The Subject

Independent and unconstrained parliamentary oversight

requires that there be a clear separaton of powers and
checks and balances partcularly between the legislature
and the executve. Where the boundaries are difuse and
the executve is clearly and overwhelmingly more powerful
than the legislature in terms of informaton and material
resources, it is unlikely that parliament, let alone oversight
commitees, will be capable of sustaining a strong critcal
stand against the government
1
. With respect to Parliaments
Budgetary Oversight functon under such an environment,
a compelling case for establishing a Parliamentary Budget
Ofce can be made. A Parliamentary budget ofce is an
independent non-partsan entty, totally separate from the
executve, which provides analytcal support to the legislature
to help inform their decisions when examining the annual
budget and other policy proposals presented for debate by
the executve. The provision of this alternatve view will goes
a long way to strengthen Parliaments budgetary oversight
functon where the alternatve budget functon is less, or
possibly non-existent.
Introducton
Parliament is responsible for playing a key role in delivering
upon democratc governance through ensuring transparency
and accountability from the Government. Democratc
governance requires that a government be capable,
accountable, partcipatory and responsive. Parliamentary
oversight contributes immensely to this requirement
by playing the crucial role of efectvely monitoring and
reviewing the legislatve, policy, and fscal administraton
by the government on behalf of the citzenry. With regard
to fscal oversight, actng upon the natonal budget is the
appropriate channel through which recommendatons
resultng from the parliaments budgetary oversight functon
can be efectvely implemented. For this to be achieved
however, parliaments oversight of the budget process has
to be fully efectve or, if not, strengthened by the support of
a parliamentary budget ofce.
This brief gives a general overview of the performance of
parliament in playing its crucial oversight role, partcularly
its budgetary oversight functon, and how this role could be
reinforced by the establishment of a parliamentary budget
ofce.
Ratonale for Parliaments involvement in
the budget process
The budget process should be a key component of parliaments
and parliamentarians functons. This is because government
budgets are about the allocaton of inadequate fnancial
resources that afect diferently the lives of the citzenry who
parliamentarians in a democratc state represent. Budgets
underscore the interacton between the executve and the
legislature in providing the public with
2
:
(a) informaton on the Appropriaton Bills;
(b) reports on accountng, fnancial control and government
performance;
(c) coherent laws and regulatons that govern fnancial
transactons; and
(d) comprehensive reports on public audit and legislatve
scrutny.
In Tanzania, however, the government ranking in respect of
its performance in budget transparency and parliamentary
oversight contnues to be low. Parliament does not play an
actve role in the budget formulaton and oversight processes.
This is briefy expounded under the Government ranking in
budget transparency and oversight heading further below.
Budgetary oversight by Parliament:
An Overview
Parliamentary oversight is about keeping an eye on the
actvites of the executve and holding the executve to
account on behalf of the countrys citzens in view of the fact
that it is the executve that puts the inadequate resources
to use to provide for the citzenry
3
. Parliaments oversight of
the budget process involves monitoring and review of the
entre process including the broad fscal challenges facing
government, expenditure controls and budgetary tradeofs
that afect present and future spending. On the overall,
the budgetary oversight functon is part of a checks - and -
balances system that ensures that there is accountability in
the utlizaton of inadequate fnancial resources.
In Tanzania, like in many other developing countries,
the parliaments budgetary oversight functon is seen as
almost inefectve. Parliaments involvement in the budget
process, with the Commitee on Finance and Economy
seldom engaging efectvely, is largely a routne scanning
and rubber stamping occasion. Presently, Parliaments slight
involvement in the budget comprises:
Review of the budget estmates by the commitee for
fnance and Economy using informaton from the Ministry
of Finance and other executve agencies;
Moving of a moton to pass a budget proposal by the
Minister for Finance in a plenary session of Parliament;
Supportng of the Ministers moton by the fnance and
economy commitee;
Parliamentary plenary debate on the natonal budget,
and
Strengthening Parliaments
Budgetary Oversight Function:
The case for a Budget Ofce
Approval of the budget within 40 days with more or less
no amendments.
Notwithstanding the above involvement, the efectveness
of the debates is constrained by the following reasons:
Parliamentarians on
the overall lack the
capacity in terms of
appropriate technical
skills to efectvely
partcipate in the budget
process. This partly
owes to the fact that
our Parliamentarians are
of various professional
standing and
backgrounds including
law, engineering,
medicine, social
sciences, educaton,
entertainment and
others. While some
possess the expertse, others do not and would be new to
the process. The same parliamentarians are also appointed
to parliamentary commitees which consequently lack the
capacity and expertse to provide parliamentarians with
the systematc support in policy analysis that they need
to foster efectve oversight
4
. This is further weakened by
the traditonal show of disinterest during budget sessions
and the presumptuous mentality that budget formulaton
and presentaton belong to the executve. Evidence of this
is the weak atendance of parliamentarians during sector
budget sessions
5
. The result of this is that while a few
parliamentarians are able to engage in policy debate at a
general level, they are unable to efectvely engage with the
executve on maters of the budget.
Inadequate informaton for a proper analysis also hinders
the efectve partcipaton of parliamentarians in the budget
process. Parliamentarians are handicapped in this regard
unless the policy area happens to be one of their own
expertse
6
. Even with the informaton they get, there is
never enough tme for them to digest and develop credible
arguments for debate. The practce is for government to
overwhelm parliamentarians with informaton at the last
minutes such that they are made to submit to policies not
because they agree with them but because of ignorance. The
result of this is to follow the routne scanning and rubber-
stamping as have been other budget sessions.
Coupled with the above is the wrong mentality of the
oversight role being ofen seen as that of oppositon partes
alone, designed to police and expose maladministraton and
corrupton
7
. This is so because parliament is largely divided
along party lines with the ruling party having majority
representaton. Parliamentarians from the ruling party rarely
support motons moved from the oppositon side regardless
of whether they would be rightly seeking justfcatons from
the executve.
Besides the above, reforms around the area of the budget
have only targeted the executve and processes undertaken
therefrom. Standard budget reforms, transparency on the
overall, expenditure control mechanisms and other reform
initatves within the budget cycle have only targeted the
executve ignoring the important role that the legislature
would play in the process.
These are some of the reasons behind why efectve
executon of parliaments budgetary oversight functon by
the parliament is not seen to happen.
Government ranking on budget transparency
and oversight
Tanzanias ranking in the Open Budget Surveys of 2006, 2008
and 2010 has contnuously been low. An initatve of the
Internatonal Budget Partnership, the Open Budget Survey,
from which is derived the index, is a comprehensive analysis
and survey that evaluates whether central governments give
the public access to budget informaton and opportunites
to partcipate in the budget process across 85 countries.
Tanzania scored 48%, 35% and 45% in the 2006, 2008 and
2010 surveys respectvely, as one of the few countries which
provide some level of informaton on governments budget
and fnancial actvites during the course of the budget
year. The survey also examines the ability of legislatures to
hold their governments accountable. As per the 2010 Open
Budget Index, the parliaments budgetary oversight was
rated weak because:
Parliament does not have full powers to change the
executves budget proposal at the start of the budget
year;
Parliament does not have sufcient tme to discuss and
approve the executves budget proposal citng receipt
of the budget in less than six weeks before the start of
the fnancial year; and
Parliament does not hold open discussions at which the
public can partcipate.
In the spirit of good governance, there is a need for
government to improve parliamentary oversight of the
budget process and have it more involved throughout the
budget cycle. Improving parliamentary involvement in
the budget process augments the legislatures oversight
by creatng an incentve to exercise power vis-a-vie the
executve while enhancing its technical capacity. In our case,
strengthening Parliamentary oversight requires reforms
targeted at reinvigoratng Parliaments budgetary oversight
functon. Budgetary reforms that have happened in Nigeria,
Ghana, South Africa, Kenya and Uganda, among others, have
revived their respectve Parliaments oversight functon of
the budget process by the establishment of an independent
entty within the legislature - an entty that examines the
draf annual budget proposed by the executve and provides
analytcal support to parliamentarians for alternatve budget
proposals. The entty in reference is known as a parliamentary
budget ofce.
What is a Parliamentary Budget Ofce?
A Parliamentary Budget Ofce (PBO) is an independent
non-partsan entty within the legislature that examines the
draf annual budget proposed by the executve and provides
analytcal support to parliamentarians to be able to queston
the proposal in queston and enable them to propose
alternatve budget proposals
8
. Its key role is to produce
objectve budgetary, fscal and programmatc informaton
for legislators to be able to contribute, interpret, review
FACT BOX
Parliament does not have the
power to amend the budget in
Tanzania or to reallocate funds.
Although Parliament can refuse to
adopt the budget presented by the
executve, the consequences of this
step are profound: the President
has the consttutonal power to
dissolve Parliament in response.
Source: Understanding the Budget
Process in Tanzania A Civil Society
Guide (2008) HakiElimu & Policy
Forum
and make concrete judgments regarding budget proposals
hence efectvely exercising their oversight functons. The
ratonale for the establishment of this special ofce is based
on the fact that legislators need this source of informaton
and analysis that is independent from the executve to
efectvely execute its budgetary oversight functons
9
.
The establishment of this unit within the parliament will
assist Members of Parliament in understanding the budget
process, the broad fscal challenges facing government, and
expenditure control and budgetary tradeofs that afect
present and future spending. The efectve operaton of this
ofce will go a long way to enhancing good governance by
helping enhance greater transparency and accountability
and further strengthen the technical ability of the parliament
in its budget negotatons with the executve.
Role of the Budget Ofce:
The core functons of a budget ofce are
10
:
1. Prepare economic forecasts that are independent from
the executve
2. Make baseline estmates of revenues and expenditures
3. Analyse budget proposals submited by the executve
4. Develop budget projectons
5. Examine proposals for new programs
Other functons that could also be undertaken by a PBO are
11
:
Undertaking cost-beneft analyses of both executve and
legislatve policy proposals,
Prepare spending-cut optons for legislatve
consideraton,
Analyzing the costs of regulatons and mandates of local
authorites,
Conductng more in-depth and longer-term economic
analyses,
Analyzing the impact of proposed and actual tax polices,
and
Producing policy briefs that explain complex budget
proposals and concepts.
Publicatons from a PBO should be made available to the
public, media, civil society organizatons, interest groups and
citzens to whom the government is answerable.
Distncton from Parliamentary Commitees
Budget ofces are distnct from parliamentary commitees
in that
12
:
The scope of work of commitees is narrowed down to
issues the commitees are referred to by parliament.
Commitees are mostly inherently partsan bodies
because they are comprised of Parliamentarians with
politcal afliatons instead of objectve, independent
budget ofce analysts.
Budget ofces typically specialize in fscal and fnancial
analysis that contributes to the adopton of the budget
and to developing budgetary implicatons of a broad
range of legislaton as opposed to a broad range of issues
that commitees may be given the mandate to cover
regardless of the fact that the output contributes to the
budget or not.
Insttutonalizing the Parliamentary Budget
Ofce
The establishment of an independent non-partsan and
objectve PBO requires that the following aspects be taken
into consideraton
13
:
Stafng: Owing to the workload that a PBO handles, ideally
the ofce should be stafed with high caliber personnel
who at least possess a postgraduate degree in economics,
fnance, taxaton, data analysis, public administraton and
policy, and have a broad understanding of the economic
and fscal issues that afect the countrys budget. It will
also add a lot of value if these have undergone training or
have conducted signifcant post-graduate work. Part-tme
employees could also be taken on to assist the full-tme
employees whenever the workload increases. To strengthen
the pool from which to atract PBO staf, pay levels of staf
should refect remuneratons paid to experts in comparable
professional capacites.
Locaton: A PBO would be best placed as a unit internal
to the legislature. This proximity has the advantage of
the ofce being able to respond in a tmely manner to
parliamentarians inquiries as well as the fact that it be seen
as a unit established to support the parliament in carrying
out its oversight functon.
Funding: A PBO will functon very well with efcient
fnancial resources. This owes to the workload that has
to be handled by the unit, the fact that its actvites run
frequently throughout the year involving a lot of research
and informaton gathering, and also the fact that the PBO
has to be well equipped with the requisite ofce equipment
in terms of hardware and sofware suitable for the day-to-
day tasks handled at the ofce.
Legal Establishment: A PBO should have its existence and
core functons codifed in law so that it is not easily shut
down or changed to suit some politcal purpose. Such law
should also serve to facilitate PBOs access to informaton by
compelling the executve to provide budgetary informaton
to the legislature in tme. In additon, the legislaton should
also provide for comprehensive budget reforms designed to
emphasize the importance as well as strengthen the role of
the legislature within the budget process.
Non-partsan atributes: For a PBO to be efectve and
objectve, it should be non-partsan in its operatons and
so should the staf. The law establishing the PBO should
also emphasize that the PBO serves all the partes in the
legislature. This atribute will enable it deliver informaton
that is objectve rather than politcal. It is also advisable that,
so as to be balanced, PBO should serve commitees rather
than individuals who would be seeking partal interests.
Role of Parliamentarians: Having a PBO operatng efectvely
hinges on the willingness of legislators to take up an actve
role in budgetng and their recogniton of the fact that the
budget ofce plays an essental part in helping them to
undertake that role. Parliamentarians ought to realize that
as representatves of the people, if they are to be more
accountable and efectve in their oversight role, the budget
is one of the most important tools through which they can
exert infuence on the economic and social development
policies of the country.
A useful case of an operatonal budget ofce:
The Ugandan Budget Ofce
14
The Ugandan Budget Ofce started operatng afer the
enactment of the Budget Act in 2001. It has since been
operatng efectvely and has helped foster accountability
through facilitatng the efectve executon of parliaments
oversight of the budget process. Amongst the roles it
contnues to play are:
PBO analyses monthly reports submited to it and
proposes diferent ways in which the tax base could be
widened. It has produced reports on identfcaton of
possible areas where reducton in taxes could trigger
increased consumpton and therefore more revenue
PBO monitors reports no disbursements from donors
in order to point out possible shortalls that would
require government to reprioritze its expenditures.
This has improved the relevant commitees capacity to
understand the loan agreements between government
and donors. Parliament no longer passes loan
agreements automatcally. Parliament is now in positon
to request government to renegotate provisions that
are found to be unfavorable.
PBO reconciles shortalls with total budget performance
and brings notce of discrepancies to the relevant sector
commitee. PBO produces quarterly budget performance
reports based on informaton collected from the treasury
as well as other sectors. This has enabled parliament to
follow general budget performance and specifc sector
performance through out the year.
Since the PBO was established, parliament is able to
follow the implicatons of macro economic policies,
receive independent informaton on poverty trends and
verify fgures given by government on economic growth.
Parliament is now able to debate from an informed
positon and where necessary recommend alternatve
approaches to government.
On issues that are budget and economy related, at
the end of the fnancial year, the PBO also produces a
record of Parliaments recommendatons to Government
to which government is supposed to respond or
implement, showing where they have not complied
and reasons why they have not complied. This has
greatly improved parliaments oversight role and has
enhanced governments accountability to parliament
and consequently the accountability of parliamentarians
to their consttuents.
In efectvely undertaking its roles, the PBO has been able to
achieve the following:
1) Demystfcaton of the budget process. Budget
discussions are livelier inside and outside parliament.
Parliament commitee meetngs are now open to
the press and public, which makes budget related
issues more understood by most of the public hence
promotng transparency on the overall.
2) Partcipaton of MPs in the process has enhanced
credibility of the budget as well as a feeling of owning
the process.
3) Parliament is now able to respond more rapidly to
problems because there is greater fow of informaton
and greater scrutny. Government is more mindful of
making mistakes in implementng the budget.
4) Donors have more confdence in the process than ever
before.
5) Overall increase in accountability. Scrutny of the
executves estmates has enhanced executve
accountability. The executve is more careful in and
precise in preparing their estmates and reports. There
is greater discipline in public spending as a result of the
efectve operaton of the budget ofce.
The non-partsan and professional nature of this unit
has enabled the PBO to perform to the satsfacton of the
parliament as well as the executve. The executve branch
now recognizes and appreciates that the parliament is able
to deal with budget issues on equal footng.
Conclusion
The weakness of parliaments budgetary oversight functon
impacts upon accountability and good governance, which
ultmately impact on eforts directed at socio-economic
development. In light of this, it is imperatve that government
rescues the situaton by strengthening parliaments
budgetary oversight functon. The potental value added to
parliaments budgetary oversight functon by the operaton
of an efectve, objectve non-partsan and commited budget
ofce cannot be over emphasized. It is tme that government
recognizes the importance of the role of parliament in the
budget process and establishes an independent non-partsan
objectve and commited budget ofce that will support the
parliament in its budgetary oversight role. The cumulatve
efects of this will go a long way to fostering accountability
within government which in-turn impact positvely on
economic development.
Notes
(Endnotes)
1 Mwesiga Baregu, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF DEFENCE
AND SECURITY IN TANZANIAS MULTIPARTY PARLIAMENT,
www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/guardiansaug04/Baregu.pdf
2 The Report of a Commonwealth Parliamentary Associaton
Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya, 10th -14th December, 2001,
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF FINANCE AND THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS, www.cpaafrica.org/.../Informaton.../
Publicatons/...Publicatons/parliamentary%20oversight%20
of%20fnance%20and%20the%20b
3 Alan Hudson, ODI and Claire Wren, One World Trust,
PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHENING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/103.pdf
4 Dr. Anthony Tsekpo (Parliamentary Centre) and Dr. Alan
Hudson (ODI), PARLIAMENTARY STRENGTHENING AND THE
PARIS PRINCIPLES TANZANIA CASE STUDY www.odi.org.uk/
resources/download/3375.pdf
5 Evarist Kagaruki, An artcle enttled ABSENTEE
PARLIAMENTARIANS in The Citzen Newspaper of Sunday 4
th

July, 2010 ( as seen on TV as well).
6 Dr. Anthony Tsekpo and Dr. Alan Hudson op. cit.
7 Hugh Corder, Saras Jagwanth, Fred Soltau, REPORT ON
PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY, www.
pmg.org.za/bills/oversight&account.htm
8 Jefrey D. Straussman, Ari Renoni, ESTABLISHING A
PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICE AS AN ELEMENT OF GOOD
GOVERNANCE, www.cid.suny.edu/.../Straussman-Renoni%20
CAP%20Note.pdf
9 Jefrey D. Straussman, Ari Renoni ibid.
10 Jefrey D. Straussman, Ari Renoni ibid.
11 John K. Johnson and Rick Stapenhurst, LEGISLATIVE BUDGET
OFFICES: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, www.ndi.org/.../
Legislatve%20Oversight%20and%20Budgetng%20- %20
Chapter%2010.pdf
12 Jefrey D. Straussman, Ari Renoni op. cit.
13 John K. Johnson and Rick Stapenhurst op. cit.
14 Hon. Beatrice Birungi Kiraso, ESTABLISHMENT OF
UGANDAS PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICE AND
PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET COMMITTEE, (books.google.co.tz/
books?isbn=082137611X)