TITLE 8 - Criminal Law II Case Digests (The Revised Penal Code)

REVISED PENAL CODE:CRIMINAL LAW II CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina/2014
MALLARI v. CA
265 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 110569, December 9, 1996
Homicide / Illegal Possession of Firearms / Lawful Arrests / Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt

FACTS: On December 27, 1990, Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then assigned at the Capas Police
Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest for
Homicide in 1989, was seen at Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac. Immediately upon receipt of such information, with
personal knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant, they proceeded to Sta. Rita,
Capas, Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers surrounded the house of appellant and arrested him.
Thereupon, the arresting officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live
ammunition. He was brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to the chief investigator while
the homemade gun and live ammunition were endorsed to the property custodian.

At the time of the arrest and seizure of the gun and live ammunition, the officers did not have with them a search
and seize warrant. They did not possess the standing warrant arrest for the Homicide case as well. However, they
contended that they knew that there was a standing warrant of arrest. And at such, they did not possess the said
warrant because they were in a hurry that if they will wait for the warrant officer, they may not reach the accused
to effect his arrest immediately. When they returned to Capas Police Station, however, they reached the warrant
officer and the warrant was shown to Mallari.

After investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition.
The trial court and the CA found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunitions. He, however, insists that there was no standing warrant for his arrest, thereby making the
search and seizure invalid. He posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is fatal and renders the search and
seizure unlawful. He also claims that even assuming that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found in
his possession, the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license therefor and absent this essential element of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms, it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the search and seizure could be validly effected as it was done on the
occasion of a lawful warrantless arrest, particularly, while in the act of committing the crime of illegal possession of
firearms in the presence of the arresting officers. Also, the Office of the Solicitor General did not attempt to point
out any evidence on record of petitioners non-possession of a license or permit for there really is no such
evidence. It relied on the theory that as the firearm involved is a homemade gun or paltik and is illegal per se, it
could not have been the subject of license. This, according to the Solicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of
proving that petitioner had no license to possess the firearm.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the arresting officer needs to have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest
2.) Whether or not there is a need to prove that there is in fact no license to possess the firearm

HELD:

1.) No. The applicable provision is Section 7, Rule 113 which allows a police officer to effect arrest without
the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. The rule allows a police officer to effect arrest
without the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. Thus, appellants arrest being lawful, the
search and seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted without a warrant.
2.) Yes. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
elements thereof, (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. The latter is a
negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the
duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at
bench, the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from the PNP that petitioner was not a

licensee of the said firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of the crime of illegal possession. The absence of the foregoing is fatal to the
prosecution's case and renders petitioner's conviction erroneous.

The Court did not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun, it is
illegally manufactured and cannot be issued a license or permit, and is no longer necessary to prove that it is
unlicensed. This appears to be at first blush, a very logical proposition. However the Court did not yield to it
because nothing was said about such, that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that a
firearm is a paltik dispenses with proof that it is unlicensed. Hence, the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.

RATIO: Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. - When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant
the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him
or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof,
(a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

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PEOPLE v. CALING
208 SCRA 821, G.R. No. 94784, May 8, 1992
Homicide / Illegal Possession of Firearms

FACTS: On August 2, 1989, Emerchon Pua, a truck driver, was drinking beer and gin in front of his house, together
with Marcelino Alindayu, and four others. Emerchons brother, Raymundo Pua, was also there. It was while they
were thus occupied that another truck driver, Angelito Caling, arrived at the place, driving a truck, with Felino Neri.
Calings truck could not pass the road leading to his employers house because two of Emerchons own trucks,
were blocking the way. Caling asked Emerchon to move his trucks, but the latter said, "Sorry, the truck wont
start." Obviously irritated, Caling then roughly backed up his truck and took another road to his employers
residence. Not long afterwards, while at his employers house, Caling heard one of Emerchons trucks being
started. Believing they had been lied to and unnecessarily inconvenienced, Caling and Felino Neri decided to
confront Emerchon. Neri had with him an M-14 rifle.

Caling and Neri saw Emerchon in his truck. Caling forthwith went up the stepping or running board of the vehicle
and said to him: "Putang ina mo, pare, umaandar pala, sabi mo hindi umaandar, para kang hindi logger, pareho
tayo lahat loggers." Emerchon replied that the truck really would not start earlier, and he was unaccountably able
to start it then, "only by chance." At this point, two shots were heard from the rear of the truck, after which
Calings companion, Felino Neri, ran towards Emerchon stating the obvious, that he had a rifle. Caling allegedly
told Neri, "Banatan mo na, pare." Neri then fired at Emerchon, hitting him below the chest, on the left side of the
abdomen. Raymundo took hold of him, and rushed him to the Isabela Provincial Hospita. Nothing could however
be done for Emerchon. He expired from the bullet wounds inflicted on him, numbering two, according to the
physician who conducted the post-mortem examination.

The Trial Court found Calings guilt of the crime, as co-conspirator, and rendered judgment convicting Caling "as
co-principal of the special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided
for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended.


Caling has then appealed and attributes to the Trial Court the following errors: 1) failing to perceive that "the
evidence for the prosecution failed to establish all the essential elements of the crime charged"; and 2) "finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of illegal possession of unlicensed
firearm used in homicide."

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a special complex crime of Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in
Homicide

HELD: No. The Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there is such a thing as "the special complex crime of
Illegal Possession of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and defined under the 2nd paragraph of
Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and declaring Caling guilty thereof. What is penalized in the first paragraph,
insofar as material to the present case, is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among others, "unlawfully
possess any firearm . . . (or) ammunition . . ." Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary
permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is attached the penalty of reclusion temporal,
maximum, to reclusion perpetua. The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the fact of
possession of a firearm without license. The crime may be denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it
from its aggravated form. Now, if, "with the use of an unlicensed firearm," a "homicide or murder is committed,"
the crime is aggravated and is more heavily punished, with the capital punishment. It is aggravated if the
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of a homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. But the
homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of possession of the unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter
absorbed in the former. The mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates the crime under
PD 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is made heavier by the firearms use in a killing. The killing, whether
homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from the act of possession, and is separately punished and defined under
the Revised Penal Code. The use of an unlicensed firearm in the perpetration of a homicide or murder gives rise to
the crime of unlawful possession in its aggravated form, not the "special complex crime" of illegal possession with
homicide or murder. A prosecution for unlawful possession under PD 1866 can only result, assuming evidence of
guilt to be adequate, in a conviction for unlawful possession, simple or aggravated, not for homicide or murder.

In a prosecution for this offense, therefore, it is incumbent on the Government to prove, not only that the accused
was in possession of a firearm in this case, an M-14 rifle, but also that said accused had not first obtained a
license or permit therefor from the appropriate authorities. Notable in the proofs of the prosecution is (1) the
absence of any evidence to establish that Neris possession of the rifle was unlawful; i.e., no license or permit had
been first obtained therefor; and (2) the absence of the rifle itself. Of course, the actuality of Felino Neris
possession of a rifle, supposedly an M-14, cannot but be conceded, in view of the evidence. There is, however,
nothing in the record by which a conclusion of whether that rifle is unlicensed or not and therefore unlawfully
possessed or not - may be drawn. Given this indisputable circumstance, it is not possible to find either Neri or
Caling guilty of unlawful possession of the weapon. If the crime of simple unlawful possession of firearm cannot be
ascribed to Caling or Neri, a fortiori, the offense of unlawful possession in its aggravated form cannot be imputed
to them.

RATIO: "SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition
or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be
imposed."

The elements of the offense of what may be denominated "simple illegal possession" under PD 1866 are two: (a)
possession of a firearm or ammunition, and (b) lack or absence of prior license or permit to possess the same.

---


PEOPLE v. MOLINA
292 SCRA 742, G.R. No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998
Murder with Special Aggravating Circumstance of Using Unlicensed Firearms

FACTS: On August 14, 1989, at Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Ilagan, Province of Isabela, a shooting
incident, reportedly between two political factions, resulted in the death of a town mayor, a Sangguniang Bayan
member and two others; and the wounding of at least six other persons after a heated conversation at a funeral
wake. The accused, had in their respective possessions the following firearms, to wit: Veriato Molina - an M-14
armalite rifle; Ruben Molina - a cal. 38 revolver; Gregorio Gajas, Casimiro Castillo and Jesus Ariola - M-16 armalite
rifles; and John Doe, Richard Doe, Michael Doe, and Mark Doe - M-16 armalite rifles and a cal. 30 garand rifle,
which were loaded with their corresponding ammunitions, without the necessary license and/or authority to
possess and carry the said firearms and ammunitions outside their residence issued by the corresponding
government authorities, and which they used in the shooting and killing of Mayor Bonifacio Uy, Municipal
Councilor Antonio Manaligod, Jaime Vargas, and Policarpio Estrada, and the serious wounding of Manuel Mariano,
Andres Figarola, Moises de la Cruz, and Wilma Acierto with intent to kill, treachery, abuse of superiority and with
the aid of armed men and of nocturnity.

The trial court further concluded that the crime committed was multiple murder and frustrated murder qualified
by treachery, abuse of superior strength and use of armed men. The lower court also found both accused-
appellants guilty of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. Evidence recovered from the crime scene
included a Smith and Wesson revolver (.38 caliber), bearing SN (Serial Number) C617376, and six spent shells
which were found by the NBI to have been fired from the aforementioned revolver. The Firearms and Explosives
Unit in Camp Crame, Quezon City, certified that said revolver had been issued to Veriato Molina of Amulung,
Cagayan; and that Ruben Molina was likewise a licensed holder of a registered revolver, Orohm Caliber .22, with
SN 232904. Neither appellant, however, had a permit to carry any firearm outside his residence.

Upon conviction by the trial court, Veriato and his uncle Ruben, filed their Notice of Appeal on several assignment
of errors upon the trial court, two of which are on the Multiple Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder Cases and
on the Illegal Possession of Firearms Case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases

HELD: In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and (2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the
firearm, did not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same outside his residence.

Both elements have been indubitably proven by the prosecution. Witnesses categorically stated that both
appellants held firearms during the incident -- Veriato, an M-14; and Ruben, a handgun. Recovered from the scene
of the crime were a revolver, which was later confirmed as registered in the name of Appellant Veriato Molina, and
spent shells expelled from it as well as from other high-caliber weapons. Neither of the appellants, though both
registered owners of handguns, was legally authorized to carry such gun outside his residence, according to a
certification issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit. Neither was Appellant Veriato authorized to possess
an M-14 rifle, the weapon he used in killing Bonifacio Uy. Obviously, the use of an M-14 rifle was unauthorized
because this weapon cannot be licensed in favor of, nor carried by, private individuals. With these pieces of
evidence, appellants should be held liable for violation of Sec. 1 of PD 1866. Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada,
violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder; appellants should perforce be culpable for two separate
offenses, as ruled by the trial court.

Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense.
Thus, the unauthorized use of a weapon which has been duly licensed in the name of its owner/possessor may still
aggravate the resultant crime. In the case at bar, although appellants may have been issued their respective
licenses to possess firearms, their carrying of such weapons outside their residences and their unauthorized use

thereof in the killing of Bonifacio Uy may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in imposing the proper
penalty for murder.

All in all, appellants may be held liable only for murder with the special aggravating circumstance of using
unlicensed firearms. Nevertheless, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon appellants, since the killing
occurred in August 1989, when the imposition of the capital penalty was still proscribed by the Constitution.
Appellants Veriato Molina and Ruben Molina are found guilty of murder for the death of Bonifacio Uy with the
special aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms.

RATIO: While affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for the murder of the late Mayor Bonifacio Uy, the
Court applies in their favor Republic Act No. 8294, which amended PD No. 1866. Under the new law, the use of
an unlicensed weapon in the commission of homicide or murder is considered simply as an aggravating
circumstance and no longer a separate offense. Thus, said law effectively modified the courts ruling in People
vs. Quijada, in which it was held that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate crimes -
one, for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and, two, for homicide or murder.

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PEOPLE v. BORROMEO
G.R. No. 61873, October 31, 1984
Parricide

FACTS: On July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada,
mother of Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old
Matilde Taborada told the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango
plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father and together they went to Susana's
hut. The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall
where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was crying.
Elias Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.

Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officers arrived. The peace officers
shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would
open the door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side. When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble
incoherent words. The trial court then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in holding as it did that appellant and Susana
Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when the officiating
priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed on the occasion or later on; hence, the
accused could only be liable for homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide

HELD: Yes. In his testimony, accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate
wife. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of
decency and law. And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not
invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.


RATIO: The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known in law. The law presumes morality,
and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption that
persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other.

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PEOPLE v. WAGAS
171 SCRA 69, G.R. No. 61704, March 8, 1989
Parricide

FACTS: On April 30, 1982, the deceased Victoria Wagas, her sister Felisca, and one Paulita, were sitting outside the
house of Berta Banis, talking about the strawberry plantation where they had picked berries that morning.
Suddenly, the accused, Nuepe Wagas, appeared before them, then slapped Victorias right cheek, and thereupon,
Nuepe pulled out a knife from his pocket. The women scampered away, shouting for help. As Felisca ran, she
looked back and saw that her sister Victoria had fallen into a canal and that Nuepe stabbed her twice.

Victorias brother, Lamor, who had been chopping firewood, heard the shouts of the women. He ran towards
where Felisca stood, and he saw Victoria sprawled on her back and bleeding, while Nuepe was standing about
seven to eight meters away from her. Lamor went after Nuepe but the latter ran away. He returned to pick up
Victoria and then rushed her to the Baguio General Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. After
Victoria was brought to the hospital, Nuepe went to their house. When the policemen arrived, they found the
accused sitting inside the bathroom, with the kitchen knife stained with fresh blood which he had purportedly
used to stab his wife to death and an empty bottle of poison (Folidol) on his side. The policemen got him.

Nuepe was then convicted of parricide. The accused did not deny the killing of his spouse. His defense was that the
killing had been committed under exceptional circumstances. He claimed that on that fateful day of April 30, he
arrived home after selling strawberries in the market, to find Victoria and a certain Jacinto Solano in the master
bedroom, engaged in what seemed to him like a sexual act. In a fit of fury, he allegedly rushed to the kitchen and
armed himself with a knife purportedly to protect himself from the man he caught with his wife and who looked
stronger than himself. When he returned to the bedroom, Jacinto had dressed up and had gone out through the
window. Giving chase and still failing to catch Jacinto, he decided to return home to confront his wife.

He, however, found her not at the family abode, but at the house of Berta Banis. He said he asked her why she had
gone to bed with another man, but she only infuriated him when she revealed her plan to separate from him.
Hearing that, Nuepe slapped his wife. She ran away, but he followed her to a slope where both of them rolled
downhill. Then he noticed that blood was gushing from Victorias chest. Still clutching his knife, he went home and
closeted himself in the bathroom where he broke down and cried and was later found by the police.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of causing the death of a person under exceptional circumstances is tenable

HELD: No. Article 247 prescribes the essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. The death caused must be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by
the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery. (It can be vice-versa, the wife killing the husband.)
In the instant case, there was failure of the defense to prove the alleged discovery of the sexual congress between
Victoria and Jacinto Solano. On the contrary, witnesses for the prosecution testified that Victoria had been with
them picking berries all morning of that fateful day. Nothing in the record of this case did the court find any basis
for doubting this testimonial evidence and not appreciating it as sufficient proof of the fact of Victorias absence
from their house all morning of April 30, 1981. The improbability of the claimed adulterous rendezvous is thus
apparent. In effect, the uncorroborated testimony of Nuepe that his wife committed the ultimate act of infidelity
was successfully rebutted. His defense, therefore, has no leg to stand on.


RATIO: The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is
strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a
purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto;
and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only
during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

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PEOPLE v. ABARCA
153 SCRA 735, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances

FACTS: On July 15, 1984, upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of
sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The
accused went to look for a firearm. He went to the house of C2C Arturo Talbo and got Talbo's firearm, an M-16
rifle, and went back to his house. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong
session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
three times with his rifle. Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the
room where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused. Kingsley Koh died
instantaneously as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen. Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet. His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the
hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments. The trial court then found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.

The accused then contended that the trial court erred in convicting him for the crime charged instead of entering a
judgment of conviction under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case
2) Whether or not the accused is liable for the injuries suffered by third persons

HELD:

1) Yes. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the
shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant.
The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit the
killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by
external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
2) No. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done
amounts to a felony. But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not
committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. The court cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder
for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

RATIO: There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the
act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.

Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the accused-
appellant of murder, therefore erred.

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PEOPLE v. MILAGROS MABANSAG
G.R. No. L-46293, January 30, 1984
Parricide

FACTS: Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City) - The court a quo rendered judgment finding Milagros Calma
Mabansag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide. The evidence for the prosecution has been
summarized in the People's brief, in that the accused had illicit relations with her co-accused Tiburcio Caparaz, to
whom she had a bigamous marriage with. The accused sought the services of violent men, accused Pagsibigan and
Peralta, to kill her husband, Francisco Mabansag, for a price. Tiburcio Caparaz was later on discharged from the
information to become a state witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of a co-accused against another accused is probable rendering the former
credible

HELD: Yes. As stated above, the court has testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz. In a sense, his testimony was tainted with
treachery against his co-accused Mabansag with whom he had illicit relations and with whom he was married
against accused Pagsibigan and Peralta who appeared to be violent men of whom he should be afraid, and against
Aguilar, his own compadre. It is for this reason that the court as shown above had to very examine this testimony
and to a whether it finds support on other corroborating evidence, testimony and document There is sti ll,
however, one point that ought to be considered. Are the circumsatnces narrated by Tiburcio Caparaz probable?
For not only must the evidence come from an able witness, but the evidence must demonstrate Probabilities and
not improbabilities. The instant case, as established by the testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz presents this situation:
Accused Mabansag is faced with a criminal prosecution by her husband, Fransisco Mabansag, for adultery or
bigamy in view of her illicit relations with Tiburcio Caparaz and her marriage (bigamous) to him. She is determined
to stop Francisco Mabansag from filing a case against her. No woman would like to face a criminal suit. What is
more natural than to approach her paramour and disclose to him her plan to kill Francisco Mabansag. She is able
to obtain the services of accused Pagsibigan and Peralta. Her choice is well made, for these men are violent men
(who later on are to die violent deaths). The plan to liquidate Francisco Mabansag is laid down for money
consideration. There is nothing more common than killers for money. The habits and movements of Francisco
Mabansag are studied. Killing is a serious business. For some reason or another, no occasion presents the right
time and place to execute the plan. Circumstances are not always within the control Of the paid assassins. Then
comes March 31, 1959, and all the four conspirators, Tiburcio Caparaz, accused Mabansag, accused Peralta.
accused Pagsibigan and accused Aguilar successfully kill Fransisco Mabansag. The court finds nothing improbable in
this series of events or circumstances attested to by the testimony of Tiburcio Caparaz.

RATIO: The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that "the matter of assigning value to declarations at the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimony in the light of the defendants demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby
placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. The findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed for the trial judge is in a better position to appreciate
the same, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying during the trial, unless there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; in
the case at bar, there is no such showing.

---

PIMENTEL v. MA. PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010
Parricide

FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed an action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito R. Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On February 7, 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On February 11 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question in a criminal case for parricide

HELD: No. The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In
this case, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such,
the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action
was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal case. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The relationship between the offender and
the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the
civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed
the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed
all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in the
civil case is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of
the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still
be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.

RATIO: Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial
Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.


---

PEOPLE v. OYANIB
G.R. No. 130634-35, March 12, 2001
Homicide / Parricide

FACTS: In 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita Oyanib decided to live separately. Manolito
retained custody of their two children. Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all
efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito. In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in front of
Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging
bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and
reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.

In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan
City National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two subjects and invited his parents to
a meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day,
Manolito went to Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. Upon reaching Titas rented
place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting
knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were
down to his knees.

Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. The suddenness of the
assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed
Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle.
She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake."

In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him
again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he
stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed her three more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the
lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared
from the ground floor and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he
had nothing to do with it. Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan
City and stayed at the wake of his friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her
paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for
Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to
surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City.
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wifes place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-
defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him
so they could live together.

After trial, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of Homicide and Parricide to which he interposed an appeal with the Supreme Court to entitle him to the
exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code

HELD: Yes. Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstances
provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the facts and the
evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of
the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically
showed that Jesus pants were wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any

underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual
intercourse. Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to
the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his
wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. Accused must prove
these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death caused
must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act
of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery." There is no
question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove
to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to
have acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, cccused-
appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He
saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, Accused stabbed
Jesus who fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of
him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib
surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

RATIO: The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to
avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even
with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be justified when the
unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so much so
that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

---

US v. ALANO
32 Phil. 381; 383-384, G.R. No. L- 11021, December 1, 1915

FACTS: Accused Alano, feeling tired, went to bed, while his wife remained at the window looking out and a little
while afterward told her husband that she would go down for a moment to the Chinese store nearby, which she
did.

As Teresa Marcelo was slow in returning and her sick child was crying, Eufrasio Alano left the house to look for her
in the Chinese store situated on the corner of Calles Dakota and Tennessee, and, not finding her there, went to
look for her in another Chinese store nearby, with the same result. He therefore started to return home through
an alley where he tripped on a wire lying across the way. He then observed as he stopped that among some grass
near a clump of thick bamboo a man was lying upon a woman in a position to hold sexual intercourse with her, but
they both hurriedly arose from the ground, startled by the noise made by the defendant in stumbling. Alano at
once recognized the woman as his wife, for whom he was looking, and the man as Martin Gonzalez, who
immediately started to run. He was wearing an undershirt and a pair of drawers, which lower garment he held and
pulled up as he ran. Enraged by what he had seen, the defendant drew a fan-knife he had in his pocket and
pursued Martin Gonzalez, although he did not succeed in overtaking him, and, not knowing where he had filed,
returned to the house, where he found his wife Teresa in the act of climbing the stairs. He then reprimanded her
for her disgraceful conduct and immediately stabbed her several times, although she finally succeeded in entering
the house, pursued by her husband and fell face downwards on the floor near the place where a sick woman

Ricarda Garces was lying. The latter on seeing this occurrence, began to scream and started to run, as did also
Teresa Marcelo who had arisen and gone down the stairs out of the house; but her infuriated husband again
assaulted her and when she reached the ground she fell on one of the posts beside the stairs. When the defendant
saw her fall, he entered the house, took some clothes and started out in the direction of Fort McKinley.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused killed her wife immediately thereafter the act of sexual intercourse to entitle
him to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

HELD: Yes. The unfaithful wife was not killed in the very place where she was caught, for the reason that the
wronged husband preferred first to attack the despoiler of his honor and afterwards the adulterous wife who
succeeded in getting away from the place where she was caught with her paramour. The assault upon the woman
must be understood to be a continuation of the act of the wronged husband's pursuit of her paramour, who had
the good fortune to escape and immediately get away from the place of the crime. Consequently, although the
deceased did not fall dead in the place where she was caught, but in another place nearby, logically it must be
understood that the case at bar comes within the provisions of the said article.

The discovery, the escape, the pursuit and the killing must all form part of one continuous act.

RATIO: For a husband to be justified, it is not necessary that he sees the carnal act being committed by his wife
with his own eyes. It is enough that he surprises them under such circumstances as to show reasonably that the
carnal act is being committed or has just been committed.

---

PEOPLE v. GONZALES
69 Phil. 66, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939

FACTS: At the trial, the appellant testified that, on June 2, 1938, on returning to his house from the woods, he
surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo Evangelio in the act, told her that the man was the very one who
used to ask rice and food from them, and counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His wife, promised
him not to do the act again. Thereafter - the accused continued testifying - he left the house and went towards the
South to see his carabaos. Upon returning to his house at above five o'clock in the afternoon, and not finding his
wife there, he looked for her and found her with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place covered with
underbush, who was standing and buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels. The accused went after
him, but unable to overtake him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely obfuscated, attacked her with
a knife without intending to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her dead body to his house. The
Court of First Instance of Tayabas found him guilty of parricide.

The appellant contends that, having surprised his wife, in the afternoon of the date in question, under
circumstances indicative that she had carnal intercourse with Isabelo, he was entitled to the privilege afforded by
article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail himself of Article 247

HELD: No. The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid article, because the privilege there granted is
conditioned on the requirement that the spouse surprise the husband or the wife in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act or carnal intercourse, but
after the act, if any such there was, because from the fact that she was rising up and the man was buttoning his
drawers, it does not necessarily follow that a man and a woman had committed the carnal act.

The court cannot entirely accept the defense sought to be established by the accused, first, because his testimony
is improbable. It is not conceivable that the accused had only mildly counseled his wife not to repeat committing

adultery with Isabelo, instead of taking harsher measures as is natural in such circumstances, if it were true that he
had surprised the two offender in the act of adultery on returning to his house on the date in question. Secondly,
because even assuming that the accused caught his wife rising up and Isabelo cannot invoke the privilege of article
247 of the Revised Penal Code, because he did not surprise the supposed offenders in the very act of committing
adultery, but thereafter, if the respective positions of the woman and the man were sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that they had committed the carnal act.

RATIO: Article 247 is not applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with
another person.

---

PEOPLE v. BITUANAN
56 Phil. 23, G.R. No. 34510, October 31, 1939

FACTS: Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by Datu Alon according to Moro customs and usages.
According to the same customs and usages, the Datu divorced the couple. Twenty days afterwards, Bituanan
caught Sabay and a Moro by the name of Ali Sabpa sleeping on the same bed. Thereupon, Bituanan attacked Ali
Sabpa and Sabay, killing the former and wounding the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 247 can be applied in the case

HELD: No. The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion,
was valid. This is so because of the nature of the provisions of the Philippines, as prescribed by statute, are two
only adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband, as determined by a proper
court. Granting, without necessarily having to decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were, accordingly, not legally
divorced, it only need be said that there is no evidence in the record showing that Bituanan surprised Sabay and Ali
Sabpa in the act of adultery when he killed the latter. The privilege given in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
extends solely to the case of a husband who surprises his wife in the act of actual adultery, that is, actual carnal
knowledge with her paramour. As an example, the article does not apply to a husband who catches his wife
sleeping with another man on the same bed.

RATIO: The phrase in the act of committing sexual intercourse does not include merely sleeping on the same
bed. Article 247 is not applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with
another person.

---

PEOPLE v. CALIJAN
226 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 94592, September 28, 1993
Murder / Homicide

FACTS: Intoxicated with alcohol, Ruben Calijan with Arnolfo Baya, enroute home, passed the house of Gregorio
Belnas, the landlord of Arnolfo. Standing at the front yard, Ruben called out to Gregorio: "Nong, let us smoke."

After a brief while, Gregorio came down bringing with him a lighted kerosene lamp and some tobacco leaves for
smoking. They all sat down on a bench by a bamboo table near a stove in the kitchen contiguous to the main
house. Arnolfo and Gregorio sat side by side, with Ruben facing them. They smoked for ten minutes. Then, for no
apparent reason, Ruben stood up saying, "Nong Gorio, you want to be killed?" Completely taken aback, the 55-
year old Gregorio could only mutter: "I have not done any offense against you, Ruben, because we have not
quarreled with each other." Ruben replied, "If I want to kill you, I may kill you now."


Arnolfo tried to pacify Ruben saying, "Dong, do not do that; Dong, let us go home." But Ruben could not be
dissuaded. Arnolfo stepped back and Gregorio ran towards the door. But Ruben, being much younger, was quicker.
He overtook Gregorio, held his left hand and stabbed him on his left chest with the hunting knife he had. The stab
wound proved to be fatal. Gregorio died of hemorrhage that same night. Seeing the fallen Gregorio, Arnolfo ran
away.

The ensuing events were witnessed by Edwin Baya, brother of Arnolfo. Edwin recounted that between 11:00
oclock and 12:00 oclock midnight of 30 June 1989, Ruben went to his (Edwin) house and asked him, "Dong, come
with me because Gregorio is already dead." So, together they repaired to the house of Gregorio. Pointing to the
prostrate victim, Ruben told Edwin to lift him because they were going to throw the cadaver into the Sicopong
River. Edwin refused but Ruben threatened him with the hunting knife. After disposing of the corpse, Ruben and
Edwin went to the house of Rubens relative, Walter Calijan, and both slept there. Edwin heard Ruben admitting to
the wife of Walter that he (Ruben) killed Gregorio. Edwin left the following morning and reported the incident to a
CAFGU member who then formed a team to arrest Ruben and turn him over to the police. The trial court then
declared Ruben guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

In his appeal, he prays that he be adjudged guilty but only for homicide because there was neither treachery nor
evident premeditation that attended the killing, contrary to the conclusion of the lower court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder

HELD: No. After a careful assessment of the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
appreciating treachery and evident premeditation as having qualified the crime to murder. Consequently, the
killing of Gregorio Belnas was simple homicide aggravated by scoffing at the corpse and mitigated on the other
hand by intoxication that was not habitual. It was emphasized that aggravating circumstances, especially those
which qualify criminal responsibility, must be proved indubitably as the crime itself. Mere presumptions or
inferences are never enough.

In the absence of other notorious acts evincing his determination to murder Gregorio, known premeditation in the
instant case cannot be deduced from the mere fact that six (6) hours before he stabbed Gregorio to death, Ruben
took the hunting knife of Gerry. There is nothing in the records to show that there was enmity between the two
and it is not for the Court to conjecture that there was. Indeed, it is foolhardy for us to draw from this single act a
cold-blooded intention to take the life of another. We simply characterize the killing as spur-of-the-moment,
induced by that degree of intoxication which then triggered off the bellicosity in Ruben who, incidentally, is known
in the community as an ex-convict and a killer. Indeed, as disclosed by Arnolfo, before they left Felipes place,
Ruben got into a tiff with fellow "hantak" players because after a particular game, Ruben forcibly gathered all the
bets amounting to P40.00. Quite obviously, Ruben was in a not-so-pleasant mood that night and was just itching to
pick a quarrel with anyone. It just so happened that Gregorio got the full brunt of it, resulting in his violent death.
Neither was there treachery, given the open confrontation between the aggressor and the victim moments before
the actual stabbing. This placed Gregorio on guard because he actually attempted to escape by running towards
the door; only he was overtaken by Ruben. The court a quo likewise took into account the "aggravating
circumstance of adding ignominy on the victim by throwing his cadaver (into) the river." Strictly speaking, the act
of disposing of a cadaver into the river did not make the crime more shameful nor add to the victims moral
suffering since it was done after death had occurred and intended more to conceal the effects of the felony. The
correct aggravating circumstance to be appreciated is scoffing at the corpse of the deceased, as provided in Art.
248, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code, which is a qualifying circumstance. However, since this attendant
circumstance was not expressly alleged in the Information, but only proved at the trial, it should be treated merely
as a generic aggravating circumstance.

---


PEOPLE v. BUTLER
120 SCRA 281, G.R. No. L-50276, January 27, 1983
Murder

FACTS: Michael Butler, an American Negro serving as a seaman in the U.S. Navy since February 3,1975 (he was
born on September 4, 1957), committed murder on August 8, 1975 when he killed a hostess, Enriquita Alipo, a
Filipina, in her residence in Olongapo City, as proven by his extrajudicial confession which was corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti. The confession was admissible in evidence, although it was taken during custodial
interrogation, when Butler was not assisted by counsel, because he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived
in writing his constitutional rights to have counsel and to remain silent.

Butler's confession shows that the murder was qualified by abuse of superiority. It was not aggravated by the
circumstance of outraging or scoffing at her person or corpse. The trial court appreciated that aggravating
circumstance because of the testimony of Doctor Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, that Butler had anal
intercourse with the victim after her death. Doctor Roxas based his conclusion on the fact that the victim's anus
was partly open and contained spermatozoa. He said that the anus would have completely closed had the
intercourse occurred while the victim was still alive. The trial court conjectured that "Butler not satisfied with a
normal vaginal intercourse demanded from the deceased (hospitality girl) an anal intercourse. Upon being refused,
the accused infuriated into a demonic frenzy, took hold of a saint figurine, knocked his victim unconscious,
smothered her to death with a pillow and after she was dead, performed anal coitus with the dead person."

Butler contends that the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating
circumstances of treachery and scoffing at the corpse of the victim.

HELD: Yes. The Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that the accused is physically stronger
than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must be proved. The Court said that the essence of this
circumstance is that advantage is taken by the offender of this physical strength which is relatively superior to that
of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its existence.

In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court holds that there was an
abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of height
that the accused had over his hapless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft
11 inches tall, but also fits strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving
her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong
and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she
may have taken to defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced
us to find and rule that the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.

The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended the
commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the
accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we
started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting
on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the figurine was found broken
beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of
intracranial hemorrhage.

While the court rejected the presence of treachery, it, however, found and sustained the finding of the lower court
that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the
accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal

intercourse with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the
presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and
confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the
accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

RATIO: A guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior strength has been laid down. The
court ruled that to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion
to the means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should always be considered
whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission
of the crime. To properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the
protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to
analyze the incidents and episodes constituting the total development of the event.

---

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REVISED PENAL CODE:CRIMINAL LAW II CASES AND DOCTRINES, Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina/2014

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