Case # 71

Standard Chartered v. Confesor, G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004

(ULP-Blue sky bargaining)

Facts:
Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in the Philippines.
The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the Standard Chartered Bank
Employees Union (the Union).
Within the freedom period of the 5-year CBA signed by the Bank and the Union, the latter, through its
President Mr. Divinagracia, sent a letter containing its proposal covering political provisions and (34)
economic provisions. The Bank, through its Manager, Mr. Harris, attached its counter-proposal to the non-
economic provisions proposed by the Union. During the negotiation, there were provisions on which the
Union and the Bank could not agree, hence, the notation DEFERRED/DEADLOCKED was placed therein.
Despite the Unions proposal and the necessary revisions on the counter-proposal of the Bank, both failed
to agree on the remaining economic provisions of the CBA. The Union declared deadlock and filed Notice
of Strike before NCMB and the Bank filed a complaint for ULP and damages before Arbitration Branch of
the NLRC against the Union. The Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain as it did not
bargain in good faith and it demanded sky high economic demand, indicative of blue-sky bargaining.
Then Sec. of Labor Nieves Confesor, after the parties submitted their respective position papers, issued an
Order ordering the Bank and the Union to execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions contained therein
effective for two years thereafter or until such time as a new CBA has superseded it, new provisions which
are being demanded by either party are deemed denied but without prejudice to such agreements as the
parties may have arrived in the meantime. ULP charge by the Bank and the Union against one another is
dismissed for lack of merit, hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue: WON the Union engaged in the Blue-Sky Bargaining.

Held: We, likewise, do not agree that the Union is guilty of ULP for engaging in blue-sky bargaining or
making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals.
[59]
The Bank failed to show that the economic demands
made by the Union were exaggerated or unreasonable. The minutes of the meeting show that the Union
based its economic proposals on data of rank and file employees and the prevailing economic benefits
received by bank employees from other foreign banks doing business in the Philippines and other branches
of the Bank in the Asian region.
In sum, we find that the public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned order and resolutions. While the approval of the CBA
and the release of the signing bonus did not estop the Union from pursuing its claims of ULP against the
Bank, we find that the latter did not engage in ULP. We, likewise, hold that the Union is not guilty of ULP.
Petition is DISMISSED.

Case # 72
Octavio v. PLDT, G.R. No. 175492, February 27, 2013
(Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration- Jurisdiction)

Facts:
PLDT hired Octavio as Sales System Analyst I on a probationary status in 2000 and became member of
Gabay ng Unyon sa Telekomunikasyon sa mga Superbisor (GUTS). Existing CBA then provides that effective
2001, theres an increase of 12% of the basic wage or P2,500.00 whichever is higher. He was regularized in
2001 and was promoted to the position of Sales Analyst 2 in 2002. PLDT and GUTS entered into another
CBA which provided for the salary increases of 8% of basic wage or P2,000.00 whichever is higher for the
first year (2002).
Octavio wrote the president of GUTS, Mr. Fajardo, claiming that he was not given a salary increase in 2001
and 2002. Acting thereon, Mr. Fajardo wrote the PLDT HRD for the entitlement of the members to the
across-the-board salary increase. Grievance Committee, however, failed to reach an agreement and in effect,
denied Octavios demand for salary increase. Aggrieved, Octavio filed before the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC a complaint for payment of salary increases.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and upheld the Committee Resolution. On appeal, NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiters Decision finding that Octavios salary had been already been adjusted in accordance
with the provisions of the CBA, further ruled that it has no jurisdiction as the same involved the
interpretation and implementation of the CBA. According to it, Octavio should have brought his claim
before proper body as provided in the latest CBAs provision on grievance machinery and procedure.
Issue: WON NLRC has jurisdiction over Octavios claim.
Held: No. Every Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) shall provide a grievance machinery to which all
disputes arising from its implementation or interpretation will be subjected to compulsory negotiations.
This essential feature of a CBA provides the parties with a simple, inexpensive and expedient system of
finding reasonable and acceptable solutions to disputes and helps in the attainment of a sound and stable
industrial peace.

In its Memorandum,
20
PLDT set forth the grievance machinery and procedure provided under Article X of
the CBA of 2002-2004, viz:
Step 3. If the grievance is not settled either because of deadlock or the failure of the committee to
decide the matter, the grievance shall be transferred to a Board of Arbitrators for the final
decision.

Indisputably, the present controversy involves the determination of an employees salary increases as
provided in the CBAs. When Octavios claim for salary increases was referred to the Union-Management
Grievance Committee, the clear intention of the parties was to resolve their differences on the proper
interpretation and implementation of the pertinent provisions of the CBAs. And in accordance with the
procedure prescribed therein, the said committee made up of representatives of both the union and the
management convened. Unfortunately, it failed to reach an agreement. Octavios recourse pursuant to the
CBA was to elevate his grievance to the Board of Arbitrators for final decision. Instead, nine months later,
Octavio filed a Complaint before the NLRC.

It is settled that "when parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a
dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed."
22
Moreover, we have held
time and again that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.
Case # 73
Goya Inc. v. Goya Employees Union, G.R. No. 170054, January 21, 2013
(Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration- Jurisdiction)

Facts: Petitioner Goya, Inc. (Company), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, importation,
and wholesale of top quality food products, hired contractual employees from PESO Resources
Development Corporation (PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory. This
prompted respondent Goya, Inc. Employees UnionFFW (Union) to request for a grievance conference on
the ground that the contractual workers do not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in the
existing CBA which provides- Probationary, Regular and Casual Employees. When the matter remained
unresolved, the grievance was referred to the NCMB for voluntary arbitration.

Failure to agree at amicable settlement, both submitted for resolution before the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA)
Bienvenido E. Laguesma the solitary issue of "WON Company is guilty of unfair labor acts in engaging the
services of PESO, a third party service provider, under the existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence."

The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employees from PESO is not a management prerogative
and in gross violation of the CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). It noted that the contractual
workers engaged have been assigned to work in positions previously handled by regular workers and Union
members, in effect violating CBA with respect to categories of employees.

With the hiring of contractual employees, the Union contended that it would no longer have probationary
and casual employees from which it could obtain additional Union members; thus, rendering inutile
Section 1, Article III (Union Security) of the CBA.

In countering the Unions allegations, the Company argued that: (a) the law expressly allows contracting
and subcontracting arrangements through DOLE Order No. 18-02; (b) the engagement of contractual
employees did not, in any way, prejudice the Union, since not a single employee was terminated and
neither did it result in a reduction of working hours nor a reduction or splitting of the bargaining unit; and
(c) Section 4, Article I of the CBA merely provides for the definition of the categories of employees and does
not put a limitation on the Companys right to engage the services of job contractors or its management
prerogative to address temporary/occasional needs in its operation.

VA Laguesma dismissed the Unions charge of ULP for being purely speculative and for lacking in factual
basis, but the Company was directed to observe and comply with its commitment under the CBA.
While the Union moved for partial reconsideration of the VA Decision,

the Company immediately filed a
petition for review

before the Court of Appeals (CA) to set aside the directive to observe and comply with
the CBA commitment pertaining to the hiring of casual employees when necessitated by business
circumstances, professing that such order was not covered by the sole issue submitted for voluntary
arbitration. CA dismissed, hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the Voluntary Arbitrator had jurisdiction to rule on the engagement of PESO, a third party
service provider, under existing CBA, laws and jurisprudence.

Held: Yes. We confirm that the VA ruled on a matter that is covered by the sole issue submitted for
voluntary arbitration. Resultantly, the CA did not commit serious error when it sustained the ruling that
the hiring of contractual employees from PESO was not in keeping with the intent and spirit of the CBA.
Indeed, the opinion of the VA is germane to, or, in the words of the CA, "interrelated and intertwined with,"
the sole issue submitted for resolution by the parties. This being said, the Companys invocation of Sections
4 and 5, Rule IV

and Section 5, Rule VI

of the Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary
Arbitration Proceedings dated October 15, 2004 issued by the NCMB is plainly out of order. Petition is
DENIED.

Case # 74
Ace Navigation Co., Inc. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 197309, October 10, 2012
(Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration- Procedure)

Facts: In 2008, seaman Teodorico Fernandez (Fernandez), assisted by his wife, Glenita Fernandez, filed with
the NLRC a complaint for disability benefits against Ace Navigation Co., Inc., Vela International Marine
Ltd., and/or Rodolfo Pamintuan (petitioners).The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint contending
that the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over the dispute. They argued that exclusive original jurisdiction is
with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators, pursuant to Section 29 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC ), since the parties are covered by the AMOSUP-TCC or AMOSUP-VELA
(as later cited by the petitioners) collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Under Section 14 of the CBA, a
dispute between a seafarer and the company shall be settled through the grievance machinery and
mandatory voluntary arbitration. Fernandez opposed the motion. He argued that inasmuch as his
complaint involves a money claim, original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case is vested with the labor
arbiter.
Labor Arbiter Rioflorido denied the motion to dismiss, holding that under Section 10 of RA No.8042, the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the labor arbiter has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over money claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, but the labor
agency denied the appeal. Accordingly, it remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion, prompting the petitioners to
elevate the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CA denied the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. The CA clarified that while the law allows
parties to submit to voluntary arbitration other labor disputes, including matters falling within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code as this Court recognized
in Vivero v. CA, the parties submission agreement must be expressed in unequivocal language. It found no
such unequivocal language in the AMOSUP/TCC CBA that the parties agreed to submit money claims or,
more specifically, claims for disability benefits to voluntary arbitration. Taking note of Section 29 of the
POEA-SEC, the CA explained that the relevant POEA-SEC provisions should likewise be qualified by the
ruling in the Vivero case, the Labor Code, and other applicable laws and jurisprudence. In sum, the CA
stressed that the jurisdiction of voluntary arbitrators is limited to the seafarers claims which do not fall
within the labor arbiters original and exclusive jurisdiction or even in cases where the labor arbiter has
jurisdiction, the parties have agreed in unmistakable terms (through their CBA) to submit the case to
voluntary arbitration. The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA decision, but the appellate court
denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Who has the original and exclusive jurisdiction over Fernandezs disability claim the labor arbiter under
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, as amended, or the voluntary arbitration mechanism as prescribed in the
parties CBA and the POEA
-SEC?

RULING:
We find merit in the petition. The States labor relations policy laid down in the Constitution and fleshed
out in the enabling statute, the Labor Code (Art. 260, 261 and 262) and the POEA-SEC provide that the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
Fernandezs disability claim. There is no dispute that the claim arose out of Fernandezs employment with
the petitioners and that their relationship is covered by a CBA AMOSUP/TCC or the AMOSUP-VELA
CBA. The CBA provides for a grievance procedure for the resolution of grievances or disputes which occur
during the employment relationship and, like the grievance machinery created under Article 261 of the
Labor Code, it is a two-tiered mechanism, with voluntary arbitration as the last step.
Contrary to the CAs reading of the CBAs Article 14, there is unequivocal or unmistakable language in the
agreement which mandatorily requires the parties to submit to the grievance procedure any dispute or
cause of action they may have against each other. What might have caused the CA to miss the clear intent
of the parties in prescribing a grievance procedure in their CBA is, as the petitioners have intimated, the
use of the auxiliary verb "may" in Article 14.7(a) of the CBA which provides that "if by reason of the nature
of the Dispute, the parties are unable to amicably settle the dispute, either party may refer the case to a
MANDATORY ARBITRATION COMMITTEE." While the CA did not qualify its reading of the subject
provision of the CBA, it is reasonable to conclude that it viewed as optional the referral of a dispute to the
mandatory arbitration committee when the parties are unable to amicably settle the dispute. We find this a
strained interpretation of the CBA provision. The CA read the provision separately, or in isolation of the
other sections of Article 14, especially 14.7(h), which, in clear, explicit language, states that the "referral of
all unresolved disputes from the Grievance Resolution Committee to the Mandatory Arbitration Committee
shall be unwaivable prerequisite or condition precedent for bringing any action, claim, or cause of action,
legal or otherwise, before any court, tribunal, or panel in any jurisdiction" and that the failure by a party or
seaman to so refer the dispute to the prescribed dispute resolution mechanism shall bar any legal or other
action. Read in its entirety, the CBAs Article 14 (Grievance Procedure) unmistakably reflects the parties
agreement to submit any unresolved dispute at the grievance resolution stage to mandatory voluntary
arbitration under Article 14.7(h) of the CBA. And, it should be added that, in compliance with Section 29 of
the POEA-SEC which requires that in cases of claims and disputes arising from a seafarers employment, the
parties covered by a CBA shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.
Since the parties used unequivocal language in their CBA for the submission of their disputes to voluntary
arbitration, we find that the CA committed a reversible error in its ruling. It bears stressing at this point
that we are upholding the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators over the
present dispute, not only because of the clear language of the parties CBA on the matter; more importantly,
we so uphold the voluntary arbitrators jurisdiction, in recognition of the States express preference for
voluntary modes of dispute settlement, such as conciliation and voluntary arbitration as expressed in the
Constitution, the law and the rules. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for
resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly
observed.

Case # 75
Club Filipino v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168406, July 13, 2009
(Strikes and Lockouts- Effect of a legal v. illegal strike)

Facts: Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non profit corporation duly formed,
organized and existing under Philippine laws, with petitioner Atty. Roberto F. de Leon as its president.
Respondents Ronnie Sualog, Joel Calida, Johnny Arinto and Roberto de Guzman, on the other hand, were
former officers and members of the Club Filipino Employees Association (the union).

Prior to the expiration of the CBA on May 31, 2000 and within the freedom period, the union made several
demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA
negotiations could be held. Due to various reasons proffered by the company, respondents, as officers of the
union, filed a request for preventive mediation with the NCMB but this, however, failed to bring the
management to the negotiating table. Both only met with a declaration of a deadlock.

April 2001, the union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and
failure to bargain. Company submitted first part of its economic counter-proposal. Meanwhile, May 2001,
the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision of the DOLE.

In response to the companys counter-proposal, the union sent the company its improved proposal, but the
company refused to improve on its offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on May 26, 2001 on the
ground of a CBA bargaining deadlock.

The company filed before the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed that
all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered separated from the service.

The labor arbiter declared the strike "procedurally [infirm] and therefore illegal, the union failed to attach
its written CBA proposal and the companys counter-proposal to the notice of strike and to provide proof of
a request for a conference to settle the dispute. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the LA's decision.

CA, via petition for certiorari, set aside the rulings holding that the NLRC and the labor arbiter "took a
selective view of the attendant facts of the case" and in "negating thereby the effects of the notice of strike
the union filed." What was more, the NLRCs reasoning was flawed because "a worker ordered dismissed
under a tribunals decision has every right to question his or her dismissal." The labor arbiters ruling was
likewise wrong because it was based on a "flimsy technicality" that conveniently booted out the union
officers from the company, hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the strike staged by respondents on May 26, 2001 was legal.

Held: Yes. Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code states:
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues
in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-
proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair
labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to
resolve the dispute amicably.
Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be
deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the
Board.

In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the
counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such
counter-proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after several requests to start
negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22, 2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally
responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the company
another three weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001 the second part of its counter-proposal.
This was almost a year after the expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.

The Implementing Rules use the words "as far as practicable." In this case, attaching the counter-proposal
of the company to the notice of strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to
produce the companys counter-proposal which it did not have.

Another error committed by the labor arbiter was his declaration that respondents, as union officers,
automatically severed their employment with the company due to the alleged illegal strike. In the first
place, there was no illegal strike. Moreover, it is hornbook doctrine that a mere finding of the illegality of
the strike should not be automatically followed by the wholesale dismissal of the strikers from employment.

The law is clear:
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
Note that the verb "participates" is preceded by the adverb "knowingly." This reflects the intent of the
legislature to require "knowledge" as a condition sine qua non before a union officer can be dismissed from
employment for participating in an illegal strike.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Case # 76
Visayas Community Medical Center v. Yballe, G.R. No. 196156, January 15,2014
(Strikes and Lockouts- Effect of a legal v. illegal strike)
Facts: Respondents were hired as staff nurses and midwives by petitioner VCMC, formerly Metro Cebu
Community Hospital, Inc (MCCHI). The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees of MCCHI. Perla Nava, president of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo
sa MCCHI (NAMA-MCCHI-NFL) wrote to MCCH Administrator expressing the union's desire to renew the
CBA, however, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal to secure first the endorsement of NFL legal counsel as
the official bargaining representative of MCCHI employees.
NFL Legal Counsel Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA was never referred to NFL and
the latter has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for collective bargaining negotiations. In
view of the existing conflict between federation and its local affiliate, check-off was temporarily suspended
by the MCCHI. Atty. Alforque advised Nava that their group is not recognized by NFL.
In 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave with pay for 12 union
members. The next day, several union members led by Nava and her group launched a series of mass
actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands, marching around the hospital premises and
putting up placards, posters and streamers. Atty. Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities
being carried out by union members.
DOLE Regional Office issued certifications stating that there is nothing in their records which shows that
NAMA-MCCH- NFL is a registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its
Charter Certificate. MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union members asking them to submit
written explanation why they should not be terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities
of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has no legal personality as per DOLE records.
NCMB, upon filing of Notice to Strike by NAMA-MCCH-NFL, denied the same for want of legal personality.
Despite such rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted and approved a strike vote. More than 100 striking
employees were dismissed for continued picketing activities. Unfazed, the striking union members held
more mass actions. With the volatile situation, MCCHI filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC in
which the same was granted with permanent injunction issued.
Due to several complaints for illegal dismissal and ULP by the terminated employees, Executive Labor
Arbiter Reynoso Belarmino ruled that MCCHI and its administrators were not guilty of ULP and likewise
upheld the termination of complainant union officers who conducted the illegal strike. But NAMA
members, who cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership, are
being liable only if they actually participated therein.
Respondents and their co-complainants filed before NLRC their respective appeals. NLRC affirmed the
decision. Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed before CA who likewise dismissed the same.
The present petition was included in the four consolidated cases previously decided by this court.
Respondents claim that they have consistently manifested their non-participation in the illegal strike and
argue that there is absolutely no reason to delete the awards and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that respondents have surreptitiously changed their position as
facts on records established that they signed the collective reply of the union members and acknowledged
Nava as their union leader.
Issue: WON respondents who were mere union members were illegally dismissed and if so, entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages.
Held: Illegally dismissed. The Supreme Court stressed that the law makes a distinction between union
members and union officers. A union member who merely participates in an illegal strike may not be
terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be
declared to have lost employment status. In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment
for knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike. The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal
strike as having lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers
from service.
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a legitimate labor organization, thus, the strike staged by its leaders and
members was declared illegal. The union leaders who conducted the illegal strike despite knowledge that
NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a duly registered labor union were declared to have been validly terminated by
petitioner. However, as to the respondents who were mere union members, it was not shown that they
committed any illegal act during the strike. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in finding that
respondents actively supported the concerted protest activities, signed the collective reply of union
members manifesting that they launched the mass actions to protest managements refusal to negotiate a
new CBA, refused to appear in the investigations scheduled by petitioner because it was the unions stand
that they would only attend these investigations as a group, and failed to heed petitioners final directive for
them to desist from further taking part in the illegal strike. The CA, on the other hand, found that
respondents participation in the strike was limited to the wearing of armbands. Since an ordinary striking
worker cannot be dismissed for such mere participation in the illegal strike, the CA correctly ruled that
respondents were illegally dismissed. However, the CA erred in awarding respondents full back wages and
ordering their reinstatement despite the prevailing circumstances.
Are respondents then entitled to back wages? This Court, in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, ruled
in the negative:
The alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for having participated in an illegal strike is
the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of the
realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers interest; (c) reinstatement is no
longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer
is prejudiced by the workers continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or inequitable
have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer and employee.
In the Decision dated December 7, 2011, we held that the grant of separation pay to complainants is the
appropriate relief under the circumstances, thus:
Considering that 15 years had lapsed from the onset of this labor dispute, and in view of strained relations
that ensued, in addition to the reality of replacements already hired by the hospital which had apparently
recovered from its huge losses, and with many of the petitioners either employed elsewhere, already old
and sickly, or otherwise incapacitated, separation pay without back wages is the appropriate relief. x x x
In fine, we sustain the CA in ruling that respondents who are mere union members were illegally dismissed
for participating in the illegal strike conducted by the Nava group. However, we set aside the order for their
reinstatement and payment of full back wages.

Case # 77
Santa Rosa Coca Cola Plant Employees Union v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007
(Strikes and Lockouts-Picketing; Innocent Bystander)

Facts: The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees
of the Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.

Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms. The
CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules
of the negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola
be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that
their wages be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view that the members
of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of
the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.

On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a Notice of Strike with
the NCMB.

The Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the Alyansa in front of the Companys
premises. Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket along the front perimeter of the plant on
September 21, 1999. As a result, all of the 14 personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not
report for work, and 71 production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling
lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night shift with cumulative
downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement. The volume of
production for the day was short by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.

On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal

Issue: WON the strike, dubbed by petitioner as picketing, is illegal.

Held: Article 212(o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the concerted
action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. CA, the Court ruled that
the fact that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance,
will be deemed to be controlling.
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer, usually accompanied by
the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a
labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe.
The purpose of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.

The basic elements of a strike are present in this case. They marched to and fro in front of the companys
premises during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which already affected the
companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted a strike.

For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by Art 263 of the Labor Code must be
observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in
case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to
the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case
that petitioners totally ignored the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. Petition
denied.