing.
[38]

The only logical explanation for the existence of both Exhibits 9 and D- 1 is that there are
two extant documents. Whether one is the original and the other is falsified depends on the
proof. This the prosecution had to prove, but unfortunately failed to. In all criminal
prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the
burden of proof establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with
the prosecution.
[39]
Further, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove each and every element
of the crime charged in the information.
[40]
We repeat that, in this case, it failed to discharge
this duty. We quote with approval the OSGs disquisition on these two documents as follows:
A comparison between Exh. D-1 and Exh. 9 shows that there are two (2) sets of Sales Invoice
No. 21568. While the form is identical in most respects, there are three (3) telling differences:
(1) the type set of the sales invoice numbers are different, (2) the bottom left of Exh. D-1
indicates the name of the printing press while no such information is indicated anywhere in
Exh. 9, and (3) the bottom right of Exh. D-1 states the BIR permit which does not appear in
Exh. 9. Who could have printed Exh. 9 is anybodys guess. It is possible that petitioner or any
person acting on her behalf had a printing company copy this particular Sanford Hardware
invoice so she could use it to liquidate the PAGCOR funds she received. However, it is equally
possible that Sanford Hardware had printed two (2) sets of the same receipts, one to reflect
the real business transaction, the other one - a sanitized version - for the consumption of the
BIR people. Not one of these possibilities has been actually proven, but neither was their
improbability established.
[41]
(Italics supplied)
Indeed, the OSG points out that there are material differences between Exhibits 9 and D-1.
These include: 1) the discrepancy in the type set or fonts used for the sales invoice numbers
in the two Sales Invoices; 2) the presence of the name of the printing press at the bottom left
corner of Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9; and 3) the presence of the BIR permit in
Exhibit D-1 and its absence in Exhibit 9. It is possible that Exhibit 9 was printed by petitioner or
anyone acting on her behalf to facilitate the liquidation of funds. But it is equally possible, as
the OSG points out, that Sanford Hardware caused the printing of two sets of receipts to serve
its own purposes. However, none of these possibilities was either actually proven or definitely
ruled out by the prosecution. At bottom, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove
that Exhibit 9 was falsified.
The SBN relied on the settled rule that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one
found in possession of -- and who used, took advantage of or profited from -- a forged or
falsified document is the author of the falsification and is therefore guilty of falsification.
To convict petitioner of falsification would mean that the prosecution was able to establish
that Exhibit 9 was a falsified copy of an original document. But the rule itself shows that it
cannot be applied to the present case, because Exhibit 9 (Sales Invoice No 21568) was not
established beyond reasonable doubt to have been forged or falsified. At the very least, it may
be a second document that may or may not have been printed by petitioner herself.
Respondent claims that the original document is Exhibit D-1 but, as adverted to earlier,
Exhibit 9 was not satisfactorily demonstrated to be a copy thereof. In other words, Exhibit 9
being different from Exhibit D-1, the prosecution cannot be deemed to have presented an
original document, of which Exhibit 9 is a falsified copy.
The question is: who made this second document marked Exhibit 9? Petitioner consistently
maintains that Exhibit 9 was issued to her by Sanford Hardware when she purchased the items
mentioned therein. On the other hand, the manager of Sanford Hardware denies having
issued such document. Indeed, it is a time-honored principle
[42]
that greater probative value is
accorded to a positive than to a negative testimony. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by
the OSG:
x x x *Petitioner+ denied the accusation and insisted that she would not sacrifice her name
and reputation for the meager amount involved. She submitted photographs that the lighting
of alleys in Barangay 124 was completed. There was positive testimony by Alfonso Cua, one of
the persons who installed the articles listed in Sales Invoice No. 21568. The prosecution failed
to rebut these.
[43]
(Citations omitted)
One final point. The SBN held that the accused refused to present the original of Exhibit
9, and that it would have been so easy x x x to ask for a subpoena to direct x x x the PAGCOR
to produce the original copy, and yet the accused satisfied herself in presenting Exhibit 9 -- a
mere xerox copy of the supposed document. But, as pointed out by the OSG in its
Memorandum,
[44]
the original of Exhibit 9 was presented in court during the November 5, 1996
hearing after a subpoena duces tecum had been issued to PAGCOR, and Prosecutor Pimentel
confirmed that the x x x xerox copies are faithful reproductions of the original.
[45]

In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt
of the accused.
[46]
Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where
there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may
not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our
policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration
granted as a matter of right.
[47]

Although the evidence for the defense may be frail, criminal conviction must come, not
from its weakness, but from the strength of that for the prosecution.
[48]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution SET
ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE and
DANILO LOZANO, appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano were charged with
Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder in an information which reads:
That on or about the 6
th
of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery
and evident premeditation, availing of nighttime to afford impunity, and with the use of an
explosive, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lob a hand grenade that
landed and eventually exploded at the roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly
shrapnels that hit and killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death certificate, and causing
Jerry Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena
Agbanlog to suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies, per the medical certificates; thus, to the
latter victims, the accused commenced all the acts of execution that would have produced the
crime of Multiple Murder as consequences thereof but nevertheless did not produce them by
reason of the timely and able medical and surgical interventions of physicians, to the damage
and prejudice of the deceaseds heirs and the other victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]

On arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty.
[2]
Trial on the merits then ensued.
As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert
Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,
[3]
Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a
drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father, Barangay Councilman Jaime
Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on
the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son.
[4]

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the
house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the
roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.
[5]

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of
the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio
were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.
[6]
They were all rushed to the San
Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog
died before reaching the hospital.
[7]

Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver
of Robert Agbanlog, certified that the wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the
injuries inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of death was hypovolemic
shock due to hand grenade explosion.
[8]
The surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime
Agbanlog and Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.
[9]

SPO3 John Barraceros of the Lupao Municipal Police Station, who investigated the scene of
the crime, recovered metallic fragments at the terrace of the Agbanlog house. These
fragments were forwarded to the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Division in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, where SPO2 Jesus Q. Mamaril, a specialist in said division, identified them as
shrapnel of an MK2 hand grenade.
[10]

Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre claimed that on the night of
August 6, 1995, he was with his wife and children watching television in the house of his
father, Patricio, and his brother, Rogelio. He denied any participation in the incident and
claimed that he was surprised when three policemen from the Lupao Municipal Police Station
went to his house the following morning of August 7, 1995 and asked him to go with them to
the police station, where he has been detained since.
[11]

Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testified that he is the brother of Antonio
Comadre and the brother-in-law of Danilo Lozano. He also denied any involvement in the
grenade-throwing incident, claiming that he was at home when it happened. He stated that he
is a friend of Rey Camat and Jimmy Wabe, and that he had no animosity towards them
whatsoever. Appellant also claimed to be in good terms with the Agbanlogs so he has no
reason to cause them any grief.
[12]

Appellant Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the crime. He declared that he
was at home with his ten year-old son on the night of August 6, 1995. He added that he did
not see Antonio and George Comadre that night and has not seen them for quite sometime,
either before or after the incident. Like the two other appellants, Lozano denied having any
misunderstanding with Jaime Agbanlog, Robert Agbanlog and Jimmy Wabe.
[13]

Antonios father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his claim that he was at home
watching television with them during the night in question.
[14]
Josie Comadre, Georges wife,
testified that her husband could not have been among those who threw a hand grenade at the
house of the Agbanlogs because on the evening of August 6, 1995, they were resting inside
their house after working all day in the farm.
[15]

After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecutions evidence and convicted
appellants of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder,
[16]
the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted
Murder and sentencing them to suffer the imposable penalty of death;
2. Ordering Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of Robert Agbanlog P50,000.00 as indemnification for his death,
P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages;
3. Ordering accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay
jointly and severally Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Gerry Bullanday and Jaime Agbanlog
P30,000.00 as indemnity for their attempted murder.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Appellants contend that the trial court erred: (1) when it did not correctly and
judiciously interpret and appreciate the evidence and thus, the miscarriage of justice was
obviously omnipresent; (2) when it imposed on the accused-appellants the supreme penalty of
death despite the evident lack of the quantum of evidence to convict them of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) when it did not apply the law and jurisprudence for
the acquittal of the accused-appellants of the crime charged.
[17]

Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn statements of Jimmy Wabe, Rey
Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday in identifying the perpetrators. Wabe, Camat
and Eugenio initially executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 7, 1995 at the hospital
wherein they did not categorically state who the culprit was but merely named Antonio
Comadre as a suspect. Gerry Bullanday declared that he suspected Antonio Comadre as one
of the culprits because he saw the latters ten year-old son bring something in the nearby
store before the explosion occurred.
On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police station to give a more
detailed account of the incident, this time identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator
together with George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.
A closer scrutiny of the records shows that no contradiction actually exists, as all sworn
statements pointed to the same perpetrators, namely, Antonio Comadre, George Comadre
and Danilo Lozano. Moreover, it appears that the first statement was executed a day after the
incident, when Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were still in the hospital for the
injuries they sustained. Coherence could not thus be expected in view of their condition. It is
therefore not surprising for the witnesses to come up with a more exhaustive account of the
incident after they have regained their equanimity. The lapse of twenty days between the two
statements is immaterial because said period even helped them recall some facts which they
may have initially overlooked.
Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the harrowing event which
unfolded before their eyes. Minor discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they
do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should they
reflect adversely on the witness credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was
perjured.
[18]
Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather
than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case,
the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the senses.
[19]

Moreover, it was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and
Gerry Bullanday had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. Absent evidence showing
any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.
The trial court is likewise correct in disregarding appellants defense of alibi and denial. For
the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
[20]

Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of Jaime
Agbanlogs residence, appellants were unable to give any explanation and neither were they
able to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime. Hence,
the positive identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog,
Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and denial.
[21]

It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio
Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the
house and the moon was bright.
[22]

Appellants argument that Judge Bayani V. Vargas, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose City, Branch 38 erred in rendering the decision because he was not the judge
who heard and tried the case is not well taken.
It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record
for the trial judge might have died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth.
[23]
As far back
as the case of Co Tao v. Court of Appeals
[24]
we have held: The fact that the judge who heard
the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did
not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but
merely relied on the records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous. This rule
had been followed for quite a long time, and there is no reason to go against the principle
now.
[25]

However, the trial courts finding of conspiracy will have to be reassessed. The undisputed
facts show that when Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of
encouragement or performed any act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere
presence of George Comadre and Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense of
security to Antonio Comadre, thus proving the existence of conspiracy.
We disagree.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of
actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required.
[26]

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a
person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship.
[27]

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere
presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in
furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving
moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that their presence
provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid of any factual
basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid
basis of a finding of conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free
ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man
for a crime he did not commit.
[28]
There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must
answer for the crime.
Coming now to Antonios liability, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that treachery
attended the commission of the crime. For treachery to be appreciated two conditions must
concur: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form of
execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the
adoption of ways to minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the
offended party.
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting
victims were having a drinking spree. The suddenness of the attack coupled with the
instantaneous combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not afford the
victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring the
execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery therefore
attended the commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the use of
an explosive
[29]
as an aggravating circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can
qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
[30]
we should
determine which of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall
be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence
[31]
support this view
but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this
attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be
relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.
[32]

Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8294
[33]
which also
considers the use of explosives as an aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the
necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said amendatory law vis--vis the
qualifying circumstance of by means of explosion under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be applied in the
instant case.
R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed under
the old illegal possession of firearms law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the tumultuous
years of the Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was enacted, not to decriminalize illegal
possession of firearms and explosives, but to lower their penalties in order to rationalize them
into more acceptable and realistic levels.
[34]

This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the corresponding
penalties for illegal possession of firearms, or ammunitions and other related crimes under the
amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for unlawful possession of
explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives are used to
commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death of a person,
the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as an
aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294
now reads:
Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Explosives. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s),
rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not limited to pillbox, molotov cocktail
bombs, fire bombs, or other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on
contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special law
with the use of the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devises,
which results in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives, detonation
agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (shall be
punished with the penalty of death is DELETED.)
x x x x x x x x x.
With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the term xxx as an
aggravating circumstance, the unmistakable import is to downgrade the penalty for illegal
possession of explosives and consider its use merely as an aggravating circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty for illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Also, Congress clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as
aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of firearms and
explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal
Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder
under Article 248, but merely made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when
resorted to in committing any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code. The
legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make
such use merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined
in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives
as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like
the aggravating circumstance of explosion in paragraph 12, evident premeditation in
paragraph 13, or treachery in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance
added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.
Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made
applicable in this case. Before the use of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established that the
possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or
permit to possess. This follows the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm
[35]
which is a kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as
amended. This proof does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the
information, but no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by
appellant of the explosive was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is borne out by the provisions
of the law itself, in conjunction with the pertinent tenets of legal hermeneutics.
A reading of the title
[36]
of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the qualifier illegal/unlawful
...possession is followed by of firearms, ammunition, or explosives or instruments...
Although the term ammunition is separated from explosives by the disjunctive word or, it
does not mean that explosives are no longer included in the items which can be
illegally/unlawfully possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word or is not used to
separate but to signify a succession or to conjoin the enumerated items
together.
[37]
Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294,
[38]
subtitled: Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture,
Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives, clearly refers to
the unlawful manufacture, sale, or possession of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the acts lack of authority. Thus, when the second paragraph
of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as amended by RA No. 8294 speaks of the use of the
aforementioned explosives, etc. as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of crimes,
it refers to those explosives, etc. unlawfully manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired,
disposed or possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the same section. What is per
se aggravating is the use of unlawfully manufactured or possessed explosives. The mere
use of explosives is not.
The information in this case does not allege that appellant Antonio Comadre had
unlawfully possessed or that he had no authority to possess the grenade that he used in the
killing and attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure requires the averment of aggravating circumstances for their application.
[39]

The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the crime committed is
Murder committed by means of explosion in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code. The same, having been alleged in the Information, may be properly considered as
appellant was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
[40]

The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple
attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows
the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective
of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with
single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by
different acts and several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a
cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses
should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed
because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser
degree of perversity.
[41]

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case.
[42]
Applying the aforesaid provision
of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court,
therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
Three justices of the Court, however, continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A.
7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert Agbanlog civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00, P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence
[43]
the award of civil indemnity is
proper. However, the actual damages awarded to the heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be
modified, considering that the prosecution was able to substantiate only the amount of
P18,000.00 as funeral expenses.
[44]

The award of moral damages is appropriate there being evidence to show emotional
suffering on the part of the heirs of the deceased, but the same must be increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing judicial policy.
[45]

With respect to the surviving victims Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry
Bullanday, the trial court awarded P30,000.00 each for the injuries they sustained. We find this
award inappropriate because they were not able to present a single receipt to substantiate
their claims. Nonetheless, since it appears that they are entitled to actual damages although
the amount thereof cannot be determined, they should be awarded temperate damages of
P25,000.00 each.
[46]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court
of San Jose City, Branch 39 in Criminal Case No. L-16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant
Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted
Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P18,000.00 as actual damages and likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, Jaime
Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, P25,000.00 each as temperate
damages for the injuries they sustained. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano are
ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered
immediately RELEASED from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another
cause. Costs de oficio.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
_________________________________________________________________________---

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131588. March 27, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLENN DE LOS SANTOS, accused-
appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City,
reported over print and broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) who were undergoing an endurance run as part of the
Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training. Not much effort was spared for the
search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos
(hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to local authorities. GLENN was then charged
with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and Multiple Attempted
Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. The
information reads as follows:
That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within Barangay
Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking advantage of his driven motor
vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from behind in a sudden and unexpected manner
with the use of said vehicle members of the Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a
Special Training Course (Scout Class 07-95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants,
performing an Endurance Run of 35 kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, heading to Regional Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City,
running in a column of 3, with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to
another, thus forming a [sic] three lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st
man to the last man, unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved his
driven vehicle on the direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in spite of the continuous
warning signals made by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda
Sacro, Lemuel Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito
Buyser Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously
waving their hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to the
City proper, from a distance of 100 meters away from the joggers rear portion, but which
accused failed and refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven vehicle (an
Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus forcing the rear guard[s] to throw
themselves to [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting, bumping, or ramming the first
four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the windshields of said Isuzu Elf,
breaking said windshield, and upon being aware that bodies of the victims flew on the
windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his brake, continued to travel on a high
speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting the succeeding joggers on said 1st line,
as a result thereof the following were killed on the spot:
1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco
2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas
3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren
4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez
5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo
6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito
While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident, while
the following eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the accused thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a
consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause other than said
accuseds spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered
on the following victims which prevented their death, to wit:
1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo
2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit
3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala
4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo
5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glabe Polboroza
6. Arman Neri Hernaiz
While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:
1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera
2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano
3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang
4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion
5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro
after which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the
victims afore-enumerated helpless.
Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation
Unit Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September 1995
and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last phase of the training was the endurance run
from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run on 5 October 1995 started at
2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns: the first and second of which
had 22 trainees each, and the third had 21. The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black
short pants, and green and black combat shoes. At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle
tailed the jogging trainees. When they reached Alae, the driver of the Hummer vehicle was
instructed to dispatch advanced security at strategic locations in Carmen Hill. Since the jogging
trainees were occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear security guards were assigned
to each rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give
hand signals for other vehicles to take the left lane.
[1]

Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were
assigned as rear guards of the first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum Highway,
Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed them, all of which slowed down and
took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so.
[2]

While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high
speed towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters,
the rear security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the
road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals and coming closer
and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear guards told their co-
trainees to retract. The guards forthwith jumped in different directions. Lemuel and
Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by the said vehicle, falling like dominoes one after the
other. Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle. The driver did not reduce
his speed even after hitting the first and second columns. The guards then stopped oncoming
vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit again.
[3]

The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel, conducted
an ocular inspection of the place where the incident happened. They then proceeded to
inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City Prosecutor manifested, thus:
The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which [was]
involved in the October 5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light blue with strips
painting along the side colored orange and yellow as well as in front. We further manifest that
the windshield was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the front just below the windshield
was heavily dented as a consequence of the impact. The lower portion was likewise damaged
more particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said vehicle was likewise heavily
damaged in fact there is a cut of the plastic used as a bumper; that the right side of the
headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front signal light, right side was likewise
damaged. The side mirror was likewise totally damaged. The height of the truck from the
ground to the lower portion of the windshield is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on the front
level is 5 ft.
[4]

PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at Precinct
6, Cagayan de Oro City, and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several members of the PNP
came to their station and reported that they had been bumped by a certain
vehicle. Immediately after receiving the report, he and two other policemen proceeded to the
traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of the hit-
and-run vehicle remained on the highway. They did not see any brake marks on the highway,
which led him to conclude that the brakes of the vehicle had not been applied. The policemen
measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft. long.
[5]

GLENNs version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:
At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and the
latters fellow band members to provide them with transportation, if possible an Isuzu
Forward, that would bring their band instruments, band utilities and band members from
Macasandig and Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there, they were supposed
to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-sponsored Sabado
Nights of the Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth time that Enting
had asked such a favor from him.
[6]
Since the arrangement was to fetch Galindez and his group
at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN immediately went to Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to
get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he proceeded back to his house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro
City, and told his wife that he would go to Bukidnon to get his aunts Isuzu Forward truck
because the twenty band members and nine utilities and band instruments could not be
accommodated in the Isuzu Elf truck. Three of his friends asked to go along, namely, Roldan
Paltonag, Andot Pea, and a certain Akut.
[7]

After leaving GLENNs house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza
Restaurant. GLENN saw his kumpare Danilo Cosin and the latters wife, and joined them at
the table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale pilsen beer. When the Cosin spouses left,
GLENN joined his travelling companions at their table. The group left at 12:00 midnight for
Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional rains. It took them
sometime looking for the Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the truck in Agusan
Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had mechanical problems. Hence,
GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that they would use the Isuzu
Elf truck instead.
[8]

GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no
moon or star; neither were there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his companions
used the national highway, traversing the right lane going to Cagayan de Oro City. At the
vicinity of Mambatangan junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left curve going slightly
downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the opposite direction of
the national highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for the other driver to switch
his headlights from bright to dim. GLENN switched his own lights from bright to dim and
reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour. It was only when the vehicles were at a
distance of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the other cars headlights were switched
from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it extremely hard to adjust from high brightness
to sudden darkness.
[9]

It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after
passing the oncoming vehicle, that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. At the
sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his right foot on the brake pedal. But the impact
was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. He was trembling and could not see what
were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to pump the brake,
nor did he notice that his foot was pushing the pedal. He returned to his senses only when
one of his companions woke up and said to him: Gard, it seems we bumped on
something. Just relax, we might all die. Due to its momentum, the Elf continued on its track
and was able to stop only when it was already very near the next curve.
[10]

GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right
headlights of the truck had been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his confusion and
fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN did not report the incident to the Puerto Police
Station because he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was only when he reached his
house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken; the side mirror and round mirror,
missing; and the windshield, splintered. Two hours later, he heard on Bombo Radyo that an
accident had occurred, and he realized that it was the PNP group that he had hit. GLENN
surrendered that same day to Governor Emano.
[11]

The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-ASA
Office, Cagayan de Oro City. The former testified that when he went to GLENNs house at
about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was heavy rain; and at 12:00 midnight, the rain was
moderate. He corroborated GLENNs testimony that he (Crescente) went to GLENNs house
that evening in order to hire a truck that would bring the band instruments, band utilities and
band members from Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin for the Lanzones Festival.
[12]
Almazan, on the
other hand, testified that based on an observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan
de Oro City, there was rain from 8:00 p.m. of October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the
sky was overcast from 11:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995. What she
meant by overcast is that there was no break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and stars
could not be seen.
[13]

The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100
meters away from the place where the incident occurred. He testified that he was awakened
on that fateful night by a series of loud thuds. Thereafter, a man came to his house and asked
for a glass of water, claiming to have been hit by a vehicle. Danilo further stated that the
weather at the time was fair, and that the soil was dry and not muddy.
[14]

In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of
multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of
motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death
and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount of P30,000; and each of the
victims of attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.
Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in
finding that he caused the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the rear guards
waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that he caused the truck to run even faster
after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still have avoided the accident
from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and glaring light from the oncoming vehicle.
In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that the accused out of mischief and dare-
devilness [sic], in the exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three bottles
of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the rear guard[s] and see them scamper away as they
saw him and his vehicle coming at them to ram them down.
[15]

Likewise, the OSG posits that the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging
trainees was probably brought by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3) bottles of
beer earlier before the incident.
[16]

Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., the possibility
that [GLENN] could have fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30 in the
early morning, and thus was not able to stop his Isuzu Elf truck when the bumping thuds were
occurring in rapid succession; and after he was able to wake up upon hearing the shout of his
companions, it was already too late, as the bumping thuds had already occurred.
[17]

Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more
scrupulous in weighing the evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial courts finding that
GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent to kill was wanting. In
the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional felony. All
reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent, should be
indulged.
[18]

From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event
was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENNs part.
First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the
incident was very dark, as there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASAs observed
weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50 kilometers, at
the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was absolutely no break in the
thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there was no way for the moon and
stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that illuminated the highway.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black
short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on that
dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor flashlights
in giving hand signals.
Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other
hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENNs vehicle
was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as GLENNs truck such that their
backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.
Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENNs testimony that he had
been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle at the
opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling from the
blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into the group of
police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one to stop or swerve to a safe place
the moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the
same; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable for
GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young children
who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with his truck.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and hit the
jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds, he
continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the absence of
brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene.
For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENNs vehicle to the
confluence of the following factors:
1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were
applied the truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum,
albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.
2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of fine
and smooth asphalt, free from obstructions on the road such as potholes or
excavations. Moreover, the highway was going a little bit downward, more
particularly from the first curve to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier and
faster to traverse a distance of 20 to 25 meters which was the approximate
aggregate distance from the first elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the
columns.
3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms only)
could hardly make an impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was moving at a
speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers per hour.
4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and
the under chassis was elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying flat
on the ground without its rubber tires running over the bodies. Thus, GLENN would
not notice any destabilization of the rubber tires.
5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was
proceeding, the forward movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum
of the forward-moving truck such that there was even much lesser force resisting
the said ongoing momentum.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more
explanations -- one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the accused,
and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -- the Court should adopt the
explanation which is more favorable to the accused.
[19]

We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons
killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant to
note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the police
trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the
assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining which of
two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be true.
[20]
Thus, in People v.
Godinez,
[21]
this Court said that the existence of a motive on the part of the accused becomes
decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that the shooting was purely
accidental.
Neither is there any showing of a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police
elements disguised in a vehicular accident.
[22]
Even if there be such evidence, i.e., that the
motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be convicted
because if such were the case, the proper charge would be rebellion, and not murder.
[23]

GLENNs offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to a
safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many
trainees would have been spared.
We have once said:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no
one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person,
rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of
danger and injury.
[24]

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as
a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on
the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.
[25]

GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to
do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1)
his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical condition; and (3)
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have
known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first
bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place of
the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with the
conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his brakes, or
turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there being no
evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly probable that he
was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within the speed limits, this
did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing circumstances and conditions
at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result
of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious
physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through
negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as acts or omissions punishable by
law committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
[26]
In Reodica v. Court of
Appeals,
[27]
we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave
or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,
[28]
the
accused was convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the
complex crime of homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence, and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the
two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,
[29]
the accused
was convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide with damage to property through
reckless imprudence for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to death its
twenty-eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless
imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate
offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated
murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing
appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to
quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.
[30]
Under
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have constituted a light felony, the
penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last paragraph thereof
provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon the offender who fails
to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his hand to give. This failure
to render assistance to the victim, therefore, constitutes a qualifying circumstance because
the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree.
[31]
Moreover, the fifth paragraph
thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty, the court shall exercise its sound
discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies
through imprudence or negligence, modifying circumstances need not be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.
[32]

In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that
GLENN escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims. It being crystal
clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for under Article 365
shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the penalty would be prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Applying Article 48,
the maximum of said penalty, which is prision mayor in its medium period, should be
imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries,
GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for each count, the penalty ofarresto mayor in its
minimum period.
Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel
Pangca
[33]
and of GLENN that the latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis Oriental,
such mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the aforestated fifth
paragraph of Article 365.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which could properly be
imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render assistance to the victims, he may be
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayorin its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries, since the maximum term for each count is only two months the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.
As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the
same. Conformably with current jurisprudence,
[34]
we reduce the trial courts award of death
indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of heirs of the trainees killed. Likewise, for
lack of factual basis, we delete the awards of P30,000 to each of those who suffered serious
physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is
hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE
LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries,
and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to
the penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity
for each group of heirs of the trainees killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor
of the other victims are deleted. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., abroad on official business.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137383-84. November 23, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO VELASQUEZ y
OCAMPO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court of xxx dated February
11, 1998 convicting Reynaldo Velasquez y Ocampo of two counts of rape.
The accused, Reynaldo Velasquez y Ocampo (VELASQUEZ) was charged with the crimes of
rape and forcible abduction with rape in two informations which read as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 97-0035:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1997, in xxx and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one AAA, who
is 15 years of age, against her will and consent.
In Criminal Case No. 97-0036:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1997, in xxx and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, for the purpose of having
carnal knowledge with AAA, a fifteen (15) year old minor, by the use of force and intimidation,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design forcibly abduct the said complainant and
have sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will and consent.
On February 20, 1997, VELASQUEZ was arraigned and with assistance of counsel entered a
plea of not guilty to both crimes charged.
[2]
Thereafter, joint trial ensued.
The prosecution through the Office of the Solicitor General posits the following version of
the facts as testified to by the main prosecution witnesses, AAA:
AAA, born on September 11, 1981, resides at xxx.
On January 1, 1997, around 6:00 in the morning, while walking home in xxx, AAA was
approached by Reynaldo Velasquez, who asked her where she was going.
At that point, AAA saw Reynaldo carry a gun. The latter then poked the gun at the right ribs
of AAA and thereafter held her arms.
Reynaldo called a taxi on which the two boarded. The taxi went towards xxx. They then
proceeded to xxx, where Reynaldos grandmothers house is located. AAAwas unable to say
anything or shout inside the taxi, out of fear.
Inside the house, Reynaldo talked to AAA and told her that she could not do
anything. AAA however warned Reynaldo that he would be jailed. Reynaldo instead answered
that it would never happen and that he would not let her go home.
AAA then stood up but Reynaldo pulled her dress and forced her to sit down. Reynaldo
warned AAA that if she attempted to move, he would then harm her and kill her.
Reynaldo started to pull down AAA and made her lie on the floor. He removed her underwear,
including her panty. AAA at this point could not move because Reynaldo pointed the gun at
her.
Reynaldo covered the face of AAA with the use of a pillow and then sexually molested
her. AAA felt pain when Reynaldo inserted his penis inside her vagina while making a pumping
movement. This happened at around 8:00 in the morning of the same day.
After the sexual molestation, AAA was ordered to dress up. She was told not to make any
move while Reynaldo took his breakfast.
While Reynaldo was taking his meal, AAA pleaded to his uncle who was inside the house and
drunk that she was not related to Reynaldo and she must go home. Unfortunately, said uncle
could not understand her.
Reynaldo suddenly stood up and threatened AAA not to tell anybody what happened. He
asked AAA to simply do what he wanted, to fix herself and to comb her hair.
While combing her hair, AAA saw a small screwdriver on the table. She hid said object in her
pocket.
AAA and Reynaldo stayed at the second floor of the house of the latters grandmother until
late in the morning.
Around 11:00 in the morning, AAA told Reynaldo that she wanted to go home. They then
went downstairs and proceeded inside a room. Reynaldo asked AAA to lie down. Again,
Reynaldo sexually assaulted his victim, and inserted his penis inside AAAs vagina.
While Reynaldo was sexually molesting AAA, the latter pulled out the screwdriver and stabbed
him on the neck. This retaliatory move of AAA angered Reynaldo who then held her hands
and boxed her.
AAA became very frightened. She seated herself in a corner, fearing that Reynaldo might hit
her again.
At this moment, Reynaldos grandmother, probably noticing the commotion, shouted at the
two. AAA then begged Reynaldo to allow her to go home.
AAA and Reynaldo went out of the room at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same
date. They sat at the front of the house. AAA continuously begged Reynaldo to allow her to go
home, but the latter still refused to do so. Thereafter, Reynaldo bought a softdrink.
At this point, AAA walked away from the house, going towards the squatters area thereat.
Reynaldo followed her and shouted at her.
After overtaking AAA, Reynaldo pulled the latters clothes and boxed her again. They then
went back to the house. AAA could not resist her aggressor who was continuously hurting her.
Inside the house, Reynaldo, while holding the gun, told AAA that he would like to kill a
person. AAA, however, discovered that said weapon was merely a short toy pellet gun.
AAA continued to plea to Reynaldo and asked him if she could call her parents. Reynaldo
refused, fearing that AAA might tell her parents what had happened.
AAA, however, was able to convince Reynaldo that she had previously called her parents
informing them that she was at a friends house, and that she would again call her parents just
to tell them that she would soon be home.
Reynaldo believed AAA and went inside his grandmothers room to get money for the phone
call.
Once her sexual predator was inside the room, AAA immediately ran towards a neighbors
house. She saw a man and told him what Reynaldo did to her. She then begged for help.
The man called BB, a barangay tanod of xxx. Castro sought the assistance of his companions
and proceeded to the place.
When Castros group arrived in the area, the people thereat informed them that there was a
woman hiding under the table in one of the houses. They then brought said woman (AAA) to
the barangay headquarters.
AAA informed the tanods that Reynaldo had sexually molested her, and that the latters gun
was merely a toy.
The tanods went back to the place and looked for Reynaldo. At first, the latters grandmother
denied the presence of her grandson. However, after being convinced that it would instead
help Reynaldo if he surrenders, the latter voluntarily surrendered to the barangay tanods.
On January 2, 1997, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, Dr. Alvin David, a Medico-Legal Officer II
of the National Bureau of (Investigation), examined AAA and found a healed laceration in the
hymen of the victim.
[3]

On the other hand, VELASQUEZ vehemently denies that he raped AAA and alleges his own
version of the events which transpired as testified to by the defense witnesses as follows:
Accused REYNALDO VELASQUEZ testified that on January 1, 1997, he
met AAA in xxx. AAA asked him where he will go. When told that he is going to
his lola, AAAasked if she could go with him. They took 4 rides. First, they boarded a jeep, then
a bus then another jeep, and last, a tricycle. When they arrived at the house of hislola in xxx,
his lola and uncle Tony were there. He and AAA ate breakfast while his uncle entertained
them. After breakfast, they went outside the house and talked with the neighbors until 3:00
oclock p.m., afterwhich, they went back to the house. At around past 10:00 oclock in the
evening, AAA asked if she can call her mother. She also told him that they have to go
home. He then asked money from his lola. When they were about to board a tricycle, he
told AAA to wait for a while because he forgot to bring his toy gun. When he went outside
after taking the gun, however, AAA was already gone.
Marilyn Puntay testified that she rents a room on the ground floor of the house of accused
grandmother. In the morning of January 1, 1997, she saw accused and AAAalighting from a
tricycle. She also saw the two ate breakfast while Tony entertained them. She also
saw AAA and accused entered a vacant room adjacent to hers. Only plywood and cartoons
divide the rooms. She heard the two talking and at times laughing aloud. The door of the
room occupied by the two wasclosed, however, it is not locked.
On cross-examination, she said she saw accused and AAA alighted from a tricycle and not from
a taxi.
[4]

On February 11, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision finding the accused VELASQUEZ guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape; the dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused REYNALDO VELASQUEZ y OCAMPO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of Rape as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-0035 and 97-
0036. Accordingly, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for
each case.
The accused is ordered to pay the victim AAA the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000) as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
[5]

Hence this appeal where VELASQUEZ ascribes the following errors to the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH IS NOT EVEN SUPPORTED BY THE RESULT OF HER MEDICAL
EXAMINATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE.
[6]

In support of his appeal, VELASQUEZ attacks the credibility of the victim, AAA, and claims
that her testimony is not worthy of belief for being inconsistent and contrary to human nature
and experience. VELASQUEZ points out several allegations made by AAA in her testimony
which taint her credibility. First, AAA stated that she was boxed twice by VELASQUEZ yet no
evidence was presented to show that AAA suffered any bruise, contusion or injury as a
result therefrom. Second, AAA contradicted herself when she claimed that VELASQUEZs uncle
did not understand her when she told him that VELASQUEZ raped her as he was apparently
drunk yet on cross-examination she stated that the latter just laughed and said that she and
VELASQUEZ were already a couple. Third, it is unbelievable that AAA did not have any
opportunity to shout or cry for help considering that she had all the opportunity to do so when
she allegedly stabbed VELASQUEZ on the neck with a screwdriver. Had she shouted, she would
have caught the attention of other people inside the house. Her failure to do so is precisely
why VELASQUEZs uncle laughed and did not believe her claim that she was raped since she
was not acting in a manner, which was reflective of the truth. Finally, defense witness
MarilynPuntays testimony to the effect that she saw AAA and VELASQUEZ alight from a
tricycle corroborates VELASQUEZs testimony that AAA voluntarily accompanied him to his
grandmothers house and contradicts AAAs claim that she was forced into a taxi. Given the
weakness of her testimony, it is VELASQUEZs position that the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that the charges against him were fabricated. He should consequently be acquitted of
the crimes charged.
After a careful review of the case, we resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction.
VELASQUEZs defense consists only of a denial of AAAs accusation against him. He claims
that he did not forcibly take AAA to his grandmothers house in xxx but that she voluntarily
accompanied him there. He also denies that he sexually assaulted and raped her.
VELASQUEZs denial and his attempt at discrediting the testimony of the
complainant, AAA, do not persuade us.
Time and again this Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless the court a quo overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances, which if considered, would materially affect the result of
the case.
[7]
The evaluation or assessment made by the trial court acquires greater significance
in rape cases because from the nature of the offense the only evidence that can oftentimes be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony.
[8]

After a careful review of AAAs testimony, we find no cogent and legal basis to disturb the
trial courts finding upholding the credibility of the complainant AAA who remained steadfast
on her assertions and unfaltering in her testimony on the unfortunate incident. In her
testimony, AAA positively identified the accused VELASQUEZ as her assailant and narrated the
manner by which she was abducted and twice raped by VELASQUEZ as follows:
PROS. MANGROBANG:
Q: Madam Witness, at about six oclock in the morning of January 1, 1997, do you
remember where were you?
A: Yes, I was at xxx, sir.
Q: Where is this xxx located?
A: xxx.
Q: What were you doing then?
A: I was about to go home, sir.
Q: When you were about to go home during that particular date and time, do you
remember of any unusual incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was the usual incident?
A: That person called me. He is Reynaldo Velasquez. He approached me and called my
name.
Q: After approaching you, what did he tell you?
A: He asked where I was going.
Q: After asking where you were going, what happened next, if any?
A: I saw his toy gun. At that time I did not know that it was a toy gun. I only came to know
later that it was a toy gun.
Q: What did he do with the toy gun?
A: He poked the gun at me. Here at my right rib and he held my arms.
Q: After Reynaldo Velasquez poked his gun at you and he held your arms, what did he do
next?
A: He called for a taxi and then we boarded the taxi.
Q: After you were brought inside the taxi, where did you go, if any?
A: We proceeded to the direction of Alabang. I am not familiar with that place.
Q: By the way, what did you do when you were brought inside the taxi?
A: I could not do anything because I was afraid. I could not shout because I was afraid.
Q: What happened next after you and Reynaldo Velasquez boarded the taxi?
A: We proceeded to his lolas residence.
Q: Do you know where is this located?
A: I do not know the place, sir. Somewhere at xxx
Q: Is this a subdivision?
A: Yes, xxx Subdivision, sir.
Q: Here in xxx?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After you were brought by Reynaldo Velasquez to the house of his grandmother
at xxx Subdivision, what happened next?
A: I was inside the house and he was talking with me.
Q: What did he tell you inside the house?
A: He told me that I could not do anything if he would force me.
Q: What was your reaction?
A: I just cried and told him you will be imprisoned, but he told me he will not be jailed.
Q: What else happened after that?
A: According to him he will not allow me to go home.
Q: After he did not allow you to go home, what did you do next?
A: I was frightened and I stood up.
Q: Were there other persons inside the house at that very moment?
A: His uncle, sir. I noticed that he was drunk and he was not aware of what was
happening.
Q: What else happened after that?
A: I stood up but he pulled my dress and I was made to sit down. Then, he told me, if I am
going to leave the house, he would harm me.
Q: What did you do when he threatened to harm you if you leave the house?
A: He told me I will not be able to go home alive. So I just stayed because I was afraid.
Q: What did he do next, if any?
A: He pulled me and then made me lie on the floor, sir.
Q: After he made you lie on the floor, what did he do next?
A: He removed my underwear including my panty, sir.
Q: How about you, what did you do when he removed your panty?
A: I could not move because I was afraid he might fire the gun that he pointed at me.
Q: What did you do when he removed your panty?
A: He covered my face with a pillow, sir.
Q: What did you feel when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: I felt pain, sir.
Q: What did the accused do after he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: He made an up and down movements, sir. (Witness is crying)
Q: What happened after that?
A: I dressed up and he told me not to move.
Q: What did you do when he told you not to move?
A: I remained seated and then he took his breakfast.
Q: By the way, you said a while ago that his uncle was present and appeared to be drunk,
where was his uncle then when the accused inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: He was lying in the living room, sir. There was a curtain in between the place where we
were and the living room where the uncle was. So, he was not able to see us.
Q: And what did you do when this person was having a breakfast?
A: I was pleading to his uncle. I told him he is not my relative and he should allow me now
to go home. He did not understand me.
Q: When did you first meet the accused?
A: In a party sir.
Q: When was that?
A: I do not remember, sir.
Q: In other words, that incident of January 1 was the second time you met and saw the
accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After you pleaded to the accused that you be allowed to go home, do you remember
what happened next?
A: I was pleading to the uncle but he could not understand. Then he suddenly stood up
and I was told not to tell anything to anybody.
Q: Who told you that?
A: Reynaldo Velasquez, sir.
Q: After Reynaldo Velasquez asked you to just stay and say yes to all what he is going to
say to you, what did you do next, if any?
A: He told me to fix my self and he would bring me home.
Q: What did you do after telling you to fix yourself and bring you home?
A: I fixed myself and my hair and after placing the comb to (sic) the table near the mirror, I
saw a screw driver which is just small and I hide it in my pocket.
Q: Do you remember what time did this person sexually abused you?
A: 8 oclock in the morning, sir.
Q: Until what time did you stay at the said house if you remember?
A: About 7 in the evening, sir.
Q: So, you stayed in that house from 8 a.m. to 7 p.m.?
A: We stayed upstairs up to noontime. I think about 11:00. After I told him that we would
go home, we went downstairs. He told me to stay there for a while and then bring me
home.
Q: When you went downstairs, was there anything unusual that happened?
A: There was, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: He used me again.
Q: When you say ginamit niya ako muli, what do you mean?
A: He inserted his penis again into my vagina, sir.
Q: How did he do that? How did he insert his penis into your vagina?
A: He made me lie down and inserted his penis into my vagina and as he was in the act of
doing the up and down movements on top of my body, I slowly got the screw driver
from my pocket and I stabbed his neck. I stabbed him on the neck with the screw
driver.
Q: What did Reynaldo Velasquez do after you stabbed him on the neck?
A: He held my hands and boxed me, sir.
Q: What happened next after he boxed you?
A: I just seated myself down because I was afraid he may box me again. Then his
grandmother was shouting at us. I asked him to allow me to go home. So, we went out
of the room.
Q: What time was that when you and Reynaldo Velasquez went out of the room?
A: About 5 oclock in the evening, sir.
Q: And after you went outside the room, what did you do next, if any?
A: We stayed in front of the house of his grandmother. We did not go home. Then he
bought coke.
Q: After Reynaldo Velasquez bought a coke, what happened?
A: I was sitting, pleading to him that he would bring me home but he did not agree, sir.
Q: What did you do next after he refused you to go home?
A: I just walked towards outside the squatters area, he followed and shouted at me, sir.
Q: What did he do to you after shouting at you?
A: He pulled me and boxed me again.
Q: What else happened after that?
A: We returned to the house of his lola because he was hurting me.
Q: After bringing you back to the house where he sexually abused you, what happened
next?
A: He told me that he wanted to kill a person.
Q: You said a while ago that Reynaldo poked a gun at you will you describe what kind of
gun is this?
A: I came to know later that it is just a pellet gun, sir.
Q: Is this a long firearm, or a short firearm?
A: Short, sir.
Q: You said you stayed in the house of Reynaldos lola until 7 oclock in the evening, what
happened after 7 oclock?
A: I told him that we have to look for a pay phone outside.
Q: Did he allow you to look for a pay phone?
A: No, he did not allow me. He told me, I might be telling my parents something against
him.
Q: What happened when he did not allow you to call your parents at home?
A: I just fabricated a story that I have already called up my parents at home and that I told
my parents that I am in the house of a friend and will be coming back home.
Q: After you made such story, did Reynaldo allow you to go home?
A: Yes, he got money (barya) from the room of his lola. He went alone inside because I
would not enter the room of his lola.
Q: Where did you call?
A: I was not able to call up through the phone. While in the room of his lola getting
money, I ran away towards their neighbors.
Q: What happened next after you ran towards their neighbors?
A: I saw a man who asked me what happened and I told him what Reynaldo did to me. So,
that man told me to report the matter to the barangay. I asked his help and he called
the Barangay Tanod.
Q: Do you know the name of this person who called the barangay tanod?
A: I do not know because he is just a neighbor of the lola of Reynaldo?
Q: What happened after the neighbor of the lola of Reynaldo called the barangay tanod?
A: A barangay tanod accompanied me to their headquarters in the barangay sir.
Q: How about Reynaldo, what happened to him?
A: The barangay tanods told me that they will look for him and I told them that he has a
gun with pellets. I told them that the gun is not really a gun but a toy gun so that they
will not hesitate to apprehend him, sir.
Q: What did the barangay tanods do to the person of Reynaldo Velasquez, if you know?
A: They jailed him and then my mother fetched me.
Q: If you see this Reynaldo Velasquez again, would you be able to recognize him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you please look around the courtroom and see if he is around?
A: Yes, that person sitting there. (Witness pointing to a person who identified himself as
Reynaldo Velasquez upon being asked by the official interpreter of the Court, Ms. Nene
Javier),
[9]

The mere fact that AAA did not attempt to escape when the opportunity presented itself
should not be construed as a manifestation of consent and does not necessarily negate her
charge of rape or taint her credibility considering that VELASQUEZ employed force and
intimidation in the sexual assault. AAA attempted to resist by pushing her legs together to
prevent VELASQUEZ from consummating his lustful advances.
[10]
Unfortunately, her attempts
proved futile as his strength eventually overpowered hers.
What further bolsters AAAs credibility is the fact that she immediately reported the
commission of the rape as soon as Estifanio Castro rescued her. A complainants act in
immediately reporting the commission of rape has been considered by this Court as a factor in
strengthening her credibility
[11]
and we find such ruling in point given the circumstances
surrounding the assault against AAA.
Moreover, VELASQUEZ has not alleged any improper motive on the part of AAA to falsely
impute such a terrible crime to him. Neither is there any evidence of such improper
motive. In the absence of such motive, it is presumed that no such motive exists. The
testimony of a rape victim has oft been held as credible where, as in this case, she has no
strong ulterior motive to testify against the accused.
[12]
The trial court thus correctly ruled as
follows:
Guided by these principles, the Court has to carefully examine the testimony of the private
complainant AAA. She was put in the witness stand for three times, during direct examination,
cross-examination and in rebuttal. In all these three occasions, the Court was able to observe
the demeanor of AAA. She appears to be credible in the witness stand and her testimony is
not only spontaneous but is credible enough to withstand doubt and malice or ulterior
motives against the accused. The story narrated by AAA deserves credence as the same
appears logical and in consonance with human experience.
[13]

VELASQUEZs claim that AAAs testimony is contradicted by the findings of the
medical report
[14]
as testified to by Dr. Alvin David, who stated that based on his examination,
he discovered a healed laceration which was about four months old and that he did not find
any fresh lacerations when he examined AAA the day following the commission of the alleged
rape is also unconvincing. The absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual
abuse.
[15]
To support a conviction for rape, the court may rely solely on the testimony of the
victim provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human
nature and the normal course of things. By its very nature, rape is committed with the least
possibility of being seen by the public.
[16]
In the present case, AAAs testimony, stating in detail
the circumstances surrounding the occurrence of the two rape incidents, is controverted only
by the denial of the accused. Besides, Dr. David testified that it was possible that AAA did not
sustain any new lacerations even if she was raped the day before his examination.
[17]

In sentencing VELASQUEZ, the trial court overlooked the fact that he was charged with
simple rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0035 and forcible abduction with rape in Criminal Case No.
97-0036 and erroneously convicted VELASQUEZ of two counts of simple rape only. Considering
that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that VELASQUEZ forcibly
abducted AAA and then raped her twice, he should be convicted of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape and simple rape. The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty
for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in its maximum period.
[18]
Rape is the more
serious of the two crimes and is punishable with reclusion perpetua under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code and since reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
imposed as it is.
[19]
The subsequent rape committed by VELASQUEZ can no longer be
considered as a separate complex crime of forcible abduction with rape but only as a separate
act of rape punishable by reclusion perpetua.
[20]

Finally, VELASQUEZ is further ordered to pay AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.
[21]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant Reynaldo Velasquez y Ocampo is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Simple Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0035 and
Forcible Abduction with Rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0036. He is hereby sentenced to suffer
two counts of reclusion perpetua in each case, and to pay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.