G.R. Nos.

L-10364 and L-10376 March 31, 1958

RUFINO T. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Baizas, Macadaeg and Baviera for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two
others whose names are unknown in two separate informations with the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank before the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Cases Nos. 12802 and 12803). On a plea of not guilty,
they were tried and found guilty as charged, the court sentencing each of the three
defendants to suffer in each case a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not
more than 9 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the
costs. In addition, they were sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine Ryukyus Command,
the payee of the checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases.
The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but
with a reduced penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson
was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was
accordingly sentenced to 4 months of arresto mayor in each of the two cases.
Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review
contending (1) that the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals, do not
constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa through
(falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court of Appeals erred in denying his
motion for new trial.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are: "Espiridion Lascao, father of the late
Felipe Lascao, a lieutenant of the USAFFE, who died during the last World War, and his
widow Rosanna Paras, through the latter filed, is Felipe Lascano's only legitimate
surviving heir, their claim papers with the Red Cross Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon
in the early part of 1946.
"On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T.
Samson in getting the checks of the two claimants who were with him at Camp Murphy
by approaching an officer of the Philippine Army who could identify said persons
assuring Samson that he had known said claimants for a long time. Having been assured
twice of the identity of the supposed claimants and after examining their residence
certificates attached to the claim papers, Samson accompanied by Cruz and the
supposed claimants went to talk to Lt. Manuel Valencia and requested him to act as
guarantor to secure the claimants check. Believing in the representations made by
Samson, Lt. Valencia accompanied them to the Deceased Check Delivery Section,
Finance, AFP, and secured the release of PNB Check No-754497J, Exhibit C, in favor of
Rosalina Paras for the sum of P6,417.11 and the PNB Check No. 754498J, Exhibit D, in
favor of Espiridion Lascao for the sum of P6,417.10. Thence, the party repaired to the
Bureau of Treasury, Finance Building, where again through the help of Rufino T. Samson
on, the two checks above-mentioned were cashed by the teller Rosario Mallari who
knew Samson. In accordance with the regulations of the Bureau of Treasury to payee
Rosalina Paras, not knowing how to write or sign her name, was required to thumbmark
on the back of the check, Exhibit C, and below her thumbmark Rufino T. Samson and
Francisco Ordoez signed as witnesses. Espiridion Lascao who knows how to sign his
name was asked to do so on the back of the check, Exhibit D, and below his signature
Samson signed not as a witness but as the last indorser. The accounts called for in said
two checks were delivered to a son and Cruz, who, as will be shown hereafter, was the
person who signed as Francisco Ordoez, counted the money and delivered it to the
supposed claimants. The party then proceeded to the Aristocrat Restaurant where
together with about eleven others took their lunch for which Vergara paid P60, besides
giving Samson P300 sup-posed to be paid to the officers who helped them in securing
the checks plus P10 for Samson's taxi fare. Samson left the party and went to the movie
to meet a friend from Camp Murphy.
"On October 4, or just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy Samson
was informed by Severino Anda, one of those who were with the party which cashed
the checks, thus said cheeks were delivered to the wrong parties. Worried by such news
he left for Sorsogon the following day to locate the real claimants. While on the train he
saw an old couple whom he suspected to be the fake claimants because they had been
throwing furtive glances at him. Upon arriving at Sorsogon he reported the matter to
the matter to police and caused to be taken the couples finger prints names and
address. At about 10 a.m., October 6, he went to look for the house of the Lascao
family. He found Espiridion Lascao, too old and weak to leave the house. He saw
Rosalina at the school where she was teaching and inquired from her whether she had
received a check from Camp Murphy as well as the cheek of the old man and he was
answered in the negative. He returned to Manila the following day and on October 8
reported the matter to Sgt. Luis Balignasan, G-2 PC, who after taking his affidavit
promised to help him and conduct the necessary investigation. He submitted a copy of
the finger prints of the suspects."
Analyzing the criminal responsibility of appellant Sam-son, the court made the following
comment:
Coming now to appellant Rufino T. Samson, we believe that the following facts are
admitted; that on the strength of the assurances given by Amado L. Cruz that the
supposed claimants were the real ones he requested the help of Lt. Manuel Valencia to
act as guarantor and Valencia, relying on his representations, accompanied him and the
claimants to the Delivery Window and secured the checks for them; that again Rufino T.
Samson helped Amado T. Cruz and the supposed claimants by signing as witness
together with Cruz so that the supposed claimant Rosalina Paras could cash her check
and went to the extent of signing as last indorser on the back of the check, Exhibit D, in
favor of Espiridion Lascao and then later at the Aristocrat Restaurant accepted from
Vergara and Cruz the sum of P300 to be paid to the officers who helped them and the
further sum of P10 for his tax fare. There is no evidence that he was aware that the
supposed claimants were not the real ones and his subsequent conduct shows it to be
true; but although he did not know them personally he induced another friend of his, Lt.
Manuel Valencia, to believe in the identity of said claimants thus helping his co-accused
Amado L. Cruz, Bonifacio Vergara and John Doe and Maria Doe to perpetrate the crime
of estafa through falsification. It is unbelievable that he would accept as his share the
meager amount of P310 if he were a co-conspirator in the commission of a fraud
amounting to over P12,000. We see nothing strange in his acceptance of P310 as a
token of gratitude on the part of the claimants, but he has undoubtedly acted with
reckless imprudence for having taken no precaution whatsoever in assuring himself that
the supposed claimants were the real ones. The mere assurances given him by Amado L.
Cruz were not sufficient to justify his acting in the manner he did.
We find no error in the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the appellant
herein acted with gross negligence in assuring Lt. Valencia and the Cashier of the
identity of the supposed claimants, as a result of which the impersonators managed to
secure possession of the checks in question and to cash the same. Appellant was, or
must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve
thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all
proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since
they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would
certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large
amount if the funds belonged to appellant; and we see no justification for him treating
government fund is with less care and diligence than if they were his own. Nor does the
submission to this appellant of residence certificates constitute adequate identification,
since these certificates are tax receipts and not means of establishing the identity of
persons; and appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently intelligent and
educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen.
There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex
offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it
could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to
exculpate him from liability. Even assuming that he had no intention to defraud the
offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the
culprits, appellant's participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the
commission of the offense completed all the necessary for the perpetration of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document (Article 17,
Revised Penal Code). Anyway and for the purposes of the penalty that was actually
imposed upon appellant, it is immaterial that he be considered only guilty of falsification
of a commercial document through reckless negligence, because the penalty for the
crime of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172, No. 1, of the Revised
Penal Code, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000.00 which under the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 of the same Code
is a correctional penalty. Consequently, if in the cases at bar the crimes of falsification
were due to reckless imprudence, the corresponding penalty would be arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods (Art. 365, opening paragraph of the Revised Penal
Code), which comprehends the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals upon
appellant.
Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of appellant constitute in each
case the crime of estafathrough falsification of a mercantile document by reckless
imprudence, because in so far as the falsification is concerned, his acts of endorsing the
respective checks by way of identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to
said checks and their proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true
payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in
truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the proceedings (Art. 171,
Revised Penal Code). Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to
the official duties of appellant, he would be nevertheless liable as a private person
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme
Court of Spain assert the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence
since in falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to cause damage is not
required because what the law, seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public
confidence in these documents.
An act executed without malice or criminal purpose, but with carelessness, negligence,
or lack of precaution, which causes harm to society or to an individual, should be
classified as either reckless negligence or simple imprudence; the person responsible
therefor is liable for such results could have been anticipated, and for acts which no one
would commit except through culpable indifference.
The courts heretofore dealing with acts punishable under the Penal Code of Spain
which, with slight modifications, is practically the same as the one in force in these
Islands, have heard and decided cases involving falsification of documents with reckless
negligence. They therein applied the provisions of article 581 of the Spanish Code, which
is identical with article 568 of the Code in force in these Islands, as may be seen among
others, in judgments in cessation of July 8, 1882, December 21, 1885, November 8 1887,
and December 7,1896; also in case No. 2818, United States vs. Mariano Vega, decided
by this Court. (U.S. vs.Maleza, 14 Phil., 468).
1

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime
of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed
against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act
of imprudence on his part. Nor can it be said, counsel argues, that the alleged
imprudent act includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the
idea of negligence.
The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged, is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116. Rules of Court). As a complement we have also
the following rule: "An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proves, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, Idem.).
While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held
in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,
*
G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a
distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however
be said that conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively
charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes
the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was
charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the
Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the
cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely
failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real
claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges
acts which charge willful, falsification but which turned out to be not willful but
negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the
allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this Tribunal.
Under a charge of forcible abduction, the defendant may be convicted of illegal
detention if the evidence does not show that the kidnapping was with lewd designs.
(People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil., 775.)
The crime of theft is included necessarily in that of robbery and therefore a defendant
can he convicted of the former, notwithstanding that he was charged the latter offense.
(U.S. vs. Birueda, 4 Phil., 229; People vs.Rivera, 54 Phil., 578 )
The crime of robbery en cuadrilla is necessarily included in that
of bandolerisimo (brigandage),and therefore the defendants can be convicted of the
former on an information charging the latter. (U.S. vs. De la Cruz 4 Phil., 430.)
Where the information charges brigandage, but the evidence fails to show that the
crime was committed by an armed band, the defendants can be convicted of robbery.
(U.S. vs. Mangubat. 3 Phil., 1.)
Under a charge of malversation a public official may be found guilty of estafa.
(U.S. vs. Solis, 7 Phil., 195.)
Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the
essential elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being
sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established
to constitute the crime proved. This conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of
Section 9, Ruled 113, of the Rules of Court under which appellant could no longer be
prosecuted for estafa through falsification of commercial documents by reckless
negligence were we to acquit him in the cases at bar on the obviously technical theory
of the dissenters.
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with
imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence
submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly,
having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would be incongrous to allege at
the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is
incompatible with the concept of negligence.
With regard to the motion for new trial filed by appellant for the purpose of introducing
an allegedly newly discovered evidence which consists of an affidavit of one Emiliano
Salangsang-Salazar, it appearing that the same if admitted would only be corroborative
in nature and would not have the effect of altering the result of the case, the same is
denied.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Reyes, A., J., concurs in the result.


Separate Opinions
FELIX, J., concurring:
I concur in the majority decision for the reasons therein stated. I, however, desire to
state a few words in answer to the arguments adduced in the dissenting opinion to the
effect that "under the ruling of the majority, each and every charge of a willful offense
will necessarily imply an alternative charge of criminal negligence" and that this, is a way
of "getting around the established rule that not more than one offense should be
charged" and of preventing the accused from guarding against such hidden multiplicity
of charges. It is claimed that in such situation the defendant would be unable to
determine whether tie is being tried for committing the crime or for not preventing its
commission, when he could have done so.
This argument is, in my opinion, utterly untenable. In, the first place, there is no
multiplicity of accusations but, a charge that is included in another which is considered
in operative and ceases to have any effect on the defendant for lack of supporting
evidence. In the second place, no one better than the defendant knows what he has
done in connection with the crime he is charged and he must have in mind that section
4, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court already warned him that he could be convicted of any
crime included in the crime charged in the information if there were any variance
between the latter and the crime establish by the evidence. So that he cannot now claim
that he was caught by surprise or prejudiced in any way if the crime he was accused in
the information degenerated into a case of criminal negligence. Although I do not deny
that in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, (97 Phil., 342), We held that criminal
negligence is a distinct crime established in our Penal Code, I cannot pass unmentioned
the more juridical and more realistic point of view expressed in People vs. Faller, 7 Phil.,
529, where it was held that:
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The information alleges, that the
appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and criminally. To this information no
objection was interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results in a
crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts
charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that acted with negligence.
For the foregoing considerations, I vote with the majority in affirming the decision
appealed from, with costs against appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., dissenting:
If I regret my inability to agree that under a charge of intentionally committing a crime,
an accused may be convicted of committing such crime through negligence or
imprudence.
We have shown in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor (97 Phil., 342), July 28,
1955, that criminal negligence is not a mere variant of the intentional misdeed; that it is
a distinct and separate in itself. We also pointed out in that case that while willful crimes
are punished according to their result in crimes of negligence, what the law punishes is
the carelessness itself, the failure to take the precautions that society has a right to
expect will be taken under the circumstances of each case. So that, while the intentional
crime of lesiones is substantially different from that offalsification, lesiones by
imprudence and falsification by imprudence are in themselves substantially identical
offenses, being but two instances of criminal negligence punishable under one and the
same article (365) of the Revised Penal Code.
It is argued that negligence is not a crime but a way of committing it. That view may be
true from the philosophical standpoint, but not from that of the Penal Code,
withstanding People vs. Faller, 67 Phil., 529, which was questioned in the Quizon case.
The stubborn fact is "Que la culpa es un delito propio como el homicidio, las lesiones,
etc. lo cual tambien es absurdo; on obstante ello en nuestra sistema legislativo hay que
partir de esa base, que por otra parte el Tribunal Supreme acentua" (Puig Pea Der
Penal, Tomo 1, pag. 316). And this is emphasized by the designation of quasi-offenses by
our Penal Code, that the Spanish Penal Code does not even use.
As a consequence, it must be admitted that intentional falsification and falsification by
negligence not only differ in seriousness, but in essence; they are, by their nature, two
different offenses altogether. Wherefore, an offender who is accused of intentional
falsification cannot be held to answer for falsification by negligence, because the
essential element of the latter offense, the ingredient that characterizes it and
separates it from all other offenses, to wit, the criminal negligence or carelessness, is
not involved in the elements of the crime charged. Not only is it not included: it is
excluded by incompatibility, because malice or intent cannot co-exist with negligence.
Intent presupposes that the offender actually visualized or contemplated the act of
falsification and determined to realize it; negligence implies that the offender should
have foreseen or anticipated, but did not actually anticipate or foresee, the
consequences of his act. In the former, the law punishes the culprit for his decision to
breach the law, in the latter, for his failure to foresee that his action would result in such
a breach.
The difference being so radical, I can not see how the appellant can be held as a co-
principal of the crime of estafa with falsification through his reckless imprudence
considering that the negligence negates the appellant's knowledge of, or participation
in, the intent to commit the fraud. It is urged that appellant's imprudent act
was indispensable and that without it, the estafa could not be successfully
accomplished, hence, he should be deemed a principal by cooperation under par. 9 of
Art. 17, R.P.C. I consider the argument fallacious. Art. 17 says:
ART. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which
it would not have been accomplished.
Now, to cooperate is to help, to aid; and necessarily presupposes, knowledge of the
ultimate purpose in view. This very Court, in People vs. Aplegido, 76 Phil., 571, has ruled
that
to cooperate means to desire or wish in common a thing. But that common will or
purpose does not necessarily mean a previous understanding.
What common will or purpose can exist between one acts maliciously and another who
acts negligently? If the appellant deliberately omitted to take precautions in order to
facilitate the estafa, he would not be guilty of estafa with falsification through
imprudence, but of intentional estafa with falsification. Such deliberate intent, however,
was expressly declared not to exist by the Court of Appeals, and that finding is
conclusive.
In U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil., 386, 389, this Court, through Mr. Justice Mapa, decided
that
In view of all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that the assault was
committed, without the concurrence of the will of Isidro and Clemente Magcomot, and
in the absence of that volition, which is the fundamental source of criminal liability,
these co-defendants can not lawfully be held liable for the agrression and its
consequences. On the other hand, it can not be pleaded that the acts committed on the
body of the body of the deceased by said co-defendants and by Epifanio were
perpetrated at the same time, because this simultaneousness does not of itself
demonstrate the concurrence of wills nor the unity of action and purpose which are the
bases of the responsibility of two or more individuals, and in the absence of which, it is
strictly just, in accordance with the sound principles of law, that each one should only be
held liable for the acts perpetrated by him. (Emphasis supplied)
Other cases to the same effect are collated in People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38. Let me
note also that if it is unquestioned doctrine that it is an essential condition of complicity
that the accomplice, "With knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime"
(People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil., 49, cit. Dec. May 23, 1905; Viada, 5 Sup. 169; Dec. June 28,
1901; Viada, 4 Sup. 196). If to cooperate as an accomplice demands knowledge of the
criminal intent, how may one cooperate as principal without it? It seems to me that
such ruling would violate the basic principles of the Revised Penal Code on joint criminal
responsibility.
On the procedural side, the objections to appellant's conviction of estafa by falsification
through negligence are much more serious.
Section 5, Rule 116, upon which the majority relies as justifying the conviction,
expresses the following rule:
An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. (Italic mine)
It is not enough, therefore, that the elements of the crime for which an accused is
convicted should be proved, but then must also be charged or alleged. This means, if it
means anything at all, that the crime proved may be constituted by, some, i.e., a lesser
number, of integrating elements or requisites than the offense charged,
providedall such constituent elements are alleged. Thus, in the cases cited by the
majority opinion, a charge of robbery includes that of theft, because to constitute theft,
we merely eliminate or subtract the element of violence from the alleged components
of robbery. One accused of forcible abduction can be convicted of illegal detention,
because the elements are common except for the lewd designs; robbery is included in
brigandage (bandolerismo) because their elements are identical except for the
organization of the band for the purpose of committing highway robbery. And
malversation a public official and estafa only differ in that the former must be
committed by taking advantage of public office; by discarding the latter constituent
element, the remainder alleges a crime of estafa. All these cases, therefore, proceed on
the theory that by striking out some of the averments in the information the remainder
charges the crime of which the accused is convicted. But it has never been held that a
crime is included in the offense charged when not only must one element alleged be
discarded but another one, not alleged, must be supplied. Illustrative of this case
is People vs. Oso, 62 Phil., 271, it where we quashed a conviction for abduction with
rape, because the charge was plain abduction, carnal knowledge through violence did
not appear in the original accusation.
It is very common to say that an accused may he convicted of any lesser crime than the
one charged, without realizing that by lesser crime is meant one that is constituted by
a number of elements smaller than those alleged; not a crime that carries a lighter
penalty.
Now, let us apply, the rule to the present case. What are the ingredients of the crime of
falsification in the information?
(1) That the accused made a false statement in a narration of facts (certifying that the
impostor's signature was the genuine signature of the true payee);
(2) That he made the, false statement in a commercial paper (check);
(3) That he knew that the signature certified to by him was not that of the payee;
(4) That he acted wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously.
Clearly these allegations cannot constitute the crime of falsification by negligence by
merely striking out any number of them. And for a plain reason: the averment
of imprudence, which is the distinctive characteristic of the latter crime, is lacking; it
must be supplied from outside the information. Consequently, criminal negligence is not
included in the offense charged.
That falsification through imprudence does not include intentional falsification is self-
evident. Negligence can not include wilfulness or vice-versa. As pointed out previously,
one excludes the other. It is thus unavoidable to conclude that a charge of wilful
falsification does not charge falsification by negligence; neither does the latter include
the former. Therefore, regardless of the evidence, a conviction for falsification by
imprudence can not be had on a charge of wilful forgery, the two being incompatible
offenses.
But there is more, and worse. Under the ruling of the majority, each and every charge of
a wilful offense (except those where malice is indispensable) will necessarily imply an
alternative charge of criminal negligence, since the accused may be convicted thereof. Is
this not getting around the established rule that not more than one offense should be
charged? And how can the accused guard against such hidden multiplicity? If the
information should expressly allege that the accused "wilfully, intentionally and/or
negligently, by failing to take the requisite precautions" committed an offense,
unquestionably the accused could object on the ground that the information on its face
charges two offenses, criminal negligence and the wilful crime; and he could demand
that the prosecution should elect to stand on one charge alone, and strike out the other.
But under the majority ruling, without any specific charge, the accused must stand trial
and risk conviction of either the intentional offense or criminal negligence. Is such a
procedure at all compatible with the right of the accused to fair play? The accused can
not determine whether he is being tried for committing the crime or for not
preventing its commission, when he could have done so.
The unfairness to the accused becomes compounded when it is recalled that negligence
under our Penal Code admits two varieties: reckless imprudence
and simple imprudence, the latter involving a lesser penalty. Under the majority ruling,
therefore, a person accused of a wilful offense is actually compelled to face three ways
and defend himself against three different offenses: the wilful act, reckless negligence,
and simple imprudence. He can not object to any prosecution evidence tending to
establish any or all of these multifarious charges; he must also see that his own evidence
protects him against all three charges, altho I the information recites only one, the
intentional offense. I submit that to force an accused to guard against all three
possibilities at once is against all fairness, justice and equity. Pitted against the resources
of the state, an accused is already at a disadvantage; I see no need to make his position
worse.
To cap it all, the accused-appellant in the present case was convicted of criminal
negligence on appeal, when he no longer could ask for a reopening of the trial to
introduce evidence against such a charge. The least that he is entitled to, it seems to
me, is a new trial. It has been the practice hitherto that where the evidence shows the
accused to be guilty of a crime different from the one charged, to acquit him of the
charge and, without release from custody, remand him to answer for the proper
offense, see no reason why that rule should not be followed in the present case.
Concepcion, J., concurs.
























G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
ISIDRO G. ARENAS, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C.
LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D. SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA
B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN,
MARCELO LAPEA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official
capacities as City Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer,
respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN
CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents.
Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner.
Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan at San Carlos City, Branch X, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Civil
Case No. SCC-182.
1

In January 1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a City Judge of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), instituted
against the City of San Carlos (Pangasinan), City Council of San Carlos City and the
Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer of San Carlos City, a petition for
mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
The petition alleged that the petitioner, Isidro G. Arenas, is the incumbent City Judge of
San Carlos City (Pangasinan, that the respondent City of San Carlos, from the time of its
creation in 1966 up to the present, has been classified as a third class city; that Republic
Act No. 5967 which became effective on June 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries
of city judges of second and third class cities shall be P18,000.00 per annum; that the
petitioner was then actually receiving a monthly salary of P1,000.00 of which P350.00
was the share of the national government and P650.00 is the share of the city
government, which salary was P500.00 below the basic monthly salary of a City Judge of
a third class city; that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference between the salary
actually being received by a City Judge and the basic salary established in said act shall
be paid by the city government; that from June 21, 1969 up to the filing of the petition
on January 21, 1971, the petitioner was entitled to a salary differential of P9,500.00 with
the respondent City of San Carlos (Pangasinan); that the petitioner had repeatedly
requested the respondents to enact the necessary budget and to pay him the said
differential but the respondents, without any justification, whatsoever, refused and still
refuse to do the same; that it is the clear duty of the respondent to enact the necessary
budget providing for the payment of the salary of the petitioner as provided for in
Republic Act No. 5967; that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy
except the present action for mandamus; and that because of the refusal of the
respondent to comply with their obligation as provided in Republic Act No. 5967, the
petitioner was forced to engage the services of a lawyer to file this action for which he
was to pay the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees.
2

In their answer dated February 10, 1971, the respondents admitted and denied the
allegations in the petition and alleged that Republic Act No. 5967 further provides,
among other things, that the salary of the city judge shall at least be one hundred pesos
per month less than that of a city mayor; that the city judge receives an annual salary of
P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per month less than the salary being received by the city
mayor which is P13,200.00 yearly; that assuming the existence of a salary difference, in
view of the provision of Republic Act No. 5967, that the payment of the salary difference
shall be subject to the implementation of the respective city government, which is
discretionary on the part of the city government as to whether it would or would not
implement the payment of the salary difference, and in view of the financial difficulties
of the city which has a big overdraft, the payment of the salary difference of the city
judge cannot be made; and that the petitioner should pay his lawyer and should not
charge the attorney's fees to the respondents who have not violated any rights of the
petitioner.
3

The Court of First Instance of San Carlos City (Pangasinan), Branch X, rendered its
decision dated May 31, 1971 dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to
costs.
The pertinent portion of Section 7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads:
Sec. 7. Unless the City Charter or any special law provides higher salary, the city judge in
chartered cities shall receive a basic salary which shall not be lower than the sums as
provided thereinbelow:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) For second and third class cities, eighteen thousand pesos per annum;
xxx xxx xxx
For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other first class cities, the city judge shall
receive one thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge, and for second
and third class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand five hundred pesos less
than that fixed for the district judge, and for other cities, the city judge shall receive two
thousand pesos less than that fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the
salary of a city judge shall be at least one hundred pesos per month less than that of the
city mayor.
The petitioner contends that "... if the last proviso of said Section 7 of Republic Act No.
5967 would be interpreted as the controlling measure for fixing the salary of the city
judges, then the principal provision of Section 7 fixing the salaries of City Judges at rate
very much higher than that of a City Mayor (particularly in the case of second and third
class cities) would be rendered totally useless." The petitioner submitted "that since the
principal intention of the legislature in enacting Section 7 of Republic Act 5967 is to
increase the salary of the city judges, then the last proviso of said Section 7 should give
way to the provisions of said section preceding said proviso."
The record shows that when Republic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, San
Carlos City (Pangasinan) was a third class city; that the petitioner as city judge received
an annual salary of P12,000.00; and that the city mayor of San Carlos City received an
annual salary of P13,200.00 which was exactly P100.00 a month more than the salary of
the city judge.
During the deliberation in the Senate on House Bill No. 17046, which became Republic
Act No. 5967, the following discussion took place:
SENATOR GANZON Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will be some
cities where the city judges will receive salaries higher than those of the mayors. And in
all charters, Your Honor, the city judge is considered a department head theoretically,
at least, under the mayor. It would not be fair for the purposes of public administration
that a city department head should receive a salary higher than that of the chief
executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is very well taken, and I would like to congratulate Your
Honor.
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understand the concern of the distinguished
gentleman from Davao. But in this particular amendment prepared by the distinguished
lady from La Union, this will not require the council to pay it at P100.00 exactly less than
the salary of the mayor. It is just the limit the maximum but they may fix it at much
less than that. That is why the words "at least" were suggested by the Committee. It
need not be exactly just P100.00 less. It may be P500.00 less.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod
or Manila for that matter. The Mayors are receiving at least P1,500 a month. Now,
under the amendment of the lady from La Union, Nueva Ecija and
Davao which has already been accepted by the sponsor does it mean that if the
salary of the city mayor is P1,500, the city judges will receive P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO I would like to call his attention to lines 13 to 20. We presented
this amendment because it says here: "For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasay and other
first class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousand pesos less than that fixed for
the district judge". So it will happen, and my attention was called by the gentlemen from
Iloilo that the city judge win be receiving more salary than the city mayor. Hence the
amendment, Mr. President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred with the gentlemen from Iloilo and Batangas, and this was their objection.
We have proposed this amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no city judge
will be receiving more than the city mayor. So they will be receiving less than what is
proposed in this Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages 2773-2787.
(Emphasis supplied .)
4

It is clear from the deliberation of the Senate that the intention of Congress in enacting
Republic Act No. 5967 was that the salary of a city judge should not be higher than the
salary of the city mayor. The saving clause "Provided, however, That the salary of a city
judge shall be at least P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor" qualifies the
earlier provision which fixes the salary of city judges for second and third class cities at
P18,000.00 per annum.
The primary purpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When
there is irreconcilable repugnancy between the proviso and the body of the statute the
former is given precedence over the latter on the ground that it is the latest expression
of the intent of the legislature.
Inasmuch as the city mayor of San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was receiving an annual
salary of P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelled to provide for an annual
salary of P18,000.00 for the petitioner as city judge of the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed and the decision appealed
from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. L-14880 April 29, 1960
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINAS COMPAIA DE SEGUROS, respondent.
Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for
petitioner.
Ramon T. Garcia for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Respondent Filipinas Compaia de Seguros, an insurance company, is also engaged in
business as a real estate dealer. On January 4, 1956, respondent, in accordance with the
single rate then prescribed under Section 182 of the National Internal Revenue
Code.
1
paid the amount of P150.00 as real estate dealer's fixed annual tax for the year
1956. Subsequently said Section 182 of the Code was amended by Republic Act No.
1612, which took effect on August 24, 1956, by providing a small of graduated rates:
P150 if the annual income of the real estate dealer from his business as such is P4,000,
but does not exceed P10,000; P300, if such annual income exceeds P10,000 but does
not exceed P30,000; and P500 if such annual income exceeds P30,000.
On June 17, 1957, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and demanded
from respondent (whose annual income exceeded P30,000.00) the amount of P350.00
as additional real estate dealer's fixed annual tax for the year 1956. On July 16, 1957,
respondent wrote a letter to petitioner stating that the "records will show that the real
estate dealer's fixed tax for 1956 of this Company was fully paid by us prior to the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 1612 which amended, among other things, Sections 178
and 192 of the National Internal Revenue Code." And, as to the retroactive effect of said
Republic Act No. 1612, respondent added that the Republic Act No. 1856 which, among
other things, amended Section 182 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Congress has
clearly shown its intention when it provided that the increase in rates of taxes
envisioned by Republic Act No. 1612 is to be made effective as of 1 January 1957".
On October 23, 1957, petitioner informed respondent that "Republic Act No. 1856
which took effect June 22, 1957 amended the date of effectivity of Republic Act 1612 to
January 1, 1957. However, the said amendment applies only to fixed taxes on
occupation and not to fixed taxes on business." Hence, petitioner insisted that
respondent should pay the amount of P350.00 as additional real estate dealer's fixed
annual tax for the year 1956.
On November 20, 1957, respondent filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for
review. To this petition, petitioner filed his answer on December 6, 1957. As petitioner
practically admitted the material factual allegations in the petition for review, the case
was submitted for judgment on the pleadings.
On November 22, 1958, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision sustaining the
contention of respondent company and ordering the petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to desist from collecting the P350.00 additional assessment. From this
decision, petitioner appealed to us.
As a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (Art. 4, Civil
Code of the Philippines; Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Santos, et al., 66 Phil., 237; La
Provisora Filipina vs. Ledda, 66 Ph 573.) Otherwise stated, a state shou!d be consider as
prospective in its operation whether it enacts, amen or repeals a tax, unless the
language of the statute clearly demands or expresses that it shall have a retroactive
effect (61 C. J. 1602, cited in Loremo vs. Posadas, 64 Phi 353.) The rule applies with
greater force to the case bar, considering that Republic Act No. 1612, which imposes the
new and higher rates of real estate dealer's annual fixed tax, expressly provides in
Section 21 thereof the said Act "shall take effect upon its approval" on August 24, 1956.
The instant case involves the fixed annual real estat dealer's tax for 1956. There is no
dispute that before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1612 on August 2 1956, the
uniform fixed annual real estate dealer's was P150.00 for all owners of rental properties
receiving an aggregate amount of P3,000.00 or more a year in the form of rentals
2
and
that. "the yearly fixed taxes are due on the first of January of each year" unless tendered
in semi-annual or quarterly installments.
3
Since the petitioner indisputably paid in full on
January 4, 1956, the total annual tax then prescribed for the year 1956, require it to pay
an additional sum of P350.00 to complete the P500.00 provided in Republic Act No.
1612 which became effective by its very terms only on August 24 1956, would, in the
language of the Court of Tax Appeals result in the imposition upon respondent of a tax
burden to which it was not liable before the enactment of said amendatory act, thus
rendering its operation retroactive rather than prospective, which cannot be done, as it
would contravene the aforecited Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1612 as well as the
established rule regarding prospectivity of operation of statutes.
The view that Congress did intend to impose said increased rates of real estate dealer's
annual tax prospectively and not retroactively, finds some affirmation in Republic Act
No. 1856, approved on June 22, 1957, which fixed the effective date of said new rates
under Republic Act No. 1612 by inserting the following proviso in Section 182 of the
National Internal Revenue Code:
Provided, further, That any amount collected in excess of the rates in effect prior to
January one, nineteen hundred and fifty-seven, shall be refunded or credited to the
taxpayer concerned subject to the provisions of section three hundred and nine of this
Code. (Sec. 182 (b) (2) (1).)
Petitioner, however, contends that the above-quoted provision refers only to fixed taxes
on occupation and does not cover fixed taxes on business, such as the real estate
dealer's fixed tax herein involved. This is technically correct, but we note from the
deliberations in the Senate, where the proviso in question was introduced as an
amendment, that said House Bill No. 5919 which became Republic Act No. 1856 was
considered, amended, and enacted into law, in order precisely that the "iniquitous
effects" which were then being felt by taxpayers. in general, on account of the approval
of Republic Act No. 1612, Which was being given retroactive effect by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue by collecting these taxes retroactively from January 1, 1956, be
eliminated and complaints against such action be finally settled. (See Senate
Congressional Record, May 4, 1957, pp. 10321033.)
It is also to be observed that said House Bill No. 5819 as originally presented, was
expressly intended to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code
dealing on fixed taxes on business. The provisions in respect of fixed tax on
occupation were merely subsequently added. This would seem to indicate that the
proviso in question was intended to cover not only fixed taxes on occupation, but also
fixed taxes on business. (Senate Congressional Record, March 7, 1957, p. 444.)The fact
that said proviso was placed only at the end of paragraph "(B) On occupation" is not,
therefore, view of the circumstances, decisive and unmistakable indication that
Congress limited the proviso to occupation taxes.
Even though the primary purpose of the proviso is to limit restrain the general language
of a statute, the legislature, unfotunately, does not always use it with technical
correctness; consequently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the court
to ascertain the legislative intention, through resort to usual rules of construction
applicable to statutes, generally an give it effect even though the statute is thereby
enlarged, or the proviso made to assume the force of an independent enactment and
although a proviso as such has no existence apart from provision which it is designed to
limit or to qualify. (Statutory Construction by E. T. Crawford, pp. 604-605.)
. . . When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and
the statute should be construe with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Id. at
p. 249.)
On the general principle of prospectivity of statute on the language of Republic Act 1612
itself, especially Section 21 thereof, and on the basis of its intended scope and purpose
as disclosed in the Congressional Record we find ourselves in agreement with the Court
of Tax Appeals.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.