G.R. No.

122269 September 30, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO A. BANTUGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55,
Alaminos, Pangasinan, and HEIRS OF ZENAIDA BUSTRIA-TIGNO, represented by CAMILO TIGNO, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
For review is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated October 4, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013, dismissing a petition
filed by the Republic of the Philippines for the annulment of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, which declared private respondents to be the absolute owners of a piece of land in Barangay Malacapas,
Dasol, Pangasinan. The government, as petitioner, prays that the aforesaid decision of the trial court, rendered in Civil
Case No. A-1759, be annulled.1wphi1.nt
The facts are stated in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Sometime in 1957, one Matias Bustamante filed with the then CFI of Pangasinan an application for
registration under Act No. 496, as amended, of a tract of land containing an area of 880,000 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Malacapas, Dasol, Pangasinan.
Both the Director of Forestry and the Director of Fisheries filed oppositions to the aforecited application,
alleging among others, that "said parcel of land, with the exception of 97,525 square meters, is a part of
the Timber Land Block "A" Land Classification Project 44, which is converted into fish ponds." Isidro
Bustria [private respondents' predecessor-in-interest] and Julian Bustria, also opposed the said
application for land registration, alleging that they "have in the year 1943 occupied in good faith their
respective portions having a total area of fifty (50) hectares, more or less . . . converted their respective
portions into fish ponds . . . and actually possessed and occupied their respective portions . . . exclusively
against all persons, except the Director of Forestry & Director of Fishery." After trial, the lower court
rendered a Decision in favor of applicant Bustamante.
On appeal to this Honorable Court, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30058-R, it was found that 783,275 square
meters of the land applied for were accretions added to applicant Bustamante's riceland of 9.7525
hectares, and that said accretion was caused by the sea on the southward portion of said riceland. This
Honorable Court then ruled:
This being so, the said accretion belongs not to the riparian owner but the State.
All lands thrown up by the sea and formed upon the shores, belong to the national
domain and are for public use, in accordance with the provisions of the Law on Waters
of August 3, 1866 (Insular Government vs. Aldecoa, 19 Phil. 505) (p. 20, Decision,
November 16, 1967).
Thus, modifying the judgment of the lower court, this Honorable Court rendered a Decision on
November 16, 1967, disposing:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby modified so that only
9.7525 of the land applied for is hereby adjudicated and ordered to be registered in the
name of the applicant, the remaining area being hereby declared land of the public
domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, without prejudice to whatever
rights oppositors Isidro Bustria and Julian Bustria may have acquired over portions of
the area thus declared as land of the public domain, with costs against applicant.
SO ORDERED.
When brought up on certiorari to the Supreme Court, the foregoing Judgment was affirmed in toto in
the Resolution in G.R. No. L-18605 dated February 29, 1968.
It is relevant to state at this point that the parcel of land that is presently the subject of the dispute in
the instant case, Lot No. 7764, CAD 624-D (Portion) [Psu-155696, Lot 3 (Portion)], forms part of the
above-mentioned parcel of land declared by this Honorable Court as belonging to the public domain,
classified/zonified land available for fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175, approved on June 24,
1984, under administrative Order No. 4-1829 (Annex "D", Petition). The subject lot contains an area of
49,999 square meters, more or less. This lot has been leased to Mr. Porfirio Morado by the [Republic of
the Philippines], represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, for a period of twenty-five (25) years, or up
to December 31, 2013, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 5132, dated August 17, 1989 (Annex "E",
Petition).
On July 6, 1988, however, the late Zenaida Bustria [daughter of Isidro Bustria] filed a complaint against
Porfirio Morado in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, for ownership and
possession over the lot in question [docketed as Civil Case No. A-1759]. Herein petitioner, the Republic
of the Philippines, was not made a party to that suit.
In her complaint, Zenaida Bustria claimed absolute ownership and quiet and peaceful possession of
several lots under PSU-155696 surveyed in the name of her father, Isidro Bustria. She further asserted
that said Porfirio Morado maliciously applied for a fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources over Lot 3 thereof (the subject lot), well-knowing that said lot had always been
occupied, possessed and worked by her and her predecessors-in-interest.
Porfirio Morado denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that the lot in question is part of the
public domain which he developed and converted into a fishpond. Due, however, to Porfirio Morado's
and his counsel's failure to appear at the pre-trial and subsequent court hearings, the trial court
subsequently declared Porfirio Morado "as in default."
On December 17, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the plaintiff as the exclusive and absolute owner of the
land in question stated in paragraph 4 of the Complaint and entitled to
the exclusive and quiet possession of the said land; and
(b) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of
P15,000.00 as attorney's fees and the sum of P500.00 per day of hearing
of the counsel; plus costs.
(Annex "A", Petition)
On January 23, 1992, Porfirio Morado filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment which was denied on July
21, 1992 for lack of merit.
On July 8, 1992, a writ of execution was issued, and it was implemented by Sheriffs Manuel O. de Asis
and Sheriff Cesar A. Gines. Spouses Porfirio Morado and Juliana Morado thereafter filed with this
Honorable Court a Petition for Certiorari with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No.
28932. In a Resolution dated December 11, 1992, the Petition was denied for lack of merit. The related
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated February 18, 1993. (Rollo, pp. 107-112)
(emphasis omitted)
2

On April 19, 1994, petitioner, invoking 9 of B.P. Blg. 129,
3
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment
of the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991. Petitioner alleged that the land in question is within the
classified/zonified alienable and disposable lend for fishpond development, per L.C. Map No. 3175 approved on June 24,
1984, under Administrative Order No. 4-1829 and that since the land formed part of the public domain, the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) has jurisdiction over its disposition in accordance with P.D. No 704, 4.
On October 4, 1995 the, Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
4

Hence, this petition for review.
The judgment rendered in a case may be annulled on any of the following grounds: (a) the judgment is void for want of
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law; or (b) it was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
5
The question in this case is
whether the decision of the Regional Trial Court is void on any of these grounds. The preliminary question, however, is
whether the government can bring such action even though it was not a party to the action in which the decision sought
to be annulled was rendered.
We shall deal with these questions in inverse order.
First, is the question whether petitioner has personality to bring the action below. To begin with, an action to recover a
parcel of land is in personam. As such, it is binding only between the parties thereto, as this Court explained inChing
v. Court of Appeals,
6
viz:
An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an
action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
actionin personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while
the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is
an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible
thing.
The appellate court, holding that the proceedings before the trial court were in personam, ruled that since petitioner
was not a party to Civil Case No. A-1759, it is not a real party-in-interest and, therefore, has no personality to bring the
action for annulment of the judgment rendered in that case. The appellate court said:
Private respondents are correct. Civil Case No. A-1759 was purely for "Ownership and Possession". The
decision sought to be annulled is solely "between the private respondents [the Bustrias] and Porfirio
Morado" (Rollo, p. 142). Petitioner Republic was not a party in the case and is not bound by the
judgment rendered therein.
It is settled, a real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes & Co., Ltd., 88 Phil. 128; University of the Philippines Board of Regents
vs. Ligot-Telan, 227 SCRA 342; Tampingco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 652; Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan, 203 SCRA 310; Travelwide Associated Sales, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205).
Petitioner Republic not being a party, and the judgment not being in rem, it does not stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment sought. Petitioner Republic can on its own, and even without
resorting to this petition for annulment of judgment, institute the proper action to assert its claim that
the "subject lot is a land forming part of the public domain'' (Rollo, p. 145). It need not seek the
annulment of the subject judgment, in Civil Case No. A-1759 in which it was not a party and involves
merely a question of ownership; and possession between plaintiffs Zenaida B. Bustria and defendant
Porfirio Morado and which decision is not binding on it, to be able to assert its claim or interest in the
property. It is clear for this reason that petitioner is not a real party-in-interest (Section 2, Rule 3,
Revised Rules of Court).
7

The appellate court is in error. In Islamic Da'wah Council of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,
8
this Court held that a party
claiming ownership of a parcel of land which is the subject of foreclosure proceedings has a sufficient interest to bring
an action for annulment of the judgment rendered in the foreclosure proceedings even though it was not in the party in
such proceedings. It was held:
[A] person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is that he can
prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be
adversely affected thereby.
In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither are
they principally nor secondarily bound by the judgment rendered therein. However, in their petition
filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between the Da
Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them. This allegation, if fully substantiated by
preponderance of evidence, could be the basis for the annulment of Civil Case No. 4-43476.
9

This ruling was reiterated in Top Management Programs Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
10

The next question is whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to declare the land in question to belong to private
respondent. The government asserts that the lot is within the "classified/zonified alienable and disposable land for
fishpond development," hence, it is part of the public domain;
11
that under P.D. No. 704, 4, jurisdiction over its
disposition is vested in the BFAR; that unlike agricultural land, public lands which are declared suitable for fishpond
purposes may only be disposed of by way of license, concession, or lease; and that possession thereof, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
12

On the other hand, private respondents do not deny that Isidro Bustria, to whom they trace their ownership, previously
filed a fishpond application with the BFAR over the disputed land.
13
Neither do they deny that the disputed land formed
part of the public domain. They insist, however, that P.D. No. 704 applies only to "lands suitable for fishpond purposes"
while the land in dispute is already a "fully developed fishpond." They assert ownership of the subject lot through open
and continuous possession of their predecessor-in-interest since the Second World War.
14

We agree with petitioner. The State clearly stands to be adversely affected by the trial court's disposition of in alienable
public land.
The land involved in this case was classified as public land suitable for fishpond development.
15
In controversies
involving the disposition of public land, the burden of overcoming, the presumption of state ownership of lands of the
public domain lies upon the private claimant.
16
Private respondents have not discharged this burden.
The fact that the land in dispute was transformed into a "fully developed fishpond" does not mean that it has lost its
character as one declared "suitable for fishpond purposes" under the decree. By applying for a fishpond permit with the
BFAR, Isidro Bautista admitted the character of the land as one suitable for fishpond development since the disposition
of such lands is vested in the BFAR. Consequently, private respondents, as his successors-in-interest, are estopped from
claiming otherwise.
It is settled under the Public Land Law
17
that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years is ipso jure converted to private property by
the mere lapse of time.
18
However, only public lands classified as agricultural
19
are alienable. Lands declared for fishery
purposes are not alienable
20
and their possession, no matter how long continued, cannot ripen into ownership.
Since the disposition of lands declared suitable for fishpond purposes fall within the jurisdiction of the BFAR, in
accordance with P.D. No 704, 4,
21
the trial court's decision, dated December 17, 1991, is null and void. The trial court
has no jurisdiction to make a disposition of inalienable public land. If, as claimed, Porfirio Morado secured a fishpond
permit through fraud and misrepresentation, private respondents' sole recourse, if any, is to secure the annulment of
the same before the BFAR and apply for a new one in their favor, provided that they are qualified therefor. What they
did, however, was not only to bring their action in the wrong forum but to ask to be declared owners of the land in
dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 34013,
dated October 4, 1995, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision of Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1759 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
19 CONST., Art. XII, 3.
20 CONST., Art. XII, 2; Presidential Decree No. 704, 23.
21 Jurisdiction of the Bureau. The Bureau shall have jurisdiction and responsibility in the management,
conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery and aquatic resources of the
country except municipal waters which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned: Provided,
That fish pens and seaweed culture in municipal centers shall be under the jurisdiction of the Bureau:Provided,
further, That all municipal or city ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition
thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only
upon his approval. The Bureau shall also have the authority to regulate and supervise the production, capture
and gathering of fish and fishery/aquatic products.
The Bureau shall prepare and implement, upon approval of the Fishery Industry Development Council, a
Fishery Industry Development Program.

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they are commonly
known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered
public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in
question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz.
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of
Capiz.
1
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
2
The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is mangrove
land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps
or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is
alienable as agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American
organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the
Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new
charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories.
3
This provision has been reproduced,
but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.
4

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural lands
were allowed to be alienated.
5
Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands
were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for
alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government,
6
promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps or manglares were
defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants which
will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their
seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist
naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of
the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these flats
are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which
that term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them
are not available for purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the
public interest in what remains.
x x x
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown of
converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of settlement along
the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most productive
industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public
disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove swamps
form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on
October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except
as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and
all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the Montano case
when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry:
7

...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as
terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be
'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant
would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic
plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the general
character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase
agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not
timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress
of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect
rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered them
agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act
No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias,
8
promulgated on March 4, 1933,
more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a
unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there are
mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the Director of
Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest
lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in 1977,
the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry,
9
with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove
lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small and sparse,
fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as lumber do not
convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do not form part of the
public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan,
10
the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,
11
reiterated the ruling in the
Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether
they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
12
promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that the Bureau of
Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry,
13
the Court was more positive when it held, again
through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is
not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included
in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and
third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a
mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in
actual possession of private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land'
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
14
where this Court agreed with the Solicitor
General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," were not
private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that should
resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to
implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide
for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then,
in the discharge of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the
picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not
being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and
achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of making periodic
classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time
to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or open
to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of
the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the President of the Philippines
may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by proclamation declare the
establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not
be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of
any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been
made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including
forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and
more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be
kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The
statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional
assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so
must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as
forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as
judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering
only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective.
Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired
property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals,
15
where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much
later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and
for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership
claimed by the private respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as
forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under
Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands,
16
to prove
that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not have the
effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it
is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the
Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than
forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales
patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands
forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timber land and
not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has been declared
alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private
property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent offers of
prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing
evidence of the existence of the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let
alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that
the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that the land has been under
the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage
Law.
17
These matters are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis used by the appellate
court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to
prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases.
18

We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the subject land in his
name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the
public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of
private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private
respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.

G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May 27, 1988, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director of Lands," affirming in totothe
decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private respondents' application for confirmation and
registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the applicants Ibarra and
Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869,
respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq. m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen.
Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those
parcels of land (p. 41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the
application on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to acquire ownership
in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having been acquired by any of the various
types of title issued by the Spanish Government, such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the
'concession especial' or special grant, (3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4)
the 'titulo de compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory
information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized mode of acquisition of
title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March 14, 1977, and
included the following allegation:
Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for the
benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the applicants, herein private
respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful
and adverse possession of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80)
years (not only 30) prior to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by
planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland
by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more valuable as forest
land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10).
In this petition, the government alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable agricultural land,
mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not of
the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the requirements of
Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as
amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the
classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is
now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the government and not the courts. With these rules,
there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the
government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse of discretion
for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a timberland
block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp.
21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to
convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply (Amunategui
vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151
SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161
[1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or
areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has
an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as
those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of
the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gilbert D. Camaligan for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the 1) decision * of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
dated May 13, 1986, in AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose
T. Sanchez, applicant-appellee vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision ** of
the then Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon, 9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated November 4, 1980 in Land
Registration Case No. N-1106 entitled the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest Development, oppositors, ordering the registration
of title to the parcel of land designated, as lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technical descriptions, and the
parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, together with whatever improvements
existing thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated June 19,1986,
denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit."
The factual background of the case as found by the Intermediate Appellate Court are as follows:
On February 2, 1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez,
filed an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of said parcels,
denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio Masin,
Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592 is located in
Barrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. As basis for the application, the applicant
claimed title to the various properties through either purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928.
The legal requirements of publication and posting were duly complied with, as was the service of copies
of notice of initial hearing on the proper government officials.
In behalf of the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Solicitor
General filed an Opposition on April 20, 1979, alleging therein among others, that the applicant did not
have an imperfect title or title in fee simple to the parcel of land being applied for.
At the initial hearing held on November 13, 1979, only the Provincial Fiscal in representation of the
Solicitor General appeared to interpose personal objection to the application. Hence, an Order of
General Default against the whole world was issued by the Court a quo except for the Director of Lands
and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development.
The preliminaries dispensed with, the applicant then introduced its proofs in support of the petition,
summed up by the lower court as follows:
With respect to Lots 1, 2, and 3, plan PSU-65686.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 of plan PSU-65686 respectively containing an area of 18,977, 6,910 and
16,221 square meters, are adjoining lots & are situated in the Barrio of Masin,
Municipality of Candelaria, Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) (Exhibits F, F-1, F-2
and F-3). Said lots were surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on November 3, 1928
(Exhibit P-5) and the survey plan approved on October 20, 1929 (Exhibit F-6).
Lot 1 was acquired by the Roman Catholic Church thru Rev. Father Raymundo Esquenet
by purchase from the spouses Atanacio Yranso and Maria Coronado on October 20,
1928 (Exhibits G, G-1), portion of Lot 2 also by purchase thru Rev. Father Raymundo
Esquenet from the spouses Benito Maramot and Venancia Descaller on May 22, 1969
(Exhibits M, N-1), while the remaining portion of Lot 2 and Lot 3 were already owned
and possessed by the Roman Catholic Church even prior to the survey of the said three
lots in 1928.
Records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that even
as early as November 1918, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic
Church as its cemetery in Candelaria, Quezon (Exhibit N, N-1 to N-5).<re||an1w>
These three lots presently constituted the Roman Catholic Church cemetery in
Candelaria, Quezon.
Lots 1, 2 and 3 are declared for taxation purposes in the name of the Roman Catholic
Church under Tax Declaration Nos. 22-19-02-079, 22-19-02-077 and 22-19-02-082 as
'cemetery site' (Exhibit S, V and T).
With respect to the parcel of land described in plan PSU-112592:
This parcel of land situated in the barrio of Bucal (Taguan), Municipality of Candelaria,
Province of Quezon (formerly Tayabas) and more particularly described in plan PSU-1
12592 and its technical description with an area of 3,221 square meters (Exhibit 1) was
formerly owned and possessed by the spouses Paulo G. Macasaet, and Gabriela V. de
Macasaet. Said spouses, on February 26, 1941, donated this lot to the Roman Catholic
Church represented by Reverend Father Raymundo Esquenet (Exhibit J, J-1 to J-4). It was
surveyed for the Roman Catholic Church on Aug. 16, 1940 as church site and the
corresponding survey plan approved on Jan. 15, 1941 (Exhibits I-1, I-2, 1-3).
Previously erected on this Lot was an old chapel which was demolished and new chapel
now stands in its place on the same site.
For his part, the Fiscal in a Manifestation dated July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not adduce evidence in
support of its opposition and will submit the instant case for decision.'
Evaluating the applicant's submitted proofs, the court a quo concluded, on the basis of acquisitive
prescription at the very least, that the former had adequately shown title to the parcels of land being
claimed.
Since the acquisition of these four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous
possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-
in interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of the survey
in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan
PSU- 65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan
PSU-112592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public,
continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.
Accordingly, the court ordered the registration of the four parcels together with the improvements
thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole
duly registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines."
Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:
1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution(1973) disqualifies a private corporation from acquiring
alienable lands for the public domain.
2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New Constitution on January 17,
1973.
which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.
Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration (a point which, incidentally, the
appellant never raised in the lower court prior to its Motion for Reconsideration), the Republic elevated
this appeal. (Rollo, pp. 25-28)
On May 13, 1986, the first Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered its Decision the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the judgment a quo to be supported by law and the evidence on record, the same
is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo p. 30)
A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by Appellant Republic of the Philippines, but for lack of merit,
its motion for reconsideration was denied on June 19, 1986, by Resolution of the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate
Appellate Court which resolution reads in full:
Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion for reconsideration" filed on June 4, 1986; the
Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds raised therein
having all been considered in the decision. (Rollo, p. 31)
Hence, this petition.
The following are the assigned errors raised by the petitioner in its petition:
1. The decision and the resolution in question are contrary to law and decisions of this honorable Court
in Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome and Republic, 114 SCRA 799 (prom. June 29,1982); Republic vs. Judge
Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, June 29, 1982); and Republic vs. Judge Gonong and Iglesia
ni Cristo, 118 SCRA 729-733 (November 25,1982); Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas, Inc. 141
SCRA 21-25 (Jan. 7,1986).
2. The lands applied for registration were the subject of a previous registration case where a decree of
registration was already issued.
3. Respondent corporation failed to establish the indentity of the lands applied for. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The issue raised in this case involves the question of whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole
is qualified to apply for confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.
Corollary thereto is the question of whether or not a corporation sole should be treated as an ordinary private
corporation, for purpose of the application of Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution.
Article XIV, Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution, in part provides:
Sec. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in
excess of five hundred hectares....
Sec. 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a Certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
In its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner contends that the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena (private respondent
herein) which is admittedly a corporation sole is disqualified to own and register its title over the parcels of land
involved herein. (Rollo, p. 41)
In its petition it likewise argued that being a juridical entity, private respondent cannot avail of the benefits of Sec. 48(b)
of the public land law which applies to FILIPINO citizens or NATURAL persons. On the other hand, private respondent in
its MEMORANDUM espoused the contrary view.
There is no merit in this petition.
The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous
possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-in-interest, covering a period of
more than 52 years (at least from the date of survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to
lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at
least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole
world, and in the concept of owner.
Being disputed before this Court is the matter of the applicability of Art. XIV Sec. 11 of the 1973 Constitution to the case
at bar.
Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is disqualified to own and register
its title to the lots in question. Further, it argues that since the application for registration was filed only on February 2,
1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973, the application for registration and confirmation
of title is ineffectual because at the time it was filed, private corporation had been declared ineligible to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said constitution. (Rollo, p. 41)
The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court (146 SCRA 509 [1986]) which reversed the ruling first enunciated in the 1982 case of Manila Electric Co. vs.
CASTRO BARTOLOME, (114 SCRA 789 [1982]) imposing the constitutional ban on public land acquisition by private
corporations which ruling was declared emphatically as res judicata on January 7, 1986 inDirector of Lands vs. Hermanos
y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., (141 SCRA 21 [1986]).<re||an1w> In said case, (Director of Lands v.
IAC, supra), this Court stated that a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the
negative.
If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporation or association obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in said
case, this Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the then Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line
of cases beginning with CARINO,
1
in 1909, thru SUSI,
2
in 1925, down to HERICO,
3
in 1980, which developed, affirmed
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property. (DIRECTOR OF
LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518).
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the state than the dictim of the
statute itself;
4
that the possessor "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof being admissable to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time, and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not ORIGINALLY convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 520).
The open, continuous and exclusive possession of the four lots by private respondent can clearly be gleaned from the
following facts on record: Lot 1 and portion of Lot 2 was acquired by purchase in 1928 and 1929, respectively. The
remaining portion of lots 2 and 3 was already owned and possessed by private respondent even prior to the survey of
said lots in 1928. In fact, records of burial of the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon showed that as early as
1919, Lot 3 has already been utilized by the Roman Catholic Church as its cemetery. That at present, said three lots are
utilized as the Roman Catholic Church of Candelaria, Quezon. That said lots are declared for taxation purposes in the
name of the Roman Catholic Church. The fourth parcel of land was acquired by donation in 1941 and same lot is utilized
as church site.
It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole should be treated like an ordinary private
corporation.
In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, et al. (L-8451, December
20,1957,102 Phil. 596). We articulated:
In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation
sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into
the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of
English Law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the
clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See 1 Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, p. 682-683).
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in
some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and
advantages, particulary that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In
this sense, the King is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct from their several chapters
(Reid vs. Barry, 93 fla. 849, 112 So. 846).
Pertinent to this case is the provision of Sec. 113 Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 which reads as follows:
Sec. 113. Acquisition and alienation of property. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real
estate and personal property for its church, charitable, benevolent or educational purposes, and may
receive bequests or gifts for such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by
it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province where the
property is situated; but before the order is issued, proof must be made to the satisfaction of the Court
that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in
such manner and for such time as said court may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the
corporation that leave to mortgage or sell should be granted. The application for leave to mortgage or
sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the chief archbishop, bishop, priest, minister, rabbi or
presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious
denomination, sect or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, That in cases where the
rules, regulations and discipline of the religious denomination, sect or church religious society or order
concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the method of acquiring, holding, selling and
mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations and discipline shall control and the
intervention of the courts shall not be necessary.
There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold
real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether
or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the
lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed
in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed decision and Resolution of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.