GSU Rd 1Aff vs.

Wayne State HMButt

1ACMarihuana
Cartels Adv

Legalizing marijuana is modeled globally and breaks Cartels decrim fails
Carpenter, CATO senior fellow, 2011 (Ted, Undermining Mexicos Dangerous Drug Cartels, 11-15,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2033357, ldg)

Yet unless the production and sale of drugs is also legalized, the black-market premium will still exist and law-
abiding businesses will still stay away from the trade. In other words, drug commerce will remain in the hands of criminal elements that do
not shrink from engaging in bribery, intimidation, and murder. Wall Street Journal columnist Mary Anastasia OGrady aptly makes that distinction with respect to
the drug-law reform that Mexico enacted in 2009: Mexican consumers will now have less fear of penalties and, increasingly in the case of
marijuana, thats true in the United States as well. But trafficking will remain illegal, and to get their product past law enforcement
the criminals will still have an enormous incentive to bribe or to kill. Decriminalization will not take the
money out of the business, and therefore will not reduce corruption , cartel intimidation aimed at democratic-
government authority or the terror heaped on local populations by drug lords.58 Because of its proximity to the huge U.S. market, Mexico
will continue to be a cockpit for that drug-related violence. By its domestic commitment to prohibition, the United States is creating
the risk that the drug cartels may become powerful enough to destabilize its southern neighbor. Their impact on Mexicos
government and society has already reached worrisome levels. Worst of all, the carnage associated with the black-market trade in drugs does not respect national
boundaries. The frightening violence now convulsing Mexico could become a feature of life in American communities,
as the cartels begin to flex their muscles north of the border. When the United States and other countries ponder whether to persist in a
strategy of drug prohibition, they need to consider all of the potential societal costs, both domestic and international. On the domestic front, Americans prisons are
bulging with people who have run afoul of the drug laws. Approximately one-third of inmates in state prisons and nearly 60 percent of those in federal prisons are
incarcerated for drug trafficking offenses. Most of those inmates are small-time dealers. Prohibition has created or exacerbated a variety of social pathologies,
especially in minority communities where drug use rates are higher than the national average and rates of arrests and imprisonment are dramatically higher. Those
are all serious societal costs of prohibition. Conclusion The most feasible and effective strategy to counter the mounting turmoil in
Mexico is to drastically reduce the potential revenue flows to the trafficking organizations. In other words, the United States
could substantially defund the cartels through the full legalization (including manufacture and sale) of currently illegal
drugs. If Washington abandoned the prohibition model, it is very likely that other countries in the
international community would do the same . The United States exercises disproportionate influence
on the issue of drug policy, as it does on so many other international issues. If prohibition were
rescinded, the profit margins for the drug trade would be similar to the margins for other legal commodities, and legitimate
businesses would become the principal players. That is precisely what happened when the United States ended its
quixotic crusade against alcohol in 1933. To help reverse the burgeoning tragedy of drug-related violence in Mexico, Washington must seriously consider
adopting a similar course today with respect to currently illegal drugs. Even taking the first step away from prohibition by legalizing
marijuana, indisputably the mildest and least harmful of the illegal drugs, could cause problems for the Mexican cartels. Experts provide a
wide range of estimates about how important the marijuana trade is to those organizations. The high-end estimate, from a former DEA official,
is that marijuana accounts for approximately 55 percent of total revenues. Other experts dispute that figure. Edgardo Buscaglia,
who was a research scholar at the conservative Hoover Institution until 2008, provides the low-end estimate, contending that the drug amounts to less than 10
percent of total revenues. Officials in both the U.S. and Mexican governments contend that its more like 20 to 30 percent.59 Whatever the actual
percentage, the marijuana business is financially important to the cartels. The Mexican marijuana trade is already under pressure
from competitors in the United States. One study concluded that the annual harvest in California alone equaled or exceeded
the entire national production in Mexico, and that output for the United States was more than twice that of
Mexico.60 As sentiment for hard-line prohibition policies fades in the United States, and the likelihood of prosecution diminishes, one could expect domestic
growers, both large and small, to become bolder about starting or expanding their businesses. Legalizing pot would strike a blow against
Mexican traffickers. It would be difficult for them to compete with American producers in the American
market, given the difference in transportation distances and other factors. There would be little
incentive for consumers to buy their product from unsavory Mexican criminal syndicates when legitimate domestic
firms could offer the drug at a competitive priceand advertise how they are honest enterprises. Indeed, for many Americans, they could just
grow their own supplya cost advantage that the cartels could not hope to match. It is increasingly apparent, in any case, that both the U.S. and Mexican
governments need to make drastic changes in their efforts to combat Mexicos drug cartels. George Grayson aptly summarizes the fatal flaw in the existing strategy.
It is extremely difficultprobably impossibleto eradicate the cartels. They or their offshoots will fight to hold on to an enterprise that yields Croesus-like fortunes
from illegal substances craved by millions of consumers.61 Felipe Calderns military-led offensive is not just a futile, utopian crusade. That would be bad enough,
but the reality is much worse. It is a futile, utopian crusade that has produced an array of ugly, bloody side effects. A different approach is needed. The most
effective way is to greatly reduce the Croesus-like fortunes available to the cartels. And the only realistic way to do that is to bite the
bullet and end the policy of drug prohibition, preferably in whole, but at least in part, starting with the legalization
of marijuana. A failure to move away from prohibition in the United States creates the risk that the already nasty corruption and violence next door in Mexico
may get even worse. The danger grows that our southern neighbor could become, if not a full-blown failed
state, at least a de-facto narco-state in which the leading drug cartels exercise parallel or dual
political sovereignty with the government of Mexico . We may eventually encounter a situationif we havent alreadywhere the
cartels are the real power in significant portions of the country. And we must worry that the disorder inside Mexico will spill over the
border into the United States to a much greater extent than it has to this point. The fire of drug-related violence is flaring to an
alarming extent in Mexico. U.S. leaders need to take constructive action now, before that fire consumes our neighbors home and threatens our own. That means
recognizing reality and ending the second failed prohibition crusade.


The plan frees up resources and allows for institutional reform that resolves alternate
causes to organized crime
Jones, Baker Institute drug policy postdoctoral fellow, 2014
(Nathan, Will recreational marijuana sales in Colorado hurt Mexican cartels?, 1-2,
http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2014/01/will-recreational-marijuana-sales-in-colorado-hurt-mexican-
cartels/, ldg)

I would argue that in the short term, Colorados legalization will probably have a negligible impact on drug-related
violence in Mexico, given the size of the market and Colorados carefully written marijuana legislation and regulations. But it
represents a model for other states that could have a massive impact on cartel profits and thereby
reduce drug violence in Mexico. The Colorado and Washington state legalization efforts represent carefully tailored first steps toward the
broader legalization of marijuana that could significantly impact drug-related violence in Mexico. Markets are complex. We have to differentiate between short,
medium and long-term effects. Further we have to think about two important factors for Mexico: the profits of cartels and the strength of state institutions. Many
speciously bifurcate these issues. I argue that they cannot be separated. Mexicos cartels have significantly diversified their operations.
Marijuana is generally agreed to represent 20 percent to 30 percent of cartel profits. This varies by cartel, with
trafficking-oriented groups such as the Sinaloa cartel having higher profits from marijuana than more territorial groups such as los Zetas. This is not only due to the
trafficking of other drugs such as heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, but also due to the cartels expansion into illicit activities such as kidnapping, illegal tolls,
extortion, etc. Thus the legalization of marijuana in a single state can only cut into cartel profits. Even national marijuana legalization could not wipe them out.
Alejandro Hope and Eduardo Clarke wrote an excellent report for Mexicos Competiveness Institute that argued that if Oregon, Colorado and Washington (the
states with 2012 marijuana initiatives) legalized marijuana, it would cut into Mexican cartel profits by 30 percent; the Sinaloa cartel would be the most heavily
impacted. The authors made important assumptions. One was that marijuana produced in the legal market of these states would likely be trafficked outside these
states and still undercut the illegal marijuana market. I agree with their general findings but want to point out some issues with those assumptions. First, the federal
government has largely allowed Colorado to legalize marijuanadespite the contravention of federal lawprovided it prevents marijuana from being trafficked
outside the state and that marijuana does not fall into the hands of minors or does not benefit organized crime. Second, and as a result of the first, the states of
Colorado and Washington have very carefully regulated their markets, limiting the amounts nonresidents can buy, creating stiff penalties for those possessing large
quantities of marijuana, stepping up enforcement for trafficking outside of the state, and stepping up public awareness efforts about the illegality of trafficking
outside the state. Third, the federal government has also made clear it will be stepping up its efforts to keep Colorado marijuana in Colorado. Given that Colorado is
the test case, enforcement by both state and federal entities to prevent marijuana from leaving the state may be artificially and unsustainably high over the first
year or two. Fourth, Colorados marijuana taxes are very high and its vertically integrated market structure70 percent of marijuana sold in a retail establishment
must be cultivated by that businesswill keep the price up and limit the ability of legal marijuana to undercut the black market. In terms of the impact
on Mexican cartels in the short term, we might see a spike in other extortion-related crimes as profit
starvation sets in for certain cells in illicit networks. Attributing this to changing market dynamics in the United States will be difficult,
given that violent black market forces (rival cartels) may be a much more important confounding variable. These illicit networks may further
diversify into territorial extortionist activities, but over the long term will be wiped out by civil
society and the state as these crimes draw a powerful backlash . I documented this process in Tijuana in my 2011 doctoral
dissertation. The real benefits of legalization will be seen in the medium- and long-term. By cutting into
Mexican cartel profits, other cartel activities and power could be reduced. We know that cartel profits can be
redistributed to local cells to maintain territorial control. The ability to weaken or reduce these payments could limit their
activities and capital investments in kidnapping and extortion franchises. Finally, reducing cartel
profits could help Mexico strengthen its institutions . Building effective police and security institutions
takes decades. Decades can stretch into centuries if those agencies are constantly rejiggered and re-
corrupted by highly profitable and sophisticated organized criminal networks. Reducing illicit profits could
have an important and salubrious effect on the ability of Mexico to strengthen its security apparatus.


Cartel violence spills up to the US which triggres military response---collapses the
Mexican government and bilateral relations even if the response is limited
Metz, Strategic Studies Institute director of research, 2014 (Steven, Strategic Horizons: All Options Bad If
Mexicos Drug Violence Expands to U.S., 2-19, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13576/strategic-horizons-all-options-bad-if-
mexico-s-drug-violence-expands-to-u-s, ldg)

Over the past few decades, violence in Mexico has reached horrific levels, claiming the lives of 70,000 as criminal organizations fight each other
for control of the drug trade and wage war on the Mexican police, military, government officials and anyone else unlucky enough to get caught in the crossfire.
The chaos has spread southward, engulfing Guatemala, Honduras and Belize. Americans must face the possibility that the
conflict may also expand northward, with intergang warfare, assassinations of government officials and outright terrorism in the
United States. If so, this will force Americans to undertake a fundamental reassessment of the threat, possibly redefining it as a
security issue demanding the use of U.S. military power . One way that large-scale drug violence might move to
the United States is if the cartels miscalculate and think they can intimidate the U.S. government or strike at
American targets safely from a Mexican sanctuary. The most likely candidate would be the group known as the Zetas.
They were created when elite government anti-drug commandos switched sides in the drug war, first serving as mercenaries for the Gulf Cartel and then becoming
a powerful cartel in their own right. The Zetas used to recruit mostly ex-military and ex-law enforcement members in large part to maintain discipline and control.
But the pool of soldiers and policemen willing to join the narcotraffickers was inadequate to fuel the groups ambition. Now the Zetas are tapping a very different,
much larger, but less disciplined pool of recruits in U.S. prisons and street gangs. This is an ominous turn of events. Since intimidation through
extreme violence is a trademark of the Zetas, its spread to the United States raises the possibility of large-scale
violence on American soil. As George Grayson of the College of William and Mary put it, The Zetas are determined to gain the
reputation of being the most sadistic, cruel and beastly organization that ever existed. And without concern for extradition,
which helped break the back of the Colombian drug cartels, the Zetas show little fear of the United States government, already
having ordered direct violence against American law enforcement. Like the Zetas, most of the other Mexican cartels are
expanding their operations inside the United States. Only a handful of U.S. states are free of them today. So far the cartels dont appear
directly responsible for large numbers of killings in the United States, but as expansion and reliance on undisciplined recruits looking to
make a name for themselves through ferocity continue, the chances of miscalculation or violent freelancing
by a cartel affiliate mount . This could potentially move beyond intergang warfare to the killing of U.S. officials or
outright terrorism like the car bombs that drug cartels used in Mexico and Colombia. In an assessment for the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies
Institute, Robert Bunker and John Sullivan considered narcotrafficker car bombs inside the United States to be unlikely but not impossible. A second way
that Mexicos violence could spread north is via the partnership between the narcotraffickers and ideologically
motivated terrorist groups. The Zetas already have a substantial connection to Hezbollah, based on collaborative
narcotrafficking and arms smuggling. Hezbollah has relied on terrorism since its founding and has few qualms about
conducting attacks far from its home turf in southern Lebanon. Since Hezbollah is a close ally or proxy of Iran, it
might some day attempt to strike the United States in retribution for American action against Tehran. If so, it would likely
attempt to exploit its connection with the Zetas, pulling the narcotraffickers into a transnational proxy war. The foundation for this scenario is already in place:
Security analysts like Douglas Farah have warned of a tier-one security threat for the United States from an
improbable alliance between narcotraffickers and anti-American states like Iran and the Bolivarian regime in
Venezuela. The longer this relationship continues and the more it expands, the greater the chances of
dangerous miscalculation. No matter how violence from the Mexican cartels came to the United States, the key issue would be Washingtons
response. If the Zetas, another Mexican cartel or someone acting in their stead launched a campaign of assassinations
or bombings in the United States or helped Hezbollah or some other transnational terrorist organization with a
mass casualty attack, and the Mexican government proved unwilling or unable to respond in a way that
Washington considered adequate, the United States would have to consider military action. While the United
States has deep cultural and economic ties to Mexico and works closely with Mexican law enforcement on the narcotrafficking problem, the security relationship
between the two has always been difficultunderstandably so given the long history of U.S. military intervention in Mexico. Mexico would be unlikely
to allow the U.S. military or other government agencies free rein to strike at narcotrafficking cartels in its territory,
even if those organizations were tied to assassinations, bombings or terrorism in the United States. But any U.S. president would face
immense political pressure to strike at Americas enemies if the Mexican government could not or
would not do so itself . Failing to act firmly and decisively would weaken the president and
encourage the Mexican cartels to believe that they could attack U.S. targets with impunity . After all, the
primary lesson from Sept. 11 was that playing only defense and allowing groups that attack the United States undisturbed foreign sanctuary does not work. But
using the U.S. military against the cartels on Mexican soil could weaken the Mexican government or even
cause its collapse, end further security cooperation between Mexico and the United States and
damage one of the most important and intimate bilateral economic relationships in the world . Quite
simply, every available strategic option would be disastrous. Hopefully, cooperation between Mexican and U.S. security and intelligence services will be able to
forestall such a crisis. No one wants to see U.S. drones over Mexico. But so long as the core dynamic of narcotraffickingmassive
demand for drugs in the United States combined with their prohibition persists, the utter ruthlessness, lack
of restraint and unlimited ambition of the narcotraffickers raises the possibility of violent
miscalculation and the political and economic calamity that would follow.

Collapse results in WMD terrorism
Brookes, Heritage national security affairs senior fellow, 2009
(Peter, Mexican Mayhem: Narcotics Traffickers Threaten Mexico and U.S, 3-4,
http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/03/mexican-mayhem-narcotics-traffickers-
threaten-mexico-and-us)
Lots of weapons in Mexico come from this side of the border; indeed, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)
asserts a majority of the cartels' weapons come from the U.S., especially via gang networks operating in the Southwest. Mexico City has also expressed concerns to
Washington about precursor chemicals coming in from the U.S. that are then used by the cartels in the production of narcotics. Another problem,
according to experts, is that little inspection is done on the 100 million vehicles and trucks entering or leaving
Mexico annually at 25 crossing points, leading to plenty of finger-pointing on both sides. As a result, popular support for
Calderon's fight against the cartels has waned; because of the widespread violence, many Mexicans are for throwing in the towel, saying drugs are an American
problem. But that clearly wouldn't be good for either of us. If Mexico, a country of 110 million people, becomes even a near
narcostate, the effect on the U.S. -- make that the Western Hemisphere -- is almost incalculable. If the cartels
were to seize tracts of Mexican territory, it could lead to the establishment of lawless, ungoverned
spaces, which are favored by bad actors such as terrorists. (Think: Pakistan's tribal areas -- home to
al-Qaida and the Taliban.) Terrorists could certainly exploit successful drug smuggling routes to bring
people and explosives or even weapons of mass destruction across the border into the U.S.

Even crude devices make escalation likely
Conley, ACC chief of Systems Analysis Branch, 2003
(Harry, Not with Impunity Assessing US Policy for Retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack, 3-5,
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/spr03/conley.html, ldg)
The number of American casualties suffered due to a WMD attack may well be the most important variable in
determining the nature of the US reprisal. A key question here is how many Americans would have to be killed to prompt a massive response by
the United States. The bombing of marines in Lebanon, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 each resulted in a casualty count of
roughly the same magnitude (150300 deaths). Although these events caused anger and a desire for retaliation among the American public, they prompted no
serious call for massive or nuclear retaliation. The body count from a single biological attack could easily be one or two orders of magnitude higher than the
casualties caused by these events. Using the rule of proportionality as a guide, one could justifiably debate whether the
United States should use massive force in responding to an event that resulted in only a few thousand deaths .
However, what if the casualty count was around 300,000? Such an unthinkable result from a single CBW incident is not beyond the realm of possibility: According
to the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 100 kg of anthrax spores delivered by an efficient aerosol generator on a large urban target would be
between two and six times as lethal as a one megaton thermo-nuclear bomb.46 Would the deaths of 300,000 Americans be enough to
trigger a nuclear response? In this case, proportionality does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons . Besides
simply the total number of casualties, the types of casualties- predominantly military versus civilian- will also affect
the nature and scope of the US reprisal action. Military combat entails known risks, and the emotions resulting from a significant number of
military casualties are not likely to be as forceful as they would be if the attack were against civilians. World War II provides perhaps the best examples for the kind
of event or circumstance that would have to take place to trigger a nuclear response. A CBW event that produced a shock and death
toll roughly equivalent to those arising from the attack on Pearl Harbor might be sufficient to
prompt a nuclear retaliation. President Harry Trumans decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki- based upon a calculation that
up to one million casualties might be incurred in an invasion of the Japanese homeland47- is an example of the kind of thought process that would have to occur
prior to a nuclear response to a CBW event. Victor Utgoff suggests that if nuclear retaliation is seen at the time to offer the best
prospects for suppressing further CB attacks and speeding the defeat of the aggressor, and if the original attacks
had caused severe damage that had outraged American or allied publics, nuclear retaliation would be more than
just a possibility, whatever promises had been made.48

Advanced manufacturing is thriving because of integration and cooperation with
Mexico
Berube, Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program senior fellow, 2013
(Alan, Metro North America: Cities and Metros as Hubs of Advanced Industries and Integrated Goods
Trade, 11-7,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/11/07%20metro%20north%20america
/bmpp_metrona_final.pdf, ldg)

After decades of continued economic integration, the quantity and quality of trade within North
America is truly distinct. In 2011, the latest year for which goods and services trade data are both
available, the United States exchanged nearly $1.2 trillion worth of goods and services with Canada
and Mexico, the countrys first- and third-largest trading partners, respectively. To put this number in perspective, total U.S.
trade with Japan, Korea, and the BRICS nationsBrazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africais also
about $1.2 trillion (Figure 1).31 Integrated value chains have united North America as one economic
market that not only trades finished goods but shares in their production. Many products travel
across the border several times to take advantage of each countrys comparative advantages in
manufacturing. Value-added trade data reveal that for every $100 in final goods value that the United
States imports from Mexico, $40 is actually U.S.-made content. The equivalent share from Canada is $25. By contrast, for each
$100 in imports from China and the European Union, only $4 and $2, respectively, are U.S. value.32 THE NORTH AMERICAN ADVANCED INDUSTRY EXPORT
PLATFORM Production sharing not only minimizes the cost of goods consumed in each of the three
countries, but makes products exported to the rest of the world more competitive. In 2011, the North American
bloc sent over $1.2 trillion in goods outside the region.33 North Americas most export-oriented sectors tend to be in manufacturing, particularly in advanced
industriesR&D-intensive pursuits that require workers with significant technical knowledge and skills (see the box, What Are Advanced Industries and Why Are
They Important?). Advanced industries such as electronics ($115 billion), transportation equipment ($100
billion), industrial machinery ($82 billion), pharmaceuticals ($39 billion), and medical devices ($26
billion) drive North American goods exports to the rest of the world. Though not included in the definition of advanced
industries, energy commoditiesoil, gas, and coalare the other significant segment of North American exports ($108 billion).34 And while this report does not
focus on services, due to a lack of data, services play a critical role in advanced production sectors. For instance, every dollar of U.S. manufacturing output requires
19 cents of services, including logistics, advertising, and engineering.35 In 2012, the U.S. economy posted a $200 billion trade surplus in services.36 Boosting North
American advanced industry exports has clear advantages for each country. For the United States and Canada, both of which face
widening trade deficits in manufacturing, advanced industries represent some of the most export-
oriented segments of each economy . With little chance to compete on cost alone, each country
recognizes the increasing imperative to offer superior quality and value added. 37 For Mexico, which has
experienced a cyclical boom due to competitive wages and a favorable exchange rate, advanced industries represent opportunities to move into more sophisticated
parts of the value chain, improve productivity, and continue the nations economic ascent.38 Meeting the demand of developed economies in Europe and rising
markets in Africa, Asia, and South America for advanced industry products helps meet each countrys goals. Production sharing means that the
respective export economies of the United States, Canada, and Mexico rely greatly on intermediate
imports from their continental neighbors. At first glance, the benefits of imports may seem counterintuitive. Sourcing imports
internationally can displace domestic production and jobs, result in higher transportation costs for firms, and increase the risk of supply-chain disruptions.40 Yet
for both firms and countries, evidence shows that sourcing intermediate goods internationally
increases access to high- quality inputs, lowers overall costs for firms, and as a result increases
productivity and export prowess.41 In other words, imports improve product quality and lower
product cost, making exports more competitive in the global marketplace and ultimately supporting
jobs and wages at home. Co-production within North America also means that each country derives
more value from its partner countries exports to the rest of the world than from exports by other
global trading partners. The United States, for example, accounts for 20 percent and 16 percent of the value in Canadian and Mexican transportation
equipment exports, respectively, while Chinese, German, and Japanese transportation equipment exports all contain less than 4 percent U.S. value (Table 1). For
electrical and optical equipment, 14 percent of Canadian exports and 20 percent of Mexican exports are U.S. value added, well above the U.S. content in such
exports from China, Germany, and Japan. For machinery and chemicals, the same pattern holds.42 Simply put, the United States benefits more economically from a
Mexican or Canadian export than from a Chinese, Japanese, or German export. More recent global dynamics also indicate that this
is a unique moment for the North American production platform. Some experts suggest that changing
global wage structures, fluctuating currencies, volatile energy prices, and rapidly changing
technologies mean that North America, and the United States in particular, may be able to reshore
manufacturing jobs that left for East Asia over the past two decades.43 Others remain more pessimistic.44 Notwithstanding these
uncertainties, it does appear that North Americas free trade base and growing co-production in key
advanced industries positions it more strongly for near-term manufacturing growth . Five additional advantages
seem to favor the North American production platform: rising labor costs in China, transportation and logistical advantages from geographic proximity,
productionenhancing technological advancements, the shale gas revolution, and the growing prominence of urban economies as sites of co-located design and
production. First, experts predict that rising wages in China will make North Americas manufacturing base, particularly Mexicos, more cost-competitive vis--vis
East Asia.45 After decades of Chinese wages undercutting production in Mexico, Chinese and Mexican labor costs are converging.46 Economists at JPMorgan Chase
note that wage advantages, along with a favorable exchange rate, have been responsible for Mexicos manufacturing surge over the past couple of years.47
Furthermore, changing wage dynamics do not impact all industries equally; the extent to which labor is a significant share of input costs will determine whether
location decisions change as a result. In the case of advanced industries, where automation has already been widely implemented, labor cost changes matter most
in the assembly stages for high-value products such as electronics and precision instruments.48 Second, for manufacturers selling into the
North American market, transportation costs and logistics advantages favor making products within
North America over East Asia. The rise of just in time manufacturing processes also relies on fast,
dependable shipping to lower warehousing costs and to keep factories running at full speed. Shipments from
China can cost as much as $5,000 per container compared to $3,000 per container from Mexico.49 Products from North American factories can reach U.S. supply
chains in less than a few days; containers from China can take up to three months to reach their U.S. destination.50 In the rush to offshore production to East Asia,
many companies focused strictly on labor costs and overlooked costs associated with longer supply chains and more complex logistics.51 As those costs have
become more apparent over time, the calculus for firms seems to be changing, particularly for industries such as chemicals, machinery, and transportation
equipment that rely on lean supply chains, locate production near final demand, and manufacture large and heavy products.52


Domestic manufacturing is key to overall economic resilience and innovation
Ettlinger, Center for American Progress Vice President for Economic Policy, 2011
(Michael, Prior to joining the Center, he spent six years at the Economic Policy Institute directing the
Economic Analysis and Research Network. Previously, he was tax policy director for Citizens for Tax
Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy for 11 years. He has also served on the staff of
the New York State Assembly. The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing Why It Matters
if We Make It in America and Where We Stand Today, http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/04/pdf/manufacturing.pdf)

Manufacturing is critically important to the American economy. For generations, the strength of our country rested on the
power of our factory floorsboth the machines and the men and women who worked them. We need manufacturing to continue to be a
bedrock of strength for generations to come. Manufacturing is woven into the structure of our economy: Its
importance goes far beyond what happens behind the factory gates. The strength or weakness of American manufacturing carries
implications for the entire economy, our national security, and the well-being of all Americans. Manufacturing today accounts for
12 percent of the U.S. economy and about 11 percent of the private-sector workforce. But its significance is even greater than these numbers would
suggest. The direct impact of manufacturing is only a part of the picture. First, jobs in the manufacturing sector are good middle-class jobs for millions of Americans.
Those jobs serve an important role, offering economic opportunity to hard-working, middle-skill workers. This creates upward mobility and broadens and
strengthens the middle class to the benefit of the entire economy. Whats more, U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of
jobs that are quite different from the usual image of manufacturing. These are higher-skill service jobs that include the
accountants, bankers, and lawyers that are associated with any industry, as well as a broad range of other jobs including basic research
and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab
work. Many of these jobs are critical to American technology and innovation leadership . The problem today is this:
Many multinational corporations may for a period keep these higher-skill jobs here at home while they move basic manufacturing elsewhere in response to other
countries subsidies, the search for cheaper labor costs, and the desire for more direct access to overseas markets, but eventually many of these service jobs will
follow. When the basic manufacturing leaves, the feedback loop from the manufacturing floor to the rest of a
manufacturing operationa critical element in the innovative processis eventually broken. To maintain that
feedback loop, companies need to move higher-skill jobs to where they do their manufacturing. And with those jobs
goes American leadership in technology and innovation. This is why having a critical mass of both manufacturing and
associated service jobs in the United States matters. The industrial commons that comes from the crossfertilization
and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nations
economic competitiveness. Manufacturing also is important for the nations economic stability. The
experience of the Great Recession exemplifies this point. Although manufacturing plunged in 2008 and early 2009 along with the rest
of the economy, it is on the rebound today while other key economic sectors, such as construction, still languish. Diversity in the
economy is importantand manufacturing is a particularly important part of the mix. Although manufacturing is certainly
affected by broader economic events, the sectors internal diversitysupplying consumer goods as well as industrial goods, serving both domestic and external
markets gives it great potential resiliency. Finally, supplying our own needs through a strong domestic manufacturing sector
protects us from international economic and political disruptions. This is most obviously important in the realm of national security,
even narrowly defined as matters related to military strength, where the risk of a weak manufacturing capability is obvious. But overreliance on imports
and substantial manufacturing trade deficits weaken us in many ways, making us vulnerable to everything from
exchange rate fluctuations to trade embargoes to natural disasters.

It is key to robust military capabilities
Ezell, ITIF senior analyst, 2011
(Stephen J. The Case for a National Manufacturing Strategy. April 2011. http://www2.itif.org/2011-
national-manufacturing-strategy.pdf)

A strong manufacturing base is vital to the economic well-being of a nationand to its national
security. Thus, a decline in American manufacturing risks national security. A number of reports have
warned about the loss of the U.S. industrial base and its high-tech capabilities, arguing that these trends have the
potential to profoundly impact the military.49 For example, a 2005 Defense Science Board Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply said
the country was losing its high-tech industrial capability and that urgent action is recommended. It warned that America's most strategic
industries were not in a position to change the competitive dynamics that had emerged globally to shift the
balance of production and markets away from the United States. As the National Defense Industrial Association sums up the situation,
If we lose our preeminence in manufacturing technology, then we lose our national security.50 This
is because: As the U.S. industrial base moves offshore, so does the defense industrial base.
Reliance on foreign manufacturers increases vulnerability to counterfeit goods. As the U.S. industrial
base increasingly moves offshore, so does the defense industrial base, creating multiple vulnerabilities As Joel Yudken
explains in Manufacturing Insecurity, Continued migration of manufacturing offshore is both undercutting U.S. technology
leadership while enabling foreign countries to catch-up, if not leap-frog, U.S. capabilities in critical technologies
important to national security.51 If the U.S. defense industrial base is to retain its ability to develop the most technologically sophisticated defense
platforms, the United States will need to be at the forefront of advanced technology manufacturing capabilities in many areas, such as nanotechnology, advanced
batteries, semiconductors, sensors, etc. Unfortunately, U.S. vulnerabilities in advanced technology manufacturing capability span a
number of technologies. The mission of the Defense Production Act Title III is to target and bolster areas of high-tech manufacturing where the United
States has diminishing or no capability. Title III currently has active projects in lithium-ion (Li-ion) battery production, yttrium barium copper oxide high-temperature
superconductors, and photovoltaic solar cell encapsulants, among others. Lithium-ion battery production is particularly troubling. According to Title III there is at
present no domestic production capability for extremely long life Li-ion cells.52 As Title III makes clear in the defense context, dependence on foreign
manufacturersis not an option in some cases.53 Additional examples of defense-critical technologies where
domestic sourcing is endangered include propellant chemicals, space-qualified electronics, power sources for
space and military applications (especially batteries and photovoltaics), specialty metals, hard disk drives, and flat panel displays (LCDs).54 In fact,
Michael Webber, an engineering professor at the University of Texas, has studied the economic health of sixteen industrial sectors within the manufacturing
support base of the U.S. defense industrial system that have a direct bearing on innovation and production of novel mechanical products and systems, and finds
that, since 2001, thirteen of those sixteen industries have shown significant signs of erosion.55 Reliance on foreign manufacturers increases
U.S. vulnerability to receiving counterfeit goods According to a study conducted by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), in 2008 there
were 9,356 incidents of counterfeit foreign products making their way into the Department of Defense supply line, a 142 percent increase over 2005.56 Counterfeit
materials can and have hampered the militarys ability to maintain weapon systems in combat operationsa major vulnerability. Moreover, many distributors
surveyed in the BIS study cited insufficient steps taken by foreign governments to disrupt counterfeiting operations within their own borders.57 Ultimately, as
Yudken concludes, Only a comprehensive strategy aimed at reversing the erosion of the nations overall
manufacturing base will be sufficient for preserving and revitalizing the nations defense industrial
base in the coming decades.58

Ensures heg effectiveness and conflict suppression- no alt causes
Hubbard, Open Society Foundations program assistant, 2010
(Jesse, Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis, 5-28,
http://isrj.wordpress.com/2010/05/28/hegemonic-stability-theory/)

Regression analysis of this data shows that Pearsons r-value is -.836. In the case of American
hegemony, economic strength is a better predictor of violent conflict than even overall national
power, which had an r-value of -.819. The data is also well within the realm of statistical significance, with a p-value of .0014. While the data for British
hegemony was not as striking, the same overall pattern holds true in both cases. During both periods of hegemony, hegemonic strength was negatively related with
violent conflict, and yet use of force by the hegemon was positively correlated with violent conflict in both cases. Finally, in both cases, economic power was more
closely associated with conflict levels than military power. Statistical analysis created a more complicated picture of the hegemons role in fostering stability than
initially anticipated. VI. Conclusions and Implications for Theory and Policy To elucidate some answers regarding the complexities my analysis unearthed, I turned
first to the existing theoretical literature on hegemonic stability theory. The existing literature provides some potential frameworks for understanding these results.
Since economic strength proved to be of such crucial importance, reexamining the literature that focuses on hegemonic stability theorys economic implications was
the logical first step. As explained above, the literature on hegemonic stability theory can be broadly divided into two camps that which focuses on the
international economic system, and that which focuses on armed conflict and instability. This research falls squarely into the second camp, but insights from the
first camp are still of relevance. Even Kindlebergers early work on this question is of relevance. Kindleberger posited that the economic instability
between the First and Second World Wars could be attributed to the lack of an economic hegemon
(Kindleberger 1973). But economic instability obviously has spillover effects into the international political arena. Keynes, writing after WWI, warned in his seminal
tract The Economic Consequences of the Peace that Germanys economic humiliation could have a radicalizing effect on the nations political culture (Keynes 1919).
Given later events, his warning seems prescient. In the years since the Second World War, however, the European continent has not relapsed into armed conflict.
What was different after the second global conflagration? Crucially, the United States was in a far more powerful position than Britain was after WWI. As the tables
above show, Britains economic strength after the First World War was about 13% of the total in strength in the international system. In contrast, the United States
possessed about 53% of relative economic power in the international system in the years immediately following WWII. The U.S. helped rebuild Europes economic
strength with billions of dollars in investment through the Marshall Plan, assistance that was never available to the defeated powers after the First World War
(Kindleberger 1973). The interwar years were also marked by a series of debilitating trade wars that likely worsened the Great Depression (Ibid.). In contrast, when
Britain was more powerful, it was able to facilitate greater free trade, and after World War II, the United States played a leading role in creating institutions like the
GATT that had an essential role in facilitating global trade (Organski 1958). The possibility that economic stability is an important factor in the overall security
environment should not be discounted, especially given the results of my statistical analysis. Another theory that could provide insight
into the patterns observed in this research is that of preponderance of power. Gilpin theorized that
when a state has the preponderance of power in the international system, rivals are more likely to
resolve their disagreements without resorting to armed conflict (Gilpin 1983). The logic behind this claim is simple it
makes more sense to challenge a weaker hegemon than a stronger one. This simple yet powerful theory can help explain the puzzlingly strong positive correlation
between military conflicts engaged in by the hegemon and conflict overall. It is not necessarily that military involvement by the hegemon instigates further conflict
in the international system. Rather, this military involvement could be a function of the hegemons weaker position, which is the true cause of the higher levels of
conflict in the international system. Additionally, it is important to note that military power is, in the long run,
dependent on economic strength. Thus, it is possible that as hegemons lose relative economic power,
other nations are tempted to challenge them even if their short-term military capabilities are still
strong. This would help explain some of the variation found between the economic and military data. The results of this analysis are of clear importance
beyond the realm of theory. As the debate rages over the role of the United States in the world, hegemonic stability theory has some useful insights to bring to the
table. What this research makes clear is that a strong hegemon can exert a positive influence on stability in the international system. However, this should not give
policymakers a justification to engage in conflict or escalate military budgets purely for the sake of international stability. If anything, this research
points to the central importance of economic influence in fostering international stability. To
misconstrue these findings to justify anything else would be a grave error indeed. Hegemons may play a
stabilizing role in the international system, but this role is complicated. It is economic strength, not
military dominance that is the true test of hegemony. A weak state with a strong military is a paper
tiger it may appear fearsome, but it is vulnerable to even a short blast of wind.

Hegemonic decline causes multiple scenarios for great power war
Zhang et al., Carnegie Endowment researcher, 2011
(Yuhan, Americas decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry, 1-22,
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/, ldg)

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US
still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the worlds largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from
anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is
less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two
decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances,
motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a
subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a
status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so
will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse,
American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests,
power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century Americas emergence as a
regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning
of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain rules the waves. Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of
sole guardians of the Western Hemispheres security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law.
Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and
some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and
flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter
this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as Americas influence declines?
Given that Americas authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as
parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and
academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional
blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or
the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to
fill the vacuum left by Washingtons withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would
become more politicised and, well, less free and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally,
such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to
the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international
regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power
wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism
devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of
unrivalled US primacy.




State Budget Adv


States are balancing their budgets through cuts that devastates the quality and
availability of higher education
Hiltonsmith, Demos policy analyst, 2014
(Robert, The Great Cost Shift Continues: State Higher Education Funding After The Recession, 3-6,
http://www.demos.org/publication/great-cost-shift-continues-state-higher-education-funding-after-
recession, ldg)

As student debt continues to climb, its important to understand how our once debt-free system of
public universities and colleges has been transformed into a system in which most students borrow,
and at increasingly higher amounts. In less than a generation, our nations higher education system has become a debt-for-diploma
systemmore than seven out of 10 college seniors now borrow to pay for college and graduate with an average debt of $29,400.1 Up until about two
decades ago, state funding ensured college tuition remained within reach for most middle-class
families, and financial aid provided extra support to ensure lower-income students could afford the
costs of college. As Demos chronicled in its first report in the The Great Cost Shift series, this compact began to unravel as states disinvested in higher
education during economic downturns but were unable, or unwilling, to restore funding levels during times of economic expansion. Today, as a result, public
colleges and universities rely on tuition to fund an ever-increasing share of their operating expenses. And students and their families rely more and more on debt to
meet those rising tuition costs. Nationally, revenue from tuition paid for 44 percent of all operating expenses of public colleges and universities in 2012, the highest
share ever. A quarter century ago, the share was just 20 percent.2 This shiftfrom a collective funding of higher education to one borne increasingly by
individualshas come at the very same time that low- and middle-income households experienced stagnant or declining household income. The Great
Recession intensified these trends, leading to unprecedented declines in state funding for higher
education and steep tuition increases: NATIONWIDE CUTS: 49 states (all but North Dakota) are
spending less per student on higher education than they did before the Great Recession.3 In contrast, only 33
states cut per-student spending between 2001 and 2008,4 the period since the last recession. MANY DEEP CUTS: In many states, the cuts
have been especially deep. Since the recession, 28 states have cut per-student funding by more than
25 percent, compared to just one stateMichiganthat did so between 2001 and 2008. ESCALATING TUITION: Funding cuts have
led to large tuition increases. Nationally, average tuition at 4-year public universities increased by 20 percent in the four years since 2008 after
rising 14 percent in the four years prior. In seven states, average tuition increased by more than a third, and two statesArizona and Californiahave raised it by
more than two-thirds, or 66 percent. At public 2-year colleges, average tuition has risen by more than a third in six states. FAMILIES PRICED OUT:
Average tuition at 4-year public schools now consumes more than 15 percent of the median
household income in 26 states. Average total costincluding room and boardconsumes more than one third of the median household income in 22
states. The decreasing affordability of higher education is eroding the last relatively secure path into the
middle class, as more students take on larger amounts of debt to finance their higher educations, or
forego it altogether. With $1.2 trillion in outstanding student loan debt and climbing, student loan debt is now substantial enough to affect our overall economy as
indebted graduates find it harder to buy a home or a car.5 This brief updates our previous analysis of state funding trends by examining trends in state funding and
tuition since the Great Recession. State Cuts to Higher Education: How Much and Why? Every state but oneNorth Dakotahas cut
per-student funding since the Great Recession in order to help close wide budget gaps. Nationwide, these cuts
have averaged $2,394 per student, or 27 percent. As Figure 1 and Figure 2 show, the magnitude of the cuts varies widely from state to state.6 However,
most states have made deep cuts to higher education funding: 29 states have cut funding by more
than $2,000 per student, resulting in a national average cut in funding of more than 25 percent.
Higher education cuts triggered by the Great Recession were closely linked to state budget gaps. As
Figure 3 shows, Arizona, California, and Nevada had the three largest deficits, and also made some of the largest higher education cuts, as well. The budget gaps, in
turn, were significantly linked to the housing crisis. Declines in housing prices were the most severe in Arizona, California, Nevada, and Florida. All of the hardest-hit
states raised taxes after the Great Recession,7 but none raised them enough to close their entire gap, making higher education cuts all but inevitable. The Effects of
State Higher Education Cuts Historically, public colleges and universities get nearly all of their revenue from state
and local funding and tuition and fees. So, when states cut higher education funding, schools
essentially have two options for closing the gap: raise student charges tuition, fees, room, and board or cut
salaries and service s. Most states have chosen to do both since the Great Recession, implementing
steep hikes in charges for tuition, room, and board, and cutting thousands of course offerings and positions. Rising Tuitions
The effect of state cuts on student charges has been especially dramatic. Nationwide, tuition at public 4-year universities has risen by an average of 20 percent, or
$1,282, since 2008. The increase in total costincluding room and boardhas been even greater, rising by an average of $2,292 over the same period. Tuition at
public 2-year schools has increased sharply as well, rising by an average of 18.5 percent, or $414, since 2008. In many states, the tuition
increases have far outstripped the national average. Seventeen states have raised tuition prices by more than 20 percent since the
Great Recession, and seven statesCalifornia, Arizona, Hawaii, Alabama, Georgia, Nevada, and Washingtonhave seen tuition hikes of one-third or more. The
sharp rises in student charges since the Great Recession are closely linked to cuts in state funding for higher education. Figure 4 illustrates this connection, depicting
both per-student funding cuts and average increases in tuition in the 10 states with the largest tuition increases since the Great Recession. Families Cant Keep Up
with Rising Costs At the same time that states were cutting funding for higher education, families faced their
own budget pressures due stagnant or declining incomes. As a result, paying for college requires a much larger share of the
typical households income in many states. In a fully functioning system, much of this gap in ability to pay would be provided by financial aid and students working
in side-jobs to defray costs. What we know, however, is that aid programs, such as federal Pell grants, have lost their purchasing power as a result of rising tuition
and a greater number of eligible students. We also know that students are working more hours than ever before and taking on increasing amounts of debt. The
result has been the debt-for-diploma system in which most students fill the gap between what their parents can pay, available grant aid and their earnings from
part-time work, by taking on student debt. In seven states, tuition consumes more than 20 percent of the state
median household income, while it consumes less than 10 percent of median income in five states. Figure 5 illustrates this affordability gap,
depicting the most and least affordable states, ranked by the share of median household income consumed by the average 4-year public university tuition in the
state. And as the full tables in the Appendix show, affordability is very closely linked to state funding levels: the five
least affordable statesVermont, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and New Hampshire
were among the lowest third of states in funding per student . Affordability is also closely linked to average student debt: the
five least affordable states were all among the upper third of states, ranked by average student debt of graduates.8

This results in brain drain of talented domestic and foreign scientists
Daniels, John Hopkins president, 2014
(Ronald, Driving Innovation Through Federal Investments, 4-29,
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/Johns%20Hopkins%20University%20
-%20OWT.pdf, ldg)

Investing in the Next Generation The United States approach to research funding in recent years has placed
unique pressures on young scientists in particular. For example: In 1980, 5.6 percent of all NIH research funding
went to scientists 35 and younger. That number dropped to 1.3 percent in 2012. The average age at which a
young scientist receives an R01, the signature NIH award and an important platform for independent research, has inched upwards from 38 in 1980 to 41 in 2011.
The percent of principal investigators for R01s who were 36 years of age or younger has declined from
18 percent in 1983 to 3 percent in 2010. The number of awards that have gone to these investigators has slipped from 1,984 in 1980 to 1,135
today. The potential impact on our young scientists is grave without the funding to launch their own
research in the United States, our young scientists are discouraged. They are turning elsewhere,
pursuing positions outside of academic research, outside of the country, even outside of science
entirely . According to one report, 80 percent of scientists see an increase in recent years in the number of graduate students and fellows seeking positions
outside the academy, and 35 percent see an increase in young researchers seeking positions outside the United States. The ones who leave take
with them the next generation of innovation scholars observe that it is often the entering scientists
that are most likely to shatter paradigms and divine a new trailblazing approach that revolutionizes a
field. And the ones who stay report that they are chilled into offering more conservative proposals in
an effort to attract an ever shrinking pool of funding.

Vibrant higher education is key to biotech innovation and global sustainable ag
Abah, Nigerian National Cereals Research Institute, 2010
(J., The role of biotechnology in ensuring food security and sustainable agriculture, December,
http://www.academicjournals.org/article/article1380729543_Abah%20et%20al.pdf, ldg)

Food security and sustainable agriculture have become a burning issues in the national discuss at all levels of government as plans are being made for a changing
global climate and increasing global population. One of the most important environmental challenges facing the
developing world is how to meet current food needs without undermining the ability of future
generations to meet theirs. Agricultural production must be sufficient to feed us now and in the future. Evidently, the current state
of agricultural technology will not suffice to meet the production challenges ahead. Innovative
technologies have to be exploited in order to enable sufficient food availability in the future. In the
current practice of modern agriculture which relies on high inputs such as fuel-powered tractors, chemical
fertilizers and chemical pesticides, deploying a smart mix of farming techniques using genetic engineering of biotechnology and
integrating same into the traditional smallholders farming system offer a bright prospect of meeting the growing demand for
food by improving both yield and nutritional quality of crops and reducing the impact on the
environment. The issues of food security and sustainable agriculture in the developing world and especially in sub-Saharan Africa continued to dominate
public debate and have remained an issue of global concern. Exacerbating these issues is the complex subject of population growth. According to Population
Reference Bureau (PRB), the world population reached 6.6 billion people in 2006, up from 6 billion in 1999. It is projected that world population will beat the 8
billion mark in the year 2025; most of the increase is expected in the developing world (PRB, 2006). In order to meet these needs, FAO (1999) estimated that global
food production must increase by 60% in developing countries to accommodate the estimated population growth, close nutrition gaps and meet dietary needs. In a
similar report, FAO observed that more than 800 million people in the world do not have enough food to eat, causing 2400 people to die daily of hunger, three
quarters of whom are children and under five. Additionally, the United Nations subcommittee on nutrition (2000) estimated that 33% of children under five in the
developing countries have experienced stunted height-for-age growth. This suggests chronic undernourishment throughout childhood, which can hinder overall
health as well as intellectual development. Population growth has direct implications on available land (and this is in the light of decrease in arable land worldwide).
For Africa, where the rural population is close to 70% in most countries and where consequently the main economic and social activity is farming, these facts are
issues of grave concern. It is estimated that population growth and income will lead to a further doubling of food demand over the next generation (McCalla, 1999).
Yet, growth in farmers crop yields has been slowing down since the 1980s, and in some regions of the world, grain yields have tended to level off (Pinstrup-
Andersen et al., 1999). The challenge for developing countries therefore, is to ensure that their citizenry enjoys food security. Evidently, the current
state of agricultural technology will not suffice to meet the production challenge ahead. This problem
is further compounded by the fact that most of the agricultural research in the developing countries
focuses on a narrow range of crops and many of the crops used by local communities have not
benefited from modern research. Thus, innovative technologies have to be exploited in order to
enable sufficient food availability in the future. In this context, modern biotechnology offers the best
available options for diversifying agricultural production by speeding up the development of new
varieties, including those of underutilized crops . Biotechnology is broadly defined as a technique that uses living organisms or
substances from those organisms to make or modify a product, improve plants or animals, or develop microorganisms for specific uses (Persley, 2000). It also deals
with the construction of microorganisms, cells, plants or animals with useful traits by recombinant DNA techniques, tissue culture, embryo transfer and other
methods besides traditional genetic breeding techniques. Although, biotechnology applies across a number of fields, agricultural biotechnology however, appears to
be the most crucial for African countries and especially for resource-poor farmers whose sole livelihood depends on agriculture. The technique of
biotechnology alone cannot solve all the problems associated with agricultural production but it has the potential to address specific
problems such as increasing crop productivity, diversifying crops, enhancing nutritional value of food,
reducing environmental impacts of agricultural production and promoting market competitiveness.
Crop yields have grown slowest in many parts of the developing world, especially in Africa. It is estimated that cereal yields in Africa have increased by nearly half of
the rate in Latin America since 1970 (World Bank, 1993). Poor soils, low rainfall, high temperatures and the prevalence of pests continue to undermine food security
in many parts of Africa. These challenges are compounded by the high costs of imported agricultural inputs. Improving the situation will require greater investment
research and reliance on emerging technologies. Enhancing the nutritional value of crops is another important aspect of food security. A good example in this area is
the modification of rice to enhance its vitamin A content. United Nations projections show that while chronic malnutrition wi ll decline in Asia and Latin America in
the coming decades, the numbers for Africa will increase significantly. Biotechnology will make it easier to maintain traditional diets while improving their
nutritional value. Modern biotechnology could help in enhancing the competitiveness of agricultural
products from the developing countries and thereby promoting their integration Abah et al. 8897 into
the global economy. Efforts to diversify agricultural production in the developing world will not only promote food security in those regions, but it will
also add new crops to world food market. As articulated in the 1990 "Farm Bill", sustainable agriculture means "an integrated system of plant and animal production
practices having a site-specific application that will, over the long term: (i) Satisfy human food and fiber needs, (ii) enhance environmental quality and the natural
resource base upon which the agricultural economy depends, (iii) make the most efficient use of nonrenewable resources and on-farm resources and integrate,
where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls, (iv) sustain the economic viability of farm operations, and (v) enhance the quality of life for farmers and
society as a whole" (FACTA, 1990). The cluster of techniques that comprise biotechnology can, if effectively
harnessed and applied, radically transform farming systems by reducing post-harvest loss and
increasing crop resistance to drought. The main limiting factor to the ability of the developing countries to benefit from advances in modern
biotechnology is the lack of scientific and technological capacity and the low level of enterprise development in most of these countries. The responsibility to
formulate policies and strategies for the wider use of biotechnology lies with these countries. However, international cooperation and partnerships are essential in
promoting sustainable agriculture in the developing world. Biotechnology and sustainable agriculture in Africa debate raise several key-issues: (1) How do you
transfer biotechnology to African countries and strengthen their technological competence to acquire, assimilate, further develop and effectively apply the
technology for enhanced agricultural production? (2) What policy and institutional arrangements should be put in place to make the technology and its products
accessible to rural farmers in the region? Biotechnology on its own may not be the panacea for the worlds problem of food crisis. However, genetic engineering
presents outstanding potential to increase the efficiency of both crop improvement and animal production thereby enhancing gl obal food production and
availability in a sustainable way. This is achievable once the entire technology can be integrated into the traditional smallholder farming systems. Sustainable
agriculture will require that developing countries makes prudent choices and that they are not restricted to using only the technologies available today. Making such
choices requires access to a wider range of technologies, especially those resulting from advances in molecular biology. The international public
research system has a critical role in ensuring that access to potential benefits of new technologies is
guaranteed for poor people and environmental conservation is maintained. There must be
recognition of the need for increased public involvement in biotechnology and for complementing
private sector research, to ensure transparency and accountability and to promote a broad range of
public goods research just as markets expand for results of private goods research. There is a need for win-win-win scenarios for all concerned actors
and for creative efforts to identify and put to work enabling mechanisms for the developing countries to benefit from the gene revolution. To win the battle for food
security and sustainable agriculture, priority should be given to enhanced crop productivity which provides easy access to foodstuff for the bulk of the populace.

Resource and environmental constraints make industrial agriculture unsustainable-
results in food spikes
Hellwinckel et al., Tennessee's Agricultural Policy Analysis Center professor, 2009
(Chad, Peak Oil and the Necessity of Transitioning to Regenerative Agriculture, 10-7,
http://www.resilience.org/stories/2009-10-07/peak-oil-and-necessity-transitioning-regenerative-
agriculture)

The food crisis of 2008 gave a first glimpse of the problems that are emerging as global oil production peaks. As the total annual quantity of oil
physically capable of being extracted from the earth begins to decline over the next several decades,
agriculture may find itself dependent upon a scarce and expensive resource. In 2008, world commodity
markets reached their highest levels in 30 years, food prices skyrocketed and food shortages emerged,
leading to riots affecting more than 40 countries . After many years of having to deal with the negative consequences of chronically
low prices, poorer nations suddenly had to deal with the opposite. With the global economic downturn starting in late 2008, both energy and food commodity
prices receded from their high water mark. But forecasts of declining conventional oil production suggest it is only a matter of time before oil prices rise again, and a
food crisis re-emerges due to higher input costs and renewed emphasis on bioenergy production to fill the drop in conventional energy sources(1).
Agriculture, like all other industries over the past century, has taken great advantage of the extraction
and refining of plentiful, energy-dense, fossil fuels. Today, agriculture has evolved into a net energy
user for the first time in 10,000 yearsinstead of being a means of converting free solar energy into metabolizable energy, it now
transforms finite fossil energy into metabolizable energy. The industrial agricultural system has allowed for the cheap
production of plentiful food to feed a growing population, but evidence indicates that it is ill-suited to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. Over the next several decades, the practices of agriculture
must reverse the fossil energy dependence and once again become a net source of energy, stop
erosion and begin to regenerate soil, and meet human food needs . In other words, agriculture must transition to practices
that run on solar energy, regenerate fertility and produce in abundance. Fossil Energy Dependence To meet the needs of a growing population, the modern U.S.
food system uses 10.25 quadrillion BTUs of fossil energy inputs, or about 10% of U.S. annual fossil fuel consumption. The industrialization of
agriculture has, for the first time in history, led to the situation where agriculture actually uses more
energy than it creates, with 7.3 units of energy going to create and deliver one unit of metabolizable energy(2). This energy deficit of agriculture is an
historic anomaly. Up until the past 50 years, agriculture had always yielded more energy than it used(3). Historically, by producing more energy than the farmer
needed, others were freed from food production, and civilizations were built on the small positive gains in energy from agriculture. The Energy Returned on Energy
Invested ratio (EROEI) of U.S. agriculture in 1920 has been estimated to be 3.1, but by the 1970s had fallen to 0.7 (4). Add the energy required to move, process,
package, deliver and cook food in the modern food economy, and EROEI becomes 0.14, indicating that agriculture has lost its traditional role as an energy
production system and become simply another user of fossil fuels. Historically, the foundation of civilization rested on consistent solar radiation. Now it rests on the
annual extraction of finite fossil fuels. One solution is to find other energy sources such as wind or solar, for energy-intense agriculture. Yet when comparing the
EROEI ratios of the alternative fuels, the benefits of oil are apparent(5). Today, economies are running off the large oil discoveries of the 1950s and 1960s with
EROEI ratios of 50+ (6). Alternative fuels will likely have an increasing role in meeting the energy needs of the larger economy, but to believe agriculture can
continue to function under the current energy balance is folly. It is imperative that agriculture return to a more balanced energy ratio over the next century. Soil
Loss By using energy-dense inputs to produce on remaining land, industrial agriculture has been able to
offset soil loss with intensification of production. But in the transition to less energy-intensive
methods, continuing soil losses are not feasible. Every year 75 billion metric tons of soil erode from the earths agricultural lands, and
30 million acres are abandoned due to over-exhaustion of the soil (7,8). This is equivalent to losing an area the size of Ohio every year. Erosion is a
problem that has followed cultivation for 10,000 years. Its slow effects are evident in the lands surrounding fallen civilizations such
as in the Tigris/Euphrates valley, Israel, Greece or the hills of Italy. Over time, agriculture has led to the loss of one-third of
global arable land, much of it within the past 40 years (9). Green revolution methods of mechanization
has sped the rate of erosion in many regions and led to the abandonment of traditional practices,
such as integrated crop-animal systems or polyculture plantings, that had slowed erosion and enabled some traditional
systems to function for centuries(10). Soil is a depletable resource that forms over thousands of years. It is estimated that it takes 800 years
for one inch of soil to form in the American Midwest(11). Modern agriculture is depleting soils at a
rate of one to two magnitudes faster than they are formed (12). The United States, which has much lower erosion rates than
Africa and Asia, is still losing soil at a rate of four tons per acre per year (13,14). Once soil is eroded, it cannot be easily or quickly
recreated . This use of soils can be thought of as spending the accumulated capital of millennia, not unlike the use of fossil fuels. In the past, if one culture
exhausted its soils and declined, civilization could re-emerge in newly settled fertile areas. Today, with 3.7 billion acres under cultivation, there are few remaining
virgin soils. If this trend of soil depletion continues, we will face an increasingly hungry world, even
without the added burden of biofuels production. Establishing Regenerative Practices Long-term agricultural policies must be
guided by three imperatives: 1) reverse fossil energy dependence and once again become a net source of energy; 2) stop erosion and begin to regenerate soil; and
3) meet human food needs. There is increasing evidence that regenerative agriculture can produce more food with less energy than industrial agriculture, while
increasing the health of soils (15,16). Regenerative agriculture(17) allows natural systems to maintain their own fertility, build soil, resist pests and diseases and be
highly productive. Regenerative agriculture uses the natural dynamics of the ecosystem to construct
agricultural systems that yield for human consumption. Regenerative methods regenerate the soil,
the fertility, and the energy consumed in semi-closed nutrient cycles, and by capturing, harvesting and
reusing resources such as sun, rain, and nutrients that fall within the farms boundary. Other terms refer to
similar principles, such as natural farming, permaculture, agro-ecology, integrated agriculture, perennial polyculture, wholistic management, forest gardening,
natural systems agriculture and sustainable agriculture. Successful regenerative practices are used by small landholders
capable of managing more intensive and complex systems which rely on the integration of crop-
animal-human functions, use of perennial species, and the growing of multiple crops in the same field
(18). Many of these practices are based on traditional cultural land-use practices, but others are newly
forged systems.

Food spikes risk global food wars and imperils billions
Klare 12 [Michael, Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, As Food Prices
Rise, Dangers of Social Unrest Seem Imminent, August 9, http://highbrowmagazine.com/1459-food-
prices-rise-dangers-potential-social-unrest-seem-imminent]

The Great Drought of 2012 has yet to come to an end, but we already know that its consequences will
be severe. With more than one-half of Americas counties designated as drought disaster areas, the
2012 harvest of corn, soybeans, and other food staples is guaranteed to fall far short of predictions. This,
in turn, will boost food prices domestically and abroad, causing increased misery for farmers and low-
income Americans and far greater hardship for poor people in countries that rely on imported U.S.
grains.
This, however, is just the beginning of the likely consequences: If history is any guide, rising food prices
of this sort will also lead to widespread social unrest and violent conflict.
Foodaffordable foodis essential to human survival and well-being. Take that away, and people
become anxious, desperate, and angry. In the United States, food represents only about 13 percent of
the average household budget, a relatively small share, so a boost in food prices in 2013 will probably
not prove overly taxing for most middleand upper-income families. It could, however, produce
considerable hardship for poor and unemployed Americans with limited resources.
You are talking about a real bite out of family budgets, commented Ernie Gross, an agricultural
economist at Omahas Creighton University. This could add to the discontent already evident in
depressed and high-unemployment areas, perhaps prompting an intensified backlash against incumbent
politicians and other forms of dissent and unrest.
It is in the international arena, however, that the Great Drought is likely to have its most devastating
effects. Because so many nations depend on grain imports from the U.S. to supplement their own
harvests, and because intense drought and floods are damaging crops elsewhere as well, food supplies
are expected to shrink and prices to rise across the planet.
What happens to the U.S. supply has immense impact around the world, says Robert Thompson, a
food expert at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. As the crops most affected by the drought, corn
and soybeans, disappear from world markets, he noted, the price of all grains, including wheat, is likely
to soar, causing immense hardship to those who already have trouble affording enough food to feed
their families.
The Hunger Games, 2007-2011
What happens next is, of course, impossible to predict, but if the recent past is any guide, it could turn
ugly. In 2007-2008, when rice, corn, and wheat experienced prices hikes of 100 percent or more, sharply
higher pricesespecially for breadsparked food riots in more than two dozen countries, including
Bangladesh , Cameroon , Egypt , Haiti , Indonesia , Senegal , and Yemen . In Haiti, the rioting
became so violent and public confidence in the governments ability to address the problem dropped so
precipitously that the Haitian Senate voted to oust the countrys prime minister, Jacques-douard Alexis.
In other countries, angry protestors clashed with army and police forces, leaving scores dead.
Those price increases of 2007-2008 were largely attributed to the soaring cost of oil, which made food
production more expensive. (Oils use is widespread in farming operations, irrigation, food delivery, and
pesticide manufacture.) At the same time, increasing amounts of cropland worldwide were being
diverted from food crops to the cultivation of plants used in making biofuels.
The next price spike in 2010-11 was, however, closely associated with climate change. An intense
drought gripped much of eastern Russia during the summer of 2010, reducing the wheat harvest in that
breadbasket region by one-fifth and prompting Moscow to ban all wheat exports. Drought also hurt
Chinas grain harvest, while intense flooding destroyed much of Australias wheat crop. Together with
other extreme-weather-related effects, these disasters sent wheat prices soaring by more than 50
percent and the price of most food staples by 32 percent.
Once again, a surge in food prices resulted in widespread social unrest, this time concentrated in North
Africa and the Middle East. The earliest protests arose over the cost of staples in Algeria and then
Tunisia, whereno coincidencethe precipitating event was a young food vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi,
setting himself on fire to protest government harassment. Anger over rising food and fuel prices
combined with long-simmering resentments about government repression and corruption sparked what
became known as the Arab Spring. The rising cost of basic staples, especially a loaf of bread, was also a
cause of unrest in Egypt , Jordan , and Sudan . Other factors, notably anger at entrenched autocratic
regimes, may have proved more powerful in those places, but as the author of Tropic of Chaos, Christian
Parenti, wrote, The initial trouble was traceable, at least in part, to the price of that loaf of bread.
As for the current drought, analysts are already warning of instability in Africa , where corn is a major
staple, and of increased popular unrest in China , where food prices are expected to rise at a time of
growing hardship for that countrys vast pool of low-income, migratory workers and poor peasants.
Higher food prices in the U.S. and China could also lead to reduced consumer spending on other goods,
further contributing to the slowdown in the global economy and producing yet more worldwide misery,
with unpredictable social consequences.
The Hunger Games, 2012-?
If this was just one bad harvest, occurring in only one country, the world would undoubtedly absorb the
ensuing hardship and expect to bounce back in the years to come. Unfortunately, its becoming evident
that the Great Drought of 2012 is not a one-off event in a single heartland nation, but rather an
inevitable consequence of global warming which is only going to intensify. As a result, we can expect not
just more bad years of extreme heat, but worse years, hotter and more often, and not just in the United
States, but globally for the indefinite future.
Until recently, most scientists were reluctant to blame particular storms or droughts on global warming.
Now, however, a growing number of scientists believe that such links can be demonstrated in certain
cases. In one recent study focused on extreme weather events in 2011, for instance, climate specialists
at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Great Britains National Weather
Service concluded that human-induced climate change has made intense heat waves of the kind
experienced in Texas in 2011 more likely than ever before. Published in the Bulletin of the American
Meteorological Society, it reported that global warming had ensured that the incidence of that Texas
heat wave was 20 times more likely than it would have been in 1960; similarly, abnormally warm
temperatures like those experienced in Britain last November were said to be 62 times as likely because
of global warming.
It is still too early to apply the methodology used by these scientists to calculating the effect of global
warming on the heat waves of 2012, which are proving to be far more severe, but we can assume the
level of correlation will be high. And what can we expect in the future, as the warming gains
momentum?
When we think about climate change (if we think about it at all), we envision rising temperatures,
prolonged droughts, freakish storms, hellish wildfires, and rising sea levels. Among other things, this will
result in damaged infrastructure and diminished food supplies. These are, of course, manifestations of
warming in the physical world, not the social world we all inhabit and rely on for so many aspects of our
daily well-being and survival. The purely physical effects of climate change will, no doubt, prove
catastrophic. But the social effects including, somewhere down the line, food riots, mass starvation,
state collapse, mass migrations, and conflicts of every sort, up to and including full-scale war, could
prove even more disruptive and deadly.
In her immensely successful young-adult novel, The Hunger Games (and the movie that followed),
Suzanne Collins riveted millions with a portrait of a dystopian, resource-scarce, post-apocalyptic future
where once-rebellious districts in an impoverished North America must supply two teenagers each
year for a series of televised gladiatorial games that end in death for all but one of the youthful
contestants.
These hunger games are intended as recompense for the damage inflicted on the victorious capitol of
Panem by the rebellious districts during an insurrection. Without specifically mentioning global
warming, Collins makes it clear that climate change was significantly responsible for the hunger that
shadows the North American continent in this future era. Hence, as the gladiatorial contestants are
about to be selected, the mayor of District 12s principal city describes the disasters, the droughts, the
storms, the fires, the encroaching seas that swallowed up so much of the land [and] the brutal war for
what little sustenance remained.
In this, Collins was prescient, even if her specific vision of the violence on which such a world might be
organized is fantasy. While we may never see her version of those hunger games, do not doubt that
some version of them will come into existencethat, in fact, hunger wars of many sorts will fill our
future. These could include any combination or permutation of the deadly riots that led to the 2008
collapse of Haitis government , the pitched battles between massed protesters and security forces that
engulfed parts of Cairo as the Arab Spring developed, the ethnic struggles over disputed croplands and
water sources that have made Darfur a recurring headline of horror in our world, or the inequitable
distribution of agricultural land that continues to fuel the insurgency of the Maoist-inspired Naxalites
of India .
Combine such conflicts with another likelihood: that persistent drought and hunger will force millions of
people to abandon their traditional lands and flee to the squalor of shantytowns and expanding slums
surrounding large cities, sparking hostility from those already living there. One such eruption, with grisly
results, occurred in Johannesburgs shantytowns in 2008 when desperately poor and hungry migrants
from Malawi and Zimbabwe were set upon, beaten, and in some cases burned to death by poor South
Africans. One terrified Zimbabwean, cowering in a police station from the raging mobs, said she fled her
country because there is no work and no food. And count on something else: millions more in the
coming decades, pressed by disasters ranging from drought and flood to rising sea levels, will try to
migrate to other countries, provoking even greater hostility. And that hardly begins to exhaust the
possibilities that lie in our hunger-games future.
At this point, the focus is understandably on the immediate consequences of the still ongoing Great
Drought: dying crops, shrunken harvests, and rising food prices. But keep an eye out for the social and
political effects that undoubtedly wont begin to show up here or globally until later this year or 2013.
Better than any academic study , these will offer us a hint of what we can expect in the coming decades
from a hunger-games world of rising temperatures, persistent droughts, recurring food shortages, and
billions of famished , desperate people .


Plan generates multiple vectors for revenue-their evidence only assumes direct excise
taxes.
Caulkins, Carnegie Mellon public policy professor, 2013
(Jonathan, Article: High Tax States: Options for Gleaning Revenue from Legal Cannabis, 91 Or. L. Rev.
1041, lexis, ldg)

II Additional Sources of Government Revenue To date, most analysis has emphasized revenues from excise taxes, and
sometimes from conventional sales taxes, on sales to consumers in the legalizing jurisdiction.
However, there are other potential sources of tax revenue. A. Licensing Fees Most proposals to regulate the
marijuana industry include some form of licensing of producers, manufacturers, and stores, with
associated licensing fees. Fees are typically modest, perhaps intended to cover only the administrative
cost of processing the applications and other costs of maintaining a regulatory regime. For example, Washington
I-502's fee is $ 1,000 per year for a producer. n90 If I-502's [*1062] three-tiered excise-tax structure ended up producing tax revenue of fifty dollars per ounce, that
means the producers' license fee would vanish into irrelevance by comparison if production volumes were in the thousands, or even hundreds, of pounds per
licensee. This does not imply that fee revenue has to be negligible, especially in a big state. In California, the Alcohol Beverage
Commission is funded through license fees and has an annual budget of about $ 50 million. n91 Also, as was
noted above in Part I, section D, states could limit the number of licenses enough to drive up their market value, and then auction them to the highest bidder - a
scheme that has a variety of benefits to the public, but not to the producers. B. Drug Tourists If one jurisdiction legalizes and others do
not, drug tourism can develop in which users in the "dry" state visit a "wet" state to purchase
marijuana. This has been an issue in the Netherlands and in discussions in the United States. n92 Indeed, some Dutch localities, interested in drug-tourism
revenues, are planning to fight a national ban on the sale of marijuana to tourists. n93 It is perhaps worth distinguishing three categories of drug tourists: day-
trippers, destination tourists, and what might be called "tip-the-scalers." The first, day-trippers, are those who take short excursions for the purpose of purchasing
marijuana. Of all the states, Colorado and Washington are among the worst positioned to take advantage of this sort of tourism because relatively few people
reside within 250 miles of their borders. As shown in Figure 1, day-tripping might be much more significant if a state on the eastern seaboard, such as Connecticut
or Maryland, legalized marijuana. [*1063] Figure 1: Estimated Number of Marijuana Users Within a 100-, 250-, and 500-mile Radius of Colorado, Washington, and
Connecticut n94 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MARIJUANA USERS WITHIN A 100-, 250-,AND 500-MILE RADIUS OF COLORADO, WASHINGTON, ANDCONNECTICUT The
second are destination tourists who organize a trip around marijuana activities, but those activities go beyond the practical aspects of purchasing product. Seattle's
Hempfest draws hundreds of thousands of people, not just for product sales, but also for an array of vendors, music, and activities. Similarly, for example, people
visit Napa Valley's wineries for an overall experience and not just to obtain better deals on wine. The third involves people who take a trip motivated by another
objective, but for which the legalizing state beats out a competitor state - that is, tips the scale - because legal marijuana is viewed as an amenity. For example,
suppose snowboarders from the East Coast travel to Vail, Colorado instead of Park City, Utah because they could [*1064] obtain marijuana legally in Vail. Under any
of these scenarios, the state will capture tax revenues and other economic benefits from tourists' spending on other goods and services, such as gasoline, restaurant
meals, and lodging, in addition to taxes collected on the marijuana purchases. The importance of drug tourism will depend partially on the prevalence of these three
different types of drug tourists. The Colorado Tourism Office reports that the tax revenues per tourist dollar spent vary due to differing local tax rates and types, but
the average is about 5.5% per tourist. n95 Hence, if a drug tourist spent $ 300 on meals, lodging, and other expenses
for every $ 100 worth of marijuana purchased, the sales tax revenue on those ancillary purchases
could exceed the excise plus sales-tax revenue from the marijuana sale. n96 For Colorado tourists, per-
visit spending varies from $ 1,000 for skiers down to $ 48 for day-trippers, with an average of $ 370.
n97 Likewise, the importance of drug tourism depends on the number of tourists. Washington state and Colorado together have roughly six percent of the
nation's current marijuana users, n98 so if even a modest share of users elsewhere obtained their marijuana directly or indirectly via drug tourism, the volume of
sales via drug tourism might be significant compared to the volume of sales to in-state residents. [*1065] C. FICA and Income Taxes on "New" Jobs Another
part of the marijuana industry that becomes taxable under legalization is the salaries of workers, who
(unlike workers in illicit industries) pay income and payroll taxes. How important that is depends on the share of wages in
total costs. In many industries, labor costs predominate. If that were true also for the new marijuana industry, payroll taxes might be roughly comparable to excise-
tax revenues in Colorado. To see why, suppose, for example, the proportion of the retail sales price that comes from paying wages is the same as the wholesale
price as a proportion of retail. Then, suppose that wholesale prices are two-thirds of retail prices, and two-thirds of the marijuana industry's cost structure comes
from wages. Since the FICA rate is 15.3%, counting the employer's half, n99 it would produce essentially the same revenue as a fifteen percent excise tax on the
wholesale value. Ironically, that would be revenue to the federal government, not to the state that legalized. That said, states could also collect
income taxes on marijuana-industry wages; for example, 4.63% in Colorado. D. Hosting Support Industry Even if
most of the marijuana industry's cost structure will come from labor, it will also purchase capital
equipment (e.g., grow lights), materials (e.g., growing medium), utilities (e.g., electricity), and
professional services (e.g., legal counsel). Many of those purchases will generate sales-tax revenue,
and they may also sustain a local ancillary industry, just as auto-assembly plants sustain a supply chain of parts suppliers.
Furthermore, what the marijuana industry spends locally on wages and equipment becomes income
for others in the state, which triggers additional spending. Economic development studies discuss this additional spending in
terms of a "multiplier effect" of hosting an industry. For example, Gazel explains this effect for casino gambling. n100 In this context, the marijuana industry creates
an initial round of economic activity through the purchase of equipment, [*1066] materials, utilities, and professional services ("direct effects"). Those businesses in
turn buy the goods and services they need, creating another round of spending, and so on ("indirect effects"). Further, as incomes of regional employees in these
industries rise, household spending increases ("induced effects"). To the extent that these expenditures stay in a legalizing
state and do not "leak" out, each dollar spent on the marijuana industry will have an additional
impact on the economy and revenues as spending ripples through the economy. E. Consumer Cost Savings If
legalizing marijuana drives down prices, then marijuana spending may decline as well, since demand
for marijuana may be sufficiently price inelastic n101 so as to offset non-price factors through which
legalization might promote greater use. n102 If so, legalization could act a bit like a technological
innovation that increases consumer welfare and frees money up for other uses. Suppose that, for the sake of
argument, before legalization, consumers were spending $ 30 billion on marijuana and paying no sales tax on those expenditures. Suppose further that after
legalization, use went up but prices fell enough to reduce spending to $ 20 billion. The discussion above in Part I considered the potential sales tax revenue on the $
20 billion, but what of the residual $ 10 billion? Unless total personal income shrinks (via some macroeconomic contraction f rom increased production efficiency
displacing workers), it seems plausible that some of that $ 10 billion might be spent on other goods and services that would be taxed.

Plan allows states to better participate in bond markets which solves finance issues.
Dunn, Fortune Magazine, 2014
(Catherine, How marijuana munis could save the states, 1-30, http://fortune.com/2014/01/30/how-
marijuana-munis-could-save-the-states/, ldg)

Bonds backed by billions of dollars in pot sales taxes could shore up hard-hit state budgets that is, if the
feds would get out of the way. FORTUNE Thomas Doe, an analyst in the municipal bond market, was in Denver to give a speech last
September when an unmistakable scent caught his attention. Hed been walking down the 16th Street Mall, the citys main retail drag, and Im smelling it in the
air, says Doe, who goes by Tom. Then, completing the tableau, Doe popped into a hotel lobby and spotted three dudes wearing tie-dye and snacking on chips
this just a few months before marijuana for recreational use went on sale in Colorado. Thats when things really started to click for the 55-year-old founder and CEO
of Municipal Market Advisors, a research firm with subscribers including some 300 institutional investors, along with government regulators. Earlier last year Doe
and his colleagues had joked about whether a market for medical marijuana tourism could revive the flagging finances of a place like Puerto Rico, whose bond rating
has dropped in recent years. After Does trip to Denver, though, his thoughts on the matter of cannabis and credit ratings
turned serious, particularly in light of certain revenue projections. The Colorado Legislative Council Staff estimated additional
revenues from legalization, for example, at $100 million over two years (PDF). In Washington State, where recreational sales will begin later this year, a fiscal
impact study said tax revenue could reach up to $1.9 billion over five years, averaging nearly $400
million annually. Indeed, legalizing marijuana nationwide, to believe a 2010 report by the Cato Institute, would generate
some $8.7 billion in tax revenue, in addition to billions in cost savings related to law enforcement. Doe believes thats enough
money to help cash-strapped municipalities meet pension obligations, undertake construction
projects, and lower their borrowing costs in the bond market and, therefore, enough to inspire other states to legalize
marijuana, too. It would be a real positive for states that are struggling right now, he tells Fortune. Theyve got such an infrastructure
funding gap and they have challenges with funding their pensions that this is significant revenue. Gregory Whiteley, portfolio
manager for government securities at Jeffrey Gundlachs DoubleLine Capital, agrees about the potential upside. By all accounts the legal recreational marijuana
market is potentially quite large, so the impact on state and local finances could be significant, he says. Its not a totally new
idea. Back in 2010, hundreds of attendees surveyed at a Bond Buyer conference in California agreed that bonds backed by marijuana taxes
would materialize were the state to legalize the recreational use. (That measure, Proposition 19, failed the same year.) A
state estimate, from 2009, had put revenue potential at $1.4 billion a year (PDF). Though solid data is still lacking, Whiteley says that for now the subject is
definitely on my radar. Doe, meanwhile, has been busy putting the issue on the radar of analysts and investors. He began to speak publicly last fall about the
future of marijuana and public finances first to attendees at a bond market industry conference in Chicago in October, then to institutional investors at the
Massachusetts Investor Conference in December. This month he told clients in a research note that a successful experience in Colorado could result in a domino
effect of legalization across the country. Colorados legalization of marijuana on Jan. 1 will provide hard data as to the potential revenue source from the cannabis
product directly as well as ancillary products and services, according to the note provided to Fortune. Should tax revenue match projections then other states and
cities are apt to follow the lead of Colorado. State budget planners arent convinced by marijuanas potential just yet. Budget office folks are going to be very
cautious until they see money coming in, says Scott Pattison, executive director of the National Association of State Budget Officers. NASBOs membership would
also want to see whether any revenue gains are offset by expenditures resulting from legalization say, additional costs related to law enforcement or public
health. In other words, Pattison notes, Are there extra expenses, or do we spend less in certain areas? Budget officers would certainly take notice, however, of
revenue figures that exceed 2% of a states budget. Then I think theyll start to say, Yeah, wow, Pattison says. By Does reckoning, $400 million is enough to fund,
hypothetically, 10 social service programs that cost $40 million each, or to finance major construction. $400 million of new tax revenue would be material, he
says, adding, Ive seen states borrow $400 million to help fund infrastructure projects.
Plan
The United States should legalize nearly all marijuana in the United States.
LA Relations Adv
Marijuana legalization is a necessary first step to transform relations with Latin
America
Hakim, Inter-American Dialogue president emeritus, 2014
(Peter, Why the U.S. should legalize marijuana, 1-26,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3496, ldg)

Legalizing cannabis, a step most Americans now favor, is the only way out of this jumble, particularly after
President Obama made clear that he would not enforce a federal ban on marijuana use in those states where it was now lawful. We have other fish to fry, he said.
In another interview, he said marijuana is no more harmful than alcohol. Legalization should also contribute to easier relations
with Mexico and other neighbors to the south on issues of public security. To be sure, legal marijuana comes with costs
and risks. The American Medical Association considers cannabis a dangerous drug while the American Psychiatric Association asserts that its use impedes
neurological development in adolescents and can cause the onset of psychiatric disorders. Some studies suggest it interferes with learning and motivation. It
should be anticipated that legalization will lead to greater use, at all ages, as marijuana becomes more accessible and less expensive, and the cultural and social
stigmas surrounding its consumption literally go up in smoke. Abuse and addiction including among juveniles will rise as well. But keeping marijuana illegal also
carries a high price tag. Particularly devastating are the human costs of arresting and jailing thousands upon thousands of young Americans each year. Roughly one-
third of all U.S. citizens are arrested by age 23. Racial and ethnic minorities are most vulnerable. African-American marijuana users are over three times more likely
to be arrested and imprisoned than whites, even though the two groups consume the drug at virtually the same levels. With cannabis accounting for roughly half of
total drug arrests, legalization would sharply reduce this egregious disparity. It would also save money by reducing the U.S. prison population. A half a million people
were incarcerated for drug offenses in 2011, a ten-fold jump since 1980 at an average annual cost per prisoner of more than $20,000 in a minimum-security
federal facility. Cannabis legalization would also help to lift an unneeded burden from U.S. foreign policy in
Latin America, where Washingtons drug war has long strained diplomatic relations. Most
governments in the hemisphere have concluded that U.S. anti-drug policies are just not working and,
in many places, are actually contributing to mounting levels of crime, violence and corruption. Colombia
has been a notable exception. With U.S. support of nearly $10 billion, the country has become far more secure in the past dozen years. Yet Juan Manuel Santos,
Colombias president and arguably Washingtons closest ally in the region, is now a leading advocate of alternative drug strategies. In an exhaustive report last year,
prompted by President Santos, the Organization of American States analyzed a range of alternative policy approaches, including cannabis legalization. Few Latin
American countries are actively contemplating legalization a la Uruguay. But many have stopped arrests for use and possession of marijuana, and virtually all are
keeping a close watch on developments in Uruguay. Nowhere is there much enthusiasm for cooperating with the United States in its continuing efforts to eradicate
drug crops and interrupt drug flows. A decision by the U.S. government to legalize marijuana would be a bold step
toward breaking todays bureaucratic and political inertia and opening the way for a genuine
hemisphere-wide search for alternative strategies.

Absent the plan military and law enforcement issues dominate the agendathe plan
is key to send a signal of partnership.
Carlsen, Center for International Policy Americas program director, 2013
(Laura, At the UN, a Latin American Rebellion, 10-4, http://fpif.org/un-latin-american-rebellion/, ldg)

Latin American leaders have grown increasingly discontent about more longstanding U.S. policies as
well. Right here, in this same headquarters, 52 years ago, the convention that gave birth to the war on drugs was approved. Today, we must acknowledge, that
war has not been won, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos said, noting that his country has suffered more deaths, more bloodshed, and more sacrifices in
this war than almost any other. Santos, as he has done before, called for changing tracks rather than intensifying the war. He noted that he led the effort in the
Organization of American States to study different scenarios (meaning alternatives to the drug war approach) and commissioned studies that will be made
available to the public and evaluated in a UN Special Session in 2016. He concluded with a jab at the U.S.-led drug war. If we act
together with a comprehensive and modern visionfree of ideological and political biasesimagine
how much harm and how much violence we could avoid, he said. Central American nations repeated the need for a new model.
Costa Ricas Laura Chinchilla cited a regional agreement including Mexico and Guatemala to reevaluate internationally agreed-upon policies in search of more
effective responses to drug trafficking, from a perspective of health, a framework of respect for human rights, and a perspective of harm reduction. Guatemalan
President Otto Perez Molina, a military man who has somewhat ironically assumed the mantle of drug reform champion, told the UN, Since the start of my
government, we have clearly affirmed that the war on drugs has not yielded the desired results and that we cannot continue doing the same thing and expecting
different results. He called on nations to assess internationally agreed policies in search of more effective results and urged approaches based on public health,
violence reduction, respect for human rights, and cooperation to reduce the flow of arms and illegal funds. Perez Molina openly praised the vi sionary decision of
the citizens of the U.S. states of Colorado and Washington to legalize marijuana, and heralded the example set by [Uruguayan] President Jose Mujica in proposing
legislation that regulates the cannabis market instead of following the failed route of prohibition. Mexicos minister used the same terms, quoting the regional
agreement and placing a priority on prevention, arms control, and opening a global debate. Bolivias Morales noted that according to UN data, his country has made
more progress on fighting drug trafficking after liberating ourselves from the DEA, referring to his decision to expel the U.S. agency from Bolivia. This
onslaught of drug war opposition is not welcome in Washington. The Obama administration has been
actively trying to divert or dilute Latin American calls to reduce its militarized counternarcotics
operations, concerned more with maintaining and expanding the U.S. military presence in the region
than eliminating drug trafficking, which a recent report again shows has not diminished. Listening to Latin America Spying and the drug war
werent the only criticisms. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro cancelled his UN participation altogether, citing provocations against him and fears for his
safety were he to visit the UNs New York City headquarters. His demand to move UN headquarters out of the United States was reiterated by other Latin American
leaders. Tensions have been high between the United States and Venezuela despite the death of U.S. nemesis Hugo Chavez. Maduro just expelled U.S. charg d
affaires Kelly Kiederling and two others for allegedly encouraging acts of sabotage against the Venezuelan electrical system and economy in meetings with right-
wing groups. Criticisms of inaction on global warming were also aimed northward. Mujica of Uruguay lashed out at U.S. consumer culture, saying, If everyone
aspired to live like the average U.S. citizen, wed need three planets. Amid all this, the mainstream media paid little attention to Latin America. Its time to
listen to what theyre saying. This is a bold new Latin America speaking. Not only are these nations
reclaiming a right to differentiate their views from those of the global superpower and refusing to
render it diplomatic tributewhatever your views, a step forward in self-determinationthey are
also standing up in defense of rights we should all be defending far more vigorously. Brazil and its allies sounded
an alarm that should be heeded by all nations and by U.S. citizens especially: it is not acceptable to assume that in the modern age we no longer have the basic right
to privacy. U.S. government eavesdropping on President Rousseff and othersthanks to the global reach of ATT, Microsoft, and Google, and their unprincipled
compliance with the unprincipled requests of the NSA and other spy agenciesaffects everyone. The spy-versus-spy scenarios that made for intriguing novels have
given way to a spy industry vs. common citizen reality on a global scale. And once again, our generation is demonstrating a terrible willingness to sacrifice rights that
our ancestors fought for and our children may never inherit. The evident anger in the words of these Latin American heads of
state shows just how far Washingtons relations with the region have deteriorated. It demonstrates
the growing gap between rhetoric and reality since Obama promised the region a relationship based
on mutual respect and self determination at the beginning of his first term. Diplomacy, reaffirmed in the 68th
Assembly, has been steadily eroding in U.S. relations with Latin America as the Pentagon dominates
the agenda. Does it matter for the United States to have good relations with Latin America, including
the left-leaning leaders? Apparently, Washington has decided it doesnt. Its defensive response to the spy scandal, its
efforts to pit its free-trade allies against countries that have turned away from neoliberal economies, and its use of regional allies like
Colombia and Mexico as proxy militaries has sought to create rifts rather than mend them. The U.S.
government continues to play the neighborhood bully long after the kids on the block have grown
up. The flurry of state visits to the region have generally aimed to reinforce unpopular policies,
including the drug war and free trade, rather than listen to the calls for change. In-the-box Washington pundits
view the hemispheric outburst in the UN as a PR problem. But the Obama administration doesnt need to work on its niceties or polish its Spanish. What it
needs to do is ditch the offensive policies and practices that stirred up regional ire. The voices of
outrage from the South brought an important lesson to the UN floor: Deception and strong-arm
tactics eventually backfire.


Closer cooperation with Laitn America is key to renewable energy development and
an effective ECPA which sets a model for global energy governance
Brune, Truman National Security Fellow, 2010
(Nancy, Latin America: A Blind Spot in US Energy Security Policy, 7-26,
http://ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=250:south-of-the-border-americas-
key-to-energy-security&catid=108:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=365, ldg)

Moving forward In many ways, the fate of Latin America and the US are strongly linked. This is no less true
with our energy security interests. At this time, the US needs to move past the rhetoric and take concrete measures to direct resources,
capabilities and even some creativity into building a stronger, strategic relationship with our neighbors in Latin America in order to address our long term security
needs. How do we do this? First, the United States should commit sufficient financial, human and technological
resources to making the Energy Climate Partnerships of the Americas (ECPA), formed in April 2009 at the Fifth
Summit of the Americas, a viable, strong enterprise. The ECPA supports initiatives that focus on energy efficiency,
renewable energy, cleaner fossil fuels, critical infrastructure and energy poverty alleviation . However,
regional experts note that there has been little progress. While energy security can be strengthened by making progress in these areas,
the US needs to broaden the scope of the ECPA to explicitly discuss issues of energy security (including physical security of energy infrastructure), market-enhancing
regulatory frameworks, as well as energy integrationone of the regions greatest challengeswhich affects price stability and supply networks. Latin
America has frequently launched regional entities with the objective of improving energy integration
and collaboration. Among these are the Regional Electrical Integration Commission (1964), the Latin American Reciprocal State Oil Assistance Association
(1965), the Latin American Energy Organization (1973), and Initiative for Regional Infrastructure South American integration (2000). As recently as 2007, the South
American Energy Council was established. However, the overwhelming consensus is that energy integration and
coordination among Latin American nations remains limited and that these institutions have been ineffective, largely because
they could not overcome the challenges associated with asymmetrical regulatory frameworks, policy coordination and implementation of rules and procedures. In
their recent piece in Foreign Affairs, David G. Victor and Linda Yueh conclude that (global) energy governance requires a mechanism
for coordinating hard-nosed initiatives focused on delivering energy security and environmental
protection." The US, a country with strong institutions and regulatory bodies, must take a leadership
role to ensure that ECPA avoid the fate of previous regional energy initiatives by articulating clear mechanisms for
making decisions and resolving conflicts, establishing performance metrics, coordinating policies across countries, and monitoring and evaluating outcomes. In
other words, the US, as author of the ECPA initiative, has the added responsibility of guaranteeing its success. The energy security of the US
and of our Latin American partners cannot afford another failed effort to manage the regions energy
problems. If successful, the ECPA could serve as a model of regional, and possibly global, energy
governance, replacing the international and national institutions that are struggling to remain
relevant. Second, the US must leverage the opportunity presented by the creation of the ECPA to strengthen and expand strategic, bilateral energy
arrangements with our resource-wealthy neighbors, just as China, Iran, Russia and India are doing. America should not view ECPA as a substitute for bilateral
arrangements, but as a long-overdue occasion to jump start relations and create bold, new partnerships. To this end, the US should remove the $.58 tariff on
imported Brazilian ethanol, a policy measure which has paralyzed efforts to move forward on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on biofuels, signed by
Brazil and the US in 2007, in which the two countries expressed an intention to cooperate in research and the production and export of ethanol, with the goal of
developing a global biofuels market. The current landscape is ripe for technological partnerships which should provide the cornerstone of strategic, bilateral energy
partnerships. According to EIAs World Energy Outlook of 2007, Latin America needs to invest
approximately $1.3 trillion in overall investment in its energy sector by 2030. Moreover, the potential
for renewable energy production has remained unexplored due to engineering difficulties,
environmental concerns and lack of investment. Americas technological expertisewielded by our
private sector companies, research institutions and unique configuration of national laboratories
could assist and support strategic partnerships between the US and our Latin American neighbors.
These sorts of strategic collaborations could enable the Western Hemisphere to become the global
behemoth in renewable energy and biofuels, an area in which we are quickly losing ground to China. America stands at a crossroads. On
the one hand, we can continue our muddled, reactive engagement with Latin America. Or, we can
forge a bold new vision of collaborative engagement to strengthen our energy security and manage
the regions energy problems. Our global counterparts recognize that the countries south of the border are critical to their energy security
interests. Will America?

Failure to solve warming causes extinction geological history proves
Bushnell, NASA Langley Research Center chief scientist, 2010 (Dennis M. has a MS in mechanical
engineering, won the Lawrence A. Sperry Award, AIAA Fluid and Plasma Dynamics Award, the AIAA Dryden Lectureship, and is the recipient of
many NASA Medals for outstanding Scientific Achievement and Leadership, "Conquering Climate Change," The Futurist 44. 3, May/Jun 2010,
ProQuest)

Unless we act, the next century could see increases in species extinction, disease, and floods affecting one-third
of human population. But the tools for preventing this scenario are in our hands. Carbon-dioxide levels are now
greater than at any time in the past 650,000 years, according to data gathered from examining ice cores. These increases in CO2
correspond to estimates of man-made uses of fossil carbon fuels such as coal, petroleum, and natural gas. The global climate
computations, as reported by the ongoing Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) studies, indicate that such man-made CO2 sources could
be responsible for observed climate changes such as temperature increases, loss of ice coverage, and ocean
acidification. Admittedly, the less than satisfactory state of knowledge regarding the effects of aerosol and other issues make the global climate
computations less than fully accurate, but we must take this issue very seriously. I believe we should act in accordance with the precautionary principle: When
an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures become
obligatory, even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. As paleontologist Peter Ward discussed in his book Under a
Green Sky, several "warming events" have radically altered the life on this planet throughout geologic
history. Among the most significant of these was the Permian extinction, which took place some 250 million years ago. This
event resulted in a decimation of animal life, leading many scientists to refer to it as the Great Dying.
The Permian extinction is thought to have been caused by a sudden increase in CO2 from Siberian
volcanoes. The amount of CO2 we're releasing into the atmosphere today, through human activity, is 100 times greater
than what came out of those volcanoes. During the Permian extinction, a number of chain reaction events, or
"positive feedbacks," resulted in oxygen-depleted oceans, enabling overgrowth of certain bacteria,
producing copious amounts of hydrogen sulfide, making the atmosphere toxic, and decimating the ozone
layer, all producing species die-off. The positive feedbacks not yet fully included in the IPCC projections include the
release of the massive amounts of fossil methane, some 20 times worse than CO2 as an accelerator of warming, fossil CO2
from the tundra and oceans, reduced oceanic CO2 uptake due to higher temperatures, acidification and algae
changes, changes in the earth's ability to reflect the sun's light back into space due to loss of glacier ice, changes in land
use, and extensive water evaporation (a greenhouse gas) from temperature increases. The additional effects of these feedbacks
increase the projections from a 4C-6C temperature rise by 2100 to a 10C-12C rise, according to some estimates. At those temperatures,
beyond 2100, essentially all the ice would melt and the ocean would rise by as much as 75 meters, flooding the homes of
one-third of the global population. Between now and then, ocean methane hydrate release could cause major tidal waves, and
glacier melting could affect major rivers upon which a large percentage of the population depends. We'll see increases in flooding, storms,
disease, droughts, species extinctions, ocean acidification, and a litany of other impacts, all as a consequence of man-
made climate change. Arctic ice melting, CO2 increases, and ocean warming are all occurring much faster than previous IPCC forecasts, so, as dire as the
forecasts sound, they're actually conservative.



Newest and most rigorous studies conclude warming is anthropogenic no alt causes
Muller, University of California-Berkeley physics professor, 2012 (Richard A., former MacArthur
Foundation fellow, "The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic," 7-28-12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-
climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all)

Call me a converted skeptic. Three years ago I identified problems in previous climate studies that, in my
mind, threw doubt on the very existence of global warming. Last year, following an intensive research effort
involving a dozen scientists, I concluded that global warming was real and that the prior estimates of
the rate of warming were correct. Im now going a step further: Humans are almost entirely the cause. My total
turnaround, in such a short time, is the result of careful and objective analysis by the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature project, which I founded with my
daughter Elizabeth. Our results show that the average temperature of the earths land has risen by two and a
half degrees Fahrenheit over the past 250 years, including an increase of one and a half degrees over the most recent 50 years.
Moreover, it appears likely that essentially all of this increase results from the human emission of
greenhouse gases. These findings are stronger than those of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the United
Nations group that defines the scientific and diplomatic consensus on global warming. In its 2007 report, the I.P.C.C. concluded only that most of the warming of the
prior 50 years could be attributed to humans. It was possible, according to the I.P.C.C. consensus statement, that the warming before 1956 could be because of
changes in solar activity, and that even a substantial part of the more recent warming could be natural. Our Berkeley Earth approach used
sophisticated statistical methods developed largely by our lead scientist, Robert Rohde, which allowed us to determine earth
land temperature much further back in time. We carefully studied issues raised by skeptics: biases from
urban heating (we duplicated our results using rural data alone), from data selection (prior groups selected fewer than 20 percent of the
available temperature stations; we used virtually 100 percent), from poor station quality (we separately analyzed good stations and poor ones) and
from human intervention and data adjustment (our work is completely automated and hands-off). In our papers we demonstrate that
none of these potentially troublesome effects unduly biased our conclusions. The historic temperature pattern we
observed has abrupt dips that match the emissions of known explosive volcanic eruptions; the particulates from such events reflect sunlight, make for beautiful
sunsets and cool the earths surface for a few years. There are small, rapid variations attributable to El Nio and other ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream;
because of such oscillations, the flattening of the recent temperature rise that some people claim is not, in our view, statistically significant. What has caused the
gradual but systematic rise of two and a half degrees? We tried fitting the shape to simple math functions (exponentials, polynomials),
to solar activity and even to rising functions like world population. By far the best match was to the
record of atmospheric carbon dioxide, measured from atmospheric samples and air trapped in polar ice. Just as important, our record
is long enough that we could search for the fingerprint of solar variability, based on the historical record
of sunspots. That fingerprint is absent. Although the I.P.C.C. allowed for the possibility that variations in sunlight could have ended the Little
Ice Age, a period of cooling from the 14th century to about 1850, our data argues strongly that the temperature rise of the past
250 years cannot be attributed to solar changes. This conclusion is, in retrospect, not too surprising; weve learned from
satellite measurements that solar activity changes the brightness of the sun very little. How definite is the
attribution to humans? The carbon dioxide curve gives a better match than anything else weve tried. Its
magnitude is consistent with the calculated greenhouse effect extra warming from trapped heat radiation. These facts dont
prove causality and they shouldnt end skepticism, but they raise the bar: to be considered seriously, an alternative explanation must match the data at least as well
as carbon dioxide does. Adding methane, a second greenhouse gas, to our analysis doesnt change the results.
Moreover, our analysis does not depend on large, complex global climate models, the huge computer programs that are notorious for their hidden assumptions and
adjustable parameters. Our result is based simply on the close agreement between the shape of the observed temperature rise and the known greenhouse gas
increase. Its a scientists duty to be properly skeptical. I still find that much, if not most, of what is attributed to climate change is speculative, exaggerated or just
plain wrong. Ive analyzed some of the most alarmist claims, and my skepticism about them hasnt changed. Hurricane Katrina cannot be attributed to global
warming. The number of hurricanes hitting the United States has been going down, not up; likewise for intense tornadoes. Polar bears arent dying from receding
ice, and the Himalayan glaciers arent going to melt by 2035. And its possible that we are currently no warmer than we were a thousand years ago, during the
Medieval Warm Period or Medieval Optimum, an interval of warm conditions known from historical records and indirect evidence like tree rings. And the recent
warm spell in the United States happens to be more than offset by cooling elsewhere in the world, so its link to global warming is weaker than tenuous. The
careful analysis by our team is laid out in five scientific papers now online at BerkeleyEarth.org. That site also
shows our chart of temperature from 1753 to the present, with its clear fingerprint of volcanoes and carbon dioxide, but containing no component that matches
solar activity. Four of our papers have undergone extensive scrutiny by the scientific community, and the
newest, a paper with the analysis of the human component, is now posted, along with the data and
computer programs used. Such transparency is the heart of the scientific method; if you find our conclusions implausible, tell us of any errors of data
or analysis. What about the future? As carbon dioxide emissions increase, the temperature should continue to rise. I
expect the rate of warming to proceed at a steady pace, about one and a half degrees over land in the
next 50 years, less if the oceans are included. But if China continues its rapid economic growth (it has averaged
10 percent per year over the last 20 years) and its vast use of coal (it typically adds one new gigawatt per month), then that same
warming could take place in less than 20 years. Science is that narrow realm of knowledge that, in principle, is universally accepted. I
embarked on this analysis to answer questions that, to my mind, had not been answered. I hope that the Berkeley Earth analysis will help settle the scientific debate
regarding global warming and its human causes. Then comes the difficult part: agreeing across the political and diplomatic spectrum about what can and should be
done.


Not too late to solve warming-international cooperation in the next year is key
Leber, ThinkProgress reporter, 2014
(Rebecca, Climate Change Scientists Warn: We're Almost Too Late, 8-27,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119236/un-draft-climate-report-issues-warning-world, ldg)

There is an alarming message in a major new report on climate change, a draft of which the New York Times obtained on Tuesday. The United Nations
I ntergovernmental P anel on C limate C hange, a group of leading scientists who review the latest
and best available research, say we are dangerously close to the day when it will no longer be possible
to limit global warming to 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit (2.0 degrees Celsius) by mid-centurysomething
that world leaders have pledged to do. Of course, the pledge might already be delusional, given that countries continue to burn fossil fuels
at an unprecedented rate. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, emissions grew at 2.2 percent per year. Thats nearly twice as much as they increased in
the three decades that preceded it. And its no secret why. While emissions have been slowing in industrialized countries, that hasnt offset the growth in emissions
from China and India. The report also finds companies and countries are sitting on four times more of the fossil fuels than the world should be burning if it
reasonably expects to keep the worst of global warming at bay. In other words, countries will have the opportunity to fill the atmosphere with way too many
greenhouse gasesthe question is whether they can somehow resist the temptation. This latest draft is a revision of an earlier one,
which Reuters obtained in August. That version suggested that we would need drastic greenhouse gas
cuts of 40 to 70 percent worldwide by 2050, in order to keep to the 3.6 degrees target. What that
means in plain language is that countries like the U.S. and China would need to start confronting the
economic costs of switching away from fossil fuels now, in order to avoid a much more dangerous
(and costly) future. Why is 3.6 degrees so important? Most research today looks at the consequences warming on this scale. Its not a sure thing, as the
scientists acknowledge. The actual increase would fall somewhere within a fairly broad range. But even more optimistic scenarios, in which the planet ends up
warming little, would entail more extreme weather, acidic oceans, and a changing ecosystem. On the other end of the spectrum are some really nightmarish
possibilities. At eight degrees of warming, which the draft report sees as a distinct possibility, the effects would include vast ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica
destabilizing completely, changing coastal civilization as we know it as sea levels rise by 23 feet. Recent studies suggest the western Antarctic ice sheet may already
be past the point of irreversible melting, so this scenario is not far-fetched. The clock is ticking and the nations of the world are
well it remains to be seen what the nations of the world will do. Next month the United Nations
will hold a Climate Summit. Its the prelude to a much bigger round of international negotiations, in
Paris in 2015. President Barack Obama seems to be brokering a climate accord ahead of these talks
seen as the best chance coordinate and agree upon the greenhouse gas cuts needed that would sidestep
Republican opposition by not requiring Senate ratification. Because as this new report indicates, waiting another day to
take action on climatelet alone a whole yearis tempting fate.

2ACCase
Terror Epist

Turns the K and negates the salience of subversive narrativesnew attacks push the
public to the right
McDonough 9 (David. S. McDonough, Fellow at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie
University, Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and Security Addiction in U.S. Grand Strategy, Winter 2009,
Orbis, ScienceDirect)

The reason that the current debate is currently mired in second-order issues of multilateral versus unilateral legitimacy can be attributed to the post 9/11 security
environment. A grand strategy is, after all, a states theory about how it can best cause security for itself. 35
It would be prudent to examine why the neoconservative theory proved to be so attractive to American decision-
makers after the 9/11 attacks, and why the Democrats have begun to rely on an equally primacist theory of
their own. As Charles Kupchan has demonstrated, a sense of vulnerability is often directly associated with dramatic shifts in a states grand strategy. Kupchan is, of
course, largely concerned with vulnerability to changes in the global distribution of power. 36 Even so, the 9/11 terrorist attacks have
dramatically increased the U.S. sense of strategic vulnerability to both global terrorist organizations like
Al Qaeda and even to more traditional threats that are seen, as Donald Rumsfeld said, in a dramatic new lightthrough the prism
of our experience on 9/11. 37 Perhaps more than any previous terrorist action, these attacks demonstrated the potential inuence
of non-state terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. U.S. strategic primacy makes conventional responses
unattractive and ultimately futile to potential adversaries. The countrys societal vulnerability to terrorist
attacks will likewise lead to extremely costly defensive reactions against otherwise limited attacks. For both
the United States and its asymmetrical adversaries, the advantage clearly favors the offense over the
defense. With the innumerable list of potential targets, preemptive and preventive attacks will accomplish more against. .
.*terrorists or their support structures+, dollar for dollar, than the investment in passive defenses. 38 As former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith
has argued, a primary reliance on defense requires instrusive security measures that would inevitably endanger American civil liberties and curtail its free and open
society. 39 Strategic preponderance ensures that the United States will continue to face adversaries eager to implement asymmetrical tactics, even as it offers the
very resources necessary to implement both offensive and less effective defensive measures. Unfortunately, terrorist groups with strategic reach (i.e., capable of
inuencing the actions of states) will likely increase in the coming years due to a combination of factors, including the democractization of technology, the
privatization of war and the miniaturization of weaponry. As more groups are imbued with sophisticated technological
capabilities and are able to employ increasingly lethal weapons, the United States will be forced to rely
even further on its unprecedented global military capabilities to eliminate this threat. The global war on terror, even with tactical successes
against al Qaeda, will likely result in an inconclusive ending marked by the fragmentation and proliferation of terrorist spoiler groups. The Israelization of the
United States, in which security trumps everything, will be no temporary phenomenon. 40 Realism provides an insufcient means for understanding the current
post-9/11 strategic threat environment and underestimates the potential impact of the terrorist threat on the American sense of vulnerability. Globalized terrorism
must be confronted by proactive measures to reduce the domestic vulnerability to attack and to eliminate these organizations in their external sanctuaries. Even
then, these measures will never be able to ensure perfect security. As a result, signicant public pressure for expanded security
measures will arise after any attack. The United States will be consumed with what Frank Harvey has termed security
addiction: As expectations for acceptable levels of pain decrease, billions of dollars will continue to be
spent by both parties in a never-ending competition to convince the American public that their partys
programs are different and more likely to succeed. 41 This addiction has an important impact on the
dramatically rising levels of homeland security spending. Indeed, while this increased spending is an inevitable and
prudent reaction to the terrorist threat, it also creates high public expectations that will only amplify outrage in a security
failure. 42 Relatedly, American strategic preponderance plays an important role in facilitating a vigorous international response to globalized terrorism, including
the use of coercive military options and interventions. A primacist strategy has the dual attraction of both maximizing U.S. strategic dominance and convincing the
public of a partys national security credentials. Indeed, the Republicans had developed a strong advantage in electoral
politics by its adherence to a strong military and aggressive strategy, and the Democrats in turn learned
the lesson of its vulnerability on the issue and *...+ explicitly declared its devotion to national security and support for the military. 43 The
9/11 attacks may not have altered the distribution of power amongst major states, but it has directly created a domestic poli tical situation marked by an addiction
to expansive security measures that are needed to satisfy increasingly high public expectations. In such a climate, it is easy to see why the neo-
conservatives were so successful in selling their strategic vision. The fact that the United States has
effectively settled on a grand strategy of primacy in the post-9/11 period should come as no surprise. It
is simply inconceivable that a political party could successfully advocate a grand strategy that does
not embrace military preeminence and interventionism, two factors that are seen to provide a denite
advantage in the pursuit of a global war on terror. Political parties may disagree on the necessary
tactics to eliminate the terrorist threat. But with increased vulnerability and security addiction, the United States will continue to
embrace strategies of primacy rather than going beyond primacyfor much of the Long War.
2. Outweighs on magnitudevote on body counts
Greene 2010 Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University
(Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, The Secret Joke of Kants Soul,
www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf, WEA)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational
enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which
themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because
of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that
can accommodate our moral intuitions . Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of
one, almost certainly doesn't . Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the
infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?"
How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that
we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have
inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved
emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain
unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood
what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about . Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or
that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's
about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on
(Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as
I've suggested, may be misleading . The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values
that are not distinctively deontological , though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with
religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an
answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than
oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's
nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to
love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists
can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the
existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they
may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard
deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to
ethics . (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have
respect for persons , are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that
rational creatures can share , etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating
them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process . Likewise,
a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting
according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests , i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that
consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from
other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work
backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If
you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in
order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's
murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights."
But , as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions)
the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment , even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge
case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are
natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having
emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are
inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to
powerful moral emotions . But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion,
they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

AT: Heg K

Psychological approaches wont impact policy
Blight, Brown IR professor, 1986
(James, How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?, Political Psycholgoy,
7.4, JSTOR)

In the past several years, there has been an emphatic revival of interest among psychologists and others in applying psychological insights
to the problem of reducing the risk of war, especially nuclear war. In the following sections, I have surveyed some of the
most influential recent attempts to link psychological knowledge with reducing the risk of nuclear
war. My conclusion regarding this enterprise is not unlike Freud's in response to Einstein's inquiry: The results so far indicate that the revival of Einsteinian
enthusiasm is unwarranted. In sum, the critical conclusions are these: 1. There has been little or no influence on the
policy-making process, at the level of deep, intermediate, or precipitating psychological causes of a
potential nuclear war. 2. There is reason to believe that such influence will continue to be minimal and also, in fact, that
it probably should be minimal, when viewed from the policy-maker's perspective. The most
compelling reason policy-makers have for ignoring psychiatrists and psychologists is this: the
assumptions and modus operandi at each level are utopian - in the case of the "depth" psychologists (see section 2) because
they believe they can change the mental structures of virtually all important world leaders, and for the
"intermediate" behavioral scientists (see section 3) because they believe they can convince foreign policy makers that it is in their best
interest to permit the transformation of nuclear policy into a virtual applied behavioral science. I believe that each
of these pursuits has been and will remain fruitless. Thus, since I regard influence on the policy process
as the sine qua non of successful nuclear risk reduction, I believe psychologists are likely to remain
out in the cold, as it were, without influence, despite all their good intentions. As I argue in the last two sections, on precipitating
psychological causes of a potential nuclear war, the time may be right for viewing the potential linkage between risk of
nuclear war and psychology in a new light. The main requirement is that psychologists learn to think
in a non-utopian way about the problem of nuclear risk reduction and that they therefore avoid
calling for conversion-like psychological revolutions and suggesting "off the shelf' solutions from their
laboratories and clinics. In the final section, an outline is sketched of a phenomenological approach to the precipitating psychological causes, an approach which may
eventually yield psychological information more useful to policy-makers than have previous approaches (Blight, 1985a,b; 1986).


AT: Econ Costs

Legalizations public health benefits outweigh the costsalcohol substitution means
less traffic fatalities, teen use, and health crises
Anderson and Rees 13
D. Mark, Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State
University, Daniel I., Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Colorado Denver and
the Editor-in-Chief of the Economics of Education Review, "The Legalization of Recreational Marijuana:
How Likely Is the Worst-Case Scenario?", Oct 22 2013, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
www.dmarkanderson.com/Point_Counterpoint_07_31_13_v5.pdf
Studies based on clearly-defined natural experiments generally support the hypothesis that marijuana and alcohol
are substitutes . For instance, DiNardo & Lemieux (2001) found that increasing the MLDA from 18 to 21 encourages
marijuana use. Using data from the NSDUH and a regression discontinuity design, Crost & Guerrero (2012) found a sharp
decrease in marijuana use at 21 years of age, suggesting that young adults treat alcohol and marijuana
as substitutes. Finally, Anderson, Hansen, & Rees (2013) examined the relationship between legalizing
medical marijuana and drinking using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. These
authors found that legalization was associated with reductions in heavy drinking especially among 18-
through 29-year-olds. In addition, they found that legalization was associated with an almost 5 percent decrease in
beer sales, the alcoholic beverage of choice among young adults (Jones, 2008).
The results of DiNardo & Lemieux (2001), Crost & Guerrero (2012) and Anderson, Hansen, & Rees (2013) suggest that, as marijuana becomes
more available, young adults in Colorado and Washington will respond by drinking less, not more. If non-medical marijuana states legalize the
use of recreational marijuana, they should also experience reductions in drinking with the accompanying public health benefits.
TRAFFFIC FATALITES
Reducing traffic injuries and fatalities is potentially one of the most important public health benefits
from legalizing the use of recreational marijuana. Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the principal psychoactive component of
marijuana, impairs driving-related functions (Kelly, Darke, & Ross, 2004), but there is evidence that drivers under the influence of
THC compensate for these impairments. For instance, they tend to drive slower and take fewer risks (Robbe &
OHanlon, 1993; Sewell, Poling, & Sofuoglu, 2009). In contrast, drivers under the influence of alcohol trend to drive
faster and take more risks (Burian, Liguori, & Robinson, 2002; Marczinski, Harrison, & Fillmore, 2008; Ronen et al., 2008). While
driving under the influence of marijuana is associated with a two-fold increase in the risk of being
involved in a collision (Asbridge, Hayden, & Cartwright, 2012), driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or
greater is associated with a 4- to 27-fold increase in this same risk (Peck et al., 2008).
Driving under the combined influence of alcohol and marijuana is especially dangerous (Sewell, Poling, & Sofuoglu, 2009). Therefore, if young
adults viewed alcohol and marijuana as complements, legalizing the recreational use of marijuana could seriously jeopardize roadway safety.
Fortunately, as noted above, studies based on clearly-defined natural experiments suggest that young
adults, a group responsible for a disproportionate share of traffic accidents and fatalities (Eustace & Wei,
2010), typically substitute marijuana in place of alcohol.
Using data from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) for the period 1990- 2010, Anderson, Hansen, & Rees (2013) examined the effect
of legalizing medical marijuana on traffic fatalities. They found that legalizing medical marijuana was associated with a 13
percent decrease in fatalities involving alcohol. It is important to note, however, that their results do not necessarily imply
that driving under the influence of marijuana is safer than driving under the influence of alcohol. Because marijuana is not
typically consumed in public venues such as restaurants and bars, their results may reflect fewer
impaired drivers on the road.3
Finally, the Washington law that legalized recreational marijuana also established a THC limit for drivers of 5 nanograms per milliliter of blood. 4
A strict THC limit above which drivers are automatically considered impaired may, in the future, be viewed by the public and policymakers as a
necessary complement to legalizing recreational marijuana. However, there is little evidence that, as currently implemented, such limits
actually improve roadway safety (Anderson & Rees 2012). Given this lack of evidence, policymakers might consider lowering the BAC limit. This
could deter drunk driving (Dee, 2001; Eisenberg, 2003) and come with the added benefit of discouraging driving under the combined influence
of alcohol and marijuana. Alternatively, a substantial increase in alcohol excise taxes could help to discourage driving under the combined
influence of alcohol and marijuana. The current excise tax on liquor sold in Colorado is 60.26 cents per liter, which represents roughly 3 percent
of the retail price of Jim Beam Whisky purchased by the bottle. 5 In comparison, Colorado is set to impose a 15 percent excise tax and a 10
percent special sales tax on marijuana sales (Ingold, 2013b). Washington is considering taxing producers, sellers and buyers at a total rate of 75
percent (Donlan, 2013).
MARIJUNA USE BY TEENAGERS
Policymakers and the public are especially concerned that legalization of recreational marijuana will
encourage substance use among teenagers. This concern is bolstered by the fact that Denver teenagers receiving treatment
for substance abuse have reported obtaining marijuana from medical marijuana patients (Thurstone, Lieberman, & Schmiege, 2011;
Salomonsen-Sautel et al., 2012). The interesting question, however, is not whether diversion to teenagers will occur with the legalization of
recreational marijuana (it will). The more interesting (and policy- relevant) question is whether marijuana use by teenagers will increase when
"pot shops" open throughout Colorado and Washington.
Using data from national and state Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS) for the period 1993 through 2011, Anderson, Hansen, & Rees
(2012) found little evidence of a relationship between legalizing medical marijuana and the use of
marijuana among high school students.6 Critics of Anderson, Hansen, & Rees (2012) have argued that youth access to medical
marijuana did not appreciably increase until medical marijuana dispensaries became widespread (Ferner, 2013). In an effort to explore the role
of dispensaries, we turned to local YRBS data for the period 2001-2011.7 Specifically, we compared marijuana use among Los Angeles high
school students to marijuana use among Chicago, Dallas, Boston, and Miami-Dade County high school students (Figure 1). The first dispensaries
began operating in Los Angeles prior to the passage of the Compassionate Use Act (Curtius & Yates, 1996), but the dispensary boom did not
occur until after 2004 (Jacobson et al., 2011). From 2005 to 2010, the number of dispensaries operating in Los Angeles surged from only a
handful to more than 600 (Jacobson et al., 2011). There were no legal medical marijuana dispensaries operating in Chicago, Dallas, Boston, or
Miami-Dade County during the period 2001-2011.
Figure 1 provides little evidence that marijuana use among Los Angeles high school students increased in the
mid-2000s, perhaps because dispensaries could sell to adults with some assurance of not being shut down, while selling
marijuana to a minor was still a risky proposition even after the passage of the Compassionate Use
Act. 9 Marijuana use among Los Angeles high school students actually declined from 2007 to 2009 and
then increased from 2009 to 2011. However, there were comparably-sized increases in marijuana use
among Chicago, Dallas and Boston high school students from 2009 to 2011.
CRIME AND OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH OUTCOMES
There is evidence of a link between alcohol abuse and violent crime, including domestic violence
(Markowitz & Grossman, 1998; Markowitz, 2000, 2005; Carpenter & Dobkin, 2010). Therefore, if the legalization of recreational
marijuana leads to reduced alcohol consumption, we expect violent crime to fall. It is also possible that non-
violent crime will fall as policing resources are freed up and reallocated (Miron & Zwiebel, 1995). Adda, McConnell,
& Rasul (2011) found that non-drug crime went down after Lambeth, a borough of London, temporarily suspended arrests for marijuana
possession.
Other potential public health benefits from legalizing recreational marijuana could include a reduction
in suicides (Anderson, Rees, & Sabia, 2012), increased product quality and fewer emergency room episodes
resulting from the use of marijuana laced with chemicals such as phencyclidine (PCP) and embalming fluid. Quality
oversight by the government is absent for illegal drugs, and repeated interactions between buyers and sellers in a prohibited market is, in all
likelihood, only a partial solution (Miron & Zwiebel, 1995).
Finally, it is possible that the legalization of recreational marijuana will impact the demand for hard drugs such as
cocaine and heroin. Previous studies have documented a positive association between the use of marijuana and hard drugs
(DeSimone, 1998; van Ours, 2003; Fergusson, Boden, & Horwood, 2006; Bretteville-Jensen, Melbergy, & Jonesz, 2008; Melberg, Jones, &
Bretteville-Jensen, 2010), but these studies were not based on clearly-defined natural experiments. Two exceptions are
Kelly & Rasul (2012) and Model (1993). Kelly & Rasul (2012) found that hospital admissions for hard drugs increased after
the borough of Lambeth suspended arrests for marijuana possession. In contrast, Model (1993), who used U.S. data,
found that marijuana decriminalization led to fewer emergency room episodes involving drugs other
than marijuana.
CONCLUSION
Kleimans worst-case scenario is possible, but not likely. Based on existing empirical evidence, we expect
that the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington will lead to increased marijuana
consumption coupled with decreased alcohol consumption. As a consequence, these states will experience a
reduction in the social harms resulting from alcohol use. While it is more than likely that marijuana produced by state-
sanctioned growers will end up in the hands of minors, we predict that overall youth consumption will remain stable. On
net, we predict the public health benefits of legalization to be positive.

Warming Reps

Apocalyptic reps induce action-studies prove
-several surveys
-case studies
-also indicts the fatalism argument
Veldman, Flordida religion PhD student, 2012
(Robin, Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning
Among Environmental Activists, Ethics and the Environment, 17.1, JSTOR)

As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in
this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest
evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national
survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony
Leiserowitz identified several interpretive communities, which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception.
The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled alarmists, described climate change ETHICS &
THE ENVIRONMENT, 17(1) 2012 using apocalyptic language, such as Badbadbadlike after nuclear warno vegetation, Heat
waves, its gonna kill the world, and Death of the planet (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize
environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior
compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists were significantly
more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to
pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent
of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitzs findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach,
Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled the Alarmed (again, due to their high levels of concern about
climate change) are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening,
humancaused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an
aggressive national response (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of
concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with
their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that *w+hen asked which reason for
action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of
most life on the planet (31%) (2009, 31)a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire
to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other
studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence
that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism,
rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation.

2ACGeneology K

Perm 2AC

Perm is best-embodying the values of the alternative via the plan is key to momentum
for broader change---all or nothing approaches failthe aff isnt mutually exclusive with
your geneoloigcal reading
Wright, Wisconsin sociology professor, 2007
(Erik Olin, Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias, April,
www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of
envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody
emancipatory values, but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often depends upon
the existence of smaller steps , intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right
direction but only partially embody these values. Institutional proposals which have an all-or-
nothing quality to them are both less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more
difficult transition-cost problems if implemented. The catastrophic experience of Russia in the shock therapy approach to
market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which
partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very
limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is
that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they
offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI,
and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want, therefore, are intermediate reforms that have
two main properties: first, they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of
transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of convincing people that the
alternative is credible and desirable; and second, they enhance the capacity for action of people ,
increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation
and bring people together in problem-solving deliberations for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard.
This is what in the 1970s was called nonreformist reforms: reforms that are possible within
existing institutions and that pragmatically solve real problems while at the same time
empowering people in ways which enlarge their scope of action in the future.


Individual Alts Fail 2AC

Individual rethinking fails -governments obey institutional logics that exist
independently of individuals and constrain decision making
Wight, Sydney IR professor, 2006
(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pg 48-50)

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to
this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A
worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts
presuppose them. At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of
relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This lattice-work of relations constitutes the
structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus,
the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the
social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures:
people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be
rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship
between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects
must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the point of contact between human
agency and social structures. This is known as a positioned practice system. In many respects, the idea of positioned
practice is very similar to Pierre Bourdieus notion of habitus. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to
refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or
as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieus notion of the habitus can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap
between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a social
field. According to Bourdieu, a social field is a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions
objectively defined. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by
individuals and/or institutions the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social
field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A habitus (positioned practices) is a mediating link between
individuals subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus
derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus
is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated
more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a
matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily
knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the habitus can be seen as the site of internalization
of reality and the externalization of internality. Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the
habitus and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is
appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the habitus. When placed within
Bhaskars stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as
field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any
particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly
recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of
relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not
dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by
particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of
individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion.
Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, a complex and independent reality
that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new
reality is societyIt becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables.


Fresh Water Add-On 2AC

Illegal cultivation damages watersheds and increases pesticide pollution
Christensen, Godon Thomas Honeywell Energy, Telecommunications & Utilities Group chair,
2014
(Eric, Pot, Power & Pollution: The Overlooked Impacts of Marijuana Legalization on Utilities and the
Environment, 4-17, http://www.energynaturalresourceslaw.com/2014/04/pot-power-pollution-the-
overlooked-impacts-of-marijuana-legalization-on-utilities.html)

Water utilities and irrigation districts should also pay attention to the process of legalizing marijuana in Washington. In addition to being heavy
energy users, indoor grow operations also use huge amounts of water, especially if the operation uses hydroponics.
One recent estimate suggests that a one-room hydroponic operation may require as much as 151
liters of water per day, equivalent to application of nearly 100 inches of water per year. Often, water
discharged from indoor operations carries heavy nutrient and pesticide loads, of potential concern for wastewater utilities. Illegal operations
frequently steal fresh water and illegal dump wastewater, and legalization therefore represents an
opportunity to curb these practices . Even when grown outdoors, marijuana is a water-intensive crop.
Experts suggest that marijuana grown outdoors has water needs similar to water-intensive crops such as hops and corn. Not surprisingly, illegal
growers pay little heed to legal requirements for water diversions. Illegal diversions can severely
reduce water flows where marijuana cultivation is common. For example, recent reports indicate that illegal diversions for
marijuana farms have dewatered northern California streams, making the bad effects of its severe drought even worse. Such practices have
serious implications for legitimate water users downstream, as well as fisheries and other water-
dependent resources. Legalization should reduce this form of illegality, and may reduce pressure in
Washington watersheds that are already bumping up against limits on diversions , even on the relatively moist
west side of the state. Implications for Environmental Protection Contrary to the stereotype of marijuana growers as genial and environmentally-conscious hippies,
illegal marijuana growers are often heavily-armed and operate with little or no regard for the environmental impacts of their operations. A growing body
of evidence demonstrates that illegal marijuana operations often use extremely heavy doses of
pesticides and rodenticides, far above what would be allowed for legitimate agricultural enterprises. In
addition, labeling, storage, use, and disposal restrictions and other regulations aimed at reducing the
environmental and human health impacts of pesticide use are often ignored. Illegal operations have many other
environmental impacts. For example, thousands of "trespass" operations, illegally occupying sites on National Forests and other public lands, especially in California,
have cropped up in recent years. Often, these operations are associated with illegal clearing of forests and severe damage to other public resources such as streams,
lakes, and soils. Illegal operations in remote locations often rely on heavily-polluting diesel generators for
power. Indoor grow operations relying on diesel generators may require 70 to 140 gallons of diesel fuel to produce a single plant. Greenhouse gas emissions
associated with illegal marijuana production provide a good proxy for its total environmental impacts. One recent analysis suggests that U.S. marijuana operations
produce about 15 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, equivalent to the emissions of three million average automobiles. Moving these illegal
operations out of the shadows should help reduce these environmental impacts. Legal growers will
have to comply with environmental regulations in the same manner as operators in other legal
industries. In addition, specific regulatory requirements may increase the incentives for legalized
growers to reduce their environmental impacts. For example, as noted above, the LCB's draft regulations require growers to disclose
information about pesticide use, creating an incentive to reduce that use. Similarly, some commentators propose a specific tax on carbon-intensive grow
operations, which would create incentives to reduce energy intensity and switch to low-carbon or carbon-free energy sources. Already, the LCB, which originally
proposed to allow only indoor production, has revised its regulations to allow for outdoor production in response to comments about the carbon footprint
associated with indoor production,

Freshwater biodiversity is independently key to prevent extinction
Dudgeon et al, University of Hong Kong Ecology & Biodiversity professor, 2006
(David, he has spent 30 years researching the ecology, biodiversity and conservation of the animals that
inhabit streams and rivers, author of over 150 papers in international journals, with Angela H.
Arthington, Mark O. Gessner, Zen-Ichiro Kawabata, Duncan J. Knowler, Christian Leveque, Robert J.
Naiman, Anne-Hele`ne Prieur-Richard, Doris Soto, Melanie L. J. Stiassny, and Caroline A. Sullivan,
"Freshwater biodiversity: importance, threats, status and conservation challenges," Biological Reviews,
81.2, 2006, 163-82, Wiley Online Library)

Freshwater biodiversity is the over-riding conservation priority during the International Decade for Action Water for Life
2005 to 2015. Fresh water makes up only 0.01% of the Worlds water and approximately 0.8 % of the Earths surface, yet this tiny fraction of global water
supports at least 100 000 species out of approximately 1.8 million almost 6 % of all described species. Inland waters and freshwater
biodiversity constitute a valuable natural resource, in economic, cultural, aesthetic, scientic and educational terms. Their
conservation and management are critical to the interests of all humans, nations and governments. Yet this precious heritage is in crisis. Fresh
waters are experiencing declines in biodiversity far greater than those in the most aected terrestrial ecosystems, and if trends in human demands for water remain unaltered and species losses continue at current rates, the
opportunity to conserve much of the remaining biodiversity in fresh water will vanish before the Water for Life decade ends in 2015. Why is this so, and what is being done about it? This article explores the special features of
freshwater habitats and the biodiversity they support that makes them especially vulnerable to human activities. We document threats to global freshwater biodiversity under ve headings : overexploitation; water pollution ; ow
modication; destruction or degradation of habitat; and invasion by exotic species. Their combined and interacting inuences have resulted in population declines and range reduction of freshwater biodiversity worldwide.
Conservation of biodiversity is complicated by the landscape position of rivers and wetlands as receivers of land-use euents, and the problems posed by endemism and thus non-substitutability. In addition, in many parts of the
world, fresh water is subject to severe competition among multiple human stakeholders. Protection of freshwater biodiversity is perhaps the ultimate conservation challenge because it is inuenced by the upstream drainage
network, the surrounding land, the riparian zone, and in the case of migrating aquatic fauna downstream reaches. Such prerequisites are hardly ever met. Immediate action is needed where opportunities exist to set aside intact
lake and river ecosystems within large protected areas. For most of the global land surface, trade-os between conservation of freshwater biodiversity
and human use of ecosystem goods and services are necessary. We advocate continuing attempts to check species loss but, in many situations, urge adoption of a
compromise position of management for biodiversity conservation, ecosystem functioning and resilience, and human livelihoods in order to provide a viable long-term basis for freshwater conservation. Recognition of this need will
require adoption of a new paradigm for biodiversity protection and freshwater ecosystem management one that has been appropriately termed reconciliation ecology. I. INTRODUCTION In December 2003, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted resolution 58/217 proclaiming 2005 to 2015 as an International Decade for Action Water for Life. The resolution calls for a greater focus on water issues and development eorts, and recommits
countries to achieving the water-related goals of the 2000 Millennium Declaration and of Agenda 21: in particular, to halve by 2015 the proportion of people lacking access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. These
are vitally important matters, yet their importance should not obscure the fact that the Water for Life resolution comes at a time when the biodiversity and biological resources of inland waters
are facing unprecedented and growing threats from human activities. The general nature of these threats is known, and they are manifest in all non-polar regions of the Earth, although their relative magnitude varies signicantly
from place to place. Identifying threats has done little, however, to mitigate or alleviate them. This article explores why the transfer of knowledge to conservation action has, in the case of freshwater biodiversity, been largely
unsuccessful. The failure is related to the special features of freshwater habitats and the biodiversity they support that makes them especially vulnerable to human activities. We start by elucidating why freshwater biodiversity
is of outstanding global importance, and briey describe instances where humans have caused rapid and signicant declines in freshwater species and habitats. If trends in human demands for water remain unaltered and species
losses continue at current rates, the opportunity to conserve much of the remaining biodiversity in fresh water will vanish before the Water for Life decade ends. Such opportunity costs will be magnied by a signi- cant loss in
option values of species yet unknown for human use. In addition, these vital ecological and potential nancial losses may well be irreversible. Importantly, eective conservation action will require a major change in attitude toward
freshwater biodiversity and ecosystem management, including general recognition of the catchment as the focal management unit, and greater acceptance of the trade-os between species conservation, overall ecosystem
integrity, and the provision of goods and services to humans. At the same time, it is incumbent upon scientists to communicate eectively that
freshwater biodiversity is the over-riding conservation priority during the Water for Life decade and beyond ; after all,
water is the fundamental resource on which our life-support system depends ( Jackson et al., 2001; Postel & Richter,
2003 ; Clark & King, 2004).
2ACStrike-Through CP

Solvency

Cooperative enforcement doesnt resolve the chilling effect set in by federal prohibition
Nelson, former Office of the Comptroller of the Currency enforcement counsel, 2014
(Travis, United States: Legalized Marijuana Guidance Leaves Some Banks Dazed and Confused, 2-22,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/294914/Financial+Services/Legalized+Marijuana+Guidance+Le
aves+Some+Banks+Dazed+and+Confused, ldg)

Despite the above attempts to provide direction and clarity for financial institutions in states where
the sale of marijuana has been legalized, some in the banking industry remain unconvinced. According to a
recent Wall Street Journal report, some of the nation's largest banks have existing policies not to provide banking
services to marijuana businesses. See "Banks to be Allowed to do Business With Marijuana Dispensaries," Andrew Grossman, Wall Street Journal (Feb.
14, 2014). Frank Keating, president of the American Bankers Association, has said that the Guidance "doesn't alter the underlying
challenge for banks," and that: "As it stands, possession or distribution of marijuana violates federal
law, and banks that provide support for those activities face the risk of prosecution and assorted
sanctions." Id. Sen. Charles Grassley of Iowa, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary Committee, has called the Cole Memorandum "encouraging an
improper use of prosecutorial discretion." Id. The American Bankers Association has expressed further skepticism that
mere guidance will give financial institutions the level of comfort required to open themselves up to
marijuana businesses. According to the Association, "Because marijuana is illegal under federal statute, guidance
alone isn't enough. There's a great deal of guidance that banks would want to see in terms of banking with these types of businesses but guidance alone
doesn't change the fundamental prohibition. In order for banks to be comfortable banking marijuana businesses, the
federal statute must be changed by Congress. It's also important to recognize that while guidance for marijuana businesses might help,
guidance also can be changed overnight. Similarly, even though regulatory modifications would be less subject to change,
regulations cannot overturn federal statute only Congress can change the law. The only way to
eliminate the risk of criminal prosecution for banks is if Congress changes federal statute ." One possible
legislative remedy is currently pending in Congress the Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act of 2013 (H.R. 2652) sponsored by Rep. Perlmutter (CO 7).
This bill would do the following, among other things: (a) prohibit a federal banking regulator from terminating an institution's deposit insurance, or prohibiting,
penalizing, or otherwise discouraging an institution, based on the institution's services to marijuana-related legitimate businesses; (b) prohibit a federal banking
regulator from recommending, motivating, or encouraging a financial institution not to offer services to an operator of a marijuana-related legitimate businesses; (c)
prohibit a federal banking regulator from taking any action on a loan to an owner or operator of a marijuana-related legitimate business or real estate related to
such business; (d) grant immunity from federal prosecution or investigation to an institution providing services to marijuana-related legitimate businesses; and (e)
prohibit the Treasury Department from requiring reporting (e.g., SARs) solely because the transaction involves a marijuana-related legitimate business. These
provisions are designed to prevent federal regulators from interfering with marijuana-related legitimate businesses merely because they are in that industry.
However, the bill would not prevent regulators from taking action based on such businesses' involvement in other criminal activity. Moreover, the bill would not
prevent financial institutions from determining on their own that involvement with such businesses is too risky. The bill has 27 co sponsors, but has not made it out
of committee. In considering whether to provide financial services to marijuana-related businesses in states
where it has been legalized, institutions must consider not only the policies and guidance outlined
above, but also the substantial reputational risk management that involvement with such businesses
carries . While there are strong opinions underlying the marijuana legalization debate, both sides would likely agree that providing banking services to such
businesses carries heightened compliance and reputational risk. Moreover, while the Cole Memorandum and the FinCEN
Guidance have attempted to provide direction for institutions in how to deal with marijuana-related
businesses in a manner that comports with safety and soundness, and complies with the BSA, it also puts
institutions in the potentially awkward and uncertain position of having to apply federal law
enforcement policies and priorities to their customers' activities . Rather than the clarity provided by a policy that absolutely
prohibits involvement with customers engaged in illegal drug activities, the FinCEN Guidance places on institutions the burden of
having to make subjective judgment calls about the nature and risk of its customers' activities in a
decidedly hazy area. While this sort of risk assessment function is nothing new to financial institutions,
when such is being applied against the backdrop of clear anti-drug statutes and a public that is
increasingly scrutinizing financial institutions' activities and third-party relationships many
institutions may find any prospect of serving this new market simply go up in smoke.

This makes the industry small and sporadic by chilling banking and legal participation
Kamin, Denver constitutional rights professor, 2014
(Sam, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND STATE MARIJUANA REGULATION, Fall, University of Colorado
Law Review, lexis, ldg)

But the second Cole memo did not-and no similar memorandum could-remove the ancillary consequences of
marijuana remaining a Schedule I narcotic under the CSA. As marijuana-law reform moves from a focus on medical use to an increasing
emphasis on adult or recreational use, it confronts the consequences of marijuana's continuing federal prohibition. This Part sets forth some of the principal
problems caused by marijuana's continued prohibition before turning to a solution in the next Part. A. Consequences for the I ndustry 1. Contracting Because
marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, much of the predictability that comes from enforceable
contracts is unavailable to marijuana practitioners. In 2012, for example, an Arizona state court refused to
enforce a loan agreement between two Arizona residents and a Colorado marijuana dispensary on the basis that the
contract was void as against public policy. 33 Although this ruling had the effect of providing a windfall to the illegally-operating dispensary, the court felt itself
without recourse; so long as the trafficking of marijuana remains illegal under federal law, contracts designed to facilitate that conduct remain void. This
result reminds us why the enforceability of contracts is important not just to the parties but to society
more generally. When those who have loaned $500,000 (the amount in issue in the Arizona case) to a
cash business find themselves without recourse to the courts, they might be tempted to engage in
what the law euphemistically refers to as "self-help." Everyone is better off when contracts are enforced by courts rather than by
individuals with an ax to grind. Marijuana businesses are also currently denied one of the most basic of business
needs: access to banking services . As has been widely reported, 34 threats of money-laundering prosecution from the
federal government 35 have made banks gun-shy about lending to marijuana businesses. Currently, in
Colorado, no bank will do business with marijuana businesses. 36 There are many negative
consequences of withholding banking services from marijuana businesses. Principally, the lack of banking services
keeps marijuana businesses operating in the shadows of society. As cash businesses, they are targets
for violent crime . Faced with this ever-present threat, marijuana business operators are left with a
Hobson's choice: they can either remain cash businesses and accept the risk and stigma that comes with that, or
they can attempt to bank surreptitiously, through the use of their personal accounts or holding companies
designed to purge the taint of marijuana transactions. These latter options, of course, open practitioners to the same
threat of money-laundering charges that led to the unavailability of banking services in the first place. The governors of Colorado and
Washington appealed to the federal government for assistance with this problem, 37 and in February of 2014 the Department of Justice and
the Department of Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network released memos purporting to permit banks to
do business with those in the marijuana industry . 38 However, the banking memos, like the second
Cole memo which preceded it, stopped short of removing the specter of future enforcement actions .
39 One leading bank official was immediately quoted as saying, " We're still not going to bank them."40 The legal minefield
described in the previous Section calls out for experienced legal counsel to help marijuana
practitioners negotiate the complicated, ever-changing web of marijuana rules and regulations.
Marijuana's continuing illegality makes the provision of these legal services particularly fraught ,
however. As long as marijuana remains a prohibited substance-and as long as the CSA continues to
criminalize those who aid and abet marijuana distribution or join in a conspiracy to distribute it-
lawyers who assist their marijuana clients in setting up or running marijuana businesses necessarily
put themselves at risk. Although the second Cole memo declares that states decriminalizing marijuana would generally be permitted to enforce
marijuana laws themselves, the specter of federal prosecution of marijuana lawyers for aiding and abetting the
illegal conduct of their clients continues to loom. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d)41 and its state analogs prohibit attorneys
from knowingly facilitating criminal conduct. A literal reading of that rule would preclude a lawyer from providing any assistance-e.g., drafting contracts, negotiating
leases-to clients whom the attorney knows are engaged in on-going violations of the CSA. In fact, there is a split of authority among those states that have
considered whether providing legal services to the marijuana industry violates a lawyer's obligations under the rules of professional responsibility. 42 Colorado,
having previously found such conduct to violate its state ethics rules, 43 later amended those rules to explicitly permit lawyers to serve marijuana industry clients.
44 As I have argued elsewhere, I believe that other, countervailing policy considerations argue against such a literal reading of Rule 1.2(d) and its state-law
equivalents. 45 Because states that are legalizing marijuana-either for medical patients or for adult users-are creating a complex regulatory apparatus, fairness
requires the assistance of lawyers in navigating that system. Without the assistance of competent counsel, a state regulatory
regime becomes a trap for the unwary. Furthermore, denying competent legal counsel to those
engaged in the marijuana industry can have profound distributive effects. Powerful actors will be able
either to secure legal assistance or to proceed without it; those without the same means will
necessarily be disadvantaged and subject to considerable risk . Nonetheless, marijuana's continuing
federal illegality means that attorneys may be unwilling to serve those who are in critical need of
legal services.
[Note-federal prohibition means no lawyers which disproportionately impacts small businesses]






Law Good Fire Must Read
Deconstruction of the law
Ristroph 9
Alice, Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, Is Law? Constitutional Crisis and
Existential Anxiety, Constitutional Commentary Vol. 25, 431-459.
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1457&context=facpub
One reason to care whether law is in crisis concerns our own expectations of the function of law. A possible achievement is to offer an alternative
to violenceas we saw in Levinson and Balkins account of the Constitution as enabling nonviolent dispute resolution.66 This might be cal led the anti-
Thrasymachus view of law. Early in Platos Republic (before Socrates has tamed him), a young man called Thrasymachus describes justice as the advantage of the
stronger.67 The claim is that might makes right, and Western political and legal thought has produced many efforts to prove Thrasymachus and his heirs wrong. If
law distinguishes right from might , then it becomes important to say what law is, and to show that it
exists . Hence, many ongoing jurisprudential debates about the criteria for a valid and functional system
of law (including worries about legal indeterminancy) are motivated by worries about arbitrary power and violence.68 To
show Thrasymachus to be mistaken, we want to show that the rule of law is really different from the
rule of (the strongest) men.
In legal theory, we could view John Austins positivism law as commands backed by threats of punishmentas a descendant of
Thrasymachuss claim.69 Here, I want to examine briefly one of the most influential, and most plausible, efforts to show that law is something
more and different from the commands of a gunman: H. L. A. Harts response to Austin. Hart framed his discussion around the question, What
is law?.70 But perhaps, as the Stoppard passage that opened this essay suggests, beginning with this question led us to conjure an image of
law with various predicates that do not, as it turns out, include existence. A second form of existential anxiety, one that I suspect shapes
present talk of crisis, is the anxiety thast Thrasymachus and Austin were right and law, if it is anything more than command and force, does not
exist.
For my purposes here, the critical features of Harts account are the rule of recognition and the internal point of view. Since, in most of The Concept of Law, Hart takes laws existence for
granted, it is helpful to look at the passages where laws existence, or at least the existence of a particular form of law, is up for grabs. In his classic discussion of the question, Is international
law really law?, H. L. A. Hart deployed the concepts of a rule of recognition and the internal point of view to conclude that international law was at most in a state of transition toward fully
legal law, moving toward law properly so called but certainly not yet there.71 At the time he wrote The Concept of Law, Hart believed that international law departed from domestic (or
municipal) law in that it lacked a widely accepted rule of recognition and in that states could not be said to take the internal point of view toward international obligations. (Harts argument
has been challenged by many contemporary scholars of international law, but that particular dispute need not occupy us here.72) For law qua law to exist, Hart argued, there must be a rule of
recognition under which the authoritative status of other rules was accepted or denied, and the officials who would apply the rule of recognition must themselves take the internal point of
view toward it. That is, the officials needed to view the rule of recognition as a binding, authoritative guide to their own decisions.
Suppose Hart was right and the rule of recognition and the internal point of view are conditions for the existence of law. Two questions arise: what is the rule of recognition for constitutional
law, and who must hold the internal standpoint toward that rule? The Constitution itself initially seems a candidate for the rule of recognition, though the fact that the Constitution must itself
be interpreted leads some theorists to amend this account and say that the rule of recognition must include authoritative statements of the meaning of the Constitution, under prevailing
interpretive standards.73 As for the internal point of view, we might hope that all state officials would take this point of view toward constitutional rules.74 In other words, we might hope that
every state actor would comply with the U.S. Constitution because it is the Constitution, not simply to avoid injunctions, or judicial invalidation of legislative action, or liability under 42 U.S.C.
1983. But Harts theory does not demand universal adherence to an internal point of view. Even if legislators and other public officials complied with First or Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine only to avoid invalidation or 1983 liability even if these public officials were the equivalent of Holmess bad manHart might find that constitutional law still existed in a
meaningful sense so long as the judges applying constitutional rules believed themselves to be bound by a constitutional rule of recognition.75
Here is a possibility, one I believe we must take seriously and one that prompts anxiety about the existence of constitutional law itself: there is no common rule of recognition toward which
judges and other officials take an internal point of view.76 Individual judges may adhere to their particular understandings of the rule of recognition the Constitution as interpreted by
proper originalist methods, for example, or the Constitution as elucidated by popular understandings. But the fact that individual state actors follow their own rules of recognition in good faith
does not satisfy Harts account of law, and it does not provide a satisfying alternative to Thrasymachus. (There is no reason, on the might-makes-right account, that the mighty cannot hold the
good faith belief that they are pursuing a common good or acting pursuant to rule-governed authority. What matters is that their power is in fact traceable to their superior strength.)
There is reason for academic observers to doubt the existence of a single rule of recognition in American constitutional law. There are too many core interpretive disputes, as discussed in Part
I, and it is now widely accepted that constitutional rules are at least underdeterminatc. Should there be doubt about this claim, consider this feature of constitutional law textbooks: they
include majority and dissenting opinions, and questions after each case frequently ask the reader which opinion was more persuasive. Those questions are not posed as rhetorical. For most
constitutional decisions, we can say, it could have been otherwise. With a few votes switched, with a different line-up of Justices, the same precedents (and in some cases, the same
interpretive methodology) could have produced a different outcome. Moreover, these suspicions of indeterminancy or underdetermi-nancy are not the unique province of the academy. Think
of the discussions of Supreme Court appointments in presidential elections. Many voters, law professors or not, understand their vote for president to be also a vote for a certain kind of
Justice and for certain kinds of constitutional outcomes. Discussions of Supreme Court appointments are often framed in terms of judicial methodology I will appoint judges who are faithful
to the text of the Constitution but that language may be more a matter of decorum than of real constitutional faith.
Judges, of course, are not ignorant of the charges of indeterminancy or of the politicization of judicial appointments. And it seems possible that the erosion of constitutional faith has reached
the judiciary itself.771 claim no special insight into judicial psychology, but it seems implausible that the reasons for constitutional skepticismthe discussions of underdetermined rules, the
contingency of outcomes based on 5-4 votes, and the great attention to swing justices such as Sandra Day OConnor or Anthony Kennedyhave not influenced judges themselves. Here again
it seems worthwhile to consider dissenting opinions. Justice Scalias polemics come to mind immediately; he has often accused his colleagues of acting lawlessly.78 Yet he keeps his post and
continues to participate in a system that treats as law the determinations of five (potentially lawless) Justices. It is possible, I suppose, that Justice Scalias dissents express earnest outrage, that
he is shocked (shocked) by decisions like Lawrence v. Texas79 and Boumediene. It is possible that he believes himself to be the last best hope of constitutional law properly so called. But it
seems more likely that he shares the skepticism of academic observers of the Court.
Though one cant help but wonder whether judges are still constitutionally devout, I should emphasize here that my argument does not turn on a claim that judges
are acting in good or bad faith. Individual judges may well take the internal point of view, in Harts terms, and strive faithfully to apply the principles they recognize
as law. But it seems clear that American judges do not all hold the internal point of view toward a single,
shared rule of recognition, given the nature of disagreements among judges themselves. If there are
multiple rules of recognition, varying from judge to judge, then legal outcomes will depend on which
judge is empowered to make the critical decision, and Thrasymachus is not so far off the mark.
Contemporary judicial disagreement is profound, and it is not just a matter of Justice Scalias flair for colorful rhetoric. Consider Scott v. Harris,
the recent decision granting summary judgment (on the basis of qualified immunity) to a police officer who had rammed a passenger car during
a high-speed chase, causing an accident that left the driver a quadriplegic.80 Like most use-of-force opinions, the decision applies a deferential
Fourth Amendment standard that gives police officers wide leeway. What is unusual about Harris is that, because the case arose as a civil suit
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the critical question (whether the driver, Victor Harris, posed a sufficient threat to others bodily safety such that the
use of deadly force was reasonable) was nominally a jury question, and at summary judgment, the court should have taken the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving partythe injured driver. Thus, in earlier use-of-force cases that reached the Court as 1983 claims, the
Court articulated the Fourth Amendment standard and then remanded the case to the trial court.81 But in Harris, the Court had access to
videotapes of the chase recorded by cameras on the dashboards of the police vehicles involved.82 In the view of the eight-Justice majority, the
videotape spoke for itself: it made Harriss threat to the public so clear that no reasonable juror could conclude that the officers use of force
was unreasonable.83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the officer to be entitled to summary judgment.84
Doubtless there are many instances in which a court grants summary judgment to one party though non-judicial observers believe a reasonable
juror could find for the other party. Harris is of particular interest, though, because the reasonable juror who might have found in favor of
Victor Harris was clearly visible to the majorityin fact, this juror had a spokesman on the Court. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Scott v.
Harris, viewed the same videotape and found it to confirm the factual findings of the district court (which had denied the police offic-ers
motion for summary judgment).85 Though Justice Stevens was careful not to base his argument on an actual determination of the substantive
Fourth Amendment question (chiding his colleagues for doing just that and thereby acting as jurors rather than judges),86 he viewed the
video evidence and explained how one might conclude, perfectly reasonably, that Scott had used excessive force.87 In order for the eight
Justices in the Harris majority to believe their own opinion, they would have to conclude that Justice Stevens lived outside the realm of reason.
Harris is nominally a dispute about what reasonable jurors could conclude, rather than a direct argument about the meaning of a particular
constitutional provision. But the two reactions to the videotape should call to mind Larry Tribes worry that American constitutional law is
plagued by deep and thus far intractable divisions between wholly different ways of assessing truth and experiencing reality.88 It is not just
abortion and assisted suicide that reveal profound disagreement about what is true and real. A videotape that speaks for itself in the eyes of
eight Justices says something entirely different to the ninth.
Looking beyond the judiciary, consider the consequences of constitutional disagreement and constitutional indeterminancy for other
government officials and for would-be critics of those officials. Earlier I noted that with sufficient constitutional indeterminancy, theres no such
thing as an unconstitutional president. A more extreme version of this argument is that with sufficient legal indeterminancy, theres no such
thing as illegality. When John Yoo wrote the Office of Legal Counsel memos that defend practices formerly known as
torture, he was simply doing to bans on torture what critics had long argued it was possible to do for
any law: he was trashing them.89 This was the spawn of CLS put to work in the OLC; deconstructions
on the left are now deconstructions on the right .90
And that, of course, is cause for anxiety among those who would like to argue that George W. Bush or members of his administration acted
illegally. As I suggested in the Introduction, this may be the Pyrrhic victory of critical legal studies: If the crits were correct, then there is no
distinctively legal form of critique. About torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, and so on, we can say I don't like it or it doesnt
correspond to my vision of the good, but we cannot say its illegal. To argue that the Bush administration violated the
rule of law, we need to believe that the rule of law exists. But for 30 years or more, we have found reasons to doubt that
it does.91
Perhaps it will seem that I am overstating the influence of legal realism and critical legal studies, or the doubts about laws existence. Im willing to entertain those
possibilities, but I do want to emphasize that the focus is on constitutional law. Its easy enough to believe in law when we see it applied and enforced by figures of
authority in a recognized hierarchy. That is, the sentencing judge or the prison warden can believe in lawhe has applied it himself. And the criminal should believe
in law he has felt its force. But these examples illustrate Austinian law: commands backed by force. What remains elusive, on my account, are laws that are truly
laws given to oneself, and especially law given by a state to itself.92 That is why, in Part I of this essay, I suggested that brute force is a poor
candidate to distinguish ordinary politics, or ordinary legal decisions, from extraordinary moments of
crisis. What would be truly extraordinary is not the use of force, but its absence: a system of law truly based on consent and independent of sanction.
The Constitution, in theory, is a law given unto oneself. By this I mean not simply that the Founders gave the Constitution to future generations, but that each
successive generation must give the Constitution to itself: each generation must adopt the internal
point of view toward the Constitution in order for it to be effective. Even once we have accepted the written text as
authoritative, all but the strictest constructionists acknowledge that many meanings can plausibly be extracted from that text. (And even the strict constructionists
must acknowledge that as a factual matter many meanings have been extracted; they deny only the plausibility of those varied readings.) Any law given unto
oneself requires what Hart called the internal point of view, and what one more cynical might describe as self-delusion: it requires a belief that one is bound though
one could at any minute walk away. It is possible, I think, that we have outwitted the Constitution: that we have become too clever, too quick
to notice indeterminancy, even too post-modern to believe ourselves bound.
A third possible explanation for contemporary references to crisis is professional malaise. It could be, as I suggested earlier, that after too many
years of chewing what judges had for breakfast, professors have lost their appetites. It could be that the problems of originalists and historicists
and popular constitutionalists dont amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. And if these possibilities have not crossed the law professors
mind, they probably should.
We might consider again Larry Tribes explanation of his decision to stop work on his treatise of American constitutional law. There are two
questions of meaning there, one of which Tribe confronts directly and the other which he brushes off quickly. Most obviously, there is the
search for constitutional meaning, as Tribe acknowledges, a search that cannot be concluded within the Constitutions own text. I see no
escape from adopting some perspective... external to the constitution itself from which to decide questions not indisputably resolved one
way or the other by the text and structure--------9* Tribe goes on
to wonder where these extra-constitutional criteria come from, and who ratified the meta-constitution that such external criteria would
comprise?.94 Supreme Court Justices (and other judges) must struggle with these questions, given the public authority that they have the
enormous responsibility and privilege to wield.95 But Tribe need not. He can simply decline to finish the treatise.
If he declines to finish the treatise, though, we cant help asking ourselves what was at stake, and what remains at stake. If the law professor
lacks the responsibility of a judge, is his constitutional theory just an amusing hobby? What was the point of the constitutional law treatise, or
of other efforts to discern coherent principles of constitutional law? The significance of a treatise is the question of meaning that Tribe brushes
off quickly: he says a treatise is an attempt at a synthesis of some enduring value and insists that his decision is not based on doubts about
whether constitutional treatises arc ever worthwhile.96 But Tribes letter leaves the enduring value of a treatise rather underspecified, and it
is possible that current references to constitutional crisis in the academy stem from uncertainty about such questions of value.
Is constitutional theory good for absolutely nothing? Only if we believe that the effort to resist
Thrasymachus is futile or pointless. Constitutional theory is a species of legal and political theory, and the most intriguing forms of such theory
are produced by worries that law and violence are too closely intertwined.97 Thus I suggested at the outset of this essay that existential anxiety is not always to be
regretted, cured, or mocked. Such anxiety may be an important indication that we have noticed the ways in which
Thrasymachus seems right, and we still care enough to try to prove him wrong.98
After so much talk of crisis and anxiety, consider an illustration from the dramatic genre. Tom Stoppards play Jumpers features a troupe
of philosophy professors who double as acrobats: Logical positivists, mainly, with a linguistic analyst or two, a couple of Benthamite utilitarians . .. lapsed
Kantians and empiricists generally... and of course the usual Behaviorists... a mixture of the more philosophical members of the university gymnastics team and the
more gymnastic members of the Philosophy School.99 The Jumpers seem to practice what we would now identify as post-modern
nihilism: One shoots and kills another, then conceals the murder with cheerful aplomb. Against these
intellectually and physically adroit colleagues, the clumsy and old-fashioned Professor George Moore struggles to defend the irreducible fact of goodness,100 the
possibility of a moral conscience, and the claim that there is more in me than meets the microscope.101 Is God? Moore wonders. He can neither
shake nor defend his faith.
Law schools, I think, are filled with moral sympathizers to Professor Moore who possess the skills of modern-day Jumpers.102 The current discourse of crisis is the
latest manifestation of an old struggle between faith and doubt, and it is not one that we will resolve. On one hand, we have observed too much to believe (in law)
unquestioningly. And on the other hand, we are determined to have law, even if we must make it ourselves. There was at
least a smidgen of truth in John Finniss claim that scholars of critical legal studies were disappointed ... absolutists.103 But it is not just crits that
are disappointed when they look for law and see nothing. Few scholars of any stripe want to vindicate
Thrasymachus. All of this is just to reiterate the difficulty, and perhaps the necessity, of giving a law
unto oneself. If constitutional law did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.

No Impact 2AC
The state of exception can be contained---no impact
Jennifer Mitzen 11, PhD, University of Chicago, Associate Professor of Political Science at Ohio State
University, Michael E. Newell, Crisis Authority, the War on Terror and the Future of Constitutional
Democracy, PDF
But what Agamben has potentially overlooked is the conversation between the government, public
and media concerning the state of exception. Waevers desecuritization theory tells us that it is possible for continued debate and media
coverage to desecuritize a threat in whole or in part (Waever, 1995). As the War on Terror progressed, more academics and
government officials began to speak out against the usefulness of interrogations, the reality of the terrorist threat and the morality of
the administrations policies . Some critics suggested that the terrorist threat was not as imminent as the Administration made it appear, and that
fears of the omnipotent terroristmay have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated (Mueller, 2006).
Indeed, as Mueller points out, there have been no terrorist attacks in the United States five years prior and five years after September 11th. The resignation of
administration officials, such as Jack Goldsmith, who, it was later learned, sparred with the administration over Yoos torture memos, their wiretapping program and
their trial of suspected terrorists also contributed to this shift in sentiment (Rosen, 2007). The use of the terms torture, and prisoner abuse, that began to
surface in critical media coverage of the War on Terror framed policies as immoral. As the public gradually learned more from media
coverage, academic discourse, and protests from government officials, the administration and its
policies saw plummeting popularity in the polls. Two-thirds of the country did not approve of Bushs handling of the War on Terror by
the end of his presidency (Harris Poll) and as of February 2009 two-thirds of the country wanted some form of investigation into torture and wiretapping policies
(USA Today Poll, 2009). In November 2008 a Democratic President was elected and Democrats gained
substantial ground in Congress partly on promises of changing the policies in the War on Terror.
Republican presidential nominees, such as Mitt Romney, who argued for the continuance of many of the Bush
administrations policies in the War on Terror, did not see success at the polls. Indeed, this could be
regarded as Waevers speech-act failure which constitutes the moment of desecuritization (Waever,
1995). In this sense, Agambens warning of pure de-facto rule in the War on Terror rings hollow because of
one single important fact: the Bush administration peacefully transferred power to their political rivals after the 2008
elections. The terrorist threat still lingers in the far reaches of the globe, and a strictly Agamben-centric analysis
would suggest that the persistence of this threat would allow for the continuance of the state of
exception. If Agamben was correct that the United States was under pure de-facto rule then arguably
its rulers could decide to stay in office and to use the military to protect their position. Instead, Bush
and his administration left, suggesting that popular sovereignty remained intact.

Sovereignty can be redeployed through engagement
Lombardi, Tampa political science professor, 1996
(Mark, Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty, pg. 161)

Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for
international scholars and actors. The assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and approaches
considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of the system does little except activate
reactionary impulses and intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of sovereignty, as
has been done in many instances, does not in and of itself address the problems and issues so critical to
transnational relations. That is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous
with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the other. We cannot wait until we
have a neat self-contained and accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into
studies of Third-World issues and problem-solving. If we wait we will never address the latter and arguably
most important issue-area: the welfare and quality of life for the human race.
Extra Ev

Sovereignty can be redeployed through engagement
Lombardi, Tampa political science professor, 1996
(Mark, Perspectives on Third-World Sovereignty, pg. 161)

Sovereignty is in our collective minds. What we look at, the way we look at it and what we expect to see must be altered. This is the call for
international scholars and actors. The assumptions of the paradigm will dictate the solution and approaches
considered. Yet, a mere call to change this structure of the system does little except activate
reactionary impulses and intellectual retrenchment. Questioning the very precepts of sovereignty, as
has been done in many instances, does not in and of itself address the problems and issues so critical to
transnational relations. That is why theoretical changes and paradigm shifts must be coterminous
with applicative studies. One does not and should not precede the other. We cannot wait until we
have a neat self-contained and accurate theory of transnational relations before we launch into
studies of Third-World issues and problem-solving. If we wait we will never address the latter and arguably
most important issue-area: the welfare and quality of life for the human race.

No alternative to the law/legal system---other ideas bring more inequality and abuse
Jerold S. Auerbach 83, Professor of History at Wellesley, Justice Without Law?, 1983, p. 144-146
As cynicism about the legal system increases, so does enthusiasm for alternative dispute-settlement
institutions. The search for alternatives accelerates, as Richard Abel has suggested, "when some fairly powerful interest is threatened by an increase in the number or magnitude of
legal rights.*'6 Alternatives are designed to provide a safety valve, to siphon discontent from courts. With the danger of political confrontation reduced, the ruling power of legal institutions is
preserved, and the stability of the social system reinforced. Not incidentally, alternatives prevent the use of courts for redistributive
purposes in the interest of equality, by consigning the rights of disadvantaged citizens to institutions
with minimal power to enforce or protect them. It is, therefore, necessary to beware of the seductive
appeal of alternative institutions . They may deflect energy from political organization by groups of
people with common grievances; or discourage effective litigation strategies that could provide substantial
benefits. They may, in the end, create a two-track justice system that dispenses informal "justice" to poor people with "small" claims and "minor" disputes, who cannot afford legal
services, and who are denied access to courts. (Bar associations do not recommend that corporate law firms divert their clients to mediation, or that business deductions for legal expensesa
gigantic government subsidy for litigationbe eliminated.) Justice according to law will be reserved for the affluent, hardly a novel
development in American history but one that needs little encouragement from the spread of alternative dispute-settlement institutions. It is social context and political choice that
determine whether courts, or alternative institutions, can render justice more or less accessibleand to whom. Both can be discretionary, arbitrary, domineeringand unjust. Law can
symbolize justice, or conceal repression. It can reduce exploitation, or facilitate it. It can prohibit the abuse of power, or disguise abuse in procedural forms. It can promote equality, or sustain
inequality. Despite the resiliency and power of law, it seems unable to eradicate the tension between
legality and justice: even in a society of (legal) equals, some still remain more equal than others. But diversion from the legal system is
likely to accentuate that inequality . Without legal power the imbalance between aggrieved
individuals and corporations, or government agencies, cannot be redressed . In American society , as Laura
Nader has observed, " disputing without the force of law ... [is| doomed to fail ."7 Instructive examples document
the deleterious effect of coerced informality (even if others demonstrate the creative possibilities of indigenous experimentation). Freed
slaves after the Civil War and factory workers at the turn of the century, like inner-city poor people
now, have all been assigned places in informal proceedings that offer substantially weaker safeguards
than law can provide. Legal institutions may not provide equal justice under law, but in a society ruled by law it is their responsibility. It is chimerical to
believe that mediation or arbitration can now accomplish what law seems powerless to achieve . The
American deification of individual rights requires an accessible legal system for their protection .
Understandably, diminished faith in its capacities will encourage the yearning for alternatives. But the rhetoric of "community" and "justice" should not be permitted to conceal the
deterioration of community life and the unraveling of substantive notions of justice that has accompanied its demise. There is every reason why the values that historically are associated with
informal justice should remain compelling: especially the preference for trust, harmony, and reciprocity within a communal setting. These are not, however, the values that American society
encourages or sustains; in their absence there is no effective alternative to legal institutions. The quest for community may indeed
be "timeless and universal."8 In this century, however, the communitarian search for justice without law has deteriorated beyond recognition into a stunted off-shoot of the legal system. The
historical progression is clear: from community justice without formal legal institutions to the rule of law, all too often without justice. But injustice without law is an
even worse possibility, which misguided enthusiasm for alternative dispute settlement now seems likely to
encourage. Our legal culture too accurately expresses the individualistic and materialistic values that most Americans deeply cherish to inspire optimism about the imminent
restoration of communitarian purpose. For law to be less conspicuous Americans would have to moderate their
expansive freedom to compete, to acquire, and to possess, while simultaneously elevating shared
responsibilities above individual rights. That is an unlikely prospect unless Americans become, in
effect, un-American . Until then, the pursuit of justice without law does incalculable harm to the
prospect of equal justice.


It works your just thinking too hard about it
Nussbaum 94
Martha C., an American philosopher and the current Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law
and Ethics at the University of Chicago, "Valuing Values: A Case for Reasoned Commitment", Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities: Vol. 6: Iss. 2, Article 3, digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol6/iss2/3/
I am more optimistic than either of these philosophers about the possibility of a human rational
community. I believe that we have a number of attractive models for the rational justification of core
political values available in modem moral/political philosophy. These models include, but are not
limited to, those offered by the American pragmatists, by the Kantian/liberal tradition as exemplified in
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, by the theory of communicative action developed in the work of
Jirgen Habermas, and by the view of human capability and functioning developed by Amartya Sen.45
These views differ, but in some especially crucial ways they overlap; above all, in their strong defense
of political liberty and autonomy. I see no reason to think that argument among partisans of different
views has come to an impasse in our democracy; the convergence among the views I have just
mentioned, and between all of these and some core features of the American constitutional tradition,
gives us reasons for optimism. And recent reflections on the structure of moral justification among
persons who disagree has supported that optimism further.46 There is no way of briefly indicating the
arguments I have in mind; a sketch would be a parody, omitting the subtleties of comparison that would
make the convergence interesting. I therefore simply state the belief that those postmodernists who
dismiss the whole idea of getting agreement on values have done so prematurely, usually without
working through such arguments as I have mentioned.
Let me return here to Metha Bai. We find in her case that much of the trouble comes from a certain
sort of abstraction, which for far too long has bound people's behavior as if from without. Far from
ordering beliefs in a fruitful way, the Hindu caste system, thought of as "out there," simply fortifies
people's resistance to legitimate human claims. If we were to remove from these caste norms their
sense of externality, we would not, I believe, have a standoff. We would be able to present a very
powerful moral argument in support of Metha Bai's claim to work. This argument would make use of
nontranscendent abstractions such as the right to food, personhood, and autonomy. Even if we could
not persuade the actual in- laws of Metha Baifor they are probably using her for their own selfish
ends and are not really interested in engaging in argumentwe could convince the local government,
or the local development authority, that Metha Bai's autonomous choice to work should be respected.
Getting rid of the alleged authority of the transcendent will permit the good human abstractions to
have their full argumentative weight.

1AR

Terror Epist

Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are
self-reflexive
Michael J. Boyle '8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan,
International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State
University, April 2008, A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies, Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1,
No. 1, p. 51-64
Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed Orthodox Terrorism Studies.
The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4)
its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand,
should be a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism knowledge. An implicit presumption from this is that
terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study
has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are
not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at
various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, Understanding Terrorism).
Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in Orthodox Terrorism Studies
have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the
study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to
support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the
second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure
to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to
sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings
(Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, Silkes (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research
performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A
non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.

AT: Heg K

Social Science
Chernoff, Colgate IR professor, 2005
(Fred, The Power of International Theory, pg 157-9)

In the social sciences the explanations of state behaviour in rational-choice theory, which posits the existence of a rationally
behaving state, or in economics, which posits the existence of the rational economic person, are clearly idealisations.
However, these are parallel to and not completely disconnected from the postulation of laws governing frictionless
machines or ideal gases in the physical sciences. With regard to underlying and immediate causes, Bernstein et al. advance a number of
points in the course of offering the critique of predictiveness of IR theory and the scenario-based alternative that Bernstein et al. present.
The main point to be made with respect to the use made by Bernstein et al. of the uncertain relationships between
underlying and immediate causes is that, in their view, such a connection makes point prediction
extraordinarily difficult (2000: 47). As will become clear, this chapter argues that IR theorists offer non-point
predictions and that such predictions are often of genuine policy value. A statement like a rapid withdrawal of
US military forces from Iraq after the defeat of Saddam Hussein is likely to lead to increased violence and long-term instability, would not
qualify as a point prediction. Yet it is the sort of prediction that policymakers typically rely on and it has value for policy-makers.
Bernstein et al. thus commit a straw-person fallacy, as do other critics of predictiveness discussed above.
They raise the bar of prediction much too high. The sort of prediction that policy-makers need is often
much less than point prediction. One may grant Bernstein et al. all of their points seeking to undermine
point prediction and still conclude that they have not provided good reason to reject many sorts of
statements that satisfy the requirements of prediction, as laid out in the definition on p. 8. With regard to learning, IR differs from
predictive natural sciences in that, according to Bernstein et al., *m+olecules do not learn from experience. People do, or think they do.
We know that expectations and behavior are influenced by experience, ones own and others (2000: 47). They argue that US policies
visvis the USSR were a response to the failure of appeasement in the 1930s, and those policies were a response to British leaders belief
that more aggressive policies failed to keep peace in 1914. They cite concepts like chain reactions and contagion effects to describe
these phenomena and hazard analysis for their measurement. But they charge that these do not succeed in explaining how and why these
patterns emerge and persist (Bernstein et al. 2000: 47). They note also that theories that attempt to predict the future predict incorrectly
in part because groups (often states) react in such a way as to prevent their predictions from obtaining. Human prophecies are often
self-negating (Bernstein et al. 2000: 52). Another approach that has considerable explanatory success is cybernetic theory, which lays out
mechanisms and may even be viewed as predictive. Cybernetic theory was developed by Wiener (1949) and applied to IR especially by
Deutsch et. al (1957), and specifically to foreign-policy decision-making by Steinbruner (1974), Chernoff (1995) and others. It not only
accords with the data but offers a causal mechanism to account for the patterns. Bernstein et al. argue that actors can
change the rules of the game and consequently general theories of process in international relations will have restricted
validity (Bernstein et al. 2000: 52). Generalisations will apply only to discrete portions of history. They add that
scholars need to specify carefully the temporal and geographic domains to which their theories are applicable. We suspect those domains
are often narrower and more constrained than is generally accepted (Bernstein et al. 2000: 52). This is, however, just what one of the most
systematic and generalising of all IR scholars, i.e., Waltz, demands. He maintains that a body of propositions does not even qualify as a
theory unless it so specifies. Once these restrictions on domain are specified, theoretical generalisations might have value. For example,
Waltz says that whether we are interested in natural sciences or social sciences, *n+o matter what the subject, we have to bound the
domain of our concern, to organize it, to simplify the materials we deal with, to concentrate on the central tendencies, and to single out
the strongest propelling forces (1979: 68). He later adds, *t+o be a success a theory has to show how international politics can be
conceived of as a domain distinct from economic, social, and other international domains that one may conceive of (1979: 79). So it is not
accurate to suggest that IR theorists, at least careful ones, do not bound or constrain the scope of their studies and generalisations. While
bounded theories may offer predictions, the fallible nature of all empirical knowledge and the probabilistic nature of IR laws
does restrict what can be predicted. The longer the chain of reasoning and the greater the number of probabilistic
propositions that are conjoined, the less one may rely on the predicted event. But this is an argument for limitations on
certain types of predictions, not an argument against the predictiveness of IR or social science
theory. Bernstein et al. note also that there is the problem of the single case. They correctly observe that policy-makers often worry
about a single instance of an event type (e.g., possible war with our neighbours on our western frontier in the next year) rather than with
general propositions (e.g., the problem of war in general, or great-power war, etc.). First, with regard to the relevance of theory to policy, it
is important to note that policy-makers do sometimes care about longrun patterns or generalisations in some of
their decision-situations. Long-run generalisations are very frequently important for policy-makers. For
example, in the 1990s, numerous new states emerged in Europe and central Asia due to the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of its domination of central eastern Europe. Policy-makers had to
understand as correctly as possible the truth of generalisations in DP theory in order to decide how
much in the way of financial and diplomatic resources should be committed to help promote
democratic polities in the region. Policy-makers in 1994 were not primarily worried about a specific war, say, between Hungary
and Slovakia, but rather the long-run chances of conflict arising in a Europe with many nondemocratic states as compared to a Europe with
very few such states. Policy-makers could consider two alternative scenarios of the future. One is a Europe with some democratic states
and many non-democratic ones, possibly including a non-democratic Russia. The other one envisions a Europe with virtually all democratic
states. The generalisations about the effects of democracy on behaviour would allow policy-makers to
draw general conclusions about peace and international stability from each scenario.

CP Competition

Legalization implies all
Ferner 12 Matt Ferner The Huffington Post 09/04/2012 'Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone
Needs To Know' Authors Discuss Risks And Rewards Of Legal Weed
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/04/marijuana-legalization-research_n_1850470.html
The term legalization without any qualification means that the substance would be treated more
or less like any other article of commerce, with substance-specific regulations seeking only to shape
the behavior of producers and consumers, not to eliminate market activity. So, alcohol is legal even
though it can only be purchased by those over the age of 21, and automobiles are legal even though
manufacturers selling in the U.S. have to meet a range of regulatory requirements, including those
pertaining to emissions, fuel economy, and crash safety.

Water Add-On

Watershed protection key to freshwater biodiversity- US is key
Master et al, Nature Serve chief zoologist, 98
(Lawrence, PhD in Biological Sciences from the University of Michigan, 20 years with The Nature
Conservancy, and Stephanie R. Flack, Nature Conservancy Potomac River project director, and Bruce A.
Stein, Climate Change Adaptation National Advocacy Center director, "Rivers of Life," 1998,
www.natureserve.org/library/riversoflife.pdf)

Hidden beneath the shimmering surface of our nations rivers and lakes is an extraordinary variety of aquatic
creatures, largely unseen and unfamiliar to most of us. Though we are a nation devoted to the beauty and recreational values of our streams, creeks, and
rivers, few of us know that U.S. streamlife is exceptional on a global level, even compared with the tropics. This
remarkable freshwater diversity should be a source of great national pride. Instead, it is a source of grave concern. Rivers and lakes are the
circulatory system of our nation. These ecosystems furnish a variety of services, from clean drinking water and recreational
opportunities to transportation and food. The very quality of our lives, and freshwater species survival, is tied to their health. Our Aquatic Impoverishment Inhabitants of freshwater ecosystems have, as a whole, suffered far more
than plants and animals dependent on upland habitats such as forests and prairies. Although the plight of salmon in the Pacific Northwest and New England is widely recognized, this report focuses on the many other freshwater
species groups that are in dire straits: Two-thirds of the nations freshwater mussels are at risk of extinction, and almost 1 in 10 may already have vanished forever. Half of all crayfish species are in jeopardy. Freshwater fishes and
amphibians are doing little better, with about 40 percent of the species in these groups at risk. These losses are not confined to urban areas or to a specific region of the country. Aquatic systems are under stress nationwide, with
the largest number of imperiled species found in the Southeast. Arid western states have fewer species, but a greater proportion of them are at risk of extinction. These dramatic declines in freshwater animal species are due
primarily to the intensive human useand abuseof their habitats. Two centuries of dam construction, water withdrawals, land-use alterations, pollution, and introductions of non-native species have caused accelerated and, in
many cases, irreparable losses of freshwater species. Rivers are affected by, and reflect, the condition of the lands through which they travel. Since the Clean Water Act became law in 1972, the United States has made great strides
in improving water quality by controlling end of pipe pollution, but nonpoint source pollutionpolluted and sediment-laden runoff from urban and rural areasis still a major problem. Freshwater species and habitats provide a
wealth of goods and services to humanity. Nearly a billion people worldwide rely on fishes as their primary source of protein. In 1990, the total global harvest of freshwater fish was valued at $8.2 billion; the value of the U.S.
freshwater sport fishery in 1991 was nearly twice that, with direct expenditures totaling approximately $16 billion. And these figures do not reflect the immense worth of ecological services provided by freshwater systems, such as
flood control. Watersheds: A Practical Approach to Conservation Given the fluid nature of water, protecting aquatic biodiversity is no easy task. Human activities directly upslope, or even miles upstream, may affect streamlife in
another place. Many concerned citizens know that watershedsnatural drainage basinsare critical for addressing water-related issues, from protecting drinking
water to conserving freshwater species. But which watersheds should be priorities for conservation attention? Where should we allocate scarce conservation resources to protect freshwater
species and ecosystems? Although at-risk freshwater species can be assessed at the level of states or large regional watersheds, Rivers of Life: Critical Watersheds for Protecting Freshwater Biodiversity presents the first analysis to
define conservation priorities on a scale that is practical for action. Approximately 2,100 small watersheds cover the continental United States. These small watershed areas reflect a scale appropriate for planning and carrying out
conservation actions. Using information from natural heritage data centers and other sources, this report identifies the 15 percent of these small watershed areas that will conserve populations of all freshwater fish and mussel
species at risk in the United States. These watersheds form a blueprint for where targeted conservation actions could provide
the greatest benefit for the largest number of vulnerable freshwater fish and mussel species. Rivers of Life Protecting and restoring priority
watersheds will take creativity, commitment, and the involvement of local communities. The returns from such efforts will benefit not only the rich diversity of fishes and other aquatic life but the human communities themselves.
The art and science of aquatic conservation are exemplified by work under way in eight of these critical watersheds. Ranging from the meandering Altamaha in Georgia to the upper Verde River of Arizona, these watersheds, which
are profiled in the following pages, reflect the importance of local action and community-level partnerships in saving freshwater species and ecosystems. A Global Center of Freshwater Biodiversity: The United States The decline of
salmon populations in the Pacific Northwest and New England is the focus of great public attention, investment, and debate. Few people recognize, however, what an astonishing abundance of other life forms also inhabits our
nations streams, rivers, and lakes. Mostly hidden from view, these creatures go largely unnoticed and unappreciated. Colorful and whimsical names hint at the diversity and beauty living beneath these waters: Wabash pigtoe
mussel, dromedary pearly mussel, white catspaw pearly mussel, warpaint shiner, Devils Hole pupfish, and frecklebelly madtom. Worthy of these epithets, many freshwater species display complex and intriguing lifestyles that have
evolved as adaptations to their watery world. Consider the orangenacre mucket (Lampsilis perovalis). As adults, these mussels are unable to move a significant distance. How, then, can they colonize new habitat, especially
upstream areas? The orangenacre mucket employs a sophisticated ruse to get help from passing fishes in moving its young around. The female mussel creates a fishing lure, using her offspring as bait. 1 The larval offspring are
packaged at the end of a jelly-like tube, which can stretch up to eight feet. Dancing in the current of rocky riffles, the end of this tube bears a striking resemblance to a minnow. When a fish takes the bait, the tube shatters and
releases the larvaecalled glochidiainto the stream. A few are able to attach themselves to the gills of the duped fish, where they absorb nutrients from the host and continue their development. After a week or two the mussel
larvae drop off their mobile incubator, settling to a new home on the stream bottom. Found only in rivers and creeks in the Mobile River basin of Alabama, populations of the orangenacre mucket have declined precipitously, and
the mussel is now federally listed as endangered. The orangenacre muckets reproductive strategy illustrates the complex web of interactions and interdependencies within freshwater ecosystems. Mussel and fish are linked, and
both require suitable conditions for survival: the right water flow, clarity, temperature, oxygen levels, and substrate. Unfortunately, the odds are now against a young mussel settling into such suitable habitat. Despite these
intricate dependenciesor perhaps because of theman astounding array of mussels, fishes, and other organisms has evolved to
populate the fresh waters of our country. Indeed, the United States stands out as a global center of freshwater
biodiversity. Fresh Waters Run Rich Rivers and lakes cover less than 1 percent of the Earths surface; by volume these fresh waters amount to just 0.01 percent of the worlds total water. The remainder is marine
(97.5 percent), permanently frozen, or in aquifers beneath the ground surface. 2 Despite their slight significance in surface area and volume, rivers and lakes harbor at least 12 percent of the worlds known animal species, including
41 percent (8,400 species) of all known fishes. 3 Considering the rate at which scientists are discovering previously unknown species, freshwater fishes may actually constitute more than half of all vertebrate species on Earth. 2 This
diversity of freshwater life is not randomly distributed around the globe. The tropics, especially rainforests, are
widely recognized as centers of species diversity. Few people realize, however, that the United States is a world center of freshwater
species diversity (Table 1). Although most of the worlds freshwater fish species are tropical, the United States, with 801 species, ranks seventh among
countries in the world in recorded fish speciesafter Brazil, Venezuela, Indonesia, China, Zaire, and Peru. 4,5 In contrast, only 193 freshwater fish species are
known from all the countries of Europe and 188 species from the continent of Australia. 6 The United States harbors an impressive diversity
of freshwater species in comparison with most other countries. For several groups of organisms the United
States ranks first in the number of known species. Freshwater invertebrates are in general less well studied than fishes, a l though g roups such a s mol lusks , crayfishes, and
some aquatic insects are sufficiently well known to allow for meaningful global comparisons. These invertebrates also reveal the extraordinary diversity of Americas fresh waters. The United States is home to three-fifths of the
worlds known crayfishes, 96 percent of which occur no place else. 7,8 Almost one-third (approximately 300 species) of all known freshwater mussels occur in the United States. 7,9 By comparison, China has only 38 known mussel
species, India has 54, and the rivers of Europe and Africa have only 10 and 56 species, respectively. 10 The United States is also comparatively rich in freshwater snails and in an unusual assemblage of freshwater invertebrates
called stygobites, which are restricted to life underground. 11-15 Although freshwater insects are less well known worldwide, again the United States ranks first among countries in described species for three relatively well-studied
groups: stoneflies, mayflies, and caddisflies.

War Turns St. Violence

War turns structural violence but not the other way around
Joshua Goldstein, Intl Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412
First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace
scholars and activists support the approach, if you want peace, work for justice. Then, if one believes
that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in
order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor,
minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests
that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism,
gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars outbreaks and
outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,if you want
peace, work for peace. Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does
not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments
up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military
may be the most important way to reverse womens oppression. The dilemma is that peace work
focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this
books evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically
inadequate.

1AR K Cards

Alt fails risk-based policymaking inevitable
Danzig 11 Richard Danzig, Center for a New American Security Board Chairman, Secretary of the Navy
under President Bill Clinton, October 2011, Driving in the Dark Ten Propositions About Prediction and
National Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Prediction_Danzig.pdf
The Propensity to Make Predictions and to Act on the Basis of Predictions Is Inherently Human No
one can predict the future is a common saying, but people quite correctly believe and act otherwise in everyday
life. In fact, daily life is built on a foundation of prediction. One expects (predicts) that housing, food and water will be safe and, over the
longer term, that saved money will retain value. These predictions are typically validated by everyday experience. As a consequence, people
develop expectations about prediction and a taste, even a hunger, for it. If security in everyday life derives from
predictive power, it is natural to try to build national security in the same way. This taste for
prediction has deep roots.16 Humans are less physically capable than other species but more adept at reasoning.17 Reasoning is adaptive; it
enhances the odds of survival for the species and of survival, power, health and wealth for individuals. Reasoning depends on predictive
power. If what was benign yesterday becomes unpredictably dangerous today, it is hard to develop protective strategies, just as if two plus two equals four
today and five tomorrow, it is hard to do math. Rational thought depends on prediction and, at the same time, gives
birth to prediction. Humans are rational beings and, therefore, make predictions. The taste for
prediction has roots, moreover, in something deeper than rationality. Emotionally, people are
uncomfortable with uncertainty and pursue the illusion of control over events beyond their control.
Systematic interviews of those who have colostomies, for example, show that people are less depressed if they are informed that their impaired condition will be
permanent than if they are told that it is uncertain whether they will be able to return to normal functioning.19 Citing this and other work, Daniel Gilbert concludes
that *h+uman beings find uncertainty more painful than the things theyre uncertain about.20 An illusion of control, to employ a term now
recognized in the literature of psychology, mitigates the pain of uncertainty.21 People value random lottery tickets or
poker cards distributed to themselves more than they do tickets or cards randomly assigned to
others.22 A discomfort with uncertainty and desire for control contribute to an unjustifiable over-
reliance on prediction. 2. Requirements for Prediction Will Consistently Exceed the Ability to Predict The literature on predictive failure is rich and
compelling.23 In the most systematic assessment, conducted over 15 years ending in 2003, Philip Tetlock asked 284 established experts24 more than 27,000
questions about future political and economic outcomes (expected electoral results, likelihoods of coups, accession to treaties, proliferation, GDP growth, etc.) and
scored their results.25 Collateral exercises scored predictive achievement in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the transition to democracy in South
Africa and other events. There are too many aspects of Tetlocks richly textured discussion to permit a simple summary, but his own rendering of a central finding
will suffice for this discussion: When we pit experts against minimalist performance benchmarks dilettantes, dart-throwing chimps, and assorted extrapolation
algorithms we find few signs that expertise translates into greater ability to make either well calibrated or discriminating forecasts.26 As described below,27
there are strong reasons for a high likelihood of failure of foresight when DOD attempts to anticipate the requirements for systems over future decades. Recent
experience makes this point vividly. Over the past 20 years,28 long-term predictions about the strategic environment and associated security challenges have been
wrong, like most multi-year predictions on complex subjects.29 It is simple to list a halfdozen failures:30 American defense planners in 1990 did not anticipate the
breakup of the Soviet Union, the rapid rise of China, Japans abrupt transition from decades of exceptional economic growth to decades of no growth,31 an attack
like that on September 11, 2001 or the United States invasions of (and subsequent decade-long presences in) Afghanistan and Iraq.32 So, in this light, why does the
defense community repeatedly over-invest in prediction? A common conceptual error intensifies the hunger for prediction.
History celebrates those who made good predictions. Because Winston Churchills fame rests on, among other things, his foresight
about German militarism and the accuracy of his demands for preparation for World War II, it appears evident that confident prediction is the road to success. Yet it
is an error to focus on numerators (instances of success) without asking about denominators (instances of failure). 33 Accordingly, there is a tendency
to ignore Churchills failures in many other predictions (his disastrous expectations from military operations in Gallipoli, his underestimation of Gandhi,
etc.). There is also a tendency to ignore the great number of other predictors who are not celebrated by history because they failed in analogous circumstances.
Moreover, prediction is subject to refinement and is often a competitive enterprise. As a result, predictive power is like
wealth gaining some of it rarely satisfies the needs of those who receive it. Predictive power intensifies the demand for more
predictive power. Tell a national security advisor that another country is likely to develop a nuclear weapon, and after all his or her questions have been answered
about the basis of the prediction he or she will want to know when, in what numbers, with what reliability, at what cost, with what ability to deploy them, to
mount them on missiles, with what intent as to their use, etc. It is no wonder that U.S. intelligence agencies are consistently regarded as failing. Whatever their
mixtures of strengths and weaknesses, they are always being pushed to go beyond the point of success. Put another way, the surest prediction
about a credible prediction is that it will induce a request for another prediction. This tendency is
intensified when, as is commonly the case, prediction is competitive. If you can predict the price of a product but I can predict it faster or
more precisely, I gain an economic advantage. If I can better predict the success of troop movements over difficult terrain, then I gain a military advantage. As a
result, in competitive situations, my fears of your predictive power will drive me to demand more prediction regardless of my predictive power. Moreover, your
recognition of my predictive power will lead you to take steps to impair my predictive ability.34 Carl von
Clausewitz saw this very clearly: The very nature of interaction is bound to make *warfare+ unpredictable.35 These inherent psychological and
practical realities will consistently lead to over-prediction. People are doomed repeatedly to drive
beyond their headlights.

Imperfect predictions are better than the alternatives
Ulfelder, Political Instability Task Force research director, 2011
(Jay, Why Political Instability Forecasts Are Less Precise Than Wed Like (and Why Its Still Worth
Doing), 5-5, dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/why-political-instability-forecasts-are-
less-precise-than-wed-like-and-why-its-still-worth-doing/)

If this is the best we can do, then whats the point? Well, consider the alternatives. For starters, we might decide to skip statistical forecasting
altogether and just target our interventions at cases identified by expert judgment as likely onsets.
Unfortunately, those expert judgments are probably going to be an even less reliable guide than our
statistical forecasts, so this solution only exacerbates our problem. Alternatively, we could take no
preventive action and just respond to events as they occur. If the net costs of responding to crises as they happen are roughly
equivalent to the net costs of prevention, then this is a reasonable choice. Maybe responding to crises isnt really all that costly; maybe preventive action isnt
effective; or maybe preventive action is potentially effective but also extremely expensive. Under these circumstances, early warning is not going to be as useful as
we forecasters would like. If, however, any of those last statements are falseif responding to crises already underway is very costly, or if preventive action is
(relatively) cheap and sometimes effectivethen we have an incentive to use forecasts to help guide that action, in spite
of the lingering uncertainty about exactly where and when those crises will occur. Even in situations
where preventive action isnt feasible or desirable, reasonably accurate forecasts can still be useful if
they spur interested observers to plan for contingencies they otherwise might not have considered.
For example, policy-makers in one country might be rooting for a dictatorship in another country to
fall but still fail to plan for that event because they dont expect it to happen any time soon. A
forecasting model which identifies that dictatorship as being at high or increasing risk of collapse might
encourage those policy-makers to reconsider their expectations and, in so doing, lead them to prepare
better for that event. Where does that leave us? For me, the bottom line is this: even though forecasts of political instability
are never going to be as precise as wed like, they can still be accurate enough to be helpful, as long as
the events they predict are ones for which prevention or preparation stand a decent chance of making
a (positive) difference.