MONROY V.

CA | Bengzon, 1967

FACTS
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas,
Rizal, he filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the
first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections with the COMELEC.
Three days later petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate
of candidacy. COMELEC approved the withdrawal
respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took
his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner
had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of
candidacy
in a suit for injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents
Court of First Instance held that (a) the former had ceased to be
mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed
on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became
municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on
September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual
damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor
from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office.
on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE
WON Monroy was a de facto officer entitled to mayoralty salaries from
the time he withdrew his candidacy.

HELD/RATIO
NO. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office,
other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered
resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The forfeiture is automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat
is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment
can restore the ousted official.
The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily
render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal
effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be
subsequently withdrawn.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Court of Appeals erred in
affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay
respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he
was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the
date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support of this
he relies solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan
holding that a senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed
office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is a de facto
officer during the time he held the office of senator, and can retain
the emoluments received even as against the successful protestant
Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's finding that he
was a de facto officer when he continued occupying the office of
mayor after September 15, 1961.
Rodriguez case is not applicable here for absence of factual and legal
similarities. The Rodriguez case involved a senator who had been
proclaimed as duly elected, assumed the office and was
subsequently ousted as a result of an election contest
But the case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official
who will be ousted because of an election contest. The present case
for injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office
of municipal mayor by the incumbent occupant thereof and the
claim to that office by the vice mayor because of the operation of Sec.
27 of the Rev. Election Code.
It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public
office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the
latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered
into the office in good faith and under color of title" that applies in
the present case.
the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of
the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the
public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons
discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.
A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk
and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever
amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful
retention of the public office


CUEVAS V. BACAL | Mendoza, 2000

FACTS
Josefina G. Bacal passed the Career Executive Service Examinations.
She was conferred CES eligibility and was appointed Regional
Director of the Public Attorneys Office. She was later appointed by
President Fidel V. Ramos to the rank of CESO III.
She was designated by the Secretary of Justice as Acting Chief Public
Attorney which was confirmed by President Ramos.
Carina J. Demaisip was appointed chief public defender by
President Joseph Estrada. Another appointment paper was issued
by the President on July 6, 1998 designating petitioner Demaisip as
chief public defender (formerly chief public attorney) while, Bacal
appointed Regional Director, Public Defenders Office.
Bacal filed a petition for quo warranto questioning her replacement
as Chief Public Attorney CA: ruled in Bacals favor.

ISSUE
WON Bacals transfer amounted to a removal without cause.

HELD/RATIO
NO. Josefina G. Bacal is a CESO III and that the position of Regional
Director of the PAO, to which she was transferred, corresponds to her
CES Rank Level III and Salary Grade 28. This was her position before her
appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney of the PAO, which
requires a CES Rank Level I for appointment thereto. If she was paid a
salary equivalent to Salary Grade 30 while she was holding that office, it
was only because, under the law, if a CESO is assigned to a position with
a higher salary grade than that corresponding to his/her rank, he/she
will be allowed the salary of the CES position.
Appointments, assignments, reassignments, and transfers in the
Career Executive Service are based on rank. On this point, the
Integrated Reorganization Plan cannot be any clearer. It provides:
As to appointments: an incumbent who holds a permanent
appointment to a position embraced in the Career Executive Service
shall continue to hold his position, but may not advance to a higher
class of position in the Career Executive Service unless or until he
qualifies for membership in the Career Executive Service. As to
Assignments, Reassignments and Transfers: members of the Service
shall be assigned to occupy positions as may be identified by the
Board on the basis of the members functional expertise.
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment
of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES
eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through
a formal Board Resolution after an evaluation of the examinees
performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.
Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other
requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES
position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank.
Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the
recommendation of the Board.
The appropriate CESO rank to which a CES eligible may be appointed
depends on two major qualification criteria, namely: (1) level of
managerial responsibility; and, (2) performance.
Further, security of tenure in the career executive service is thus
acquired with respect to rank and not to position.
Within the Career Executive Service, personnel can be shifted from
one office or position to another without violation of their right to
security of tenure because their status and salaries are based on
their ranks and not on their jobs. Mobility and flexibility in the
assignment of personnel, the better to cope with the exigencies of
public service, is the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive
Service.
The implementing rules and regulations of the CES Board provide:
Salary of Career Executive Service Officers. A CESO is compensated
according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the CES position he
occupies. However, if a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a
higher salary grade than that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive
the salary of the CES position.
Should he be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower
salary grade, he shall continue to be paid the salary attached to his
CES rank.
Petitioners are, therefore, right in arguing that respondent, "as a
CESO, can be reassigned from one CES position to another and from
one department, bureau or office to another. Further, respondent, as
a CESO, can even be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with
a lower salary grade. In the instant case, respondent, who holds a
CES Rank III, was correctly and properly appointed by the
appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position
which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III."
Indeed, even in the other branches of the civil service, the rule is
that, unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station,
he can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office. This rule
has been applied to such appointments as Director III or Director IV
or Attorney IV or V in the Civil Service Commission since the
appointments are not to specified offices but to particular ranks;
Election Registrars; Election Officers, also in the Commission on
Elections; and Revenue District Officers in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Reiterating the principle in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, this Court
said:. . . The rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to
security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not
merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not
proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that
empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the
employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency.
The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel
management to harness the abilities of employees to promote
optimum public service cannot be objected to. . . .
Respondent's appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney
was merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent
transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same office, which
corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion,
much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the
Constitution.
Finally. Justice Puno makes much of the fact that petitioner Carina J.
Demaisip is not a CES eligible. Suffice it to say the law allows in
exceptional cases the appointment of non-CES eligibles provided
that the appointees subsequently pass the CES Examinations. Thus
Part III, Chap. I, Art. IV, par. 5 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan
provides that the President may, in exceptional cases, appoint any
person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that
such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career
Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to
a higher class until he qualified in such examination.

DISPOSITIVE
CA reversed.








































FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS | Feliciano, 1995

FACTS
Petitioners Salvador C. Fernandez and Anicia M. de Lima assail the
validity of Resolution No. 94-3710 of the Civil Service Commission
("Commission") and the authority of the Commission to issue the
same.
Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving
as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at
the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City,
Metropolitan Manila
Resolution No. 94-3710, signed by public respondents Patricia A.
Sto. Tomas and Ramon Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner,
respectively, of the Commission, was issued on 7 June 1994, stating:
". . . as an independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises...
Chairman Sto. Tomas, when apprised of objections of petitioners,
expressed the determination of the Commission to implement
Resolution No. 94-3710 unless restrained by higher authority
Petitioners then instituted this Petition

ISSUE
(1) WON the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of
Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel
Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to
form the RDO [Research and Development Office].
(2) WON Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional
right to security of tenure.

RATIO:
(1) YES. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292 dated 25 July 1987) sets out, in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A,
Chapter 3, the internal structure and organization of the
Commission. Sec. 16 enumerates the Offices in the Commission. Sec.
17 describes the Organizational Structure--...As an independent
constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in the
organization as the need arises.
The OCSS, OPIA and OPR, and as well each of the other Offices listed
in Section 16 consist of aggrupation of Divisions, each of which
Divisions is in turn a grouping of Sections. Each Section, Division
and Office comprises a group of positions within the agency called
the Civil Service Commission. Thus, each Office is an internal
department or organizational unit within the Commission and that
accordingly, the OCSS, OPIA and OPR, as well as all the other Offices
within the Commission constitute administrative subdivisions of
the CSC.
What Resolution No. 94-3710 did was to re-arrange some of the
administrative units within the Commission and, among other
things, merge three (3) of them (OCSS, OPIA and OPR) to form a
new grouping called the "Research and Development Office (RDO)."
It also re-allocated certain functions moving some functions from
one Office to another
The objectives sought by the Resolution: effect[ing] changes in the
organization to streamline [the Commission's] operations and
improve delivery of service."
The changes introduced and formalized through Resolution No. 94-
3710 are precisely the kind of internal changes which are referred
to in Section 17 (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3) of the 1987
Revised Administrative Code) as "changes in the organization" of
the Commission.
Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the
"abolition" of public offices, something that may be done only by the
same legislative authority, which had created those public offices in
the first place. However, the term "public office" is frequently used
to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be
exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public.
(2) NO. Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as
that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note
that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution
No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination
of the relationship of public employment between the Commission
and any of its officers and employees.
The 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen
(14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, did not mean
to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal
organization of the Commission until it might please Congress to
change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing
needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative
authority had expressly authorized the Commission to carry out
"changes in the organization," "as the need [for such changes]
arises."
To the second claim of petitioners that their right to security of
tenure was breached by the respondent's in promulgating
Resolution No. 94-3710 and ordering petitioners' assignment to the
Commission's Regional Offices in Regions III and V, firstly, the
appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to
a specified public office but rather appointments to particular
positions or ranks. The petitioners were each appointed to the
position of Director IV, without specification of any particular office
or station.
Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised
Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management
prerogative vested in the Commission and, for that matter, in any
department or agency of government embraced in the civil service
(Reassignment= An employee may be re-assigned from one
organizational unit to another in the same agency; Provided, That
such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status and
salary.")
The reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
previous positions in OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research
and Development Office (RDO) in the Central Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila and their subsequent
assignment from the RDO to the Commission's Regional Offices in
Regions V and III had been effected with express statutory authority
and did not constitute removals without lawful cause. It also follows
that such re-assignment did not involve any violation of the
constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure considering
that they retained their positions of Director IV and would continue
to enjoy the same rank, status and salary at their new assigned
stations, which they had enjoyed at the Head Office of the
Commission in Metropolitan Manila. Petitioners had not, in other
words, acquired a vested right to serve at the Commission's Head
Office.
The rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to
the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer
involved is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station.
In default of any particular station stated in their respective
appointments, no security of tenure can be asserted by the
petitioners on the basis of the mere assignments, which were given
to them. A contrary rule will erase altogether the demarcation line
we have repeatedly drawn between appointment and assignment as
two distinct concepts in the law of public officers.
The reassignment of petitioners Fernandez and de Lima from their
stations in the OPIA and OPR, respectively, to the Research
Development Office (RDO) and from the RDO to the Commissions'
Regional Offices in Regions V and III, respectively, without their
consent, did not constitute a violation of their constitutional right to
security of tenure
























GLORIA V. DE GUZMAN | Hermosisima, 1995

FACTS
Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force
College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) which was created by virtue of PD
1078. Under the said decree, the Board of Trustees is vested with
authority, among others, to appoint, as it did appoint, officials and
employees of the college, except the members of the Board of
Trustees themselves and the President of the college.
The PAFCA Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 91-026, which
declared that "All faculty/administrative employees are also subject
to the required civil service eligibilities. Thus, private respondents
were issued only temporary appointments as they lacked
appropriate civil service eligibilities.
Private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo, specifically, was issued a one-
year temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of
PAFCA.
Cerillo wasrelieved as Board Secretary of the PAFCA in accordance
with Board Resolution No. 92-017 by reason of loss of confidence.
Subsequently, however, she was designated as "Coordinator for
Extension Services".
RA No. 7605 was enacted into law. It converted PAFCA into a state
college to be known as the Philippine State College of Aeronautics
(PSCA). The Board of Trustees likewise was the governing body of
the PSCA. The power to make appointments was retained by the
Board. Petitioner Col. Julian J. Loleng, Jr. remained as Officer-in-
Charge by virtue of a designation made anew by then DECS
Secretary Isidro Cario.
Col. Loleng inform private respondents that they shall be deemed
separated from the service upon the expiration of their temporary
appointments.
Private respondents a "Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement,
with Back Wages and Damages", with the RTC. The complaint in
effect prayed that then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella complete the
filling up of positions for Board of Trustees and order the Board of
Trustees to reinstate the respondents in the case at bench to their
respective positions.
RTC (pertinent part): in favor of reinstating Cerillo as Coordinator
for Extension Services.

ISSUE
WON the reinstatement of Cerillo is proper.

HELD/RATIO
NO. Cerillo was dismissed from her appointment as Board Secretary
because of loss of confidence. Thus, this cannot be properly the
subject of a reinstatement proceeding. Cerillo's assignment as
"Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere designation. Not
being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position
cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. Even granting that
Ms. Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator for Extension
Services", her reinstatement thereto would not be possible because
the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. At any rate, a
mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of
tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an acting
capacity only.
Further, the fact Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service
Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is
no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil
service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be
considered by the appointing authority are: performance, degree of
education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more
importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the
confidence and trust of the appointing power. The position of Board
Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as it
does "not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the
duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state."
The questioned order of reinstatement amounts to an undue
interference by the RTC in the exercise of the discretionary power of
appointment vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees.

DISPOSITIVE
Reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo and the payment to the latter of
back wages and attorney's fees are hereby declared null and void.