MEETING 12 - Additional Cases

Castillo v.
Cruz
G.R. No. 182165
25 November 2009

PONENTE: Carpio Morales, J.

PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,
RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR.
ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, TISOY, and JOHN DOES

RESPONDENTS: DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Regional Trial Court: Petition for issuance of a writ of amparo and writ of habeas data
Supreme Court: Appeal to the Supreme Court by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari
pursuant to the Rules on the Writ of Amparo

FACTS:

Spouses Francisco and Amanda Cruz leased a parcel of land located at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos,
Bulacan from the Provincial Government of Bulacan. However, the Provincial Government of
Bulacan intended to use the property for projects, thus upon expiry of the lease, it demanded that
the respondents vacate the property. When the respondents refused to heed its demands, it filed
an action for unlawful detainer before the M unicipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.

The MTC rendered judgment against the respondents which was affirmed on appeal by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. The judgment for ejectment became final and executory.

Despite the said judgment, respondents refused to vacate the property and filed cases against the
Provincial Government of Bulacan and the judges who presided over the case. Notwithstanding the
cases filed by the respondents, judgment for ejectment was executed on 25 January 2008
pursuant to a Second Alias Writ of Demolition issued by the MTC. However, the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan acted favorably on an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) by the
respondents.

Thus, the Spouses Cruz, along with their sonsrespondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon
entered the property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as
owners of the property which was for lease.

In response, the Mayor of Malolos sought assistance from the Philippine National Police who were
led by Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo and sought to protect, secure and maintain the
possession of the property. The respondents, however, refused to surrender possession invoking
a prior permanent injunction issued by the RTC of Malolos which they claimed enjoined the
Provincial Government of Bulacan from repossessing the property.

On 03 March 2008, respondents herein filed for a Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data alleging that despite the permanent injunction, petitioners entered the property
and arrested the respondents when they attempted to resist the entry.

The RTC of Malolos granted the petition for amparo and habeas data as the respondents has
sufficiently proven that the petitioners committed acts subjecting the former to bodily harm, mental

torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police
brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the remedies of amparo and habeas data are proper in cases involving property
disputes without a showing of a considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect
on respondents right to life, liberty and security.
Whether or not the privilege of amparo may still be granted despite the dismissal of the case for
qualified theft against Guisande.

ANSWER:

No
No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF AMPARO

The remedy of amparo can only be invoked to protect the right to life, liberty, and security Under
the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data, the coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty, and security although the writs cover not only actual but also
threats of unlawful acts or omissions. As was held in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the
Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside
the protection of law.

Thus, to be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement
that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.
Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of
and its effect on respondents right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the
propriety of petitioners entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners in unison,
conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of
force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents)
and arrested the herein petitioners (respondents) will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact,
respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after thei r arrest.

Habeas data cannot be invoked when respondents are not gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not
even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding their
person, family, home and correspondence. More importantly, respondent Amanda and one of her
sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the
Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the
issuance of the writs by the RTC. Such petition was correctly dismissed for insufficiency and forum
shopping.

It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full advantage of
the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative charges.

It need not be underlined that respondents petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are
extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and
executory decision in a property dispute.

An independent action for Amparo and Habeas Data is improper once criminal proceedings have
been commenced; must be raised by motion in the criminal proceedings At all events,
respondents filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred,
for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto
and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the
arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents
during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by
the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal
proceedings.

It bears stressing that nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the
Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner Sos claim that
the confinement of accused Guisande at the NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts
performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of
accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed
government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner Sos and accused
Guisandes family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of habeas corpus and amparo are clear; the act or omission or the
threatened act or omission complained of confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a persons life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should be
illegal or unlawful.

As was held in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned
basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears
and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted
in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.

On the other hand, in Ampatuan v. Macaraig, the Court held that the general purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. The essential
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas
corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his
liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only
where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ
should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will
be refused.

In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH
or a medical facility of accuseds own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for
treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for
the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accuseds mental fitness to be arraigned and
stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clares Medical Center
under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat. Notwithstanding, Guisande remained in custody of the law to

answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical
treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court granted the Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari.
Accordingly, the 04 March 2008 Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan is declared null and void,
and its 28 March 2008 Decision is reversed and set aside. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed
Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008.

MERALCO VS. LIM
G.R. No. 184769
05 October 2010


PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA
RESPONDENTS: ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM

NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari


Regional Trial Court: Original petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data
Supreme Court: Appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
pursuant to the Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data

FACTS:

Respondent Rosario G. Lim, also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO). On 04 June 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of
the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO
MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.

In a Memorandum dated 04 July 2008, Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource
Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F
OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security.

The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an appeal with Ruben A.
Sapitula, Vice- President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, and
requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming
that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She likewise claimed
the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of
the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending
resolution of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan. She
claimed petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to
provide her with details or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy
in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Additionally, respondent prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer
to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

In its Decision dated 22 September 2008, the RTC granted respondents petition including the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing
respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial
court justified its ruling by declaring that recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to
victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent
whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with
information or data on the reported threats to her person.

Thus, the petition for review.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of habeas data may be properly issued to protect
purely property or commercial concerns where there is no clear showing of any unjustifiable or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy in relation to the rights to life, liberty, and security.

ANSWER: No.


PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS DATA

The remedy of habeas data can only be invoked to protect the right to privacy in relation to the
rights to life, liberty, and security The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by
means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational
privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to
life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.

The Writ of Habeas Data cannot be invoked in labor disputes where there is no unlawful violation
of the right to life, liberty, or security Castillo v. Cruz (G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009)
underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario (G. R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008)
that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution. It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are what prompted
her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any
unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or

security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on
the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals
in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just
mere jokes if they existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work
betray[s] the real intent of management and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari. The assailed decision of the trial
court was reversed and set aside.

Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 189155
07 September 2010

PONENTE: Perez, J.

PARTIES:

PETITIONER: MELISSA ROXAS
RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN.
VICTOR IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, PC/SIPT/
LEON NILO DELA CRUZ, MAJ.GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO
LACADIN, DEX, RC, and ROSE

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari


Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the
Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is
the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:

Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States, enrolled in an
exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States
of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.

On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the
house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15
heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a van.
When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for being a member
of Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA). She was then separated
from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire,
noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.

She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist
beliefs. She was informed by a person named RC that those who tortured her came from the
Special Operations Group and that she was abducted because her name is included in the
Order of Battle.

On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She
was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will

happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the
cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.

Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine
National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture.

On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted
the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the
respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the abduction
and torture of Roxas.

Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.
Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended.

ANSWERS:

No.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence.
Yes.


1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate The use
of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in impleading the respondents in her
amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-
respondent in an amparo petition.

The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of
amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate
remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security. It does not fix
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of command
responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-
blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. However, the
inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude impleading military or
police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded not actually
on the basis of command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other
pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS

Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an
actual or threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were
found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding
the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it modified the
directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows:

Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts;
and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations
and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case,
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her
stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent
reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of
Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its
consideration. It was declared that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this
case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 183871
18 February 2010

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr., J.

PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: LOURDES RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY RUBRICO
CARBONEL
RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY, JIMMY SANTANA, RUBEN
ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, P/SUPT. EDGAR ROQUERO, ARSENIO GOMEZ,
JONATHAN, and OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA decision


Supreme Court: Original Action for a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a partial judgment
which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:

On 03 April 2007, Lourdes Rubrico, chair of Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, was
abducted by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron (AISS)
based in Lipa City while attending a Lenten pabasa in Dasmarinas, Cavite. She was brought to and
detained at the air base without charges. She was released a week after relentless interrogation,
but only after she signed a statement that she would be a military asset.
Despite her release, she was tailed on at least 2 occasions. Hence, Lourdes filed a complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and grave
misconduct against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, and Jonathan, but nothing has happened. She
likewise reported the threats and harassment incidents to the Dasmarinas municipal and Cavite
provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their investigation.

Meanwhile, the human rights group Karapatan conducted an investigation which indicated that
men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) led the abduction of Lourdes. Based
on such information, Rubrico filed a petition for the writ of amparo with the Supreme Court on 25
October 2007, praying that respondents be ordered to desist from performing any threatening act
against the security of petitioners and for the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. Rubrico
also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on
the case of Lourdes.

The Supreme Court issued the desired writ and then referred the petition to the Court of Appeals
(CA) for summary hearing and appropriate action. At the hearing conducted on 20 November
2007, the CA granted petitioners motion that the petition and writ be served on Darwin Sy/Reyes,
Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma, and Jonathan. By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President
as respondent in the case.

On 31 July 2008, after due proceedings, the CA rendered its partial judgment, dismissing the
petition with respect to Esperon, Razon, Roquero, Gomez, and Ombudsman.

Hence, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an
amparo petition.

ANSWER: No.


DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY and THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Doctrine of Command Responsibility has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings
[C]ommand responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law,
has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of
war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms,
means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the
armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. In
this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague
Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-
day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates
should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is
an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators.

There is no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine. It may plausibly be contended
that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or
customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it
would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as
the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual
respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the
Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a
crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed.

Reluctance of the amparo petitioners or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance
to the police in pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end [T]he
right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of ones right by the government. And
this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an investigation are
captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
pronounced: [The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by
the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative
of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the
government.

The remedy of amparo ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously The privilege of the writ of
amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and
enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously,
lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or
on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court partially granted the petition for review. It issued a decision as follows:

Affirming the dropping of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition;

Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, and P/Dir.
Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the command responsibility principle, to attach
accountability and responsibility to them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the
alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed
against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the Ombudsman is also affirmed
for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed; and

Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the incumbent Director-
General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the investigations already commenced by
their respective units on the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments
and threats she and her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence
as required by Sec. 17 of the Amparo Rule. The Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director-General of
the PNP are directed to order their subordinate officials, in particular, to do the following:

(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of respondents Maj.
Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one
Jonathan; and submit certifications of this determination to the OMBUDSMAN with copy furnished
to petitioners, the CA, and this Court;

(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj. Darwin Sy and the
Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and

(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic sketches of
respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain
Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and locating them.

The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt of the Decision;
and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations, the Chief of Staff of the AFP and
the Director-General of the PNP are likewise directed to submit a full report of the results of the
investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB, and petitioners.

The Supreme Court accordingly referred the case back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring the
investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP.

A.M. NO. RTJ-10-2236
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. NO. 09-3083-RTJ)
RUBEN N. SALCEDO, Complainant, versus JUDGE GIL G. BOLLOZOS, Respondent.
Promulgated: July 5, 2010

BRION, J.:

We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N.
Salcedo (complainant), charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge), Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of
the Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009, entitled Jose Tanmalack, Jr., represented
by Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan
De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen Rojo.

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and
the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police
Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The
complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property) covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo. The disputed
property is about 126,112 square meters wide and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant (together with his niece
Rebecca R. Lumbay and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-going construction
over the disputed property, Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves
inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred that Tanmalack and
his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack
uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his
companions occupied the property and destroyed building materials such as G.I. sheets, lumber
and other construction materials.

The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the nearby police station. The police
promptly responded and arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same
afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed
the petition[1] on his behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for employing self-help in
preventing squatters from putting up improvements in their titled property.

Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the circumstances surrounding the filing
of the petition and how it came to be referred to the respondent judges sala, as follows:

1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was received by the Office
regarding the procedure in filing a petition for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the
established procedure is to assign cases to the different branches by raffling or in urgent cases, by
a special raffle upon proper motions. But since the office has not received any case of that nature
yet, and as the schedule of raffling will still be in the afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to
the Executive Judge for instruction and or appropriate action;

2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to consult the 1st Vice Executive
Judge Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice
Executive Judge Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;

3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be adopted under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC);

4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the petition was not clearly stated
in the Rule but if the case will be referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be
willing to look at the petition;

5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00 P.M. already, direct from the
chamber of Judge Lucagbo, I found out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45
P.M. as stamped in the petition;

6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador,
referred the case to the Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon;

7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to whom I left the information
that I was going to the sala of 1st Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to inform the Admin.
Officer of my whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her to refer the case to you [referring
to the respondent judge];

8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr. Exclamador and Ms. Lagamon
to explain why they referred the case to your sala without any instruction from me;

9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was no longer around; that the
lawyer was insisting to refer the case immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and
considering the novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and fearing that no judge will be left
to act on the petition if they still discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of
Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case to you since your sala was the nearest to our office, it
being adjacent to your court;

10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the handwritten petition to Judge
Lucagbo nor was there any instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the petition
conform to a form acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed by Judge Lucagbo;

11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the circumstances and was not
motivated by any ill motive or malice.[2]

Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions propounded to Tanmalacks
representative and counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated
January 23, 2008, directing the police officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x
to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose
Tanmalack, Jr., to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku. The respondent judge also directed the
police officers to file their verified return to the petition within five (5) working days, together with
supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief
Investigator. At six oclock in the evening of that same day, the police released Tanmalack to the
custody of Atty. Francis Ku.

In his complaint, the complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he
claims had been unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that the handwritten petition
did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the
Rules and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the respondent judge accommodated the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalacks counsel) are
members of the Masonic fraternity.

The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March 30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged:

(a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court, he had no option but to
exercise his judicial duty without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioners
counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason);

(b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo and writ of habeas corpus, he
deemed it more in consonance with the [Rule on the Writ of Amparo];

(c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and was immediately assigned
to his sala by the Office of the Clerk of Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states
that any judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said Sec. 3 further states
that it can be filed on any day and at any time;

(d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained at the
Agora Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City; that the issuance of the writ was a matter of great
urgency because the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late afternoon of January
23, 2008, which was a Friday, and that if the Court would not act on the petition, the detainee
would certainly spend the night in jail;

(e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5 of the SC
Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be signed and verified; that he found
the petition sufficient in form and in substance;

(f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall immediately order the issuance of the
writ if on its face it ought to issue, he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioners
representative and their counsel, thus, the following information were elicited:

1) That the property of petitioners family, which is under their possession and Tanmalack
registered under TCT No. T-1627491, was intruded by some persons who wanted to fence the
area and put up improvements by constructing shanties thereon;

2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it resulted to heated arguments
and altercations which prompted him to go to the police station to report the incident and be
blottered;

3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the late afternoon of January 23,
2008 in order to air his complaint, the intruders came and introduced themselves as the owners of
the property;

4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these intruders and despite the
protestations of petitioner and his relatives, the police did not anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to
leave the police station; and,

5) That petitioners counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate release of his client from
police custody but to no avail;

(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the allegations in the
petition, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his judicial function, found that the same warranted
the issuance of the writ; the arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not present in
the area where the alleged incident happened, so that the statements of the complainants
(Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would be hearsay;

(h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a verified return pursuant to the
rules; during the summary hearing of the petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo who
appeared, the alleged complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the detention of the
petitioner were absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by the Court, gave the following answers:

1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be a verified return) on the complaint
considering that the petitioner was already released;

2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came first to the police station to complain,
followed by the person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict between the petitioner and
the other persons is on a property dispute, of which it was petitioner who is in possession; and

3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and neither did he detain him but only he
could not release the petitioner because of the complaint and for further evaluation.
(i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner brought heavily armed men with
him when he allegedly harassed the complainant.
(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner as well as the respondent Rojo
have arrived into an agreement that the writ be considered permanent.]

THE REPORT OF THE OCA

The OCA informed the Court that the case was already ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8,
2010, signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Raul
Bautista Villanueva. The Report likewise presented a brief factual background of the case.

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against the respondent judge be
dismissed for lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an evaluation which reads:

EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, as in the instant case, or of a private individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions
the writ covers only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of the right to life,
liberty and security because it covers both actual and threatened violations of such rights.

Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of amparo was
attended by irregularities. The detainees sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section 2(b)
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). Also, the petition was properly filed
with the Regional Trial Court where the act or omission was committed or where any of its
elements occurred.

Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was assigned is deemed to have complied with
his oath and judicial duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of amparo upon determination
that the right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was being violated or threatened to be violated. These is
no showing that respondent Judge, in granting the petition for a writ of amparo was motivated by
bad faith, ignominy or ill will, thus, herein complainants allegation that respondent Judges act was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and partiality, and grave disregard of the
rules, deserves scant consideration.

This Office agrees with respondent Judges observation that Rojos declaration not anymore to
contest the petition and that he (Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he
could not release the latter for further evaluation because of the complaint is an admission that he
deprived [or threatened to deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his liberty.

OUR RULING

We concur with the OCAs recommendation that the administrative complaint against the
respondent judge be dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of
Amparo in Tanmalacks favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more
closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.[3] The present case involves
concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature concerns that we have previously
ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.[4] In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[5] we held:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ
and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and
to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
was or is being committed.

In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by the respondent judge
since Tanmalacks petition is fatally defective in substance and content, as it does not allege that
he is a victim of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof. The
petition merely states that he is under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police stating that he
is not arrested but merely in custody.[6]

Whether the respondent judge could be held administratively liable for the error he
committed in the present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the negative.

Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative
functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
liability civil, criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as
long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the
rule that errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.[7]

In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an
issue in the present administrative case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have
been to file an appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello
III v. Diaz,[8] we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not complement,
supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their
administrative liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other available remedies
have been settled. We laid down the rationale for the rule in Flores v. Abesamis,[9] viz:

As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being
committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors
or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission
of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle)
include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for

new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be
deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or
neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or
a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be.

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions
against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies,
as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for
the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his
criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.

Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of criminal actions) as a substitute for or
supplement to the specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or
orders, on the theory that the Judges orders had caused him undue injury. This is impermissible,
as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that administrative or
criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without
pressure or influence from external forces or factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the
fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may
make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be
recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the
scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be
had only if there be a final declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the
manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence of malice or
bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgment
or order or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.[10]

We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as
the OCA did, that there is no evidence on record that supports the complainants allegation that the
issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance of the law. The
fact that the respondent judge and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not
justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality. Bias and partiality can never be
presumed and must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be
inferred from respondent judges issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on record
that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The complainants allegation of partiality will not
suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome the presumption that the
respondent judge dispensed justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.[11]

Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a
party. To hold a judge administratively accountable simply because he erred in his judgment has
never been the intent of the law; reasonable competence and good faith judgments, not complete
infallibility, are what the law requires.

The more significant issue in this case is the complainants charge of gross ignorance of the law
against the respondent judge.

A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the
law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and procedural
rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to
keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the
noble office and great privilege vested in him.[12]

We find that the respondent judges error does not rise to the level of gross ignorance of the law
that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the

Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely
three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that
time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel
aspects of the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot
be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute
gross ignorance of the law.

More importantly, for full liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found to be erroneous;
it must be established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar
motive.[13] In the present case, the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence that the
respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo.

We take this occasion, however, to remind the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence." A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and
be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to
be proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
Judges must not only render just, correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but
must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for
good judges are men who have mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in
accordance with law.[14] We mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge the need
to be more judicious and circumspect in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of
Amparo.
We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of proving
the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.[15] We cannot give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures
and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in this case, the administrative complaint
must be dismissed for lack of merit.[16]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative
complaint against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21,
Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498
03 December 2009

PONENTE: Brion, J.

PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police
Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
RESPONDENT: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA,
JR., Attorney-in-Fact



Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo

FACTS:

Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin
Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31,
2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House.
Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga.
When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for
Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong
to simply wait for Tagitis return.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim
studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean
Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed
against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon,
Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners), with the Court of
Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case
for hearing on January 7, 2008.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
enforced disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed
the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case
qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis
and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to
the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the
military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-
CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the
motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in
every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights, is indispensable in an
amparo petition.
Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations
is sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.
Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

ANSWERS:

No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security
through State or private party action.
Yes.
No.


1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature
and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of the
Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course
state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe
with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest
him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or
covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is
to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains
the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated
component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State
or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are
present.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with
the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove
the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents
must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The
rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under
circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and
the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The [characteristics of amparo
proceedings] namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level
of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in
court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the
equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo
situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to
observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the
protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner
needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo
petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable
case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced
disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional
rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided
the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision
in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law
and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free

administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter
which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as
to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a rule,
minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to
strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on
every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified
to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.

3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance,
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [The writ of
amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life,
liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr.
Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate
criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the
other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level
of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing
the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.

The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points
remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress
may promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the
considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as
the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule
should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction The
Amparo Rule expressly provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. We note that although the writ specifically covers enforced
disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of
the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House
of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and
resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee
instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided
the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to

carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the
matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these
criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to
enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power of the
Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances Even without the
benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional
mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the
constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly
procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal
protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in
addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural
rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on
actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can
make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating
public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional
rights.

DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7,
2008 under the following terms:

Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the
government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly
responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices
regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable
with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his assets in relation with the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the
monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the
PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further
investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and
action;
Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and
the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of
this Decision;
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the
Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision
were given to, and were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the
Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of
contempt from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation
constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the
circumstances of this case demand.

Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the
aforementioned directives particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are
specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City.

Yano v. Sanchez
G.R. No. 186640
11 February 2010


PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
LT. GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A.
VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army
RESPONDENTS: CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA MEDINA



Supreme Court: Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and
Inspection
Original Action for Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued an Order which is
the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

FACTS:

On December 28, 2007, Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before the Supreme Court a petition for
issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen.
Esperon, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

On January 2, 2008, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen.
Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before the Court of Appeals (CA), which will hear and
decide the case which was eventually re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A.

Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008 to include Marciana Medina (Marciana) and to
implead other military officers including Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional
respondents.

In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez
(Nicolas) and Heherson Medina (Heherson) were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin,
Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the wives of
Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home, heard gunshots and saw
armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; and that that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day,
Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers,
pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains.

Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded to search at the
Capas Station of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Detachment of the 71st Infantry
Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army) in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and Camp of the

Bravo Company of the Armys 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to no
avail. They likewise alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas
and Heherson at the Camp of the Bravo Company sometime in 2006. Hence, on 21 December
2006, they filed a case before the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which endorsed the same
to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.

In the amended petition dated January 14, 2008, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ
of Amparo, the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of
certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the
rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

In their Return, the military officers mainly denied having custody of the victims and posited that the
respondents herein failed to substantiate their claim.

In a Decision dated 17 September 2008, the CA absolved the impleaded military officers on the
ground that the petitioners have not adequately and convincingly established any direct or indirect
link between the individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson.
Notwithstanding, it granted petitioners the following reliefs:

Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any
military camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City,
within reasonable working hours of any day except when the military camp is on red alert status.
Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine
Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay
to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas
and Heherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written
report to this Court within three (3) months from notice.

The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration mainly arguing that since
respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition by substantial evidence, the CA should
not have granted those reliefs. This motion was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated March 3,
2009.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the failure of the respondents herein to present substantial evidence to prove
that the public officials failed to observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duty is
a ground for the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Whether or not the grant of the provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule
is proper in cases where the public respondents were absolved of the disappearance of the alleged
victims.

ANSWERS:

No.
No.


1. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

Effect of failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duty [T]he requirement for a government official or employee to observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected
to be taken in safeguarding every citizens constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of

cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the public
official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic
grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or
her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public official
provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certai n interim
reliefs.

2. PROPRIETY OF PROVISIONAL RELIEFS IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

The interim or provisional remedies provided in Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to
assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition Section 14 of
the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to,
inter alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence,
viz: x x x These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order the
inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into the
disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs
granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could
not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals insofar as it grants the
following reliefs :

Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel, Tarlac City, any
military camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm, Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City,
within reasonable working hours of any day except when the military camp is on red alert status.
Thorough and Impartial Investigation for the appropriate Investigating Unit of the Philippine
Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay
to conduct their respective investigation of all angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas
and Heherson and to immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written
report to this Court within three (3) months from notice.

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