Cases in Legal Medicine

Cases in Legal Medicine
Atty. Edmund Turqueza

Therese Zsa Raval-Torres

Therese Zsa S. Raval Torres Page 2 of 45

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MACARIO A. ULEP, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Castor Raval for accused-appellant.
G.R. No. L-36858 June 20, 1988
FIRST DIVISION
GANCAYCO, J.:

A man must love his wife. He must not lift a finger to hurt her. Indeed he must be
her protector. When against this unwritten rule he beats her, he ceases to be a
man. He becomes a beast. And the law imposes the supreme penalty when in
the process he kills her. It is parricide pure and simple.

This is what Macario A. Ulep, was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, Second Judicial District. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs in a decision of March 20, 1973.

The facts are undisputed. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries
inflicted upon her on that very day by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. The
following day, the Chief of Police of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte received a report of
the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief
of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the deceased and
there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and
the husband of the deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an
autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the
daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to
decide on her preference.

At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was made shortly
before the burial. Accordingly, the police chief and Dr. Eliseo Bonoan, a
physician, caught up with the funeral Procession at the Catholic cemetery and
thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased.

The autopsy reports read as follows:
POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP
Age: 42
Nationality: Filipino
Address: No. 24, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte


Date: May 25, 1970

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS

SKIN:
A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in
color was noted on the upper half, anterior aspect
of the arm, left.

SKELETAL SYSTEM:
Complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs,
left. The 4th and 5th ribs fractured along the
midolavicular line, left. The 6th and 7th ribs
fractured along the anterior auxillary line, left.
Presence of extravascated blood and injuries of the
surrounding tissues of the broken ribs areas, left.
Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the
juncture of the rib and external cartillages with
concomitant injury to its sounding tissues and
extravascated blood, right side.

THORACIC CAVITY:
Presence of about 200 cc. of a serous fluid found
within the cavity.
Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
Heart with small amount of clotted blood. Coronary
vessels congested. The big blood vessels contained
small amount of clotted blood.

ABDOMINAL CAVITY:
Presence of about 500 cc. of serous fluid within the
cavity.

DIGESTIVE SYSTEM:
Apparently normal

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
The meningeal vessels were congested.

CAUSE OF DEATH:


CARDIAC ARREST
PRIMARY SHOCK.
(Exh. D, p. 16, rec.).
1

Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario
Ulep. A statement was prepared and signed by the accused and was
subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos Norte. In this
statement, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted that he caused the death of his
wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent
words. The following day, PC sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan, Laoag
City conducted another investigation of accused Macario Ulep. His statement
was reduced to writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. He reiterated
that the cause of death of his wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his elbowing her on her
breast. This statement was marked Exhibit "B".

Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in
the afternoon. She vomitted and then went to bed, The accused then left for the
fields and returned at around 9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her
bed. He reported this death to their barrio captain.

Despite these statements, (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt, Ulep retracted
his statement in court by narrating that more than a year before that, and while
his wife went to have their palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice
turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast. With the pain in her chest,
she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."

The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH
OF ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE ELBOW BLOWS BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON HER BREAST, AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS
AFFIDAVITS, EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1," ENGLISH TRANSLATION,
WHEN SUCH ADMISSION IS BUT A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART.

II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF
DEATH OF SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO A LONG STANDING
PROCESS OR CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM, AS TESTIFIED TO BY
DR. PEDRO BLANCO FOR THE DEFENSE.

III


THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM
OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.

Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo, the
wife, of the accused. Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock
due to fractured ribs? The appellant alleges that the gradual weakening of the
heart due to a long standing illness of the body system caused the cardiac arrest
which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo.

The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. Eliseo V. Bonoan
who conducted an autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile deceased by a
previous marriage. The husband who previously denied permission to conduct an
autopsy was present when the autopsy was performed shortly before the body
was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In the necropsy report of
Dr. Bonoan, the cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary
shock. We agree and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of
Dr. Bonoan.
The defense took exception to Dr. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the
chest could have been caused by blows or physical pressure. Could such injuries
not have been inflicted by elbow blows when the victim was standing or by knee
or feet blows when the victim was lying on her back or was sitting with her back
against the wall?

While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest
of his wife immediately before her death and the prosecution attributed these
blows as the proximate cause of the cardiac arrest and primary shock which
resulted in the wife's death, the defense assails this theory of the prosecution in
the following manner:

First, there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This
indicates that the elbow blows were not of sufficient force to
fracture the ribs. This is so because a fracture necessarily results in
the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and it is the
extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion.
2
Dr.
Blanco attributes the absence of swelling or contusion on the
chest, where the fractures were found, to the fact that the fracture
conditions Were of long standing; that is, some repairs has
happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling
to disappear (t.s.n., p. 180).

Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found
by Dr. Bonoan were present, the same could have not caused


cardiac arrest and primary shock. This is so because only
extravasated blood was present around the immediate area of
the fractures, This means that the fractures were not depressed or
that the fractured ends did not cave-in, so as to injure the heart
and impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest. The claim of Dr.
Bonoan that the chest is pliant and is like an accordion which can
be compressed is puerile to say the least. Even so, the elbow blows
of the accused could not have caused a compression of the
chest wall, no matter how pliant it could be. And even on the
theory that the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a
piece of wood placed on the chest, while the victim was lying on
her back, still the fractures could not have injured the heart or
impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest, because the
fractures, were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. The
fractures merely caused the extravasation of blood within the
fractured areas. And neither would the fractures cause primary
shock because they were merely complete fractures; which
means a mere breakage that would not cause the stoppage of
the heart, because it does not tend to compress the heart.
3

And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at
the points of fracture, the same could not have caused cardiac
arrest or primary shock because the lacerations were limited to the
pleura. The points of fracture did not cave-in or were not
depressed and they did not injure or impede the heart to cause
cardiac arrest. Neither did the lacerations of the pleura cause
primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura, which
indicates that the hemorrhage was nil. This is so because the
serous fluid in the pleura -as not reddish.

On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution shows that the
deceased died of cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the
heart due to a long standing process or condition in her body
system. Thus the theory of the defense is strengthened by the very
evidence of the prosecution.
4

Furthermore, both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. of serous
fluid in the pleura. The appellant claims that it is not normal whereas the
prosecution says that the pleura normally contains 100 to 200 cc. of serous fluid
and that this is normal. Anyway both agree that there should be enough serous
fluid to lubricate the tissues.


The presence of 500 cc. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which, according
to Dr. Blanco, the physician, witness for the appellant, may be due to the chronic
condition of the kidney like nephritis and edema or the hardening of the liver or a
long progressively weakening of the heart.
5
Dr. Bonoan did not concur in this
view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a result of the diffusion of
the medicine used in the embalming.
6
We find cogent basis in the explanation
given by Dr. Bonoan.

Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted
blood in the heart and blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal
vessels. The appellant bares that this is a sign of the hardening of the heart. Dr.
Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there were no signs of circulatory
weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the heart and such
being the condition there could be no abnormality and thus he further declares
that such clots are normally found in the heart of a dead person or in any part of
the circulatory system.
7

There is an admission by Dr. Blanco, the appellant's witness, that he has not
"attended a case of fractured ribs"
8
and that he explains cardiac failure as a
"failing of the heart" and his further concept is that it is "the stopping of the heart."
He says that such stoppage could be due to trauma, such as a fracture of the
ribs.
9

A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death
of Asuncion Pablo on May 21, 1970. She was legally married to Macario Ulep, the
appellant herein. The death, established in two affidavits, Exhibits "A" and "B," was
caused by said accused. In these affidavits, the appellant admitted that he
elbowed and attacked his wife. This attack caused the complete fracture of the
4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her left chest and the 3rd, and 4th ribs, right chest of
Asuncion Pablo on the same evening of May 21, 1970. The trial judge observed:
"There was never any attempt on the part of the accused to repudiate the sworn
statements wherein he admitted that the cause of death of his wife was his
having elbowed her many times on her breast."
10

Having realized the gravity of his act, the appellant presented a witness to prove
that sometime in February or March, 1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of
rice and the side portion of a bullcart and was attended to by a town quack
doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said that two (2) ribs on each side of the
chest were fractured, without stating which particular ribs were so affected.

From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy report,
the cause of death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary


shock caused by the strong pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. This
happens when one steps, kneels or presses the body of a victim against a wall.
The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor upon a thin-framed
woman can only bring about fatal results.

We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book, Medical
Jurisprudence under the title of "SHOCK," to wit:
Sec. 225. Shock. Death may also be due to the shock
associated with the injury. The possibility of a person dying from the
shock attendant upon an injury which, by itself appears to be
unimportant is attested by experience. No satisfactory explanation
of the cause of the shock seems to have been found, though it is
due in some way to the upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of the
body. Shock from an injury may be fatal even when the blow
leaves no trace behind it; as, for instance, when a person receives
a violent blow upon the pit of the stomach, or behind the ear, or
to the larynx. ... In the case ofReg. v. Slane, et al.,
11
the deceased
had received injuries to the abdomen by kick and blows, but there
were no marks of bruises present, or anything to show the cause of
death. Death however, had followed twenty minutes after the
maltreatment and was evidently due to the shock. The prisoners
were convicted of murder.
12

We have previously stated that:
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart
disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.
13

Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended."

Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not
cause any external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and
peritonitis and cause death, and even though the victim may have been
previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot
accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the
death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted.
14


We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement
between the two medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and
that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the life of the victim, Asuncion
Pablo.

There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame
for these inhuman acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.

The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to indemnity, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Page 56, Rollo.
2 Page 36, Rollo; page 7, Appellant's Brief.
6 Page 56, Rollo; page 15, Appellee's Brief.
7 Page 56, Rollo; page 16, Appellee's Brief.
8 Ibid.
9 Page 56, Rollo: page 16, Appellee's Brief.
10 Page 13, Rollo; page 13, Decision of the Court of First Instance.
11 Citing Derham Wint. Ass. 1872.
12 Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, 5th Ed.
13 People vs. Ilustre, 54 Phil. 594.
14 United States v. Rosalinda Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22.


vs.
RODOLFO MATYAONG, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 140206. June 21, 2001]
THIRD DIVISION D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

On 28 March 1996, accused appellant Rodolfo Matyaong was charged with
the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, for hitting his wife Rufina Matyaong with a piece of wood, in an
information which states

That on or about the 27
th
day of December, 1995, at Brgy. Latud, Municipality of
Rizal, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with evident premeditation, treachery and with intent to
kill, while armed with a round wood (Bakawan), did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and club one RUFINA MATYAONG
Y PAZ, his lawfully wedded wife, hitting her in the different vital parts of her body
and inflicting upon her multiple contusion and hematuas [sic] in the body which
were the direct and immediate cause of her death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[1]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant denied culpability.
[2]
Thus, trial
ensued, with the prosecution presenting four witnesses, namely Rodolfo
Matyaong, Jr., Wilfredo Tablazon, Roberta Paz, and Sgt. Almirante Caburnay.

Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr., who was ten years old at the time his testimony was
taken, is the eldest child of accused-appellant and Rufina Matyaong. Rodolfo
testified that on the evening of 27 December 1995, he was at home cooking
dinner for his family. His mother sat nearby reading a letter from his Auntie
Ventura, while at the same time nursing his youngest brother. The domestic calm
was interrupted, however, by the arrival of accused-appellant who, upon seeing
Rufina reading a letter and being illiterate, immediately suspected that it was
about another man. Turning a deaf ear to his wifes explanation that the letter
was actually about God, accused-appellant grabbed a piece of mangrove
wood, commonly known as bakawan, which was two feet in length and 1
inches wide, and beat Rufina. As a result, Rufina lost consciousness and fell to the
floor. Accused-appellant revived Rufina by pouring water on her, after which he
threw the lighted wick lamp at her and then grabbed the bakawan. Rufina fled
her house and ran towards the forest.


Rodolfo also declared that prior to the attack, his mother was suffering from
diarrhea and vomitting spells, as were many other people in their locality.
[3]

Wilfredo Tablazon, barangay kagawad of Canipaan, declared that on the
same evening, he was supervising a benefit dance at a local school in a
neighboring barangay when he was approached by Soling Balahing asking for
his help. Soling told him that Rufina Matyaong was hurt and hiding from her
husband in the grassy area near her [Soling] house. After some hesitation,
Tablazon finally agreed to go with Soling to the place where Rufina was
hiding. Tablazon saw Rufina lying on the ground with three of her children. She
was in a very weak condition. Sobbing, Rufina pleaded with him to bring her to
Canipaan. Tablazon acceded to her request and Rufina was taken by Jun
Makauling to Canipaan by pumpboat. The following morning, she was brought to
the barangay health center. Tablazon testified that, while at the health center,
Rufina vomitted once and suffered diarrhea. Also, he noticed that she had large
contusions on both her arms. Due to Rufinas worsening condition, and at the
instance of Rufina and her mother, Tablazon decided to fetch accused-
appellant to see his wife. When they arrived at the health center, Tablazon heard
accused-appellant say to his wife, Hindi rin mangyari yan kung hindi mo
kasalanan. Accused-appellant remained at the health center, assisting his wife,
until she expired on 29 December 1995.
[4]

Another witness for the prosecution was Roberta Paz the mother of the
victim. Roberta learned about the assault on her daughter only the day after it
occurred. On 28 December 1995, at 7 a.m., Delfin Tabo went to Robertas house
and informed her that Tablazon was looking for her. Roberta went with Delfin to
the house of Tablazon where she found her daughter, who told her that she was
mauled by accused-appellant. Roberta noticed that her daughter had bruises all
over her body. They made a mock hammock for Rufina to lie in and then,
together with Tablazon and the barangay captain, brought her to the barangay
health center.
[5]

At the Canipaan health center, Rufina was treated by Sgt. Almirante
Caburnay.
[6]
Sgt. Caburnay belonged to the Philippine Marines 6
th
Marine
Batallion Landing Team, Western Command. From October 1995 to January 1996,
he was assigned to Canipaan, Rizal, Palawan as a first aider. On 28 December
1995, Sgt. Caburnay was at the marine detachment in Canipaan when Roberta
Paz asked him for assistance for her daughter. He proceeded to the health
center where he saw Rufina. He noticed that she had bruises and hematoma on
her left arm and back. He was also informed that the patient was suffering from
diarrhea. In order to prevent dehydration, Sgt. Caburnay gave Rufina dextrose
and, in addition, he administered antibiotics. After assessing Rufinas condition, he


advised Roberta to bring her daughter to the health center in the town proper of
Rizal so that she could receive better medical attention. Unfortunately, Rufina did
not live long enough to receive further treatment in Rizal. On 29 December 1995,
at five in the morning, Rufina Matyaong breathed her last at the Canipaan health
center.
[7]

In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that his wife died from
dehydration caused by diarrhea and vomitting, which started on 27 December
1995. He said that Rufina told him that she got sick after she ate sarimburao (fish).
Accused-appellant testified that, from December 28, until she died the following
day, he took care of his wife while she was at the health center in Canipaan. With
him at the health center were Roberta Paz, Vilma Apostol and barangay captain
Belo Fernando. According to accused-appellant, he cooked lugaw for his wife,
and emptied ten chamber pots which she used whenever she vomitted or
defecated. Furthermore, accused-appellant declared that three of his children
were also retching and suffering from diarrhea, but that they all recovered.
Finally, it was insisted by accused-appellant that his son Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr.
was induced by Roberta Paz to testify falsely against him.
[8]

To buttress accused-appellants testimony, the defense presented Vilma
Apostol, a resident of Canipaan and a barangay health worker. Vilma declared
that on 27 December 1995, she was fetched from her house by Roberta Paz to
help care for Rufina at the health center. When she arrived thereat, she observed
that Rufina was already in serious condition she could no longer speak or ingest
any solids, she was being given dextrose, and she was always vomitting and
experiencing severe diarrhea.
[9]

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment,
[10]
finding accused-appellant
guilty of parricide, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, as the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong was appreciated
in his favor. In addition, the court ordered accused-appellants to pay the heirs of
Rufina Matyaong P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The trial court held that, although
he may not have intended to kill her, Rufinas death was the direct and natural
consequence of accused-appellants felonious act of clubbing her, and
therefore, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, he is liable for the
same.
[11]

Hence, the present appeal.

Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish that he
had inflicted any injuries upon his wife. No medical certificate or autopsy report
was introduced in evidence that would prove that Rufina had sustained any


wounds or bruises due to the alleged beating by her husband. Even assuming
that accused-appellant had mauled his wife, the prosecution did not present any
evidence that such beating caused her death. It is the position of the defense
that Rufina died due to her vomitting and diarrhea, and not from the beatings.
[12]

In lieu of an appellees brief, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion asking the Court to acquit accused-appellant since his guilt was not
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the Solicitor Generals opinion that,
although it was established that accused-appellant beat up Rufina, the
prosecution nevertheless failed to establish the nexus between the beatings and
her death.
[13]

The elements of parricide are as follows: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.
[14]

In every criminal case, the evidence presented must be sufficient to prove
the corpus delicti - that is, the actual offense committed. In this case, the
prosecution must first establish that the life of a human being was taken, and
second, that the death was occasioned by the accuseds criminal act or
agency.
[15]
If the evidence clearly discloses that a certain person is dead, and
that his death resulted from the use of violent and criminal means by another,
then the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved.
[16]

In the case at bar, it has been established that accused-appellant beat his
wife with a piece of wood. This conclusion is based upon the unrebutted
testimony of Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr. an eyewitness to the assault. Having failed
to prove that the witness was impelled by improper motives, the Court has no
reason to disbelieve the childs testimony, which the trial court found to be
credible.
[17]
It is also undisputed that the victim died on 29 December 1995, or
almost two days after the assault. However, we agree with the Solicitor General
that the prosecution has not established the crucial link between the assault and
the death. In other words, it has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the beatings inflicted by accused-appellant upon his wife were the
proximate cause of her death.

It is significant that, in this particular case, no post mortem examination was
conducted in order to determine the precise cause of death. There was neither
an ante mortem nor post mortem examination of the victims body for purposes
of ascertaining the nature and extent of any wounds that may have been
sustained as a result of the beating. The significance of evidence on the precise


nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased is that it often leads the careful
examiner to uncover the real cause of death. Therefore, the examination of a
wound, from the legal point of view, should lead to the determination as to when
the wound was inflicted, what the degree of danger of the wound is, with its
dangers to life or function, whether the wound was given by the injured man
himself, or by some one else, and with what manner of instrument the wound was
produced.
[18]
Wharton and Stilles provides a valuable discussion on the
importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by the victim
In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to
the function of the various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into
mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be made, would be very desirable; but
the unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes which give
gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination
of some injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification
impracticable. The general classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and
mortal wounds may be used, but the possibility of the slight wound terminating
with the loss of the persons life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a
slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x
The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the
extent of the injury, the form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the
blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the entrance of disease-producing
bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of the
person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical
treatment. No one should be willing, on theoretical grounds alone, to give an
opinion as to the agency of the wound in producing death. A careful post-
mortem examination will usually show the violent cause of death, and it is the
duty of the physician whose opinion is desired, to make that examination most
carefully, and to base his opinion entirely upon the findings of this examination;
not upon previous notions of the probable nature and effects of the
wound. Moreover, it is necessary not merely to make an examination of the
regions apparently involved in the injury, but also a thorough examination of the
entire body; for, notwithstanding the immediate cause of death may be evident,
it is still advisable to be sure that there was no cause of death in any other
part.
[19]
x x x

In the case at bar, not an iota of evidence on these points is extant in the
records of this case. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, none of whom
were competent to conduct a medico-legal examination of the victims body,
on the injuries sustained by Rufina are, to say the least, inconsistent - Rodolfo
Matyaong, Jr., the only eyewitness to the attack, was unable to state on what
parts of his mothers body the blows fell; Wilfredo Tablazon said that Rufina had
contusions on both her arms; Roberta Paz declared that there were bruises all


over her daughters body; and Sgt. Caburnay noted bruises and hematoma on
the victims left arm and back. These haphazard observations will certainly not
suffice for purposes of a criminal proceeding, wherein a mans liberty, and
maybe, even life, are at stake.

In addition, the fact that the victim was suffering from severe diarrhea and
vomitting, a condition prevalent in the locality at the time, both prior to and after
the assault, according to the testimony of both prosecution

and defense
witnesses,
[20]
and that she did not die immediately after the beating, but almost
two days later, makes evidence on the exact cause of her death even more
imperative. It is very possible that Rufina died due to food poisoning, of which
vomitting and diarrhea are classic symptoms.
[21]
Irritant foods and food
poisoning, on account of organic and vegetable fermentation, may cause
serious gastric, as well as intestinal, irritation; and there may ensue a still further
conversion of these altered food products into poisonous substances, by a well-
known physico-chemical process, called ptomains, leukomains, etc., and these
may be absorbed into the circulation of the blood, and cause peculiar symptoms
of intoxication by the secondary poisonous products.
[22]
When two possible
causes of death are present, a doubt is created as to the actual cause, which
can only be overcome by expert testimony by a qualified physician who
conducted a thorough examination of the victim.
[23]

In the case of U.S. v. Palalon,
[24]
where accused struck the victim with the
back of his hand, a few hours after which the victim contracted a fever and died
two and one-half days later, the Court acquitted the accused of the charge of
homicide on the ground that the cause of death had not been established,
despite the fact that a physician had conducted an examination of the
deceaseds body and had linked the blows sustained by the victim to his death.
The Court held that
There is no question as to the fact that the defendant struck the deceased a
blow on the mouth. But it is extremely doubtful that the blow either directly or
indirectly caused the death. It is not denied that fever was prevalent in the
locality in July, 1925, and it is quite probable that the death of the deceased was
due entirely to natural causes. The theory of the prosecution is that the
deceased, in falling down, received fatal internal injuries, and bases its
conclusions on the testimony of Dr. Jose V. Valero, who stated in substance that
he examined the body of the deceased on the day following the death and
found ecchymosis on the right shoulder and on the stomach and that, as a result
of the former, there was a congestion of the right lung, which was the principal
cause of the death; that the blows causing the ecchymosis must have been of
such force as to have made its effect felt immediately; and that the victim could
not have continued working.


No proper autopsy of the body was made, and through the testimony of the
boys father and that of the witnesses for the defense, it has been proven
conclusively that the deceased, contrary to the doctors theory of the case,
continued to work for more than a day after he received the blow. The
ecchymosis testified to by the doctor may have been nothing but suggillations or
death spots formed after the death; the fact that the marks were found both
on the stomach and on the back of the deceased so indicates. x x x

In the present case the examination of the body took place over twenty-four
hours after the death and appears to have been very incomplete; no incisions
were made and the examining physician, a young man of limited experience,
admitted that his conclusions were partly based upon the statements of the
members of the family of the deceased. In these circumstances the conclusions
cannot have been much more than mere guesses. In this connection we may
say that in cases of death under suspicious circumstances it is the duty of the
physician performing the post mortem examination to exercise the utmost care
and not draw unwarranted conclusions from external appearances susceptible
of different interpretations.

Meanwhile, in People v. Ilustre,
[25]
the Court affirmed the judgment of
conviction of defendant for homicide based upon the opinion of three doctors
who held that the death was caused by blows inflicted upon the deceaseds
right hypochondrium, which bruised the liver and produced an internal
hemorrhage. Further, the Court held that [t]he fact that the deceased
suffered from incipient pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect the defendants
criminal liability, for even if it rendered the blow more fatal, the efficient cause of
the death remains the same.

In People v. Ulep,
[26]
the Court held accused liable for the death of his wife
based primarily upon the autopsy report which described the cause of death as
cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by strong pressure applied on the
upper front chest bone, since it was conclusively established that accused had
elbowed his wife on the chest. In light of the autopsy report, the Court was
unconvinced by the defenses argument that death was caused by a chronic
condition of the deceased, holding that
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused (a) is the efficient cause of
death; or (b) accelerated his death; or (c) is the proximate cause of death; then
there is criminal liability.
[27]


All these cases lead to the inescapable conclusion that in order to hold a
person liable for the death of another, the evidence must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that accuseds criminal act was the proximate cause of such
death. Such proof is especially crucial when there are several possible causes of
death. In the case at bar, even assuming that the victim was afflicted with food
poisoning, accused-appellant may still be held liable for her death if the
prosecution had presented proof that accused-appellants act of beating his
wife was the efficient or proximate cause of death, or had accelerated her
death, which it did not.

No man is convicted on a probability. The accused is entitled to an acquittal,
unless his guilt is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that the
prosecution has the burden of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, each and
every element constituting the crime charged. This is premised upon the
accuseds constitutionally guaranteed right to be presumed innocent.
[28]

There being no evidence on the injuries sustained by Rufina Matyaong and
the cause of her death, accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal for the
Court entertains a reasonable doubt that his actions have in fact caused the
death of his wife.

Although it is perhaps possible to convict accused-appellant under
paragraph 3 of Article 266,
[29]
which does not require proof of injury, still, the
penalty for the same being only arresto menor, and it appearing that accused-
appellant has been detained in prison for a period greatly in excess of that
penalty, we find it unnecessary to provide for further punishment.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
of parricide.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, 6.
[2]
Ibid., 13.
[3]

TSN, 14 November 1996, 1- 36.

[4]
TSN, 6 January 1997, 1- 26.
[5]
TSN, 14 November 1996, 37-48.
[6]
Alternately referred to in the transcript of stenographic notes as Sgt. Almerante
Gaburnay.


[7]
TSN, 21 November 1996, 1-17; TSN, 14 November 1996, 45-47.
[8]
TSN, 18 February 1997, 1-20.
[9]
TSN, 5 June 1997, 1-17.
[10]
Promulgated on 7 May 1999 by Judge Gregorio T. Villanueva.
[11]
Rollo, 18-22.
[12]
Ibid., 31-43.
[13]
Ibid., 57-65.
[14]
People v. Cayago, 312 SCRA 623 (1999).
[15]
Francisco, V.J., Criminal Evidence, vol. III, p. 1511 [1947]; Words and Phrases, Corpus
Delicti, Permanent Edition 9A, [1960].
[16]
Francisco, supra.
[17]
People v. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 (1999).
[18]
Wharton and Stilles, Medical Jurisprudence, vol. III, fifth edition, p. 174 [1905].
[19]
Ibid., p. 188.
[20]
TSN, 14 November 1996, 20-21; TSN, 6 January 1997, 18; TSN, 21 November 1996, 10; TSN,
18 February 1997, 5-7, 10-11; TSN, 5 June 1997, 7.
[21]
Wharton and Stilles, supra, vol. II, p. 30.
[22]
Ibid., p. 8.
[23]
Kerr, Forensic Medicine, 5
th
ed. p. 78 [1954].
[24]
49 Phil 177 (1926).
[25]
54 Phil 594 (1930).
[26]
162 SCRA 182 (1988).
[27]
Citing People v. Ilustre, 54 Phil 594 (1930).
[28]
Constitution, Art. III, sec. 14.
[29]
ART. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
xxx xxx xxx
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos when the
offender shall illtreat another by dead without causing injury.


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUANITO JUTIE, accused-appellant.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 72975 March 31, 1989
FIRST DIVISION
MEDIALDEA, J.

For the killing of Elpidio Nepuscua on December 13, 1982, Pedro Aboy y Paris and
Juanito Jutie were charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2753 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, at Lingayen, Pangasinan, under an
information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of December, 1982, in the
afternoon, at Barangay Longos Municipality of Calasiao, Province
of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Pedro Aboy y Paris,
together with Juanito Jutie who is still at large, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping one another, armed with a
gun (caliber .30), with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation,
and treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Elpidio Nepuscua y Joves,
thereby inflicting upon him several gunshot wounds which caused
his death.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
1
.

Aboy was arrested on the day following the incident and was arraigned and tried
separately since Jutie was at large. On August 15, 1983, the trial court rendered its
decision convicting Aboy of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Aboy did not appeal.

Jutie, on the other hand, was arrested only on October 16, 1983. Upon being
arraigned, he entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After trial on
the merits, the trial court, on September 24, 1985, rendered its decision convicting
Jutie, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds and holds accused, JUANITO JUTIE, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER defined and penalized
under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and

1
(p. 28, Records)


conformable thereto, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
The Court further orders the accused to indemnify jointly and
severally with his co-accused Pedro Aboy the heirs of the
deceased Elpidio Nepuscua, the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P
l2,000.00) PESOS, as moral damages, plus TWO THOUSAND (P
2,000.00) PESOS as actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED
2
.

Not satisfied with the decision, Jutie appealed and assigned the following errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
APPELANT JUANITO JUTIE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE CONTRADICTING TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS ROBERTO JOVES.
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JUAN T.
ZABALA THAT THE WOUNDS WERE PRODUCED BY
TWO (2) WEAPONS
3
.

The evidence on record shows that at about four o'clock in the afternoon of
December 13, 1982, Roberto Joves, a 14-year old boy, and his younger brother,
Romel, went to a field in Longos Calasiao, Pangasinan, to gather "dangla" leaves
for their sick sister. On their way home, they met Elpidio Nepuscua who was then
running and followed by Pedro Aboy and Juanita Jutie. Aboy later caught up
with Nepuscua and pointed his gun at the latter. Nepuscua in turn raised both his
hands and cried. Nepuscua also moved backwards and stopped upon reaching
a small dike (pilapil), after which he knelt on the ground. Thereupon, Aboy shot
Nepuscua, with his .30 caliber carbine. After ahoy shot Nepuscua, Jutie also fired
at the latter with a 10-inch long firearm. Frightened by the incident, Roberto and
Romel ran home and reported the matter to their mother.
The incident was later reported to the police authorities at Calasiao. The police
investigators who went to the scene of the incident found the deceased,
Nepuscua, covered with rice hay. They also found thereat three (3) empty shells
of a .30 caliber carbine.

2
(Decision, pp. 82-83, Rollo)
3
(P. 112, Rollo)


The cadaver of Nepuscua was autopsied by Dr. Juan Zabala, Municipal Health
Officer of Calasiao, Pangasinan. His testimony on his findings was summarized by
the trial court, to wit:
A gunshot wound with entrance harrowing frontal bone located
on the right temple making exit wound at the forehead
4
, gunshot
wound with entrance on the chin grazing the frontal facial bone
making exit wound infront of the left ear
5
, trajectory of bullet,
backward and upward laterally; gunshot wound with entrance
located sub-scapular which is on back (right) grazing the muscle
of right arm making an exit wound on the right arm medial side
6
,
trajectory of bullet forward downward and since arm is movable, it
is not possible to determine whether laterally or medially; gunshot
wound with entrance penetrating the abdomen with exit on the
right side bringing out part of the small intestines
7
, trajectory of the
bullet is from left side of the victim more or less horizontal making
exit wound on the right side of the body, gun-shot wound with
entrance on the left forearm making exit on the front forearm
which appears incised wound due to splatter of the bone
8
,
trajectory of bullet, backward forward in medially anatomical
position; gunshot wound with entrance located on back of left
ring finger with exit in front palm surface of left ring finger
9
; gun-
shot wound located in the lateral side of left leg with an exit
wound just below the knee cap of leg
10
, trajectory of bullet,
upward medially; that wounds marked as Exhibit "D-1" and "D-3"
are fatal wounds because gunshot wound marked Exhibit D-1
caused damage on the head which is a sensitive organ of the
body and wound Exhibit "D-3" is likewise fatal, because it is near to
the brain; that the seven (7) gunshot wounds found on the body of
the victim based on their sizes were inflicted and caused by two
(2) kinds of firearms and that wounds Exhibit D-1 and D-3 were
caused by one firearm while the other five (5) wounds were
caused by one firearm while the other five (5) wounds were
caused by another kind of firearm; that the cause of death of the

4
(Exhs. D-1 and D-2)
5
(Exhs. D-3 & D-4)
6
(Exhs. D-5 & D-6)
7
(Exhs. D-7 & D-8)
8
(Exhs. D-9 & D-10)
9
(Exhs. D-11 & D-12)
10
(Exhs. D-13 & D- 14)


victim was cardio-respiratory arrest due to brain damage due to
gunshot wounds resulting in the stopping of the heart to function
due to destruction of the motor center which is the brain; that
wounds designated as Exhibits "D-1 and D-3, were inflicted frontally
while wounds marked Exhibits D-7, D-9" and D-13 were inflicted
from the left side. Wound Exhibit D-5 was inflicted from the back
while Exhibit D- 11 could not be determined from what side due to
the movements of the arm when raised up, lowered down or
stretched forward; that no slug was found in the body of the victim
and that the police were not able to find any firearm in the place
of the incident; that the gunshot wounds caused by smaller caliber
gun, the relative position of the assailant to the victim is that the
victim was lower than the assailant, but with respect to the fatal
gunshot wounds, the relative position of the assailant and the
victim, is that they are at the same level; that gunshot wound
marked Exhibit D-9 does not actually an incised wound because
there is an entrance wound and it appears to be incised because
of the bones splinters cutting some muscles
11
.

Accused Juanito Jutie, upon the other hand, denied participation in the
commission of the crime, According to him, he was by the window of their house
resting when he saw Pedro Aboy holding a gun and chasing somebody; that be
went down from their house and ran after Aboy; that at a distance of fifteen
meters, he saw Aboy pointing his gun at the victim whom he did not recognize at
once because of the victim's hat; that Jutie wanted to help the victim but he was
prevented by Aboy who warned him not to report the incident to anybody
otherwise he would kill him; that out of fear, he immediately went to his aunt's
house in Barangay Nancamaliran Urdaneta, Pangasinan; that he stayed there
until he learned that Aboy was already sentenced and sent to the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that he did not think of surrendering to the police
authorities because he has not committed any crime; that be is not related to
Aboy; and that he came to know Aboy only as a buyer of scrap iron.

Anent his first and second assigned errors, appellant submits that the trial court
should have not relied on the testimony of the prosecution witness Roberto Joves
in view of the glaring contradictions found in his sworn statement before the
police authorities and the Municipal Judge as against his testimony in open court.
He claims that at the witness stand, Joves stated that appellant was equipped
with a short firearm and fired at the victim whereas his sworn statement made no

11
(pp. 2-3, Decision)


mention of this fact. Appellant concludes that Joves' failure to report such a vital
information to the police makes his testimony in court a mere fabrication
12
.

With regard to his third assigned error, appellant asserts that Dr. Zabala's
testimony that two firearms were used is doubtful considering that the same is not
supported by proof and it was not shown that the doctor is a ballistics expert. He
points out that the firearm that was allegedly used was not presented in
evidence; that no slug was found in the body of the victim and that the distance
between the alleged assailant and the victim was not established
13
.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

The alleged variance in Joves' sworn statement and his testimony in open court
was satisfactorily explained by the witness himself during the cross- examination.
He testified:
Atty. Teodoro Regino, counsel for the accused.
Q And the shooting by Pedro Aboy was followed by
the shooting by the accused Juanita Jutie, is that
what you mean?
A Yes, Sir.
Q This is the first time that you revealed this incident
is it not?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You did not tell that incident to the police
authorities in the evening of December 13 when
you were investigated?
Fiscal Milo:
May I make of record that question was not asked by the police.
Court: Answer
Witness:
A They did not ask me, Sir.
Atty. Regino:
Q You did not also tell the alleged shooting of
Juanita Jutie, to the PC Investigator and Linayen
when you gave your supplemental statement?
A They did not also ask me, Sir.
Q In fact you kept it to yourself what you saw. Jutie
did to the allegedly did to Nepuscua, [sic], is it not?
Fiscal Milo:

12
(pp. 121-126, Rollo)
13
(pp. 121-126, Rollo)


Calling for an opinion, Your Honor.
Court: Answer
Witness: I did not tell to anybody, Sir.
Atty. Regino: May I invite the attention of the Honorable Court to
the medical autopsy report.
Atty. Regino: I think that would be all, your Honor.
Court: Did not the PC or the police tell you to tell everything what
you know in the shooting'.? They did not ask you that?
A No Sir
14
.

It is to be recalled that during the investigation of this case before the police
authorities and before the Municipal Judge for preliminary investigation, only
Pedro Aboy was arrested since appellant Jutie remained at large. Thus, it may be
inferred that the investigation was only limited to the participation of Aboy as
there was hardly any question asked as to the appellant's role in the commission
of the crime. Joves could not be expected to offer information to the authorities if
he was not being asked. Besides, he was only 14 years old when he witnessed the
violent death of his grandfather. The resultant shock and nervousness could have
led to his inability to recount everything he had seen to the police authorities and
the Municipal Judge. We have held that such memory lapse due to a traumatic
experience of being a witness to the killing of the victim is understandable and
does not impair the intrinsic credibility of the witness
15
. Moreover, affidavits are
usually deficient. Being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and sometimes from
want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be
unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection
of all that belongs to the subject
16
. Prosecution witness Joves positively identified
the appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime
17
. The records do not
disclose any ill-motive on his part to falsely accuse appellant of an atrocious
crime. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the
principal witness for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that
no such improper motive existed, and that, his testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit
18
. On the other hand, appellant's reason for his disappearance for several

14
(pp. 44-46, TSN, March 6, 1984)
15
(see People vs. Santos, L-60055, April 28, 1983, 121 SCRA 833)
16
(Moore on Facts, 1094-1095, cited in People vs. Alcantara, L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
812; People vs. Pacala, L-26647, August 15, 1974, 58 SCRA 370; People vs. Gonzales, September
11, 1980, 99 SCRA 697; People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. 63862, July 31, 1987, 52 SCRA 570)
17
(pp. 12, 38-39, TSN, March 6,1984)
18
(People vs. Sawah, L-15333, June 29,1962, 5 SCRA 385)


months is unconvincing. It was duly established during the trial that, contrary to
the claim of appellant, Aboy is his uncle as well as his constant companion and
that the latter stayed at appellant's house for days whenever he comes to buy
scrap iron from them. It is improbable, then, that appellant did not know of Aboy's
arrest and detention considering his close relationship with him and the fact that
he also hid in a relative's house which is situated in a place not too distant as to
foreclose any news regarding the incident. We have ruled, time and again, that
flight is inconsistent with innocence.

Appellant further assails the veracity of the testimony of Dr. Juan T. Zabala that
the wounds were produced by two weapons considering that the doctor's
testimony was not supported by proof and that he is not a ballistics expert. This
argument is untenable. Dr. Zabala's expertise as a medico-legal can not be
gainsaid. Having examined the body of the victim, he was more than competent
to testify on the nature of wounds, location and the means used to cause the
injuries. It is significant to note, too, that Dr. Zabala's testimony is in accord not
only with the physical evidence which showed that the entrance of the gunshot
wounds in the victim's body were of different sizes but also with the positive
testimony of Joves that he saw appellant shoot the victim with a short firearm.
Even the defense witness, Dr. Benigno Parayno admitted that it was possible to
conclude that two different kinds of guns were used as there were two kinds of
gun-shot wounds (p. 178, TSN, February 6, 1985). Thus, the trial court was correct in
giving weight to Dr. Zabala's testimony.
We find that the totality of the circumstances obtaining in this case justifies a
finding of conspiracy. We deem it sufficient to quote from the decision of the trial
court:
. . . (T)here was conspiracy on the part of Pedro Aboy and Juanito
Jutie to snuff the life of Elpidio Nepuscua and this is evidently
established by the fact that both accused were seen by Roberto
Joves chasing the victim before the shooting happened; that both
were seen to be armed with guns, Pedro Aboy with a long firearm
(carbine caliber .30) while Juanita Jutie with a short one; both shot
the victim not only once but several times as eloquently shown by
the several gunshot wounds of different sizes inflicted upon the
body of the deceased implying that there was more than one gun
used in the shooting of the deceased. If indeed Pedro Aboy alone
shot the victim, it is rather extraordinary and unnatural that the
gun-shot wounds suffered by the deceased are of different sizes.
Evidence to be believed must be credible by itself and in
conformity to reason, knowledge and common sense. Likewise,
the accused having admitted to be in the scene crime at the time
of the killing, the latter have a lot of explanation to do in


convincing the court that he never participated to what
happened to the victim. Naturally, the bald denial of the accused
of the accusation imputed against him will not be sufficient to
refute and destroy the overwhelming evidence adduced by the
prosecution proving and pointing that he also shot the
deceased
19
.

Likewise, We agree with the trial court that treachery was present in this case. The
victim was unarmed and had raised his hands crying and pleading for his life
when he was shot by Aboy and the appellant. Obviously, the stand taken by the
victim posed no risk to the assailants. We have previously held that treachery is
present where the victim was shot while his hands were raised pleading for his
life
20
.

The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery and the same is penalized
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. Since there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
the aforesaid penalty should be imposed in its medium period. The court a
quo correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The actual damages in
the amount of P 2,000.00 is increased to P 30,000.00
21
. Such modification will no
longer be imposed on his co-conspirator Aboy whose conviction under a
separate trial had long become final and executory. In pursuing this appeal,
appellant assumed the risk of having the judgment under review affirmed,
reversed or modified only insofar as his culpability is concerned. Thus, he should
pay an indemnity of P 30,000.00 but with the right to demand contribution from
his co-accused in the sum of P 1,000.00
22
.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the lower court is modified in that
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of P 30,000.00 but with the right
to demand contribution from his co-accused Pedro Aboy in the sum of P 1,000.00.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

19
(p. 322, Records)
20
(People vs. Lebumfacil, L-32910, March 28, 1980; 96 SCRA 573; People vs. Lasatin, L-5874,
February 11, 1953; 92 Phil. 668)
21
(see People vs. Daniel, L-66551, April 25, 1985; 136 SCRA 92)
22
(see People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17,1969; 28 SCRA 764).


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIOMEDES MAGALLANO and
MARCELO MAGALLANO,accused-appellants.
[G.R. No. 114872. January 16, 1997]
SECOND DIVISION
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:

The brothers Diomedes Magallano and Marcelo Magallano, accused-
appellants in this appellate review, assail the verdict of guilt rendered against
them by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, of Dumaguete City for the crime of
murder. Appellants assert that their respective pleas of self-defense and denial
should have been favorably appreciated by the trial court, considering the
inconsistencies and consequent unreliability of the testimony of the prosecutions
principal eyewitness, hence their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
[1]
We find otherwise; accordingly, we affirm the challenged judgment.

Appellants were charged with murder for the death of Elfonio Adelantar in
an amended information dated July 16, 1992, the indictment alleging:
That on or about February 1, 1989 at Sitio Tampa-on, Barangay Banawe,
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring together and mutually
helping each other, with treachery and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one Elfonio Adelantar,
inflicting upon the latter multiple injuries, which directly caused the death of said
Elfonio Adelantar.
[2]

Duly arraigned with the assistance of their counsel on August 20, 1992,
appellants registered negative pleas.
[3]
Trial proceeded thereafter, with the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Dr. Rogelio M. Kadili, Municipal Health Officer
of Pamplona, Negros Oriental; Marciano Rodriguez, then Barangay Captain
of Barangay Banawe, Pamplona, Negros Oriental; Cirilo Manaban, brother-in-law
of the victim and eyewitness to the crime; and Virginia M. Adelantar, the victims
spouse and elder sister of Cirilo Manaban.

Appellants, on the other hand, testified in their defense. To lend support to
their declarations, one Dr. Inofredita Abordo Sibol, who supposedly treated the
wounds inflicted upon the brothers by the victim, was presented in
court. Eventually, the trial court rendered the following judgment on February 3,
1994:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby finds both accused
Diomedes Magallano and Marcelo Magallano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery with no attendant generic


aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Both accused Diomedes Magallano
and Marcelo Magallano are hereby sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and its accessory penalties and to indemnify the heirs of the victim (in)
the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemni(t)y on a pro-rata
basis. Cost(s) de of(i)cio.
[4]

The key prosecution witness, Cirilo Manaban who was then only fourteen
years old, recalled that the killing of his brother-in-law, Elfonio Adelantar, occurred
at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 1, 1992. While they were both
resting on a bench in the house of the Adelantars in the
aforesaid Sitio Tampa-on of Barangay Banawe, Elfonio aimed and shot with his
slingshot at a bird perched on a nearby mango tree. Elfonio missed and the bird
flew and settled on another tree a few meters away from the house. Elfonio rose
and went towards the bird, with Cirilo following him about ten meters behind in
order to retrieve the bird if it was shot down by Elfonio.
[5]

At that point, appellant Marcelo Magallano emerged from a clearing in a
nearby sugarcane plantation and talked to Elfonio. In a little while, appellant
Diomedes Magallano stealthily approached from behind the two and, without
much ado, hacked Elfonio with a bolo in plain sight and to the horror of
Cirilo. The victims attempt to unsheathe his own weapon was preempted by a
hacking blow on his arm delivered by appellant Marcelo Magallano. Cirilo then
scurried away and rushed back to the victims house where he informed his sister
of the violent incident. Thereafter, he reported the matter to his father at their
house. When they later went to the scene of the crime, they found the lifeless
body of Elfonio Adelantar. The victim was buried the next day.
[6]

Both appellants denied the version of the prosecution. According to
Marcelo, it was in fact Elfonio who had initiated the fight when, as he was passing
by the victim, the latter deliberately aimed and threw a knife at him. Marcelo
claims that he was hit on the left leg but he was able to run home. A few minutes
later, his brother, Diomedes, arrived with a fresh wound on his face. Diomedes
informed him that he had been attacked for no reason at all by an apparently
intoxicated Elfonio Adelantar and that he was forced to retaliate, resulting in the
victims death.
[7]

Elfonio Adelantar, further reported Diomedes, was able to inflict a wound on
his right forearm at the outset. However, Diomedes claimed that he responded
with a hacking blow of his own on the victim before running away for
safety. After applying some herbal medicine, the two brothers later proceeded
to a hospital.
[8]
Dr. Inofredita Abordo Sibol testified that she attended to the


brothers and treated their wounds which they allegedly sustained at the hands of
the victim.
[9]

Appellants advert to what they insist are inconsistencies in the narration of
the events by Cirilo Manaban, as well as his supposedly unnatural reaction while
the fight was taking place. In particular, they point out that in the sworn affidavit
that Manaban executed five days after the incident and in the subsequent
preliminary examination conducted about three weeks thereafter by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Pamplona, said witness, contrary to his testimony in
the court below, never disclosed that Marcelo Magallano had himself hacked
the victim with his bolo just as the latter was about to reach for his own weapon.

Moreover, appellants raise an issue on Cirilo Manabans seemingly
inconsistent stand in his affidavit wherein he stated that, after Diomedes
Magallano attacked the victim, he instantly ran away to inform his sister of the
fight. Manaban contradicted this statement later in the preliminary examination
when he claimed that it was to his fathers house that he first went after the
incident. Then, in his testimony before the lower court, Manaban made another
turnaround when he recalled that he first ran to his sisters house and then later
proceeded to his fathers house.

The testimony of the barangay captain, Marcelino Rodriguez, to the effect
that he saw three hacked wounds on the victims body but that there was no
wound on his arm, is also cited as refuting the claim of Cirilo Manaban that
Marcelo Magallano had struck with his bolo at the victims arm. Finally,
appellants express surprise that Cirilo Manaban should idly stand nearby and not
make any attempt to assist his brother-in-law while the latter was being
waylaid. This, appellants claim, is not the ordinary human reaction and which all
the more rendered Cirilo Manabans testimony unworthy of belief.

In fine, appellants arguments revolve on the matter of credibility of
witnesses. Already well settled and often reiterated is the rule that the findings of
trial courts which are factual in nature deserve to be respected and affirmed by
appellate courts where no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of
the facts, or speculative and unsupported conclusions, can readily be gleaned
from such findings.
[10]
We have conscientiously reviewed the records and we are
convinced that the trial courts evaluation of the evidence, specifically Cirilo
Manabans testimony, was objective and fairly calibrated and should therefore
be accorded affirmance by this Court.

Cirilo Manaban was only a couple of years into his teens when the incident
happened. To a boy of such age, the violent and gory event must have


traumatized him no end for, indeed, he unwittingly made inaccurate answers
during the occasions pointed out by appellants. But, far from being corrosive of
the testimony of Cirilo Manaban, those inconsistencies are merely minor lapses
and clearly of no consequence, especially when viewed against his narration of
the events before the trial court. There, he never wavered during the direct and
cross-examination on his categorical assertion that Marcelo Magallano had
likewise taken active part in the killing of his brother-in-law by wounding the latter
on the arm.

Manaban was forthright and unequivocal in his testimony that while he was
about ten meters away from his brother-in-law, appellant Marcelo Magallano
suddenly appeared and talked to the victim as the latter was preparing to shoot
at the bird perched on top of a duhat tree. Suddenly, appellant Diomedes
Magallano emerged out of nowhere and unceremoniously pounced upon the
unsuspecting victim with his 18-inch pinuti, a locally made jungle bolo. Marcelo
then followed suit with his own bolo, just as Elfonio Adelantar was attempting to
unsheathe his weapon. As fate would have it, Marcelo beat the latter to the
draw with a hacking blow on the victims arm.

Cirilo Manaban had known the Magallano brothers for quite some time as
they were all residents of the same area. Marcelo Magallano, in fact, had at one
time been a frequent visitor of his other elder sister, Diosa Manaban. Thus, he
could not have been mistaken as to the identity of the malefactors. No ulterior or
ill motive was ever attributed to this witness as to why he should testify falsely
against the brothers. True, the victim was a relative of this witness, but
relationship, whether by consanguinity or affinity, is not by itself a demerit in
weighing the true worth of ones testimony.
[11]
The essential test is that the
testimony of the witness is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human
experience.
[12]

Withal, even without Cirilo Manabans assertion that Marcelo Magallano
likewise hacked his brother-in-law, said appellant could nonetheless be held
accountable as conspirator in the murder of Elfonio Adelantar. Manabans
testimony was that Marcelo suddenly came into view from the sugarcane
plantation and engaged Elfonio in conversation. Almost simultaneously,
Diomedes came from behind and assaulted Elfonio without any warning at all. It
is quite apparent that Marcelo and Diomedes had resorted to such a ruse, with
Marcelo distracting Elfonio in idle talk so that Diomedes could come undetected
from behind for a successful attack. The scheme undoubtedly was contrived to
avoid any possible defense that the victim would put up since he was likewise
armed, a fact obviously known to appellants.


There was thus not only treachery, but conspiracy as well. Direct proof is not
essential to establish conspiracy as this may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably
point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community
of interest.
[13]
Where conspiracy is duly proven, all the accused are answerable
collectively as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation.
[14]
As
the all too familiar principle in criminal law goes, the act of one is the act of all.

The imputed aberrant behavior of Cirilo Manaban, in not extending help to
his brother-in-law during the aggression on the latter, is easily
understandable. Manaban, apart from his relatively young age at the time, was
unarmed. The attack was sudden and completely unexpected. Fear obviously
gripped the boy and it was only natural for him to stand terrified and watch
helplessly as his brother-in-law was being savagely ambushed. The novelty and
ghastly nature of the episode transfixed him for a moment, but as soon as he had
gathered enough of his wits, he scampered for his life. Certainly, nothing could
be more natural a reaction than the one exhibited by Cirilo Manaban under the
foregoing circumstances. It would even have been unnatural had he acted
contrariwise.

On the other hand, appellants resort to the jaded apologia of denial and
self-defense hardly merits sympathy. Courts have generally viewed with disfavor
the defense of denial on account of its aridity and the facility with which an
accused could concoct the same to suit his defense. Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot secure worthiness more than that
placed upon the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and
positive evidence.
[15]
Self-defense, on the other hand, should be established as
convincingly as possible and the onus falls on the accused who relies on it to
prove its unequivocal signification.
[16]
The emphatic and untraversed account of
the event made by Cirilo Manaban regarding appellants participation in the
crime has rendered totally ineffective and inutile the defenses they would now
invoke.

Finally, in view of the position taken by plaintiff-appellee in its brief, it should
again be stressed that on the question of whether the passage of Republic Act
No. 7659 has transformed the indivisible nature of reclusion perpetua into a
divisible one because of its defined duration ranging from 20 years and 1 day
to 40 years, we have already ruled in the negative. In an En Banc Resolution of
January 9, 1995,
[17]
rendered on a motion for clarification of the Courts decision
in People vs. Lucas,
[18]
it was explained that (a)fter deliberating on the motion
and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that
although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion


perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no
clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.

Consequently, said resolution deleted from the Lucas decision the
disquisitions on whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty and set aside the
pronouncement therein as to its division into three periods. As has heretofore
been the nature of this penalty, reclusion perpetua, remains as an indivisible
penalty without any minimum, medium, or maximum period. As such, it should be
imposed in the case at bar in its entire duration in accordance with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code regardless of the presence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the
crime.
[19]
The contrary recommendation of the Solicitor General is accordingly
rejected.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 10114 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Brief for Accused-Appellant Marcelo Magallano, 1; rollo, 45; Brief for Accused-
Appellant Diomedes Magallano, 1; rollo, 118.
[2]
Original Record, 42.
[3]
Ibid., 51-52.
[4]
Ibid., 179; per Judge Saturnino Ll. Villegas.
[5]
TSN, April 12, 1993, 13-18, 48.
[6]
Ibid., id., 18-23.
[7]
Ibid., May 18, 1993, 3-22; May 31, 1993, 6.
[8]
Ibid., May 31, 1993, 7-17.
[9]
Ibid., id., 19-25.
[10]
People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 116524, January 18, 1996, 252 SCRA 31; People vs.
Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 98402-04, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 14.
[11]
People vs. Magsombol, G.R. No. 98197, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 187; People vs.
Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, January 19, 1995, 240 SCRA 283.
[12]
People vs. Gapasan, G.R. No. 110812, March 29, 1995, 243 SCRA 53; People vs.
Reyes, G.R. No. 105204, March 9, 1995, 242 SCRA 264.
[13]
People vs. Compil, G.R. No. 95028, May 15, 1995, 244 SCRA 135; People vs. Omog-
bolahan, et al., G.R. No. 112659, January 24, 1996, 252 SCRA 213.
[14]
People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309; People vs.
Parica, et al., G.R. No. 80611, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 557.
[15]
People vs. Lamsing, G.R. No. 105316, September 21, 1995, 248 SCRA 471; People vs.
Amania, et al., G.R. No. 108598, September 21, 1995, 248 SCRA 486.


[16]
People vs. Tamparong, et al., G.R. No. 112713, October 25, 1995, 249 SCRA 584;
People vs. Rivero, G.R. No. 112721, March 15, 1995, 242 SCRA 354.
[17]
En Banc Resolution, G.R. Nos. 108172-73, 240 SCRA 66.
[18]
G.R. Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994, 232 SCRA 537.
[19]
People vs. Saliling, G.R. No. 117732, October 10, 1995, 249 SCRA 185; People vs.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 107495, July 31, 1995, 246 SCRA 769; People vs. Baculi, G.R.
No. 110591, July 26, 1995, 246 SCRA 756.


vs.
JESUS DEUNIDA Y ENRIQUEZ, accused-appellant.
Dumlao, Farolan, Ignacio & Associates Law Office for accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 105199-200 March 28, 1994
FIRST DIVISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Following his arrest six months after the fatal shooting of Felipe Ramos, Jr. in the
evening of 31 December 1990, accused Jesus Deunida was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila with murder and illegal possession of firearms under
P.D. No. 1866 in two separate informations, dated 26 June 1991, which were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 91-95987 and 91-95988, respectively,
1
and
consolidated with and raffled to Branch 49 of the said court.

However, after a reinvestigation which the court ordered upon motion
2
of the
accused and for lack of the requisite prior preliminary investigation, the
prosecution, in a Manifestation filed on 18 September 1991,
3
moved for the
withdrawal of the information for murder and the amendment of the information
for illegal possession of firearms on the ground stated in the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor
4
that the filing of two separate informations was
erroneous since what the accused had committed is only one offense, viz., the
violation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 or "Qualified
Illegal Possession of Firearm." The amended information
5
attached to the
manifestation bears the docket number for the case for murder, viz., Criminal
Case No. 91-95987. However, the body thereof is for violation of P.D.
No. 1866, which is the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 91-95988, and reads
as follows:
The undersigned accuses JESUS DEUNIDA Y ENRIQUEZ of violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about December 31, 1990, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control the
following, to wit: one (1) caliber .38 revolver (Paltik)
marked Smith and Wesson, without first having
secured the necessary license or permit therefor
from the corresponding authorities, which
described firearm was used by the accused in the
commission of the crime of homicide.


Although the original records transmitted to this Court by the trial court do not
show that the latter formally acted on the manifestation, the challenged decision
states that the withdrawal and amendment were both granted.
6
From the
certificate of arraignment,
7
it likewise appears that the accused was arraigned in
Criminal Case No. 91-95987, evidently on the amended information for illegal
possession of firearms.
8

During the testimony of Dr. Marcial Cenido, the first witness for the prosecution,
the trial court discerned,
9
and the defense counsel confirmed,
10
that the theory
of the accused was self-defense. The parties then stipulated that:
(1) the amount of actual damages (funeral expenses) incurred by the private
complainant was P50,000.00;
11
(2) the gun used in the fatal shooting was
the "paltik" .38 caliber revolver ("Exhibit "P") turned over by the accused to
P/Cpl. Meneleo Renon after the shooting, and the copper slug (Exhibit "E") was
the one recovered from the body of the victim;
12
and (3) at the time the gun was
fired, the accused has no license or permit to possess the gun and the recovered
live bullets (Exhibit "P-1") as certified to by the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
13
The parties then agreed to have the "reverse
trial" method to expedite the disposition of the case and the prosecution marked
and submitted its evidence consisting of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Cenido,
the human sketch prepared by him, the certificate of death, the recovered slug,
sworn statements of Marlon Comia, Joel Baltazar, Cpl. Meneleo Renon, advance
information on the case, progress report, certification of the Firearms and
Explosives Unit, booking sheet and arrest report, the paltik revolver, and the
bullets.
14
The defense then presented as its witnesses the accused himself and his
two friends, Aurelio Sta. Cruz and Agustin Arigore. The prosecution presented as
rebuttal witnesses Mrs. Belen Fortes, an eyewitness to the shooting, and P/Cpl.
Meneleo Renon, an off-duty traffic policeman who had placed the accused
under arrest shortly after the shooting. These witnesses are neighbors of the
accused. Thereafter, the defense recalled the accused as a surrebuttal witness.
The inculpatory evidence adduced by the prosecution is faithfully summarized by
the appellee as follows:
On December 31, 1990, New Year's Eve, at about 10:30 o'clock in
the evening, Belen Fortes of 2347-A Amatista St., San Andres Bukid,
Manila, went to the store of her neighbor, accused Jesus Deunida,
at 2323 Amatista St., San Andres Bukid, Manila (TSN, Nov. 13, 1991,
p. 8), to buy some things in preparation for the midnight
celebration to welcome the New Year. As she approached the
store, she saw ahead of her Felipe Ramos, Jr. who was about two
feet away to her left (TSN, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 8) also approaching the
store. Ramos was about two feet away from the store and he
addressed appellant Deunida who was inside the store,
"Hinahanap mo raw ako?" (Ibid., pp. 2 and 4).


Despite the screen covering the front of the store, Fortes could
clearly see the face of appellant inside the store because the
screen had an opening of about 10 by 12 inches and the street
light overhead illuminated the store (Ibid., pp. 1-13). Fortes heard
appellant reply but could not make out the words after which she
saw appellant aim a gun at Ramos, the muzzle of the gun jutting
through the opening in the screen (Ibid., pp. 4-5, 13-14).
When Ramos saw the gun aimed at him, he turned around and
was about to run away when the gun fired hitting Ramos at the
back and causing him to be thrown to the other side of the street
(Ibid., p. 5).
Appellant came out of his store, approached Ramos and again
aimed the gun at him. But neighbor pleaded with appellant not to
shoot again, shouting "Mang Jess, huwag, si Ato yan" (Ibid., pp. 5-
6).
Appellant relented and Ramos stood up to look for help. Fortes ran
home to tell her husband what happened and then returned to
the scene and helped the other neighbors bring Ramos to the
Philippine General Hospital where he would expire later (page 5 of
the Amended Decision, as annexed in the Appellant's Brief).
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Marcial Cenido on January 1, 1991
revealed that Ramos suffered a gunshot entry wound in the back,
specifically at the left posterior thorax below the level of the armpit
with a copper slug found inside the body. According to Dr.
Cenido, the entry wound and slug are consistent with a handgun
as the firearm used in killing the victim (TSN, Nov. 5, 1991, pp. 10-11)
and in the absence of powder burns that the muzzle of the gun
was about 24 inches from the body when it fired. The trajectory of
the bullet is forward or from back to front, very slightly downward
and slightly towards the left lateral line penetrating the posterior
thorax and left side of the liver. He concludes from the foregoing
findings that the assailant was at the back of the victim, that the
position of the assailant was possibly standing and the victim could
have been seated. He also explained that the abrasions in the
right forearm could have been due to a fall (TSN, Nov. 5, 1991, pp.
24, 17).
Appellant was placed under arrest by Cpl. Meneleo Renon who
was at home watching television when the incident happened.
He was called to the scene right after the shooting by his daughter
and niece who called him; telling him "Papa, papa, si Mang Jess
binaril si Ato" (TSN,
Jan. 28, 1992, pp. 49-50).


Renon immediately went to the crime scene. He saw appellant
holding a gun and about to leave and he called appellant.
Appellant handed to him the gun and said "Pasensiya na kayo
nabaril ko si Ato" (Ibid., pp. 51-52, 54, 56). Renon opened the gun
and discovered one (1) empty shell and four (4) live bullets (Ibid.,
p. 53).
Renon told appellant that he was under arrest and made him sit in
front of his house to wait for the policemen from homicide section
(Ibid.,
p. 54).
While waiting for the policemen, appellant asked Renon if he
could go inside his house to drink water. Since appellant was his
neighbor, Renon allowed him to enter his house to drink (Ibid.).
When the policemen from the homicide section arrived, Renon
called appellant but discovered that the latter had escaped to
the roof top by using a long ladder (Ibid., p. 55).
Renon and the homicide operatives tried to locate the appellant
at a place called Texas Anakbayan where the appellant was
known to have many friends but they failed to find him (Ibid.).
Appellant was finally arrested on June 12, 1991 in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan.
15

On the other hand, the accused denied both the possession of the fatal gun and
the responsibility for shooting the victim, and offered a different version of the
incident which he summed up in his brief, citing the testimonies of Aurelio Sta.
Cruz and Agustin Arigore:
[A]t about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of December 31, 1990,
both of them [Sta. Cruz and Arigore] went to the house of the
Accused-Appellant to invite him to join the celebration of their
[barkada] in the house of Chairman Alfredo Tan. While he was
outside the store and at the gate with his two (2) friends, the victim
arrived, approached him, saying "Mang Jess, babarilin mo raw
ako," then poked a gun at him. It was parried by the Accused-
Appellant, but when it was poked again, the latter tried to get it
by grappling with the victim. It was at the [sic] point when
Accused-Appellant was twisting the victim's arm with the gun, and
the latter almost on his knees, that the gun fired. The victim
disengaged himself by running to the other side of the street. He
was pursued by Accused-Appellant, poked the gun at him but he
was prevented by his friend.
When Cpl. Meneleo (Pandong) Renon arrived, the Accused-
Appellant handed him the gun saying "Pandong, baril ito ni Ato,


naagaw ko" to which the policeman responded, "Sige Jess, ako na
ang bahala dito." With his two (2 ) friends, they proceeded to the
drinking party, stayed there overnight. When in the morning he
was informed that Ato died and that he was being hunted by the
victim's relatives, he went to his in-laws in Bulacan, stayed there
until arrest.
16

This version is of course not absolutely consistent with the accused's earlier stand
that he acted in self-defense, which resulted in an agreement for the holding of a
"reverse trial" method. This prompted the trial court to remark that by the
evidence he offered in court, the accused:
evolved an alternative defense, to wit, (a) that at the time the
gun,
Exhibit "P", was fired, the first right finger of the deceased was on
the trigger and that the accused was merely holding the handle
of the gun and implied that it was not the Accused who shot the
deceased; and
(b) assuming, gratia arguendo, that it was the Accused who shot
the deceased, while they were wrestling for the possession of the
gun, he did so only in self-defense.
17

In its Decision
18
promulgated on 3 April 1992, the trial court found the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "qualified violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866" and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of actual damages and P5,000.00 by way of indemnity. It
further ordered the confiscation in favor of the government of the gun and the
four live bullets and one empty cartridge and directed the branch clerk of court
to cause the delivery thereof to the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the PNP for
disposition in accordance with law upon the finality of the decision.

On 10 April 1992, the trial court amended its decision,
19
a copy of which was
received by the accused's counsel on 14 April 1992. The trial court rejected the
accused's claim of self-defense in view of the "cogent facts and circumstances
spread in the records, not to mention the testimony of the [a]ccused himself,
belying and discrediting his claim." It gave more credence to the prosecution
witnesses' accounts of the incident and the medical findings and opinion of Dr.
Cenido, held that the accused's flight after the incident as an indication of guilt,
and considered his statement to Cpl. Renon admitting the shooting as part of
the res gestae.
It also disregarded for lack of substantial basis the accused's allegations of bias
and ill-motive against witnesses Mrs. Belen Fortes and Cpl. Renon, ruling instead


that the accused's self-serving claim that the victim was a "protege" or "bata" of
Renon was belied by the latter's leniency and lack of vindictiveness towards the
accused after the shooting, such as allowing the accused to go inside his house
to drink water without being handcuffed, enabling him to escape.

The Court stated that Renon satisfactorily explained why he made his sworn
statement only on 22 June 1991; moreover, he had promptly reported the
incident to the Homicide Section, turned over the gun, the four live bullets and
the empty cartridge, and informed the police of the accused's escape. The
Court explained that Fortes did not report the incident to the police and give a
sworn statement because she helped bring the victim to the hospital and
thereafter the accused's relatives brokered for an amicable settlement of the
case which would render her sworn statement useless. It also said that the
accused's allegations that the relatives of the victim threatened to kidnap her
daughter and that Fortes went on television to denounce him were
unsubstantiated and pure hearsay since the same were only relayed to him by his
wife who did not testify.
20

On 21 April 1992, the accused filed his notice of appeal.
21

In his Appellant's Brief,
22
the accused prays that we reverse the amended
decision of the trial court and acquit him because the trial court erred: (1) in
finding the testimonies of Fortes and Renon credible and free from ill-motive or
vindictiveness, fabrication, and collusion; (2) in relying on the said testimonies as
basis for his conviction; (3) in finding that the victim, Felipe Ramos, Jr., was not the
aggressor; (4) in convicting him on the basis of contradicting testimonies,
assumptions, and conclusions; (5) in considering his "alleged flight" as evidence of
his guilt; (5) in "misappreciating and ignoring" his evidence of self-defense; and (7)
in not applying the "equipoise rule" in his favor.
23
In further amplification thereof,
he asserts that the testimonies of Fortes and Renon are inconsistent and
improbable; that Dr. Cenido was not a qualified forensic expert to testify on the
distance at which the victim was shot based on the absence of gunpowder
burns at the victim's wound, which absence can be explained; that Dr. Cenido's
findings also support his claim that the victim was shot from the back while
seated; that his evidence amply proves self-defense; and that his flight was due
to the threats to his life and his family and cannot be taken as evidence of guilt.
24

At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's legal position
in withdrawing the information for murder, the offense defined in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not absorb the crime of homicide or
murder under the Revised Penal Code and, therefore, does not bar the
simultaneous or subsequent prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision


in Lazaro vs. People
25
involving a violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating
prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling in view of our
decisions in People vs. Tac-an,
26
People vs. Tiozon,
27
and People vs. Caling.
28

In Tac-an, we ruled that the accused who had been charged with illegal
possession of a firearm and ammunition under the second paragraph of Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866 was not placed in double jeopardy when he was also charged
in another case with murder because the former offense is a different offense
punished by a special law while the latter offense is defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code. We reiterated that the constitutional right against
double jeopardy protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same
offense and that when the subsequent information charges another and different
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no double
jeopardy. In Tiozon, we explicitly stated that the killing of a person with the use of
an unlicensed firearm may give rise to two separate prosecutions: one for the
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and another for murder or homicide under
Article 248 or Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. And in Caling, we also ruled
that the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder
gives rise to two distinct crimes, viz., unlawful possession of firearms, which may be
either simple or aggravated as defined and punished respectively by the first and
second paragraphs of Section 1 P.D. 1866; and homicide or murder, committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The killing is obviously distinct from the act
of possession and is separately defined and punished under the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, in the instant case, the information for murder was erroneously
withdrawn.

Let us now draw our attention to the merits of the appeal.
After a careful review and consideration of the records, the evidence, and the
arguments of the parties, we find the appeal to be without merit.
In the first place, having pleaded self-defense, the accused necessarily admitted
having shot and killed the victim with an unlicensed firearm (Exhibit "P"). It was
then incumbent upon him, to avoid criminal liability, to prove that justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for
even if that were weak it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the
killing.
29
Being an affirmative allegation, its elements, namely
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the accused, must be proved with certainty by sufficient and
convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the
part of the person invoking it.
30


The accused failed to discharge the burden which was shifted to him by his plea
of self-defense. He was not able to show unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. On the other hand, the prosecution, through the testimony of Belen Fortes,
successfully proved that it was the accused who assaulted the victim with a gun
and shot the latter at his back,
31
which facts she elaborated in detail on cross-
examination.
32
Cpl. Renon, to whom the accused surrendered the gun and the
live bullets after the incident, testified that the accused told him that he shot
Felipe Renon.
33

The allegation that the testimonies of Belen Fortes and Cpl. Renon are not
credible does not convince us. The trial court gave them full faith and credit thus:
More, the Court belabored to monitor and keenly observe the
conduct and demeanor of Belen Fortes and Cpl. Meneleo Renon
when they testified before the Court, and the Court is fully
convinced, without equivocation that they testified before the
Court spontaneously, in a candid and straightforward manner,
their testimonies bereft of tell-tale signs and the affectations and
artificialities of perjured or rehearsed witnesses.
34

The rule in the appellate process is that the trial court's determination on the issue
of the credibility of witnesses must be given great weight and respect, unless it
has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. The rationale for this is that the trial court is in a
much better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. It can thus easily detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not.
35
In the
instant case, we find no cogent reason to depart from this rule. The alleged ill-
motive or vindictiveness on the part of prosecution witnesses Fortes and Renon
were not proved. They are thus presumed not to have been actuated by any
improper motive.
36

Since unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was absent, the second
requisite for self-defense, which presupposes the presence of the first, cannot
logically exist.

The accused further failed to prove the third requisite of self-defense. On the
contrary, his own evidence discloses that minutes before the shooting incident,
the accused's daughter reminded the victim of the two empty beer bottles which
he borrowed from the accused's store, but the victim, who appeared drunk as
shown by his bloodshot eyes and "broken voice", arrogantly told her that no one
had yet shouted at him. Because of the victim's attitude, the accused told him to
return the empty bottles. The victim came back with the bottles which he
dropped on top of the table in the store shouting at the same time, "Eto na ang


bote. Wala na akong utang sa inyo na bote," which "irritated" the
accused.
37
When the victim left, the accused even remarked, "Pag hindi mo
hahabaan ang pasensiya mo dito kay Ato, mababaril mo."
38

Finally, his own version of how the shooting took place further befuddled his
belated claim that the victim himself pressed the trigger of the gun, thereby
suggesting that the latter accidentally fired the gun and killed himself. This is
belied by the physical evidence showing that the victim was shot from behind at
a distance since there were no contusions or gunpowder burns on the skin at the
point of entry of the bullet. The demonstration made by the accused in
court
39
further showed that it was physically impossible for the victim to have shot
himself, if indeed he was positioned in the manner demonstrated. The following
findings and observations of the trial court are well taken:
The vacillating and chamelonic stance of the Accused bespoke
of the unreliability of his testimony. It must be borne in mind that
when he testified before the Court, and as borne by his Necropsy
Report,Exhibit "B", Dr. Marcial Cenido averred that the trajectory of
the bullet which hit the back of the deceased was obliquely
forward, slightly downward and very slightly towards the lateral,
grazing the left lateral side of the 8th thoracic vertebra of the
deceased. If the muzzle of the gun was directed to the left side of
the body of the deceased when it fired, the deceased could not
have been hit or that if he was hit by the bullet from the gun, the
trajectory should have been directed towards well the left side of
the body of the deceased, and not obliquely forward, slightly
downward only and very slightly towards the lateral side.
On the other hand, if, as claimed by the Accused, his left palm
held the right palm of the deceased and pressed it against the
back of the deceased, the muzzle of the gun could not have
been directed towards the back of the deceased, but towards
the left side of the deceased. More, the deceased would have to
move his right hand outward from his back and from the waist and
bended his hand from his wrist towards his back which it would
have been extremely difficult if not impossible for the deceased to
do so considering that the right arm of the Accused was holding
the right arm of the deceased between the elbow and the wrist.
The scenario evolved by the Accused could not have happened
for another reason. According to Marcial Cenido, infra, he found
no contusion collar or gunpowder burns on the skin of the point of
entry of the bullet on the body of the deceased which meant that
the deceased must have twenty-four (24) inches away from the
muzzle of the gun thus belied the claim of the Accused that the


gun which was pressed against the back of the deceased when
the latter was shot and, on the other hand, corroborated the
testimony of Belen Fortes that the Accused shot the deceased at
a distance of about two (2) feet from the store.
40

The accused's contention that Dr. Cenido's testimony should not be considered
"as he is not a forensic expert on the matter" is untenable for before Dr. Cenido
gave his testimony, the accused's counsel admitted in open court "the
competency of the of witness as an expert witness."
41
Also, when the questioned
testimony was given, the defense did not make any objection thereto.
Finally, the accused's flight after the incident removes any remaining shred of
doubt on his guilt. His flight is fully established and his allegation of threats to his life
and to his family, rightly brushed aside by the trial court as unsubstantiated,
dubious, and hearsay, is simply a fabricated tale to cover up the naked fact of
his flight. Undeniably, his flight evidenced guilt.
42

Consequently, there is no room for the accused's plea for the application of the
"equipoise rule," invoking "Cruz[should be Corpuz] vs. People."
43
As Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz emphasized in the said case, the equipoise rule is applicable only
where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced; there is no such equipoise
if the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome
by the evidence of the defense.

The gravamen of the offense under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 is the possession of a firearm without a license and the use of such
unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder, which were alleged
in the amended information in this case. The evidence established beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused who had in his custody and possession the
firearm (Exhibit "P") had no license or permit to possess it and that he used it in
shooting to death Felipe Ramos, Jr.
The trial court thus correctly convicted the accused and imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua only, instead of the prescribed death penalty under the
second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. At the time the offense was
committed, the death penalty could not be imposed pursuant to Section 19 (1),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the awards for actual damages in the amounts of P50,000.00,
representing funeral expenses, although stipulated by the parties, and P50,000.00
as moral damages, which the parties left to the discretion of the trial court, are
improper and should be deleted for, although death had taken place, the
offense charged is illegal possession of firearm and the killing merely aggravated
it. No private interest is therefore involved. The civil liability arising from death may


be the subject of a separate civil action or impliedly instituted with the criminal
action for murder or homicide.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING, with the above
modification consisting of the deletion of the awards for actual and moral
damages, the challenged amended Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 45 dated 10 April 1992, in Criminal Case No. 91-95987.
Costs against accused Jesus Deunida y Enriquez.
SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes
1 Original Records (OR), Criminal Case No. 91-95987, 2; Criminal Case
No. 91-95988, 1.
2 Id., 18-21.
3 OR, Criminal Case No. 91-95987, 32.
4 Id., 33-35, citing Lazaro vs. People, 112 SCRA 430 [1982].
5 Id., 36-37.
6 OR, Criminal Case No. 91-95987, 144.
7 Id., 44.
8 There was an apparent confusion in the trial court for although the
information for murder was withdrawn, the subsequent orders, including
the decision, bear the two docket numbers, viz., Criminal Cases Nos. 91-
95987 and 95988, and because of the erroneous docket number for the
amended information, Criminal Case
no. 91-95987 ultimately became the case for illegal possession of firearms.
9 Order of 5 November 1991; OR, Criminal Case No. 91-95987, op. cit., 77.
Subsequent references to OR pertain to Criminal Case No. 91-95987.
10 TSN, 5 November 1991, 22.
11 Id., 22-23.
12 Id., 19.
13 Certification, Exhibit "M"; OR, 74.
14 OR, 57-76; 119.
15 Brief for the Appellee, 3-8; Rollo, 193-198.
16 Rollo, 108-109.
17 OR, 121-122.
18 Id., 113-140; Rollo, 16-42. Per Judge Romero J. Callejo.
19 OR, 143-172; Rollo, 59-87.
20 OR, 157-161.
21 Id., 174.
22 Rollo, 100-134.
23 Id., 103-104.
24 Rollo, 120-133.
25 112 SCRA 430 [1982].
26 182 SCRA 601 [1990].


27 198 SCRA 368 [1991].
28 208 SCRA 821 [1992].
29 People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 [1946]; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87
[1969]; People vs. Molina, 213 SCRA 52 [1992]; People vs. Ybeas, 213 SCRA
793 [1992]; People vs. Mindac, 216 SCRA 558 [1992].
30 People vs. Ybeas, supra., citing People vs. Paya-an, 84 SCRA 353 [1978];
Article 11 (1), Revised Penal Code; 1 RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, 132 (1987 ed.).
31 TSN, 4 February 1992, 4-6.
32 Id., 10-15.
33 TSN, 28 January 1992, 52.
34 OR, 130.
35 People vs. Pascual, 208 SCRA 393 [1992]; People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA
164 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992].
36 People vs. Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992].
37 TSN, 13 November 1991, 13-14.
38 Id., 33. "Ato" is the nickname of the victim.
39 TSN, 13 November 1991, 41-42.
40 OR, 164-165.
41 TSN, 5 November 1991, 2.
42 People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 177 [1992], citing People vs. Alegado,
25 Phil. 510 [1913].
43 194 SCRA 73 [1991].

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Atty. Edmund Turqueza

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