1

10. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

A. REQUIREMENTS AS TO BILL
1. As to titles
Philippine Judges Association vs Prado CRUZ, J .:
FACTS:The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No.7354. These
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other
government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their
official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The
petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354(see ISSUE for the grounds stated
by the petitioners).
ISSUE:WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the followinggrounds:1) its *title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
HELD1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be
an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject,
and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. In the case at bar, there pealing clause which includes the withdrawal of
franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.

DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
FACTS:At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the
validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The
Voters Registration Act of 1996".RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved
by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who,
either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at
least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned
by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district."
Issue: SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC
CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT
EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT
WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE
Held: Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with
where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general
objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane
to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title.[8] Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated
considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the
law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter
enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING
REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which
provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a
guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an
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alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing
registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not
require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.[9]In
determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the
presumption is in favor of its validity



















































3

In case of Conflict:

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ vs EDGARDO PARAS

FACTS:
1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is an owner of clubs and cabarets in
Bulacan.
2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as prohibition and closure ordinance which
was based on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (butwas originally enacted on June 20,
1953.
.3. The said RA is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTINGMUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILSTHE POWER TO REGULATE THEESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE
ANDOPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVETERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.
4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city
shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs, cabaret sand other similar places of amusement within its
territorial jurisdiction.
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely the
power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit."6. The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938.7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for
prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed on the grounds that (1) Ordinance No.
84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling; (2) Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners right to due
process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to
petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing; and (3)That under
Presidential Decree No. 189 (as amended, by Presidential Decree No.259 the power to
license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
HELD:
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by
the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide
gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional
infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A
construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly
commends itself.

TATAD VS SEC
FACTS: The government created laws accommodate these innovations in the oil
industry. One such law is the Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180.
This law allows that any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude
oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate
refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same
for his own requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. Tatad
assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that the imposition of
different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products
violates the equal protection clause. Tatad contends that the 3%-7% tariff differential
unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and discriminates against prospective
investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have their own refineries and will
4

have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.3% is to be taxed on unrefined
crude products and 7% on refined crude products.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional.
HELD:We come to the submission that the provisions on 4% tariff differential, minimum
inventory and predatory pricing are separable from the body of R.A. No. 8180, and
hence, should alone bedeclared as unconstitutional. In taking this position, the movants
rely heavily on the separability provision of R.A. No. 8180. We cannot affirm the
movants for the determine whether or not a particular provision is separable, the courts
should consider the intent of the legislature. It is truethat the most of the time, such
intent is expressed in a separability clause stating that the invalidity or
unconstitutionality of any provision or section of the law will not affect the validity or
constitutionality of the remainder. Nonetheless, the separability clause only creates
presumptionthat the act is severable. It is merely an aid in statutory construction It is not
an inexorable command 18. A separability clause does not clothe the valid parts with
immunity from the invalidating effect the law gives to the inseparable blending of the
bad with the good
These parability clause cannot also be applied if it will produce an absurd result 19. In
sum, if theseparation of the statute will defeat the intent of the legislature, separation will
not take place despite the inclusion of a separability clause in the law.

FARIAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. Any
elective official, whether national or local, running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections
Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed
in its title.
The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of
the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as
ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of
Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter
of RA 9006.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
HELD:No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006
does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of
its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received
5

the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be
claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the
House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed
their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.


















































6

2. Requirements (origin) as to other laws

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
FACTS:
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2)
of the Constitution.
HELD: No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the
revenue law. It is sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of
the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the Senate.SB. No. 1630, having been
certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of printing
but also of reading the bill on separate days.

Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita
FACTS: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%);or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a
tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

7

ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO

HELD: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can
never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use
or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law
is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January
1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or
non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence
of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of
the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon
the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which
cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate
when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence
of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has
occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such
information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law

8

Appropriation Laws
Demetria vs Alba
FACTS
1.)Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of the country
, as members of theNational Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of
constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the
Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of
the reliefs
2.) Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977
on the ff. grounds:
- It infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing the illegal transfer of public
moneys- It is repugnant to the constitution as it fails to specify the objectives and
purposes for which the proposed transfer of funds are to be made- It allows the
President to override the safeguards, form and procedure prescribed by the Constitution
in approving appropriations- it amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers on the
transfer of funds by the President and the implementation thereof by the Budget
Minister and the Treasurer arewithout or in excess of their authority and jurisdiction- The
threatened and continuing transfer of funds by the president and theimplementation
thereof by the budget minister and the treasurer of the Philippines arewithout or in
excess of their authority and jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON the Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is
unconstitutional.
HELD:YES.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, beingrepugnant to Section
16(5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is null and void.
-Paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.
-Section 16(5) Article VIII reads as follows:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, theChief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.
- Prohibition to transfer was explicit and categorical. For flexibility in the use of public
funds, the Constitution provided a leeway in which the purpose and condition for which
funds may be transferred were specified


Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as
the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for
the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00The said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic
Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign
Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967,
entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of
the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans
9

by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.The petitioners were questioning the
constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the
budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being
higher than the budget for education.
HELD:
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to
respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state
policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to
provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the
very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds
and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional
PCA vs Enriquez
Facts:
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the
president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the
constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that
Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those
funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of
1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators
Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition
and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al
contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in
the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President
in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power
and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Taada petitions the SC dismissed the other
petitions and granted the others

HELD: The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
representatives of their local districts know more about the problems in their
constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence,
with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to
where funds should be allocated.

BRILLANTES VS COMELEC

FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436[2] authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local
elections. It also mandated the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms
and printing materials.
10

Sec. 52. Modification of Expenditure Components. Unless specifically authorized in this
Act, no change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items in this Act and
other appropriations laws unless in cases of augmentation from savings in
appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
ISSUES and RULINGS:
Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELECs savings, if
any, because it would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5)[47] of the 1987
Constitution.

The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.[48] In this
case, no law has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to
transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the
assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no
law appropriating any amount for an unofficial count and tabulation of the votes cast
during the May 10, 2004 elections:
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that per records of the Senate, Congress has not legislated any
appropriation intended to defray the cost of an unofficial count, tabulation or
consolidation of the votes cast during the May 10, 2004 elections.
May 11, 2004. Pasay City, Philippines.
What is worrisome is that despite the concerns of the Commissioners during its En
Banc meeting on April 27, 2004, the COMELEC nevertheless approved the assailed
resolution the very next day. The COMELEC had not executed any supplemental
contract for the implementation of the project with PMSI. Worse, even in the absence of
a certification of availability of funds for the project, it approved the assailed resolution.

Atitiw V. Zamora G.R
FACTS: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous
regions in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact
organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the
residual powers of President Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then
the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organicact for the cordillera
autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. Thecourt
declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of
2000 (GAA 2000) whichincludes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O
270 to extend the implementation of thewinding up of operations of the CAR and
extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of
paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the
appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay theseparation
and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees.
ISSUE:Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is
unconstitutional.
2.Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal
EO 220.3.

HELD: Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled
out in EO.220Ruling:In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said
that xxx an appropriations bill covers a broader range of subject matter and therefore
includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. Thetitle of an appropriations bill
cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a title that
embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1
of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an
appropriations bill must relate specifically to some particular appropriations. On the
other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected,
there is no such thing as an irrepealably law. And nothing could prevent the Congress
11

from amending or repealing the E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law.
The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes
mutual respect. Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative
while the sourcing of funds is within the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any
grave abuse of discretion, the court cannot correct the acts of either the Executive or
the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR



















































12

Tax Laws
CIR v. YMCA
FACTS: Private Respondent YMCA--a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts
various programs beneficial to the public pursuant to its religious, educational and
charitable objectives--leases out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like
restaurants and canteen operators, deriving substantial income for such. Seeing this,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private
respondent for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals
and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. YMCA opposed arguing
that its rental income is not subject to tax, mainly because of the provisions of Section
27 of NIRC which provides that civic league or organizations not organized for profit but
operate exclusively for promotion of social welfare and those organized exclusively for
pleasure, recreation and other non-profitble businesses shall not be taxed.
ISSUE: Is the contention of YMCA tenable?
HELD: No. Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied
the doctrine of strict in interpretation in construing tax exemptions. Furthermore, a claim
of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the
language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption "must expressly
be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken."

CHAVEZ VS PCGG
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official asked the court to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman]from privately
entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the latePresident Ferdinand
E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets ofFerdinand Marcos located in the
Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcosgold hoard.Chavez assailed the validity of the
General and Supplemental Agreement executed by thegovernment (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs on December 28,1993.Item No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the
PRIVATE PARTY (Marcosheirs) shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic
of the Philippines.
ISSUE:W/N the compromise agreement entered into by the PCGG and the Marcos heirs which
committing to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs isvalid.
HELD:The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for
being contrary to law and the Constitution. Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a
clear violation of the Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the
Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the
Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power
to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten
wealth cases. Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoss form paying taxes
on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection clause under the
Billof Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class
legislation. It will also violate the constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable."Neither
can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner of internal revenue to
compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the
validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayers financial position demonstrates a
clear inability to pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses,
because under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their
properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall
within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised
only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and
collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of
tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of
13

the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be
compromised.

LUNG CENTER v. QUEZON CITYNATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS: The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-
profit entityestablished by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1823. It owns a piece of
land, in the middle of which is a hospital stands. A big space at the ground floor is being
leased to private parties for canteen and small stores and to medical and to professional
practitioners. A big portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to a
private enterprise. In 1993, both land and the hospital building were assessed for real
property taxes in the amount of about Php 4.5 Million. The petitioner avers that it is a
charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable institution is not altered by the
fact that it admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions
of the land to private parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical
practitioners from which it derives income to be used for operational expenses.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is tax exempt under the 1987 Constitution.

HELD: Only the hospital is exempt from property tax.RATIONALE: The test whether an
enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose reorganized in
law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private advantage. As a
general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether
out-patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so
long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which
it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons
managing or operating the institution. However, under the 1973and 1987 Constitutions
and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is
burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution;
and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for
charitable purposes. Accordingly, only those portions of the hospital used for patients
whether paying or non-paying are exempt from real property taxes. Those portions of its
real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes
as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.


HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.
FACTS:On December 12, 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive
Order 156 entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the
motor vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines." The said
provision prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles in the country
including the Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone, subject to a few exceptions.
Consequently, three separate actions for declaratory relief were filed by Southwing
Heavy Industries Inc, Subic Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor Vehicle
Importers Association of Subic Bay Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered
declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.
ISSUE: WON Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal.
HELD:Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional
limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is
lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power,
it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the
lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such delegation
confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be defined as the
authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative body to adopt rules
and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law and implement legislative
policy provided that it must comply with the following requisites:
14

(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and
statutory bases.
Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said executive issuance duly
complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law since the respondents
never questioned the procedure that paved way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead,
what they challenged was the absence of substantive due process in the issuance of
the EO.
In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third
requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the
authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is the domestic
industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its application by extending the
prohibition on the importation of used cars to the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to
some extent, a foreign territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is
actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227 which states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic
Bay Freeport where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other national
tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."
Regarding the fourth requisite, the Court finds that the issuance of EO is unreasonable.
Since the nature of EO 156 is to protect the domestic industry from the deterioration of
the local motor manufacturing firms, the Court however, finds no logic in all the
encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport Zone which is
outside the customs territory of the Philippines. As long as the used motor vehicles do
not enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied
will not arise.
The Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is VOID insofar as it is made
applicable within the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area but is declared
VALID insofar as it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of
EO 97-A (an EO executed by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos in 1993 providing the Tax and Duty
Free Privilege within the Subic Freeport Zone). Hence, used motor vehicles that come
into the Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area may
be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine territory, but they
cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside of the secured fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area.

Petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED provided that said provision is declared VALID
insofar as it applies to the Philippine territory outside the presently fenced-in former
Subic Naval Base area and VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in
former Subic Naval Base area.












15

B. Procedure on the Passage of Bills

Alvarez vs Guingona
FACTS:In April 1993, HB 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the
HOR.
In May 1993, a Senate bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817
was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, the HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the
Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee
on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was
totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that
the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that the Santiago
was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be
a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97
included the IRA which should not be.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows.
Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on
its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on
the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the
said HB as well).

Arroyo v. De Venecia
FACTS:An amendment to the National Internal Revenue Code was introduced to the
House of Representatives involving taxations on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes. This waslater passed accordingly and brought to the House of Senate. Upon
the interpellation on thesecond reading, herein petitioner moved for adjournment for
lack of quorum which isconstitutionally needed to conduct business. Petitioners motion
was defeated and wasrailroaded. The bill was then signed into law by President Fidel
Ramos.
ISSUE:Whether or not the law was passed on violation on the constitutional mandate.
HELD:There is no rule of the House concerned that quorum shall be determined by viva
voce or nominal voting. The Constitution does not require that the yeas and nays of the
Members betaken every time a House has to vote, except only on the following
instances upon the last andthe third readings of the bill, at the request of 1/5 of the
Members present and in repassing a billover the veto of the President. Second, there is
obviousness on the part of the petitioner to delaythe business of the House, thus
eliminating the alleged skullduggery on part of the accused.Third, the enrolled bill
doctrine states that enrolled bills are in itself conclusive thus legally binding provided it
is in harmony with the constitution. Lastly, the court upheld principle of separation of
powers, which herein, is applicable for the legislative branch for it has exercised its
power without grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

TOLENTINO VS. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS:The valued-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goodsand properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to
10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services.
Republic ActNo. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
enhance itsadministration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.The
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA) contends that theimposition
of VAT on sales and leases by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non
-impairment of
contracts.
16

ISSUE:Whether R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional on ground that it violates the
contractclause under Art. III, sec 10 of the Bill of Rights.
HELD:No. The Supreme Court the contention of CREBA, that the imposition of the VAT
on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision of non-impairment of
contracts, is only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical. It is enough to say
that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment,
fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read
into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the
maintenance of a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and
good order of society. In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a
limitation on the exercise of the State's power of taxation save only where a tax
exemption has been granted for a valid consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in
G.R. No. 115852, and the Court does not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its
position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made
by a general, but only by a specific, law. Further, the Supreme Court held the validity of
Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal and substantive aspects as this has been raised in
the various cases before it. To sum up, the Court holds:
(1) That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by
Congress in the enactment of the statute;
(2) That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes
beyond those prescribed by the Constitution - have been observed is precluded by the
principle of separation of powers;
(3) That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor
interfere with the free exercise of religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an
education; and
(4) That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is
regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected
under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not justify the grant of
prospective relief by writ of prohibition. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec. Ermita

FACTS: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law. The challenged
section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a
tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
17

precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO

HELD: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can
never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use
or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law
is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January
1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or
non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence
of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of
the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

























18

C. Procedure on passage of Joint Resolution of Congress

GALICTO vs. AQUINO

FACTS:On September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, which provided for the guiding principles
and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for
GOCCs and GFIs. EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and
other forms ofcompensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of
all GOCC and GFIemployees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2)
a suspension of all allowances,bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of
Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. Jelbert Galicto claims that as a PhilHealth
employee, he is affected by the implementation ofEO 7, which was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,as it is null and void for
lack of legal basis. He asserts that EO7 is unconstitutional for having been issued
beyond the powers of the President. It is contended, however, that the President
exercises control over the governing boards of the GOCCs and GFIs; thus, he can fix
their compensation packages in order to control the grant of excessive salaries,
allowances, incentives, etc. Hence, he filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
seeking to nullify and enjoin the implementation of EO7.

ISSUE: Was certiorari a proper remedy?

HELD: No. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed
of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is
not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is
an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7:Section
1.
Who may file petition.
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphases ours.)






















19

D. Presidents Veto Power Qualified Veto vs. Pocket Veto

Qualified Veto prevents a bill or a portion or item thereof from becoming a law unless
passed again by stated proportion of votes, like for instance, two-thirds vote of all
members of the legislative body or with other formalities.

Pocket Veto - A pocket veto is a legislative maneuver in lawmaking that allows a
president or other official with veto power effectively to exercise that power over a bill by
taking no action. Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called
pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the
President to communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the
receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto
messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to
what new laws are in force.

Veto power of President:

Every bill, in order to become a law, must be presented to and signed by the President.
If the President does not approve of the bill, he shall veto the same and return it with his
objections to the House from which it originated. The House shall enter the objections
in the Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
The President must communicate his decision to veto within 30 days from the date of
receipt thereof. If he fails to do so, the bill shall become a law as if he signed it.
This rule eliminates the pocket veto whereby the President would simply refuse to act
on the bill.
To OVERRIDE the veto, at least 2/3 of ALL the members of each House must agree to
pass the bill. In such case, the veto is overriden and becomes a law without need of
presidential approval.
Item veto
The President may veto particular items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill.
This veto will not affect items to which he does not object.

Gonzales v. Macaraig

FACTS: On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased
certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to
the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to
the President for consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President
signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become RA 6688. In the
process, 7 Special Provisions and Section 55, a General Provision, were vetoed. On 2
February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 (Authorizing and Directing the
Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper
Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the
Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the
General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes) was
adopted. On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Neptali
A. Gonzales, Ernesto M. Maceda, Alberto G. Romulo, Heherson T. Alvarez, Edgardo J.
Angara, Agapito A. Aquino, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Ernesto F. Herrera, Jose D. Lina,
Jr., John Osmea, Vicente T. Paterno, Rene A. Saguisag, Leticia Ramos-Shahani,
Mamintal Abdul J. Tamano, Wigberto E. Taada, Jovito R. Salonga, Orlando S.
Mercado, Juan Ponce Enrile, Joseph Estrada, Sotero Laurel, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
Santanina Rasul, Victor Ziga, as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate and as substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be
affected by this case, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the
20

Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Vicente
Jayme, Carlos Dominguez, Fulgencio Factoran, Fiorello Estuar, Lourdes Quisumbing,
Raul Manglapus, Alfredo Bengson, Jose Concepcion, Luis Santos, Mita Pardo De
Tavera, Rainerio Reyes, Guillermo Carague, Rosalina Cajucom and Eufemio C.
Domingo from implementing RA 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the
Supreme Court. Gonzales et al.s cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does
not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section
55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provisions; (2) when the President
objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power
but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to
strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of
that power. The Solicitor General, as counsel for Macaraig et al., counters that the issue
in the present case is a political question beyond the power of the Supreme Court to
determine; that Gonzales et al. had a political remedy, which was to override the veto;
that Section 55 is a rider because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and,
therefore, merits the Presidents veto; that the power of the President to augment items
in the appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the
Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670 (4
August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto
provisions or other distinct and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill.

ISSUE: whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution or differently put, has the President the power to veto provisions of an
Appropriations Bill

HELD: No. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the
1987 Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if
exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is
what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise
of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In
other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of the same item. Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI,
Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the
extent of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has
not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate
veto. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that
a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates. In other
words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its
operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the
entire bill. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90)
because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches
of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that
the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections
55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of
21

appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and
statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of
such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the
Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being delimited to
transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from
savings. More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation from
savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An
Appropriations Bill is one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation
of money from the public treasury. It is a legislative authorization of receipts and
expenditures. The power of augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no
means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation item
inserted in an appropriation measure.


Bengzon vs. Drilon

FACTS:The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
who are currently receiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A.
No. 1797. Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed
by President Marcos. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore
said retirement pensions and privilege. President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill
No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special
Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY
1992).
ISSUES: 1.Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General
Appropriatons Act; and
2 Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary
HELD:
1.The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also
provides limitations to its exercise. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at
all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its
undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the
item veto power to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable
appropriation or revenue measure. What was done by the President was the vetoing of
a provision and not an item.
2.Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the
Judiciary. The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to
the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of
the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any
savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the
judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The
Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where
augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution.

PCA vs. Enriquez, respondent
FACTS:RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994)
entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the
Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes was approved
by the President and vetoed some of the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it
violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before
22

the Supreme Court.PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional
and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the
President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and Management
and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of the conditions
imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of
the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of:
1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and
DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain
appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is
constitutional and valid?
HELD: Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling.
Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said
provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are appropriate
provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows for the use of
income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for Western Visayas State
Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so
by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio fo works for
maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH. Vetoed
by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is
not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization, prior approval of
Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called legislative
veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law or requiring legislative
approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of Staff to
augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only
the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO
VALID. Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of special
fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A
provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO
VALID.

Belgica vs Ochoa
FACTS:This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of
the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel
to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for
hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30
million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs,
IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
23

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department
provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
ISSUE:
1. THE CONSTITUTION HAS ALSO PROVIDED FOR AN ELABORATE SYSTEM OF
CHECKS AND BALANCES TO SECURE COORDINATION IN THE WORKINGS OF
THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK AND BALANCE.
HELD: THE PRESIDENTS POWER TO VETO AN ITEM WRITTEN INTO AN
APPROPRIATION, REVENUE OR TARIFF BILL
SUBMITTED TO HIM BY CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL THROUGH A PROCESS
KNOWN AS BILL PRESENTMENT.
2. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE PRESIDENTS VETO POWER?

HELD: IT IS FOUND IN SECTION 27(2), ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS:
Sec. 27. x x x.
x x x x (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff
bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
3. BUT BY EXERCISING HIS VETO POWER IS THE PRESIDENT ALSO
PERFORMING LAW-MAKING FUNCTION?
HELD:YES. IT IS A CHECK ON THE LEGISLATURE.
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief
Executive an integral partof the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly
known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of
the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must determine in
passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view. The Constitution is a
limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the
affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of
the Legislature.
4. HOW WILL THE PRESIDENT EXERCISE HIS VETO POWER FUNCTION?

HELD: HE MAY NOT BE CONFINED TO RULES OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OR
HAMPERED BY THE UNWISE INTERFERENCE OF THE JUDICIARY.
The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto [in the
same manner] as the will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by
the Legislature.

5. WHAT IS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTS VETO-POWER?

HELD: THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTS ITEM-VETO POWER RESTS
ON A VARIETY OF POLICY GOALS SUCH AS TO PREVENT LOG-ROLLING
LEGISLATION, IMPOSE FISCAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE LEGISLATURE, AS WELL
AS TO FORTIFY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHS ROLE IN THE BUDGETARY
PROCESS.
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court
characterized the Presidents item power as a salutary check upon the legislative
body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or
of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority
of that body ; phrased differently, it is meant to increase the chances in favor of the
community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.

24

6. FOR THE PRESIDENT TO EXERCISE HIS ITEM-VETO POWER WHAT IS
NECESSARY?

HELD: THERE MUST EXIST A PROPER ITEM WHICH MAY BE THE OBJECT OF
THE VETO.

7. WHAT IS AN ITEM IN A BILL OR APPROPRIATION?

HELD:AN ITEM, AS DEFINED IN THE FIELD OF APPROPRIATIONS, PERTAINS TO
THE PARTICULARS, THE DETAILS, THE DISTINCT AND SEVERABLE PARTS OF
THE APPROPRIATION OR OF THE BILL.
In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, the US
Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows: An item of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of
money, notsome general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation
bill.









































25

E. Legislative Veto

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. PurisimaG.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

FACTS:
1.This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335

(Attrition Actof 2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and theBureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets byproviding a system of rewards and sanctions through
the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a RevenuePerformance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status2.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reformlegislation. They
contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s]
the officials andemployees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty
hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of suchrewards. Petitioners also
assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates
the doctrineof separation of powers,
for it permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,
the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d)
to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of oversight
has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government With this
backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional
per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative
sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress
. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either executive or
judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any
post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection withit, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matterpertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and

26

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power asit entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.










































27

F. Effectivity of Laws

TAADA v. TUVERA [136 SCRA 27 (1985)

FACTS:Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern, aright
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/orcause the publication
in the Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders. The respondents would have this case dismissed on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel public duty,
they need not show any specific interest. Respondents further contend that publication
in the OG is not asine qua non requirement for the effectively of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates


ISSUE: WON publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable requirement for the
effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc. where laws themselves provide
for their own effectivity dates


HELD: Yes. It is the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concern
&corollarily access to official records, & to documents & papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation
as may be provided by law (6 AIV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid & enforceable,
must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or
LOI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the OG as they
constitute important legislative acts. The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a person
may be bound bylaw, he must first be officially informed of its contents. Judgment:
Respondents ordered to publish in Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances of general application, and unless so published shall have no binding force
and effect. Impt Point: It illustrates how decrees & issuances issued by one man
Marcosare in fact laws of genl application & provide for penalties. The constitution
afforded Marcos both executive & legislative powers. The generality of law (CC A14) will
never work w/o constructive notice. The ruling of this case provides the publication
constitutes the necessary constructive notice & is thus the cure for ignorance as an
excuse. Ignorance will not even mitigate the crime


146 scra 446
Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unless otherwise provided means
in Article 2 of the Civil Code
With the Supreme Courts decision that ordered Tuvera et al to publish in the Official
Gazette the unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect, Tuvera et al move for
reconsideration and clarification.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the Official Gazette or elsewhere
as long as the people were sufficiently informed.

HELD: The Supreme Court cannot rule upon the wisdom of a law or repeal or modify it if
it finds the same as impractical. That is not its function for such is the function of the
legislature. The task of the Supreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the law as
conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in accordance
with prescribed procedure. Hence, the Court declared that all laws shall immediately
28

upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
clause unless otherwise provided pertains to the date of publication and not the
requirement of publication.


PVB vs VEGA
FACTS: In 1985, Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the
liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila Branch 39.
Thereafter, the PVB employees union herein petitioner filed claim for accrued and
unpaid employee wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed into
law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on
February 24, 1992.
Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and
for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.
In May 1992, Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen
despite the late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169
became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official
Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
HELD: The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs
Tuvera, this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication, which cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission
would affect due process in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that
are supposed to govern it.


























29

G. Initiative And Referendum



6: LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SECTION 1.THE LEGISLATIVE POWER SHALL BE VESTED IN THE CONGRESS OF
THEPHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE
OFREPRESENTATIVES, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT RESERVED TO THE PEOPLE
BYTHE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM.

GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279)

FACTS: In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataanagreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the
Subic Special Economic Zone(SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as
the Bases Conversion Development Actof 1992.
May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye1993. In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be
complied with beforethey include their municipality with SSEZ.
Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its
submission,which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the
Local GovernmentCode of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of
signatures to cause therepeal of said resolution.
Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
BayanMorong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the
denial of the petitionfor a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter
productive and futility.
July 6, 1993: COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the
groundthat its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance
July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor,
Atty.Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by
the petitioners
ISSUE:
Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong
Bataan the proper subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can
be exercised even what is questioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?)
HELD:Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and
SET ASIDE.
RATIONALE:
In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power:
1. ORIGINAL
- possessed by the sovereign people
2. DERIVATIVE
- delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the
original power of the people.
One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power
to make laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of peoples
initiative was thus installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject
any act or law by congress or local legislative body.
COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it
approved RA no.6735 entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor. Which spelled out the requirements for
the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of the local initiative
and referendum; and their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as
appropriate subjects of local initiatives.
LOCAL INITIATIVES-
30

legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or
matters that can be taken up in a local initiative.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate
subjects of a local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an
expression of will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including
not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards
and determinations." The law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation
of the Constitution.
Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art
1that the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a
national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance.
Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local
initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers
of the Sanggunians to enact.

Resolution vs. Ordinance
RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to
have only a temporary effect
ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to
persons or things in general.

Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and
economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the
SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227
(The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992),which created the Subic
Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national
policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to
the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of
its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and
other installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan passed Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10 Serye 1993, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as
required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and
submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for
Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.18, Serye 1993 requesting Congress of the Philippines so
amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the
subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

31

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes
and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848
adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of
Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent isintent on proceeding with a local
initiative that proposes anamendment of a national law

ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No.
2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people
of Morong to enact;
., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."

HELD:
1.YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started by
private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for
a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the
footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not
mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of
votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the
ballots themselves bore the description referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is
unquestionably an INITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to
propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people
to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In
initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people; hence the respondent Commission
cannot control or change the substance or the content of legislation.
2.The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the
proposal stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and
obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and
the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In
the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No.
2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues
brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over,
in the exercise of its review powers.

32

Santiago vs. COMELEC
G.R No. 127325
March 19, 1997

FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and
directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between
petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to
file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December
18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following
arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an
enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by
peoples initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the
draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is
a pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve,
or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can
only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause
"proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for
Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and
local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735
specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
33

COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to
forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made
permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

Lambino Vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 174153
Oct. 25 2006

FACTS: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged
that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17
of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-
7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift
the present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.
COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions
and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement
the initiative petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples
initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino Groups petition.

HELD: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did
not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution
may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the
executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.
34

B. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
1. President

Qualifications, Election, Term and Oath


Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years
thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President
shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-
President, or the Acting President shall take the following oath or affirmation:chanrobles
virtual law library
"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President [or Vice-President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and
defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself
to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In case of affirmation, last sentence will
be omitted].

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. RAMOS
P.E.T. Case No. 001 February 13, 1996

FACTS:The presidential election of 1992 was clouded with much uncertainty as to who
is the real winner. However, Congress sitting as Board of Canvassers proclaimed Fidel
V. Ramos as duly elected President of the Republic. Protestant filed before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) for annulment of proclamation on grounds of
massive fraud and electoral sabotage among others. While the election contest is still
pending, Miriam Defensor-Santiago was elected Senator of the Republic in the mid-term
election in 1995.
35


ISSUE: WON by assuming the position of a Senator, did Defensor-Santiago have
effectively abandoned her Presidential Election protest?

HELD:YES. An election contest involves a public office in which the public has an
interest. In the case at bar, when protestant entered into a political contract with the
electorate as Senator, she impliedly waives her vested right to the election contest.
More so, corollary to her position is the discharge of her functions. In assuming the
office of the Senator then, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn the
protest, or at very least, abandoned her determination to protect or pursue the public
interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate. Such
abandonment or withdrawal operates to render moot and academic the instant case.
Moreover, the resolution of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate
the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections. Petition was
DISMISSED.

TECSON V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
VITUG; March 3, 2004

FACTS
On December 31, 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino
(KNP).
In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born
citizen.
His real name was stated to be Fernando, Jr. or Ronald Allan Poe, born in
Manila on August 20, 1939.
On January 9, 2004, Victorino X. Fornier filed a petition before the COMELEC to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy on
the ground that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: Whether FPJ is a natural-born Filipino Citizen.
HELD: - Carpio-Morales adopts the rule that an illegitimate, child of an alien-mother
who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born
citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate
child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship (nothing more to do to
acquire citizenship = natural born).
- no evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge
FPJ as his own son at birth
- Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the
only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that
he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
Conclusion WHEREFORE, I vote to: (1) DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161434
and 161634 for being premature, (2) DECLARE COMELEC Resolutions dated January
23, 2004 and February 6, 2004, rendered in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 NULL AND
VOID, and (3) DIRECT the COMELEC to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe Jr., for containing a false material representation.

POE, JR vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS: On June 24, 2004, Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed as
the duly elected President of the Philippines and movie-actor Fernando Poe, Jr was the
second-placer. Mr. FPJ filed an election protest before this Electoral Tribunal and Mrs.
GMA filed her Answer with Counter Protest. Mr. FPJ died on December 14, 2004. Mr.
FPJs counsel submitted to the Tribunal a Manifestation with UrgentPetition/Motion to
Intervene as a Substitute for Deceased Protestant FPJ BY THE WIDOW, Mrs. Jesusa
Sonora Poe a.k.a.Susan Roces.As movant/intervenor, Mrs. Poe claims that there is an
36

urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her latehusband to ascertain the true
and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people.Mrs. GMA
contends that under the Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the
registered candidateswho obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency
may contest the election of the president. Mrs. GMAalso stresses that this Tribunal has
no jurisdiction over actions of surviving spouses to ascertain the vote of theelectorate as
the Tribunal has jurisdiction only over election protests and quo warranto cases.Mrs.
GMA, further asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to
replace the deceasedprotestant since a public office is personal and not a property that
passes on to the heirs. She points out that thewidow has no legal right to substitute for
her husband in an election protest. Since no such right survives the
husband,considering that the right to file an election protest is personal and non-
transmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a widow is allowed to substitute/intervene during the pending protest
case.
HELD: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is guided by its Rules, as well as the Rules of
Court in a suppletory manner. Considering the transcendental importance of the
electoral contest involving the Presidency, a rush to judgment is simply out of the
question. Yet decide the matter we must, without further delay, to prevent popularunrest
and avoid further destabilization of government at the highest level.Rule 14 of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal Rules provides:
Rule 14.
Election Protest
.
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30)days after the proclamation
of the winner. Stated above, the Rule effectively excludes the widow of a losing
candidate. PET Rules, however, does not have any rule on substitution nor intervention
but it does allow for the analogous and suppletory application of the Rules of Court,
decisions of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. Hence
Rule 19, section 1 of Rules of Court A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or in the success of either of the parties or an interest against both Rule 3,
Section 16 of the Rules of Court allows substitution by a legal representative. This rule
to an election contest, the Court ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer
and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the Court consistently
rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant
dies during the pending protest case. However, this rule is
Not purely personal and exclusive. Hence, we have allowed substitution and
intervention but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment tand the party who is entitled to the avails
of the suit. In the case, Mrs. Poe herself denies any claim to the office of the













37

Privilege and Salary

Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the
President and Vice-President shall be determined by law and shall not be
decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase
was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source.




Akbayan vs Aquino -


FACTS:Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as
congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the
full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).

Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement
violates there right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest.
That the non-disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and
reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.

Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter
sought involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception
to the right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public
concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege.

ISSUE: Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are
still covered by the doctrine of executive privilege?

HELD: The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no
exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as
Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean
that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the
context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that
calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its
traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were
seeking information from the Presidents representatives on the state of the then on-
going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the
petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of
the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of
access to information.

Rep vs SB

Facts:
Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment
(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),filed a petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379 declaration of the aggregate
amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrowin the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth.
The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, usingvarious foreign foundations
in certain Swiss banks. In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25
38

millionand US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcoscouple's salaries,
other lawful income as well as incomefrom legitimately acquired property. The treasury
notes arefrozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas,
by virtue of the freeze order issued by thePCGG.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and theSupplemental
Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by theMarcos children and then
PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a globalsettlement of the assets of the
Marcos family.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify,collate, cause the
inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to beowned by the Marcos family under
the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its
premises or "whereasclauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the
SwissFederal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million
U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to theRepublic of the Philippines
provided certain conditionalities are met x xx."
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approvethe
General/Supplemental Agreements.
In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan denied theRepublic's
motion for summary judgment.
"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not provethat the money in
the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spousesbecause no legal proof exists in the
record as to the ownership by theMarcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss
Banks. The basis forthe forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to
havebeen established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also havebeen without
basis."
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the
requisites of Sections 26 and 37 of RA 1379.

HELD:
RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired,
hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the
official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it.
The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss
deposits may be effected:(1) ownership by the public officer of money or property
acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and(2) the
extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly
disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer.(3) that the said amount is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of theSwiss
funds pursuant to RA 1379.

O Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officers.
O Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos had acquired and owned properties during their term of
office, as evidenced by their admittance regarding the ownership of the Swiss accounts.
O The Swiss accounts of the Marcoses had balances amounting to US$356 million, a
figure beyond the aggregate legitimate income of $304,372.43.

The Petition was granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as
of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of
the Philippines. RATIO DECIDENDI: (1973 CONST)
39

Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their
tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor
may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of
any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled
corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel
before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x xx. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or
special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to
the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before
any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession,
and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law



Gudani vs Senga

FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of
massive cheating in the 2004 elections and the surfacing of the Hello Garci
controversy. President Arroyo issued E.O 164 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry
without her approval. However, the two concluded their testimonies before the Senate in
spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, both of them were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honored principle of the Chain of Command.

ISSUE: May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before
a legislative inquiry?
HELD: Yes. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey the President they may dislike
or distrust. The ability of the President to prevent military officials from testifying before
Congress DOES NOT TURN ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE BUT ON THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVES POWER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF to control the actions and speech
of the armed forces. Under the Commander in Chief Clause (Art. XVl, section 5), the
President has absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned
under civilian law. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006)

The President can prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry. Is this rule absolute?

ANSWER: No. The rule is not absolute. In as much as it is ill advised for Congress to
interfere with the Presidents power as Commander-in-Chief, it is similarly detrimental
for the President to unduly interfere with Congress right to conduct legislative inquiries.
xxx Courts are empowered, under the principle of JUDICIAL REVIEW, to arbitrate
disputes between the executive and legislative branches of the government on the
proper parameters of power. By this, if the court so rule, the duty falls on the shoulders
of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military
officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disregarded with notion of
officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
40

obliged to comply with the final orders of the court. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165,
August 15, 2006)

NERI VS. SENATE

FACTS: In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of
review and arbitrate a hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts
co-equal branches of government. On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning
the National Broadband Project (the NBN Project), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo) of the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. To be specific, petitioner refused to answer
questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b)
whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him
to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three
questions by requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On
November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent
Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground
of executive privilege.

The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply, therefore,
issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his
testimony.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. Denied.
Petition for certiorari and Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application
for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) granted by the SC court.

ISSUE:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications
privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are critical to the exercise of their functions;

HELD:

I
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
Presidential Communications Privilege

Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of
the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system.
That is far from the truth. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of
executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15 The
Court articulated in these cases that, the right to information does not extend to
matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers, by which
41

the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in
closed-door Cabinet meetings.

In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who
invoked executive privilege on a specific matter involving an executive agreement
between the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees investigation.
Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate
v. Ermita.

A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be
unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to
the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution x x x

II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege

A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power.
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not
relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, because the
Constitution does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board
which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to Congress.

This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make
such power less executive. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does
not diminish the executive nature of the power. In the same way that certain legislative
acts require action from the President for their validity does not render such acts less
legislative in nature.
B. The doctrine of operational proximity was laid down precisely to limit the scope of
the presidential communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.

Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the
doctrine of operational proximity for the reason that it maybe misconstrued to expand
the scope of the presidential communications privilege to communications between
those who are operationally proximate to the President but who may have no direct
communications with her.

It must be stressed that the doctrine of operational proximity was laid down in In re:
Sealed Case27precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege to a large swath of the
executive branch (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the
official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term advisor
of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized
interest; and in balancing respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing
42

interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional provisions on government
transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.

The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations
with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v. Ermita, it
was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the
privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal
department.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations

In PMPF v. Manglapus, . The Resolution went on to state, thus:The nature of
diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are
inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.

With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions
regarding the right of the people to information and public accountability and
transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support respondent
Committees case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to
information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency.
These are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic
government. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect
to three (3) specific questions, did not in any way curb the publics right to information or
diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.

This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in
aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation
and even call petitioner Neri to testify again.

III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions

The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege
is that the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling
needfor disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the information
elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative
functions, among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to
curb graft and corruption.

We remain unpersuaded by respondents assertions.
The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude
into the sphere of competence of the President in order to gather information which,
according to said respondents, would aid them in crafting legislation. Clearly, the need
for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial
power to adjudicate actual controversies.

For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before
legislatives bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of
cases by courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before this Court, the
43

counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate could still come
up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other
words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all.

Oversight Function of the Congress
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent
Committees need for information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as
in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because
curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of Congress.44 And if this is
the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions
covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in
nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption
is a legislative or oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees investigation
cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

Office of the Ombudsman: The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped
by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the
allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor.







































44

Prohibitions

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of
the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position,
hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not
apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the
President is the Chairman. The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO
284contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution , hold any other office
or employment during their tenure .They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries hey shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The petitioners maintained that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution. Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain
that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13,Article VII
makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials
mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents
provides: Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointiveofficial shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries
.
ISSUE No. 1 :

Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?

HELD:No.

T he intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
45

formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is
allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees,
while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7,
pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being
ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity?
HELD: The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying
to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in anex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
"any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are
properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-
officio means "from office; by virtue of office."Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in
an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment
or authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be
closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions
required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such
additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution.

NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
JUANITO G. ESPINO, DIRECTOR IV, NCR, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND
ERNESTO C. EULALIA, RESIDENT AUDITOR, NATIONAL AMNESTY
COMMISSION. RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency
created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No.
347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is
composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the
President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local
Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex
officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid
honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident
auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives
amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to
COA Memorandum No. 97-038.




46

ISSUE:

Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio
members

HELD:

The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new
appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were themselves
also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An
appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise
the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely connotes an imposition
of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue
of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the
person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without an
appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of the
position.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein
imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
[D]oes the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B which, for
easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, i ncluding
government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.

But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article IX-B already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to
lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly
refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. . . .
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not,
however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these
posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said officials.

[T]he prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation in
ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio
means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon
the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character,
or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." An ex-officio
member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To
illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board
of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has
no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid
for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. x x

[E]x-officio posts held by the executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of his office do not fall under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition...





47

Bitonio vs. COA

FACTS: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV
of the Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per
diem for every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997.

After a post audit of the PEZAs disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the
payment of per diems to Mr. Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling declaring
unconstitutional the holding of other offices by the cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants in addition to their primary office and the receipt of compensation therefore,
and, to COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997, implementing
Senate Committee Reports No. 509.

In his motion for reconsideration to the COA, he contended that the Supreme Court
modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits the prohibition to
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their Assistants. Officials given the rank
equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and other appointive
officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.

He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA 7916), enacted four years after the Civil
Liberties Union case became final, authorized the payment of per diems; in expressly
authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have been aware
of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil Liberties
Union case.

COA rendered the assailed decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.

HELD: The assailed decision of the COA is affirmed.

The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to receive per diem for his board meetings sitting
as representative of the Secretary of Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.

The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity
as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited
from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition
likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the Secretary of
Labor. The Supreme Court cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the
Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a better right than his principal.

Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to the
Constitution. No law can render it nugatory because the Constitution is more superior to
a statute. The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is
the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such defect. The
option of designating representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries
was deleted. Likewise, the paragraph as to payment of per diems to the members of the
Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in
conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC. V. ELMAPONENTE:

48

Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,Undersecretary , or Assistant
Secretary are not covered by the constitutional prohibition , nor is the Solicitor General
affected thereby.
NATURE:SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the SC. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus.
FACTS:
On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of office as
Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999,during his tenure as PCGG
Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of office as CPLC
the following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may receive as
CPLC.Petitioners, citing the case of
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
alleged that respondent Elmas concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and
CPLC contravenes Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding
incompatible offices. Relying on the Resolution of the same case, respondents allege
that:a) the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given
the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary; b) it is Section 7, par. 2,
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in their case. This provision,
according to the respondents, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1)
the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and(2) the primary
functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment; c) since there exists a
close relation between the two positions and there isno incompatibility between them,
the primary functions of either position would allow respondent Elmas concurrent
appointments to both positions; and d) the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent
public officials is an accepted practice.
PUBLIC OFFICERS & ELECTION LAWS
In 2001, the appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced bythe
appointees of the incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
ISSUE/S:
1) WON Respondent Magdangal B. Elmas concurrent appointmentsas PCGG
Chairman and CPLC is unconstitutional for being the violative of theproscription against
multiple offices imposed by Section 13, Article VII andSection 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution; 2) Who are deemedcovered by the strict prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987Constitution?
HELD:
1)YES.In harmonizing Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2,Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, the Court held inCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary that(a)
all elective and appointive public officials and employees are allowed to hold other office
or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by
the primary functions of their positions (Section7, Article IX-B); but(b) the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself (Section 13, Article VII). Test in
determining WON incompatibility exists between two offices: WON one office is
subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the
other (People v. Green)Definition/Requisites of Incompatibility: Incompatibility between
two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the two. The force of the word, in its
application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two
places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and
antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. What is not
incompatibile: Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the
one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that incompatibility
from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other.
Here, an incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC.
49

The duties of the CPLC include giving independent and impartial legal advice on the
actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other
Presidential appointees.

Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the
President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of respondent Undersecretary
Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria
Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC).

On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente
T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen
and lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautistas
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any
other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed
Administrator of the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such
on February 2, 2009.

Petitioner argues that Bautistas concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and
MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .

On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not
present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to
be resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA
Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and
academic. Petitioners prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is
nothing left to enjoin.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions
in government, the fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers
him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which
she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple
offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.


Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable
to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of said office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any
other office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an
50

imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare
assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was
OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her designation as such
OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of her office as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are
hardly persuaded by respondents submission that respondent Bautistas designation as
OIC of MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary
position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry
Board, which includes the DOTC Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as
Vice-Chairman, and the following as members: Executive Secretary (Office of the
President), Philippine Ports Authority General Manager, Department of National
Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines General Manager, and the
Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.

It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and
temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such holding of office
pertains to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate
performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual
or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and
not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in
Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office
means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration,
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the
office.

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President,
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil
Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the
Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object
sought to be accomplished by adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be
avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the Marcos regime, of
designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple
offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials,
who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant
betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would
draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which were
envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiple
governmental offices and employment. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.

FUNA vs AGRA

FACTS:

Alberto Agra's holding of two concurrent positions as acting Department of Justice
secretary and Solicitor General during the tail-end of the Arroyo administration.
The ruling stemmed from a petition filed by lawyers Dennis Funa and Melanio Elvis
Balayan, who said Agras two positions are unconstitutional because it runs counter to
51

Article 7, Section 13 of the Constitution prohibiting dual or multiple positions in the
government.

ISSUE: WON concurrent positions of AGRA is unconstitutional

HELD: "The SC today unanimously held in Funa v Agra that the designation of then
acting Sec. of Justice Alberto Agra as secretary of Justice concurrent with his
designation as acting solicitor general was unconstitutional and void," the Supreme
Court Public Information Office told reporters in a text message.

The resolution voiding Agra's dual posts was written by Justice Lucas Bersamin.

The Supreme Court, however, clarified that its latest ruling does not nullify Agra's acts
while sitting in those two positions. "The SC declares that Agra was a de facto officer
and thus his acts were valid for all purposes," it said.

Agra, an Acting Solicitor General, was appointed to the DOJ post in March 2010 after
his predecessor, Agnes Devanadera, resigned to pursue her congressional bid in the
first district of Quezon province in that year's elections.

Aside from being unconstitutional, Funa said that under Administrative Code of 1987,
the Office of the Solicitor General is supposed to be independent" and autonomous"
from the DOJ.

Funa was the same litigant who had successfully challenged the dual position of Elena
Bautista as Maritime Industry Authority (Marina) administrator and undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).

1. Compare with other Officials Prohibitions:
Article VI:
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Article IX:

Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
Article VII:
2. Exceptions: